People v.
Formigones
FACTS:
In the month of November, 1946, the defendant Abelardo
Formigones was living on his farm in Bahao, Libmanan,
municipality of Sipocot, Camarines Sur, with his wife, Julia
Agricola, and his five children. From there they went to live in
the house of his half-brother, Zacarias Formigones, in the barrio
of Binahian of the same municipality of Sipocot, to find
employment as harvesters of palay. Late in the afternoon, Julia
was sitting at the head of the stairs of the house. The accused,
without any previous quarrel or provocation whatsoever, took
his bolo from the wall of the house and stabbed his wife, Julia,
in the back, the blade penetrating the right lung and causing a
severe hemorrhage resulting in her death not long thereafter.
The blow sent Julia toppling down the stairs to the ground,
immediately followed by her husband Abelardo who, taking her
up in his arms, carried her up the house, laid her on the floor of
the living room and then lay down beside her. In this position he
was found by the people who came in response to the shouts
for help made by his eldest daughter, who witnessed and
testified to the stabbing of her mother by her father. Defendant
admitted that he killed, motive was admittedly of jealousy
because according to his statement he used to have quarrels
with his wife for the reason that he often saw her in the company
of his brother Zacarias.
Investigated by the Constabulary, defendant Abelardo signed a
written statement, Exhibit D, wherein he admitted that he killed
The motive was admittedly of jealousy because according to his
statement he used to have quarrels with his wife for the reason
that he often saw her in the company of his brother Zacarias;
that he suspected that the two were maintaining illicit relations
because he noticed that his had become indifferent to him
(defendant).
At the trial of the case in the Court of First Instance, the
defendant entered a plea of not guilty, but did not testify. His
counsel presented the testimony of two guards of the provincial
jail where Abelardo was confined to the effect that his conduct
there was rather strange and that he behaved like an insane
person; that sometimes he would remove his clothes and go
stark naked in the presence of his fellow prisoners; that at times
he would remain silent and indifferent to his surroundings; that
he would refused to take a bath and wash his clothes until
forced by the prison authorities; and that sometimes he would
sing in chorus with his fellow prisoners, or even alone by himself
without being asked; and that once when the door of his cell
was opened, he suddenly darted from inside into the prison
compound apparently in an attempt to regain his liberty.
He appealed based on the theory that the appellant is an
imbecile and therefore exempt from criminal liability under
article 12 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE: Is the appellant imbecile and covered by Article 12 of
the RPC?
RULING:
Dr. Francisco Gomez, who examined him, it was his opinion that
Abelardo was suffering only from feeblemindedness and not
imbecility and that he could distinguish right from wrong.
In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within
the meaning of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code so as to be
exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely
of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of
committing the crime. The Supreme Court of Spain held that in
order that this exempting circumstances may be taken into
account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be
deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own
acts; that he acts without the least discernment;1 that there be
a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there be a
total deprivation of freedom of the will. For this reason, it was
held that the imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission
of the act should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or
freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his mental
faculties does not exclude imputability.
The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness
cannot be equaled to imbecility or insanity.The allegation of
insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive
evidence that the defendant had previously lost his reason or
was demented, a few moments prior to or during the
perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a
normal condition. Acts penalized by law are always reputed to
be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a person acted
unconsciously, in order to relieve him from liability, on the basis
of his mental condition, unless his insanity and absence of will
are proved.
As to the strange behaviour of the accused during his
confinement, assuming that it was not feigned to stimulate
insanity, it may be attributed either to his being feebleminded or
eccentric, or to a morbid mental condition produced by remorse
at having killed his wife.
After a careful study of the record, we are convinced that the
appellant is not an imbecile. According to the evidence, during
his marriage of about 16 years, he has not done anything or
conducted himself in anyway so as to warrant an opinion that
he was or is an imbecile. He regularly and dutifully cultivated his
farm, raised five children, and supported his family and even
maintained in school his children of school age, with the fruits of
his work. Occasionally, as a side line he made copra. And a man
who could feel the pangs of jealousy to take violent measure to
the extent of killing his wife whom he suspected of being
unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so he was vindicating
his honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile. Whether or
not his suspicions were justified, is of little or no import. The fact
is that he believed her faithless.
But to show that his feeling of jealousy had some color of
justification and was not a mere product of hallucination and
aberrations of a disordered mind as that an imbecile or a lunatic,
there is evidence to the following effect. In addition to the
observations made by appellant in his written statement Exhibit
D, it is said that when he and his wife first went to live in the
house of his half brother, Zacarias Formigones, the latter was
living with his grandmother, and his house was vacant.
However, after the family of Abelardo was settled in the house,
Zacarias not only frequented said house but also used to sleep
there nights. All this may have aroused and even partly
confirmed the suspicions of Abelardo, at least to his way of
thinking.
The appellant has all the sympathies of the Court. He seems to
be one of those unfortunate beings, simple, and even
feebleminded, whose faculties have not been fully developed.
His action in picking up the body of his wife after she fell down
to the ground, dead, taking her upstairs, laying her on the floor,
and lying beside her for hours, shows his feeling of remorse at
having killed his loved one though he thought that she has
betrayed him. Although he did not exactly surrender to the
authorities, still he made no effort to flee and compel the police
to hunt him down and arrest him. In his written statement he
readily admitted that he killed his wife, and at the trial he made
no effort to deny or repudiate said written statement, thus saving
the government all the trouble and expense of catching him, and
insuring his conviction.
Although the deceased was struck in the back, we are not
prepared to find that the aggravating circumstance of treachery
attended the commission of the crime. It seems that the
prosecution was not intent or proving it. At least said
aggravating circumstance was not alleged in the complaint
either in the justice of the peace court or in the Court of First
Instance. We are inclined to give him the benefit of the doubt
and we therefore declined to find the existence of this
aggravating circumstance. On the other hand, the fact that the
accused is feebleminded warrants the finding in his favor of the
mitigating circumstance provided for in either paragraph 8 or
paragraph 9 of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, namely
that the accused is "suffering some physical defect which thus
restricts his means of action, defense, or communication with
his fellow beings," or such illness "as would diminish the
exercise of his will power." To this we may add the mitigating
circumstance in paragraph 6 of the same article, — that of
having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have
produced passion or obfuscation. The accused evidently killed
his wife in a fit of jealousy.
In conclusion, we find the appellant guilty of parricide and we
hereby affirm the judgment of the lower court with the
modification that the appellant will be credited with one-half of
any preventive imprisonment he has undergone. Appellant will
pay costs.
Following the attitude adopted and the action taken by this same
court in the two cases above cited, and believing that the
appellant is entitled to a lighter penalty, this case should be
brought to the attention of the Chief Executive who, in his
discretion may reduce the penalty to that next lower to reclusion
perpetua to death or otherwise apply executive clemency in the
manner he sees fit.
People v. Isla
Facts:
This is an appeal from the December 17, 2010 Decision1ςrνll
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 28761, which
affirmed the April 26, 2004 Decision2ςrνll of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 98, Quezon City (RTC), finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Rape and Frustrated
Murder.
Criminal Case No. Q-97-72078
The undersigned accuses EDWIN ISLA Y ROSSELL of the
crime of Frustrated Murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of July, 1997, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused, with intent to kill, with treachery
and with evident premeditation, with abuse of superior strength,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and employ personal violence upon the person of
AAA3ςrνll by then and there stabbing her with a kitchen knife,
hitting her twice below the chest, thereby inflicting upon said
AAA serious and mortal wounds, the offender thus performing
all the acts of execution which would produce death, which,
however, was not produced by reason of cause independent of
the will of the perpetrator, that is, the timely medical intervention,
to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.
Criminal Case No. Q-97-72079
The undersigned accuses EDWIN ISLA Y ROSSELL, of the
crime of Rape, committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of July, 1997, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused by means of force and
intimidation, to wit: by then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously undress her and put himself on top of her, and
thereafter have carnal knowledge with the undersigned
complainant against her will and without her consent.
During the trial, the prosecution presented three (3) witnesses;
namely: complainant AAA; Dr. Ma. Cristina Freyra (Dr. Freyra),
the chief of the medico-legal division of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory; and Dr. Reynaldo Perez (Dr.
Perez) of the East Avenue Medical Center, AAAs attending
physician.
According to AAAs account, on July 21, 1997, at around 3:00
oclock in the afternoon, she was inside her rented house
together with her two (2) children, aged 1 years old and 9
months old, respectively. She then noticed that accused Edwin
Isla (Isla) was standing by the door of her kitchen. He asked her
what time her landlady would be arriving and she answered that
she had no idea. Thereafter, she opened the door of the kitchen,
hoping that passersby would see him inside the house. After
fifteen (15) minutes, she was startled when he suddenly poked
a knife on her neck and pulled her inside the bedroom. By this
time, she noticed that she had already closed the window and
the door of the living room. She pleaded and begged for mercy
but to no avail. She was warned not to shout or resist otherwise
she would be stabbed.
Inside the bedroom, she was made to lie down on the floor
because there was no bed. Isla placed himself on top of her and
then he removed her upper clothing. He raised her bra,
exposing her breasts and then kissed them. Eventually, he
made her spread her legs and had carnal knowledge with her.
