Statutory Law.

  

 Rufus Rodriguez, Legal Research, Chapter 4, pp. 83-149 (2002)

STATUTORY LAW consists mainly of the following:

1. The 1987 Constitution

2. Treaties and International Agreements
3. Statutes enacted by Legislature
4. Administrative Rules and Regulations
5. Ordinances enacted by Autonomous Region
6. Ordinances enacted by Local Government Units

Statute laws are the rules and regulations promulgated by competent authorities; enactments of legislative
bodies (national or local) or they may be rules and regulations of administrative (departments or bureau) or
judicial agencies. Research of statutory law does not end with consulting the law itself.  At times, it extends to
the intent of each provision or even the words used in the law. In this regard, the deliberations of these laws
must be consulted. The deliberation of laws, except Presidential Decrees and other Martial law issuances are
available

 Constitution

In our legal order, the Constitution is “law” and law of the highest authoritativeness and obligation.  As the
“supreme law of the land,” it is the ultimate authority to which reference must be made to determine the
validity of national laws, administrative e regulations, local ordinances and executive actions.

RESEARCHING THE CONSTITUTION

 The different Constitutions of the Philippines are provided in some history books such as Gregorio F.
Zaide’s Philippine Constitutional History and Constitutions of Modern Nations  (1970) and Founders of
Freedom; The History of Three Constitution  by a seven-man Board.  The Philippine legal system
recognizes the following Constitutions:  Malolos, 1935, 1943,  1973, Provisional or Freedom and
1987 Constitutions.   The 1943 Constitution was effective only during the Second World War while
the Provisional Constitution was effective only from the time President Corazon became President
until the 1987 Constitution was ratified and proclaimed by President Aquino by virtue of
Proclamation No. 58, February 11, 1987.
 Majority of printed publications provide the 1935, 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions only. The
online sources (E-library (Links to an external site.),  Chan Robles (Links to an external
site.),  LawPhil (Links to an external site.),  CD Asia (Links to an external site.), Law Juan) however have
the full-text  of  all  Constitutions of the Philippines: Malolos, 1935, 1943 of Japanese, 1973,
Provisional or Freedom Constitution and 1987.  The  books of Senator Ambrosio Padilla (The 1987
Constitutions of the Republic of the Philippines  . vol. 3, pp 779-863) and  Carmelo Sison  provide  a
comparative presentation of the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
 Text of the Malolos Constitution is available in some history books such as Gregorio F.
Zaide’s Philippine Constitutional History and Constitutions of Modern Nations  , p. 176 (1970) and
online. (E-library (Links to an external site.),  Chan Robles (Links to an external site.),  CD Asia (Links to
an external site.), Law Juan).
 The Constitutional Convention proceedings provide for the intent and background of each provision
of the Constitution.  Sources for the  1934-1935  Constitutional  Convention are: 10 volumes of the
Constitutional Convention Record  by the House of Representatives (1966), Salvador Laurel's seven
volumes book entitled Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention  (1966); 6 volumes of
the  Philippine Constitution, Origins, Making, Meaning and Application  by the Philippine Lawyers
Association with Jose Aruego as one of  its editors (1970) and Journal of  the Constitutional
convention of the Philippines by Vicente Francisco.
  Proceedings of the 1973 Constitutional Convention were never published.  A photocopy and
softcopy of the complete compilation is available at the Filipiniana Reading Room of the National
Library of the Philippines.
 Journals (3 volumes) and Records (5 volumes) of the Constitutional Convention of 1986 were
published by the Constitutional Commission.  This publication does not have an index. This problem
was remedied when CD Technologies Asia Inc. came out with a CD-ROM version, which facilitated
research for it has a search engine.
 The proceedings and text of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions are electronically  available at
the Supreme Court E-Library.
 Commentaries or interpretations on the constitution, decisions of the Supreme Court and other
courts, textbooks or treaties, periodical articles of the different Constitution are available.

o Civil Code, art. 7

Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not excused by
disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter
shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders or regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution.

Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, 15 July 1936.

FACTS: In the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro
Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of the National
Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. The provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the
petitioner as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number
of votes. On November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office. Respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before
the Electoral Commission a “Motion of Protest” against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara,
and praying, among other-things, that said respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly
for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified.

Petitioner Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral
Commission a “Motion to Dismiss the Protest”, alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was
adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests
against the election of its members should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and
is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest in question was filed out of the
prescribed period

Respondent Pedro Ynsua, filed an “Answer to the Motion of Dismissal” alleging that there is no legal or
constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest against the election of a member of the National
Assembly after confirmation.

The Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner’s Motion to
Dismiss the Protest.

ISSUES: Whether the Electoral Commission has the right to take cognizance of the protest regardless of the
National Assembly’s proclamation. – YES.

HELD: The Electoral Commission has been granted by the Constitution (1935) to be “the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly,”
according to Section 4 of Article VI of the 1935 Constitution. To wit:
 a. SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme
Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly,
three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by
the party having the second largest number of votes herein. The senior Justice in the
Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly.”

b. The Court in deciding also invoked the intentions of the Framers through the delegates’
deliberations. Seeing that it was the express intention of the Sponsorship Committee and the
Convention to create an impartial body to decide cases involving the elections, it is clear what
the Electoral Commission’s constitutional duty is

Notes:

 The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in
the workings of the various departments of the government.

