PEOPLE -VERSUS- BENDECIO
Gerry's sister, testified that on the day of the incident, she and her niece
The Case
This appeal assails the Decision1 dated August 17, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 39046 affirming the verdict of conviction against appellant Nestor Bendecio y Viejo alias "Tan"
for the complex crime of attempted murder with murder.
Antecedents
The Charge
Appellant Nestor Bendecio y Viejo alias "Tan" was charged with the complex crime of attempted
murder with murder, viz.:
That on or about the 24th day of December, 2011, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill armed with a
hand gun with treachery suddenly attacked one GERRY MARASIGAN Y CAMPIT, when he did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire a shot with his revolver at the latter without
warning, which means was consciously adopted by the accused to ensure impunity, thus
commencing the commission of the crime of murder, directly by overt acts but nevertheless did not
perform all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of murder by reason of
cause or causes other than his own spontaneous desistance, that is, the accused missed his aim
and hit instead another victim JONABELLE MARASIGAN a seven (7) year old minor, born on
November 1, 2004 whose minority is equivalent to employing treachery on the part of the herein
accused, thereby inflicting upon the latter fatal wounds which directly caused her death, to the
damage and prejudice of her surviving heirs.
Contrary to law.2
On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.3 Trial ensued.
During the trial, Gerry Marasigan and Princess Marasigan testified for the prosecution. On the other
hand, appellant was the lone witness for the defense.
Prosecution's Version
Gerry Marasigan testified that on December 24, 2011, around midnight, a friend invited him to a
drinking spree at the latter's home. He obliged and joined the drinking spree until his wife came to
fetch him. On their way out, he bumped into appellant whom he recognized as his mother's
neighbor. Appellant asked him "Anong problema?" He replied: "Kuya Nestor, asawa ko 'to, hindi mo
na ba ako nakikilala?" Appellant rebuffed "Hindi, bastos ka eh."
He no longer paid attention to appellant and proceeded to walk home with his wife. Back in their
home, he was closing the front door when he noticed appellant standing right outside the doorway.
He was a mere arm's length away from appellant when suddenly, the latter drew a gun, aimed at
him, and fired. But it was not he who got hit, instead it was his seven (7)-year-old daughter Jonabel
and his sister Princess. Jonabel was fatally hit. He immediately brought Jonabel to the hospital but
she died the following day.
He was not a friend, but a mere acquaintance of appellant. They never had any prior altercation. 4
Princess Marasigan, 
Jonabel were inside Gerry's house in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Around 11 o'clock in the evening, Gerry
and his wife hurriedly went inside their house. She stood up and, to her surprise, saw appellant
holding a gun and firing it in Gerry's direction. She clearly saw appellant with a gun in hand because
of the light by the front door.
When they heard the shot, she and her niece Jonabel hid inside the bathroom. Only then did she
realize that they were both bleeding. Appellant only fired once, albeit the single bullet pierced
Jonabel's chest before hitting her in the leg.5 She filed a separate criminal case against appellant
for her injury.
Defense's Version
Appellant testified that he was in Samat, Samar on the date of the alleged shooting incident. He
only knew Gerry because his sister's paupahan was next to Gerry's house. He did not know of any
reason why Gerry would implicate him in the purported shooting incident involving his daughter.6
The Trial Court's Ruling
By Decision dated July 19, 2016, the Regional Trial Court-Branch 207, Muntinlupa City found
appellant guilty of the complex crime of attempted murder with homicide, viz.:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Nestor Bendecio y Viejo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the complex crime of attempted murder with homicide and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
of twelve years of prison mayor in its maximum as the minimum period to twenty years of reclusion
temporal in its maximum as the maximum period, and is ordered to pay the heirs of Jonabelle
Marasigan the amount of P75,000.00 as and for civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as and for moral
damages, P30,000.00 as and for temperate damages, and P75,000.00 as and for exemplary
damages, all with 6% interest per annum from the finality of this decision.7
The trial court gave full credence to the positive testimonies of Gerry and Princess who testified in a
straightforward, candid, and convincing manner, leaving no room for doubt that appellant was the
perpetrator of the crime. Thus, the trial court rejected appellant's self-serving, nay, uncorroborated
defenses of denial and alibi.8
Appellant was guilty of a complex crime because his single act of firing a gun at Gerry, though
ending up killing Jonabel, emanated from a single criminal intent.9 The trial court appreciated
treachery as a qualifying circumstance in the attempted killing of Gerry's, but not as to the killing of
Jonabel.
The Court of Appeals' Proceedings
In his appeal, appellant faulted the trial court for convicting him of the complex crime of attempted
murder with homicide based on the supposedly doubtful testimonies of Gerry and Princess. The trial
court should not have given full weight and credence to Gerry's positive identification of him since
Gerry admitted in open court that he joined a drinking session prior to the shooting incident. Thus,
Gerry's inebriation diminished his ability to clearly identify the man armed with a gun standing by his
doorstep that night. As regards Princess, her blood relationship with Gerry cast serious doubt on
her credibility.10
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) defended the verdict of conviction. The
OSG maintained that the trial court's conclusion on the credibility of the witnesses deserved great
respect. The defense lacked evidence to support the allegation that Gerry's level of intoxication
impaired his capacity to identify his assailant; intoxication, by itself, does not necessarily prevent a
witness from making a positive identification of the perpetrator of the crime. Too, it was immaterial
that Princess was Gerry's relative. More so because her testimony was not inherently improbable
nor was it shown that she was improperly impelled to falsely incriminate appellant.11
The Court of Appeals' Ruling
Under its assailed Decision dated August  17, 2017, the Court of Appeals affirmed with
modification, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated 19 July 2016 of
the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 207 in Crim. Case No. 12-305
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-appellant Nestor Bendecio y Viejo is hereby
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of attempted murder with murder and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is further ordered to pay
the heirs of Jonabel Marasigan P75,000.00 each as civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary
damages, and P50,000.00 as temperate damages, with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the time of finality of this decision until fully paid to be imposed on said civil indemnity
and all awarded damages.
SO ORDERED.12
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's factual findings on the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses since appellant offered no evidence, other than his bare allegations, to show that Gerry's
level of intoxication impaired his ability to identify appellant or that Princess had ulterior motive to
falsely testify against him.13
It affirmed the trial court's factual finding that appellant's intended victim was Gerry though the bullet
he fired hit Princess and killed Jonabel instead.14 Since appellant failed to perform all the acts of
execution which would have resulted in Gerry's death, appellant was liable for attempted murder,
qualified as it was by treachery.15
Appellant's poor aim amounted to aberratio ictus or mistake in the blow — a circumstance that
neither exempted him from nor mitigated his criminal liability. On the contrary, it rendered appellant
liable for Jonabel's death under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). For although it may not
have been appellant's intention to shoot Jonabel, it is clear that Jonabel's death was the natural and
direct consequence of appellant's felonious assault against Gerry.16
The Court of Appeals further ruled that the killing of Jonabel amounted to murder, not homicide. For
Jonabel was a hapless victim who had no opportunity to defend herself or retaliate.17
In accordance with People v. Jugueta,18 the Court of Appeals increased the award of temperate
damages to P50,000.19
The Present Petition
Appellant now seeks affirmative relief from the Court and prays anew for his acquittal.
In compliance with Resolution dated January 19, 2018 of the Court, the OSG20 and
appellant21 manifested that in lieu of supplemental briefs, they were adopting their respective briefs
submitted before the Court of Appeals.
Issue
Did the Court of Appeals err in convicting appellant of the complex crime of attempted murder with
murder?
Ruling
Appellant was charged with the complex crime of murder and attempted murder.
Article 248 of the RPC defines and penalizes murder, thus:
Article 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill
another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed
with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing
means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
xxxx
It requires the following elements: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing
was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (4)
the killing is not parricide or infanticide.22
On the other hand, Article 6 of the RPC23 states that there is an attempt to commit a felony when
the offender directly commences its commission by overt acts but was unable to perform all the acts
of execution which should have produced the felony by reason of some cause or accident other
than his or her own spontaneous desistance. In Palaganas v. People,24 the Court held that
attempted murder or attempted homicide is committed when the accused intended to kill the victim,
as manifested by the use of a deadly weapon in the assault, and the wound/s sustained by the
victim was/were not fatal.
Here, records bear the detailed narrations of Gerry and Princess about the shooting incident.
Appellant fired at Gerry but instead of hitting the latter, the bullet hit Jonabel in the chest and
thereafter, Princess in the leg. Jonabel died as a result.
Although appellant, with intent to kill, fired his gun at Gerry, appellant was not able to consummate
the killing for reasons other than his own desistance - he simply missed and ended up wounding
Princess and killing Jonabel.
The Court reckons with the third element of the crime of murder, i.e., the killing was attended by any
of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC.
The Information alleged that treachery attended the shooting of Gerry. There is treachery when two
(2) elements concur: (1) the employment of means, methods, or manner of execution which would
ensure the offender's safety from any defense or retaliatory act on the part of the offended party;
and (2) such means, method, or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously chosen by the
offender.25 The essence of treachery consists of the sudden and unexpected attack on an
unguarded and unsuspecting victim without any ounce of provocation on his or her part.26
The case records undeniably prove that Gerry was the intended victim of the shooting. When Gerry
went home and tried to close the front door, he noticed appellant standing right outside the
doorway. Suddenly, appellant drew a gun, aimed at him, and fired. Appellant, however, missed
hitting Gerry and ended up injuring Princess and killing Jonabel.
The qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the attempted killing of Gerry. In People v.
Amora,27 the Court held that the qualifying circumstance of treachery does not require that the
perpetrator attack his or her victim from behind. Even a frontal attack could be treacherous when
unexpected and on an unarmed victim who would be in no position to repel the attack or avoid it.
This is the case for Gerry. As shown, appellant commenced the commission of murder by suddenly
firing his gun towards Gerry who was then unarmed and was not in a position to defend himself.
Gerry, however, did not die as a result because appellant simply missed.
Evidently, Gerry never saw that what started as a mere accidental bumping that night in the house
of a friend would carry on and end in a tragedy inside his own home. He almost got killed while his
young innocent child lost her life. Things happened so sudden and fast, he never got the chance to
defend himself or his child or even to just run away.
As for Jonabel's death, what happened to this seven (7)-year-old was a clear case of aberratio ictus
or mistake in the blow. Under the doctrine of aberratio ictus, as embodied in Article 4 of the
RPC,28 criminal liability is imposed for the acts committed in violation of law and for all the natural
and logical consequences resulting therefrom. Thus, while it may not have been appellant's
intention to shoot Jonabel, this fact alone will not exculpate him of his criminal liability. Jonabel's
death was unquestionably the natural and direct consequence of appellant's felonious deadly
assault against Gerry.29
Notably, the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended Jonabel's killing. As pointed out by
Justice Mario V. Lopez during the deliberation, although appellant did not intend to kill Jonabel,
treachery may still be appreciated in aberratio ictus, pursuant to the Court's ruling in People v.
Flora30 There, the accused fired his gun at his target, but missed, and hit two (2) other persons.
The Court appreciated treachery as a qualifying circumstance and convicted the accused for
murder and attempted murder because even if the death and injury of the two (2) other persons
resulted from accused's poor aim, accused's act of suddenly firing upon his victims rendered the
latter helpless to defend themselves. This is applicable here. Just because Jonabel was not the
intended victim does not make appellant's sudden attack any less treacherous.
In another vein, appellant faults the Court of Appeals for affirming the trial court's factual findings on
the credibility of the testimonies of Gerry and Princess.Ꮮαwρhi ৷ Appellant essentially argues that
Gerry's testimony should not have been given weight and credence because he was under the
influence of alcohol when the purported shooting incident took place and thus, he could not have
positively identified that appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. Appellant also asserts that
Princess, being Gerry's sister, is a biased witness whose testimony is unworthy of belief.
We are not persuaded.
When the credibility of witnesses is put in issue, the Court will generally not disturb the trial court's
factual findings thereon, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, as in this case. Indeed,
the trial court was in a better position to decide the question of credibility as it heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and the manner by which they testified during the
trial.31
Notably, appellant offered no evidence, other than his bare allegations, to show that Gerry's level of
intoxication impaired his ability to identify appellant or that Princess had ulterior motive to testify
against him.
Against the testimonies of Gerry and Princess, appellant's denial and alibi must crumble. We have
held time and again that denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses which cannot prevail over the
positive and credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that it was appellant who committed
the crime charged. Hence, as between a categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on one
hand, and a mere denial on the other, the former is generally held to prevail.32
Article 48 of the RJPC states that there is a complex crime when a single act constitutes two (2) or
more grave or less grave felonies. Here, appellant's single act of firing his gun constituted the crime
of attempted murder, with respect to Gerry, and the crime of murder, as regards Jonabel. Article 48
of the RPC likewise provides that the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same
to be applied in its maximum period. Here, the most serious crime is murder. Hence, the imposable
penalty is that of murder in its maximum period. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Due to Republic Act No. 934633 (RA 9346),
however, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua. More, in accordance with A.M. No. 15-
08-02,34 the qualification of "without eligibility for parole" shall be used in order to emphasize that
the accused should have been sentenced to suffer the death penalty had it not been for RA 9346.
As for the monetary award, People v. Jugueta35 teaches that civil indemnity, moral damages, and
exemplary damages must be awarded for each component of the complex crime. Prevailing
jurisprudence sets the award of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages,
and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages in murder cases where the imposable penalty is death but
due to the prohibition to impose the same, the actual penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua. An
award of P50,000.00 as temperate damages is likewise proper. With respect to the crime of
attempted murder, an award of P25,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as moral damages, and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is fitting.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated August 17, 2017 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CRNo. 39046 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Appellant Nestor Bendecio y Viejo alias "Tan" is guilty of the COMPLEX CRIME OF MURDER
WITH ATTEMPTED MURDER and sentenced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. He
is further ordered to pay Gerry Marasigan P25,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as moral
damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and the heirs of Jonabel Marasigan F100,000.00
as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
J>50,000.000 as temperate damages. These amounts shall earn six percent (6%) interest per
annum from finality of this decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE VS. GLECERIO PITULAN
In homicide, the prosecution's failure to present the weapon is not fatal to its case. An eyewitness'
credible testimony on the fact of the crime and the assailant's identity is sufficient to prove
the corpus delicti. Moreover, the prosecution's failure to conduct paraffin and ballistic testing has no
effect on the evidentiary value of an eyewitness' positive identification of the accused as the
assailant. The accused's bare denial, on its own, cannot outweigh the eyewitness' positive
identification.
This Court resolves the Notice of Appeal1 assailing the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the Regional Trial Court Decision3 finding Glecerio Pitulan y Briones (Pitulan) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of direct assault with murder.
Three (3) Informations were filed against Pitulan for direct assault with murder of police Officer 1
Aldy Monteroso (PO1 Monteroso), direct assault with attempted murder of police Officer 1 Alberto
Cirilo Dionisio (PO1 Dionisio), and direct assault with frustrated murder of PO1 Benito De Vera
(PO1 De Vera). The Informations read:
Criminal Case No. Q-03-116802 against Glecerio Pitulan y Briones for Direct Assault with Murder
"That on or about the 20th day of April, 2003 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring, confederating with Eufemio Pitulan, Sergs Pitulan, Edward Pitulan, Felomino Pitulan
and Augusto Torres, who were killed during the shootout with the apprehending police officers, and
with another person whose name, identity and whereabouts has (sic) not yet been ascertained, and
mutually helping each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with treachery,
evident premeditation, and taking advantage of superior strength, attack, assault and employ
personal violence upon the person of PO1 ALDY MONTEROSO y BELTRAN, a bonafide member
of the PNP CPDO, assigned at police Station 3, Talipapa police Station, this City, and therefore an
agent of a person in authority who was then engaged in the performance of his official duties, and
the accused knew him to be such, by then and there shooting him, with intent to kill, with the use of
a .38 cal. revolver, hitting him on the chest, thereby inflicting upon him fatal injury which was the
direct cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said PO1 Aldy B. Monteroso.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
Criminal Case No. Q-03-116803 against Glecerio Pitulan y Briones for Direct Assault with
Attempted Murder
That on or about the 20th day of April, 2003 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring, confederating with Eufemio Pitulan, Sergs Pitulan, Edward Pitulan, Felomino Pitulan
and Augusto Torres, who were killed during the shootout with the apprehending police officers, and
with another person whose name, identity and whereabouts has (sic) not yet been ascertained, and
mutually helping each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with treachery,
evident premeditation, and taking advantage of superior strength, commence the commission of the
crime of Murder directly by overt acts upon the person of one PO1 ALBERTO CIRILO DIONISIO y
DELACRUZ, a bonafide member of the PNP, CPDO, assigned at police Station 3, Talipapa police
Station, this City, and therefore an agent of a person in authority who was then engaged in the
performance of his official duties, and the accused knew him to be such, by then and there shooting
him, with intent to kill, with the use of a .38 cal. [r]evolver, but said accused was not able to perform
all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of Murder by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, to the damage and prejudice of the said PO1
Alberto Cirilo Dionisio y Dela Cruz.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
Criminal Case No. Q-05-133382 against Glecerio Pitulan y Briones For Direct Assault with
Frustrated Murder
"That on or about the 20th day of April, 2003 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring, confederating with Eufemio Pitulan, Sergs Pitulan, Edward Pitulan, Felomino Pitulan
and Augusto Torres, who were killed during the shootout with the apprehending police officers, and
with another person whose name, identity and whereabouts has (sic) not yet been ascertained, and
mutually helping each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with treachery,
evident premeditation, and taking advantage of superior strength, attack, assault and employ
personal violence upon the person of (sic) commence the commission of the crime of Murder
directly by overt acts upon the person of one PO1 BENITO DE VERA y JOPSON, a bonafide
member of the PNP, CPDO, assigned at police Station 3, Talipapa police Station, this City, and
therefore an agent of a person in authority who was then engaged in the performance of his official
duties, and the accused knew him to be such, by then and there shooting him, with intent to kill, with
the use of a .38 cal. [r]evolver, hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon
him fatal injuries, the offender performing all the acts of execution which would produce death as a
consequence but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason of some causes independent of
the will of the perpetrator, to the damage and prejudice of the said PO1 Benito De Veyra (sic) y
Jopson.
CONTRARY TO LAW."4
Pitulan was arraigned on all the charges, to which he pleaded not guilty. Trial thus ensued.5
For its part, the prosecution presented PO1 De Vera, PO1 Dionisio, and police Officer 3 Eric Cortez
(PO3 Cortez) as witnesses. The parties stipulated on the testimonies of the prosecution's other
witnesses, the case investigator and the medico-legal officer.6
From their testimonies, the prosecution alleged that on April 20, 2003, the group of PO1 De Vera,
PO1 Dionisio, and PO1 Monteroso responded to a report that of a group of armed men aboard a
Hyundai van was acting suspiciously along General Avenue, Barangay Bahay Toro, Project 8,
Quezon City. Thus, the officers, in complete uniform, rode their police mobile patrol to the reported
location.7
On their way to General Avenue, the officers saw a van, with plate no. PVY-701, matching the
description of the vehicle they were looking for. They ordered the van to halt, but it gave chase
instead, until the officers overtook and blocked its path along Road 20.8
The officers ordered the riders to step out of the vehicle. When all but the driver complied, PO1
Monteroso opened the door opposite the driver's side to check on him. However, as soon as he did
so, the driver-who was later identified as Pitulan-shot him thrice on the chest.9
Simultaneously, the other van passengers, later identified as Eufemio Pitulan, Sergs Pitulan,
Edward Pitulan, Felomino Pitulan, and Augusto Torres, wrestled with PO1 De Vera and PO1
Dionisio.10 One (1) of them was able to get PO1 Monteroso's gun and fired at PO1 De Vera,
injuring him in the shootout.11
