What is the Archipelagic Doctrine?

The fact that for Archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the
right of innocent passage and sea lanes passage does not place them in lesser footing
vis-a-vis continental coastal states which are subject, in their territorial sea, to the right
of innocent passage and the right to transit passage through international straits. The
imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a
concession by archipelagic states, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters
landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth, or distance from coast, as
archipelagic waters subject to national sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of
archipelagic state's archipelago and waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive
entity prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands under UNCLOS III.
Separate islands generate their own maritime zones, placing the waters between the
islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the state's territorial
sovereignty subjecting these waters to the rights of other states under UNCLOS III.

The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of the municipal and
international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to
necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded,
expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law principle of
freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the Philippine
government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass
legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and
sea lanes passage (Magallona, et. al. vs. Ermita, et. al., GR No. 187167, august 16,
2011).
 ARCHIPELAGIC DOCTRINE

It is defined as all waters, around between and

connecting different islands belonging to the
Philippine Archipelago, irrespective of their width or
dimension, are necessary appurtenances of its land
territory, forming an integral part of the national or
inland waters, subject to the exclusive sovereignty of
the Philippines. It is found in the 2nd sentence
of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution. 

It emphasizes the unity of the land and waters by

defining an archipelago as group of islands
surrounded by waters or a body of waters studded
with islands. 

To emphasize unity, an imaginary single baseline is

drawn around the islands by joining appropriate
points of the outermost islands of the archipelago
with straight lines and all islands and waters
enclosed within the baseline form part of its
territory. 
The main purpose of the archipelagic doctrine is to
protect the territorial interests of an archipelago,
that is, the territorial integrity of the archipelago.
Without it, there would be “pockets of high seas”
between some of our islands and islets, thus foreign
vessels would be able to pass through these “pockets
of seas” and would have no jurisdiction over them.
Accordingly, if we follow the old rule of  international
law, it is possible that between islands, e.g. Bohol
and Siquijor, due to the more than 24 mile distance
between the 2 islands, there may be high seas. Thus,
foreign vessels may just enter anytime at will, posing
danger to the security of the State. However,
applying the doctrine, even these bodies of
water within the baseline, regardless of breadth,
form part of the archipelago and are thus considered
as internal waters. 

Following the Archipelagic Doctrine, the Spratlys

Group of Islands is not part of Philippine archipelago.
It is too far to be included within the archipelagic
lines encircling the internal waters of Philippine
Archipelago. However, the SGI is part of the
Philippine territory because it was discovered by a
Filipino seaman in the name of Vice‐Admiral Cloma
who later renounced his claim over it in favor of
the Republic of the Philippines. Subsequently, then
Pres. Marcos issued a Presidential Decree
constituting SGI as part of the Philippine territory
and sending some of our armed forces to protect said
island and maintain our sovereignty over it.  

Moreover, Spratlys group of Islands is considered as

part of our National Territory. Article I of the
Constitution provides: “The national territory
comprises the Philippine archipelago, x x x, and all
other territories over which the Philippines has
sovereignty or jurisdiction, x x x.” The Spratlys
Group of islands falls under the second phrase “and
all other territories over which the Philippines has
sovereignty or jurisdiction”. It is part of our national
territory because Philippines exercise sovereignty
(through election of public officials) over Spratlys
Group of Islands 

DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY

Under this doctrine, if a law or contract violates any norm of the

Constitution, that law or contract, whether promulgated by the
legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private
persons for private purposes, is null and void and without any
force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in
every statute and contract. (Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No.
122156, Feb. 3, 1997)

Justice Isagani A. Cruz eloquently expound the essence of this

great doctrine in this wise:

“The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all

other laws must conform and to which all persons, including
the highest officials of the land, must  defer. No act shall be
valid, however nobly intentioned, if it conflicts with the
Constitution. The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All
must bow to the mandate of this law. Expediency must not be
allowed to sap its strength nor greed for power debase its
rectitude. Right or wrong, the Constitution must be upheld as
long as it has not been changed by the sovereign people lest
its disregard result in the usurpation of the majesty of the law
by the pretenders to illegitimate power.” (Isagani A.  Cruz,
Philippine Political Law, Central Lawbook Publishing, Co., Inc.
1991 Ed., p. 11)