While he was committing the dastardly act, she noticed a knife
pointed at her. She also informed the trial court that during the
whole ordeal, her children were present and witnessed
everything.
When Isla stood up after raping her, she noticed that the knife
he was holding was already bloodstained. At this point, she
found out that she was stabbed with the knife. She tried to take
hold of the knife while shouting for help. In response, Isla struck
her the second time, this time, under her lower left breast. She
also sustained a wound on her palm while trying to disarm him.
Then the knife fell to the floor. It was at this moment that she
was able to get hold of it and she threw it outside through a
broken window in the room. Thereafter, Isla scampered out of
the house through the backdoor.
In a little while, a neighbor came knocking at the door and was
able to see AAAs condition. She was taken to the East Avenue
Medical Center (EAMC) for medical attention and was confined
there for five (5) days.
At the hospital, Dr. Freyra conducted an examination on AAA
upon the request of the station commander of the PNP Lagro
Police Station. The stab wounds required medical attendance
of not less than 30 days. An examination of AAAs sexual organ
showed congestions and abrasion in the labia minora and
yielded negative result on the presence of spermatozoa.
Dr. Perez concluded that the stab wounds were severe and fatal
which could have led to AAAs death had it not been for the
timely medical attendance.
Isla never denied that he raped AAA on July 21, 1997. Invoking
the defense of insanity, he testified that before the incident, he
and AAA had an illicit relationship for about two months until
they broke up. He had to use a knife to be able to have sexual
intercourse with her. It was the first time that he and AAA had
sex. After raping her, he admitted stabbing AAA twice, first on
her left breast and then on her lower right breast "for reason he
cannot understand."6ςrνll He also punched her several times
when she attempted to grab the knife from him.
Dr. Villacorta testified that Isla was suffering from a major
depressive disorder with psychotic features; that he manifested
psychosis on account of his hallucinations, poor impulse
control, poor judgment, and low frustration tolerance; and that
he exhibited such behavioral pattern immediately prior to being
jailed. Dr. Villacorta, however, could not say with definite
certainty or not Isla was suffering from such mental disorder on
July 21, 1997 as there was no examination conducted on Isla
on the said date.7ςrνll
To corroborate Dr. Villacortas findings, Dr. Gomez was
presented. After a thorough interview and psychiatric testing on
Isla, she likewise observed that Isla was suffering from a major
depressive disorder which impaired his mental faculties. She
said that his psychosis could have been existing prior to or
about July 21, 1997 but again, like Dr. Villacorta, she opined
that such finding could not be conclusive because of lack of
information from other informants during that time.
RTC Ruling
RTC convicted Isla of the crimes of rape and frustrated murder.
It did not give credence to his defense of insanity because it
noted that Isla committed the crimes charged during a lucid
interval. He knew that what he was doing was unlawful. There
was no indication that he was deprived of reason or discernment
and freedom of will when he committed all the acts attending
the commission of the crime.
CA Ruling
CA denied the appeal and affirmed the RTC decision which
found Isla to have acted with discernment when he committed
the crimes. Isla exactly knew that what he was doing was evil
so much so that he had to employ cunning means, by discreetly
closing the windows and the door of the house and by resorting
to threats and violence, to ensure the consummation of his
dastardly deed. The fact that he scampered away after AAA was
able to take the knife from him, would only show that he fully
understood that he committed a crime for which he could be
held liable.
Held:
This Court is not convinced with Islas defense.
Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides for one of
the circumstances which will exempt one from criminal liability
which is when the perpetrator of the act was an imbecile or
insane, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval. This
circumstance, however, is not easily available to an accused as
a successful defense. Insanity is the exception rather than the
rule in the human condition. Under Article 800 of the Civil Code,
the presumption is that every human is sane. Anyone who
pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden
of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. It is in the
nature of confession and avoidance. An accused invoking
insanity admits to have committed the crime but claims that he
or she is not guilty because of insanity. The testimony or proof
of an accused's insanity must, however, relate to the time
immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of
the offense with which he is charged.13ςrνll
In the case at bench, the defense failed to overcome the
presumption of sanity. The respective testimonies of Dr.
Villacorta and Dr. Gomez of the NCMH, as qualified expert
witnesses, failed to support its claim of insanity. As observed by
the CA, the mental examination on Isla taken four to six years
after the incident happened in July 1997, in effect, showed that
it could not be concluded with certainty that he was suffering
from such psychosis immediately before or simultaneous to the
commission of the crimes. The expert witnesses themselves
opined that their findings were not conclusive as to whether Isla
was insane on that fateful day of July 21, 1997, as no
examination was made on said day or for lack of information
from other informants during that time.14ςrνll
This Court also agrees with the observation of the RTC as
affirmed by the CA that Isla acted with discernment as can be
deduced from his acts before, during and after the commission
of the crimes with which he was charged. The RTC wrote:
“The overt acts committed by the accused are attributed to a
criminal mind, not a lunatic. There is no indication whatsoever
that he was completely deprived of reason or discernment and
freedom of will when he stood for a while by the door of
complainants house, then entered it, toyed with a disconnected
telephone set, and cunningly poked a knife at complainants
neck and dragged her inside the room where he raped her. The
fact that he first discreetly closed the door and the window
before he approached and poked a knife at complainant, then,
as he laid on top of her, ordered her to undress, kissed her
breast, separated apart her legs with his own legs, and satisfied
his lust, all the while holding a knife with his right hand poked at
complainants body, are calculated means to ensure
consummation of his lewd design. These are by no means the
workings of an imbecile, but by one engulfed by lust.”
In the case of People vs. Rafanan, Jr., this Court has held that
the defense of insanity may be accepted as an exempting
circumstance on the test of cognition, which requires a complete
deprivation of intelligence, not only of the will, in committing the
criminal act.
If Isla had become insane after the commission of the crime,
such fact does not alter the situation and the Courts ruling is the
same. His defense still fails considering that he was not insane
during the commission of the acts charged. Any problem
regarding his present mental condition should be dealt with
administratively.
With respect to the stabbings, it appears that Isla committed two
acts. The first was while he was ravishing AAA. The Court
considers this and the rape as one continuous act, the stabbing
being necessary, as far as he was concerned, for the successful
perpetration of the crime. When he testified, Isla claimed that he
had to use the knife so he could have sexual intercourse with
her.
The second stabbing took place after consummation of the rape
act. According to AAA, after her defilement, she noticed the
knife bloodied and she tried to wrest it from him. In their
struggle, she was stabbed under her lower left breast but she
was able to force Isla to drop the knife. At this point, Isla was
able to escape through the backdoor. This second stabbing is a
separate and distinct offense as it was not a necessary means
to commit the rape. It was intended to do away with her life.
Thus, it has been written, "Where a girl was raped and then
strangled to death, the crimes are the separate crimes of rape
and homicide, not complex.
The Court, however, finds itself unable to agree that the second
crime committed was frustrated murder. In the information, it
was alleged that the stabbing was committed with treachery,
evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength. There is,
however, nothing in the records of the case that would show the
presence of the said qualifying circumstances.
For said reasons, the crime charged should have been
frustrated homicide only. Consequently the penalty should be
changed.
People v. Gimena
Facts:
The defendant Juan N. Gimena is charged with the crime of
parricide. It appears from the evidence that on the morning of
April 9, 1930, in the municipality of Ronda, Province of Cebu,
the defendant helped his father-in-law, Gregorio Diana, in
cleaning bamboo. After having finished the cleaning he went
home and upon arriving there he found his wife Crispina Diana
and a child 2 weeks of age sleeping together on the floor.
Shortly afterwards Gregorio Diana heard his daughter, the
defendant's wife, cry for help.
He went to the defendant's house which was close to his own
and there found the defendant attacking Crispina with a bolo.
With the assistance of Teodulo Gimena, a brother of the
defendant, Gregorio succeeded in disarming the defendant and
tied him to a post of the house. The matter was then reported to
the authorities and the justice of the peace, the chief of police,
a sanitary inspector and a policeman appeared on the scene.
The justice of the peace asked the defendant why he had
attacked his wife and received the answer that it was because
she had given the sum of P2.70 to one Apolinar Sereno whom
he, the defendant, suspected of illicit relations with the wife.
A few hours later on the same day Crispina Diana died and the
examination subsequently made disclosed ten wounds in
different parts of her body.
After trial the court below found the defendant guilty of parricide
and considering in his favor the mitigating circumstances of
obfuscation and lack of instruction, sentenced him to suffer
fourteen years and eight months and one day of cadena
temporal with the accessory penalties prescribed by law and to
pay the costs.
Held:
The appellant's argument in his favor is that he was in a state of
somnambulism when he attacked his wife. We do not think that
this theory can serve as a defense in the present case. By order
of the trial court the defendant was placed under observation for
some time by Dr. Luis B. Gomez, but the doctor apparently did
not discover any somnambulism on the part of the defendant. A
defense of that character must be proven and such proof is
lacking in this case.
The defense that the offense charged was committed by the
accused during the prevalence of or in a state of somnambulism
has been recognized; but the latest holding of courts is to the
effect that it does not constitute a defense other than that
embraced in a plea of insanity. (Wharton's Criminal Law, Vol. 1,
p. 574.)
