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Romania - Nations in Transit 2022 Country Report - Freedom House
Romania - Nations in Transit 2022 Country Report - Freedom House
Romania 56
SEMI-CONSOLIDATED DEMOCRACY /100
The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 representing the highest level of democratic progress
and 1 the lowest.
The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year.
The Democracy Percentage,
introduced in 2020, is a translation of the Democracy Score to the 0-100 scale, where 0 equals least democratic and 100
equals most democratic.
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Executive Summary
Throughout 2021, democracy in Romania was affected by a combination of three
overlapping crises: a health crisis, a political crisis, and an energy crisis. While the
leaders of the country’s main political parties quarreled over the distribution of
positions, ministries, and funds, Romania suffered one of the highest COVID-19 death
rate in the European Union (EU), 1
experienced rising energy costs, and saw the
fourth-highest rate of inflation among EU countries in October. 2
Romania’s political crisis started in September 2021 following internal disputes within
the center-right coalition 5
of PNL, “Save Romania” Union (USR), 6
and UDMR. 7
Instead of taking advantage of what could have been a period of political calm, the
coalition crumbled under the ambitions of then-Prime Minister Florin Cîțu to rule as
he wished. Losing the support of its coalition partners, the Cîțu government collapsed
in October following a no-confidence motion initiated by PSD and supported by all
opposition parties in Parliament as well as the second-largest party in the erstwhile
governing coalition, USR. The removal of the Cîțu government through this motion of
censure intensified political tensions that had already led to a record depreciation of
the national currency, the Romanian leu (RON). 8
Although Romania is due to
receive an estimated €29.2 billion from the EU as part of the bloc’s COVID-19 recovery
program, the country’s prevailing political instability jeopardizes the management of
these funds.
On top of this, the Constitutional Court of Romania (CCR) decided to delay the vote
on a motion of no confidence 9
brought forward on September 3 by USR and
Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR). This move arguably favored Cîțu in the
PNL leadership elections on September 25, as the delay effectively ensured that he
remained prime minister at least until the PNL leadership vote. The CCR’s intervention
raises questions about its independence and political neutrality, although eventually,
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on September 28, it ruled that the motion should be debated and voted on in
Parliament. Before this could be considered, however, the Cîțu government fell on
October 5 in a separate vote brought by the PSD that recorded the highest number of
supporters for a motion of censure in more than 30 years.
Another means of influencing the PNL leader elections at the PNL congress was PM
Cîțu’s decision on September 7 to award over €18 million in new party subsidies,
although by that point in the year the political parties had generally only spent half of
their existing annual subsidies. Moreover, the fact that around 5,000 people gathered
indoors at the PNL congress, despite restrictions on gatherings and soaring rates of
COVID-19 infections, was a clear expression of how authorities could be overpowered
by the will of political leaders. Finally, in hopes of getting reinstated as prime minister
after the no-confidence motion, Cîțu, acting as interim PM, decided on October 7 to
allocate over one billion RON from the state’s reserve fund to Romanian
municipalities, disregarding any objective criteria for distributing the funds and clearly
favoring municipalities led by PNL mayors. Meanwhile, cities and towns with hundreds
of thousands of inhabitants led by USR mayors received no funding, as Cîțu blatantly
sought to take revenge on the party.
The government’s incapacity to handle the health crisis was laid bare by the relatively
low rates of vaccination in the country: by year’s end Romania’s COVID-19 vaccine
uptake rate was among the lowest in the EU. 10
This low enthusiasm for the vaccine
could be explained by the widespread distrust in state authorities as well as high rates
of skepticism and vaccine hesitancy among certain segments of the population. This
skepticism was propelled by an increasing number of vocal antivaccination
campaigners, including the newly formed AUR party. As dozens of civil society leaders
pleaded with politicians to cease all contact with AUR members, the far-right party
organized antivaccination protests, even at the height of the fourth wave of the
COVID-19 pandemic. Hence, the alliance between the progressive USR and AUR to
submit a no-confidence motion against the Cîțu government disappointed a large
share of civil society and political figures, including the country’s president, Klaus
Iohannis.
Some Romanian media played a role in diffusing conspiracy theories and distrust in
the COVID-19 vaccine. State and private media are still at risk of political and
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commercial interference, especially regarding editorial content. Moreover, there is no
transparency in political party spending on media marketing, nor on TV content paid
for by political parties.