BAR QUESTION (2004)

BNN Republic has a defense treaty with EVA  Federation.
According to the Republic's Secretary of Defense, the treaty allows
temporary basing of friendly foreign troops in case of training
exercises for the war on terrorism. The Majority Leader of the
Senate contends that whether temporary or not, the basing of
foreign troops however friendly is prohibited by the Constitution of
BNN which provides that, "No foreign military bases shall be
allowed in BNN territory." In case there is indeed an irreconcilable
conflict between a provision of the treaty and a provision of the
Constitution, in a jurisdiction and legal system like ours, which
should prevail: the provision of the treaty or of the Constitution?
Why? Explain with reasons, briefly.

ANSWER: In case of conflict between a provision of a treaty and a

provision of the Constitution, the provision of the Constitution
should prevail. Section 5(2)(a), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty when it
conflicts with the Constitution.  (Gonzales v. Hechanova, 9 SCRA
230 [1963]).

PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL HIERARCHY

A higher court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the

redress cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts.

This is an ordained sequence of recourse to courts vested with

concurrent jurisdiction, beginning from the lowest, on to the
next highest, and ultimately to the highest. This  hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and is likewise
determinative of the proper forum for petitions for
extraordinary writs. This is an established policy necessary to
avoid inordinate demands upon the Court‘s time and attention
which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to preclude the further clogging of the
Court‘s docket.

The SC is a court of last resort. It cannot and should not be

burdened with the task of deciding cases in the first instances.
Its jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be
exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious
and important reasons exist.

Petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first

level courts should be filed with the RTC and those against the
latter with the CA. A direct invocation of the SC‘s original
jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only where
there are special and important reasons therefore, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition.

The doctrine of hierarchy of courts may be disregarded if

warranted by the nature and importance of the issues raised
in the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations,
or in cases of national interest and of serious  implications.

Sec. 9[1], BP 129; Sec. 5[1], Art. VIII, Constitution of the

Philippines, By “hierarchy  of courts” is meant that while the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Regional Trial
Courts have concurrent original jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus, such
occurrence does not accord litigants unrestrained freedom of
 choice of the court to which application therefore maybe
directed. The application should be filed with the court of
lower level unless the importance of the issue involved
deserves the action of the court of  higher level.  (Uy vs.

Contreras , 237 SCRA 167)

MARTIAL LAW 101

The Requisites in proclaiming Martial Law

1. There must be an invasion or rebellion, and
2. Public safety requires the proclamation of martial law all over
the Philippines or any part thereof.
The invasion and rebellion must be actual and not merely
imminent.

The following cannot be done [Art. VII, Sec. 18]:

 Suspend the operation of the Constitution.
 Supplant the functioning of the civil courts and the legislative
assemblies.
 Confer jurisdiction upon military courts and agencies over
civilians, where civil courts are able to function.
Open Court Doctrine  — Civilians cannot be tried by military
courts if the civil courts are open and functioning. If the civil
courts are not functioning, then civilians can be tried by the
military courts. Martial law usually contemplates a case where
the courts are already closed and the civil institutions have
already crumbled, i.e. a "theater of war." If the courts are still
open, the President can just suspend the privilege and achieve
the same effect.
 Automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. The President must suspend the privilege
expressly.
A “writ of habeas corpus” is an order from the court
commanding a detaining officer to inform the court if he has
the person in custody, and what is his  basis in detaining that
person.

The “privilege of the writ” is that portion of the writ requiring

the detaining officer to show cause why he should not be
tested. What is permitted to be suspended by the President is
not the writ itself but its privilege.

The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege

of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. (Sec. 13, Art. III,
1987 Constitution).