We can find no error in the decision of the court below and the
appealed judgment is therefore affirmed with the costs against
the appellant. So ordered.
People v. Madarang
Facts:
What distinguishes man from beast is his intellect. Man's action
is guided and controlled by his mind. Law is designed for
rational beings as it is based on our inherent sense of right
which is inseparable from reason. Thus, when man's reasoning
is so distorted by disease that he is totally incapable of
distinguishing right from wrong, he loses responsibility before
the law. In the case at bar, we are asked to resolve whether or
not the accused, invoking insanity, can claim exemption from
liability for the crime he committed.
Accused FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO was charged
with parricide for killing his wife LILIA MADARANG in an
Information 1 which reads:
That on or about September 3, 1993, at Poblacion, the above-
named accused, with evident premeditation and treachery,
armed with a bladed weapon, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab LILIA M.
MADARANG, his legitimate wife, inflicting upon her stab wound
4 1/2 inches by 1 1/2 inch(es) long and 3/16 of an inch wide,
located just below the left clavicle 1 3/4 inch(es) lateral to the
supra-sternal notch, and plowed along the interpace slightly
coursing upward and posteriorly and stab wound 1 inch in
length, gaping and 3 1/2 inch(es) deep, located at the right arm
at its medial aspect, coursing upwards and medially towards the
apex of the right axilla which caused her instantaneous death,
to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Lilia M. Madarang.
At the arraignment, the accused refused to enter a plea.
Pursuant to the Rules, the trial court entered a "not guilty" plea
for him. At the initial hearing of the case on May 5, 1994, the
accused's counsel manifested that his client had been observed
behaving in an abnormal manner inside the provincial jail. Thus,
the Court called the accused to the stand but he refused to
answer any of the questions propounded by the court. Hence,
on the same date, the Court issued an Order 2 directing the
transfer of the accused to the National Center for Mental Health
(NCMH) for psychiatric evaluation to determine his fitness to
stand trial.
The initial examination of the accused at the NCMH revealed
that he was suffering from a form of psychosis known as
schizophrenia. The accused was detained at the hospital and
was administered medication for his illness. On June 19, 1996,
after more than two (2) years of confinement, the accused was
discharged from the NCMH and recommitted to the provincial
jail as he was already found fit to face the charges against him.
3
As culled from the testimonies of the accused, his mother-in-law
AVELINA MIRADOR, and his daughter LILIFER MADARANG,
the following facts were established: The accused and Lilia
Mirador were legally married and their union was blessed with
seven (7) children. The accused worked as a seaman for
sixteen (16) years. He was employed in a United States ship
until 1972. In 1973, he worked as a seaman in Germany and
stayed there for nine (9) years, or until 1982. Thereafter, he
returned to his family in Infanta, Pangasinan, and started a
hardware store business. His venture however failed. Worse, he
lost his entire fortune due to cockfighting. 4
The accused, his wife Lilia and their children were forced to stay
in the house of Avelina Mirador as the accused could no longer
support his family. Moreover, Lilia was then already heavy with
their eight child and was about to give birth. 5
At about 5:00 p.m., the accused and Lilia had a squabble. The
accused was jealous of another man and was accusing Lilia of
infidelity. In the heat of the fight and in the presence of their
children, the accused stabbed Lilia, resulting in her untimely
demise. 6
AVELINA MIRADOR was then in the pigpen when she heard
the children of the accused shouting and crying inside her
house. She called out to them and asked what was wrong. She
received no reply. Her nephew barged into the house and
brought out the children one at a time, leaving the accused with
Lilia. While passing by Avelina, her nephew warned her: "You
better run." Avelina then saw the accused emerge from the
house holding a bolo. She scampered for safety.
She declared that during the period that the accused and his
family stayed in her house, she did not notice anything peculiar
in accused's behavior that would suggest that he was suffering
from any mental illness. Neither did she know of any reason why
the accused killed his wife as she never saw the two engage in
any argument while they were living with her.
The accused declared that he has absolutely no recollection of
the stabbing incident. He could not remember where he was on
that fateful day. He did not know the whereabouts of his wife. It
was only during one of the hearings when his mother-in-law
showed him a picture of his wife in a coffin that he learned about
her death. He, however, was not aware of the cause of her
demise. He claimed that he did not know whether he suffered
from any mental illness and did not remember being confined at
the NCMH for treatment.
The NCMH conducted three (3) medical and psychiatric
evaluations of the accused during his confinement therein.
Based on the first medical report, dated August 2, 1994, 10 the
accused was found to be suffering from insanity or psychosis,
classified as schizophrenia. Dr. Tibayan explained that
schizophrenia is a mental abnormality characterized by
impaired fundamental reasoning, delusions, hallucinations,
preoccupation with one's thoughts, poor self-care, insight and
judgment, and impaired cognitive, social and occupational
functions. The patient may be incapable of distinguishing right
from wrong or know what he is doing. He may become
destructive or have a propensity to attack any one if his
hallucinations were violent. 11 A schizophrenic, however, may
have lucid intervals during which he may be able to distinguish
right from wrong. 12 Dr. Tibayan opined that the accused's
mental illness may have begun even prior to his admission to
the NCMH and it was highly possible that he was already
suffering from schizophrenia prior to his commission of the
crime.
After one and a half years of confinement, the third psychiatric
evaluation of the accused, dated May 27, 1996, 14 showed that
his mental condition considerably improved due to continuous
medication. The accused was recommended to be discharged
from the NCMH and recommitted to jail to stand trial. 15
The trial court convicted the accused as his evidence failed to
refute the presumption of sanity at the time he committed the
offense.
First. He had no recollection of the stabbing incident. Hence, he
was completely unaware of his acts that fateful day and must
have committed the crime without the least discernment.
Second. His behavior at the time of the stabbing proved he was
then afflicted with schizophrenia. He cited the testimony of Dr.
Tibayan that a schizophrenic may go into extremes — he may
be violent and destructive, or very silent and self-focused. The
appellant exhibited his violent tendencies on that fateful day. He
killed his wife and Avelina and her nephew were so frightened
that they ran away at the sight of him holding a bolo. He did not
seem to recognize anybody and could have turned to anyone
and inflicted further injury. He avers that this is peculiar only to
persons who are mentally deranged for a sane person who just
committed a crime would have appeared remorseful and
repentant after realizing that what he did was wrong.
Third. The appellant also relies on Dr. Tibayan's opinion that
there was a high possibility that he was already suffering from
insanity prior to his commission of the crime on September 3,
1993. 17 The defense posits that his mental illness may have
been caused by his loss of fortune. His hardware business,
which he started through 16 years of working as a seaman, went
bankrupt. He ended up virtually dependent on his mother-in-law
for his family's support and all these may have been beyond his
capacity to handle.
The appellant further contends that the fact that he and his wife
never engaged in a fight prior to that fateful day should be
considered. The marked change in his behavior when he
uncharacteristically quarreled with his wife on that day and
suddenly turned violent on her confirms that he was mentally
disturbed when he committed the crime.
Lastly, the appellant urges that he had no motive to kill Lilia who
was scheduled to give birth to their eighth child three (3) days
prior to the killing. Unless overpowered by something beyond
his control, nobody in his right mind would kill his wife who was
carrying his child. Jealousy, the appellant posits, is not a
sufficient reason to kill a pregnant spouse.
Held:
We find these arguments without merit.
In the Philippines, the courts have established a more stringent
criterion for insanity to be exempting as it is required that there
must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the
act, i.e., the accused is deprived of reason; he acted without the
least discernment because there is a complete absence of the
power to discern, or that there is a total deprivation of the will.
Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude
imputability.
The issue of insanity is a question of fact for insanity is a
condition of the mind, not susceptible of the usual means of
proof. As no man can know what is going on in the mind of
another, the state or condition of a person's mind can only be
measured and judged by his behavior. Establishing the insanity
of an accused requires opinion testimony which may be given
by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused, by
a witness who has rational basis to conclude that the accused
was insane based on the witness' own perception of the
accused, or by a witness who is qualified as an expert, such as
a psychiatrist. 31 The testimony or proof of the accused's
insanity must relate to the time preceding or coetaneous with
the commission of the offense with which he is charged. 32
In the case at bar, the appellant was diagnosed to be suffering
from schizophrenia when he was committed to the NCMH
months after he killed his wife. Medical books describe
schizophrenia as a chronic mental disorder characterized by
inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality and often
accompanied by hallucinations and delusions. Formerly called
dementia pracecox, it is the most common form of psychosis. 3
Symptomatically, schizophrenic reactions are recognizable
through odd and bizarre behavior apparent in aloofness or
periods of impulsive destructiveness and immature and
exaggerated emotionality, often ambivalently directed.
The interpersonal perceptions are distorted in the more serious
states by delusions and hallucinations. In the most disorganized
form of schizophrenic living, withdrawal into a fantasy life takes
place and is associated with serious thought disorder and
profound habit deterioration in which the usual social customs
are disregarded. 34 During the initial stage, the common early
symptom is aloofness, a withdrawal behind barriers of
loneliness, hopelessness, hatred and fear. Frequently, the
patient would seem preoccupied and dreamy and may appear
"far away." He does not empathize with the feelings of others
and manifests little concern about the realities of life situations.