In the matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar, 94 Phil. 534 (1954).

FACTS: The Court passed several candidates who were not able to meet the requirements in pursuant to the
Rule 127, Section 14 of the Rules of Court. This brought upon bar flunkers who felt discriminated upon, hence,
they filed a petition. In response to this, the Republic act No. 972 was created that made several adjustments
that allowed ill-prepared candidates to pass the bar exams.

ISSUES: Whether RA 972 is unconstitutional; and Whether Congress committed grave abuse of discretion. –
YES.

HELD: Republic Act no. 972 is declared unconstitutional because it is contrary to public interest:

 1094 bar candidates who confessed to having inadequate preparation for the bar exams.
 The public interest demands of the legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more
so as legal problems evolve by the times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of
the vital requisites for the practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly
 An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should be
developed constantly and maintained firmly

In the judicial system from which ours has evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function
and responsibility.

Serrano vs. Gallant, G.R. No. 167614, 24 March 2009.

FACTS: For Antonio Serrano, a Filipino seafarer, the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8042, does not magnify the contributions of OFWs to national development, but exacerbates the
hardships borne by them by unduly limiting their entitlement in case of illegal dismissal to their lump-sum salary
either for the unexpired portion of their employment contract “or for three months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less” (subject clause). Petitioner claims that the last clause violates the OFWs’
constitutional rights in that it impairs the terms of their contract, deprives them of equal protection and denies
them due process.

ISSUES: Whether the 5th paragraph of Section 10, RA 8042 violate the non-impairment of contract clause of
the Constitution. – NO.
HELD: The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly enacted have only a prospective
operation, and cannot affect acts or contracts already perfected; however, as to laws already in existence, their
provisions are read into contracts and deemed a part thereof. Thus, the non-impairment clause under Section
10, Article II is limited in application to laws about to be enacted that would in any way derogate from existing
acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties thereto.

As aptly observed by the OSG, the enactment of R.A. No. 8042 in 1995 preceded the execution of the
employment contract between petitioner and respondents in 1998. Hence, it cannot be argued that R.A. No.
8042, particularly the subject clause, impaired the employment contract of the parties. Rather, when the
parties executed their 1998 employment contract, they were deemed to have incorporated into it all the
provisions of R.A. No. 8042.

Sameer Overseas Placement Agency v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 170139, 5 August 2014.

FACTS: Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency.
Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired thus signed a one-year employment contract for a monthly salary of
NT$15,360.00. Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. She alleged
that in her employment contract, she agreed to work as quality control for one year. In Taiwan, she was asked
to work as a cutter.

Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy, without prior notice,
that she was terminated and that “she should immediately report to their office to get her salary and passport.”
She was asked to “prepare for immediate repatriation.” Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July
14, 1997, she only earned a total of NT$9,000.15 According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her
plane ticket to Manila.

On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC against petitioner and Wacoal.
LA dismissed the complaint. NLRC reversed LA’s decision. CA affirmed the ruling of the National Labor
Relations Commission finding respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her three months’ worth of salary,
the reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation, and attorney’s fees

ISSUES: Whether Cabiles was entitled to the unexpired portion of her salary due to illegal dismissal. – YES.

HELD: The Court held that the award of the three-month equivalent of respondent’s salary should be increased
to the amount equivalent to the unexpired term of the employment contract. In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime
Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., this court ruled that the clause “or for three (3) months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and
substantive due process.

A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It “confers no rights; it imposes no
duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.”

The Court said that they are aware that the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less” was reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of Republic Act No. 10022 in
2010.

Ruling on the constitutional issue

In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the government may exercise its
powers in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of the existence of any law that supports
such exercise. The Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws must be read in light of the
Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it is a nullity. Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null
because it is inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment
of the same or a similar law or provision. A law or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional
remains as such unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.

The Court observed that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in Republic Act. No. 10022, violates the
constitutional rights to equal protection and due process.96 Petitioner as well as the Solicitor General have
failed to show any compelling change in the circumstances that would warrant us to revisit the precedent.

The Court declared, once again, the clause, “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less” in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is
declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.

Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, 3 February 1997.

FACTS: Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, Respondent Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) decided to sell through public bidding shares of the Manila Hotel. There were two entities who
participated in the bidding: Petitioner Manila Prince Hotel (MHC), a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy
the shares at ₱ 41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, which bid for the shares at ₱ 44.00 per
share. Eventually, MHC matched the bid price of Renong Berhad at ₱ 44.00 per share. MHC even sent a
manager’s check to GSIS which the latter refused. Apprehensive about the GSIS’ refusal, MHC filed a petition
for prohibition and mandamus before the Supreme Court.

MHC invokes Paragraph 2, Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution (commonly known as the “Filipino
First Policy”) where it states that in grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos. In the same vein, MHC submits that Manila
Hotel has become a part of the national patrimony for its importance in the national Filipino heritage. Also, the
ownership of shares by the GSIS shows that they are engaged in the hotel business, which makes them part of
the national economy. Thus, the aforementioned constitutional provision can be invoked. Further, MHC should
be considered the preferred bidder since the bidding rules provide that the shares must be awarded to qualified
bidders in case the highest bidder cannot be awarded the same, provided that the qualified bidders matched the
highest bid.