The Role of Congress (See art. VII, sec. 18, par. 1,2)

1. Congress may revoke the proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas  corpus before
the lapse of 60 days from the date of suspension or
proclamation.
2. Upon such proclamation or suspension, Congress
shall convene at once. If it is not in session, it
shall convene in accordance with its rules without need of a
call within 24 hours following the proclamation or suspension.
3. Within 48 hours from the proclamation or the suspension, the
President shall submit a report, in person or in writing, to the
Congress (meeting in joint session of the action he has
taken).
4. The Congress shall then vote jointly, by an absolute majority.
It has two options:
 To revoke such proclamation or suspension. When it so
revoked, the President cannot set aside (or veto) the
revocation as he normally would do in the case of bills.
 To extend it beyond the 60-day period of its validity. Congress
can only so extend the proclamation or suspension upon the
initiative of the President.

The period need not be 60 days; it could be more, as Congress

would determine, based on the persistence of the emergency.

The Role of the Supreme Court (See Art. VII, Sec. 18, par.
3)
 The Supreme Court may review , in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of:
 the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ, or
The Supreme Court declared that it had the power to inquire
into the factual basis of the suspension of the privilege of the
writ and to annul the same if no legal ground could be
established. Hence, the suspension of the privilege of the writ
is no longer a political question to be resolved solely by the
President. (Lansang v. Garcia, G.R. No. L ‐33964, Dec. 11,
1971) This also applies to the proclamation of martial law.

 the extension thereof. It must promulgate its decision thereon

within 30 days from its filing.
 Calling-out power is purely discretionary on the President; the
Constitution does not explicitly provide for a judicial review of
its factual basis.[IBP v. Zamora (2001)]

 The jurisdiction of the SC may be invoked in a proper case.

Although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the
power to review the sufficiency of the factual  basis of the
proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that
the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review
powers, which is automatic rather than initiated. Only when
Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the
Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court
step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the
President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands
of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands
of the Court.

If the Congress procrastinates or altogether fails to fulfill its

duty respecting the proclamation or suspension within the
short time expected of it, then the Court can step in, hear the
petitions challenging the President’s action, and ascertain if it
has a factual basis. [Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo (2012)]

 Petition for habeas corpus

 When a person is arrested without a warrant for complicity in
the rebellion or invasion, he or someone else in his behalf has
the standing to question the validity of the proclamation or
suspension.
 Before the SC can decide on the legality of his detention, it
must first pass upon the validity of the proclamation or
suspension.
 Limit on Calling out Power. 
 Test of Arbitrariness : The question is not whether the
President or Congress acted correctly, but whether he acted
arbitrarily in that the action had no  basis in fact. [IBP v.
Zamora, (2000)]. Amounts to a determination of whether or
not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to ack or
excess of jurisdiction

4 ways for the proclamation or suspension to be lifted :

(P-C-S-O)
1. Lifting by the President himself
2. Revocation by Congress
3. Nullification by the Supreme Court
4. Operation of law after 60 days

When martial law is declared, no new powers are given to the

President; no extension of arbitrary authority is recognized;
no civil rights of individuals are suspended. The relation of the
citizens to their State is unchanged. Supreme Court cannot
rule upon the correctness of the President’s actions but only
upon its arbitrariness.

RA 7055 (1991) "An Act Strengthening  Civilian Supremacy

over the Military by Returning to the Civil Courts the
Jurisdiction over Certain Offenses involving Members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, other Persons Subject to
Military Law, and the Members of the Philippine National
Police, Repealing for the Purpose Certain Presidential Decrees"

RA 7055 effectively placed upon the civil courts the

jurisdiction over certain offenses involving members of the
AFP and other members subject to military law.

RA 7055 provides that when these individuals commit crimes

or offenses penalized under the RPC, other special penal laws,
or local government ordinances, regardless of whether
civilians are co-accused, victims, or offended parties which
may be natural or juridical persons, they shall be tried by the
proper civil court, except when  the offense, as determined
before arraignment by the civil court, is service-connected in
which case it shall be tried by court-martial.