The schizophrenic suffers from a feeling of rejection and an
intolerable lack of self-respect. He withdraws from emotional
involvement with other people to protect himself from painful
relationships.
There is shallowness of affect, a paucity of emotional
responsiveness and a loss of spontaneity. Frequently, he
becomes neglectful of personal care and cleanliness. 35 A
variety of subjective experiences, associated with or influenced
by mounting anxiety and fears precede the earliest behavioral
changes and oddities. He becomes aware of increasing tension
and confusion and becomes distracted in conversation
manifested by his inability to maintain a train of thought in his
conversations. Outwardly, this will be noticed as blocks or
breaks in conversations. The schizophrenic may not speak or
respond appropriately to his companions. He may look fixedly
away, or he may appear to stare, as he does not regularly blink
his eyes in his attempt to hold his attention. 36
None of the witnesses presented by the appellant declared that
he exhibited any of the myriad symptoms associated with
schizophrenia immediately before or simultaneous with the
stabbing incident. To be sure, the record is bereft of even a
single account of abnormal or bizarre behavior on the part of the
appellant prior to that fateful day. Although Dr. Tibayan opined
that there is a high possibility that the appellant was already
suffering from schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing, he also
declared that schizophrenics have lucid intervals during which
they are capable of distinguishing right from wrong. 37 Hence
the importance of adducing proof to show that the appellant was
not in his lucid interval at the time he committed the offense.
Although the appellant was diagnosed with schizophrenia a few
months after the stabbing incident, the evidence of insanity after
the fact of commission of the offense may be accorded weight
only if there is also proof of abnormal behavior immediately
before or simultaneous to the commission of the crime.
Evidence on the alleged insanity must refer to the time
preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of
its execution.
In the case at bar, we find the evidence adduced by the defense
insufficient to establish his claim of insanity at the time he killed
his wife. There is a dearth of evidence on record to show that
the appellant was completely of unsound mind prior to or
coetaneous with the commission of the crime. The arguments
advanced by the appellant to prove his insanity are speculative
and non-sequitur. For one, his claim that he has absolutely no
recollection of the stabbing incident amounts to a mere general
denial that can be made with facility.
The fact that Avelina and her nephew were frightened at the
sight of the appellant holding a bolo after he killed his wife does
not, by any stretch of imagination, prove that the appellant has
lost his grip on reality on that occasion. Neither is the appellant's
seemingly non-repentant attitude immediately after he stabbed
his wife an indicium of his alleged insanity. Even criminals of
stable mental condition take this non-remorseful stance.
Similarly, that the appellant and his wife were never seen
quarreling prior to that fateful day does not by itself prove the
appellant's unstable mental condition. Neither can it be said that
jealousy is not a sufficient reason to kill a pregnant spouse. Our
jurisprudence is replete with cases where lives had been
terminated for the flimsiest reason.
The appellant attributes his loss of sanity to the fact that he lost
his business and became totally dependent on his mother-in-
law for support. We find this, however, purely speculative and
unsupported by record. To be sure, there was no showing of
any odd or bizarre behavior on the part of the appellant after he
lost his fortune and prior to his commission of the crime that may
be symptomatic of his mental illness. In fact, the appellant's
mother-in-law declared that during the time that she knew the
appellant and while he lived in her house, she did not notice
anything irregular or abnormal in the appellant's behavior that
could have suggested that he was suffering from any mental
illness.

An accused invoking the insanity defense pleads not guilty by
reason thereof. He admits committing the crime but claims that
he is not guilty because he was insane at the time of its
commission. Hence, the accused is tried on the issue of sanity
alone and if found to be sane, a judgment of conviction is
rendered without any trial on the issue of guilt as he had already
admitted committing the crime. 39 As the appellant, in the case
at bar, failed to establish by convincing evidence his alleged
insanity at the time he killed his wife, we are constrained to
affirm his conviction.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the trial court convicting
the appellant of the crime of parricide is AFFIRMED in toto.
Llave v. People
Facts:
The spouses Domingo and Marilou Santos were residents of
Pasay City.4 One of their children, Debbielyn, was born on
December 8, 1994.5 In 2002, she was a Grade II student at the
Villamor Air Base Elementary School in Pasay City6 and
attended classes from 12:00 noon to 6:00 p.m.7
Domingo eked out a living as a jeepney driver, while Marilou
sold quail eggs at a nearby church.8 Adjacent to their house
was that of Teofisto Bucud, a barbecue vendor who would
usually start selling at 6:30 p.m.9 Next to Teofisto’s residence
was a vacant house
That on or about the 24th day of September 2002, NIEL F.
LLAVE, a minor 12 years of age but acting with discernment, by
means of force threat and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
complainant, DEBBIELYN SANTOS, a minor, seven (7) years
of age, against her will and consent.
Debbielyn testified that on September 24, 2002, she arrived
home at past 6:00 p.m. She changed her clothes and proceeded
to her mother’s store. Marilou asked her daughter to bring home
the container with the unsold quail eggs.11 Debbielyn did as told
and went on her way. As she neared the vacant house, she saw
petitioner, who suddenly pulled her behind a pile of hollow
blocks which was in front of the vacant house. There was a little
light from the lamp post.12 She resisted to no avail.13 Petitioner
ordered her to lie down on the cement. Petrified, she complied.
He removed her shorts and underwear then removed his own.
He got on top of her.14 She felt his penis being inserted into her
vagina. He kissed her.15 She felt pain and cried.16 She was
sure there were passersby on the street near the vacant house
at the time.
It was then that Teofisto came out of their house and heard the
girl’s cries. He rushed to the place and saw petitioner on top of
Debbielyn, naked from the waist down. Teofisto shouted at
petitioner, and the latter fled from the scene. Teofisto told
Debbielyn to inform her parents about what happened.17 She
told her father about the incident.18 Her parents later reported
what happened to the police authorities.19 Debbielyn told the
police that petitioner was a bad boy because he was a rapist.
Petitioner testified and declared that he was a freshman at the
Pasay City South High School.41 He had been one of the three
outstanding students in grade school and received awards such
as Best in Mathematics.42 He also finished a computer course
and received a Certificate of Completion from the Philippine Air
Force Management Information Center.43 He denied having
raped the private complainant. He declared that at 6:30 p.m. on
September 24, 2002, he was outside of their house to buy rice
in the carinderia44 and he saw her on his way back.45 He also
met his father, who asked him what he had done to their
neighbor. He was also told that the victim’s father was so angry
that the latter wanted to kill him.46 He did not ask his father for
the name of the angry neighbor. He was also told to pass by
Cadena de Amor Street in going to his aunt’s house. Petitioner
also declared that his mother prodded him to go to his aunt’s
house.47 Later, Domingo and Barangay Tanod Jorge
Dominguez arrived at his aunt’s house and brought him to the
barangay hall. He did not know of any reason why Debbielyn
and her parents would charge him with rape.
RTC RULING: At the conclusion of the trial, the court rendered
judgment convicting Neil of the crime charged. Sentenced him
to prision mayor minimum, Six (6) years and One (1) day to
Eight (8) years, and pay civil indemnity of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(Php50,000.00).
CA RULING: The CA rendered judgment affirming the decision
with modification. Sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two
(2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional medium as
the minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
medium as the maximum. Additionally, the accused-appellant is
ordered to pay the complaining witness the amount of ₱50,000
by way of moral damages and ₱20,000 by way of exemplary
damages.
ISSUE
1. WON he was deprived of his right to a preliminary
investigation.
2. WON he acted with discernment
Held:
1. Yes. Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:
SEC. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. –
When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant involving
an offense which requires a preliminary investigation, the
complaint or information may be filed by a prosecutor without
need of such investigation provided an inquest has been
conducted in accordance with existing rules. In the absence or
unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be
filed by the offended party or a peace officer directly with the
proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or
arresting officer or person. The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) avers that petitioner was subjected to an inquest
investigation under Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as gleaned from the Certification of the City
Prosecutor incorporated in the Information.
Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested
may ask for a preliminary investigation in accordance with this
Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of his
counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and
the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days
from its inception.
After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a
preliminary investigation, the accused may, within five (5) days
from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary
investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his
defense as provided for in this Rule.
As gleaned from the Certification of the City Prosecutor which
was incorporated in the Information, petitioner did not execute
any waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code before the Information was filed. He was arraigned with
the assistance of counsel on October 10, 2002, and thereafter
filed a petition for bail.63 Petitioner’s failure to file a motion for a
preliminary investigation within five days from finding out that an
Information had been filed against him effectively operates as a
waiver of his right to such preliminary investigation.
2. Yes. Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that a person over nine years of age and under fifteen
is exempt from criminal liability, unless he acted with
discernment. The basic reason behind the exempting
circumstance is complete absence of intelligence, freedom of
action of the offender which is an essential element of a felony
either by dolus or by culpa. Intelligence is the power necessary
to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from
an illicit act.84 On the other hand, discernment is the mental
capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong.
