An Allocation Problem of Support Fire in Combat as a Differential Game

Author(s): Yasushi Kawara

Source: Operations Research, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 1973), pp. 942-951
Published by: INFORMS
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 An Allocation Problem of Support Fire in Combat
as a Differential Game

Yasushi Kawara
Nippon Electronics Technical College, Tokyo, Japan
(ReceivedDecember14, 1970)

This paper analyzes as a differential game the problem of allocating support

fire between two different targets (the enemy primary units and support
units) in a combat. It assumes that the game begins when one side's primary
units start the advance on the enemy, and that the game ends when they come
in contact with the enemy primaryunits. The paper also examines the rela-
tion between the value of the game and its duration.

CONSIDER TWO FORCES in combat. Suppose that each is comprised of

primary and support units. We imagine the former to be mainly infantry; the
support consists essentially of artillery.
The combat outcome depends, often decisively, on the strategies of the sup-
port units, which consist essentially of decisions as to how to allocate their fire
between the primary and support units of the enemy. Taking into account the
enemy's similar decisions, the optimal friendly allocation becomes the optimal
strategy of the combat game.
WEISS[51 suggested casting this type of problem in the form of a differential
game in the manner of ISAACS.[31 We do so in this paper.
An actual battle reflects complex interrelations of forces and environment. To
obtain a model that emphasizes support-fire allocation, we can divide the combat
duration into phases in which most elements stay reasonably constant and study
each separately. Here our analysis is confined to the initial period: the advance of
one side's primary units until they contact those of the enemy.

FORMULATION OF THE COMBAT GAME

INITIALLY, THE TWO forces confront one another at a distance. One, called the
attacker, advances toward his stationary enemy, the defender. This period of
approach of the primary units concerns us here; we refer to it as combat. Its
length is 0, the combatduration. In our problem the time t extends from t = 0 until
t= .
As combat progresses, we assume:
1. The support units of each side know only the general location of the enemy
primary force and fire into this without knowledge of the consequences.
2. The support units are sufficiently aware of the location and condition of the
enemy support units that, when a target is killed, fire may be shifted immediately
to a new target. The fire is uniformly distributed over the enemy's surviving
units.
942

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 SupportFirein Combat 943

3. The areas held by both attacker and defender are constant during combat.
(The attacker's area changes in location, but not in size, during his advance.)
4. The effectiveness of each surviving support unit does not change during
combat.
5. The effectiveness of each surviving primary unit is small compared to that
of the corresponding support and is neglected.
With these assumptions, the following differential equations describe the com-
bat situation:
X1j=-k2 IOX4) X4 =Ki( 1-A X3,
(k1X)
x2 =-klXa, T=-1,
X3 =-K2( I 1-) X4,

where at = dxj/dt, P=-dT/dt,

Fig. 1. The situationat time t.

x1, x2 =the numbers of primary units on the sides of attacker and defender at
time t,
X3, X4 =thenumbers of support units on the sides of attacker and defender
at time t,
ki, k2 =the effectiveness of the attacker's and defender's support units on the
enemy primary units,
K1, K2=the effectiveness of the attacker's and defender's support units on the
enemy support units,
At,4 =the fraction of the attacker's and defender's surviving support units
directed at the enemy primary units (0 <VI, ?1).
T =time to end of combat.
This situation is schematized in Fig. 1.

THE DIFFERENTIAL GAME ANALYSIS

As OUR PROBLEM iS mathematically similar to Example 5.4 of reference 3, references

will occasionally be made thereto.