The assertion of military authority over civilians cannot rest

on the President's power as Commander in Chief or on any
theory of martial law. As long as civil courts remain open and
are regularly functioning, military tribunals cannot try and
exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by
them and which are properly cognizable by civil courts. To
hold otherwise is a violation of the right to due process.
[Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34 (1987)]

MANDAMUS IS NOT A PROPER REMEDY TO

EXECUTE MONEY JUDGMENTS AGAINST THE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT

Petitioners, SSWDA Inc., Celso and Manuel were the owners of two
(2) parcels of land located in Puerto Princesa City. Before Puerto
Princesa became a city, the national  government established a
military camp in Puerto Princesa, known as the Western Command.
In building the command’s facilities and road network,
encroachment on several properties of petitioners resulted.
Petitioners’ property was used as a road right-of-way leading to
the military camp. This road was named the "Wescom Road." Soon
after, the City of Puerto Princesa decided to develop the "Wescom
Road" because local residents started to build their houses
alongside it.

In view of the encroachment, petitioners filed an action for

Payment of Just Compensation against the respondents Puerto
Princesa City, Mayor Hagedorn and the City Council of Puerto
Princesa City before the RTC of Quezon City. The RTC rendered a
decision in favor of petitioners.

After the RTC Decision became final and executory, a writ of

execution was issued. The money judgment amounted was reduced
to P12,000,000.00, subject to the condition agreed by the parties.
Petitioners claimed that respondents paid the initial P2,000,000.00
but failed to give further payments after. However, records show
that the total negotiated amount of  P12 million was already fully
paid and received by petitioners on the  basis of the certification
issued by then City Treasurer of Puerto Princesa.

Nevertheless, petitioners filed a complaint before the RTC-Br. 223

against respondents for collection of unpaid just compensation,
including interests and rentals, in accordance with the RTC-Br. 78
Decision. If also filed complaints before the COA, Ombudsman and
DILG to compel the respondents to pay the judgment but COA
countered that it does not have jurisdiction over the matter.

The petitioners filed the present petition for mandamus seeking

to direct, command and compel the respondents to enforce,
implement or pay the petitioners the judgment award of the
Decision of the Quezon City RTC.

ISSUE:

Is mandamus a proper remedy to compel the respondents to pay

the just compensation?

RULING:
Mandamus is NOT the proper remedy to compel the respondents to
pay the just compensation. Mandamus is a command issuing from
a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state
or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or
board, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance
of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the
official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from
operation of law. This definition recognizes the public character of
the remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted
to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which
the public has no interest. The writ is a proper recourse for
citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the
performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right
involved is mandated by the Constitution. As the quoted provision
instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board,
officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
station.

The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official

to do anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty
not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which he is not
entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which
is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists,
although objection raising a mere technical question will be
disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious. As a
rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following
grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person against whom
the action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office,
trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or person
has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled. On the part
of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus
that he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and
it must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act
required.

Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that

mandamus cannot be used to enforce contractual obligations.
Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract
rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation
in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ
is not appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual.
The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the execution of an act,
when, otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly,
issues only in cases relating to the public and to the  government;
hence, it is called a prerogative writ. To preserve its prerogative
character, mandamus is not used for the redress of private
wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public.

The Court cannot blame petitioners for resorting to the remedy of

mandamus because they have done everything in the books to
satisfy their just and demandable claim. They went to the courts,
the COA, the Ombudsman, and the DILG. They resorted to the
remedy of mandamus because in at least three (3) cases, the
Court sanctioned the remedy in cases of final judgments rendered
against a local government unit (LGU).

Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the

writ is that there should be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of mandamus
being invoked. In other words, mandamus can be issued only in
cases where the usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy
are powerless to afford relief. Although classified as a legal
remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature and its issuance is
generally controlled by equitable principles. Indeed, the grant of
the writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the court.

The legal remedy is to seek relief with the COA pursuant to

Supreme Court Administrative  Circular 10-2000 dated October 25,
2000, which enjoined judges to observe utmost caution, prudence
and judiciousness in the issuance of writs of execution to satisfy
money judgments against government agencies and
local government units. Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as
amended by Section 26 of P.D. No. 1445, it is the COA which has
primary jurisdiction to examine, audit and settle "all debts  and
claims of any sort" due from or owing the  Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries.