The prosecution is burdened to prove that the accused acted
with discernment by evidence of physical appearance, attitude
or deportment not only before and during the commission of the
act, but also after and during the trial.85 The surrounding
circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he
was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstance includes
the gruesome nature of the crime and the minor’s cunning and
shrewdness.
In the present case, the petitioner, with methodical fashion,
dragged the resisting victim behind the pile of hollow blocks
near the vacant house to insure that passersby would not be
able to discover his dastardly acts. When he was discovered by
Teofisto Bucud who shouted at him, the petitioner hastily fled
from the scene to escape arrest. Upon the prodding of his father
and her mother, he hid in his grandmother’s house to avoid
being arrested by policemen and remained thereat until
barangay tanods arrived and took him into custody.
The petitioner also testified that he had been an outstanding
grade school student and even received awards. While in Grade
I, he was the best in his class in his academic subjects. He
represented his class in a quiz bee contest.86 At his the age of
12, he finished a computer course.
The trial court correctly ruled that the petitioner acted with
discernment when he had carnal knowledge of the offended
party; hence, the CA cannot be faulted for affirming the trial
court’s ruling.
In People v. Doqueña,87 the Court held that the accused-
appellant therein acted with discernment in raping the victim
under the following facts:
“Taking into account the fact that when the accused Valentin
Doqueña committed the crime in question, he was a 7th grade
pupil in the intermediate school of the municipality of Sual,
Pangasinan, and as such pupil, he was one of the brightest in
said school and was a captain of a company of the cadet corps
thereof, and during the time he was studying therein he always
obtain excellent marks, this court is convinced that the accused,
in committing the crime, acted with discernment and was
conscious of the nature and consequences of his act, and so
also has this court observed at the time said accused was
testifying in his behalf during the trial of this case.”
The CA ordered petitioner to pay ₱50,000.00 as moral damages
and ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages. There is no factual
basis for the award of exemplary damages. Under Article 2231,
of the New Civil Code, exemplary damages may be awarded if
the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances. In this case, no aggravating circumstance was
alleged in the Information and proved by the People; hence, the
award must be deleted.
LEGAL PREMISES
Rape is consummated if there is some degree of penetration
within the vaginal surface. Corroborative evidence is not
necessary to prove rape. As long as the testimony of the victim
is credible, such testimony will suffice for conviction of
consummated rape.
Discernment, as used in Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal
Code is defined as follows: "the discernment that constitutes an
exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor
under fifteen (15) years of age but over nine (9), who commits
an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand
the difference between right and wrong" (People v. Doquena,
68 Phil. 580 [1939]).
For a minor above nine but below fifteen years of age, he must
discern the rightness or wrongness of the effects of his act
(Guevarra v. Almodova, G.R. No. 75256, January 26, 1989).
Professor Ambrocio Padilla, in his annotation of Criminal Law
(p. 375, 1998 Ed.), writes that "discernment is more than the
mere understanding between right and wrong. Rather, it means
the mental capacity of a minor between 9 and 15 years of age
to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act"
(People v. Navarro, [CA] [51 O.G. 4062]).
Judging whether a minor accused acted with discernment, his
mental capacity to understand the difference between right and
wrong, which may be known and should be determined by
considering all the circumstances disclosed by the record of the
case, his appearance, his attitude and his behavior and
conduct, not only before and during the commission of the act,
but also after and even during the trial should be taken into
consideration (People v. Doquena, supra).
People v. Ayaya
Facts:
The appellant was tried in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas
upon the following information:
“That on or about January 15, 1928, in the municipality of
Pagbilao, Province of Tayabas, Philippine Islands, and within
the jurisdiction of this court, the above-named accused, with the
intent to kill her husband Benito dela Cruz, with whom she was
united in lawful marriage, with treachery and by means of an
umbrella, did voluntarily, unlawfully, and feloniously assault and
attack her said husband Benito de la Cruz, inflicting a mortal
wound in the upper left eyelid, as a result of which said Benito
de la Cruz died five (5) days thereafter. In violation of article 402
of the Penal Code.”
It appears from the record that at about 1 o'clock in the morning
of January 16, 1928, Jose Fajardo, the chief of police of
Pagbilao, Tayabas, was informed by a policeman that one
Benito de la Cruz was drunk, wounded, and vomiting in his
house in said municipality. Said chief of police went to the place
and found Benito, the deceased, lying in bed with a wound on
his left eyelid, and unconscious, for he did not answer the
questions put to him. When his wife, the defendant Praxedes
Ayaya, was questioned as to the cause of that wound, she
replied that it was due to the fact that she herself had jabbed
her husband with an umbrella.
Health officer Victoriano Litonjua was then called, and upon
examining Benito, found he had a wound on the left upper eyelid
which was bleeding: that his pupils were dilated and, from the
odor of his breath and from his vomiting, it appeared that Benito
was drunk. In view of the wounded man's condition he was later
taken to the provincial hospital of Tayabas, where he died four
days after the incident. Health officer Litonjua and Dr. G. Santos
Cuyugan, the director of the provincial hospital of Tayabas, who
treated the wounded man, expressed different opinions as to
the cause of the death of Benito de la Cruz. Health officer
Litonjua believes that the deceased's cerebral hemorrhage was
due to his alcoholic excesses, whereas Doctor Cuyugan, who
performed the autopsy, declared that the wound was caused by
some blunt instrument and that his death was caused by the
cerebral hemorrhage produced by the wound he had received
in the forehead, and that health officer Litonjua's statement as
to said hemorrhage being due to the alcohol is erroneous.
The trial court found the defendant guilty of the crime alleged in
the information, and taking into account that the defendant did
not intend to inflict so grave an injury as she did, and that there
had been provocation on the part of the offended party,
sentenced her to fourteen years, eight months and one day
reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the law, and to pay
the heirs of the deceased the sum of P500 by way of indemnity,
plus the costs of the action.
The defendant appealed from this judgment, and her attorney,
in support of the petition that the judgment appealed from be
reversed and the appellant acquitted with costs de oficio,
assigns the following errors: (1) The trial court erred in holding
that the deceased's wound on the left upper eyelid was caused
by the appellant; (2) supposing, without admitting, that said
wound was really caused by the herein appellant, the lower
court erred in concluding that said wound was the immediate
cause of the death of the deceased and consequently, in
convicting the appellant; and (3) the lower court erred in not
acquitting the appellant, at least, for reasonable doubt.
In the defendant's sworn statement she states, among other
things, that at about 8 o'clock at night on January 15, 1928, she,
with her husband Benito de la Cruz, and her son Emilio, drank
tuba in the store of one Felicidad Losloso; that afterwards they
went to a cinema; that while returning home and without any
warning her husband, who was drunk, gave her a blow which
she dodged; that then her husband went home, preceding her
and her son and when they arrived at the house they found the
door closed; that she and her son pushed the door and
attempted to open it, but her husband, who was inside,
prevented it; that then the door gave way somewhat and her
son Emilio succeeded in putting his head between the opening
of the door and the wall and in order to prevent the door from
crushing him, she pushed it; that Benito then poked his head
out of the opening of the door and when she saw him, she
jabbed him with the umbrella she carried; that she does not
know where she jabbed him although she thinks it was in the
body; and that when she and her son finally succeeded in
entering the house, they found that Benito was already in bed
with a wound in the forehead. The accused herself, in her
testimony in her own behalf, substantially repeated what she
had declared before the justice of the peace of Pagbilao, stating,
however, that when the door was opened and her son put his
head between the opening of the door and the wall, in order to
prevent the door from crushing her son's head, she jabbed her
husband with her umbrella with a downward motion, though she
could not tell if she touched him or not. She stated, furthermore,
that she did not know how the wound in her husband's forehead
was caused. This point of the defendant's testimony has not
been contradicted by any evidence to the contrary; rather it has
been corroborated by her son Emilio de la Cruz who also
testified at the trial.
Held:
In view of the fact that there is no eyewitness of the act herein
prosecuted, with the exception of the defendant and her son
Emilio de la Cruz, we are compelled to accept the declaration of
the defendant that she jabbed her husband with her umbrella in
order to prevent the door from closing and crushing her son's
head which was inserted between said door and the wall of the
house. Said defendant, explaining what took place, says in part:
"When the door was ajar my son went in, and then my husband
pushed it and as I saw that he was about to crush my son's
head, I jabbed my husband with the point of the umbrella,
downwards to prevent him from crushing my son's head."
We find nothing improbable in this statement and if we add to
this the absence of any reasonable motive to prompt said
defendant to injure her husband, we are compelled to conclude
that in thrusting her umbrella in the opening of the door in
question, she did so to free her son from the imminent danger
of having his head crushed or being strangled; and if she thus
caused her husband's injury, it was by a mere accident, without
any fault or intention to cause it. This being so, we believe that
she incurred no criminal liability in accordance with article 8, No.
8, of the Penal Code, because, it being a licit act to free her son
from the grave danger threatening him, and the fact of having
touched the left eye of her husband, who was behind the door,
with the end of her umbrella, does not make her criminally liable.
U.S. v. Caballeros
The defendants have been sentenced by the Court of First
Instance of Cebu to the penalty of seven years of presidio mayor
as accessories after the fact in the crime of assassination or
murder perpetrated on the persons of the American school-
teachers Louis A. Thomas, Clyde O. France, John E. Wells, and
Ernest Eger, because, without having taken part in the said
crime as principals or as accomplices, they took part in the
burial of the corpses of the victims in order to conceal the crime.