Pitulan then attempted to escape, but on his way, he encountered PO3 Cortez and his team who
was responding to a radio message of the gun battle.12
PO3 Cortez's team ordered the van to stop and attempted to approach the van. However, its driver,
whom he later identified as Pitulan, opened fire at their patrol car. The officers fired back and, in the
shootout that ensued, hit the van's left tire. The van hit an island at the intersection of Visayas
Avenue and Congressional Avenue.13
The other van passengers turned out dead in the shootout,14 leaving Pitulan to surrender to the
police. Once PO3 Cortez and his team arrested him, they brought Pitulan to the East Avenue
Medical Center for treatment.15 The officers were able to recover from him a .38 cal. revolver, four
(4) live ammunitions, and two (2) empty shells.16
Pitulan solely testified for the defense. He alleged that on April 20, 2003, he was with his four (4)
brothers on a Besta van driven by a certain Rudy Pagador. Pitulan fell asleep on the road, only to
be awakened later on by successive gunfire, from which he sustained wounds that caused him to
fall unconscious on the floor of the van. He later woke up in a hospital, where he was told that his
brothers were all dead.17
In its January 21, 2013 Decision,18 the Regional Trial Court convicted Pitulan of the complex crime
of direct assault with murder. It found no dispute that Pitulan was in the van during the shootout,
save for his denial that he participated as driver and shooter.19 It gave credence to the eyewitness
account of PO1 De Vera over Pitulan's bare denial.20
In ruling that treachery attended PO1 Monteroso's killing, the trial court noted that PO1 Monteroso
was shot thrice after opening the door opposite the driver's side, leaving him no opportunity to
defend himself.21 Moreover, since the officer was killed during the performance of his duties,
Pitulan was convicted of the complex crime of direct assault with murder.22
As for the other charges, the trial court found no conspiracy among the van's passengers who were
involved in the shootout. Hence, it acquitted Pitulan of direct assault with attempted murder and
direct assault with frustrated murder against PO1 Dionisio and PO1 De Vera, respectively.23
The Regional Trial Court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the complex crime of direct
assault with murder. Pitulan was ordered to pay the heirs of PO1 Monteroso P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity ex delicto, moral damages of P50,000.00, exemplary damages of P30,000.00, and
temperate damages of P30,000.00, and costs of suit. The dispositive portion of the Decision read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Glecerio Pitulan y Briones in
Criminal Case No. Q-03-116802 GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Direct Assault
with Murder and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Accused Glecerio Pitulan y Briones is hereby further ordered to pay the heirs of PO1 Aldy
Monteroso y Beltran the following amounts:
1) Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity;
2) Php50,000.00 as moral damages;
3) Php30,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4) Php30,000.00 as temperate damages; and
5) costs of suit.
In Criminal Case No. Q-03-116803 and Criminal Case No. Q-03-116804, judgment is hereby
rendered ACQUITTING the accused Glecerio Pitulan y Briones of the offenses of Direct Assault
with Attempted Murder and Direct Assault with Frustrated Murder, for lack of evidence.
SO ORDERED.24
Pitulan appealed his case. However, the Court of Appeals, in ·its August 12, 2015
Decision,25 affirmed his conviction. It found the police officers' testimonies clear that it was Pitulan
who fired successive shots at PO1 Monteroso, the same one who drove off only to be arrested by
PO3 Cortez's team.26 It also affirmed the trial court's findings that the killing of PO1 Monteroso was
attended with treachery, qualifying the complex crime to direct assault with murder.27
The Court of Appeals dismissed Pitulan's contention that in failing to present the gun and conduct
paraffin and ballistic testing, the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.28 It
held that paraffin testing is extremely unreliable for not being conclusive as to whether the nitrates
came from the discharge of a firearm.29 Moreover, it stated that the lack of ballistic testing does not
affect the evidentiary value of an eyewitness' positive identification of the assailant, as in this
case.30
On September 18, 2015, Pitulan filed his Notice of Appeal.31 The Court of Appeals, having given
due course to his appeal, elevated the case records to this Court.32
This Court later required the parties to file their supplemental briefs.33 However, both accused-
appellant and plaintiff-appellee People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
manifested that they would no longer do so. Instead, they would adopt their Briefs filed before the
Court of Appeals.34
In his Brief,35 accused-appellant alleges that the lower courts erred in convicting him of direct
assault with murder despite the prosecution failing to establish his identity as PO1 Monteroso's
assailant.36
Expounding on this, accused-appellant claims that PO1 De Vera's eyewitness account should not
have been given credence, as he was behind the police mobile during the shootout and, thus, could
not have seen the driver who shot PO1 Monteroso. He also insists that the prosecution's failure to
conduct ballistic and paraffin testing was fatal, as the officers failed to determine whether he really
fired any gun. He also faults the prosecution for failing to present the gun used in the shooting.37
On the other hand, plaintiff-appellee argues in its Brief38 that PO1 De Vera's testimony was clear
and unequivocal, successfully establishing accused-appellant's identity as the assailant. Contrary to
accusedappellant's claim, the officer had directly witnessed the shooting because the back of the
police mobile was positioned in front of the van.39
Moreover, plaintiff-appellee, citing People v. Fernandez,40 asserts that the presentation of the
murder weapon is not indispensable "when the accused has positively been identified."41 Finally, it
points out that this Court has rendered both paraffin and ballistic testing inconclusive, citing People Q: Where did you encounter or meet the van?
v. De Guzman42 and Lumanog v. People.43 A: Along Road 20, sir.
Q: Now, when you saw the van along Road 20, what happened then?
The issues for this Court's resolution are as follows: A: We chased the van and we asked them to pull over but they did not stop, Sir.
Q: You said that you chased the van and asked them to pull over, how did you ask them to pull
First, whether or not the prosecution's failure to conduct paraffin and ballistic testing was fatal in over?
proving the guilt of accused-appellant Glecerio Pitulan y Briones; and A: We sounded the siren, sir.
Q: You said that they did not stop, what did you do?
Second, whether or not accused-appellant was correctly convicted of the complex crime of direct A: Our driver overtook the van, sir.
assault with murder. Q: After over taking (sic) the van, what happened then?
A: They were forced to stop, sir.
This Court sustains accused-appellant's conviction only for the complex crime of direct assault with Q: Where were they forced to stop, what particular place where (sic) they forced to stop?
homicide. A: Along Road 20 in front of House No. 126, sir.
Q: Where is this Road 20, what city is it located, Mr. Witness?
The determination of witnesses' credibility is left to the trial courts, which have the unique
A: Brgy. Bahay Toro, Project 8, Quezon City.
opportunity to observe their conduct in court. The trial courts' findings are generally binding on this Q: Now, Mr. witness, after you said that your driver was able to stop, what happened when you
Court and will not be overturned without a showing of any fact or circumstance that was overlooked, were able to stop them?
misunderstood, or misapplied, which may change the results of a case. If these findings are A: We ordered them to get off the van, sir.
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, then all the more will this Court be stringent in applying the rule.44 Q: Where were you when this order for them to alight from the van was made?
A: We also alighted from the Mobile Patrol car, sir.
Moreover, denial is an inherently weak defense. Absent any clear and convincing evidence, bare Q: Let us go directly to you, Mr. witness. Where were you then standing at that time when they were
denial will not outweigh an affirmative testimony from a credible witness.45 Without "any showing of being asked to alight from their van?
ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, a categorical, consistent and A: I was behind our Mobile Patrol car, sir.
positive identification of the accused prevails over denial and alibi."46 Q: What happened when ... who m particular who was ordering the occupants of the van to alight?
A: All of us, sir shouting [at] them to alight from the van.
In this case, accused-appellant assailed his conviction allegedly based on compelling doubt that he Q: Then what happened?
was the assailant. However, based on PO1 De Vera's testimony, both the Regional Trial Court and A: Some alighted but some remained inside the van, sir.
the Court of Appeals found that of the van's passengers, only accused-appellant did not alight when Q: When some of the occupants [in that] van alighted, what happened then, while others remained
ordered to do so. As he was the only one in the van, no other person could have shot PO1 inside the van, what happened then?
Monteroso from inside. PO1 De Vera testified: A: We asked those who remain inside the van to also alight from the van, sir.
Q: When you were asking them to ... those who remain inside to alight, what happened then?
Q: (Prosecutor Luis Maceren) A: The rest alighted except for one, sir.
Mr. Witness, you said that you responded to a shootout. When was this when you responded to a Q: When this one person did not alight from the van, what happened next?
shootout? A: We ordered them to raise their hands, sir.
A: (PO1 Benito De Vera, Jr.) Responded to an alarm, sir. Q: What happened when you asked them to raise their hands?
Q: Alright, responded to an alarm, when was that? A: They didn't raise their hands, sir.
A: April 20, 2003, sir. Q: What did PO1 Alvin (sic) Monteroso do when you said one of the person (sic) did not alight from
Q: You mentioned that you responded to an alarm, what was that alarm about? the van?
A: A Hyundai van was parked with persons inside the van and some were outside the van with 'may A: He opened the door of the van on the right sir.
nakabukol' and looking suspiciously, sir. Q: By the way, Mr. Witness, where was this person who did not alight from the van seated?
Q: No[w], Mr. Witness, when you received this alarm, what did you and Mobile Patrol QC 15 do? A: At the driver's seat, sir.
A: We proceeded to the place, sir. Q: You said that PO1 Alvin (sic) Monteroso opened the van on the right, what do you mean on the
Q: By the way, Mr. Witness, you mentioned that your Mobile Patrol QC 15 is a marked vehicle, right?
could you tell us what was the attire of the group including yourself at the time that you were in the A: The door on the right side opposite the driver, sir.
performance of your duty as a member of the mobile group? Q: What happened then when Officer Monteroso opened the said door?
A: We were in complete uniform, sir. A: That's when he was shot at, sir.
Q: You said that you, together with your fellow officers proceeded to or responded to this alarm, Q: What happened to Officer Monteroso when he was shot at?
where did you proceed to? A: What I saw was when he was shot at he stepped back and started turning around (nagpaikot-
A: General Avenue near Road 20, sir. ikot), sir.
Q: Were you able to arrive at this area? Q: Who shot at Officer Monteroso?
A: No, sir because we met the van. A: That person, sir.
Interpreter:
Witness pointing to a person seated inside the court room when ask (sic) to identify himsel[f] he
gave his name as Glecerio Pitulan.
Q: After Officer Monteroso was shot, what happened then?
A: "Kinuyog niya kami", his gun was taken from them [him], sir.
Q: You said "kinuyog," what do you mean by "kinuyog," Mr. Witness?
A: He was attacked and his gun was taken from him, sir.
Q: Who attacked him?
A: The companions of Pitulan, sir.47
Moreover, PO3 Cortez testified that the driver of the van whom they arrested was none other than
accused-appellant himself. PO3 Cortez stated:
TSN dated March 21, 2006.
PO3 Eric Cortez
Prosecutor Andres
Q: So after receiving that radio message from your radio operator regarding that gun battle and
after you were directed to proceed to Road 20, Project 8, Quezon City, what did you and your
companions do, if any?
A: We proceeded and while we were approaching Mindanao Avenue we received a radio message
coming from CPD-Pre[c]inct 3 regarding the description of the vehicle.
....
Q: And while you were already approaching the target area, what transpired there?
A: While we were approaching Congressional Avenue at the time, we spotted the said vehicle,
Hyundai van, so we got close to it and after that we ordered the driver to stop, sir.
Q: After ordering the driver of that Hyundai van with Plate No. PVT-701 as you said to stop, what is
the reaction of the driver, if any to your order?
A: The driver fired [at] our mobile patrol car C-172, sir.
Q: So, after your group was fired upon, what were (sic) you and your companions do, if any?
A: We retaliated, and shot the rear left wheel of the said van, Sir.
Q: After hitting the rear left wheel as you said of the Hyundai van, what happened next, if any?
A: The Hyundai van hit an island near the stop light at the intersection of Visayas Avenue and
Congressional Avenue.
Q: After the said Hyundai van hit the island near the stop light at the intersection of Visayas Avenue
and Congressional Avenue, what else happened, if any?
A: We ordered the driver of the van to surrender. When we were approaching to (sic) the said
vehicle with maximum precaution, the drive of the said van surrendered peacefully and we
confiscated to (sic) his possession and control a .38 revolver sir.48
As the trial court aptly noted, there is no dispute as to where accused appellant was at the time of
the incident. He categorically admitted during trial that he was inside the van when the shootout
happened:
There is no dispute that there was a gun battle between the group of the police officers-
complainants and the group of the accused. The accused himself admitted this, in addition to the
fact that he and his companions (his four brothers and one Rudy Pagador and Augusto Torres)
were on board a blue Hyundai Besta/Grace Van, qualifying his statement only by asserting that he
was not driving the said van and he was asleep when he woke up to the sound of gunfire, but he
never shot at anybody and he lost consciousness, waking up much later already confined in a
hospital.49
To this, accused-appellant only denied his involvement in the shooting and claimed that he was
knocked unconscious from the wounds he allegedly sustained. This bare denial, without substantial
evidence, cannot controvert the clear and positive identification of PO1 De Vera that he saw
accused-appellant shoot PO1 Monteroso.
Accused-appellant further assailed his conviction on the ground that the prosecution failed not only
to present the gun in evidence, but also to conduct paraffin and ballistic testing-ultimately failing to
prove that it was he who shot PO1 Monteroso dead.
These defenses fail. The lower courts correctly convicted accused-appellant for the killing of PO1
Monteroso.
In People v. Tuniaco,50 this Court held that the presentation of the murder weapon is not
indispensable to prove the corpus delicti, as its physical existence is not an element of murder. To
prove the corpus delicti, the prosecution only needs to show that: "(a) a certain result has been
established ... and (b) some person is criminally responsible for it."51
Here, the prosecution was able to fulfill the twin requirements and prove the corpus delicti. First, it
offered in evidence PO1 Monteroso's death certificate52 showing the cause of his death as
"hemorrhagic shock secondary to a gunshot wound to the chest."53 Second, it established the
identity of the shooter through the clear and positive testimony of PO1 De Vera, a credible
eyewitness. Even without the gun, there is no dispute that the prosecution sufficiently established
the corpus delicti.
Likewise, the Court of Appeals is correct in ruling that paraffin and ballistic testing are not
indispensable to prove accused-appellant's guilt. In De Guzman,54 this Court discussed that
paraffin testing is conclusive only as to the presence of nitrate particles in a person, but not as to its
source, such as from firing a gun. By itself, paraffin testing only indicates a possibility, not
infallibility, that a person has fired a gun:
In a recent case, we reiterated the rule that paraffin test is inconclusive. We held: "Scientific experts
concur in the view that the paraffin test has ... proved extremely unreliable in use. The only thing
that it can definitely establish is the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand. It cannot
be established from this test alone that the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of
firearm. The person may have handled one or more of a number of substances which give the
same positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks, fertilizers,
pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as peas, beans, and alfalta (sic). A person who uses
tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands since these substances are present in
the products of combustion of tobacco." The presence of nitrates should be taken only as an
indication of a possibility or even of a probability but not of infallibility that a person has fired a gun,
since nitrates are also admittedly found in substances other than gunpowder.55 (Citations omitted)
Similarly, ballistic testing establishes only a likelihood that a bullet was fired from a specific weapon.
By itself, it is not enough to prove when the weapon was fired and who fired the weapon.
In Lumanog,56 this Court held that ballistic testing, along with the presentation of the weapon and
bullets used, are indispensable if there is no credible eyewitness to the shooting. To sustain a
conviction, it is sufficient that the corpus delicti is established and the eyewitness, through a credible
testimony, identifies the accused as the assailant. This Court held:
As this Court held in Velasco v. People -
As regards the failure of the police to present a ballistic report on the seven spent shells recovered
from the crime scene, the same does not constitute suppression of evidence. A ballistic report
serves only as a guide for the courts in considering the ultimate facts of the case. It would be
indispensable if there are no credible eyewitnesses to the crime inasmuch as it is corroborative in
nature. The presentation of weapons or the slugs and bullets used and ballistic examination are not
prerequisites for conviction. The corpus delicti and the positive identification of accused-appellant
as the perpetrator of the crime are more than enough to sustain his conviction. Even without a
ballistic report, the positive identification by prosecution witnesses is more than sufficient to prove
accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant case, since the identity of the assailant has
been sufficiently established, a ballistic report on the slugs can be dispensed with in proving
petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.57 (Emphasis in the original)
Finally, in People v. Casanghay,58 this Court ruled that the absence of paraffin and ballistic testing
is not fatal to the prosecution's case. It has no effect on the evidentiary value of an eyewitness
testimony positively identifying the accused as the assailant:
The absence of a ballistic examination comparing the bullets fired from the fatal gun with the
deformed slug recovered at the scene of the crime cannot nullify the evidentiary value of the
positive identification of the appellant by prosecution eyewitnesses. Likewise, the failure of the
police to conduct a paraffin test on the appellant is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. Scientific
experts agree that the paraffin test is extremely unreliable. The only thing that it can definitely
establish is the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand. It cannot be established
from this test alone that the source of the nitrates or nitrites is the discharge of a firearm.59 (Citation
omitted)
With the identity of accused-appellant as PO1 Monteroso's assailant established, the only issue left
is whether he was properly convicted of direct assault with murder.
Every conviction requires that the prosecution prove: (1) the identity of the accused; and (2) the fact
of the crime. The second requirement is fulfilled when all the elements of the crime charged are
present.60
Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Article 148. Direct assaults. - Any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ
force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of
rebellion and sedition, or shall attack, employ force or seriously intimidate or resist any person in
authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of
such performance, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, when the assault is committed with a weapon or
when the offender is a public officer or employee, or when the offender lays hands upon a person in
authority. If none of these circumstances be present, the penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum period and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed.
Direct assault may be carried out in two (2) modes: (1) through committing an act equivalent to
rebellion or sedition, but without public uprising; and (2) through employing force and resisting any
person in authority while engaged in the performance of duties. The elements of the second mode
of direct assault are as follows:
Appellants committed the second form of assault, the elements of which are: 1) that there must be
an attack, use of force, or serious intimidation or resistance upon a person in authority or his agent;
2) the assault was made when the said person was performing his duties or on the occasion of such
performance; and 3) the accused knew that the victim is a person in authority or his agent, that is,
that the accused must have the intention to offend, injure or assault the offended party as a person
in authority or an agent of a person in authority.61 (Citation omitted)
In this case, accused-appellant was identified as the driver of the van and the shooter who attacked
and killed PO1 Monteroso. When the shooting happened, PO1 Monteroso and his team were
responding to a report of a suspicious group of men aboard a van. He was also in complete uniform
and aboard a police mobile.62 When accused-appellant shot PO1 Monteroso, he knew that he was
a person of authority in the exercise of official duties. Thus, all the elements of direct assault are
present.
In People v. Vibal,63 this Court held that when the assault leads to the death of an agent or a
person in authority, the resulting offense is the complex crime of direct assault with murder or
homicide.
The lower courts convicted accused-appellant of direct assault with murder. This Court modifies the
conviction to the complex crime of direct assault with homicide, there being no treachery which
qualified the killing of PO1 Monteroso to murder.
The essence of treachery is "in the suddenness of the attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting
victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself [or herself] and thereby ensuring the
commission of the offense without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended
party might make."64
For treachery to qualify the killing to murder, the following elements must be proven: "(1) that at the
time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself [or herself], and (2) that the
offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him [or
her]."65
The prosecution was not able to establish the existence of treachery here. After the chase, PO1 De
Vera's team ordered the van's passengers to alight and raise their hands. Because the driver,
accused-appellant, refused to heed the order, PO1 Monteroso approached the vehicle to accost
him. PO1 Monteroso was a fully armed and trained police officer; his training and police work would
have prepared him for the possible hostilities that· a person impending arrest may commit. The
previous car chase and accused-appellant's refusal to heed police order should have warned him of
a possible violent behavior to evade arrest.
Thus, it is not possible that PO1 Monteroso was in no position to defend himself at the time of the
attack. This Court has held that when a police officer had been forewarned of brewing violence, he
or she could not have been completely taken by surprise by the attack. In such instance, therefore,
treachery could not have attended the killing.66
Here, without the first element of treachery, the killing of PO1 Monteroso cannot be qualified to
murder. Accused-appellant is, therefore, guilty of the complex crime of direct assault with homicide.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code requires that the penalty for a complex crime is the maximum
penalty of the graver offense. The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal while the penalty for
direct assault is prision correccional. Thus, the proper penalty to be imposed for the complex crime
of direct assault with homicide is reclusion temporal, subject to the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