The settlement of the monetary claim was still subject to the

primary jurisdiction of the COA despite the final decision of the
RTC having already validated the claim. As such, the claimants had
no alternative except to first seek the approval of the COA of their
monetary claim. Considering that the COA still retained its primary
jurisdiction to adjudicate money claim, petitioners should have
filed a petition for certiorari with this Court pursuant to  Section 50
of P.D. No. 1445. Hence, the COA's refusal to act did not leave the
petitioners without any remedy at all.

Hence, petition for mandamus is not proper. Petitioners are

enjoined to file its claim with the Commission on Audit.

G.R. No. 181792,  April 21, 2014

 STAR SPECIAL WATCHMAN AND  DETECTIVE AGENCY, INC.,
CELSO A. FERNANDEZ and MANUEL V. FERNANDEZ, Petitioners,
vs. PUERTO PRINCESA CITY, MAYOR  EDWARD HAGEDORN and
CITY COUNCIL OF PUERTO PRINCESA CITY, Respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

DEATH OR PHYSICAL INJURY INFLICTED UNDER

EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES

Do you know that killing your adulterous wife or her paramour

is technically permitted under Article 247 of the Revised
Penal Code, depending on the circumstance?

Article 247 provides, “Any legally married person who, having

surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both
of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict
upon them any serious physical injuries, shall suffer the
penalty of destierro (banishment).”

The law only applies if the following elements are present:

1. The offender is any lgelly married person;
2. The offender surprises his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person; and
3. The offender kills or seriously injures any or both of them
during the act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter.
Note: This article does not define a crime. It provides a
defense, which the accused must prove

The rationale for Art. 247

The law affords protection to a spouse considered to have
acted in a justified outburst of passion or a state of mental
disequilibrium. The offended spouse has no time to regain his
self‐control.

Art. 247 far from defining a felony is more of an exempting

circumstance as the penalty intended more for the protection
of the accused rather than a punishment. Put differently, it
practically grants a privilege amounting to an exemption for
adequate punishment.

Two stages contemplated under Art. 247

1. When the offender surprised the other spouse with a
paramour or mistress.

“Surprise” means to come upon suddenly or unexpectedly.

The attack must take place while the sexual intercourse is

going on. If the surprise was before or after the intercourse,
no matter how immediate, Article 247 does not  apply.

2. When the offender kills or inflicts serious physical injury

upon the other spouse and paramour while in the act of
intercourse, or immediately thereafter, that is, after
surprising.

The phrase “immediately thereafter”  has been interpreted to

mean that between the surprising and the killing or the
inflicting of the physical injury, there should be no
interruption or interval of time. In other words, it must be a
continuous process.

“in the act of committing sexual intercourse”  means that there

must be actual sexual intercourse. It does not include
preparatory acts.

It not necessary that the spouse actually saw the sexual

intercourse.
It is enough that he/she surprised them under such
circumstances that no other reasonable  conclusion can be
inferred but that a carnal act was being performed or has just
been committed.

Note: The killing or infliction of physical injuries must be in

the act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter. Thus,
where the accused surprised his wife and her paramour in the
carnal act but the latter ran away, he first chased him and
unable to catch up with him, returned to his wife whom he
found at the stairs of their house, no longer in the place
where he saw her having sex with the paramour and killed
her, he can avail of Art 247.

A bar examinee, who killed the paramour of his wife in a

mahjong session, an hour after he had surprised them in the
act of sexual intercourse in his house, since at that time, he
had to run away and get a gun as the paramour was armed,
was granted the benefits of this article.  (People v. Abarca,
G.R. No. 74433, Sept.14, 1987)