The evidence does not justify, in our opinion, this sentence. As
regards Roberto Baculi, although he confessed to having
assisted in the burial of the corpses, it appears that he did so
because he was compelled to do so by the murderers of the four
teachers. And not only does the defendant affirm this, but he is
corroborated by the only eyewitness to the crime, Teodoro
Sabate, who, by the way, is a witness for the prosecution. This
witness says he was present when the Americans were killed;
that Roberto Baculi was not a member of the group who killed
the Americans, but the he was in a banana plantation on his
property gathering some bananas; that when he heard the shots
he began to run; that he was, however, seen by Damaso and
Isidoro, the leaders of the band; that the latter called to him and
striking him with the butts of their guns they forced him to bury
the corpses.
The Penal Code exempts from liability any person who performs
the act by reason of irresistible force (par. 9, art. 8). Baculi
acted, doubtless, under such circumstances when he executed
the acts which are charged against him.
As regards the other defendant, Apolonio Caballeros, there is
no proof that he took any part in any way in the execution of the
crime with which he has been charged; there is conclusive proof
to the contrary, since Baculi, as well as one of the witnesses for
the prosecution, Teodoro Sabate, expressly declare that he,
Caballeros, did not take any part in the burial of the aforesaid
corpses, nor was he even in the place of the occurrence when
the burial took place. The confession of his supposed liability
and guilt, made before an official of the division of information
of the Constabulary, Enrique Calderon, as the latter states when
testifying as a witness, can not be considered as legal proof,
because the same witness says that Roberto Baculi was the
only one of the defendants who made a confession to him
voluntarily. It appears besides, from the statements of another
witness for the prosecution, Meliton Covarrubias, that the
confession of Apolonio Caballeros was made through the
promise made to him and to the other defendants that nothing
would be done to them. Confessions which do not appear to
have been made freely and voluntarily, without force,
intimidation, or promise of pardon, can not be accepted as proof
on a trial. (Sec. 4, Act No. 619 of the Philippine Commission).
The fact of the defendants not reporting to the authorities the
perpetration of the crime, which seems to be one of the motives
for the conviction and which the court below takes into
consideration in his judgment, is not punished by the Penal
Code and therefore that can not render the defendants
criminally liable according to law.
By virtue, then, of the above considerations, and with a reversal
of the judgment appealed from, we acquit the defendants,
appellants, with the costs de oficio in both instances. So
ordered.
People v. Anticamara
Facts:
Conrado Estrella and his wife employed AAA and Sulpacio
Abad as maid and driver respectively. Sometime on the
afternoon of 07 May 2002, the group of Fernando Fernandez
(Lando), Alberto Anticamara (Al), Dick Taedo (Dick), Roberto
Taedo (Bet), Marvin Lim (Marvin), and Fred Doe entered the
house of AAA’s employer whilst she was sleeping. Thinking that
the intruders left the house already, she attempted to run but
Dick was still there. After a brief commotion, the group decided
to tie AAA and was led outside the house. AAA saw Abad tied
and blindfolded inside a vehicle.
AAA was brought to the fishpond, there she saw Necitas
Ordeiza-Taedo (Cita). The group brought Abad outside the
vehicle and was led away. AAA heard the group discussing to
make a decision since Abad apparently has been shot four
times. Later on, Lando and Fred boarded the vehicle taking AAA
with them to San Miguel, Tarlac. She was kept in Lando’s house
until 09 May 2002.
On 09 May 2002, Lando told AAA that Fred and Bert has
intention to kill her and he brought her to a hotel. Through threat,
Lando sexually molested AAA. Later on Fred, Bert and Lando
transferred AAA to the house of Fred’s niece in Riles, Tarlac.
Fred kept AAA as a wife and repeatedly raped her at night,
threatening to give her back to Lando whom she knew killed
Abad.
On 22 May 2002, Fred, together with his family, transferred AAA
to Carnaga. AAA was made to stay as a house helper in the
house of Fred’s brother-in-law. On 04 June 2002, AAA escaped
the house and sought help from her friend who called AAA’s
brother. Arriving Mandaue City, AAA and her brother reported
the incident to police authorities. The cadaver of Abad was
autopsied and cause of death was gunshot wounds on trunk.
Lando, Al and Cita pleaded not guilty during arraignment while
Dick, Bet, Marvin and Fred Doe remained at-large.
The Regional Trial Court convicted both Lando and Al for the
crime of Murder and Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention.
Whereas Cita was found not guilty for both crimes due to
insufficiency of evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision.
Lando appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals contending
that the court gravely erred in giving scant consideration to the
evidence presented by the accused-appellant which is more
credible than that of the prosecution.
Issue: Whether or not the Court erred in finding circumstantial
evidence against the accused-appellant sufficient to convict
them?
Held:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and
circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may
be inferred according to reason and common experience.
In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution, when analyzed and taken together, lead to the
inescapable conclusion that the appellants are responsible for
the death of Sulpacio. In addition to these circumstances, the
trial court further found that AAA heard Fred utter “Usapan natin
pare, kung sino ang masagasaan, sagasaan. (Our agreement
is that whoever comes our way should be eliminated).”
Moreover, NBI Agent Gerald V. Geralde testified that on June
23, 2002, appellant Al admitted his participation as lookout and
naming his companions Dick, Lando, Fred, Marvin and Bet as
the ones who took AAA and Sulpacio from the house of the
Estrellas and brought them to the fishpond. Al also pointed and
led the authorities to a shallow grave in Sitio Rosalia, Barangay
San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, where the remains of
Sulpacio were buried. The autopsy conducted on the body,
prepared by the Medico Legal Officer Dr. Bandonil, shows that
several holes were found on various parts of the body of the
victim and Dr. Bandonil concluded that the cause of the victim’s
death was the gunshot wounds. The report also indicates that a
piece of cloth was found wrapped around the eye sockets and
tied at the back of the skull, and another cloth was also found
tied at the remnants of the left wrist.
In the case at bar, although no one directly saw the actual killing
of Sulpacio, the prosecution was able to paint a clear picture
that the appellants took Sulpacio away from the house of the
Estrellas, tied and blindfolded him, and brought him to another
place where he was repeatedly shot and buried.
In the present case, prior to the commission of the crime, the
group met at the landing field in Carmen, Pangasinan and
discussed their plan to rob the house of the Estrellas with the
agreement that whoever comes their way will be eliminated.15
Appellant Al served as a lookout by posting himself across the
house of the Estrellas with the task of reporting any movements
outside. Fred then climbed the old unserviceable gate of the
Estrella compound and then opened the small door and the rest
of the group entered the house of the Estrellas through that
opening.16 After almost an hour inside the house, they left on
board a vehicle with AAA and Sulpacio. AAA and Sulpacio were
brought to Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome, Rosales,
Pangasinan. In that place, Sulpacio was killed and AAA was
brought to another place and deprived of her liberty. These
circumstances establish a community of criminal design
between the malefactors in committing the crime. Clearly, the
group conspired to rob the house of the Estrellas and kill any
person who comes their way. The killing of Sulpacio was part of
their conspiracy. Further, Dick's act of arming himself with a gun
constitutes direct evidence of a deliberate plan to kill should the
need arise.
Appellant Al attempts to evade criminal liability by alleging that
he was only forced to participate in the commission of the crime
because he and his family were threatened to be killed. Al's
defense fails to impress us. Under Article 1217 of the Revised
Penal Code, a person is exempt from criminal liability if he acts
under the compulsion of an irresistible force, or under the
impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury,
because such person does not act with freedom.18 To avail of
this exempting circumstance, the evidence must establish: (1)
the existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) that the fear must be
real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than,
or at least equal to, that committed.19 For such defense to
prosper, the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present,
imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-
grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the
act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough.20
There is nothing in the records to substantiate appellant Al's
insistence that he was under duress from his co-accused while
participating in the crime that would suffice to exempt him from
incurring criminal liability. The evidence shows that Al was
tasked to act as a lookout and directed to station himself across
the house of the Estrellas. Al was there from 7:30 p.m. to 1:00
a.m.21 of the following day, while the rest of the group was
waiting in the landing field. Thus, while all alone, Al had every
opportunity to escape since he was no longer subjected to a
real, imminent or reasonable fear. However, he opted to stay
across the house of the Estrellas for almost six (6) hours,22 and
thereafter returned to the landing field where the group was
waiting for his report. Subsequently, the group proceeded to the
Estrellas’ house. When the group entered the house, Al stayed
for almost one (1) hour outside to wait for his companions. Later,
when the group left the house aboard a vehicle, Al rode with
them in going to Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome, Rosales,
Pangasinan, bringing with them Sulpacio and AAA.23 Clearly,
appellant Al had ample opportunity to escape if he wished to,
but he never did. Neither did he request for assistance from the
authorities or any person passing by the house of the Estrellas
during the period he was stationed there. Clearly, Al did not
make any effort to perform an overt act to dissociate or detach
himself from the conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent
the commission thereof that would exempt himself from criminal
liability.24 Therefore, it is obvious that he willingly agreed to be
a part of the conspiracy.
