Compiled Cases For Succession Project Full Time Students

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Compiled Case Digests for Articles
1015-1023, 1041-1057, New Civil
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Code of the Philippines
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Submitted to: Judge Grace G. Victoria-Ruiz
11/4/2019
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Submitted by:
ADRIANO, Ernesto III B. (ARTS. 1015, 1041, 1050)
BERNABE, Khristienne Rian C. (ARTS. 1016, 1042, 1051)
DE GUZMAN, Michaela (ARTS. 1017, 1043, 1052)
GALITA, Chloe Anne S. (ARTS. 1018, 1044, 1053)
GUILALAS Christian James S. (ARTS. 1019, 1045, 1054)
MANALASTAS, Joathron O. (ARTS. 1020, 1046, 1055)
SANTOS, Toni Cassandra B. (ARTS. 1021, 1047, 1056)
TORCULAS, Joyce Liezel Q. (ARTS. 1022, 1048, 1057)
URIAN, Joseph Andrew D. (ARTS. 1023, 1049)
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Table of Contents
Title Page
Article 1015
In the matter of the estate of TOMAS RODRIGUEZ vs. MARGARITA
LOPEZ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 5
HEIRS OF ANTERO SOLIVA vs. SEVERINO SOLIVA, et al………………………… 7
Article 1016
In the matter of the estate of TOMAS RODRIGUEZ AND LUZ LOPEZ
DE BUENO, vs. MARGARITA LOPEZ……………………………………………………… 11
GIL P. POLICARPIO, ET AL vs. JOSE V. SALAMAT, ET AL………………………….. 13
Article 1017
RAMON DEL ROSARIO vs. CLEMENTE DEL ROSARIO……………………………… 15
TORRES vs. LOPEZ…………………………………………………………………………… 16
Article 1018
AMPARO S. CRUZ vs. ANGELITO S. CRUZ………………………………………………. 18
Article 1019
In the matter of the estate of TOMAS RODRIGUEZ and LUZ LOPEZ
DE BUENO vs. MARGARITA LOPEZ……………………………………………………….. 20
YNZA vs. RODRIGUEZ………………………………………………………………………… 22
Article 1020
TORRES AND LOPEZ DE BUENO vs. LOPEZ……………………………………………. 24
CRUZ vs. CRUZ………………………………………………………………………………….. 25
Article 1021
TORRES vs. LOPEZ…………………………………………………………………………….. 27
BELEN vs. BPI………………………………………………………………………………….. 29
Article 1022
PARISH PRIEST OF VICTORIA TARLAC vs. RIGOR…………………………………… 31
TORRES AND LOPEZ DE BUENO vs. LOPEZ…………………………………………… 33
Article 1023
MATILDE ARAMBURU vs. ANGEL ORTIZ………………………………………………. 35
GIL POLICARPIO vs. JOSE SALAMAT…………………………………………………… 37
Article 1041
AMPARO S. CRUZ et al vs. ANGELITO S. CRUZ, et al………………………………… 38
Article 1042
Intestate Estate of the Late VITO BORROMEO vs. BORROMEO……………………… 41
MARIANO RAMOS vs. EUGENIO MARQUEZ……………………………………………. 44
Article 1043
DE VERA CERTEZA vs. VILLADOLID…………………………………………………….. 46
Intestate Estate of the Late VITO BORROMEO vs. BORROMEO……………………… 47
Article 1044
MICHAEL GUY vs CA………………………………………………………………………….. 50
HINLO vs. DE LEON…………………………………………………………………………… 52
Article 1045
DOLORESA. IGNACIO vs. FELISA MARTINEZ and JUAN MARTINEZ…………… 54
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MICHAEL C. GUY vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS……………………………………. 56
Article 1046
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. ABADILLA…………………… 59
PALAD vs. GOVERNOR OF QUEZON PROVINCE……………………………………… 61
Article 1047
RAMOS V. MARQUEZ………………………………………………………………………… 63
HINLO V. DE LEON…………………………………………………………………………... 66
Article 1048
Article 1049
Intestate Estate of VITO BORROMEO vs. BORROMEO………………………………… 69
ANTONIO BALTAZAR vs. LORENZO LAXA……………………………………………... 70
Article 1050
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.DAVID REY GUZMAN……………………… 73
AGAPITO HINLO vs. SATURNINA DE LEON…………………………………………… 75
Article 1051
DAMIANA INTO vs. MARIO VALLE, et al………………………………………………… 78
SIMEONA BARCELONA, et al. vs. HILARION BARCELONA………………………...80
Article 1052
LEVISTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS………………………………………………………… 82
Article 1053
MARIANO RAMOS vs. EUGENIO MARQUEZ…………………………………………….. 84
ELOY IMPERIAL vs. COURT OF APPEALS……………………………………………… 86
Article 1054
AGAPITO HINLO vs. SATURNINA DE LEON……………………………………………. 88
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO vs. BORROMEO………… 92
Article 1055
Article 1056
REPUBLIC vs. GUZMAN……………………………………………………………………… 94
YUSAY vs. YUSAY GONZALES……………………………………………………………... 96
Article 1057
WENCESLA CACHO vs. JOHN G. UDAN, AND RUSTICO G. UDAN……………….. 99
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO vs. BORROMEO………… 101
Adriano, Ernesto III B. Student Number 2017-167488

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Article 1015
Applicable
In the matter of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez, deceased. MANUEL

TORRES, special administrator, and LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO, heir, vs.
MARGARITA LOPEZ,
G.R. No. L-25966 November 1, 1926
Facts:
On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez executed his last will and testament,
in the second clause of which he declared:
I institute as the only and universal heirs to all my property, my

cousin Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno.
Prior to the time of the execution of this will the testator, Tomas Rodriguez,
had been judicially declared incapable of taking care of himself and had been
placed under the care of his cousin Vicente F. Lopez, as guardian. On January 7,
1924, or only four days after the will above-mentioned was made, Vicente F.
Lopez died; and the testator, Tomas Rodriguez, died on February 25, 1924,
thereafter. At the time the will was made Vicente F. Lopez had not presented his
final accounts as guardian, and no such accounts had been presented by him at the
time of his death. Margariat Lopez was a cousin and nearest relative of the
decedent. The will referred to, and after having been contested, has been admitted
to probate by judicial determination
Margarita Lopez, claims said half by the intestate succession as next of kin
and nearest heir; while the appellee, Luz Lopez de Bueno, claims the same by
accretion and in the character of universal heir the will of the decedent.
Issue:
Whether or not Luz Lopez de Bueno have better right on the other half of the
estate by accretion
Ruling:
Yes, Our discussion of the legal problem presented should begin with article
753 of the Civil Code which in effect declares that, with certain exceptions in favor
of near relatives, no testamentary provision shall be valid when made by a ward in
favor of his guardian before the final accounts of the latter have been approved.
This provision is of undoubted application to the situation before us; and the
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provision made in the will of Tomas Rodriguez in favor of Vicente F. Lopez was
not any general incapacity on his part, but a special incapacity due to the accidental
relation of guardian and ward existing between the parties.
We now pass to article 982 of the Civil Code, defining the right of accretion.
It is there declared, in effect, that accretion take place in a testamentary succession,
first when the two or more persons are called to the same inheritance or the same
portion thereof without special designation of shares; and secondly, when one of
the persons so called dies before the testator or renounces the inheritance or is
disqualifying to receive it. In the case before us we have a will calling Vicente F.
Lopez and his daughter, Luz Lopez de Bueno, to the same inheritance without
special designation of shares. In addition to this, one of the persons named as heir
has predeceased the testator, this person being also disqualified to receive the
estate even if he had been alive at the time of the testator's death. This article (982)
is therefore also of exact application to the case in hand; and its effect is to give to
the survivor, Luz Lopez de Bueno, not only the undivided half which she would
have received in conjunction with her father if he had been alive and qualified to
take, but also the half which pertained to him. There was no error whatever,
therefore, in the order of the trial court declaring Luz Lopez de Bueno entitled to
the whole estate.
A distinction is then drawn between incapacity to succeed and incapacity to

take, and it is contended that the disability of Vicente F. Lopez was such as to
bring the case under article 912 rather than 982. We are of the opinion that the case
cannot be made to turn upon so refined an interpretation of the language of the
Code, and at any rate the disability to which Vicente F. Lopez was subject was not
a general disability to succeed but an accidental incapacity to receive the legacy, a
consideration which makes a case for accretion rather than for intestate succession.
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Article 1015
Not Applicable
HEIRS OF ANTERO SOLIVA,vs. SEVERINO, JOEL, GRACE, CENON,

