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Airport and Aviation Security Book Report - Carrion
Airport and Aviation Security Book Report - Carrion
Airport and Aviation Security: U.S. Policy and Strategy in the Age of Global Terrorism
Book Report
Abstract
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Airport and aviation security are one of the most important economic infrastructures in the world
today. The attacks on September 11th, 2001, were a wakeup call to many that we are not safe in
this dynamic world. International terrorism is a serious threat and prior to that many slept
without any care of the threats that were out there. By evaluating and managing security risks
while using intelligence and counter terrorism information, passenger screening methods and in-
flight security measures have been adapted to combat the rising threats. This book report covers
some of the strategies and policies following the attacks on 9/11 that have been given emphasis
The attacks of 9/11 caught the US and the world completely off guard as to the
capabilities and sophistication of terrorists and their ability to perform a calculated and
coordinated attack on such a large scale. As Elias (2010) states, “existing policies and strategies
for aviation security in the United States were put in the spotlight, focusing on why the United
States was so unprepared to defend against such an attack and how to strengthen aviation and
homeland security to prevent future terrorist attacks” (p. xvii). As a result of these attacks the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created. Additionally elaborate security systems
and extensive security measures were implemented to airports in an effort to improve security
and rebuilt the trust that was broken with the public in regards to air travel. This book report will
cover and summarize the main points of the text written by Bartholomew Elias in regards to
airport and aviation security changes of pre-post 9/11. Elias is a specialist in aviation policy for
the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) in Washington D.C. and offers excellent research
The book starts with a brief recollection of terrorism in the aviation sector which dates
back to the 1960’s. Elias explains the significance of how much deadlier aviation attacks have
been over conventional terrorist attacks. To show this comparison, Elias (2010) makes a very
interesting statement, “Among the attacks against aviation, the average number of American
fatalities per event was 12.2. In comparison, among the 155 attacks against non-aviation targets,
the average number of American fatalities per attack across all of the other categories of targets
was less than 3 per event” (p.1). However the author explains not all hijackings resulted in death
and many were done for ransom. The early 1970’s had a spike in ransom hijackings, one of the
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most famous being that of D.B. Cooper, an individual that hijacked a Boeing 727 and parachuted
his way out. As a result of the alarmingly high hijacking incidence that was occurring in the US
during the 1970’s, President Nixon unveiled a plan to prevent these crimes. Elias (2010) states,
“this new plan laid the groundwork for the US policy and strategy for aviation security” (p.5).
Among these was the sky marshal program (which still exists today) and new electronic
screening technologies. According to Elias (2010), the FAA focused on methods designed to
pick out potential hijackers (p.10). The pre 9/11 era had many debates relating to the passenger
screening process, aviation security roles and responsibilities and aircraft bombings.
Technological changes such as liquid and plastic explosives changed the focus of many experts
from hijacking to bomb detection. Also, Elias (2010) mentions the first incidences of aircraft in
the US being used a kinetic weapons pre dating the attacks of 9/11(p. 23).
9/11 Attacks
The author mentions that due to the FAA’s focus on detection of explosive devices, the
hijackings on 9/11 were made easier due to lack of concern of domestic hijackings with
random and not everyone was checked. The author (2010) notes that “On December 4, 1998, the
CIA included in its Presidential Daily Brief intelligence analysis of information received from a
friendly government, warning of a possible al Qaeda hijacking within the United States” (p.46).
This build up along with other threats were warning signs of the looming attack. Due to the lack
of communication, complexity and abstract nature of the attacks, the North American Aerospace
Defense (NORAD) Command was unable to intercept any of the threats in defense of their
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targets. In the days following the attacks, an aircraft security response team was assembled to
provide short term immediate fixes and solutions. Elias (2010) states:
With regard to screening procedures, the team recommended that all persons, including
airline employees and crews, and their carry-on items be screened at an approved
screening checkpoint at all airport terminals with scheduled commercial air carrier
screening, limiting each passenger to one carry-on item, and allowing only ticketed
These were only some of the many solutions discussed further in the report and Congressional
response on the matter was also pending. The debate of expanding federal involvement in
aviation security operations was ongoing. Elias (2010) mentions 2 main issues being discussed,
“1) what should the extent of the federal role in security screening operations be? and 2) which
federal agency should have responsibility for screening functions?” (p. 58). These questions led
new organization within DOT created by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (Elias,
2010). Furthermore, the book talks about the Homeland Security Act of 2002 enacted by the
president and congress. This act established the Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) program,
and most importantly it reorganized government agencies under the creation of the Department
of Homeland Defense (DHS). After the pass of this act TSA now operated as an entity of DHS
Following the creation of DHS, the strategies and policies to improve aviation security
have been significant and endless. Constant scrutiny is given to areas of concern and
vulnerability. The 9/11 Commission has been making recommendations to strengthen aviation
security and counter terrorism (Elias, 2010). Enhanced passenger and employee screening of
100% of individuals, improvised explosive device (IED) detection systems, human interaction
and behavioral training, and deployment of hardened containers are some of these strategies.
Elias (2010) explains that in 2006 the National Aviation Security Policy called for the DHS to
serve as the focal entity for managing and coordinating border and transportation security
initiatives for the homeland and abroad (p. 102). Additionally, Elias (2010) states, “ This
National Aviation Security Policy also involves matters concerning the DOD, the Department of
State, the DOJ, and a variety of other federal, state, and local agencies and private entities, and
relies on close coordination with and continued cooperation from other nations” (p. 102). This
policy is critical to the global stability and aviation growth interests of the US at home and
abroad preventing terrorist acts and other hostile actions against aviation. The coordination and
communication efforts of these agencies has allowed for an improved response to threats even
with international partners. Elias (2010) also talks about risk assessment methods used to
evaluate and manage security risks (p. 133). Within this is the use of James Reason’s Swiss
cheese model representing the gaps and weaknesses in the various layers of systems. Also
covered in the text are the exploitation of intelligence and counter terror information to prevent
attacks. These operations as explained are primarily conducted by the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), National
Security Agency (NSA), Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) and the Department of Defense
(DOD). The TSA however, also plays a role in security intelligence as it works closely with the
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information related to threats and vulnerabilities to aviation and other transportation modes
(Elias, 2010). Terrorist watch lists and prescreening systems have allowed many individuals to
potential threats. The book also talks about other areas such as airline in-flight security measures,
perimeter security and access control, air cargo security and security for general aviation
operations.
Conclusion
Bartholomew Elias does a great job of going in depth in the many passages of acts,
policies, and strategies that have shaped the aviation security world as it stands. The content of
this book as related to US policy and strategy and aviation are extensive. This book report only
touches on the most significant strategies and actual reading of the text is necessary to
understand the scope to which the events of 9/11 changed airport and aviation security. From pre
9/11 history to post 9/11 changes, this book has it all. In retrospect, it is truly disturbing how the
terrorist hijackings of 9/11 were allowed to happen. How terrorists were able to get through so
many loopholes in the law enforcement community and aviation security, it could be said was
only a matter of time. Organizations such as TSA and DHS along with others have a significant
impact in aviation security and will hopefully continue to evolve to meet dynamic threats. This
book has a lifetime worth of knowledge and shows why Elias is a specialist in aviation policy for
the US CRS.
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References
Elias, B. (2010). Airport and aviation security: U.S. policy and strategy in the age of global
http://www.crcnetbase.com.ezproxy.libproxy.db.erau.edu/doi/book/10.1201/9781420070309