Pursuant to People v. Jugueta,67 the civil indemnity awarded to the heirs of PO1 Monteroso should
be decreased to P50,000.00, moral damages retained at P50,000.00, and temperate damages
increased to P50,000.00. There being no aggravating or qualifying circumstance proven during trial,
the award of exemplary damages should be deleted.

WHEREFORE, the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Court of Appeals are PARTIALLY
REVERSED. The assailed August 12, 2015 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 06017 is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Glecerio Pitulan y Briones is found GUILTY of the
complex crime of direct assault with homicide. He is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten
(10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.
PEOPLE vs.FELIPE MIRANDILLA, JR., 
Accused-appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of Police Officer 1 Aldy Monteroso civil indemnity,
moral damages, and temperate damages worth P50,000.00 each. PEREZ, J.:

All damages awarded shall be subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the For Review before this Court is the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
finality of this Decision until fully paid.68 00271,1 dated 29 February 2008, finding accused Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., (Mirandilla) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of special complex crime of kidnapping with rape; four counts of rape; and, one
SO OREDERED. count of rape through sexual assault.

Mirandilla is now asking this Court to acquit him. He contends that he could not have kidnapped and
raped the victim, AAA,2 whom he claims to be his live-in partner. The records, however, reveal with
moral certainty his guilt. Accordingly, We modify the CA Decision and find him guilty of the special
complex crime of kidnapping and illegal detention with rape.

THE FACTS

AAA narrated her 39-day ordeal in the hands of Mirandilla.

It was 2 December 2000, eve of the fiesta in Barangay San Francisco, Legazpi City. At the plaza,
AAA was dancing with her elder sister, BBB.3

AAA went out of the dancing hall to buy candies in a nearby store. While making her way back
through the crowd, a man grabbed her hand, his arm wrapped her shoulders, with a knife’s point
thrust at her right side. She will come to know the man’s name at the police station, after her
escape, to be Felipe Mirandilla, Jr.4 He told her not to move or ask for help. Another man joined
and went beside her, while two others stayed at her back, one of whom had a gun. They slipped
through the unsuspecting crowd, walked farther as the deafening music faded into soft sounds.
After a four-hour walk through the grassy fields, they reached the Mayon International Hotel, where
they boarded a waiting tricycle. Upon passing the Albay Cathedral, the others alighted, leaving AAA
alone with Mirandilla who after receiving a gun from a companion, drove the tricycle farther away
and into the darkness. Minutes later, they reached the Gallera de Legazpi in Rawis.5