Judicial independence in Romania seemed to register positive trends in 2021, although
no concrete progress was made in dissolving the prosecutorial special section for
investigating magistrates (SIIJ), depoliticizing the CCR, or improving the stability and
predictability of legislation. A set of amendments to the three laws that govern
Romania’s justice system, necessitated by the former ruling PSD’s interference with
the judiciary and state prosecution, remained subject to parliamentary debate in 2021,
but the sheer number of amendments makes the duration and outcome of this
legislative process unpredictable. Uncertainty over long-sought improvements to the
penal and criminal procedure code are also a major challenge for the fight against
corruption. This uncertainty, as well as the lack of a national anticorruption strategy,
hampers Romania’s efforts in preventing and sanctioning corruption at all levels. In
the meantime, high-profile cases of corruption continue to come to light.
In the midst of an ongoing public health crisis, a full-blown political crisis was the last
thing the Romanian population needed, given the interim government had failed to
step up COVID-19 restrictions to contain the fourth wave of the pandemic. 11
This
last wave took over 20,000 lives, although many could have been saved if not for the
political deadlock. 12
At a Glance
In Romania, national governance is democratic yet dominated by clientelistic party
politics. Elections are free, but the accumulation of significant sums by parties in
power tilts the balance in favor of their reelection. Civil society is an active force in
supporting democracy and defending the rule of law, but there is a need for more
public consultation and support from the state. Media are relatively independent
though at risk of political pressure and self-censorship. Local governance is
democratic yet highly influenced by party politics at the national level. Judicial
independence has seen positive developments over recent years, but concerns persist
about legislative predictability, coherence, and stability. Some efforts to stamp out
corruption have been sustained. However, the country clearly needs a well-resourced,
stand-alone strategy to fight corruption at all levels of society.
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lower house , the Chamber of Deputies. Moreover, former prime minister Sorin
Grindeanu (PSD) took the position of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
Transport and Infrastructure. Grindeanu, who was Romania’s head of
government for six months in 2017, managed to trigger the country’s largest
post-revolution protests with the adoption of the emergency ordinance OUG13
for the amnesty for criminal offenses. 39
Grindeanu also goes down in history
as the first prime minister to be ousted by a motion of no confidence by his own
party. 40
The incoming government of Nicolae Ciucă also nominated the
controversial 41
former mayor of Bucharest, Gabriela Firea, as head of the
newly created Ministry of Family and Youth and the only woman proposed TOPas
minister in the new cabinet. Firea is a strong supporter of the traditional family,
does not agree with providing sex education in school without parental consent,
and seeks to increase the birth rate in Romania. 42
This raises public concerns
that Romania may follow the conservative path taken by Poland and Hungary.
Electoral Process
1.00-7.00 pts
Civil Society
1.00-7.00 pts
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Assesses the organizational capacity and financial sustainability of the civic
sector; the legal and political environment in which it operates; the 5.50
functioning of trade unions; interest group participation in the policy
/ 7.00
process; and the threat posed by antidemocratic extremist groups.
Civil society organizations (CSOs) have played an active role in defending the
rule of law in Romania. 58
However, the country’s civic space is considered to be
relatively narrow by international observers such as the European Commission
and CIVICUS. 59
Despite the supportive legislative framework for civil society, mandatory
consultation procedures prior to the adoption of normative acts are seen as
perfunctory: the number of public consultations and impact assessments
remains limited, and the few bills that are subject to public consultation do not
tend to have a major budgetary impact. 60
Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic
has had a negative impact on the rights to freedom of assembly and association
of CSOs, as is the case throughout Europe. 61
On January 4, the Law on Measures for Preventing and Combating Antigypsyism
62
entered into force. This is an important development for the protection of
Independent Media
1.00-7.00 pts
Across the country, there were increasing signs of the use of Strategic Lawsuits
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Against Public Participation (SLAPPs), whereby politicians, 74
church officials,
75
or businesspersons with links to the state 76
sue well-established
this alone fails to justify the haste with which PM Cîțu adopted it. 100
On top of the Saligny program, Cîțu decided on October 7—after the motion of
no confidence against him had been adopted—to allocate more than one billion
RON to municipalities from the state’s reserve fund. However, it seems that the
way in which this money was allocated to administrative-territorial units was
arbitrary, strictly based on political criteria, and reminiscent of the period when
former PSD leader Liviu Dragnea would distribute public funds among party
insiders and supporters. Out of 41 cities and sectors led by USR mayors, only 5
received funds from the government, leaving cities with hundreds of thousands
of inhabitants, such as Alba Iulia, Bacau, Brasov, Sectors 1 and 2 of Bucharest, and
Timișoara, with no funding. 101
A Radio Free Europe analysis showed that PSD
was also disadvantaged in the distribution of funds, with cities led by the party
receiving only about 25 percent of the amount allocated even though PSD has
the largest number of mayors. 102
Winners in this split were cities with PNL
leadership, but also Covasna, Harghita, and Mureș where UDMR is strong. 103
The lack of medical infrastructure and personnel, especially in rural areas, has
contributed to the failure of the country’s vaccination campaign, given that
about 44 percent of Romania’s population lives in rural areas. 104
Corruption
1.00-7.00 pts
In 2021, one of then-PM Cîțu’s commitments was to adopt a new National Anti-
Corruption Strategy for 2021–25, including measures aimed at preventing
corruption, promoting organizational integrity and anticorruption education, as
well as procedures for recovering losses generated by the commission of
crimes. On July 28, the Ministry of Justice launched a period of public debate on
the draft government decision approving the new strategy, 131
which had not
been adopted by year’s end.