U.S. v. Exaltacion
Facts:
March 26, 1903, the provincial fiscal of Bulacan presented to
the court of that province an information charging Liberato
Exaltacion and Buenaventura Tanchinco with the crime of
rebellion, in that they, subsequently to the 4th day of November,
1901, willfully and illegally bound themselves to take part in a
rebellion against the Government of the United States in these
Islands, swearing allegiance to the Katipunan Society, the
purpose of which was to overthrow the said Government by
force of arms, this against the statute in the case made and
provided.
In the course of the trial Don Pablo Tecson, the provincial
governor of Bulacan, testified under oath that the two
defendants were arrested in the month of March, 1903, the
police some days before having captured a number of
documents in the encampment of one Contreras, as so-called
general of bandits, situated at a place called Langca, of the town
of Meycauayan, among which documents appeared the papers
now on pages 2 and 3 of the record, signed by the said
Exaltacion and Tanchinco, who recognized the said documents
when they were exhibited to them; that the said defendants
stated to the witness that they had signed the said documents
under compulsion; that the purpose of the Katipunan Society
was to obtain the independence of the Philippines; that this
statement was made in the house of the parish priest of
Meycauayan in the presence of Exequiel Casas and Fernando
Nieto. The latter, upon their examination as witnesses, testified
to the same facts, stating that the defendants told Governor
Tecson that they had signed the said documents under fear of
death at the hands of the thieves by whom they had been
captured. The witness Casas, the municipal president of
Meycauayan, testified that he held office as such in place of the
former president, Don Tomas Testa, who was kidnapped in the
month of October, 1902.
The said documents, the first of which was dated July 4 and the
second July 17, 1902, were written in Tagalog, and contain an
oath taken in the name of God, and a covenant on the part of
the subscribers to carry out the superior orders of the
Katipunan, and never disobey them until their death in the
defense of the mother country. The two accused, under oath,
testified to having signed the said documents and alleged that
they did so under compulsion and force while they were held as
captives by the thieves; that the defendant Tanchinco was
captured in the fields one day when he was going to work on his
farm by three armed men, unknown to him, who asked him if he
was an agent or friend of President Testa, and upon his replying
in the negative they compelled him in view of his denial to sign
a document, now on page 3 of the record.
The defendant Tanchinco cited Lazaro Yusay to testify to the
fact that he was captured at a place called Kaibiga in the
township of Novaliches, and that on the day following his
release, having been unable to pay the $300 which was
demanded of him, he reported to the president, Tomas Testa.
The defendant Liberato Exaltacion under oath testified that he
was captured near Meycauayan by five persons, unknown,
dressed as policemen and armed with guns or revolvers; that
these men bound him and took him into the forest and there
compelled him by threats of death to sign the documents now
on page 2 of the record; that thereupon they allowed him to go
upon promise to return. This defendant testified that Antero
Villano and Tomas Rivera saw him while on the road in the
hands of the thieves. Both the accused testified that as soon as
they were released they presented themselves to the president,
Don Tomas Testa, in the presence of witnesses, and
subsequently went to Bonifacio Morales, a lieutenant of
volunteers, and reported to him the fact that they had been
captured.
The witnesses of whom the last two were present when
Tanchinco appeared before Senor Testa, the president of
Meycauayan, and reported to him what had happened to him —
all testified to the same fact and corroborated the statements of
the accused with respect to their capture and their subsequent
report to President Testa and to the witness Morales.
The evidence for the prosecution, and especially the two
documents above referred to, signed by the accused, is not
sufficient to prove the guilt of the latter or to justify the imposition
upon them of the penalty inflicted by the judgment of the court
below.
Held:
The facts, established by the evidence, that the defendants
were kidnapped by brigands who belonged to the Contreras
band, and that they signed the said documents under
compulsion and while in captivity, relieve them from all criminal
liability from the crime of rebellion of which they are charged.
The conduct of the defendants in presenting themselves first to
the local president of Meycauayan and subsequently to Lieut.
Bonifacio Morales, of the Bulacan Government Volunteers, as
soon as they were released by the bandits is corroborative of
their testimony, and is the best demonstration of their
innocence. This conclusion is not overcome by the trifling
discrepancy between the testimony of the witness Yusay and
that of the defendant Tanchinco nor the fact the Exaltacion was
unable to determine the date when he was captured or that on
which he appeared before President Testa.
The guilt of the defendants of the crime defined and punished
by Act No. 292 not having been established at the trial beyond
a reasonable doubt, we are of the opinion that the judgment
below must be reversed and the defendants acquitted with the
costs de oficio. The judge below will be informed of this decision
and a copy of the judgment entered herein will be furnished him
for his information and guidance. So ordered.
People v. Dequina
Facts:
Accused-appellants Nelida D. Dequina (Dequina), Joselito J.
Jundoc (Jundoc), and Nora C. Jingabo (Jingabo) were charged
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 27, with
Violations of Section 4, in relation to Section 21, paragraphs (e-
l), (f), (m), and (o) of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659. The accusatory portion of the Amended
Information reads:
That on or about September 29, 1999, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confed erating
together and helping one another, not being authorized by law
to sell, deliver, transport or give away to another any prohibited
drug, did and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell, or
offer for sale, deliver or transport marijuana dried flowering tops
with total weight of thirty two thousand nine hundred ninety five
(32,995) grams which is a prohibited drug. All accused-
appellants entered a plea of not guilty.
The combined testimony of accused Nora Jingabo and Joselito
Jundoc established the following facts.
On September 27, 1999, while [Jundoc] and [Jingabo] were
tending to their fish stall in Iloilo Public Market, [Dequina], their
friend, came and invited them to meet her, for a still undisclosed
reason, at the ground floor of the Gaisano Mall, early in the
morning of the following day, September 28, 1999. As agreed
upon, they met at the designated place and time. Not long
thereafter, Sally joined them. They knew Sally to be [Dequina’s]
supplier of RTW’s and other merchandise. For a while,
[Dequina] and Sally excused themselves and proceeded to the
first floor of the mall where they talked privately. Soon after Sally
left, [Jingabo] and [Jundoc] asked [Dequina] what they talked
about. Instead of answering, [Dequina] asked if they are willing
to go with her to Manila in order to get something. While a little
bit surprised, [Jingabo] and [Jundoc] readily agreed as they had
never been in the city before. [Dequina] handed to them their
plane tickets. They were told that the same were given by Sally.
However, they noticed that the plane tickets were not in their
names but in the names of other persons. When they called the
attention of [Dequina] about it, the latter simply replied "Anyway
that is free". [Jingabo] noticed anxiety got the better of Nelida at
that time. Nevertheless, the three of them enplaned for Manila
at around 7:45 a.m. of September 28, 1999.
From the Ninoy Aquino Domestic Airport, they proceeded to the
house of [Dequina’s] aunt in Guadalupe, Makati City. In the
afternoon, their host noticed the presence of unfamiliar vehicles.
Some of these vehicles were even parked right in front of the
house. Unmindful about it, they left Guadalupe at around 6:00
p.m. and proceeded to a Philippine Rabbit Bus Terminal.
Thereat, two male persons approached [Dequina] and handed
to her bus tickets. They were pointed to the particular vehicle
where they were to board.
They reached Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga between 12:30 and
1:00 a.m. of September 29, 1999. While they were having their
snacks, a couple approached [Dequina] and they had a talk.
Thereafter, the couple motioned them to three male persons,
each carrying a bag, at the opposite side of the road. Upon
[Dequina’s] instruction, they took the bags from the three men.
Then, they waited for their ride back to Manila.

As they boarded the bus, the conductor loaded their bags inside
the compartment. They alighted at SM EDSA at around 6:00
a.m. of September 29, 1999. They boarded a waiting tricycle.
When they reached a certain store, the trike driver bought
carton boxes where they loaded two of the three bags.
Thereafter, the tricycle driver pointed [Dequina] to a waiting taxi
where they boarded along with their baggages.
As they entered the pier premises, a police officer on board a
mobile patrol car ordered them to stop. They were ordered to
alight and the police officers ordered the driver to open the taxi’s
compartment. One of the police officers took a knife from his
pocket and slashed one of the bags. Then, the policemen told
them that what they had in their bags were marijuana. The
police officers ordered them to board the mobile car while the
bags were loaded inside the compartment of the same car.
They were brought to a "sari-sari" store where a certain Chief
Sapitula, whom they later knew to be the police officers’
superior, was waiting. Sapitula interrogated [Dequina] and at
one point, he slapped her. Sapitula summoned press people
who took their photographs. Thereafter, they were brought to
the "Hospital ng Bayan" and finally, to the police precinct were
they were charged accordingly.4
The parties dispensed with the testimony of Prose M. Arreola, a
representative of Air Philippines, since they were willing to
stipulate on the existence of the passenger manifest, on which
appeared the accused-appellants’ assumed names, as well as
the accused-appellants’ plane tickets for the flight from Iloilo to
Manila on September 28, 1999 at 7:00 a.m.
The RTC, in a Decision dated October 30, 2000, found the
accused-appellants guilty as charged.