Mirandilla dragged AAA out of the tricycle and pushed her inside a concrete house. At gunpoint he
ordered her to remove her pants.6 When she defied him, he slapped her and hit her arms with a
gun, forced his hands inside her pants, into her panty, and reaching her vagina, slipped his three
fingers and rotated them inside. The pain weakened her. He forcibly pulled her pants down and
lifting her legs, pushed and pulled his penis inside.7 "Sayang ka," she heard him whisper at her,8 as
she succumbed to pain and exhaustion.
When AAA woke up the following morning, she found herself alone. She cried for help, shouting
until her throat dried. But no one heard her. No rescue came.
At around midnight, Mirandilla arrived together with his gang. Pointing a gun at AAA, he ordered her
to open her mouth; she sheepishly obeyed. He forced his penis inside her mouth, pulling through
her hair with his left hand and slapping her with his right. After satisfying his lust, he dragged her
into the tricycle and drove to Bogtong, Legazpi. At the road’s side, Mirandilla pushed her against a
reclining tree, gagged her mouth with cloth, punched her arm, thigh, and lap, and pulled up her
over-sized shirt. Her underwear was gone. Then she felt Mirandilla’s penis inside her vagina. A little
while, a companion warned Mirandilla to move out. And they drove away.9
They reached a nipa hut and AAA was thrown inside. Her mouth was again covered with cloth.
Mirandilla, with a gun aimed at her point blank, grabbed her shirt, forced her legs open, and again
inserted his penis into her vagina.10
The following evening, Mirandilla and his gang brought AAA to Guinobatan, where she suffered the
same fate. They repeatedly detained her at daytime, moved her back and forth from one place to
another on the following nights, first to Bonga, then back to Guinobatan, where she was locked up
in a cell-type house and was raped repeatedly on the grassy field right outside her cell, then to
Camalig, where they caged her in a small house in the middle of a rice field. She was allegedly
raped 27 times.11
One afternoon, in Guinobatan, AAA succeeded in opening the door of her cell. Seeing that
Mirandilla and his companions were busy playing cards, she rushed outside and ran, crossed a
river, got drenched, and continued running. She rested for awhile, hiding behind a rock; she walked
through the fields and stayed out of people’s sight for two nights. Finally, she found a road and
followed its path, leading her to the house of Evelyn Guevarra who brought her to the police station.
It was 11 January 2001. AAA was in foul smell, starving and sleepless. Evelyn Guevarra gave her a
bath and the police gave her food. When the police presented to her pictures of suspected
criminals, she recognized the man’s face – she was certain it was him. He was Felipe Mirandilla,
Jr., the police told her.12
The following morning, accompanied by the police, AAA submitted herself to Dr. Sarah Vasquez,
Legazpi City’s Health Officer for medical examination. The doctor discovered hymenal lacerations in
different positions of her hymen, indicative of sexual intercourse.13 Foul smelling pus also oozed
from her vagina - AAA had contracted gonorrhoea.14
Mirandilla denied the charges against him. This is his version.
Mirandilla first met AAA on 3 October 2000. By stroke of fate, they bumped into each other at the
Albay Park where AAA, wearing a school uniform, approached him. They had a short chat. They
were neighbors in Barangay San Francisco until Mirandilla left his wife and daughter there for
good.15
Two days later, Mirandilla and AAA met again at the park. He started courting her,16 and, after five
days, as AAA celebrated her 18th birthday, they became lovers. Mirandilla was then 33 years old.
Immediately, Mirandilla and AAA had sex nightly in their friends’ houses and in cheap motels. On 24
October 2000, after Mirandilla went to his mother’s house in Kilikao, they met again at the park, at
their usual meeting place, in front of the park’s comfort room, near Arlene Moret, a cigarette vendor
who also served as the CR’s guard.17 They decided to elope and live as a couple. They found an
abandoned house in Rawis, at the back of Gallera de Legazpi. Emilio Mendoza who owned the
house, rented it to them for ₱1,500.00.18 They lived there from 28 October until 11 December
2000.19 From 12 December 2000 until 11 January 2001,20 Mirandilla and AAA stayed in Rogelio
Marcellana’s house, at the resettlement Site in Banquerohan, Legazpi City.
Mirandilla and AAA’s nightly sexual intimacy continued, with abstentions only during AAA’s
menstrual periods, the last of which she had on 7 December 2000.21 In late December, however,
Mirandilla, who just arrived home after visiting his mother in Kilikao, saw AAA soaked in blood,
moaning in excruciating stomach pain.22 AAA had abortion – an inference he drew upon seeing the
cover of pills lying beside AAA. Mirandilla claimed that AAA bled for days until she left him in
January 2001 after quarrelling for days.23
Mirandilla, however, had a second version of this crucial event. He claimed that AAA missed her
menstruation in December 200024 and that he would not have known she had an abortion had she
not confessed it to him.25
THE RTC RULING
Mirandilla was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi City, Branch 5, with
kidnapping with rape (Crim. Case No. 9278), four counts of rape (Crim. Case Nos. 9274 to 9277),
and rape through sexual assault (Crim. Case No. 9279).
The RTC, in its decision dated 1 July 2004, convicted Mirandilla of kidnapping, four counts of rape,
and one count of rape through sexual assault with this finding:
This Court has arrived at the factual conclusion that Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., in the company of three
others [conferrers], kidnapped AAA in Barangay xxx, City of xxx, on or on about midnight of
December 2, 2000 or early morning of December 3, 2000, held her in detention for thirty-nine days
in separate cells situated in the City of xxx; xxx; and xxx. Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., carnally abused her
while holding a gun and/or a knife for twenty seven times, employing force and intimidation. The
twenty seven sexual intercourses were eventually perpetrated between the City of xxx and the
towns of xxx and xxx. At least once, Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., put his penis inside the mouth of AAA
against her will while employing intimidation, threats, and force.26
THE COURT OF APPEALS RULING
On review, the CA affirmed with modification the RTC ruling, convicting Mirandilla. It found him
guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape (instead of kidnapping as the RTC
ruled), four counts of rape, and one count of rape by sexual assault.27 It rejected Mirandilla’s
defense that he and AAA were live-in partners and that their sexual encounters were
consensual.28 It noted that Mirandilla failed to adduce any evidence or any credible witness to
sustain his defense.29
Hence, this appeal.
Mirandilla repeats his allegations that the prosecution’s lone witness, AAA, was not a credible
witness and that he and AAA were live-in partners whose intimacy they expressed in consensual
sex.
OUR RULING
We find Mirandilla guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and illegal detention with rape.
Mirandilla admitted in open court to have had sexual intercourse with AAA, which happened almost
nightly during their cohabitation. He contended that they were live-in partners, entangled in a
whirlwind romance, which intimacy they expressed in countless passionate sex, which headed
ironically to separation mainly because of AAA’s intentional abortion of their first child to be – a
betrayal in its gravest form which he found hard to forgive.
In stark contrast to Mirandilla’s tale of a love affair, is AAA’s claim of her horrific ordeal and her flight
to freedom after 39 days in captivity during which Mirandilla raped her 27 times.
First Issue:
Credibility of Prosecution Witness
Jurisprudence is consistent that for testimonial evidence to be believed, it must not only come from
a credible witness but must be credible in itself – tested by human experience, observation,
common knowledge and accepted conduct that has evolved through the years.30
Daggers v. Van Dyck,31 illuminates:
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be
credible in itself – such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its
conformity to our knowledge, observation, and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs
to the miraculous and is outside of judicial cognizance.32
First, the trial judge, who had the opportunity of observing AAA’s manner and demeanour on the
witness stand, was convinced of her credibility: "AAA appeared to be a simple and truthful woman,
whose testimony was consistent, steady and firm, free from any material and serious
contradictions."33 The court continued:
The record nowhere yields any evidence of ill motive on the part of AAA to influence her in
fabricating criminal charges against Felipe Mirandilla, Jr. The absence of ill motive enhances the
standing of AAA as a witness. x x x.
When AAA testified in court, she was sobbing. While she was facing Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., to
positively identify him in open court, she was crying. Felipe Mirandilla Jr.’s response was to smile.
AAA was a picture of a woman who was gravely harmed, craving for justice. x x x.34
Second, the trial court found AAA’s testimony to be credible in itself. AAA’s ordeal was entered into
the police blotter immediately after her escape,35 negating opportunity for concoction.36 While in
Mirandilla’s company, none of her parents, brothers, sisters, relatives, classmates, or anyone who
knew her, visited, saw, or talked to her. None of them knew her whereabouts.37 AAA’s testimony
was corroborated by Dr. Sarah Vasquez, Legazpi City’s Health Officer, who discovered the
presence not only of hymenal lacerations but also gonorrhoea, a sexually transmitted disease.
More importantly, AAA remained consistent in the midst of gruelling cross examination. The
defense lawyer tried to impeach her testimony, but failed to do so.
The Court of Appeals confirmed AAA’s credibility in affirming the RTC decision.
We emphasize that a trial court’s assessment of a witness’ credibility, when affirmed by the CA, is
even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight or influence.38 This is so because of the judicial experience that trial courts
are in a better position to decide the question of credibility, having heard the witnesses themselves
and having observed firsthand their deportment and manner of testifying under gruelling
examination.39 Thus, in Estioca v. People,40 we held:
In resolving issues pertaining to the credibility of the witnesses, this Court is guided by the following
principles: (1) the reviewing court will not disturb the findings of the lower courts, unless there is a
showing that it overlooked or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that
may affect the result of the case; (2) the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are
entitled to great respect and even finality, as it had the opportunity to examine their demeanour
when they testified on the witness stand; and (3) a witness who testifies in a clear, positive and
convincing manner is a credible witness.41
Second Issue
"Sweetheart Theory" not Proven
Accused’s bare invocation of sweetheart theory cannot alone, stand. To be credible, it must be
corroborated by documentary, testimonial, or other evidence.42 Usually, these are letters, notes,
photos, mementos, or credible testimonies of those who know the lovers.43
The sweetheart theory as a defense, however, necessarily admits carnal knowledge, the first
element of rape. Effectively, it leaves the prosecution the burden to prove only force or intimidation,
the coupling element of rape. Love, is not a license for lust.44
This admission makes the sweetheart theory more difficult to defend, for it is not only an affirmative
defense that needs convincing proof;45 after the prosecution has successfully established a prima
facie case,46 the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused,47 who has to adduce evidence that
the intercourse was consensual.48
A prima facie case arises when the party having the burden of proof has produced evidence
sufficient to support a finding and adjudication for him of the issue in litigation.49
Burden of evidence is "that logical necessity which rests on a party at any particular time during the
trial to create a prima facie case in his favour or to overthrow one when created against
him."50(Emphasis supplied)
Mirandilla with his version of facts as narrated above attempted to meet the prosecution’s prima
facie case. To corroborate it, he presented his mother, Alicia Mirandilla; his relatives, Rogelio
Marcellana and Emilio Mendoza; and, his friend Arlene Moret.
Arlene Moret, the cigarette vendor who also served as the CR’s guard, testified that on 30 October
2000, AAA and Mirandilla arrived together at the park.51 They approached her and chatted with
her. On cross examination, she claimed otherwise: Mirandilla arrived alone two hours earlier,
chatting with her first, before AAA finally came.52 She also claimed meeting the couple for the first
time on 30 October 2000, only to contradict herself on cross examination with the version that she
met them previously, three times at least, in the previous month.53 On the other hand, Mirandilla
claimed first meeting AAA on 3 October 2000 at the park.54
The accused’s mother, Alicia Mirandilla, testified meeting her son only once, and living in Kilikao
only after his imprisonment.55 This contradicted Mirandilla’s claim that he visited his mother several
times in Kilikao, from October 2000 until January 2001.56
Even Mirandilla contradicted himself. His claim that he saw AAA soaked in blood, agonizing in pain,
with the abortifacient pills’ cover lying nearby, cannot be reconciled with his other claim that he
came to know AAA’s abortion only through the latter’s admission.57
Taken individually and as a whole, the defense witnesses’ testimonies contradicted each other and
flip-flopped on materials facts, constraining this Court to infer that they concocted stories in a
desperate attempt to exonerate the accused.
As a rule, self-contradictions and contradictory statement of witnesses should be reconciled,58 it
being true that such is possible since a witness is not expected to give error-free testimony
considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory.59 But, this principle, learned
from lessons of human experience, applies only to minor or trivial matters – innocent lapses that do
not affect witness’ credibility.60 They do not apply to self-contradictions on material facts.61 Where
these contradictions cannot be reconciled, the Court has to reject the testimonies,62 and apply the
maxim, falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. Thus,
To completely disregard all the testimony of a witness based on the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in
omnibus, testimony must have been false as to a material point, and the witness must have a
conscious and deliberate intention to falsify a material point. In other words, its requirements, which
must concur, are the following: (1) that the false testimony is as to one or more material points; and
(2) that there should be a conscious and deliberate intention to falsity.63
Crimes and Punishment
An appeal in criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question, including one not
raised by the parties.64 This was our pronouncement in the 1902 landmark case of U.S. v.
Abijan,65 which is now embodied in Section 11, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court:
SEC 11. Scope of Judgment. – The Court of Appeals may reverse, affirm, or modify the judgment
and increase or reduce the penalty imposed by the trial court, remand the case to the Regional Trial
Court for new trial or retrial, or dismiss the case. (Emphasis supplied)
The reason behind this rule is that when an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he
waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the
review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice
dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the appellant.66
To reiterate, the six informations charged Mirandilla with kidnapping and serious illegal detention
with rape (Crim. Case No. 9278), four counts of rape (Crim. Case Nos. 9274-75-76-77), and one
count of rape through sexual assault (Crim. Case No. 9279).
The accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case No. 9278 alleged that Mirandilla
kidnapped AAA and seriously and illegally detained her for more than three days during which time
he had carnal knowledge of her, against her will.67
The Court agrees with the CA in finding Mirandilla guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping
with rape, instead of simple kidnapping as the RTC ruled. It was the RTC, no less, which found that
Mirandilla kidnapped AAA, held her in detention for 39 days and carnally abused her while holding a
gun and/or a knife.68
Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code states that:
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation; xxx.
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or
any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
AAA was able to prove each element of rape committed under Article 266-A, par. 1(a) of the
Revised Penal Code, that (1) Mirandilla had carnal knowledge of her; (2) through force, threat, or
intimidation. She was also able to prove each element of rape by sexual assault under Article 266-
A, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code: (1) Mirandilla inserted his penis into her mouth; (2) through
force, threat, or intimidation.
Likewise, kidnapping and serious illegal detention is provided for under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code:
Article 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. – Any private individual who shall kidnap or
detain another, or in any manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death;
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days. xxx
An imminent Spanish commentator explained:
la detención, la prición, la privación de la libertad de una persona, en cualquier forma y por
cualquier medio ó por cualquier tiempo en virtud de la cual resulte interrumpido el libre ejercicio de
su actividad."69
Emphatically, the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No.
7659,70 states that when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped,
or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. This
provision gives rise to a special complex crime. As the Court explained in People v.
Larrañaga,71 this arises where the law provides a single penalty for two or more component
offenses.72
Notably, however, no matter how many rapes had been committed in the special complex crime of
kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime is only one kidnapping with rape.73 This is because these
composite acts are regarded as a single indivisible offense as in fact R.A. No. 7659 punishes these
acts with only one single penalty. In a way, R.A. 7659 depreciated the seriousness of rape because
no matter how many times the victim was raped, like in the present case, there is only one crime
committed – the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape.
However, for the crime of kidnapping with rape, as in this case, the offender should not have taken
the victim with lewd designs, otherwise, it would be complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. In
People v. Garcia,74 we explained that if the taking was by forcible abduction and the woman was
raped several times, the crimes committed is one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, in
as much as the forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape; and each of the other
counts of rape constitutes distinct and separate count of rape.75
It having been established that Mirandilla’s act was kidnapping and serious illegal detention (not
forcible abduction) and on the occasion thereof, he raped AAA several times, We hold that
Mirandilla is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with rape, warranting the penalty of death. However, in view of R.A. No. 9346
entitled, An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines,76 the penalty of death
is hereby reduced to reclusion perpetua,77 without eligibility for parole.78
We, therefore, modify the CA Decision. We hold that the separate informations of rape cannot be
considered as separate and distinct crimes in view of the above discussion.
As to the award of damages, we have the following rulings.
This Court has consistently held that upon the finding of the fact of rape, the award of civil damages
ex delicto is mandatory.79 As we elucidated in People v. Prades,80 the award authorized by the
criminal law as civil indemnity ex delicto for the offended party, aside from other proven actual
damages, is itself equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law.81 Thus, we held that
the civil liability ex delicto provided by the Revised Penal Code, that is, restitution, reparation, and
indemnification,82 all correspond to actual or compensatory damages in the Civil Code.83
In the 1998 landmark case of People v. Victor,84 the Court enunciated that if, in the crime of rape,
the death penalty is imposed, the indemnity ex delicto for the victim shall be in the increased
amount of NOT85 less than ₱75,000.00. To reiterate the words of the Court: "this is not only a
reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuation over time,
but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence
of heinous crimes..."86 xxx (Emphasis supplied)
After the enactment R.A. 9346,87 prohibiting the imposition of death penalty, questions arose as to
the continued applicability of the Victor88 ruling. Thus, in People v. Quiachon,89 the Court
pronounced that even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed because of R.A. No. 9346, the
civil indemnity ex delicto of ₱75,000.00 still applies because this indemnity is not dependent on the
actual imposition of death, but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the penalty of
death attended the commission of the offense.90 As explained in People v. Salome,91 while R.A.
No. 9346 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the fact remains that the penalty provided for
by the law for a heinous offense is still death, and the offense is still heinous.92 (Emphasis
supplied)
In addition, AAA is entitled to moral damages pursuant to Art. 2219 of the Civil Code,93 without the
necessity of additional pleadings or proof other than the fact of rape. This move of dispensing
evidence to prove moral damage in rape cases, traces its origin in People v. Prades,94 where we
held that:
The Court has also resolved that in crimes of rape, such as that under consideration, moral
damages may additionally be awarded to the victim in the criminal proceeding, in such amount as
the Court deems just, without the need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof as has heretofore
been the practice. Indeed, the conventional requirement of allegata et probata in civil procedure and
for essentially civil cases should be dispensed with in criminal prosecutions for rape with the civil
aspect included therein, since no appropriate pleadings are filed wherein such allegations can be
made. (Emphasis supplied)1avvphi1
Corollarily, the fact that complainant has suffered the trauma of mental, physical and psychological
sufferings which constitute the bases for moral damages are too obvious to still require the recital
thereof at the trial by the victim, since the Court itself even assumes and acknowledges such agony
on her part as a gauge of her credibility. What exists by necessary implication as being ineludibly
present in the case need not go through superfluity of still being proven through a testimonial
charade. (Emphasis supplied)95
AAA is also entitled to exemplary damages of ₱30,000.00, pursuant to the present jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00271 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
with rape under the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, by R.A.
No. 7659, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole,
and to pay the offended party AAA, the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto,
₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE vs.HERNANDO BONGOS
Before this Court is an appeal via Rule 45 from the Decision1 dated October 16, 2015 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06774, affirming in toto the Decision2 dated March 7, 2014 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Legazpi City in Criminal Case No. 11758, convicting
accused-appellant Hernando Bongos y Arevalo of the complex crime of robbery with rape.
On October 14, 2010, the prosecution charged Hernando Bongos y Arevalo alias "Ando/Pat" and
Ronel Dexisne y Altavano alias "Popoy" before the RTC, Legazpi City with the complex crime of
robbery with rape.
Only accused Bongos was arrested, while co-accused Ronel Dexisne was at-large. The
Information3 alleged
That on or about the 8th day of June, 2010, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and
helping one another for a common purpose, armed with a gun, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with intent to gain and by means of violence and intimidation take, steal,
and carry away cash money in the amount of ₱20,000.00 by destroying the lock of the drawer of
spouses BBB and CCC without their knowledge and consent; that by reason or on occasion of said