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944 YasushiKawara

In our model the objective of fire support is to assist the primary units to gain
the superiority over the enemy primary units at the time of contact. It is assumed
reasonable to use the following ratio of numbers of the two sides' primary units
as a measure of this superiority:
H = SlIS2, (2)
where si and S2 are the values of xi and x2 at T=O.
If we take this ratio as payoff to the attacker and its negative as payoff to the
defender, we can treat this problem as a two-person zero-sum game in which the
attacker tries to maximize H and the defender to minimize it. [When H = S1/S2 is
replaced by H= S2/si and the roles of O and A/ as minimizing and maximizing are
reversed by interchanging the roles of the players, the outcome of the game is un-
affected. Therefore this game is symmetric.]
It is assumed that the combat duration 0 is finite and is known to both sides.
[It is useful to consider the time T until termination as a state variable (compare
reference 3, page 34). In our original model we are interested in only one par-
ticular value of T and it is this we denote by 9.]
The optimal strategies we are now going to obtain are (AI,4), which satisfy
the following equation according to game theory:
min. max. H = max. min. H = V,
where V is the value of the game. Let us represent the optimal values of A, 4 at
each instant by A, A.
According to Isaacs, if the value of the game exists, the following relation holds
between A/ and 4 at each instant of a party during which both players act opti-
mally:
mine max. V=maxv minorV=0, (3)
where V= E Viti+VTP(Vi=OV/OXi, VT=OV/OT). Therefore, using (1), we
obtain
min., max. (S1x3a+ S2x40 -K2x4V3-K1x3V4- VT) = 0, (4)
where
Si =-klX2V2+KiV4, S2 =-k2x1Vl+K2V3. (5)
Thus + and + are determined by signs of Si and S2 as follows:
1, if Si> . f1, if S2< 0O (6)

Now it is necessary to obtain the expressions of xi, T, and Vs at each specific in-
stant in order to determine (A, A). For this purpose we employ the retrogressive
path equations (RPE) named by Isaacs. The RPE for our model are as follows:
xi = k2xi4)x4, V1=-k2 x4V,
2= klX2X3, V2 = -kJX V2,

X3-=K2(1-.)X4, V3 klX24V2-K1( 1- V4, (7)

X4= Kl(1-A P 3, V4 =k24 1V- K2 ( 1 -A V3,
o

T= 1.

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 SupportFirein Combat 945

If the combat duration is finite, xi and x2 will not go to zero during combat,
but X3 and X4 may do so. Accordingly, we consider two cases; throughout let Si
be the value of xi at termination (when primary units of both sides come in con-
tact).
Case 1. Support units (X3, X4) of both sides survive combat.
Since we set V= S/82 at T=O (compare reference 3, p. 98, center),

V1= 0V/Ox1 = 0V/Os1= 1/s2, V2 = 0V/Ox2= V/s2 =-S1/2X

V3=0, V1=0. (8)
Therefore, from (5) we have

S1=1ks1/s2 > 0, S2 =-k2sl/s2 < 0,

and so, from (6),
A=1, +=1. ~~~~~~~(9)

Therefore, near termination, the support units concentrate all their fire on the
enemy primary units. The RPE then become

xl =k2xlx4, Vi=-k2x4V1,
x2= kjx2x3, V2 -k1x3 V2,

X3= 0O V3 =-k1X2V2, (10)

X4 = 0O V4 =-k2xll,

T=1,

which, with the preceding initial conditions, have the integrals (r is the time until
termination)
k2834r V1k284r,
xi = sie V1 = (1/s2)e

k 1S33T
X2-=S2e
z
83* v2 =
V2 - (8 ) e-kls
(SI/S22 )ek1131

X3 = S3, X4= S4, V3= ki(sI/s2) ,

T= , V4=-k2(s1/s2)r.
Thus
S= k2Ki(s1/s2) (k1/k2Ki- r), S2 = klK2(si/s2) ( r-k2jkiK2),

and there will either be a transition surface for a when T-=7T7= k1/k2K, (on which
, switches from 1 to 0) or such a surface for 4 when r = T2=k2/klK2, whichever
is smaller.
We shall assume T1< T2, for the contrary inequality may be reduced to this
case by reversing the notations of the players. The coincidental case of T1= T2
will be ignored.
Accordingly we treat T= Ti as a new terminal surface and integrate the RPE
afresh, but now with ; = 0, + = 1 (compare reference 3, p. 99). There results

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946 YasushiKawara

x= siexp{k2[L Kis3r'2+s4( T1+ r') ]},

8
X = S k1S3 T1 X = S

x4=Kls3r'+s4, T=r'+Ti,
V1= (1/S2) exp{ - k2[?' Ks3r2 +s4( Ti+ r') ]} (12)
V2 = - (S1/S22) exp ( -k1S3T)
V3= 1 k2Ki(si/s2) (r'2?+2Tlr'+2T12),
V14=- k2-(S/S2) ( r'+ Ti),
where r' is measured from T1. We find Si to remain negative, but now
S2 =1? k2KiK2(si/s2) { r'2+2Tlr'+2[T 12 -(1/KiK2) II,
so that a transition surface at which + changes from 1 to 0 occurs when the ex-
pression in the brace vanishes, that is, when r'= - Ti+ V/2/K1K2- T12.

TABLE I
OPTIMAL STRATEGIES FOR THE CASE WHERE BOTH SIDES' SUPPORT UNITS ARE
NOT ANNIHILATED DURING COMBAT

[T1=k1/(k2Kj), T1'= X/2/(K1K2)- {k/(k2K1) }2, T2=k2/(k1K2),

T2'=\/2/(K1K2)y- {k2/(kjK2) }2]

Case T1<T2 T1>T2 Ti=T2=To

Time tend O_ T<Tl Tl?T<Ti' Tl'<T O<T<T2 T2?T<T2' T2'<T O?T<To To<T

1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0

Again, as in reference 3, p. 100, we can integrate the RPE, with t=+-0,

from our new acting terminal surface, obtaining
xi = siexpIk2[j/ Kls3(T1'- T1)2+s4Ti']},
X2= s2exp(kls3T,),
X3 = s3cosh\/K1K2r + /K2/K1KK1s3(T1- T1)+S41 sinh \/KiK2r"
X4= {Kls3( T1'- T1)+S41 cosh \/KiK2r + V\K1/K2S3sinh v/KiK2r",
T= r"+Ti', (13)
VI = ( 1/s2) exp{ - k2[ x1 Kls3(T1'- T-1)2+ s4T,']},
V2 = - (S1/S2) exp( -kls3T,),
V3= (k2sj/K2s2) cosh \/KIK2r" + k2 x/ki/K2 (sl/s2) T.'sinh /KiK2r"
V4= - k2 s/S2) T1'coshV'KiK2r - (k2/ vK1K2) (81/82) sinh V"KiK2r",
where T1'= T12, and r" is measured from T1'. No further transi-
/2/(K-1K2) -
tion surfaces occur.
Table I and Figs. 2-4 display the results.
If we take as an example a combat whose duration 0 is comparatively long
(0> Ti' or T2'), as Table I shows, the optimal strategy for each side is to concen-

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 Support Fire in Combat 947

trate its fire on the other's support units at first, and to switch the fire to the enemy
primary units at an appropriate later time. Note that the optimal times to switch
the fire do not depend on the current strengths of either side, but only on the effec-
tivenesses ki and Ki.
Since the defender will generally have the greater effectiveness on the enemy
primary units, we may suppose ki < k2. As reality suggests that K, =K2, we can
expect that T1<T2. Therefore it is probably optimal that the attacker concen-
trates all his fire on the enemy support units longer than the defender. This can

-T=0 T=T= T=T,

X <,

5 10 15 T
Fig. 2. The changesof xl/x2underoptimalstrategiesfor T1<T2, ki =0.005, k2= 0.01,
Ki=K2=O.1, and 83=84=5.

be interpreted as an effort by the attacker to suppress the enemy support units

that deter his own maneuverability.
Case 2. One side's or both sides' support units are annihilated during combat.
As before, we take T1< T2. Then, for a combat of large duration 0, it is
likely that X3 will becomezero at some T? T1'and X4at a T? T1.
(a) The attacker's support units (X3) are annihilated.
The analysis is handled much as in reference 3, p. 101. Part of the boundary
of the state space, where X3 =0, is used as a terminal set and the RPE integrated
regressively form these initial conditions. If G1is the time X3 first vanishes, the
terminal manifold satisfies

xi = sie ,284 X2 S2, X3 =0, X4 =S4, T= (14)

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948 YasushiKawara

and on it
V = (XIX2) C-k2$x@ (1
After calculatingthe V, we find that here
SI= -k2Ki (0i-Ti) (si/s2),
and so .0. On the otherhand,+ switchesfrom 1 to O. In sum:
+=1 forO _T<0i, A=O, +=O for T=G6. (16)

7=0 .
-rT=Tl =,
0
3

N_

-4..---',5*..t/

~~~~~i =K2 0-1,

and/ 84 5 ./

xi.1= . X2 = 82

Fig. 3. The changesof x underoptimalstrategies

T.<2, fr k1=0.005, k2-=.01
5I(/S)-KT k24, V2/// /8 /
uni2t .1, and S4a=5.

Integratinlg the RPE (with lT = 0) now yields

-3 VKKswsinh K12r, x4=s~cosh KKr,

Vi=(lIs2)e-*2S43, V2=-81/8 2 (17)

173= (k2/K2) (81/82) cosh KI+k202 K1/2(s/s2)sinh v/Kkr

V4--k201(s1/s2) cosh V/KiK2r- (k2/ V/K1K2)(81/82) sinh V&TKxr
anld we find no further switches of strategies.
(b) The defender's support units are annihilated.

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 Support Fire in Combat 949

Let X4 reach 0 when T =02. Proceeding along the preceding lines, we find that
f and + becomes
for T<02,

A&=0, f=1, for T=02(T1?02<T2), (18)

f=0, f=0, for T=02(T2?02).
Let us consider the case T1< 02< T2. We can integrate the RPF Avith,=0,
=1, obtaining

T=0 'T=5 1 15TiT(So

I(didtI
Ihe)

Fig. 4. The changesof X4underoptimalstrategiesfor T, < T2, ki = 0.005, k2 = 0.01,

K1=K2 =0.1, and 3= 5.
2
xi= k2K183r2 X2 = SC =18302

X3=S3, X4=K ;S3r, T=02r,

V1=
(1/s2)e12 k2KI83i-2 v2 s/22)ek1830 19
V3= /' k2Kj(s1/s2)
(T'2+2T1lr+2T202), V4 -k2( Su/S2)(r+ T1).
Here S2= /1!xk2KjK2
( S/S2) I Ir2?2Tjr?2( TjO2-1/KjK2) } and ~ switchesto 0 when
-7~V,+-T1
Ti2"'= 02~ - 2(T102- 1/K1Kj2).
The computation of the optimal paths here is left to the reader, but a general
picture is revealed by Figs. 2-4.

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950 YasushiKawara

RELATION BETWEEN THE VALUE OF THE GAME AND COMBAT

DURATION

THE COMBAT DURATION 0 depends on the missions assigned to the attacker and
the defender, the maneuverability of the attacker, the deterrent effect of the de-
fender, weather, terrain, etc. In most cases, the attacker is considered capable of
determining the combat duration in his favor. Accordingly, the attacker should
try to maximize the value of the game by choosing the proper combat duration.
Here we assume that the defender has enough support units not to be annihilated
for any value of 0, and will examine the relation between the value of the game
and combat duration. Let us consider the case where T1< T2.
Case 1. 0 ? 0 < T1.
In this case, the support units of neither side are annihilated, and the value of
the game is
V (x10/x20)exp{k1x30-k2x40) O}, (20)
where xio represents the initial value of xi. Then V becomes the maximum when
('
0, if x30/x40<k2/kl,
0 = arbitrary, if X30/X40= k2/kl, (21)
tT1, if x30/x40> k2/kl.
Case 2. T1< 0 < T1'. [Here the attacker's support units are not annihilated,
and the condition under which the defender's are not annihilated is
x40-Kix30(0- T1) > 0.]
In this case, if X30/X40<1/{ K(T1'-T1)}, the defender's support units are not
annihilated for any value of 0, and the value of the game is
V = ( x1o/X20) expjk2[J1Kjx30(02?+T12) -X400]}. (22)

Then V becomes the maximum when:

(a) If 2/{K1(T1+?T1) } <1/{K1(T1-T1)},
/ T1, if x30/x40_2/K( Tl+T?23),
T1', if 2/K1(T1'+ Ti) ?x30/x40<1/Ki(T'-Ti). (23)

(b) If 2/{ K1( T1'+ T1)} _ 1/{ Kd(T1'-T) ,

0 = T1, for X30/X40< 1/K1(T1'- T1). (24)
Case 3. 0? T1'. [Here the condition under which the attacker's support
units are not annihilated is
x30coshVK1K2( 0-T1' )-/K2/K1x4osinh 0- T1') > 0,
V\K1K2(
and the same condition for the defender's support units is
{x4o-K1( T1'- T) x30}
cosh (- T1')
(O'K1K2
-{ V/K1/K2x30o-VK1K2( T1'- T1)x4o}sinh V/K1K2(0- T1') >0.]
In this case, if X30/X40<<
VK2/K1, the defender's support units are not annihi-
lated for any value of 0, and the value of the game is

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 SupportFirein Combat 951

V= (X10/X20) exp{Acosh 2K1K( 0-T,') -Bsinh V/K1K20(e-Tj') }, (25)

where
A = k2[( 1/K2) X30- T'x40], B = k2 /K1/K2[(
1l/K1) 4o- T1 X30].
Now V becomes the maximum when
/T1', if X30/X40 1/K1T', 26
(1/ V/K1K2)tanh1 (B/A) + T1', if 1/K1T' ? x30/x40< V\K2/K1. (2)
These results may be summarized as follows: the attacker should plan a quick
combat when x301/x40 is comparatively small, a prolonged combat when X30/X40 is
comparatively large.

CONCLUSION AND REMARKS

IN OUR MODEL, if the combat duration does not exceed a limited time, the optimal
strategies of support units consist of concentrating all their fire on the enemy
primary units. On the other hand, if the combat duration exceeds the limited
time, the optimal strategies require concentrating all the fire on the enemy sup-
port units for the excess time before requiring it on the enemy primary units. This
limited time does not depend on the current strengths of either side but only on
the effectivenesses of both sides' support units. As a result, it is possible to plan
the optimal allocation comparatively easily.
Moreover, the analysis shows that the attacker can receive the maximum of the
value of the game as the payoff by selecting the proper combat duration, accord-
ing to the ratio of the initial strength of his support units to that of the enemy's.
This is useful for the attacker to determine whether he should shorten or lengthen
the combat.
Not all situations in actual combats, however, can be represented by the model
developed in this paper, so we will have to build and analyze an assortment of
pertinent real possibilities. In such cases more complicated phenomena may be
expected to appear. Of course, no claim is made that the model presented here
reflects the complicated phenomena of real warfare. It may, however, offer some
insights that have practical value.

REFERENCES

1. R. E. BACH, L. DOLANSKY, AND H. L. STUBBS, "Some Recent Contributions to the Lan-

chester Theory of Combat," Opns. Res. 10, 314-326 (1962).
2. S. J. DEITCHMAN, "A Lanchester Model of Guerrilla Warfare," Opns. Res. 10, 818-827
(1962).
3. R. ISSACS, Differential Games, Wiley, New York, 1965.
4. H. K. WEISS,"Lanchester-Type Models of Warfare," in Proc. First International Conf.
on Operational Res., OPERATIONS RESEARCH SOCIETY OF AMERICA, Baltimore, Mary-
land, 1957.
5. , "Some Differential Games of Tactical Interest and the Value of a Supporting
Weapons System," Opns. Res. 7,180-196 (1959).

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