JR., RENATO, EDUARDO, HILARIO, all surnamed SOLIVA, ROGELIO V.
ROLEDA, and SANVIC ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by its Manager,
SANTOS PORAQUE,
G.R. No. 159611 April 22, 2015
Facts:
The Spouses Ceferino (also known as Rufino) Soliva and Juana Endeza
possessed and owned, during their lifetime, three parcels of land in Calbayog City,
specifically:
(1) a 1.436-hectare lot (Parcel 1) under Tax Declaration (TD) No. 42753;
(2) a 9,447-square meter lot (Parcel 2) under TD No. 24419, (a 1,600-square

meter portion of this lot, however, was owned by Brigida Mancol which the
spouses held for Mancol as her tenants); and
(3) a 5,136-square meter Riceland under TD No. 14298.
At the core of the controversy is a 14,609-square meter parcel of land (as

finally determined by the RTC), situated in Cagsalaosao, Calbayog City and
designated as Parcel 2 in the Plan of Land.5 The Plan divided Parcel 2 into six (6)
portions, namely:
1. Lot 1 828 square meters
2. Lot 2-A 3,305 square meters
3. Lot 2-B 877 square meters
4. Lot 3 2,741 square meters
Ceferino died in 1954, while Juana died in 1972. They had five children,
namely: Dorotea Cenon, Severino, Victoriano and Antero.
Earlier or on June 22, 1949, Mancol sold to Cenon the 1,600-square meter
portion of Parcel 2 As Cenon then lived in Manila, he left the possession and
enjoyment of this portion to his parents. However, when Ceferino died in 1954,
Cenon took over the administration of the entire estate, including Parcel 1.
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In March 1959, Severino received as his share in their parents’ estate the
5,136-square meter rice land covered by TD No. 14298. Severino subsequently
sold this lot
On November 13, 1970, Juana sold to Cenon half of Parcel 2 as her share in
the conjugal partnership, through a Deed of Conditional Sale
On January 21, 1986, Cenon sold to Roleda a 4,092-square meter portion of

Parcel 2.On August 14, 1991, Roleda subsequently sold the same
Meanwhile, Cenon died in 1987; he was survived by his children, namely:

Joel, Grace, Cenon, Renato, Eduardo and Hilario.
The RTC disposed of the case the properties within their respective shares
excluding severino from the partition of Parcel 2 as he had already received his
share in their parents’ inheritance – the 5,136-square meter parcel of Riceland
covered by TD No. 14298. As stated in the 1959 Deed of Absolute Sale between
Severino and Fortunato Calagos, Juana, Cenon, Antero and Victoriano confirmed
and agreed to the "sale of the land as part of the real estatead judicated and given to
Severino x xx as his share in the inheritance." In fact, this 5,136-square meter
parcel of land far exceeds the portion he would have received as share in Parcel 2.
Hence, he is no longer entitled to participate in its partition.
Cenon is likewise excluded from the partition of Parcel 2 as he likewise

already received his share in their parents’ inheritance. Moreover, the Deed of
Absolute Sale between Cenon and Roleda described the portion which Cenon sold
to the latter as only a portion, not the whole of Parcel 2.
In short, Cenon could validly sell to Roleda only the 1,600-square meter
portion which he bought from Mancol. When he sold to Roleda 4,092 square
meters Parcel 2, he effectively sold an extra 2,582-square meter portion which
rightfully pertains to the heirs of Ceferino and Juana as pro indiviso owners.
Accordingly, this 2,582-square meter portion should be treated as his share in their
parents’ estate that bars him from further participating in the partition of the
remaining portion of Parcel 2. Antero and the defendants a quo, except for SEI and
Roleda, separately appealed the RTC’s January 25, 1994 decision with the CA.
CA’s DecisionCeferino had no right whatsoever over the 1,600-square meter

portion of Parcel 2; his right covered only the 13,009-squaremeter portion (14,609-
1,600) not affected by this document. Thus, when he died in 1954, he transferred to
his heirs only the rights which he had over the 13,009-squaremeter portion.
In these lights, Cenon validly acquired ownership over a total area of

10,706.3 square meters of Parcel 2. As owner, he had all the right to alienate it,
either in its entirety or only its portion. Accordingly, his sale to Roleda of the
4,092.8-square meter portion was valid as it falls well within his total property
ownership.
Cenon’s remaining 6,613.5 square meters share of Parcel 2 shall, in turn, be

divided equally among his heirs.
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As for Ceferino’s other heirs, they each acquired a pro indiviso share over
the remaining 3,902.7 square meters of Parcel 2. But, since Severino had already
received his share in 1959, only Victoriano, Antero and Dorotea, as represented by
her heirs Sergio and Romeo, are entitled to participate in its partition.
Assailing the CA’s decision, Antero argues that the CA erroneously applied
Article 1015 inasmuch as Severino did not repudiate the share in their parents’
inheritance which he received in 1959.hence, no accretion of inheritance could take
place. in which case his share shall be added or incorporated to the share of his co-
heirs.Accordingly, Parcel 2 should be divided equally, or in 1/4 share each, among
Ceferino and Juana's
Issue:
Whether the CA correctly applied the concept of accretion, under Article

1015 of the Civil Code, in distributing Severino’s supposed share in Parcel 2 in
favor of Ceferino’s other heirs.
Ruling:
No,We disagree with Antero’s argument. He obviously misinterprets the

CA’s ruling as he views this "adding" of share within the terms of Article 1015 of
the Civil Code.
Art. 1015. Accretion is a right by virtue of which, when two or more persons
are called to the same inheritance, devise or legacy, the part assigned to the one
who renounces or cannot receive his share, or who died before the testator, is
added or incorporated to that of his coheirs, co-devisees, or co-legatees. [Emphases
supplied.]
In this regard, the CA said:
However, inasmuch as it is undisputed that Severino is no longer entitled to

any share of parcel 2 since he was already given a separate parcel of land x xx on
30 April 1959, his supposed share shall be added to those of Juana Endesa,
Victoriano, Cenon, Dorotea and Antero increasing their respective share to 1,300
square meters each, instead of 1,084 square meters. [Emphases and underscoring
supplied.]
A careful reading of this CA ruling would show that the share of Severino
was "added" to the shares of Juana, Victoriano, Cenon, Dorotea and Antero, not
pursuant to the provisions of Article 1015 of the Civil Code. The CA decision, for
one, did not use the term "accretion;" neither did it mention, in any of its portions,
Article 1015, or that the CA was adding Severino’s supposed share in accordance
with this article.
On the contrary, the CA added Severino’s share to those of the other heirs
because it recognized the fact that Severino has already received his share of the
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estate in 1959. Thus, rather than receiving an area of 1,084 square meters each, the
remaining five heirs of Ceferino – Juana, Cenon, Victoriano, Dorotea and Antero –
would each receive a total area of 1,300.9 square meters of Ceferino’s inheritance
in Parcel 2, as Severino was no longer entitled to share in its partition.
In effect, the CA simply provided for a clearer and detailed picture of how
this distributable portion of Parcel 2 should be computed and how its partition
should be effected.
Bernabe, Khristienne Rian C. Student Number 2017-101640
Article 1016

TORRES, special administrator, and LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO, vs.
MARGARITA LOPEZ
G.R. No. L-25966
November 1, 1926
STREET, J.
Facts:
Tomas Rodriguez executed his last will and testament declaring Vicente F. Lopez
and his daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno as the only and universal heir to all his
properties. Prior to the time of the execution of this will, the testator, Tomas
Rodriguez, had been judicially declared incapable of taking care of himself and
had been placed under the care of his cousin Vicente F. Lopez, as guardian. Only
four days after the will was made, Vicente F. Lopez died; and the testator, Tomas
Rodriguez, died thereafter. Margariat Lopez, a cousin and nearest relative of the
decedent, contested the will claiming that she is entitled to half of the estate by
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intestate estate. The will referred to, and after having been contested, has been
admitted to probate by judicial determination.
Issue:
Whether or not the property to be inherited by Vicente Lopez is accredited to Luz
Lopez de Bueno, who was the other heir called to the same inheritance
Ruling:
Yes, the property is accredited to Luz Lopez de Bueno.
No testamentary provision shall be valid when made by a ward in favor of his

guardian before the final accounts of the latter have been approved. This provision
is of undoubted application to the situation before us having the effect that Vicente
F. Lopez is incapacitated to inherit from his ward, Tomas Rodriguez. Due to this,
accretion will then take place.
It is there declared, in effect, that accretion take place in a testamentary