2001 Bar Question

A and B are husband and wife. A is employed as a security
guard at Landmark, his shift being from 11:00 p.m. to 7:00
a.m. One night, he felt sick and cold, hence, he decided to go
home around midnight after getting permission from his duty
officer. Upon reaching the front yard of his home, he noticed
that the light in the master bedroom was on and that
the bedroom window was open. Approaching the front door, he
was surprised to hear sighs and giggles inside the bedroom.
He opened the door very carefully and peeped inside where he
saw his wife B having sexual intercourse with their neighbor
C. A rushed inside and grabbed C but the latter managed to
wrest himself free and jumped out of the window. A followed
suit and managed to catch C again and after a furious
struggle, managed also to strangle him to death. A then
rushed back to their bedroom where his wife B was cowering
under the bed covers. Still enraged, A hit B with fist blows and
rendered her unconscious. The police arrived after being
summoned by their neighbors and arrested A who was
detained, inquested and charged for the death of C and
serious physical injuries of B.

1. Is A liable for C’s death? Why?

2. Is A liable for B’s injuries? Why?

A:
1. Yes. A is liable for C’s death but under the exceptional
circumstances in Art. 247 of the RPC where only destierro is
prescribed. Article 247 governs since A surprised his wife B in
the act of having sexual intercourse with C, and the killing of
C was immediately thereafter as the discover, escape, pursuit
and killing of C form one continuous act. (US v. Vargas, 2 Phil
194)

2. Likewise, A is liable for the serious physical injuries he

inflicted on his wife but under the same exceptional
circumstances in Article 247 of the Revised Penal  Code for the
same reason. 

SAYING "PUTANG INA MO" IS NOT REALLY TO

SLANDER

       This case is before us on appeal by  certiorari, from the

decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that a the municipal
court of Cavite City, convicting Rosauro Reyes of the crimes of
grave threats and grave oral defamation, and sentencing him,
in the first case (Criminal Case No. 2594), to four (4) months
and ten (10) days of arresto mayor and to pay a fine of P300,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and in the
second case (Criminal Case  No. 2595), to an indeterminate
penalty of from four (4) months of  arresto mayor to one (1)
year and eight (8) months of  prison correccional  and to pay
Agustin Hallare the sum of P800 as moral damages, with costs
in both cases.

        The petitioner herein, Rosauro Reyes, was a

former civilian employee of the Navy Exchange, Sangley Point,
Cavite City, whose services were terminated on May 6, 1961.
In the afternoon of June 6, 1961, he led a group of about 20
to 30 persons in a demonstration staged in front of the main
gate of the United States Naval Station at Sangley Point. They
carried placards bearing statements such as, "Agustin,
mamatay ka;" "To, alla boss con Nolan;" "Frank do not be a
common funk;" "Agustin, mamamatay ka rin"; "Agustin, Nolan
for you;" "Agustin alla bos con Nolan;" "Agustin, dillega, el dia
di quida rin bo chiquiting;" and others. The base commander,
Capt. McAllister, called up Col. Patricia Monzon, who as
Philippine Military Liaison Officer at Sangley Point was in
charge of preserving harmonious relations between personnel
of the naval station and the  civilian population of Cavite City.
Capt. McAllister requested Col. Monzon to join him at the main
gate of the base to meet the demonstrators. Col. Monzon went
to the place and talked to Rosauro Reyes and one Luis
Buenaventura upon learning that the demonstration was not
directed against the naval station but against Agustin Hallare
and a certain Frank Nolan for their having allegedly caused
the dismissal of Rosauro Reyes from the Navy Exchange, Col.
Monzon suggested to them to demonstrate in front of Hallare's
residence, but they told him that they would like the people in
the station to know how they felt about Hallare and Nolan.
They assured him, however, that they did not intend to use
violence, as "they just wanted to blow off steam."

     At that time Agustin Hallare was in his office inside the
naval station. When he learned about the demonstration he
became apprehensive about his safety, so he sought Col.
Monzon's protection. The colonel thereupon escorted Hallare,
his brother, and another person in going out of the station,
using his (Monzon's) car for the purpose. Once outside, Col.
Monzon purpose slowed down to accommodate the request of
Reyes. He told Hallare to take a good look at the
demonstrators and at the placards they were carrying. When
the demonstrators saw Hallare they shouted, "Mabuhay si
Agustin." Then they boarded their jeeps and followed the car.
One jeep overtook passed the car while the other to led
behind. After Hallare and his  companions had alighted in front
of his residence at 967 Burgos St., Cavite City, Col. Monzon
sped away.