robbery, above-named accused conspiring, confederating and helping one another for a common
purpose with lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of
force and intimidation, have carnal knowledge of one [AAA] househelper of spouses BBB and CCC,
against her will and without her consent, and to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid victims.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned on March 15, 2011, Bongos pleaded not guilty to the crime charged, while Dexisne
remained at-large. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The facts are as follows:
At around 7 o'clock in the evening of June 8, 2010, at Barangay 123, Legazpi City, AAA, helper of
BBB and CCC, was left to tend the house when CCC went to her mother's house. While AAA was
washing dishes, two male persons entered the house through the kitchen. She identified them as
Bongos, the one wearing bonnet up to his forehead, and Dexisne, the one wearing black short
pants with red stripes on the side. She knew them because they are neighbors of her employers.
Bongos pointed a gun at her, while Dexisne pointed his knife. They forced her to enter the room
where the money of her employer was and demanded her to open the drawer. Since it was locked,
Dexisne forced it open using a steel, while Bongos remained at AAA's side poking the gun at her
neck. After they took the money, they forcibly dragged AAA outside the house until they reached a
clearing on the lower level of the yard. There, armed with a knife and gun, both accused threatened
and ordered AAA to undress herself. When she refused to do so, Dexisne got violent and slashed
her leg and then hit her chest near her left breast which caused her to lose consciousness.4
When AAA woke up, she no longer had her clothes on and felt pain on her private part. She was
afraid so she went to DDD, the grandfather of CCC and asked for help. DDD summoned someone
to fetch CCC to come home. Together with CCC, AAA reported the robbery incident to the
authorities the following day. However, AAA did not tell CCC of the rape incident because she was
ashamed and afraid that accused would really make good of their threat to kill or harm her in case
she makes a report about the incident.5
CCC confirmed that on June 8, 2010, at around 8 o'clock in the evening, the two maids of her
grandfather went to the house of her mother and told her that an incident happened in her house.
When she reached the house of her grandfather, she saw AAA crying. She asked AAA what
happened and the latter told her that someone entered her house and took money. CCC testified
that she immediately went to her house where she discovered that Php20,000.00 was indeed
missing from the drawer. CCC also testified that on June 12, 2010, AAA told her that she was
likewise raped by the accused. CCC knew accused "Poypoy" as Dexisne and "Ando" as Bongos
since both were her neighbors. They had the incident blottered at the police station on June 14,
2010.6
In the Medico-Legal Report issued on June 17, 2010 by Dr. James Belgira,7 the genital examination
upon AAA revealed that her hymen was dilated and there were deep-healed lacerations at 3 o'clock
and 6 o'clock positions, which concluded that there were clear signs of blunt vaginal penetrating
trauma. Later, Dr. Belgira testified that the approximate time wherein the deep-healed lacerations
were inflicted was around three to five days prior to the examination day. He examined AAA on
June 15, 2010. He further testified that the cause of the dilation and lacerations of the hymen may
be due to a blunt protruding hard object inserted in the vagina which has a diameter sufficient
enough to break the maximum elasticity of the hymenal body.
For its part, the defense alleged that around 1 o'clock in the afternoon of June 8, 2010, Bongos was
at the house of his parents in Barangay 123, Legazpi City to fix the tricycle of his father. Those
present at the house were his father and mother, Nimfa Bongos and Dexisne. Bongos claimed that
he finished fixing the tricycle at around 8 o'clock in the evening and then he went directly to his
house, about 150 meters away from his father's house, while Dexisne was left behind. He only
knew of the case against him when he was summoned. Prior to June 8, 2010, he does not know
any reason or ill-motive on the part of AAA or spouses BBB and CCC in indicting him in the case.
However, later on he was told by CCC that because he testified in favor of Dexisne, he would also
be included in the case.
In a Decision8 dated March 7, 2014, the court a quo convicted Bongos of the complex crime of
robbery with rape. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
Above premises considered, accused Hernando Bongos is hereby declared GUILTY of the complex
crime of robbery with rape, as defined and penalized under Article 294 [1] of the Revised Penal
Code. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
He is also ordered to return the amount of ₱20,000.00, which was proven by the prosecution to
have been taken by Bongos and his co-accused, to [CCC] and to pay the latter the amount of
₱50,000.00 as moral damages for accused' act of having violated the sanctity of [CCC's] home. He
is also ordered to pay exemplary damages in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) to
[CCC].
Also, accused is hereby ordered to pay [AAA] the following amounts: (i) ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity; (ii) ₱75,000.00 as moral damages; and (iii) ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
It is further understood that an interest rate of 6% per annum, reckoned upon the finality of this
judgment, is imposed on all the damages awarded both to [CCC] and [AAA].
The case against Ronel Dexisne is hereby sent to the archives pending his arrest.
So Ordered.9
The court a quo rejected Bongos' defense of alibi and denial, and instead gave credence and
probative weight to AAA's testimony.1âwphi1 It held that although AAA did not witness the actual
rape as she was unconscious when it happened, the circumstantial evidence taken all together
proved that on the occasion of robbery, she was raped by the malefactors. It, likewise, found that
there was also conspiracy between Bongos and Dexisne from their coordinated acts from the time
they gained entry into BBB and CCC's house, until they have successfully taken the money from
AAA through force and intimidation and the eventual rape of her.
Unperturbed, Bongos appealed the court a quo's decision before the Court of Appeals. However, on
October 16, 2015, in its disputed Decision,10 the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of
the trial court.
Hence, this appeal, raising the same issue brought before the appellate court, to wit:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
The appeal lacks merit.
Robbery with rape is a special complex crime under Article 294 of the RPC. To be convicted of
robbery with rape, the following elements must concur: (1) the taking of personal property is
committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another;
(3) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (4) the robbery is
accompanied by rape.11
For a conviction of the crime of robbery with rape to stand, it must be shown that the rape was
committed by reason or on the occasion of a robbery and not the other way around. This special
complex crime under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code contemplates a situation where the
original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to gain, personal property belonging to another
and rape is committed on the occasion thereof or as an accompanying crime.12
After going over the records of the case, We find no compelling reason to disturb the findings of the
trial court as affirmed by the appellate court.1âwphi1 The prosecution was able to establish that
Bongos and Dexisne entered the house of the victims armed with a handgun and knife and took
spouses BBB and CCC's money amounting to ₱20,000.00 without consent and by means of
violence and intimidation.
During trial, AAA testified as to the identity of Bongos and Dexisne as the perpetrators, as well as
the events that transpired during the incident, to wit:
xxxx
ARP CALLEJA
Q And, could you please tell us who were those two persons who entered the house?
A Ronel Dexisne and Hernando Bongos y Arevalo.
Q Is this Ronel Dexisne present in Court now?
A He is not in court.
Q How about Hernando Bongos?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Will you please point to him?
A (At this juncture the witness points to a man seated in front of the row of benches inside the court
rooms wearing a yellow t-shirt and light blue pants with white stripes, who when asked of his name
answered that he is Hernando Bongos)
Q Prior to June 8, 2010 are you familiar with Hernando Bongos?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Could you tell us the reason why you are already familiar with Hernando Bongos?
A He is a neighbor of my employer in Banquerohan.
Q You said that those two persons, Ronel Dexisne and Hernando Bongos, entered the house. After
entering the house, what did they do?
A. The poked a gun and pointed a knife at me.
Q Who was the person who poked a gun at you?
A It was Hernando Bongos, Sir. (At this juncture the witness points to accused Hernando Bongos)
Q How about the person who pointed a knife at you?
A It was Ronel Dexisne, Sir.
Q After those two persons poked a gun and pointed a knife at you, what happened next?
A They forced me to enter the room.
Q And what happened next, after they forced you to enter the room.
A They were asking me to point where the money of my employer was.
Q Did you comply with that order?
A It took me quite a time before I pointed it to them.
Q After you pointed to them where the money was, what happened next?
A After they get (sic) the money they still wanted me to go with them outside.
Q Where was the money placed?
A Inside the drawer.
Q Who opened the drawer? Q Now, while the accused Bongos poked a gun at you and Dexisne pointed his knife at you, they
A Ronel Dexisne. dragged you at a room in the house of your employer, is that correct?
xxxx A Yes, Sir.
Q And what did they do after they dragged you inside the room?
Q How was it opened by Dexisne? A They forced me to show to them where the money was kept.
A By a steel. Q Which money are you referring to?
Q You mean he forcibly destroyed the lock then he opened the drawer? A The money of [BBB].
A. Yes, Your Honor. Q Did you not ask them why they knew that there is money kept in the room of your employer?
xxxx A No, Sir.
Q And did you point to them where the money was kept?
Q While Dexisne was opening the drawer what was Hernando Bongos [d]oing? A Yes, Sir
A He was poking a gun at me. Q Where was the money kept?
Q How far were you from Dexisne during that time? A Inside the drawer.
A Just near. Q And what did they do after you pointed the place where the money was kept?
Q On what part of your body was the gun poked? A They got it, Sir.
A On my neck. Q Both of them took the money?
x x x x.13 A Yes, Sir.
Q How were they able to get the money?
ATTY. RANESES ON CROSS-EXAMINATION: A The drawer was locked. They used a piece of steel to destroy the lock.
Q You mean both of them used the steel to open the lock?
Q. Your complaint states that on June 8, 2010 at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, the two (2)
A Yes, Sir.
accused with reference to Dexisne and Bongos, Bongos now being present, entered the house
Q. Who was carrying the piece of steel which they forced to open the lock?
where you were working. The house belonging to [BBB]. Is that true?
A. Dexisne Sir.
A Yes, Sir.
COURT (To the Witness)
Q At that time, Bongos was armed with a gun or a firearm?
Q. He was the one who forced the lock of the drawer?
A Yes, Sir.
A. Yes, Your Honor.
Q And Dexisne was also with a knife
ATTY. RANESES
A Yes, Sir.
Q And after Dexisne took the money, where did he place the money?
Q Bongos poked a gun at you?
A. In a bag, Sir.
A Yes, Sir.
Q. Whose bag was it?
Q While Dexisne pointed his knife at you also?
A. Dexisne Sir.
A Yes, Sir.
COURT (To the Witness)
Q After that and while Bongos was still pointing a gun at you....
Q You mean when Dexisne and Bongos arrived at the house of [BBB], Dexisne had a bag with
(interrupted)
him?
ARP CALLEJA A Yes, Your Honor.
Your Honor please may I just be clarified if the surname Bongos refers to the accused as the one COURT
arraigned?
Okay.
ATTY. RANESES
He is not Atty. Bongos. ATTY RANESES
ARP CALLEJA
May we know from the defense counsel if that person he mentions as Bongos is the one arraigned Q. In other words, Dexisne had with him a bag and he was likewise armed with a knife?
and now present in court?
ATTY. RANESES A. Yes, Sir.14
Admitted, Your Honor.
COURT Having established that the personal properties of the victims were unlawfully taken by the accused-
Atty. Raneses, you are not the counsel for accused Dexisne? Just for accused Bongos? appellant, intent to gain was sufficiently proven. Intent to gain, or animus lucrandi, as an element of
ATTY. RANESES the crime of robbery, is an internal act; hence, presumed from the unlawful taking of things. Thus,
Yes, only for Bongos. I mentioned Dexisne Your Honor because at that time both of them were the first three elements of the crime were clearly established.
present and both of them are supposed to be examined in the rape of [AAA].
As to the last requirement, the courts a quo correctly held that although AAA did not exactly witness A Yes, Sir.
the actual rape because she was unconscious at that time, circumstantial evidence shows that the Q And because you refused he delivered a fistic blow at the left side of your breast?
victim was raped by the appellant and his co-accused, to wit: A Yes, Sir.
Q After that, the rape took place?
ARP CALLEJA ON DIRECT EXAMINATION OF AAA A I lost consciousness.
Q In other words, you are not sure whether or not you were raped because you were unconscious?
xxxx A When I regained my consciousness, I was already undressed Sir.
Q I am asking you whether or not you knew that you were raped not whether you were undressed
Q After the two, Dexisne and Bongos, got the money what did they do next? or not after you regained your consciousness.
A They brought me outside of our fence. ARP CALLEJA
Q Could you tell us how were you brought outside of your fence?
A They pulled me. May I put into the records Your Honor that the witness is crying while being cross-examined.
Q And who was the person who pulled you?
A It was Ronel Dexisne, Sir. COURT (To the Witness)
Q And on what part of your body was being pulled by Ronel Dexisne?
A Here, Sir. (Witness holding her left arm near the elbow.) Q Okay, I think what the counsel wants to ask you is whether you knew that you were being raped
Q And, while Dexisne was pulling you, what was Bongos doing then? actually because you said that you lost consciousness.
A He was pushing my back and at the same time poking the gun at me. A Yes, Your Honor.
Q And after the two pulled you out of the fence what happened next? Q So you knew. How did you come to know that because you said earlier that you lost
A On the lower part of the place outside the fence that was where they raped me. consciousness?
Q What do you mean by the word rape? A When I regained consciousness, I felt pain in my ....
A Before they raped be (sic) they forced me to undress myself but I did not do it. Q In your vagina?
Q What was your position when you were being forced to undress? A Yes, Your Honor.16
A I was then standing Sir. Circumstantial evidence, also known as indirect or presumptive evidence, refers to proof of
Q And did you undress yourself? collateral facts and circumstances when the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to
A No, Sir. reason and common experience. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if (a)
Q And what happened next after you did not comply with their order? there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
A Ronel Dexisne got mad at me and all I can remember is he hit me here? (Witness pointing at the proven; (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
left side of her body just beside her left breast) reasonable doubt. A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained
Q After Dexisne hit you wbat happened next? when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable
A I lost consciousness. conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.17
Q For how many minutes did you regain consciousness?
A I do not know, Sir. Here, the prosecution presented circumstantial evidence that when analyzed and taken together,
Q After you regain (sic) consciousness what did you discover to (sic) your body? lead to the obvious conclusion that Bongos and Dexisne also raped AAA on the occasion of the
A After I regained consciousness I found out that I have no longer my clothes on. robbery: first, after appellant took the money, they forcibly dragged AAA outside of the house's
Q Are you telling us that when you regain (sic) consciousness you were totally naked?
fence;18 second, appellant forced AAA to undress; third, when AAA refused, co-accused Dexisne
A Yes, Sir.
got mad and hit her at her chest causing her to lose consciousness; fourth, when AAA regained
Q Were you able to locate your dress after you regain (sic) consciousness?
A Yes, Sir. consciousness, AAA had no longer clothes on; and fifth, she felt pain in her private part.
Q In what particular place?
In several decided cases, the victim was unconscious and was not aware of the sexual intercourse
A A little far from where I was.15
that transpired, yet the accused was found guilty on the basis of circumstantial evidence.
xxxx
In People v. Gaufo, 19 the victim was hit on her head by the accused when she fought back and
ATTY. RANESES ON CROSS-EXAMINATION OF AAA:
asked for help. The accused then punched her abdomen causing her to lose consciousness. Upon
Q Actually it was Dexisne who dragged you by holding you by your left hand, is that not correct? regaining her bearings, she noticed that she had no more underwear, her private part was bleeding
A Yes, Sir. and her body was painful. The combination of these circumstances, among others, led the Court to
Q While the accused Bongos was pushing you from behind and at the same time pointing his gun at adjudge the accused guilty of rape.
you?
A Yes, Sir. In People v. Evangelia, 20 when one of the robbers stripped off AAA's clothes and AAA resisted
Q When they reached the grassy patch with you did Dexisne and Bongos undress you? and fought back, appellant slammed her head twice against the concrete wall, causing her to lose
consciousness. When she regained her senses, appellant and the other robbers were already gone,
and she found herself lying on the side on the floor of the comfort room with her feet untied and her
hands still tied behind her back. She saw her shorts and panty strewn at her side. She suffered pain
in her knees, head, stomach, and her vagina, which was bleeding. The Court found that the
accused raped the victim:
In People v. Pabol, 21 the victim shouted for help and then accused covered her mouth and she fell
unconscious. When she had woken up, she discovered that her ears had been sliced, her blouse
opened and her underwear stained with her own blood. She also experienced pain in her private
part after the incident. Given the foregoing circumstances, the Court found that the accused raped
the victim.
Bongos, however, while he asserted that at the time of the incident, both him and Dexisne were in
his father's house in Purok 2, 'Banquerohan, Legazpi City, he was unable to show that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime considering that his father's house was
just around 250 meters away from BBB's house.22 Basic is the rule that for alibi to prosper, the
accused must prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed and that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime. Physical impossibility refers to
the distance between the place where the appellant was when the crime transpired and the place
where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places. Where there is the
least chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi must fail.23
Thus, between the categorical statements of the prosecution witness, on one hand, and the bare
denial of the appellant, on the other, the former must perforce prevail. An affirmative testimony is far
stronger than a negative testimony especially when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness.
Alibi and denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving
evidence undeserving of weight in law. They are considered with suspicion and always received
with caution, not only because they are inherently weak and unreliable but also because they are
easily fabricated and concocted.24 Denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of prosecution
witnesses who were not shown to have any ill-motive to testify against the appellant.25
We are also in concurrence with the findings of the courts a quo of conspiracy between Bongos and
Dexisne. Conspiracy was shown by the coordinated acts of Bongos and Dexisne from the time they
gained entry into BBB and CCC's residence, went to their room and forcibly opened the drawer of
the bedroom table and took the money inside; and thereafter forcibly dragged AAA outside of the
house and raped her. There can be no other conclusion than that the successful perpetration of the
crime was done through the concerted efforts of Bongos and Dexisne.
Moreover, the rule in this jurisdiction is that whenever a rape is committed as a consequence, or on
the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part therein are liable as principals of the crime of
robbery with rape, although not all of them took part in the rape. Thus, in People v. Verceles, et
al., 26 We have ruled that once conspiracy is established between two accused in the commission
of the crime of robbery, they would be both equally culpable for the rape committed by one of them
on the occasion of the robbery, unless any of them proves that he endeavored to prevent the other
from committing the rape. The immediately preceding condition is absent in the instant case.27
We do not find it necessary anymore to belabor on the issue raised by the appellant on the
probative value of the medico-legal report. A medicolegal report is not indispensable to the
prosecution of the rape case, it being merely corroborative in nature.28 At this point, the fact of
robbery and rape and the identity of the perpetrators were proven even by the lone testimony of
AAA. The credible disclosure of AAA that Bongos and Dexisne raped her on the occasion of the
robbery is the most important proof of the commission of the crime.
Likewise, delay in reporting an incident of rape due to threats does not affect the credibility of the
complainant, nor can it be taken against her. The charge of rape is rendered doubtful only if the
delay was unreasonable and unexplained.29 AAA explained that she did not immediately report that
she was also raped during the occasion of the robbery incident because appellant, who was also a
neighbor, threatened to kill her if she does.30 Nonetheless, the 9-day delay in reporting the rape
incident cannot be said to be unreasonable considering the shame and fear that AAA felt. Such
delay does not affect the truthfulness of the charge in the absence of other circumstances that show
the same to be a mere concoction or impelled by some ill motive.31
Finally, the Information should have alleged that the crime was committed inside the dwelling of the
victims which was proven during the trial. We could not, therefore, consider this as an aggravating
circumstance, although if alleged, it should have been admitted since the crime committed is
robbery with violence and thus could have increased the penalty to death although it could not be
imposed because of the provisions of RA 9346 and the accused could not be eligible for parole.
However, as enunciated in People v. Jugueta32citing People v. Catubig, 33 the said aggravating
circumstance can be appreciated but only for determining the civil liability awarded. Accordingly, the
award of civil, moral, and exemplary damages should be increased to ₱100,000.00 each.
In view of the foregoing, We find no basis to disturb the findings of the trial court as affirmed by the
appellate court with regard to accused-appellant's guilt. The prosecution's evidence established with
certainty that accused-appellant, together with Dexisne, conspired with each other in stealing the
money of BBB and CCC through violence and intimidation by pointing the gun and poking the knife
on AAA who was then left alone in the house at the time of the incident. Furthermore, the
prosecution was able to show that, on the occasion of the robbery, AAA was also raped. We, thus,
agree with the courts a quo in their appreciation that the original intent of Bongos and Dexisne was
to take, with intent to gain, the personal effects of BBB and CCC, and rape was committed on the
occasion thereof.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06774 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant
Hernando Bongos is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of ROBBERY
WITH RAPE, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Accused-appellant is, likewise, ORDERED TO RETURN the amount of ₱20,000.00 which was
stolen from Spouses BBB and CCC as proven during the trial.
Accused-appellant is further DIRECTED TO PAY the victim AAA the amounts of ₱l00,000.00 as
civil indemnity, ₱l00,000.00 as moral damages and ₱l00,000.00 as exemplary damages. Interest at
the rate of six percent (6%) per annum is imposed on all the damages awarded in this case from
date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
 - Lacerated wound (1/2) inch long below (L) labia