succession, first when the two or more persons are called to the same inheritance or
the same portion thereof without special designation of shares; and secondly, when
one of the persons so called dies before the testator or renounces the inheritance or
is disqualifying to receive it.
In the case before us we have a will calling Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter, Luz
Lopez de Bueno, to the same inheritance without special designation of shares. In
addition to this, one of the persons named as heir has predeceased the testator, this
person being also disqualified to receive the estate even if he had been alive at the
time of the testator's death. This article is therefore also of exact application to the
case in hand; and its effect is to give to the survivor, Luz Lopez de Bueno, not only
the undivided half which she would have received in conjunction with her father if
he had been alive and qualified to take, but also the half which pertained to him.
There was no error whatever, therefore, in the order of the trial court declaring Luz
Lopez de Bueno entitled to the whole estate.
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Article 1016
GIL P. POLICARPIO, ET ALvs. JOSE V. SALAMAT, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-21809
January 31, 1966
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.
Facts:
In a duly probated last will and testament of one Damasa Crisostomo, she gave the
naked ownership of a fishpond owned by her to her sister Teodorica de la Cruz
while its usufruct to the children of her cousins Antonio Perez, Patricia Vicente
and Canuto Lorenzo. The children of Antonio Perez, Patricia Vicente and Canuto
Lorenzo turned out to be fourteen. On the other hand, Teodorica de la Cruz, the
naked owner, bequeathed in her will all her rights to the fishpond to Jose V.
Salamat.
The fourteen usufructuaries leased the fishpond first to one Gil P. Policarpio who
used to give them proportionately the usufruct corresponding to them. During the
term of the lease, however, three of the usufructuaries, and so, upon their death,
both the naked owner and the remaining usufructuaries claimed the shares
corresponding to the deceased usufructuaries. Because of these conflicting claims,
the lessee withheld said amount.
Subsequently, the surviving usufructuaries leased the fishpond to one Batas Riego
de Dios who, after executing the contract of lease, came to know of the existing
conflicting claims, and not knowing to whom of the claimants the shares of the
deceased usufructuaries should be paid, said lessee was also constrained to
withhold the corresponding part of the usufruct of the property. The two lessees
then commenced an action for interpleader against both the naked owner and
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surviving usufructuaries to compel them to interplead and litigate their conflicting
claims.
Defendant Jose V. Salamat avers as special defense that he is the successor-in-

interest of Teodorica de la Cruz and as such he is entitled to the shares
corresponding to the three deceased usufructuaries inasmuch as the usufruct in
their favor was automatically extinguished by death and became merged with the
naked owner.
The surviving usufructuaries, on the other hand, adhere to the theory that since the
usufructuaries were instituted simultaneously by the late Damasa Crisostomo, the
death of the three usufructuaries did not extinguish the usufruct, hence, the
surviving usufructuaries are entitled to receive the shares corresponding to the
deceased usufructuaries, the usufruct to continue until the death of the last
usufructuary.
Issue:
Whether or not the eleven surviving usufructuaries of the fishpond in question are
the ones entitled to the fruits that would have corresponded to the three deceased
usufructuaries or the naked owner Jose V. Salamat.
Ruling:
It appears that there is accretion among usufructuaries who are constituted at the
same time when one of them dies before the end of the usufruct.
However, the only exception is if the usufruct is constituted in a last will and
testament and the testator makes a contrary provision. Here there is none. On the
contrary, the testatrix constituted the usufruct in favor of the children of her three
cousins with the particular injunction that they are the only ones to enjoy the same
as long as they live, from which it can be implied that, should any of them die, the
share of the latter shall accrue to the surviving ones. These provisions of the will
are clear. They do not admit of any other interpretation.
Wherefore, The eleven surviving usufructuaries are hereby declared to be entitled

to the shares of the three deceased usufructuaries and, hence, as a corollary,
appellees Gil P. Policarpio and Batas Riego de Dios are hereby ordered to pay to
them the money withheld by them respectively representing the shares of the
deceased usufructuaries.
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Michaela De Guzman Student No. 10-167474
Art 1017
Applicable
Ramon Del Rosario v. Clemente Del Rosario
G.R. No. 1027
May 19, 1903
Facts:
The ninth clause of the will of Doña Honorata is as follows:
"The testatrix bequeaths the sum of 3,000 pesos to her nephews Enrique
Gloria and Ramon del Rosario in equal parts — that is, 1,500 pesos each."
Don Enrique Gloria died before the testatrix.
Issue:
Whether or not Don Ramon is entitled to the other half of 3,000 pesos when
Enrique Gloria died by virtue of Right of Accretion
Ruling:
Yes, Don Ramon is entitled to the other half of 3,000 pesos
A legacy of a certain sum to two nephews in equal shares is payable in its

entirety to the survivor of them in case one dies before the testator. This is pursuant
to the provisions of articles 982 and 983 of the Civil Code
Applying this, Don Enrique died first before the Testatrix. Therefore, the
right of accretion exists as to the other half in favor of the plaintiff, Ramon, and he
is entitled to have it paid to him.
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Art 1017
Applicable
Torres vs Lopez
49 Phil 504
November 1, 1926
Facts:
On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez executed his last will and
testament, in the second clause of which he declared:
I institute as the only and universal heirs to all my property, my cousin

Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno.
On January 7, 1924, or only four days after the will above-mentioned was
made, Vicente F. Lopez died; and the testator, Tomas Rodriguez, died on
February 25, 1924, thereafter.
Margarita Lopez as the next kin of the deceased contended that there was
a partial intestacy with respect to the half of the estate which was intended for
Vicente F. Lopez, when he died first before the testator. This person being also
disqualified to receive the estate even if he had been alive at the time of the
testator's death pursuant to article 912 wherein it is declared, among other things,
that legal succession takes place if the heir dies before the testator and also when
the heir instituted is disqualified to succeed.
Issue: Whether or not there was a partial intestate or accretion
Ruling:
There was accretion.
In playing the provisions of the Code it is the duty of the court to

harmonize its provisions as far as possible, giving due effect to all; and in case of
conflict between two provisions the more general is to be considered as being
limited by the more specific. As between articles 912 and 983, it is obvious that
the former is the more general of the two, dealing, as it does, with the general
topic of intestate succession while the latter is more specific, defining the
particular conditions under which accretion takes place. In case of conflict,
therefore, the provisions of the former article must be considered limited by the
latter. Indeed, in subsection 3 of article 912 the provision with respect to intestate
succession is expressly subordinated to article 983 by the expression "and (if)
there is no right of accretion." It is true that the same express qualification is not
found in subsection 4 of article 912, yet it must be so understood, in view of the
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rule of interpretation above referred to, by which the more specific is held to
control the general. Besides, this interpretation supplies the only possible means
of harmonizing the two provisions. In addition to this, article 986 of the Civil
Code affords independent proof that intestate succession to a vacant portion can
only occur when accretion is impossible.
Applying it in this case, the co-heir get the share by accretion for intestacy
takes place only when accretion is not possible and accretion is possible in the
given case.
Accretion take place when one of two joint heirs called by will to an
inheritance without special designation of shares dies before the testator, the part
pertaining to such heir will, upon the subsequent death of the testator, go by
accretion to the coheir; and the additional circumstance that the predeceasing heir
was, at the time of the making of the will, disqualified to take, by reason of his
being then the legal guardian of the testator with accounts unsettled, does not
make a case for intestate succession as to his part of the estate.
Galita, Chloe Anne S. Student Number 2017-167510
Article 1018 (Applicable)

AMPARO S. CRUZ v. ANGELITO S. CRUZ
FACTS:
The present action involves a situation where one heir was able - through the
expedient of an extrajudicial settlement that was written in a language that is not
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understood by one of her co-heirs - to secure a share in the estate of her parents
that was greater than that of her siblings, in violation of the principle in succession
that heirs should inherit in equal shares.
Thus, Antonia - represented in this case by her surviving heirs - received two lots
as against her siblings, including respondent Concepcion, who respectively
received only one lot each in the subject 940 square-meter property. This she was
able to achieve through the subject 1986 deed of extrajudicial settlement - which
was written in English, a language that was not known to and understood by
Concepcion given that she finished only Grade 3 elementary education. With the
help of Amparo, Antonia was able to secure Concepcion's consent and signature
without the benefit of explaining the contents of the subject deed of extrajudicial
settlement. For this reason, Concepcion did not have adequate knowledge of the
contents and ramifications of the subject deed of extrajudicial settlement; she was
left unaware of the sharing arrangement contained therein, and realized it only
when Antonia attempted to subdivide the subject property in 1998, and the plan of
subdivision survey was shown to Concepcion- which revealed that Antonia
obtained two lots. Consequently, Concepcion filed Civil Case No. 1380-98 SM on
August 17, 1998.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the co-heirs were wrongfully deprived of their rightful share to the
estate of their parents;
HELD:
This is a simple case of exclusion in legal succession, where co-heirs were
effectively deprived of their rightful share to the estate of their parents who died
without a will - by virtue of a defective deed of extrajudicial settlement or partition
which granted a bigger share to one of the heirs and was prepared in such a way
that the other heirs would be effectively deprived of discovering and knowing its
contents.
While it is true that under the law, the children of the deceased shall always inherit
from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares, but in this
case, two of Concepcion's co-heirs renounced their shares in the subject property;
their shares therefore accrued to the remaining co-heirs, in equal shares as well.
Thus, in accordance with Article 1018,in legal succession, the share of the person
who repudiates the inheritance shall always accrue to his co-heirs.
~ 17 ~
Guilalas, Christian James S. Student Number 2017-167461
Article 1019