     The three jeeps carrying the demonstrators parked in front

of Hallare's residence after having gone by it twice Rosauro
Reyes got off his jeep and posted himself at the gate, and
with his right hand inside his pocket and his left holding the
gate-door, he shouted repeatedly, "Agustin, putang ina mo.
Agustin, mawawala ka. Agustin lumabas ka, papatayin kita."
Thereafter, he boarded his jeep and the motorcade left the
premises. Meanwhile, Hallare, frightened by the demeanor of
Reyes and the other demonstrators, stayed inside the house.

     On the basis of the foregoing events Rosauro Reyes was

charged on July 24 and 25, 1961 with grave threats and grave
oral defamation, respectively (Criminal Cases Nos. 2594 and
2595, Municipal Court of Cavite City), as follows;

  The undersigned City Fiscal of the City of Cavite accuses

Rosauro Reyes of the crime of Grave Threats, as defined by
Article 282 of the Revised Penal  Code and penalized by
paragraph 2 of the same Article, committed as follows:
  That on or about June 6, 1961, in the City of Cavite,
Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, orally threaten to
kill, one Agustin Hallare.
            Contrary to law.
            Cavite City, July 24, 1961.
DEOGRACIAS S. SOLIS             
City Fiscal             
BY: (SGD.) BUEN N. GUTIERREZ             
Special Counsel      

      
  The undersigned complainant, after being duly sworn to an
oath in accordance with law, accuses Rosauro Reyes of the
crime of Grave Oral Defamation, as defined and penalized by
Article 358 of the Revised Penal  Code, committed as follows:
  That on or about June 6, 1961, in the City of Cavite,
Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused, without any
justifiable motive but with the intention to cause dishonor,
discredit and contempt to the undersigned complainant, in the
presence of and within hearing of several persons, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously utter to the
undersigned complainant the following insulting and serious
defamatory remarks, to wit: "AGUSIN, PUTANG INA MO".
which if translated into English are as follows: "Agustin, Your
mother is a whore."
            Contrary to law.
            Cavite City, July 25, 1961.
(SGD.) AGUSTIN HALLARE             
Complainant             
  Subscribed and sworn to before me this. 25th day of July,
1961, in the City of Cavite, Philippines.
(SGD.) BUEN N. GUTIERREZ             
Special Counsel             

     Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to both

charges and the cases were set for joint trial. On the day of
the hearing the prosecution moved to amend the information
in Criminal Case No. 2594 for grave threats by deleting
therefrom the word "orally". The defense counsel objected to
the motion on the ground that the accused had already been
arraigned on the original information and that the amendment
"would affect materially the interest of the accused."
Nevertheless, the amendment was allowed and the joint trial
proceeded.

     From the judgment of conviction the accused appeal to the

Court of Appeals, which returned a verdict of affirmance. A
motion for reconsideration having been denied, the accused
brought this appeal by certiorari. 

     Petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in

affirming the proceedings in the lower court allowing the
substantial amendment of the information for grave threats
after petitioner had been arraigned on the original
information; (2) in proceeding with the trial of the case of
grave threats without first requiring petitioner to enter his
plea on the amended information; (3) in convicting petitioner
of both offenses when he could legally be  convicted of only
one offense, thereby putting him in jeopardy of being
penalized twice for the same offense; (4) in convicting
petitioner of grave threats when the evidence adduced and
considered by the court tend to establish the offense of light
threats only; and (5) in convicting petitioner of grave oral
defamation when the evidence tend to establish that of simple
slander only.

     On the first error assigned, the rule is that after the
accused has pleaded the information may be amended as to all
matters of form by leave and at the discretion of the court
when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of
the defendant (Section 13, Rule 110, New Rules of Court).
Amendments that touch upon matters of substance cannot be
permitted after the plea is entered.