which directly caused her death, to the damage and prejudice of her heirs.5 (Citation omitted)

ZZZ went at large, but he was later arrested on February 6, 2003. Upon arraignment, ZZZ pleaded
not guilty to the crime charged.6

The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses: (1) the victim's uncle BBB; (2) Senior Police Officer 3
Jaime Lavarias (SPO3 Lavarias); (3) Dr. Paz Q. Mejia (Dr. Mejia); (4) Dr. Ronald Bandonill (Dr.
Bandonill); and (5) the victim's father CCC.7

BBB testified that he was the uncle of both AAA and ZZZ. The victim's father, CCC, was his brother,
and ZZZ's mother is his second cousin. ZZZ's mother and AAA's father are relatives, making them
related.8

BBB testified that at around 7:00p.m. on May 16, 1996, he was on his way to the store to buy
cigarettes when he saw ZZZ dragging AAA by the wrist toward the school. Though it was dark and
he was about 1 0 meters away, he was able to see them using a flashlight he was carrying. Still, he
said he presumed nothing was off, thinking they were relatives. He had merely reprimanded them
before he went on to buy his cigarette and returned home, where he had a drinking spree with his
nephews.9

The following day, news spread that AAA was missing. With his cousin Josefino Camilet, BBB went
on a search for his niece and informed barangay officials who then helped to look for her.10