TORRES, special administrator, and LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO, heir vs.
MARGARITA LOPEZ
Facts: Tomas Rodriguez executed his last will and testament, in the second clause
of which he declared:
I institute as the only and universal heirs to all my property, my cousin

Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno.
Prior to the time of the execution of this will the testator, Tomas Rodriguez, had
been judicially declared incapable of taking care of himself and had been placed
under the care of his cousin Vicente F. Lopez, as guardian. On January 7, 1924, or
only four days after the will above-mentioned was made, Vicente F. Lopez died;
~ 18 ~
and the testator, Tomas Rodriguez, died on February 25, 1924, thereafter. At the
time the will was made Vicente F. Lopez had not presented his final accounts as
guardian, and no such accounts had been presented by him at the time of his death.
Margarita Lopez was a cousin and nearest relative of the decedent. The will
referred to, and after having been contested, has been admitted to probate by
judicial determination (Torres and Lopez de Bueno vs. Lopez, 48 Phil., 772).
The argument in favor of the appellant supposes that there has supervened a partial
intestacy with respect to the half of the estate which was intended for Vicente F.
Lopez and that this half has descended to the appellant, Margarita Lopez, as next
of kin and sole heir at law of the decedent. In this connection attention is directed
to article 764 of the Civil Code wherein it is declared, among other things, that a
will may be valid even though the person instituted as heir is disqualified to inherit.
Our attention is next invited to article 912 wherein it is declared, among other
things, that legal succession takes place if the heir dies before the testator and also
when the heir instituted is disqualified to succeed. Upon these provisions an
argument is planted conducting to the conclusion that the will of Tomas Rodriguez
was valid, notwithstanding the fact that one of the individuals named as heirs in the
will was disqualified to take, and that as a consequence Margarita Lopez is entitled
to inherit the share of said disqualified heir.
Issue: Whether or not there is a right of accretion in this case.
Ruling: Yes. There is a right of accretion here in favor of Luz Lopez De Bueno.
We now pass to article 982 of the Civil Code, defining the right of accretion. It is
there declared, in effect, that accretion take place in a testamentary succession, first
when the two or more persons are called to the same inheritance or the same
disqualifying to receive it. In the case before us we have a will calling Vicente F.
Lopez and his daughter, Luz Lopez de Bueno, to the same inheritance without
special designation of shares. In addition to this, one of the persons named as heir
has predeceased the testator, this person being also disqualified to receive the
estate even if he had been alive at the time of the testator's death. This article (982)
is therefore also of exact application to the case in hand; and its effect is to give to
the survivor, Luz Lopez de Bueno, not only the undivided half which she would
have received in conjunction with her father if he had been alive and qualified to
take, but also the half which pertained to him. There was no error whatever,
therefore, in the order of the trial court declaring Luz Lopez de Bueno entitled to
the whole estate.
As to the contention of Margarita, We are the opinion that this contention is

untenable and that the appellee clearly has the better right. In playing the
provisions of the Code it is the duty of the court to harmonize its provisions as far
as possible, giving due effect to all; and in case of conflict between two provisions
the more general is to be considered as being limited by the more specific. As
between articles 912 and 983, it is obvious that the former is the more general of
the two, dealing, as it does, with the general topic of intestate succession while the
~ 19 ~
latter is more specific, defining the particular conditions under which accretion
takes place. In case of conflict, therefore, the provisions of the former article must
be considered limited by the latter. Indeed, in subsection 3 of article 912 the
provision with respect to intestate succession is expressly subordinated to article
983 by the expression "and (if) there is no right of accretion." It is true that the
same express qualification is not found in subsection 4 of article 912, yet it must be
so understood, in view of the rule of interpretation above referred to, by which the
more specific is held to control the general. Besides, this interpretation supplies the
only possible means of harmonizing the two provisions. In addition to this, article
986 of the Civil Code affords independent proof that intestate succession to a
vacant portion can only occur when accretion is impossible.
Article 1019
Ynza vs. Rodriguez
Facts: Dionisio Ynza, of Spanish descent, single, and a resident of Iloilo City, died
on September 3, 1932, leaving a will. He left extensive properties, real and
personal, in the City of Iloilo and in the Province of Negros Occidental.
In the month of December, 1932, about three months after the death of the testator
and after the will was probated, one of the children and legatees, Maria Cristina
Ynza who was then residing in Spain, came to the Philippines with her husband.
Inasmuch as she wanted to keep her residence in Spain, she decided to sell as in
fact she sold her share of one-third of all the estates of Dionisio Ynza, to her co-
legatees Julia Ynza and Jose Ynza, for the sum of P118,000, thereby leaving Jose
and Julia sole co-owners of said estates. A project of partition (Exhibit B) was
submitted by Jose Ynza as administrator and it was approved by the court on
January 14, 1933 (Exhibit D).
On April 24, 1934, Jose Ynza sold to his co-legatee and co-owner Julia his one-
half share of the estate situated in the City of Iloilo as a result of which, he
remained half co-owner only of the properties situated in Negros Occidental. said
will Julia left all her properties, real and personal, in the City of Iloilo to the Sisters
Sofia Staub and Claudia Staub with a proviso that they have under their care her
protegee Carmen Danuya, and that upon her attaining majority she be given the
sum of P5,000 by the executor. Her properties situated in Negros Occidental were
disposed of.
Julia Ynza died without issue in Iloilo on November 22, 1949, leaving a will
~ 20 ~
That plaintiff Jose Ynza instated an action Abrasia, to declare himself absolute
owner of all the properties left by Julia Ynza including their products, by virtue of
the right of accretion established in the conditional legacy by Dionisio Ynza under
paragraph 5 of his will
Issue: whether or not there is proportional sharing of property received by

accretion
Ruling: None. There is no proportional sharing of property received by accretion.
It may not be considered as accretion as apparently contemplated by the testator by

his employment of the word "accrecera." Under the old Civil Code, Article 982
thereof, there is right of accretion in testamentary succession when two or more
persons are called to the same inheritance or to the same portion thereof without
special designation of parts, and one of the persons so called die before the testator
or renounces the inheritance or be incapable of receiving it. In the present case, the
three persons called to the inheritance, namely, Jose, Julia, and Maria Cristina,
survived the testator. However, the condition imposed in paragraph 5 of the will of
Dionisio Ynza might possibly be regarded as a charge or trust limiting the
ownership and disposition of the 1/3 portion allotted to — each of the legatees. The
intention of the testator might have been as contended by plaintiff-appellant to
prevent the property from going into the hands of strangers and at the same time
giving a right to the surviving legatee or legatees the right to receive intact the one-
third portion of the legatee who dies without issue. This right may naturally be
renounced or waived by any of the legatees who stand to benefit by it.
~ 21 ~
Manalastas, Jiathron O. Student Number 2017-116749
Article 1020
Torres and Lopez de Bueno vs. Lopez
Facts: The facts necessary to an understanding of the case are these: On January 3,
1924, Tomas Rodriguez executed his last will and testament, in the second clause
of which he declared:
"I institute as the only and universal heirs to all my property, my cousin Vicente F.
Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno."
and the testator, Tomas Rodriguez, died on February 25, 1924, thereafter.
The argument in favor of the appellant supposes that there has supervened a partial
intestacy with respect to the half of the estate which was intended for Vicente F.
Lopez and that this half has descended to the appellant, Margarita Lopez, as next
of kin and sole heir at law of the decedent.
Issue: Whether or not Luz de Bueno will succeed to the inheritance of his co-heir
Held: Yes.
When one of two joint heirs called by will to an inheritance without special
designation of shares dies before the testator, the part pertaining to such heir will,
upon the subsequent death of the testator, go by accretion to the coheir; and the
additional circumstance that the predeceasing heir was, at the time of the making
of the will, disqualified to take, by reason of his being then the legal guardian of
the testator with accounts unsettled, does not make a case for intestate succession
as to his part of the estate.

~ 22 ~
Article 1020
Cruz vs. Cruz
Facts: In an Amended Complaintrespondents Angelito S. Cruz, Concepcion S.