In the 2021 Rule of Law Report published on July 20, the European Commission
noted that experts and business leaders still perceive a high level of corruption
in the Romanian public sector. 132
In Transparency International’s 2021
Corruption Perceptions Index, Romania had a score of 45/100, placing it twenty-
fifth in the EU and sixty-sixth globally. 133
This perception has remained relatively
stable over the last five years.
Uncertainty over the investigation, prosecution, and sanctioning of high-level
corruption, particularly on the admissibility of evidence, remains a major
challenge in the fight against corruption. 134
This uncertainty has had a negative
influence over the work of the National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA),
which had to restart at least 67 investigations to comply with a CCR decision of
April 6 regarding the investigation of disjoined cases. 135
In the spring, investigative journalists from the media platform Recorder
published a report showing how several heads of forestry directorates across
the country had been changed through a blackmail campaign coordinated TOP
from
the top of the Ministry of Environment. 136
Similar practices were discovered at
the National Administration “Romanian Waters.” 137
This was further proof that
the politicization of public institutions continues and is being directed from the
highest levels. Officials ousted through blackmail campaigns were replaced by
politically connected directors who handed out contracts to firms that were
associated with political parties. To recover the cost of bribes, these firms
accordingly overvalue the work undertaken. 138
On March 3, former Senate President Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu was indicted by
DNA prosecutors in a corruption case in which he is accused of receiving
material benefits worth some $800,000 from representatives of an Austrian
company in 2007–08, while he was prime minister. 139
In another case, a
prosecutor from the Prosecutor General’s Office asked judges of the High Court
of Cassation and Justice on November 9 to acquit Popescu-Tăriceanu for abuse
of office and complicity in misuse of official capacity, almost a year after he was
sent to trial. 140
Popescu-Tăriceanu was accused in December 2020 of failing to
put to a vote in the Senate plenary the termination of the mandate of Senator
Cristian Marciu, even though a final court decision declared Marciu
“incompatible” and no longer able to hold office. 141
The court adjourned the
case until December 7, 2021, when it acquitted both Popescu-Tăriceanu and
Marciu. 142
In May, an amendment allowing for electronic submission of assets and interests
disclosures became operational. This should facilitate the work of the National
Integrity Agency (ANI) in investigating conflicts of interest or unjustified wealth.
143
However, ANI faces a leadership deficit given that the presidency has been
Author: Claudia Badulescu is a PhD Researcher in Political and Social Sciences at the
European University Institute (EUI) where she is studying Europeanization of post-
communist public administrations from the CEE and the Western Balkans. At EUI,
Badulescu has worked on a variety of international research projects, including the
Horizon 2020 project InDivEU, the ERC Synergy program SOLID , the POLCON
project, and the euandi 2019 project. Previously, she worked as a Senior Project
Manager at France’s ENA, where she had a leading role in the management of
international projects supporting administrative reform in Eastern Europe and the
Middle East.
Footnotes
1 Cristian Gherasim, “Romania reaches historic high in Covid deaths”, EUobserver, 5
November 2021, https://euobserver.com/coronavirus/153428
2 “October 2021 Annual inflation up to 4.1% in the euro area Up to 4.4% in the EU”, Eurostat
131/2021, 17 November 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/11563383/2-
17112021-AP-…
3 Sourced from: Worldometer, COVID-19 CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC, TOP
https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/
4 The Romanian health system had been under sustained pressure since long before the
COVID-19 pandemic, being historically plagued by corruption, inefficiency and politicized
leadership. However, the COVID-19 crisis pushed the health system to its limits and showed
its incapacity to deal with the high influx of patients. To date, eleven fires were recorded at
public hospitals since the onset of the pandemic, which resulted in dozens of deaths and
catastrophic injuries. “Ard spitalele României. Lista neagră a tragediilor: 11 incendii în mai
puţin de un an” [Romania's hospitals are burning. Black list of tragedies: 11 fires in less than a
year], Adevarul, 11 November 2021, https://adevarul.ro/news/eveniment/ard-spitalele-
romaniei-lista-neagra-…
5 “Romania to get a government for Christmas”, Euractiv, 22 December 2020,
https://www.euractiv.com/section/elections/news/romania-to-get-a-govern…
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