A couple of days later, the barangay officials found a lifeless AAA in a bamboo grove near the
school. BBB said that her niece's naked body had already blackened due to decomposition. On the
same day, he said he found ZZZ in his house-the last time he had ever seen him.11
PEOPLE vs.ZZZ,
SPO3 Lavarias testified that he way AAA was found. When he and his companions went to
In the absence of direct evidence, a resort to circumstantial evidence is usually necessary in ███████████, they saw AAA's corpse under the bamboo grove. They came to know the body's
proving the commission of rape. This is because the crime "is generally unwitnessed and very often identity through BBB, who also claimed that ZZZ was the person behind the crime. Accompanied by
only the victim is left to testify for [him or] herself. It becomes even more difficult when the complex BBB, the police went to ZZZ's house, but he was nowhere to be found. They proceeded to prepare
crime of rape with homicide is committed because the victim could no longer testify."1 an investigation report and requested an autopsy on AAA.12
This Court resolves the appeal from the Court of Appeals' February 29, 2016 Decision2 in CA-G.R. In the police officers' Joint Affidavit, SPO3 Lavarias recalled that they went back to the barangay on
CR-HC No. 06486. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court's March 4, 2013 May 20, 1996 and found YYY, ZZZ's brother. YYY told them that on the night of the incident, he was
Decision3 finding ZZZ guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide. walking home with ZZZ and AAA when his brother told him to go home alone.13
In an October 14, 1996 Information, ZZZ was charged with the crime of rape with homicide.4 It Dr. Mejia, a municipal health officer in ███████████, testified that she was the physician who
read: conducted the initial autopsy as requested by the police officers. According to her report, there was
a crack on AAA's temporal skull and a half-inch long laceration below her left labia, while brain
That on or about the 16th day of May 1996 in the evening, in
matter leaked above her left ear. The doctor also noted that the body had already been
████████████████████████████████████████████████████, Philippines and
decomposing when it was found.14
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with Dr. Mejia, however, said that she could not give a precise medical opinion on the laceration on
AAA against her will and consent and on the same occasion the said accused did then and there AAA's labia as she was not an obstetrician gynecologist. She also could not precisely tell how many
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously strike, assault and club the said victim inflicting upon her the days lapsed since AAA had died, though she testified that the cracked temporal skull may have
following: caused AAA's death.15
- Cracked temporal skull with brains coming out
Dr. Bandonill, the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, testified that he
conducted an autopsy on AAA on May 29, 1996. Upon examination, he found that the cadaver was
at an advanced state of decomposition, the face was contorted, the tongue was protruding / from
the mouth, and all the extremities were flexed. He noted that the contorted face could have been
either due to decomposition or due to a grimace caused by pain before she died.16
Dr. Bandonill also observed contusions on AAA's face, right arm's anterior surface, and the front
and side parts of her thigh. He noted contusions on the genital area, which could have been caused
by a hard or blunt instrument. Clumps of dried blood from the vaginal opening could have also been
caused by a tear inside the genital area.17
From these findings, Dr. Bandonill remarked that AAA might have been sexually assaulted. He
added that AAA's death could have been caused by the traumatic cerebral contusion.18
CCC, the victim's father, testified that AAA was 11 years old when she was raped and killed. He
showed that he spent ₱20,000.00 for the internment of AAA and ₱30,000.00 for miscellaneous
expenses such as transportation costs. In anguish from AAA's death, he also asked for damages.19
For the defense, ZZZ testified that he was 15 years old when the incident happened, as evidenced
by his birth certificate. He confirmed that he knew AAA as his cousin, and that both resided in the
same barangay. On the night of May 16, 1996, he said that he went to his grandmother's house,
where he watched television with his brother and around 20 other people including AAA. After
watching, he and his brother, YYY, returned to their sister's house to sleep. He said that he did not
notice if AAA left their grandmother's house.20
Cansino added that when AAA was found dead, none of the barangay officials and police officers
went to his sister's house to investigate him. On May 22, 1996, his stepfather brought him to Tarlac
to work as a helper in a grocery store, where he used the alias Peter Viray to be employed. He later
found out that he was charged with rape with homicide of AAA.21
Also testifying for the defense was YYY, ZZZ's brother, who retracted what he had said earlier when
the police interviewed him. Affirming ZZZ's testimony, he testified that on the night of the incident,
they watched television at their grandmother's house before they went home and slept at their
sister's house.22
In a March 4, 2013 Decision,23 the Regional Trial Court found ZZZ guilty of the crime charged. The
dispositive portion read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, punishable by reclusion perpetua. However, the
service of sentence is hereby suspended, and in lieu of imprisonment, he is disposed with in an
agricultural camp or any other training facility that may be supervised and controlled by the BUCOR,
in coordination with the DSWD, in accordance with Section 51 of RA 9344.
The accused is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim: Php20,000.00 as actual damages;
Php100,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto; Php75,000.00 as moral damages; and Php50,000.00
as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.24
The trial court found that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution proved ZZZ's
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It ruled that there was moral certainty that ZZZ perpetrated the
crime since he had been the last person seen with AAA before she disappeared, and he fled and
hid his identity when he learned that he was a suspect.25 The trial court ruled that the positive
identification of ZZZ prevailed over the defense of denial. It found his alibi that he went home after
watching television did not preclude the possibility that he was at the crime scene.26
Adopting the report of the social worker who was assigned to ZZZ, the trial court found that he
acted with discernment in committing the crime against AAA.27
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals, m its February 29, 2016 Decision,28 affirmed ZZZ's conviction:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Appeal is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision dated March 2013 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 56, ███████████, in Criminal
Case No. SCC-2594 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.29
The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court in relying on the testimony of BBB, who saw ZZZ
dragging AAA toward the school on the night of the incident. Aside from finding his testimony
spontaneous and convincing, it did not find any motive from BBB to wrongly implicate ZZZ to the
crime.30
The Court of Appeals ruled that although BBB did not actually see ZZZ raping AAA, circumstantial
evidence led to the reasonable conclusion that ZZZ perpetrated the crime: (1) BBB positively
identified ZZZ as the person last seen with the victim immediately before the incident; and (2) ZZZ
hid from authorities and adopted an alias. The Court of Appeals concluded that these pieces of
circumstantial evidence operated against ZZZ.31
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals ruled that between the categorical statements and the bare
denial of ZZZ, the former prevailed. While ZZZ's testimony was corroborated by his brother, the
Court of Appeals ruled that the latter could not be considered a disinterested witness. Moreover, it
found that it was not physically impossible for ZZZ to be in the crime scene since he and AAA
resided in the same barangay.32
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court was correct in retroactively applying Republic Act No.
9344, or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of2006. Under Section 6 of the law, a child above 15
years old but below 18 years old is not exempt from criminal liability when the child acted with
discernment. The Court of Appeals found that ZZZ acted with discernment when he perpetrated the
crime in a dark and isolated place, and when he evaded arrest by fleeing to Tarlac under an alias. It
noted that even the social worker assigned to him arrived at the same conclusion.33
As ZZZ was already above 30 years old when he was convicted, the Court of Appeals held that the
automatic suspension of the penalty as provided under Sections 38 and 40 of Republic Act No.
9344 was no longer applicable.34
ZZZ filed his Notice of Appeal. His appeal having been given due course, the Court of Appeals
elevated the records of this case to this Court.35
In its February 20, 2017 Resolution,36 this Court required the parties to submit their supplemental
briefs. Both parties later manifested that they would adopt their Briefs before the Court of
Appeals.37
Accused-appellant mainly argues that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt.38
First, accused-appellant questions the credibility of BBB's testimony. He claims that contrary to
BBB's testimony, human experience dictates that BBB, as AAA's guardian, should have been
alarmed when he allegedly saw him dragging her to a dark place. He also questions BBB's story in
which AAA did not ask for help when BBB allegedly saw her being dragged.39 Moreover, he finds it
suspicious that BBB failed to find AAA's body when he purportedly searched the area near the
school, as the corpse's stench would have caught his attention.40 He surmises that BBB implicated
him in the crime because BBB was himself investigated by the police.41
Even assuming that he was the last person seen with AAA, accused-appellant argues that this
merely raises suspicion but is not sufficient to establish his guilt.42
Second, accused-appellant posits that even if he committed the crime, the Information failed to
allege that he acted with discernment, which meant that he should not be held criminally liable. He
posits that the trial court, in failing to conduct its own determination and merely relying on the social
worker's report, erred in ruling that he had acted with discernment.43
Third, accused-appellant contends that he was not guilty of fleeing to evade the charge against him.
He reasons that he went to Tarlac because he was brought there by his stepfather, and as a child,
he had no choice but to follow this order. He also points out that he regularly returned to
███████████ every month while he was working in Tarlac.44
Lastly, accused-appellant avers that his denial must be considered since it was corroborated by his
brother, who was with him when the crime was committed. He posits that while the defense of
denial is deemed inherently weak, the prosecution cannot profit from this alone; instead, it should
rely on the strength of its own evidence.45
On the other hand, plaintiff-appellee People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, argues that the circumstantial evidence submitted by the prosecution proves accused-
appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.46 It avers that the circumstances in this case created an
unbroken chain that led to the reasonable conclusion that accused appellant raped and killed
AAA.47
Moreover, plaintiff-appellee argues that the testimony of ZZZ's brother, YYY, deserves no
credence.48 It points out that according to PO3 Lavarias' testimony, YYY narrated on May 20, 1996
that while he was walking home with accused-appellant and AAA on the night of the incident, his
brother advised him to leave them behind.49 In his testimony in court, however, YYY recanted this
story and stated that he went home with accused-appellant. Plaintiff-appellee submits that YYY's
narration in 1996 was more credible than his testimony, as it was taken almost right after the
incident and when he was only seven (7) years old, leaving little room for coaching.50
Plaintiff-appellee contends that the trial court did not err in giving credence to BBB's testimony,
maintaining that there was nothing incredible in what he said: (1) he was not alarmed when he saw
accused-appellant with AAA because they were relatives; and (2) he testified that both of them told
him that they would follow him home after he had admonished them.51 Plaintiff-appellee also
maintains that SPO3 Lavarias clarified that BBB was never a suspect in the case, quashing
accused-appellant's claim that BBB had the motive to implicate him in the crime.52 It echoes the
settled doctrine that appellate courts will generally not disturb the trial court's findings when it comes
to witnesses' credibility.53
Plaintiff-appellee asserts that the positive identification of accused appellant, taken together with
other circumstantial evidence, leads to a reasonable conclusion that he perpetrated the crime.54
As to whether accused-appellant acted with discernment, plaintiff-appellee posits that the allegation
in the Information sufficiently met the requirement.55 Nevertheless, should there be a defect in the
Information, plaintiff-appellee maintains that accused-appellant is deemed to have waived his
objections when he entered his plea.56 Moreover, it argues that hiding from authorities indicates
accused-appellant's discernment, as it shows that he was fully aware of his act's consequences and
depravity.57
The issues for this Court's resolution are the following:
First, whether or not accused-appellant ZZZ is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
with homicide; and
Second, whether or not the prosecution proved that accused-appellant acted with discernment.
I
In People v. Villarino,58 the elements of special complex crime of rape with homicide are the
following:
(1) the appellant had carnal knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was
achieved by means of force, threat or intimidation; and (3) by reason or on occasion of such carnal
knowledge by means of force, threat or intimidation, the appellant killed a woman.59
The commission of the crime of rape may be proven not only by direct evidence, but also by
circumstantial evidence.60 Circumstantial evidence are "proof of collateral facts and circumstances
from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common
experience."61
In the absence of direct evidence, a resort to circumstantial evidence is usually necessary in
proving the commission of rape. This is because rape "is generally unwitnessed and very often only
the victim is left to testify for [him or] herself. It becomes even more difficult when the complex crime
of rape with homicide is committed because the victim could no longer testify."62
Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides the requirements for circumstantial
evidence to be sufficient to sustain a conviction:
SECTION 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals considered the following circumstantial evidence in
convicting accused-appellant: (1) BBB testified seeing him dragging AAA to the school on the night
of the incident; (2) accused-appellant's brother, YYY, testified going home with him and AAA, but
accused-appellant asked him to leave them behind; (3) after AAA's body had been found, accused-
appellant fled town and hid his identity using an alias; and (4) the post-mortem examination
conducted by Dr. Mejia and Dr. Bandonill confirmed that the cause of AAA's death was a traumatic
cerebral contusion, while the dried blood from her vagina was caused by a tear inside the genital
area.
A careful review of the records shows nothing that warrants the reversal of the trial court's and the
Court of Appeals' rulings.
Accused-appellant questions the trial court's Decision by pointing out that the sole basis of his
conviction is that he had been the last person seen with AAA before she disappeared. This is not
the case. His conviction is anchored not only on this single instance, but on the series of
circumstantial evidence against him. The circumstantial evidence proffered by the prosecution
constitutes an unbroken chain that leads to a reasonable conclusion that accused-appellant, and no
other person, was the author of the crime. Indeed, proof beyond reasonable doubt "does not mean
such a degree of proof as to exclude the possibility of error and produce absolute certainty. Only
moral certainty is required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind."63
Moreover, there is no showing that the trial court erred in g1vmg credence to BBB's testimony. As
BBB explained, he reprimanded accused-appellant and AAA when he saw them, but he was not
suspicious since the two were relatives. Moreover, the prosecution established that BBB was not a
suspect in the crime, and nor was there any proof that BBB had motive to erroneously implicate
accused-appellant.
As this Court held in People v. Baron,64 "factual findings of the trial court and its evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed
on appeal, unless the trial court is shown to have overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied any
fact or circumstance of weight and substance."65 Here, it was not shown that the trial court erred
and misapprehended any fact or evidence. The trial court's findings, when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are binding and conclusive on this Court.66 Thus, its findings must not be disturbed.
Lastly, accused-appellant's denial cannot prevail over the prosecution's evidence. Although the
testimony of his brother YYY corroborated his denial, it does not escape this Court's attention that
his brother admitted in his initial testimony that he did not go home with accused-appellant on the
night of the incident. This Court has held that retractions are generally disfavored as they are
unreliable.67
Nevertheless, even if we consider YYY's more recent testimony, accused-appellant's alibi must still
fail. For his defense of alibi to be credible, he must show that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the crime scene when the crime was committed.68 Yet, accused-appellant, who stayed in the
same barangay as AAA and the school, failed to do so.
II
Republic Act No. 9344, or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, provides the minimum age
of criminal responsibility:
SECTION 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at
the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child
shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child is deemed to be fifteen (15) years of age on the day of the fifteenth anniversary of his/her
birthdate.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from
criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with
discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings m
accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil
liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.
This Court has defined discernment as the "mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the
consequences of his unlawful act."69 This is determined by considering all the facts of each
case.70
Under Republic Act No. 9344, children above 15 years old but below 18 years old who acted
without discernment are exempt from criminal responsibility. They "shall be released and shall be
subjected to an intervention program as may be determined by a local social welfare and
development officer, pursuant to Section 20[.]"71
On the other hand, if they acted with discernment, they shall not be exempt from criminal
responsibility. In Dorado v. People, this Court explained how the law applies to children in conflict
with the law who acted with discernment:
Consequently, under R.A. No. 9344, only a child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18)
years of age who acted with discernment shall not be exempted from criminal responsibility.
Nevertheless, the said child does not immediately proceed to trial. Instead, he or she may undergo
a diversion, which refers to an alternative, child-appropriate process of determining the
responsibility and treatment of the [child in conflict with the law] without resorting to formal court
proceedings. If the diversion is unsuccessful or if the other grounds provided by law are present,
then the [child in conflict with the law] shall undergo the appropriate preliminary investigation of his
or her criminal case, and trial before the courts may proceed.
Once the [child in conflict with the law] is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall not
immediately execute its judgment; rather, it shall place the [child in conflict with the law] under
suspended sentence. Notably, the suspension shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already
eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his or her guilt. During the
suspension, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the
Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law. If the disposition measures are
successful, then the court shall discharge the [child in conflict with the law]. Conversely, if
unsuccessful, then the court has the following options: (1) to discharge the child, (2) to order
execution of sentence, or (3) to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or
until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.72 (Citations omitted)
Here, accused-appellant argues that even if he were guilty of raping AAA, he must still be exempt
from criminal liability since he was only 15 years old73 when he committed the offense and the
prosecution failed to prove that he acted with discernment.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that accused-appellant acted with discernment in
carrying out the crime.74 First, he perpetrated the crime in a dark and isolated place. Second, after
knowing that he had been tagged as the suspect, he evaded authorities by fleeing to Tarlac and
concealing his identity. Third, as confirmed by the social worker assigned to him, he knew and
understood the consequences of his acts. Lastly, Dr. Bandonill concluded that AAA was raped by
means of force, as evidenced by the contusions all over her body and by the tear from her vaginal
area.
As can be gleaned from these facts, accused-appellant committed the crime with an understanding
of its depravity and consequences. He must suffer the full brunt of the penalty of the crime.
Considering that accused-appellant is already over 30 years old when he was convicted, the
automatic suspension of the sentence provided under Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344, in
relation to Section 40, may no longer be applied. While the suspension of sentence still applies
even if the child in conflict with the law is already of the age of majority at the time his conviction
was rendered, the suspension applies only until the minor reaches the maximum age of 21.75 The
provisions state:
SECTION 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18)
years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the
court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense
committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the
child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided,
however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen
years (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court
shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on
Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
....
SECTION 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. If the court finds that the
objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been
fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of
his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before
the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended
sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to
order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or
until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.
As to the proper penalty for rape with homicide, Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code provides:
ARTICLE 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. - Rape is committed -
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of
the circumstances mentioned above be present.
ARTICLE 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.
....
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.
Thus, the imposable penalty for the crime of rape with homicide is death.1âшphi1 Under Article
6376 of the Revised Penal Code, if the penalty prescribed by law is composed of two (2) indivisible
penalties, the lesser penalty shall be imposed if neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances
are present in the commission of the crime. Absent any aggravating circumstances, the lesser
penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposable. Furthermore, since accused-appellant was a minor
when he committed the crime, he is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority
under Section 68(2)77 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, the proper imposable penalty on him
is reclusion temporal.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the indeterminate penalty has a minimum period within
the range of prision mayor-the penalty one (1) degree lower to that provided in Article 249-and a
maximum period within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period. Hence, the
indeterminate sentence of 10 years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and
four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, should be imposed.
In accordance with People v. Jugueta,78 the proper amount of damages for the special complex
crime of rape with homicide when the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua should be ₱75,000.00
each for civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages. This Court also affirms the
award of actual damages of ₱20,000.00. In addition, the damages awarded shall earn legal interest
at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of the judgment until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals' February 29, 2016 Decision in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06486
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant ZZZ is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the special complex crime of rape with homicide and is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Accused-appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of AAA the amounts of: (1) Seventy-Five Thousand
Pesos (₱75,000.00) as civil indemnity; (2) Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) as moral
damages; (3) Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) as exemplary damages; and (4) Twenty
Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) as actual damages.
All damages awarded shall be subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
. Code as amended by Republic Act 7659 in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code and is
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.FERDINAND T. BALUNTONG
Ferdinand T. Baluntong (appellant) appeals from the August 13, 2007 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals to which the Court had earlier referred the present case for intermediate review following
People v. Mateo.2
In its challenged Decision, the appellate court affirmed appellant’s conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 43, of Double Murder with Frustrated Murder, following
his indictment for such offense in an Information reading:
That on or about the 31st day of July 1998, at about 10:30 in the evening at Barangay Danggay,
Municipality of Roxas, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there, with malice aforethought and with
deliberate intent to kill, set on fire, the house of Celerina Solangon, causing the complete
destruction of the said house and the death of Celerina Solangon and Alvin Savarez, and inflicting
serious physical injuries on Josua (sic) Savarez, thereby performing all the acts of execution which
would produce the crime of murder as a consequance (sic) but which, nevertheless do not produce
it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.3 x x x x (underscoring supplied)
Gathered from the records of the case is the following version of the prosecution:
At around 10:30 p.m. of July 31, 1998, while then 12-year old Jovelyn Santos (Jovelyn) was
sleeping in the house of her grandmother Celerina Solangon (Celerina) at Barangay Dangay,
Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, she was awakened by heat emanating from the walls of the house. She
thus roused her cousin Dorecyll and together they went out of the house.
Jovelyn saw appellant putting dry hay (dayami) around the house near the terrace where the fire
started, but appellant ran away when he saw her and Dorecyll.
Appellant’s neighbor, Felicitas Sarzona (Felicitas), also saw appellant near Celerina’s house after it
caught fire, following which, appellant fled on seeing Jovelyn and Dorecyll stepping out of the
house, as other neighbors repaired to the scene to help contain the flames. Felicitas also saw
Celerina, who was at a neighbor’s house before the fire started, enter the burning house and
resurface with her grandsons Alvin and Joshua.
Celerina and Alvin sustained third degree burns which led to their death. Joshua sustained second
degree burns.
Upon the other hand, appellant, denying the charge, invoked alibi, claiming that he, on his mother
Rosalinda’s request, went to Caloocan City on July 15, 1998 (16 days before the incident) and
stayed there until February 1999. Rosalinda corroborated appellant’s alibi.
By Decision of February 28, 2003, the trial court found appellant guilty as charged, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(a) The court finds accused Ferdinand Baluntong GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the complex
crime of Double Murder with Frustrated Murder punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
hereby sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH to be executed in accordance with the
existing law;
xxxx
(c) Accused Ferdinand Baluntong is also ordered to pay the heirs of Celerina Suba Solangon the
sum of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages and the heirs of Elvin [sic] Savariz the following: (I)
the sum of ₱50,000.00 as compensatory damages (II) the sum of ₱16,500.00 as actual damages;
and (III) the sum of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.4 (emphasis in the original; italics and underscoring supplied)
In affirming the trial court’s conviction of appellant, the appellate court brushed aside appellant’s
claim that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The appellate court,
however, modified the trial court’s decision by reducing the penalty to reclusion perpetua in light of
the passage of Republic Act No. 9346,5 and by additionally awarding exemplary damages to the
heirs of the victims (Celerina and Alvin), and temperate damages to Joshua representing his
"hospitalization and recuperation." Thus the appellate court disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 28, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 43, is MODIFIED as follows:
1. Accused-appellant FERDINAND BALUNTONG y TALAGA is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the complex crime of Double Murder with Frustrated Murder and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
2. Accused-appellant is further required to pay the heirs of the victims the amount of P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages and the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages for the hospitalization
and recuperation of Joshua Savariz.
3. In all other respects, the February 28, 2003 Decision of the regional trial court is hereby
AFFIRMED.6 (italics and emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
In his Brief, appellant raises doubt on prosecution witness Felicitas’ claim that she saw appellant
fleeing away from the burning house, it being then 10:30 p.m. and, therefore, dark. He raises doubt
too on Jovelyn’s claim that she saw appellant, given her failure to ask him to stop putting dried hay
around the house if indeed her claim were true.
After combing through the records of the case, the Court finds that the trial court, as well as the
appellate court, did not err in finding that appellant was the malefactor.
There should be no doubt on prosecution witnesses Felicitas’ and Jovelyn’s positive identification of
their neighbor-herein appellant as the person they saw during the burning of the house, given,
among other things, the illumination generated by the fire. Consider the following testimonies of
Felicitas and Jovelyn:
FELICITAS:
Q: Which portion of the house was on fire when you saw Balentong (sic) for the first time?
A: The fire was at the rear portion going up, sir.
Q: How far was Balentong (sic) from that burning portion of the house?
A: He was just infront (sic) of the house, sir.
Q: How far from the burning portion of the house?
A: About two (2) meters away, sir.
Q: The two (2) meters from the front portion or two (2) meters from the burning portion?
A: About two (2) meters, sir.
Q: From the burning portion?
A: Yes, sir.7 (underscoring supplied)
JOVELYN:
Q: How big was the fire when according to you, you saw the back of this Ferdinand Balontong (sic)?
A: It is already considerable size, Your Honor.
Q: What effect has this fire in the illumination in that vicinity, regarding visibility of that vicinity?
A: The surrounding was illuminated by that fire, Your Honor.8 (underscoring supplied)
Appellant’s alibi must thus fail.
In determining the offense committed by appellant, People v. Malngan9 teaches:
[I]n cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what crime/crimes was/were
perpetrated – whether arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the
main objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but
death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting
homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person who
may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the
crime committed is murder only; lastly, (c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and
in fact the offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing,
then there are two separate and distinct crimes committed – homicide/murder and arson. (emphasis
and underscoring partly in the original; emphasis partly supplied)
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613, "Amending the Law on Arson," reads:
Section 3. Other Cases of Arson. ─ The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua shall
be imposed if the property burned is any of the following:
xxxx
2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
The Court finds that there is no showing that appellant’s main objective was to kill Celerina and her
housemates and that the fire was resorted to as the means to accomplish the goal.
In her Affidavit executed on August 11, 1998,10 Felicitas stated that what she knew is that Celerina
wanted appellant, who was renting a house near Celerina’s, to move out.
How Felicitas acquired such "knowledge" was not probed into, however, despite the fact that she
was cross-examined thereon.11
Absent any concrete basis then to hold that the house was set on fire to kill the occupants,
appellant cannot be held liable for double murder with frustrated murder. This is especially true with
respect to the death of Celerina, for even assuming arguendo that appellant wanted to kill her to get
even with her in light of her alleged desire to drive him out of the neighboring house, Celerina was
outside the house at the time it was set on fire. She merely entered the burning house to save her
grandsons.
While the above-quoted Information charged appellant with "Double Murder with Frustrated
Murder," appellant may be convicted of Arson. For the only difference between a charge for Murder
under Article 248 (3) of the Revised Penal Code and one for Arson under the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Section 3 (2) of P.D. No. 1613, lies in the intent in pursuing the act.
As reflected above, as it was not shown that the main motive was to kill the occupants of the
house, the crime would only be arson, the homicide being a mere consequence thereof, hence,
absorbed by arson.12
When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that
proved, and the offense charged is included or necessarily includes the offense proved, conviction
shall be for the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or the offense charged
which is included in the offense proved.13

Under Section 5 of P.D. 1613, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death is imposed when death
results. In the light of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346,14 the penalty should be reclusion
perpetua.

A word on the damages awarded.

The appellate court affirmed the award of compensatory damages to the heirs of Celerina. But
entitlement thereto was not proven.

The appellate court likewise affirmed the award of compensatory damages, actual damages, and
moral damages to the heirs of Alvin. Compensatory damages and actual damages are the same,
however.15 Since the trial court awarded the duly proven actual damages of ₱16,500.00
representing burial expenses, the award of compensatory damages of ₱50,000.00 does not lie. It is
gathered from the evidence, however, that Alvin was hospitalized for five days,16 hence, an award
of ₱8,500.00 as temperate damages for the purpose would be reasonable.1avvph!l

As for the award to Alvin of moral damages, the records do not yield any basis therefor.

More. The appellate court awarded exemplary damages "to the heirs of the victims," clearly
referring to the deceased Celerina and Alvin. Absent proof of the presence of any aggravating
circumstances, however, the award does not lie.17

When death occurs due to a crime, the grant of civil indemnity requires no proof other than the
death of the victim. The heirs of Celerina are thus entitled to an award of ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity ex delicto.18 And so are Alvin’s.

The appellate court’s award of temperate damages of ₱25,000.00 to Joshua is in order.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Court of Appeals Decision of August 13, 2007 is REVERSED and SET

ASIDE, and a NEW one is rendered as follows:

Appellant, Ferdinand T. Baluntong, is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Simple Arson
under Sec. 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with
no eligibility for parole.

Appellant is ORDERED to pay the amount of ₱50,000.00 to the heirs of Celerina Solangon, and the
same amount to the heirs of Alvin Savariz, representing civil indemnity.