Cruz (Concepcion), and Serafin S. Cruz alleged that they — together with their
siblings, petitioner Amparo S. Cruz (Amparo) and Antonia Cruz (Antonia) —
inherited a 940-square-meter parcel of land (the subject property) from their late
parents, spouses Felix and Felisa Cruz, which land was covered by Original
Certificate of Title No.
ON-658, that on July 31, 1986, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial
settlement of estate covering the subject property, on the agreement that each heir
was to receive an equal portion of the subject property as mandated by law; that in
1998, when the subject property was being subdivided and the subdivision survey
plan was shown to respondents, they discovered that Antonia was allocated two
lots, as against one (1) each for the respondents.
That Antonia’s allocation of two lots contravened the agreement among the heirs
that they would receive equal shares in the subject property; that Amparo and
Antonia were able to perpetrate the fraud by inducing Concepcion — who was
illiterate — to sign the deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate, which was written
in the English language, without previously reading and explaining the contents
thereof to the latter;
That Amparo and Antonia fraudulently took advantage of Concepcion’s ignorance

and mental weakness, deceiving and cajoling her into signing the deed of
extrajudicial settlement, to her damage and injury; and that Antonia passed away,
but left as her heirs herein petitioners Ernesto Halili, Alicia H. Florencio, Donald
Halili, Editha H. Rivera, Ernesto Halili, Jr. and JulitoHalili
In their Answer, petitioners prayed for dismissal, claiming that the July 31, 1986
deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate had been voluntarily and freely executed
by the parties, free from vitiated consent; that respondents’ cause of action has
prescribed; that the complaint failed to state a cause of action; and that no earnest
efforts toward compromise have been made.
Issue: Whether or not the action for annulment of the extrajudicial settlement of
estate has prescribed
~ 23 ~
Held: No. The deed of extrajudicial partition in the case at bar being invalid, the
action to have it annulled does not prescribe.
The present action involves a situation where one heir was able — through the
understood by one of her coheirs — to secure a share in the estate of her parents
This she was able to achieve through the subject 1986 deed of extrajudicial
settlement — which was written in English, a language that was not known to and
understood by Concepcion given that she finished only Grade 3 elementary
education.
For this reason, Concepcion did not have adequate knowledge of the contents and
ramifications of the subject deed of extrajudicial settlement
Under the law, “[t]he children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in
their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.”—Under the law, “[t]he
children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing
the inheritance in equal shares.” In this case, two of Concepcion’s coheirs
renounced their shares in the subject property; their shares therefore accrued to the
remaining coheirs, in equal shares as well.
Article 1020. The heirs to whom the inheritance accrues shall succeed to

all the rights and obligations which the heir who renounced or could not receive it
would have had.
Toni Cassandra B. Santos Student Number 2017-167463
ARTICLE 1021 (FOR)
TORRES V. LOPEZ
G.R. No. L-25966
November 1, 1926
FACTS:
~ 24 ~
This appeal involves a controversy over one-half of the estate of Tomas
Rodriguez, decedent. The appellant, Margarita Lopez, claims said half by the
intestate succession as next of kin and nearest heir; while the appellee, Luz Lopez
de Bueno, claims the same by accretion and in the character of universal heir the
will of the decedent.
Tomas Rodriguez executed his last will and testament. Prior to the time of the
execution of this will the testator, Tomas, had been judicially declared incapable of
taking care of himself and had been placed under the care of his cousin Vicente F.
Lopez, as guardian. Subsequently Vicente and Tomas. Margarita Lopez was a
cousin and nearest relative of the decedent. The will referred to, and after having
been contested, has been admitted to probate by judicial determination.
Appellant supposes that there has supervened a partial intestacy with respect to the
half of the estate which was intended for Vicente and that this half has descended
to the appellant, Margarita Lopez, as next of kin and sole heir at law of the
decedent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Luz Lopez de Bueno has a right over the one-half of the
estate of Tomas Rodriguez by virtue of accretion
RULING:
Yes. Article 982 of the Civil Code defines the right of accretion. It is there
declared, in effect, that accretion take place in a testamentary succession, first
when the two or more persons are called to the same inheritance or the same
disqualifying to receive it.
In the case at bar, the Court have a will calling Vicente and his daughter, Luz
Lopez de Bueno, to the same inheritance without special designation of shares. In
addition to this, one of the persons named as heir has predeceased the testator, this
person being also disqualified to receive the estate even if he had been alive at the
time of the testator's death. This article (982) is therefore also of exact application
to the case in hand; and its effect is to give to the survivor, Luz Lopez de Bueno,
not only the undivided half which she would have received in conjunction with her
father if he had been alive and qualified to take, but also the half which pertained
to him. There was no error whatever, therefore, in the order of the trial court
declaring Luz Lopez de Bueno entitled to the whole estate.
~ 25 ~
The case cannot be made to turn upon so refined an interpretation of the language
of the Code, and at any rate the disability to which Vicente was subject was not a
general disability to succeed but an accidental incapacity to receive the legacy, a
consideration which makes a case for accretion rather than for intestate succession.
~ 26 ~
ARTICLE 1021 (AGAINST)
BELEN V. BPI
G.R. No. L-14474
October 31, 1960
FACTS:
When Benigno Diaz died, the codicil and together with his will was
admitted to probate. The proceedings for the administration of the estate of
Benigno Diaz were closed in 1950 and the estate was thereafter put under the
administration of the appellee Bank of the Philippine Islands, as trustee for the
benefit of the legatees.
Filomena Diaz died leaving two legitimate children. Onesima filed a petition
in special proceedings, contending that the amount that would have appertained to
Filomena under the codicil should now be divided (equally) only between herself
and Milagros, as the surviving children of the said deceased, to the exclusion, in
other words, of the seven (7) legitimate children of Milagros to which the court
denied.
Onesima has appealed to this Court, insisting that that the term
"susdescendeinteslegitimos," as used in the codicil, should be interpreted to mean
descendants nearest in the degree to the original legatee Filomena. In the present
case, her two daughters, Milagros and Onesima.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the "susdescendienteslegitimos" refer to the descendants

nearest in degree
RULING:
No. It is suggested that "descendienteslegitimos" could mean the nearest

descendant but with the right of representation in favor of the more distant
relatives. Unquestionably, the testator was at liberty to provide a series of
successive substitutions in the order of proximity of relationship to the original
legatee. And he, likewise, was free to ordain that the more distant descendants
should enjoy the right of representation as in intestate succession. But to arrive at
such conclusion, the Court must declare that the testator had:
~ 27 ~
a) Rejected, or intended to reject, the right of accretion among co-heirs and co-
legatees, as established for testamentary successions by Articles 1016 (old Art.
982) and intended to replace such accretion with representation;
ART. 1016. In order that the right of accretion may take place in a testamentary
succession, it shall be necessary:
(1) That two or more persons be called to the same inheritance, or to the same
portion thereof, pro indiviso; and
(2) That one of the persons thus called die before the testator or renounce the
inheritance, or be incapacitated to receive it.
XXX
(c) Rejected finally the rule of Article 1022 (old Art. 986), that vacancies in the
free part should be filed according to the rules of accretion or substitution (not
representation); and in default of these two, ultimately inherited by the testator's
own heirs intestate:
ART. 1022. In testamentary succession, when the right of accretion does not take
place, the vacant portion of the instituted heirs, if no substitute has been
designated, shall pass to the legal heirs of the testator, who shall receive it with the
same charges and obligations.
There is no doubt that, the testator's intention being the cardinal rule of succession
in the absence of compulsory (forced) heirs, he could have rendered inoperative all
the articles mentioned, if he had so desired. But without any other supporting
circumstances, we deem expression "o a susdesecendienteslegitimos," the testator
Benigno Diaz did intend to circumvent all the legal provisions heretofore quoted. It
was incumbent upon appellant to prove such intention on the part of the testator;
yet she has not done so.
The Court conclude that in the absence of other indications of contrary intent, the
proper rule to apply in the instant case is that the testator, by designating a class or
group of legatees, intended all members thereof to succeed per capita, in
consonance with article 846. So that the original legacy to Filomena Diaz should
be equally divided among her surviving children and grandchidren.
Torculas, Joyce Liezel Q. Student Number 2017-167495
ARTICLE 1022
In testamentary succession, when the right of accretion does not take place, the
vacant portion of the instituted heirs, if no substitute has been designated, shall
pass to the legal heirs of the testator, who shall receive it with the same charges
and obligations. (986)
~ 28 ~
APPLICABLE:
PARISH PRIEST OF VICTORIA TARLAC vs. RIGOR
G.R. No. L-22036; April 30, 1979
FACTS:
Father Rigor Pascual, a native of Victoria Tarlac, left a will with named
devisees constituting his nearest relatives, his three (3) sisters namely, Florencia
Rigor-Escobar, Belina Rigor-Manaloto and Nestora Rigor-Quiambao, as well as
his cousin, FortunatoGamalinda. In addition, he devised the 44-hectares of riclnd
in favor of anyone of his nearest male relatives who shall take the priesthood.
The lower court, in its order, approved the project partition, directed that that
after payment of all obligations of the estate, the administrator should deliver to the
devisees their respective shares. During the administration of the estate, no nephew
claimed the devise, therefore the testate proceeding remained pending.
Subsequently, about 13 years after the approval of the project of partition, the
parish priest of Victoria filed a petition for the delivery of the riceland to the
church as trustee. The intestate heirs of Fr. Rigor countered that the bequest be
declared inoperative and that they be adjudged as the person entitled to the said
riceland since no nearest male relative of the testator has ever studied for the
priesthood.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property shall pass to the legal hiers of the
testator.
RULING:
Yes. The subject property, specifically the riceland shall pass to the legal
heirs of the testator.
This case is covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article 960
(2), which provides that legal succession takes place when the will "does not
dispose of all that belongs to the testator." There being no substitution nor
accretion as to the said ricelands the same should be distributed among the
testator's legal heirs.
~ 29 ~
In the case at bar, when the testator died, his nearest leagal heirs were his
three sisters or second-degree relatives, Mrs. Escobar, Mrs. Manaloto and Mrs.
Quiambao. Hence, the subject property shall be designated to the testator’s three
sisters.
~ 30 ~
Article 1022
APPLICABLE:
TORRES AND LOPEZ DE BUENO VS. LOPEZ
G.R. NO. 25966. NOVEMBER 1, 1926
FACTS:
On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez executed his last will and testament, in
the second clause of which he declared: "I institute as the only and universal heirs
to all my property, my cousin Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez de
Bueno."
and the testator, Tomas Rodriguez, died on February 25, 1924, thereafter. At the
time the will was made Vicente F. Lopez had not presented his final accounts as
guardian, and no such accounts had been presented by him at the time of his death.
Margarita Lopez was a cousin and nearest relative of the decedent. The will
referred to, after having been contested, has been admitted to probate by judicial
determination.
The appellant, Margarita Lopez, claims said half by intestate succession as next
of kin and nearest heir; while the appellee, Luz Lopez de Bueno, claims the same
by accretion and in the character of universal heir under the will of the decedent.
ISSUE:
Whether Margarita Lopez being considered as the nearest heir, has the right
to succeed the undivided half of the inheritance left by the deceased Vicente
Lopez.
RULING:
No. Margarita Lopez has no right to succeed the undivided half of the
inheritance.
It is there declared, in effect, that accretion takes place in a testamentary

succession, first, when two or more persons are called to the same inheritance or
~ 31 ~
the same portion thereof without special designation of shares; and, secondly,
when one of the persons so called dies before the testator or renounces the
inheritance or is disqualified to receive it. In the case before us we have a will
calling Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter, Luz Lopez de Bueno, to the same
inheritance without special designation of shares.
In addition to this, one of the persons named as heir has predeceased the
testator, this person being also disqualified to receive the estate even if he had been
alive at the time of the testator's death. This article (982) is therefore also of exact
application to the case in hand; and its effect is to give to the survivor, Luz Lopez
de Bueno, not only the undivided half which she would have received in
conjunction with her father if he had been alive and qualified to take, but also the
half which pertained to him. There was no error whatever, therefore, in the order of
the trial court declaring Luz Lopez de Bueno entitled to the whole estate.
Furthermore, 986 of the Old Civil Code affords independent proof that intestate
succession to a vacant portion can only occur when accretion is impossible.
Urian, Joseph Andrew D. Student Number 2017-167754

Article 1023
POSITIVE
MATILDE ARAMBURU vsANGEL ORTIZ
G.R. No. L-5398 January 7, 1910
~ 32 ~
FACTS:
The counsel for MatildeAramburu presented a complaint against Angel

Ortiz, and against the heirs of the late CeferinoAramburufor the recovery of certain
money, judgment was rendered sentencing the defendants, Ceferino, Josefa,
Matilde, Adelaida, Leonor, Encarnacion, Angel, Jose, Carmen, Alfredo, and Julia,
all bearing the surname of Aramburu, as heirs of said deceased, to pay to the
plaintiff Ortiz the sum of P262,628.19 with the agreed interest of 8 per cent from
the 1st of July, 1903, until full payment was made.
The court orders the said eleven defendant heirs to pay the plaintiff the sum
of P345,193.31 and the agreed interest thereon at the rate of 8 per cent from the 1st
of July, 1903, until its payment is completed, and to pay costs of the proceedings;
provided, however, that the five last-named defendant minors, Angel, Jose,
Carmen, Alfredo, and Julia Aramburu, shall only be obligated to pay said money
and interests to the extent of the property that they respectively inherited from their
father.
MatildeAramburu, was sentenced to pay Ortiz the sum of P31,381.21, with

interest at the rate of 8 per cent from the 1st of July, 1903, until full payment is
made, this being one-eleventh part of the aforesaid sum of P345,193.31, and for the
purposes of execution of the said judgment, private property of MatildeAramburu
to the value of P57,031.83 was sold, the sum of P8,331.75 in cash was withdrawn
from the Hongkong Bank, and both these amounts were applied to the payment of
said judgment, with the exception of P54.66 that was withheld for sheriff's fees.
It is seen that MatildeAramburu has paid Angel Ortiz by reason of said

judgment P65,308.92. As the eleventh part corresponding to MatildeAramburu
only amounted to P31,381.21, plus interest thereon from the 1st of July, 1903, until
the time of payment, it appears that the creditor Ortiz received, and that
MatildeAramburu paid an excess of P25,561.95.
Ortiz refuses to return the same in spite of the demands made upon him for
the reason that the plaintiff prayed that judgment be entered against the defendant
Ortiz, sentencing him to refund to the plaintiff the sum of P25,561.95, with the
legal interest, since the date of the filing of the complaint, and the costs.
The eleven defendants assumed the title and quality of heirs of the late
Aramburu, and in all their business transactions, as they had with Ortiz,
which acts necessarily imply willingness to accept the inheritance, and
constitute the tacit acceptance defined by article 999 of the Civil Code; an
acceptance which is pure and simple on the part of the heirs who are of age,
and which, according to paragraph 2 of article 992, must be understood as
made under benefit of inventory on the part of those who are minors.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs are liable to the acknowledged debt.
~ 33 ~
RULING:
Yes, according to article 1003 of the code they thereupon became liable for
all the charges of said inheritance not only with the inherited property but also with
their own
The obligation of heirs who accept an inheritance encumbered by debts does

not arise from the contracts, but from the law which has established the right to
inherit, and has declared that the obligation to pay an hereditary indebtedness is in
solidum, as whatever may have been the form in which they accepted the
inheritance, and, according to the form of such acceptance, the extent of their
respective liability would differ.
But the creditor is entitled to claim the entire amount of his credit from any
one of the heirs who accepted the inheritance without benefit of inventory, and also
from any of the others who received the same with benefit to the extent of their
hereditary portion. (Arts. 988, 998, 1003, 1010, 1023, Civil Code.)
In view of the foregoing, and considering that the judgment appealed from is
in accordance with the law, it is our opinion that the same should be and it is
hereby affirmed with the costs against the petitioner.
~ 34 ~
Article 1023
NEGATIVE
Gil Policarpiovs Jose Salamat
G.R. No. L-21809
FACTS:
In a duly probated last will and testament of Damasa Crisostomo, she gave
the naked ownership of a fishpond owned by her, to her sister Teodorica de la Cruz
while its usufruct to the children of her cousins Antonio Perez, Patricia Vicente
and Canuto Lorenzo. The fishpond is situated at Hagonoy, Bulacan.
The Children of Antonio Perez, Vicente and Canuto Lorenzo turned out to
be 14. The usufructuaries lease the fishpond to Policarpio. As the days go by, some
of the usufructuaries died and Jose Salamat became the naked owner. Salamat
claims for the share from the said usufructuaries.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Salamat has the right to claim for profits from the fishpond.
RULING:
No, he possesses no right. The said usufructuaries are declared to be entitled
to the shares of the three deceased usufructuaries and, as a corollary, appellees Gil
Policarpio and Batas Riego de Dios are ordered to pay to them the money withheld
by them respectively representing the shares of the deceased usufructuaries.
There is accretion among usufructuaries who are constituted at the same time when
one of them dies before the end of the usufruct.
Article 1041
Not Applicable
~ 35 ~
AMPARO S. CRUZ; ERNESTO HALILI; ALICIA H. FLORENCIO;
DONALD HALILI; EDITHA H. RIVERA; ERNESTO HALILI, JR.; AND
JULITO HALILI, Petitioners, v.ANGELITO S. CRUZ, CONCEPCION S.
CRUZ, SERAFIN S. CRUZ, AND VICENTE S.
G.R. No. 211153, February 28, 2018
Facts:
Angelito S. Cruz, Concepcion S. Cruz and Serafin S. Cruz alleged that they -
together with their siblings, petitioner Amparo S. Cruz and Antonia Cruz inherited
a 940-square-meter parcel of land from their late parents, spouses Felix and Felisa
Cruz, which land was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. ON-658, that on
July 31, 1986, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate
covering the subject property, on the agreement that each heir was to receive an
equal portion of the subject property as mandated by law; that in 1998, when the
subject property was being subdivided and the subdivision survey plan was shown
to respondents, they discovered that Antonia was allocated two lots, as against one
(1) each for the respondents; that Antonia's allocation of two lots contravened the
agreement among the heirs that they would receive equal shares in the subject
property; that Amparo and Antonia were able to perpetrate the fraud by inducing
Concepcion - who was illiterate - to sign the deed of extrajudicial settlement of
estate, which was written in the English language, without previously reading and
explaining the contents thereof to the latter; that Amparo and Antonia fraudulently
took advantage of Concepcion's ignorance and mental weakness, deceiving and
cajoling her into signing the deed of extrajudicial settlement, to her damage and
injury; and that Antonia passed away, but left as her heirs herein petitioners
Ernesto Halili, Alicia H. Florencio, Donald Halili, Editha H. Rivera, Ernesto Halili,
Jr. and JulitoHalili, who are in possession of the two lots allocated to Antonia.
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dismissing the case, the the fraud
as basis of the Complaint, is not delineated therein with particularity. Under Sec. 5
Rule 8, fraud must be alleged specifically, not generally. Nonetheless, apart from
such allegations, no clear and convincing evidence was presented by plaintiffs. For
one, while plaintiff Concepcion Cruz. Enriquez is admittedly only grade 3 and
could hardly understand English as what is written in the extra-judicial settlement
which was not even allegedly fully explained to her, it appears that she can
absolutely read and write, and understand English albeit not fully. And as she is
deeply interested in her inheritance share, she is aware of the import and
consequences of what she executed and signed. For the past 10 years, there is no
way she could feign ignorance of the alleged fraud and make passive reactions or
complaint thereof. Being adversely interested in the property, her apprehensions
were purely in the state of her mind, if not unilateral and afterthought.
The CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. The essence of consent is the
agreement of the parties on the terms of the contract, the acceptance by one of the
offer made by the other. It is the concurrence of the minds of the parties on the
object and the cause which constitutes the contract. The area of agreement must
extend to all points that the parties deem material or there is no consent at all.
~ 36 ~
To be valid, consent must meet the following requisites: (a) it should be
intelligent, or with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (b) it should be
free; and (c) it should be spontaneous. Intelligence in consent is vitiated by error;
freedom by violence, intimidation or undue influence; and spontaneity by fraud.
Here, appellant Concepcion clearly denied any knowledge of the import and
implication of the subject document she signed, the subject extra-judicial
settlement. She asserted that she does not understand English, the language in
which the terms of the subject document she signed was written. To quote a part of
her testimony, translated in English, as follows:
Issue:
Whether or not the repudiation of concepcion in the extra-judicial settlement

of his inheritance in the estate of their parents was his free and voluntary act.
Ruling:
No, the extra-judicial settelement was void because the consent of

concepcion was obtain through fraud.
The present action involves a situation where one heir was able - through the
understood by one of her co-heirs - to secure a share in the estate of her parents
Thus, Antonia - represented in this case by her surviving heirs - received two
lots as against her siblings, including respondent Concepcion, who respectively
received only one lot each in the subject 940 square-meter property. This she was
able to achieve through the subject 1986 deed of extrajudicial settlement - which
was written in English, a language that was not known to and understood by
Concepcion given that she finished only Grade 3 elementary education. With the
help of Amparo, Antonia was able to secure Concepcion's consent and signature
without the benefit of explaining the contents of the subject deed of extrajudicial
settlement. For this reason, Concepcion did not have adequate knowledge of the
contents and ramifications of the subject deed of extrajudicial settlement; she was
left unaware of the sharing arrangement contained therein, and realized it only
when Antonia attempted to subdivide the subject property in 1998, and the plan of
subdivision survey was shown to Concepcion- which revealed that Antonia
obtained two lots. Consequently, Concepcion filed Civil Case No. 1380-98 SM on
August 17, 1998.
In short, this is a simple case of exclusion in legal succession, where co-

heirs were effectively deprived of their rightful share to the estate of their parents
who died without a will - by virtue of a defective deed of extrajudicial settlement
or partition which granted a bigger share to one of the heirs and was prepared in
~ 37 ~
such a way that the other heirs would be effectively deprived of discovering and
knowing its contents.
Article 1042
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO, vs.

BORROMEO
G.R. No. L-41171
July 23, 1987
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
Facts:
Vito Borromeo died without forced heirs but leaving extensive properties.
The testate proceedings of the forged will supposedly signed by Vito was
converted into an intestate proceedings and several parties came before the court
filing claims or petitions alleging themselves as heirs of the intestate estate of Vito
Borromeo. The trial court then issued an order declaring the following, to the
exclusion of all others, as the intestate heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo,
namely, Jose Cuenco Borromeo, Judge Crispin Borromeo, Vitaliana Borromeo,
Patrocinio Borromeo Herrera, Salud Borromeo, Asuncion Borromeo, Marcial
Borromeo, Amelinda Borromeo de Talam, and the heirs of Canuto Borromeo. The
court also ordered that the assets of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo shall be
divided into 4/9 and 5/9 groups and distributed in equal and equitable shares
among the 9 abovenamed declared intestate heirs.
~ 38 ~
Respondent Fortunato Borromeo, who had earlier claimed as heir under the forged
will, filed a motion praying that he be declared as one of the heirs of the deceased
Vito Borromeo, alleging that he is an illegitimate son of the deceased and is
entitled to receive a legitime like all other forced heirs.
Fortunato Borromeo asserted and incorporated a Waiver of Hereditary Rights

supposedly signed by Pilar N. Borromeo, Maria B. Putong, Jose Borromeo, Canuto
V. Borromeo, Jr., Salud Borromeo, Patrocinio Borromeo-Herrera, Marcial
Borromeo, Asuncion Borromeo, Federico V. Borromeo, Consuelo B. Morales,
Remedios Alfonso and Amelinda B. Talam In the waiver, five of the nine heirs
relinquished to Fortunato their shares in the disputed estate. After due hearing, the
trial court concluding that the five declared heirs who signed the waiver agreement
assigning their hereditary rights to Fortunato Borromeo had lost the same rights,
declared the latter as entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo.
Petitioner now seeks to annul and set aside the trial court's declaring respondent
Fortunato Borromeo entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo. It is further
argued by the petitioner that the document entitled " waiver of Hereditary Rights"
aside from having been cancelled and revoked by Tomas L. Borromeo, Fortunato
Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo, is without force and effect because there can be
no effective waiver of hereditary rights before there has been a valid acceptance of
the inheritance the heirs intend to transfer.
Respondent Fortunato Borromeo on the other hand, contends that there is no need
for a person to be first declared as heir before he can accept or repudiate an
inheritance. What is required is that he must first be certain of the death of the
person from whom he is to inherit and that he must be certain of his right to the
inheritance. He points out that at the time of the signing of the waiver document,
the signatories to the waiver document were certain that Vito Borromeo was
already dead as well as of their rights to the inheritance as shown in the waiver
document itself.
Issue:
Whether or not acceptance or repudiation retroacts to the moment of the death of

the decedent
Ruling:
Yes, it does.
The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is that "the properties

included in an existing inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to third
persons with respect to the heirs, who by fiction of law continue the personality of
the former. Nor do such properties have the character of future property, because
the heirs acquire a right to succession from the moment of the death of the
deceased, by principle established, the heirs succeed the deceased by the mere fact
of death.
~ 39 ~
More or less, time may elapse from the moment of the death of the deceased until
the heirs enter into possession of the hereditary property, but the acceptance in any
event retroacts to the moment of the death, in accordance with article 989 of the
Civil Code. The right is vested, although conditioned upon the adjudication of the
corresponding hereditary portion." The heirs, therefore, could waive their
hereditary rights in 1967 even if the order to partition the estate was issued only in
1969.
In this case, however, the purported "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" cannot be

considered to be effective even if acceptance or repudiation retroacts to the
moment of the death of the decedent. The circumstances of this case show that the
signatories to the waiver document did not have the clear and convincing intention
to relinquish their rights.
~ 40 ~
Article 1042
MARIANO RAMOS vs. EUGENIO MARQUEZ