On the other hand, GSIS maintains that Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. XII of the Constitution cannot be invoked because it
is not self-executing and would require an implementing legislation. Granting that the said provision is self-
executing, the Manila Hotel cannot be considered a part of the national patrimony because it only refers to
lands of public domain, waters, minerals, etc. Further, granting that Manila Hotel is part of the national
patrimony, GSIS is not selling its land or the building, but its shares of ownership.

ISSUES: Whether Sec. 10, Art. XII of the Constitution may be invoked as a self-executing provision. – YES.

HELD: It admits that a provision which lays down the basic principle, such as those found in Art. II of the
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. However, the Court also held that a provision which is complete in
itself and becomes operative without aid of an enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by
means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus, a constitutional
provision is self-executing if the nature or extent of right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the
constitution itself. Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. XII of the Constitution is mandatory, positive command, which is
complete in itself and requires not further implementing laws for its enforcement. Thus, it may be invoked by
MHC in the present case.
  Statutes
o How a bill becomes law
 Phil. Const. art. VI, §§ 26 & 27.

SECTION 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title thereof.

(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and
printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage,
except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall
be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

SECTION 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the
President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his
objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed
to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass
the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be
reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such
cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for
or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House
where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he
had signed it.

(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff
bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.

o Effectivity of laws
 Civil Code, art. 2.

ARTICLE 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.

Tañada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, 29 December 1986.

FACTS: Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the disclosure of a number of
Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by Law. The government argued
that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided, as when the
decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon approval. The court decided
on April 24, 1985 in affirming the necessity for publication of some of the decrees. The court ordered the
respondents to publish in the official gazette all unpublished Presidential Issuances which are of general force
and effect. The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and
those which are not. The publication means complete publication, and that publication must be made in the
official gazette.

ISSUES: Whether all laws shall be published in the official gazette.

HELD: The Court held that all statute including those of local application shall be published as condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.

The publication must be full or no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of
the laws. The clause “unless otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the new Civil Code meant that the publication
required therein was not always imperative, that the publication when necessary, did not have to be made in
the official gazette.

Virgilio O. Garcillano,  R. No. 170338, 23 December 2008.

FACTS: More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between
the President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
surfaced. They captured unprecedented public attention and thrust the country into a controversy that placed
the legitimacy of the present administration on the line, and resulted in the near-collapse of the Arroyo
government. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the “Hello Garci” tapes, allegedly contained the President’s
instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004
presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted
separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.

In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then Minority Floor Leader Francis G. Escudero
delivered a privilege speech, “Tale of Two Tapes,” and set in motion a congressional investigation jointly
conducted by the Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security,
Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondent House
Committees). During the inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged. But on July 5, 2005,
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of former
NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the respondent House Committees seven alleged “original” tape
recordings of the supposed three-hour taped conversation. After prolonged and impassioned debate by the
committee members on the admissibility and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually played in
the chambers of the House.

Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with this Court a Petition for
Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that the respondent House Committees be restrained from using
these tape recordings of the “illegally obtained” wiretapped conversations in their committee reports and for
any other purpose. He further implored that the said recordings and any reference thereto be ordered stricken
off the records of the inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed to desist from further using the
recordings in any of the House proceedings.

Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and debates on the “Garci tapes” abruptly stopped.

After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo Lacson roused the slumbering issue with a privilege
speech, “The Lighthouse That Brought Darkness.” In his discourse, Senator Lacson promised to provide the
public “the whole unvarnished truth – the what’s, when’s, where’s, who’s and why’s” of the alleged wiretap, and
sought an inquiry into the perceived willingness of telecommunications providers to participate in nefarious
wiretapping activities.

On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacson’s speech was referred to the Senate Committee on
National Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo Biazon, who had previously filed two bills seeking to
regulate the sale, purchase and use of wiretapping equipment and to prohibit the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) from performing electoral duties.

On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of
Appeals, filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the
Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the intended legislative
inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.
ISSUES: Whether the publication in the internet of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation is sufficient?

HELD: The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without
duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.

Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that “[t]he Senate or the House of
Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure.” The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the
basic requirements of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code,
which provides that “[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in
the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.”

The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules
of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation
only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the
term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of
these rules when they first opened their session.

The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect.
R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a
written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in
evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents. It does not
make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution,
use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries
in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules,
because it can do so only “in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.”

Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this
fact, the recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant
petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative investigation subject thereof still could
not be undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees, because no published rules governed it, in clear
contravention of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the petition in G.R. No. 179275 is
GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines and/or
any of its committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the “Hello Garci” tapes.

o Other Principles
 Civil Code, arts. 3, 4, & 7.

ARTICLE 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. (2)

ARTICLE 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. (3)
ARTICLE 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be
excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

 Administrative Code, bk. I, chaps. 5 & 6.

CHAPTER 5

Operation and Effect of Laws

SECTION 18. When Laws Take Effect.—Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided.

SECTION 19. Prospectivity.—Laws shall have prospective effect unless the contrary is expressly provided.

SECTION 20. Interpretation of Laws and Administrative Issuances.—In the interpretation of a law or

administrative issuance promulgated in all the official languages, the English text shall control, unless otherwise
specifically provided. In case of ambiguity, omission or mistake, the other texts may be consulted.

SECTION 21. No Implied Revival of Repealed Law.—When a law which expressly repeals a prior law is itself
repealed, the law first repealed shall not be thereby revived unless expressly so provided.

SECTION 22. Revival of Law Impliedly Repealed.—When a law which impliedly repeals a prior law is itself
repealed, the prior law shall thereby be revived, unless the repealing law provides otherwise.

SECTION 23. Ignorance of the Law.—Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

Official Gazette

SECTION 24. Contents.—There shall be published in the Official Gazette all legislative acts and resolutions of a
public nature; all executive and administrative issuances of general application; decisions or abstracts of
decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, or other courts of similar rank, as may be deemed by
the said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; such documents or classes of documents as may be
required so to be published by law; and such documents or classes of documents as the President shall
determine from time to time to have general application or which he may authorize so to be published.

The publication of any law, resolution or other official documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima facie
evidence of its authority.

SECTION 25. Editing and Publications.—The Official Gazette shall be edited in the Office of the President and
published weekly in Pilipino or in the English language. It shall be sold and distributed by the National Printing
Office which shall promptly mail copies thereof to subscribers free of postage.

Tawang Multipurpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad Water District, G.R. No. 166471, 22 March 2011.

FACTS: Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) is a cooperative, organized to provide domestic water
services in Barangay Tawang, La Trinidad, Benguet. La Trinidad Water District (LTWD) is a local water utility
created under Section 47 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 198, as amended. It is authorized to supply water for
domestic, industrial and commercial purposes within the municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet.

TMPC filed with the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) an application for a certificate of public
convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a waterworks system in Barangay Tawang. LTWD opposed TMPCs
application, arguing that its franchise is exclusive as provided under PD 198. A CPC is however granted. LTWD
filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by NWRB. LTWD then appealed to the RTC where
it court set aside the NWRB decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES: Whether the petition may be granted. – YES.

HELD: RTC Decision Set Aside. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation
of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations
organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than
fifty years.

Plain words do not require explanation. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions are clear franchises for the
operation of a public utility cannot be exclusive in character. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly
and clearly state that,"nor shall such franchise x x x be exclusive in character." There is no exception.

When the law is clear, there is nothing for the courts to do but to apply it. The duty of the Court is to apply the
law the way it is worded. What cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly. This rule is basic and,
to a reasonable mind, does not need explanation. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be
done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.

Indeed, the President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises that are exclusive in character.
What the President, Congress and the Court cannot legally do directly they cannot do indirectly. Thus, the
President, Congress and the Court cannot create indirectly.

In PD No. 198, as amended, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) created indirectly
franchises that are exclusive in character by allowing the BOD of LTWD and the LWUA to create directly
franchises that are exclusive in character.

In case of conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution always prevails because the
Constitution is the basic law to which all other laws must conform to. The duty of the Court is to uphold the
Constitution and to declare void all laws that do not conform to it. Petition Granted. Section 47 of PD 198 is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

o Treaties and executive agreements

Treaty. An agreement or a contract between two (bilateral) or more (multilateral) nations or sovereigns,
entered into by agents appointed (generally the Secretary of Foreign Affairs or ambassadors) for the
purpose and duly sanctioned by supreme powers of the respective countries.  Treaties that do not have
legislative sanctions are executive agreements which may or may not have legislative authorization, and
which have limited execution by constitutional restrictions.

In the Philippines, no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in
by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. (Article VII, section 21, 1987 Constitution). 
Those without the concurrence of the Senate are considered as Executive Agreements.

The President of the Philippines may enter into international treaties or agreements as the national
welfare and interest may require, and may contract and guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the
Republic, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.  During the time of Marcos, there was
the so-called Tripoli Agreement.

EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT

Executive Agreement.  Treaty that does not have legislative sanctions, which may or may not have
legislative authorization, and which have limited execution by constitutional restrictions.
  Phil. Const. art. VIII, §§ 20 & 21; art. XII, § 2.  

 Phil. Const. art. VII, § 20 & 21

SECTION 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendar
year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its decisions on applications for loans to be contracted or
guaranteed by the Government or government-owned and controlled corporations which would have the
effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be provided by law.

SECTION 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at
least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

 Phil. Const. art. XII, § 2.

SECTION 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources
are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control
and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be
for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under
such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure
and limit of the grant.

The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive
economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as
cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and
lagoons.

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and
other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State
shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision,
within thirty days from its execution.

 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 2(a), (b), & (g), 31-33.

Article 2

Use of terms

1. For the purposes of the present Convention:

(a) “treaty” means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever
its particular designation;
(b) “ratification”, “acceptance”, “approval” and “accession” mean in each case the international act so named
whereby a State establishes on the international plane its consent to be bound by a treaty;

(g) “party” means a State which has consented to be bound by the treaty and for which the treaty is in force.

Article 31

General rule of interpretation

1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.

2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including
its preamble and annexes:

a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the
conclusion of the treaty;
b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty
and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.

3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:

(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the
application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the
parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.

Article 33

Interpretation of treaties authenticated in two or more languages

1. When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is equally authoritative in each
language, unless the treaty provides or the parties agree that, in case of divergence, a particular text shall
prevail.

2. A version of the treaty in a language other than one of those in which the text was authenticated shall be
considered an authentic text only if the treaty so provides or the parties so agree.