     After a careful consideration of the original information,

we find that all the elements of the crime of grave threats as
defined in Article 282 1 of the Revised Penal  Code and
penalized by its paragraph 2 were alleged therein namely: (1)
that the offender threatened another person with the infliction
upon his person of a wrong; (2) that such wrong amounted to
a crime; and (3) that the threat was not subject to a
condition. Hence, petitioner could have
been convicted thereunder. It is to be noted that under the
aforementioned provision the particular manner in which the
threat is made not a qualifying ingredient of the offense, such
that the deletion of the word "orally" did not affect the nature
and essence of the crime as charged originally. Neither did it
change the basic theory of the prosecution that the accused
threatened to kill Rosauro Reyes so as to require the
petitioner to undergo any material change or modification in
his defense. Contrary to his claim, made with the concurrence
of the Solicitor General, petitioner was not exposed after the
amendment to the danger of conviction under paragraph 1 of
Article 282, which provides for a different penalty, since there
was no allegation in the amended information that the threat
was made subject to a condition. In our view the deletion of
the word "orally" was effected in order to make the
information conformable to the evidence to be presented
during the trial. It was merely a formal amendment which in
no way prejudiced petitioner's rights.

     Petitioner next contends that even assuming that the

amendment was properly allowed, the trial court committed a
reversible error in proceeding with the trial on the merits
without first requiring him to enter his plea to the amended
information. Considering, however, that the amendment was
not substantial, no second plea was necessary at all.

     The third and fourth issues are related and will be

discussed together. Petitioner avers that the appellate court
erred in affirming the decision of the trial court erred in
affirming him of grave threats and of grave oral defamation
when he could legally be convicted of only one offense, and in
convicting him of grave threats at all when the evidence
adduced and considered by the court indicates the commission
of light threats only.

     The demonstration led by petitioner Agustin Hallare in

front of the main gate of the naval station; the fact that
placards with threatening statements were carried by the
demonstrators; their persistence in trailing Hallare in a
motorcade up to his residence; and the demonstration
conducted in front thereof, culminating in repeated threats
flung by petitioner in a loud voice, give rise to only one
conclusion: that the threats were made "with the deliberate
purpose of creating in the mind of the person threatened the
belief that the threat would be carried into effect."   Indeed,
Hallare became so apprehensive of his safety that he sought
the protection of Col. Monzon, who had to escort him home,
wherein he stayed while the demonstration was going on. It
cannot be denied that the threats were made deliberately and
not merely in a temporary fit of anger, motivated as they were
by the dismissal of petitioner one month before the incident.
We, therefore, hold that the appellate court was correct in
upholding petitioner's conviction for the offense of grave
threats.

    The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance

of the words, "Agustin, putang ina mo". This is a common
enough expression in the dialect that is often employed, not
really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. It
is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer, that
is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother. In the instant
case, it should be viewed as part of the threats voiced by
appellant against Agustin Hallare, evidently to make the same
more emphatic. In the case of Yebra, G.R. No. L-14348, Sept.
30, 1960, this Court said:

  The letter containing the allegedly libelous remarks is more

threatening than libelous and the intent to threaten is the
principal aim and object to the letter. The libelous remarks
contained in the letter, if so they be considered, are merely
preparatory remarks culminating in the final threat. In other
words, the libelous remarks express the beat of passion which
engulfs the writer of the letter, which heat of passion in the
latter part of the letter culminates into a threat. This is the
more important and serious offense committed by the
accused. Under the circumstances the Court believes, after the
study of the whole letter, that the offense committed therein
is clearly and principally that of threats and that the
statements therein derogatory to the person named do not
constitute an independent crime of libel, for which the writer
maybe prosecuted separately from the threats and which
should be considered as part of the more important offense of
threats.

  The foregoing ruling applies with equal force to the facts of

the present case.
  WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed
and petitioner is acquitted, with costs  de oficio, insofar as
Criminal Case No. 2595 of the Court  a quo (for oral
defamation) is concerned; and affirmed with respect to
Criminal Case No. 2594, for grave threats, with costs against
petitioner.

G.R. Nos. L-21528 and L-21529, March 28, 1969

ROSAURO REYES, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
MAKALINTAL, J.: