THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-5272
March 19, 1910
▪ Explain why the Supreme Court ruled that Ah Chong is not criminally liable.
FACTS:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at “Officers’ quarters, No. 27,” Fort Mc Kinley,
Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house
boy or muchacho. “Officers’ quarters No. 27” as a detached house situates some 40 meters from
the nearest building, and in August, 19087, was occupied solely as an officers’ mess or club. No
one slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear
of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the
building, by which communication was had with the other part of the house. This porch was
covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of the room was not
furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had attached
a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat
insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In the room there was but one
small window, which, like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and window, there
were no other openings of any kind in the room.

On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o’clock, the defendant, who had received for the
night, was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in
bed and called out twice, “Who is there?” He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise
at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room.
Due to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and the
defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. “If
you enter the room, I will kill you.” At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge
of the chair which had been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant
thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom he
supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair was
merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against which it rested.
Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at
the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the
porch and fell down on the steps in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant,
who immediately recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called
to his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages
to bind up Pascual’s wounds.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just
described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and
as defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow
for his personal protection.
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly and
amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding that when either returned at night,
he should knock at the door and acquiant his companion with his identity.
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital,
where he died from the effects of the wound on the following day.
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial
court of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one
day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law.

ISSUE:
Should the defendant be acquitted by invoking mistake of fact?

HELD:
YES. Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be
entitle to complete exception from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal
blow, if the intruder who forced open the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous
thief or “ladron,” as the defendant believed him to be. No one, under such circumstances,
would doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief
having forced open the door notwithstanding defendant’s thrice-repeated warning to
desist, and his threat that he would kill the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not
be questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a small room, with no means of escape,
with the thief advancing upon him despite his warnings defendant would have been wholly
justified in using any available weapon to defend himself from such an assault, and in
striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the
first blow.
The question then squarely presents itself, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally
responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt
from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the
crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time
when he committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold
that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged
ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as
shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves
the actor from criminal liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as
laid down by Baron Parke, “The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they
appear to him.” That is to say, the question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and without
fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be determined by the circumstances as they appeared
to him at the time when the mistake was made, and the effect which the surrounding
circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent, criminal
or other wise, upon which he acted.
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant
Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who
forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent
peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view
of all the circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time,
he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more
than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them
to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he
can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling
into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the
imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property and the property under
his charge.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and
the defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with
the costs of both instance de oficio.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-47722
July 27, 1943
▪ Why did the Supreme Court reject the plea of the accused that they should be
acquitted for having acted under a mistake of fact?
FACTS:
Captain Godofredo Monsod (Provincial Inspector of Cabanatuan) was instructed to arrest
Balagtas, a notorious criminal, and, if overpowered, to get him dead or alive. The same
instruction was given to the Chief of Police Oanis who knew the whereabouts of Irene,
the paramour of Balagtas. Upon arriving at Irene’s house, Oanis approached Mallare and
asked her where Irene’s room was. Mallare indicated the place and upon further inquiry
also said that Irene was sleeping with her paramour.
Defendants Oanis and Galanta (Corporal of the Philippine Constabulary) then went to the
room of Irene, and upon seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door where
they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber
revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and
looking at the door where the shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. It
turned out later that the person shot and killed was not Balagtas but a peaceful and
innocent citizen named Tecson, Irene’s paramour.
Consequently, Oanis and Galanta were charged with the crime of murder.
The trial court found appellants guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence. Hence,
the present appeal. It is contended that, as appellants acted in innocent mistake of fact in
the honest performance of their official duties, both of them believing that Tecson was
Balagtas, they incur no criminal liability. Appellants rely on the case of U.S. v. Ah Chong.

ISSUE:
Whether or not appellants are criminally liable for the death of Tecson.

HELD:
Yes. The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the
killing being intentional and not accidental.
• Appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with the mitigating circumstance

➢ ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or
carelessness
➢ appellants found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The
person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his
identity without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable
effort to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed.
➢ "No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested
shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention."
➢ a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence
in making an arrest
➢ The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and
not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being
simply the incident of another act performed without malice.
➢ 2 requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one:
1. offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right-present
2. injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of
such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.-not present
➢ According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by 1 or 2 degrees than that
prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.
PEOPLE vs. GERVERO G.R. No. 206725, July 11, 2018
Doctrines: Mistake of Fact. —The mistake of fact applies only when the mistake is
committed without fault or carelessness. The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this
applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness.
Facts:
1. Victims Hernando Villegas (Hernando), Jose Villegas (Jose), and Benito Bausug, Jr.
(Bausug) were members of the Civilian Volunteer Organization (CVO).
2. Accused were members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU),
and were carrying firearms. They approached the victims and asked money from
Hernando, and the latter gave them Php 20. One of the accused (Bañes) remarked, “Is
that the only amount you can give when you just received money from your wife?” The
other accused (Castigador), took the money and said “You just watch out.”
3. Later in the evening, a burst of gunfire from where the victims were walking was
heard. A shout was heard, “This is Hernando, a CVO!” and someone replied, “Birahi na!
(Shoot now!)”.
4. The accused interposed the defense of mistake of fact, claiming that they thought
the victims were members of the New People’s Army (NPA). The accused were given
oral instructions by Senior Inspector Benigno Baldevinos to conduct a tactical patrol and
combat operations against the NPA. They were told to use the password “Simoy”, to
which the response would be “Amoy

ISSUES:

I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE

DEFENSE OF MISTAKE OF FACT; AND

II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY QUALIFIED THE KILLING TO MURDER.
DANDY L. DUNGO v. PEOPLE, GR No. 209464, 2015-07-01

• Is the crime of hazing, a crime mala in se or crime mala prohibita? Explain.

• Is good faith a valid defense for violation of R.A. No. 8049? Explain.

What Is The Difference Between Mala Prohibita And Mala In Se?

As discussed previously, mala prohibita are acts and omissions which are made crimes
because special statutes criminalize it.

Mala in se, on the other hand, are acts and omissions which are inherently wrongful and
immoral regardless of regulations governing their conduct.

https://ralblaw.com/mala-prohibita-vs-mala-in-se-principles-of-criminal-law/