3. The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text.

4. Except where a particular text prevails in accordance with paragraph 1, when a comparison of the authentic
texts discloses a difference of meaning which the application of articles 31 and 32 does not remove, the
meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be
adopted.

Bayan Muna v. Alberto Romulo, G.R. No. 159618, 1 February 2011.

FACTS: Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the marginalized
sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the
period material to this case. Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then Executive
Secretary.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal
Court (ICC) with “the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international
concern x x x and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions.” The serious crimes adverted to
cover those considered grave under international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes,
and crimes of aggression.

On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge d’Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which,
by its terms, is “subject to ratification, acceptance or approval” by the signatory states. As of the filing of the
instant petition, only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed the ratification, approval
and concurrence process. The Philippines is not among the 92.

RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement

On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No. 0470 to the Department
of Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-surrender bilateral agreement (Agreement, hereinafter)
between the USA and the RP.

Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-037 dated May 13, 2003 (E/N BFO-028-03, hereinafter), the RP,
represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and accepted the US proposals embodied under the US
Embassy Note adverted to and put in effect the Agreement with the US government. In esse, the Agreement
aims to protect what it refers to and defines as “persons” of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits
that might be brought against them in international tribunals.8 It is reflective of the increasing pace of the
strategic security and defense partnership between the two countries. As of May 2, 2003, similar bilateral
agreements have been effected by and between the US and 33 other countries.

The Agreement pertinently provides as follows:

1. For purposes of this Agreement, “persons” are current or former Government officials,
employees (including contractors), or military personnel or nationals of one Party.
2. Persons of one Party present in the territory of the other shall not, absent the express consent of
the first Party,
(a) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any international tribunal for any
purpose, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, or
(b) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any other entity or third country, or
expelled to a third country, for the purpose of surrender to or transfer to any
international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security
Council.

3. When the [US] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the Philippines to a
third country, the [US] will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that person by the third
country to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN
Security Council, absent the express consent of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines [GRP].
4. When the [GRP] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the [USA] to a third
country, the [GRP] will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that person by the third country
to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security
Council, absent the express consent of the Government of the [US].
5. This Agreement shall remain in force until one year after the date on which one party notifies the
other of its intent to terminate the Agreement. The provisions of this Agreement shall continue
 to apply with respect to any act occurring, or any allegation arising, before the effective date of
termination.

In response to a query of then Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayo on the status of the non-surrender
agreement, Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his letter of October 28, 2003 that the exchange of diplomatic
notes constituted a legally binding agreement under international law; and that, under US law, the said
agreement did not require the advice and consent of the US Senate.

In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying the
Agreement and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect.

ISSUES: Whether the the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement is valid in relation to the Rome Statute and the
national criminal jurisdiction of the Philippines. – YES.

HELD: The agreement is not in contravention with the Rome Statute but complementary. as per article 1 of the
Rome Statute, the ICC “shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes
of international concern, as referred to in this Statute, and shall be complementary to national criminal
jurisdictions.” The primary jurisdiction rests on the state where the crime is committed followed by the ICC
jurisdiction. Further, it neither violates nor neglects the state’s discretion to try persons in their national criminal
jurisdiction. Moreover, it is consistent with the requirement of consent prior to the pursuance of international
obligations and agreements, wherein the surrender of criminals shall not be requested without the consent of
the sending state.

IPAP v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204605, 19 July 2016.

FACTS: The Madrid System for the International Registration of Marks (Madrid System), which is the
centralized system providing a one-stop solution for registering and managing marks worldwide, allows the
trademark owner to file one application in one language, and to pay one set of fees to protect his mark in the
territories of up to 97 member-states. The Madrid System is governed by the Madrid Agreement, concluded in
1891, and the Madrid Protocol, concluded in 1989.

The Madrid Protocol, which was adopted in order to remove the challenges deterring some countries from
acceding to the Madrid Agreement, has two objectives, namely: (1) to facilitate securing protection for marks;
and (2) to make the management of the registered marks easier in different countries.

In 2011, the Intellectual Property Office of the Philippines (IPOPHL) recommended to the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA) the country's accession to the Madrid Protocol. The DFA then endorsed the Madrid
Protocol to President Benigno Aquino III, who eventually signed it on March 27, 2012. The DFA treated the
Madrid Protocol as an executive agreement, not a treaty, and therefore did not require the concurrence of at
least 2/3 of all members of the Senators following its ratification. The Madrid Protocol entered into force in the
Philippines on July 25, 2012.

Subsequently, the Intellectual Property Association of the Philippines (IPAP), an association of more than 100
law firms and individual practitioners in intellectual property law, challenged the constitutionality of the entry
into force of the Madrid Protocol. IPAP argued that the Madrid Protocol was a treaty that required Presidential
ratification and Senate concurrence before its entry into force in the Philippines. Because the Madrid Protocol
did not have Senate's concurrence, IPAP argued that its entry into force was unconstitutional.

Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUES: Whether the President’s ratification of the Madrid Protocol is valid and constitutional.
HELD: In the Philippines, the DFA, by virtue of Section 9, Executive Order No. 459, is initially given the power
to determine whether an agreement is to be treated as a treaty or as an executive agreement.

The distinction between treaties and executive agreements are highlighted in Commissioner of Customs v.
Eastern Sea Trading, “... the right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of
subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history we
have entered into executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most-
favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection…”

Francis B. Sayre, former U.S. High Commissioner to the Philippines, in his work on “The Constitutionality of
Trade Agreement Acts” stated that executive agreements, “cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels,
navigation dues, income tax on on shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and
commercial relations generally, international claims, postal matters, the registration of trademarks and
copyrights, etcetera. Some of them were concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in
conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff
acts…” The pronouncement demonstrates that the registration of trademarks and copyrights are subject of
executive agreements without the need for Senate concurrence.

DFA Secretary Del Rosario’s determination and treatment of the Madrid Protocol as an executive agreement,
being in apparent contemplation of the express state policies on intellectual property as well as within the
power under Executive Order No. 459, are upheld

Pangilinan v. Cayetano,  R. Nos. 238875/239483/240954, 16 March 2021.

FACTS: On March 15, 2018, President Duterte announced PH’s withdrawal from the International Criminal
Court (ICC). The day after, he submitted a Notice of Withdrawal through a Note Verbale to the United Nations’
Secretary General. This was then received and acknowledged by the Secretary General. Three petitions were
filed praying that the Notice of Withdrawal be void ab initio or invalid and directing the Executive Secretary to
recall and revoke the Notice of Withdrawal and to submit the issue before the Senate for its deliberation. This is
because the withdrawal should have gotten the concurrence of at least two-thirds of the Senate before being
submitted.

ISSUES: Whether the Philippines’ withdrawal through a Note Verbale is valid. – YES.

HELD: The Court held that it is valid as President Duterte was able to complete the requisites necessary for
withdrawing from the Rome Statute, as seen in Article 127(1) of the Rome Statute. Furthermore, while Senate
concurrence is expressly required to make treaties valid and effective, no similar express mechanism concerning
withdrawal from treaties or international agreements is provided in the Constitution. Thus, the Court ruled that
the petitions be rendered moot as the ICC’s acknowledgement of the withdrawal through the Note Verbale
removed any potential relief from this Court’s sphere.

o Presidential issuances

Presidential Issuances. Administrative acts, orders and regulations of the President touching on
the organization or mode of operation of the government, re-arranging or adjusting districts,
divisions or parts of the Philippines, and acts and commands governing the general performance
of duties of public officials and employees or disposing of issues of general concern are made
effective by Executive Orders. Those orders fixing the dates when specific laws, resolutions or
orders cease to take effect and any information concerning matters of public moment
determined by law, resolution or executive orders, take the form of executive Proclamation.
  Administrative Code, bk. III, chaps. 1 & 2.

Section 1. Power of Control. - The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
Section 2. Executive Orders. - Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent
character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be
promulgated in executive orders.
Section 3. Administrative Orders. - Acts of the President which relate to particular aspect of
governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in
administrative orders.
Section 4. Proclamations. - Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of
public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or
regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of
an executive order.
Section 5. Memorandum Orders. - Acts of the President on matters of administrative detail or of
subordinate or temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or office of the
Government shall be embodied in memorandum orders.
Section 6. Memorandum Circulars. - Acts of the President on matters relating to internal
administration, which the President desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the
departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the Government, for information or compliance, shall
be embodied in memorandum circulars.
Section 7. General or Special Orders. - Acts and commands of the President in his capacity as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or special
orders.
Types of Presidential Issuances
 Executive Order. These are acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent
character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory power. "Administrative
acts, orders, and regulations of the President touching on the organization or mode of
operation of the government, re-arranging or adjusting the districts, divisions or parts of the
Philippines, and acts and commands governing the general performance and duties of public
officials and employees or disposing of issues of general concerns."[1]
 Executive Proclamation. "Orders fixing the dates when specific laws, resolutions, or orders
ceases to take effect and any information concerning matters of public moment determined by
law, resolution or executive orders."[2]
 Memorandum Orders.  Acts of the President on matters of administrative detail of subordinate
or temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or office of the Government.
 Memorandum Circulars.  Acts of the President on matters relating to internal administration,
which the President desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the departments,
agencies, bureaus or offices of the Government, for information and compliance
 General or Special Orders. Acts and commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-
in-chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
 o Administrative issuances, rules, and regulations
 Administrative Code, bk. IV, chap. 11