Appellant is likewise ORDERED to pay the amount of ₱16,500.00 to the heirs of Alvin as actual
damages for burial expenses, and ₱8,500.00 as temperate damages for hospitalization expenses.
Appellant is further ORDERED to pay ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages to the heirs of Celerina.
Finally, appellant is ORDERED to pay ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages to Joshua Savariz.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.HENRY T. GO
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution1 of the Third
Division2 of the Sandiganbayan (SB) dated June 2, 2005 which quashed the Information filed
against herein respondent for alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A.
3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's Decision3 in Agan, Jr. v.
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the various contracts awarded by the
Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), to Philippine
Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction, operation and maintenance of the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). Subsequent to the
above Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among those charged
was herein respondent, who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having
supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering into a
contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to
indict, among others, herein respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was
likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted because he
died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause.
Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was charged before the SB as follows:
On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the late ARTURO ENRILE, then
Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), committing the
offense in relation to his office and taking advantage of the same, in conspiracy with accused,
HENRY T. GO, Chairman and President of the Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., Inc.
(PIATCO), did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into a Concession
Agreement, after the project for the construction of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was awarded to Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO,
which Concession Agreement substantially amended the draft Concession Agreement covering the
construction of the NAIA IPT III under Republic Act 6957, as amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT
law), specifically the provision on Public Utility Revenues, as well as the assumption by the
government of the liabilities of PIATCO in the event of the latter's default under Article IV, Section
4.04 (b) and (c) in relation to Article 1.06 of the Concession Agreement, which terms are more
beneficial to PIATCO while manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government of the
Republic of the Philippines.4
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28090.
On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to wit:
The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from today within which to show cause why this
case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused considering that
the accused is a private person and the public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is
already deceased, and not an accused in this case.5
The prosecution complied with the above Order contending that the SB has already acquired
jurisdiction over the person of respondent by reason of his voluntary appearance, when he filed a
motion for consolidation and when he posted bail. The prosecution also argued that the SB has
exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's case, even if he is a private person, because he was
alleged to have conspired with a public officer.6
On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quash7 the Information filed against him on the
ground that the operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of
R.A. 3019. Respondent, citing the show cause order of the SB, also contended that, independently
of the deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer with whom he was alleged to have conspired,
respondent, who is not a public officer nor was capacitated by any official authority as a government
agent, may not be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
The prosecution filed its Opposition.8
On June 2, 2005, the SB issued its assailed Resolution, pertinent portions of which read thus:
Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused Henry T. Go dated April 22, 2005, and it appearing
that Henry T. Go, the lone accused in this case is a private person and his alleged co-conspirator-
public official was already deceased long before this case was filed in court, for lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused, the Court grants the Motion to Quash and the Information filed in
this case is hereby ordered quashed and dismissed.9
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE
IN GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE AND IN DISMISSING CRIMINAL CASE NO.
28090 ON THE GROUND THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF
RESPONDENT GO.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE,
IN RULING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO
DESPITE THE IRREFUTABLE FACT THAT HE HAS ALREADY POSTED BAIL FOR HIS
PROVISIONAL LIBERTY
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED WHEN, IN COMPLETE
DISREGARD OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IT QUASHED
THE INFORMATION AND DISMISSED CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2809010
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
The elements of the above provision are:
(1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.11
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in conspiracy
with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under
Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain
acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which
may lead thereto.12 This is the controlling doctrine as enunciated by this Court in previous cases,
among which is a case involving herein private respondent.13
The only question that needs to be settled in the present petition is whether herein respondent, a
private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the
public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the filing of the
Information.
Respondent contends that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is no public officer who
was charged in the Information and, as such, prosecution against respondent may not prosper.
The Court is not persuaded.
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer with whom
respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the allegation
of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already
expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His
death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between
him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that
there was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement
of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019.14 Were it not for his death, he should have been charged.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019,
among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public
officer. The law, however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted
together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be
charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has already died, the private
person may be indicted alone.
Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for conspiracy.15 If
two or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of them pursuant to the
agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they are jointly responsible
therefor.16 This means that everything said, written or done by any of the conspirators in execution
or furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or written by each of
them and it makes no difference whether the actual actor is alive or dead, sane or insane at the
time of trial.17 The death of one of two or more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the
survivor or survivors.18 Thus, this Court held that:
x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot conspire alone. The crime
depends upon the joint act or intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does not follow that one person
cannot be convicted of conspiracy. So long as the acquittal or death of a co-conspirator does not
remove the bases of a charge for conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the offense.19
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that, as alleged in the Information filed against
respondent, which is deemed hypothetically admitted in the latter's Motion to Quash, he
(respondent) conspired with Secretary Enrile in violating Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 and that in
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Hence, the criminal liability incurred by a co-conspirator is
also incurred by the other co-conspirators.
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that the avowed policy of the State and the legislative
intent to repress "acts of public officers and private persons alike, which constitute graft or corrupt
practices,"20 would be frustrated if the death of a public officer would bar the prosecution of a
private person who conspired with such public officer in violating the Anti-Graft Law.
In this regard, this Court's disquisition in the early case of People v. Peralta21 as to the nature of
and the principles governing conspiracy, as construed under Philippine jurisdiction, is instructive, to
wit:
x x x A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime except when
the law specifically provides a penalty therefor as in treason, rebellion and sedition. The crime of
conspiracy known to the common law is not an indictable offense in the Philippines. An agreement
to commit a crime is a reprehensible act from the view-point of morality, but as long as the
conspirators do not perform overt acts in furtherance of their malevolent design, the sovereignty of
the State is not outraged and the tranquility of the public remains undisturbed.
However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme, a felony is committed by two or more
malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy assumes pivotal importance in the determination of the
liability of the perpetrators. In stressing the significance of conspiracy in criminal law, this Court in
U.S. vs. Infante and Barreto opined that
While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for the mere act of conspiring to commit a
crime unless the statute specifically prescribes a penalty therefor, nevertheless the existence of a
conspiracy to commit a crime is in many cases a fact of vital importance, when considered together
with the other evidence of record, in establishing the existence, of the consummated crime and its
commission by the conspirators.
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals
regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation in the commission of
the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law
the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that "when two
or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical volition of one,
or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively contributes to the
wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by himself alone."
Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than his own, "when two or more persons
agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the others, done in
furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy." The imposition of collective liability upon the
conspirators is clearly explained in one case where this Court held that x x x it is impossible to
graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking into consideration the close and
inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal act, for the commission of which they all acted
by common agreement x x x. The crime must therefore in view of the solidarity of the act and intent
which existed between the x x x accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party created by
them, and they are all equally responsible x x x
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the
commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by reason
of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of
participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. Of course, as to any
conspirator who was remote from the situs of aggression, he could be drawn within the enveloping
ambit of the conspiracy if it be proved that through his moral ascendancy over the rest of the
conspirators the latter were moved or impelled to carry out the conspiracy.
In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in the scheming and execution of the crime
amply justifies the imputation to all of them the act of any one of them. It is in this light that
conspiracy is generally viewed not as a separate indictable offense, but a rule for collectivizing
criminal liability.
xxxx
x x x A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is that once conspiracy is proved, all of
the conspirators who acted in furtherance of the common design are liable as co-principals. This
rule of collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The concerted
action of the conspirators in consummating their common purpose is a patent display of their evil
partnership, and for the consequences of such criminal enterprise they must be held solidarily
liable.22
This is not to say, however, that private respondent should be found guilty of conspiring with
Secretary Enrile. It is settled that the absence or presence of conspiracy is factual in nature and
involves evidentiary matters.23 Hence, the allegation of conspiracy against respondent is better left
ventilated before the trial court during trial, where respondent can adduce evidence to prove or
disprove its presence.
Respondent claims in his Manifestation and Motion24 as well as in his Urgent Motion to
Resolve25 that in a different case, he was likewise indicted before the SB for conspiracy with the
late Secretary Enrile in violating the same Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 by allegedly entering into
another agreement (Side Agreement) which is separate from the Concession Agreement subject of
the present case. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28091. Here, the SB, through a
Resolution, granted respondent's motion to quash the Information on the ground that the SB has no
jurisdiction over the person of respondent. The prosecution questioned the said SB Resolution
before this Court via a petition for review on certiorari. The petition was docketed as G.R. No.
168919. In a minute resolution dated August 31, 2005, this Court denied the petition finding no
reversible error on the part of the SB. This Resolution became final and executory on January 11,
2006. Respondent now argues that this Court's resolution in G.R. No. 168919 should be applied in
the instant case.
The Court does not agree. Respondent should be reminded that prior to this Court's ruling in G.R.
No. 168919, he already posted bail for his provisional liberty. In fact, he even filed a Motion for
Consolidation26 in Criminal Case No. 28091. The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that
private respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation vests the SB with
jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in
filing motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction
of the court.27
Thus, it has been held that:
When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a warrant of
arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court he
must raise the question of the court’s jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest opportunity. If
he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby
gives the court jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel. John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)
xxxx
As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78, 86]:
"[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or impliedly.
When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the
purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be deemed to have
submitted himself to that jurisdiction."
Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the
court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction.
If the appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives the court jurisdiction over the person."
Verily, petitioner’s participation in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan was not confined to
his opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered other matters which called for
respondent court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard now to deny said court’s
jurisdiction over him. x x x.28
In the instant case, respondent did not make any special appearance to question the jurisdiction of
the SB over his person prior to his posting of bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation. In fact, his
Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 28090 only came after the SB issued an
Order requiring the prosecution to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction over his person.
As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case involves a contract
entered into by public officers representing the government. More importantly, the SB is a special
criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. 3019
committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This
includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the
said public officers. In the instant case, respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3(g) of
R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both respondent and
Secretary Enrile should have been charged before and tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan.
However, by reason of the death of the latter, this can no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons
already discussed, it does not follow that the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over the
person of and the case involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise would mean that the power
of a court to decide a case would no longer be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on other
factors, such as the death of one of the alleged offenders.
Lastly, the issues raised in the present petition involve matters which are mere incidents in the main
case and the main case has already been pending for over nine (9) years. Thus, a referral of the
case to the Regional Trial Court would further delay the resolution of the main case and it would, by
no means, promote respondent's right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of his case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 2,
2005, granting respondent's Motion to Quash, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Sandiganbayan is forthwith DIRECTED to proceed with deliberate dispatch in the disposition of
Criminal Case No. 28090.
SO ORDERED.
SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN, vs. SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and JUANITA L. TAN, 
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the Resolution1 dated March 7, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94, Quezon City in
Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 and the RTC Resolution2 dated July 11, 2005 which denied petitioner's
Verified Motion for Reconsideration.
The factual background of the case:
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven) were
married.3 Out of this union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle4 and Kristen Denise.5 On
January 12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO)6 against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses
Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in
conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in
violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9262,8 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004."
On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued an Order/Notice9 granting petitioner's prayer for a TPO.
On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Issuance of
Permanent Protection Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the Petition,10 contending that the
RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not
covered by R.A. No. 9262.
On February 28, 2005, petitioner filed a Comment on Opposition11 to respondents' Motion to
Dismiss arguing that respondents were covered by R.A. No. 9262 under a liberal interpretation
thereof aimed at promoting the protection and safety of victims of violence.
On March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution12 dismissing the case as to respondents on the
ground that, being the parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not included/covered as
respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the well-known rule of law "expressio unius est exclusio
alterius."13
On March 16, 2005, petitioner filed her Verified Motion for Reconsideration14 contending that the
doctrine of necessary implication should be applied in the broader interests of substantial justice
and due process.
On April 8, 2005, respondents filed their Comment on the Verified Motion for
Reconsideration15 arguing that petitioner's liberal construction unduly broadened the provisions of
R.A. No. 9262 since the relationship between the offender and the alleged victim was an essential
condition for the application of R.A. No. 9262.
On July 11, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution16 denying petitioner's
Verified Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC reasoned that to include respondents under the
coverage of R.A. No. 9262 would be a strained interpretation of the provisions of the law.
Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law, to wit:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO & JUANITA, PARENTS-IN-LAW OF
SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE
ORDER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
"ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004".17
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in the light of the provisions of Section
47 of R.A. No. 9262 which explicitly provides for the suppletory application of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the provision on "conspiracy" under Article 8 of the RPC can be
suppletorily applied to R.A. No. 9262; that Steven and respondents had community of design and
purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her
to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally
and physically; that respondents should be included as indispensable or necessary parties for
complete resolution of the case.
On the other hand, respondents submit that they are not covered by R.A. No. 9262 since Section 3
thereof explicitly provides that the offender should be related to the victim only by marriage, a
former marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship; that allegations on the conspiracy of
respondents require a factual determination which cannot be done by this Court in a petition for
review; that respondents cannot be characterized as indispensable or necessary parties, since their
presence in the case is not only unnecessary but altogether illegal, considering the non-inclusion of
in-laws as offenders under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262.
The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as "any act or a
series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a
woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a
common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family
abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or
economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty."
While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by
marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of
the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.
Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of the RPC,
thus:
SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code and other
applicable laws, shall have suppletory application. (Emphasis supplied)
Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or in the future
may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code
shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the
contrary. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity
to crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in which the special law is silent on
a particular matter.
Thus, in People v. Moreno,18 the Court applied suppletorily the provision on subsidiary penalty
under Article 39 of the RPC to cases of violations of Act No. 3992, otherwise known as the "Revised
Motor Vehicle Law," noting that the special law did not contain any provision that the defendant
could be sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
In People v. Li Wai Cheung,19 the Court applied suppletorily the rules on the service of sentences
provided in Article 70 of the RPC in favor of the accused who was found guilty of multiple violations
of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," considering the lack of
similar rules under the special law.
In People v. Chowdury,20 the Court applied suppletorily Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the RPC to define
the words "principal," "accomplices" and "accessories" under R.A. No. 8042, otherwise known as
the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," because said words were not defined
therein, although the special law referred to the same terms in enumerating the persons liable for
the crime of illegal recruitment.
In Yu v. People,21 the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under
Article 39 of the RPC to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22, otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks
Law," noting the absence of an express provision on subsidiary imprisonment in said special law.
Most recently, in Ladonga v. People,22 the Court applied suppletorily the principle of conspiracy
under Article 8 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a contrary provision therein.
With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be applied
suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of Section 47 that the RPC shall be
supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which by their nature, are
necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily.
Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy or action in
concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and
the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the
conspirators are principals.23
It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts of
violence against women and their children may be committed by an offender through another, thus:
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
xxx
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another,
that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child.
This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child against her/his
will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the
woman or her child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated March 7, 2005
and July 11, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-05-
54536 are hereby PARTLY REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the dismissal of the petition
against respondents is concerned.

In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the purpose of preventing further acts of
violence against the woman or her child may include

individuals other than the offending husband, thus:

SEC. 8. Protection Orders. – x x x The protection orders that may be issued under this Act shall
include any, some or all of the following reliefs:

(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through
another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act; 1avvphi1.net

(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly; x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal construction of the law, thus:

SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety of
victims of violence against women and their children. (Emphasis supplied)

It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law24 and that this intent must be effectuated by
the courts. In the present case, the express language of R.A. No. 9262 reflects the intent of the
legislature for liberal construction as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the law
according to its true intent, meaning and spirit - the protection and safety of victims of violence
against women and children.

Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius" finds
no application here. It must be remembered that this maxim is only an "ancillary rule of statutory
construction." It is not of universal application. Neither is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a
means of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and should not be permitted
to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature.25

The Court notes that petitioner unnecessarily argues at great length on the attendance of
circumstances evidencing the conspiracy or connivance of Steven and respondents to cause
verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her. However, conspiracy is an evidentiary matter
which should be threshed out in a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in the
present petition since this Court is not a trier of facts.26 It is thus premature for petitioner to argue
evidentiary matters since this controversy is centered only on the determination of whether
respondents may be included in a petition under R.A. No. 9262. The presence or absence of
conspiracy can be best passed upon after a trial on the merits.

Considering the Court's ruling that the principle of conspiracy may be applied suppletorily to R.A.
No. 9262, the Court will no longer delve on whether respondents may be considered indispensable
or necessary parties. To do so would be an exercise in superfluity.