In its Decision9 dated August 16, 2006, the appellate court
affirmed accused-appellants’ conviction.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED, the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, in Manila, in Criminal Case
No. 99-177393, finding accused-appellants NELIDA DEQUINA
y DIMAPANAN, JOSELITO JUNDOC y JAPITANA and NORA
JINGABO y CRUZ guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegally
transporting 32[,]995 grams of marijuana is hereby AFFIRMED.
Held:
In order to exonerate herself from criminal liability, Dequina
contends that she transported the marijuana under the
compulsion of an irresistible fear. Jundoc and Jingabo, on the
other hand, claim that they went along to accommodate
Dequina, a trusted childhood friend.
We are unconvinced.
A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force,
like one who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of
equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability because
he does not act with freedom. Actus me invito factus non est
meus actus. An act done by me against my will is not my act.
The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the
actor to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but
against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be
present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to
induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily
harm if the act be done.
A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be
of such a character as to leave no opportunity for the accused
for escape or self-defense in equal combat.19 Here, Dequina’s
version of events that culminated with her and Jundoc and
Jingabo’s arrests on September 29, 1999 is implausible.
Equally far-fetched is Jundoc and Jingabo’s assertion of blind
trust in Dequina and total ignorance of the transportation of
marijuana. We agree with the Court of Appeals when it
observed that:
While [Dequina] wants us to believe that she acted under
compulsion and that a certain Sally called all the shots, she
nevertheless admitted that their accommodations when they
reached Manila was with her aunt in Guadalupe. On cross
examination, she said that it was she who told Sally that they
were going to stay with her aunt. More importantly, the alleged
threat on her daughter was unclear. At one point in her
testimony, she claimed that her daughter was to be under the
custody of Sally while she was away. However, during the trial
her lawyer manifested that her daughter was in fact in Manila
and in the court room attending the hearing.1âwphi1 Moreover,
accused-appellants themselves picture a very precise and
elaborate scheme in the transport of the huge shipment of
marijuana.
With this, it is simply contrary to human experience that the
people behind the shipment would entrust the same to an
unknowing and uncertain person such as [Dequina] and her two
stooges, unless they themselves were in on it. Furthermore, the
scheme or transport of the marijuana shipment was so exact
that [Jundoc] and [Jingabo] only had enough time to rest in the
house of [Dequina’s] aunt in Guadalupe – from the time they
arrived in Manila in the morning to the time they had to go to
provincial bus station in the afternoon, negating their purported
desire to see Manila. Clearly, the defense’ story is riddled with
holes.
Conspiracy can be inferred from and proven by acts of the
accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and
design, concerted action, and community of interests. Although
the same degree of proof required for establishing the crime is
required to support a finding of the presence of conspiracy, it
need not be proven by direct evidence. Conspiracy may be
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was
perpetrated.21 Thus, as found by the RTC, conspiracy by and
among accused-appellants was present in this case, as it may
be inferred from the following acts of accused-appellants:
This was shown when by their account, the three accused left
Iloilo together, stayed in Manila for a while, left for Dau,
Mabalacat, Pampanga and returned to Manila thereafter. They
were together when the apprehending police officers pounced
on them near the pier premises on their way back to Iloilo, each
of them carrying a travelling bag which contained marijuana. x
x x.22
People v. Bandian
Facts:
Charged with the crime of infanticide, convicted thereof and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua and the corresponding
accessory penalties, with the costs of the suit, Josefina Bandian
appealed from said sentence alleging that the trial court erred:
I. In taking into consideration, to convict her, her alleged
admission to Dr. Nepomuceno that she had thrown away her
newborn babe, and
II. In holding her guilty of infanticide, beyond reasonable doubt,
and in sentencing her to reclusion perpetua, with costs.
At about 7 o'clock in the morning of January 31, 1936, Valentin
Aguilar, the appellant's neighbor, saw the appellant go to a
thicket about four or five brazas from her house, apparently to
respond to a call of nature because it was there that the people
of the place used to go for that purpose. A few minutes later, he
again saw her emerge from the thicket with her clothes stained
with blood both in the front and back, staggering and visibly
showing signs of not being able to support herself. He ran to her
aid and, having noted that she was very weak and dizzy, he
supported and helped her go up to her house and placed her in
her own bed.
Upon being asked before Aguilar brought her to her house, what
happened to her, the appellant merely answered that she was
very dizzy. Not wishing to be alone with the appellant in such
circumstances, Valentin Aguilar called Adriano Comcom, who
lived nearby, to help them, and later requested him to take
bamboo leaves to stop the hemorrhage which had come upon
the appellant. Comcom had scarcely gone about five brazas
when he saw the body of a newborn babe near a path adjoining
the thicket where the appellant had gone a few moments before.
Comcom informed Aguilar of it and latter told him to bring the
body to the appellant's house. Upon being asked whether the
baby which had just been shown to her was hers or not, the
appellant answered in the affirmative.
Upon being notified of the incident at 2 o'clock in the afternoon
of said day, Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno, president of the sanitary
division of Talisayan, Oriental Misamis, went to the appellant's
house and found her lying in bed still bleeding. Her bed, the floor
of her house and beneath it, directly under the bed, were full of
blood. Basing his opinion upon said facts, the physician in
question declared that the appellant gave birth in her house and
in her own bed; that after giving birth she threw her child into the
thicket to kill it for the purpose of concealing her dishonor from
the man, Luis Kirol, with whom she had theretofore been living
maritally, because the child was not his but of another man with
whom she had previously had amorous relations. To give force
to his conclusions, he testified that the appellant had admitted
to him that she had killed her child, when he went to her house
at the time and on the date above-stated.
It should be stated that there is no evidence showing how the
child in question died. Dr. Nepomuceno himself affirmed that the
wounds found in the body of the child were not caused by the
hand of man but by bites animals, the pigs that usually roamed
through the thicket where it was found.
Held:
Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must
be committed wilfully or
consciously, or at least it must be result of a voluntary,
conscious and free act or omission. Even in cases where said
crimes are committed through mere imprudence, the person
who commits them, under said circumstances, must be in the
full enjoyment of his mental faculties, or must be conscious of
his acts, in order that he may be held liable.
The evidence certainly does not show that the appellant, in
causing her child's death in one way or another, or in
abandoning it in the thicket, did so wilfully, consciously or
imprudently. She had no cause to kill or abandon it, to expose
it to death, because her affair with a former lover, which was not
unknown to her second lover, Luis Kirol, took place three years
before the incident; her married life with Kirol — she considers
him her husband as he considers her his wife — began a year
ago; as he so testified at the trial, he knew that the appellant
was pregnant and he believed from the beginning, affirming
such belief when he testified at the trial, that the child carried by
the appellant in her womb was his, and he testified that he and
she had been eagerly waiting for the birth of the child. The
appellant, therefore, had no cause to be ashamed of her
pregnancy to Kirol.
If to the foregoing facts is added the testimony of the witnesses
Valentin Aguilar and Adriano Comcom that the child was taken
from the thicket and carried already dead to the appellant's happened by mere accident, from liability any person who so
house after the appellant had left the place, staggering, without acts and behaves under such circumstances (art. 12,
strength to remain on her feet and very dizzy, to the extent of subsection 4, Revised Penal Code).
having to be as in fact she was helped to go up to her house
and to lie in bed, it will clearly appear how far from the truth were In conclusion, taking into account the foregoing facts and
Dr. Nepomuceno's affirmation and conclusions. Also add to all considerations, and granting that the appellant was aware of her
these the fact that the appellant denied having made any involuntary childbirth in the thicket and that she later failed to
admission to said physician and that from the time she became take her child therefrom, having been so prevented by reason
pregnant she continuously had fever. of causes entirely independent of her will, it should be held that
the alleged errors attributed to the lower court by the appellant
This illness and her extreme debility undoubtedly caused by her are true; and it appearing that under such circumstances said
long illness as well as the hemorrhage which she had upon appellant has the fourth and seventh exempting circumstances
giving birth, coupled with the circumstances that she is a in her favor, is hereby acquitted of the crime of which she had
primipara, being then only 23 years of age, and therefore been accused and convicted, with costs de oficio, and she is
inexperienced as to childbirth and as to the inconvenience or actually confined in jail in connection with this case, it is ordered
difficulties usually attending such event; and the fact that she, that she be released immediately. So ordered.
like her lover Luis Kirol — a mere laborer earning only twenty-
five centavos a day — is uneducated and could supplant with
what she had read or learned from books what experience itself
could teach her, undoubtedly were the reasons why she was
not aware of her childbirth, or if she was, it did not occur to her
or she was unable, due to her debility or dizziness, which
causes may be considered lawful or insuperable to constitute
the seventh exempting circumstance (art. 12, Revised Penal
Code), to take her child from the thicket where she had given it
birth, so as not to leave it abandoned and exposed to the danger
of losing its life.

The act performed by the appellant in the morning in question,

by going into the thicket, according to her, to respond to call of
nature, notwithstanding the fact that she had fever for a long
time, was perfectly lawful. If by doing so she caused a wrong as
that of giving birth to her child in that same place and later
abandoning it, not because of imprudence or any other reason
than that she was overcome by strong dizziness and extreme
debility, she should not be blamed therefor because it all