Section 50. General Classification of Issuances. - The administrative issuances of Secretaries and heads
of bureaus, offices or agencies shall be in the form of circulars or orders.
(1) Circulars shall refer to issuances prescribing policies, rules and regulations, and procedures
promulgated pursuant to law, applicable to individuals and organizations outside the Government and
designed to supplement provisions of the law or to provide means for carrying them out, including
information relating thereto; and
(2) Orders shall refer to issuances directed to particular offices, officials, or employees, concerning
specific matters including assignments, detail and transfer of personnel, for observance or compliance
by all concerned.
Section 51. Numbering System of Issuances. - Every circular or order issued pursuant to the preceding
section shall properly be identified as such and chronologically numbered. Each class of issuance shall
begin with number 1 of each calendar year .
Section 52. Official Logbook. - Each department, bureau, office or agency shall keep and preserve a
logbook in which shall be recorded in chronological order, all final official acts, decisions, transactions
or contracts, pertaining to the department, bureau, office or agency. Whenever the performance of an
official act is in issue, the date and the time record in the logbook shall be controlling. The logbook
shall be in the custody of the chief Administrative Officer concerned and shall be open to the public
for inspection.
Section 53. Government-wide Application of the Classification of Issuances. -
(1) The Records Management and Archives Office in the General Services Administration shall provide
such assistance as may be necessary to effect general adherence to the foregoing classification of
issuances, including the conduct of studies for developing sub-classifications and guidelines to meet
peculiar needs; and
(2) All administrative issuances of a general or permanent character shall be compiled, indexed and
published pursuant to the provisions of this Code.
General Classification of Issuances
Circulars. Issuances prescribing policies, rules and regulations, and procedures promulgated pursuant
to law, applicable to individuals and organizations outside the Government and designed to
supplement provisions of law or to provide means for carrying them out, including information relating
thereto.
 If issued by by the Regional directors, such are purely information or of implementing nature
and orders relating to the administration of the internal affairs of regional offices and units
within their supervision
Orders. Issuance directed to particular officials, or employees concerning specific matters including
assignments, details and transfer of personnel, for observation or compliance by all concerned.  It
concerns the administration of the internal affairs of the bureau, office or regional office within such
bureau, office or regional office. 
All Departments, Bureaus, and other government agencies use or issue the Administrative Orders,
Memorandum Circulars and Memorandum Orders for their administrative rules and regulations always
start with No. 1 each year.[ Therefore, you need to note the (1) year it was promulgated; and (2) issuing
agency

 Administrative Code, bk. IV, chap. 6, § 36

Section 36. Authority to Prescribe Forms and Issue Regulations. -

(1) The head of a bureau or office shall prescribe forms and issue circulars or orders to secure the
harmonious and efficient administration of his bureau or office and to carry into full effect the laws
relating to matters within his jurisdiction. Penalties shall not be prescribed in any circular or order
for its violation, except as expressly allowed by law;
(2) Heads of bureaus or offices are authorized to issue orders regarding the administration of their
internal affairs for the guidance of or compliance by their officers and employees;
(3) Regional directors are authorized to issue circulars of purely information or implementing
nature and orders relating to the administration of the internal affairs of regional offices and units
within their supervision; and
(4) Issuances under paragraphs (2) and (3) hereof shall not require, for their effectivity, approval by
the Secretary or other authority.

 Civil Code, art. 7

ARTICLE 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be
excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

Tañada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, 29 December 1986.

FACTS: Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the disclosure of a number of
Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by Law. The government argued
that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided, as when the
decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon approval. The court decided
on April 24, 1985 in affirming the necessity for publication of some of the decrees. The court ordered the
respondents to publish in the official gazette all unpublished Presidential Issuances which are of general force
and effect. The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and
those which are not. The publication means complete publication, and that publication must be made in the
official gazette.

ISSUES: Whether all laws shall be published in the official gazette.

HELD: The Court held that all statute including those of local application shall be published as condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.

The publication must be full or no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of
the laws. The clause “unless otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the new Civil Code meant that the publication
required therein was not always imperative, that the publication when necessary, did not have to be made in
the official gazette.
 Commissioner of Customs v. Hypermix Feeds, G.R. No. 179579, 1 February 2012.

FACTS: In 2003, petitioner Commissioner of Customs issued CMO 27-2003 where wheat was classified
according to the following: (1) importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge; and which
would be the basis if wheat would be classified either as food grade or feed grade. The corresponding tariff for
food grade wheat was 3%, for feed grade, 7%.

On December 19, 2003, respondent filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the Las Piñas City RTC since it
feared that their importation of Chinese milling wheat would be affected by the memorandum. Respondent
argued that the order was in violation of the Revised Administrative Code and publication or registration with
the University of the Philippines Law Center.

Hypermix alleged that the regulation adjudged their import as feed grade without the benefit of prior
examination; thus, it would be subjected to the 7% tariff upon the arrival of the shipment, forcing them to pay
133% more than was proper.

Respondent also contended that the equal protection clause of the Constitution was violated when the
regulation treated non-flour millers differently from flour millers for no reason at all.

Lastly, respondent asserted that the retroactive application of the regulation was confiscatory in nature.

In 2004, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) effective for twenty (20) days from notice.
Petitioners thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss.

Customs alleged that: (1) the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, because
respondent was asking for a judicial determination of the classification of wheat; (2) an action for declaratory
relief was improper; (3) CMO 27-2003 was an internal administrative rule and not legislative in nature; and (4)
the claims of respondent were speculative and premature, because the Bureau of Customs (BOC) had yet to
examine respondent’s products.

In 2005, the RTC rendered its Decision without having to resolve the application for preliminary injunction and
the Motion to Dismiss since both parties agreed that it would be resolved together in the main case.

The trial court rule in favor of respondent. Petitioners appealed to the CA which was dismissed, hence this
petition.

ISSUES: Whether CMO 27-2003 is valid. – NO.

HELD: VIOLATION OF THE REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE

Petitioners violated respondent's right to due process in the issuance of CMO 27-2003 when they failed to
observe the requirements under the Revised Administrative Code:

○ Sec 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified
copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectively of this Code which are not filed
within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the bases of any sanction against any party of
persons.
 ○ Sec 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish
or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior
to the adoption of any rule. (2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed
rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least 2 weeks before the first hearing
thereon. (3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY

● Going now to the content of CMO 27-2003, The Court held that it is unconstitutional for being violative of
the equal protection clause of the Constitution because there is no reasonable classification.

● For a classification to be reasonable, it must be shown that: ○ (1) it rests on substantial distinctions ○ (2) it is
germane to the purpose of the law ○ (3) it is not limited to existing conditions only ○ (4) it applies equally to all
members of the same class

● It failed to meet those requirements because the Court do not see how the quality of wheat is affected by
who imports it, where it is discharged, or which country it came from. UNDUE EXERCISE OF POWERS LEGAL
RESEARCH S.Y. 2022-2023 | FIRST SEMESTER Module 3: Statutory Law

● Petitioner Commissioner of Customs also went beyond his powers when the regulation limited the customs
commissioner's duties mandated by Section 1403 of the Tariff and Customs Law, as amended. ○ The customs
officer [...] shall determine whether the packages designated for examination and their contents are in
accordance with the declaration in the entry, invoice and other pertinent documents and shall make return in
such a manner as to indicate whether the articles have been truly and correctly declared in the entry as regard
their quantity, measurement, weight, and tariff classification and not imported contrary to law [...]

● The provision mandates that the customs officer must first assess and determine the classifiation of the
imported article before tariff may be imposed.

● But CMO 23-2007 has already classified the article even BEFORE the customs officer had the chance to
examine it.

● In effect, the petitioner, Commissioner of Customs diminished the powers granted by the Tariff and Customs
Code with regard to wheat importation when it no longer required the customs officer's prior examination and
assessment of the proper classification of the wheat.

● Basically, the Commissioner of Customs went beyond his powers of delegated authority when the regulation
limited the powers of the customs officer to examine and assess imported articles.

o Ordinances

Ordinances Enacted by the Autonomous Region

The 1987 Constitution created the Autonomous Regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordillera.   The
legislative assemblies of these autonomous regions enact ordinances to govern the region and may
create administrative agencies to operate in the regions.
Ordinances Enacted by Local Government Units
Each of the basic local government units, provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, have
lawmaking powers to pass what is commonly called “ordinances” (to distinguish them from statutes
enacted by Congress), which are usually of local interests only. 
The "general welfare clause" empowers local government units to enact and implement measures for
the general well-being of their inhabitants as an exercise of police power.
Section 16 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides:
SECTION 16. General Welfare. – Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental
for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the
general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure
and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and
safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the
development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public
morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their
residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.  
The Local Government Code of 1991 further provides:
SECTION 511. Posting and Publication of Ordinances with Penal Sanctions. –
(a) Ordinances with penal sanctions shall be posted at prominent places in the provincial capitol,
city, municipal or barangay hall, as the case may be, for a minimum period of three (3)
consecutive weeks. Such ordinances shall also be published in a newspaper of general
circulation, where available, within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit
concerned, except in the case of barangay ordinances. Unless otherwise provided therein, said
ordinances shall take effect on the day following its publication, or at the end of the period of
posting, whichever occurs later.
(b) Any public officer or employee who violates an ordinance may be meted administrative
disciplinary action, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate civil or criminal action.
(c) The secretary to the sanggunian concerned shall transmit official copies of such ordinances
to the chief executive officer of the Office Gazette within seven (7) days following the approval
of the said ordinance for publication purposes. The Official Gazette may publish ordinances
with penal sanctions for archival and reference purposes.

White Light Corp. v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846, 20 January 2009 (validity)

FACTS: Manila Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed an Ordinance prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels,
lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila. The City claims that it is a
legitimate exercise of police power.

Herein petitioners, assails the validity and constitutionality of the ordinance arguing that it violates the right to
privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is an unreasonable and
oppressive interference in their business.
The RTC declared the ordinance null and void, thus, the City of Manila elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals. The CA reversed the RTC ruling.

ISSUES: Whether the ordinance is valid. – NO.

HELD: The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held
that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit
to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following
substantive requirements:

(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.

The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting
out a room more than twice a day.

The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for
illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall
within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends does not sanctify any and all
means for their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated
analysis of its guarantees to the people.
Case Law. 

 Rufus Rodriguez, Chapter 5, pp. 150-181,  Legal Research (2002)

 Types of Court opinions
o Phil. Const. art. VIII, § 13.
o Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc. v. CIR, G.R. No. 167330, 18 September 2009.
 Difference between question of law and question of fact
o Pagsibigan v. People, G.R. No. 163868, 4 June 2009.
 Stare decisis
o Civil Code, art. 8.
o De Castro v. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, etc., 20 April 2010.
o Const. art. VIII, § 4, ¶ 3.
 Law of the Case
o Virata v.  Ng Wee, G.R. No. 220926, 5 July 2017.
o Fallo
o Florentino v. Rivera, G.R. No. 167968, 23 January 2006.
o Hipos v. Bay, G.R. Nos. 174813-15, 17 March 2009. 
 Lack of applicable law
o Civil Code, art. 9
o Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, 19 October 2007.
o Reyes v. Lim, G.R. No. 134241, Aug. 11, 2003.
o Floresca v. Philex Mining Company, G.R. No. L-30642, 30 April 1985

Case Briefing and Synthesis. 

o Rufus Rodriguez, Legal Research, Chapter 3, pp. 9-82 (2002)