G.R. No. L-4242
April 1, 1908
TORRES, J.
Facts:
Angelina Marquez died and her will was declared void as it could not be legalized
in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Eugenio
Marquez, on behalf of his son Delfin Marquez, filed an application for the
administration and partition of the estate of the said Angelina Marquez, mother of
Mariano Ramos, alleging that Delfin is a son had by him with his wife Florentina
Austria, who in turn is the daughter of Maria Ramos, sister of Mariano Ramos, and
that both the latter were the children of the aforesaid Angelina Marquez; Delfin,
the aforesaid son of the petitioner, died on the 13th of February of said year.
Mariano Ramos objected to the estate of his mother being divided for the reason
that Eugenio Marquez was not an heir of the latter.
At the hearing the judge below rendered judgment, declaring that the property,
rights, and actions left by the late Angelina Marquez should be divided in two
equal parts, one in favor of her son, Mariano Ramos, as heir under the law and his
own right, and the remaining half to Eugenio Marquez as the sole heir of his
deceased son, Delfin Marquez, who in his turn was the heir to the other half of the
said property, rights, and actions of Angelina Marquez as the representative of his
late mother and grandmother, Florentina Austria and Maria Ramos.
Issue:
Whether Eugenio Marquez, as the legitimate father and sole heir of his deceased
minor child, Delfin Marquez, is entitled to inherit in conjunction with the
granduncle of his late son, Mariano Ramos, from the great-mother of his said son,
Angelina Marquez, Mariano's mother
Ruling:
Yes, Eugenio marquez is entitled to inherit.
~ 41 ~
Delfin Marquez having died while still a minor without having accepted or
repudiated the inheritance of his said great-grandmother, the right thereto was
transferred by action of the law, from the very moment of his death, to his father,
Eugenio Marquez, with the consequent effects retroactive to the moment of the
death of Angelina Marquez; therefore, upon Eugenio Marquez claiming the share
of the inheritance that should have pertained to his son, if living, he exercised a
right which belonged to him and in which the law protects him, as stated by the
court below in its judgment.
~ 42 ~
Art 1043
Applicable
De Vera Certeza vs. Villadolid
55 OG 3857
December 18, 1958
Facts:
Patricio Bailon, executed on December 31, 1924 a last will and testament
wherein it is declared that he and his wife has no forced heir. He instituted his
wife, Tomasa Raqueno Bautista, as the sole heir of his estate and appointing her as
his executrix.
On April 2, 1945 Patrio Bailon died. Special proceeding for the probate of
the last will and testament was commenced by his wife, Tomasa. However about
three months before the final distribution of the estate Tomasa died. Her death was
never reported in the testate proceeding.
The administrator of Patricio delivered to the heir of Tomasa the estate.
However it was opposed by Villadolid, the alleged illegitimate son of Patricio.
Villadolid contended that Tomasa died before she was declared by the court as the
heir of the estate and that she had never before expressed her acceptance of the
inheritance. For these reasons, Tomasa had not acquired right to the estate of the
deceased.
Issue: Whether or not Tomasa had acquired right to the inheritance even if she had
not expressed his acceptance
Ruling:
Yes, Tomasa had acquired right to the inheritance even if she had not
expressed his acceptance.
The condition required under Art. 1043 of the Civil Code which is
reproduced from Art. 991 of the former Civil code are: The heir must be certain of
(1) the death of the decedent and (2) his right to the inheritance.
The death of Patricio Bailon is established. There can be no question, as to
the right of Tomasa to inherit the estate of the deceased because she was
designated in the last will and testament as the sole heir to the estate.
Hence, the conditions required under Art 1043 are present.

Art 1043
Not Applicable
~ 43 ~
Intestate Estate of the Late Vito Borromeo v. Borromeo
G.R. No. L-55000,
July 23, 1987.
FACTS:
Fortunato claimed a portion of the legitimes being an illegitimate son of the

deceased. He presented the Waiver of Hereditary Rights supposedly signed by the
rest of the Borromeo’s. In the waiver of the 9 heirs relinquished to Fortunato their
shares in the disputed estate.
Petitioner argued that the document entitled " Waiver of Hereditary Rights"
executed on July 31, 1967, aside from having been cancelled and revoked on June
29, 1968, by Tomas L. Borromeo, Fortunato Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo, is
without force and effect because there can be no effective waiver of hereditary
rights before there has been a valid acceptance of the inheritance the heirs intend to
transfer. Pursuant to Article 1043 of the Civil Code, to make acceptance or
repudiation of inheritance valid, the person must be certain of the death of the one
from whom he is to inherit and of his right to the inheritance. Since the petitioner
and her co-heirs were not certain of their right to the inheritance until they were
declared heirs, their rights were, therefore, uncertain.
This view, according to the petitioner, is also supported by Article 1057 of

the same Code which directs heirs, devicees, and legatees to signify their
acceptance or repudiation within thirty days after the court has issued an order for
the distribution of the estate.
Respondent Fortunato Borromeo on the other hand, contends that under

Article 1043 of the Civil Code there is no need for a person to be first declared as
heir before he can accept or repudiate an inheritance. What is required is that he
must first be certain of the death of the person from whom he is to inherit and that
he must be certain of his right to the inheritance. He points out that at the time of
the signing of the waiver document on July 31, 1967, the signatories to the waiver
document were certain that Vito Borromeo was already dead as well as of their
rights to the inheritance as shown in the waiver document itself.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is Waiver of Hereditary Rights
RULING
~ 44 ~
The circumstances of this case show that the signatories to the waiver
document did not have the clear and convincing intention to relinquish their rights,
Thus: (1) On October 27, 1967. Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo filed a
pleading entitled "Compliance" wherein they submitted a proposal for the amicable
settlement of the case. In that Compliance, they proposed to concede to all the
eight (8) intestate heirs of Vito Borromeo all properties, personal and real,
including all cash and sums of money in the hands of the Special Administrator, as
of October 31, 1967, not contested or claimed by them in any action then pending
in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. In turn, the heirs would waive and concede
to them all the 14 contested lots.
In this document, the respondent recognizes and concedes that the petitioner,
like the other signatories to the waiver document, is an heir of the deceased Vito
Borromeo, entitled to share in the estate. This shows that the "Waiver of
Hereditary Rights" was never meant to be what the respondent now purports it to
be. Had the intent been otherwise, there would not be any reason for Fortunato,
Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo to mention the heirs in the offer to settle the case
amicably, and offer to concede to them parts of the estate of the deceased; (2) On
April 21 and 30, 1969, the majority of the declared heirs executed an Agreement
on how the estate they inherited shall be distributed. This Agreement of Partition
was approved by the trial court on August 15, 1969; (3) On June 29, 1968, the
petitioner, among others, signed a document entitled Deed of Assignment"
purporting to transfer and assign in favor of the respondent and Tomas and Amelia
Borromeo all her (Patrocinio B. Herrera's) rights, interests, and participation as an
intestate heir in the estate of the deceased Vito Borromeo. The stated consideration
for said assignment was P100,000.00; (4) On the same date, June 29, 1968, the
respondent Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo (assignees in the aforementioned deed of
assignment) in turn executed a "Deed of Reconveyance" in favor of the heirs-
assignors named in the same deed of assignment. The stated consideration was
P50,000.00; (5) A Cancellation of Deed of Assignment and Deed of Reconveyance
was signed by Tomas Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo on October 15, 1968, while
Fortunato Borromeo signed this document on March 24, 1969.
Applying this, there was no valid Waiver of Hereditary Rights.
~ 45 ~
Article 1044 (Not applicable)
Michael Guy vs CA
FACTS:
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate
children of Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati City on October 29, 1992,
leaving an estate valued at P10,000,000.00 consisting of real and personal
properties. His known heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children,
Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all surnamed Guy. Private respondents
prayed for the appointment of a regular administrator for the orderly settlement of
Sima Wei's estate. They likewise prayed that, in the meantime, petitioner Michael
C. Guy, son of the decedent, be appointed as Special Administrator of the estate.
Attached to private respondents' petition was a Certification Against Forum
Shopping6 signed by their counsel, Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoñez.
Filing a motion to dismiss, petitioner and his co-heirs alleged that private

respondents' claim had been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished by
reason of Remedios' June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in
exchange for the financial and educational assistance received from petitioner,
Remedios and her minor children discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and
all liabilities.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Remedios and her minor children discharge the estate of Sima Wei
from any and all liabilities by reason of the alleged waiver;
HELD:
Even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of private
respondents, such waiver will not bar the latter's claim. Article 1044 of the Civil
Code, provides:
ART. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his property may accept
or repudiate an inheritance.
Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted

by their parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the
inheritance left to their wards only by judicial authorization.
The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belong to the persons
designated by the testator to determine the beneficiaries and distribute the
property, or in their default, to those mentioned in Article 1030. (Emphasis
supplied)
~ 46 ~
Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards
without judicial approval. This is because repudiation amounts to an alienation of
property which must pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the
ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in
the instant case is void and will not bar private respondents from asserting their
rights as heirs of the deceased.
Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of

a known right. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which
waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver
cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of
fact.
In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived their
successional rights because they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged
illegitimate children of the deceased. Petitioner himself has consistently denied that
private respondents are his co-heirs. It would thus be inconsistent to rule that they
waived their hereditary rights when petitioner claims that they do not have such
right. Hence, petitioner's invocation of waiver on the part of private respondents
must fail.
Article 1044 Not Applicable
Hinlo vs. De Leon
FACTS:
Esteban Hinlo and his wife NicasiaJamandre owed RufinoTongoy the sum of
P2,300.30, and as security for their debt gave them a mortgage on a rural property
of 30 hectares in area. Esteban Hinlo on May 15,1890 and NicasiaJamandre on
~ 47 ~
June 17, 1897. Prior to their death, no suit had been instituted for the recovery of
the debt. These spouses at death left five children, named Agapito, Honorato,
Perfecto, Guagerio, and Encarnacion, the eldest of whom, Agapito, at the time of
his mother's death in 1897, was but 19 years 3 months and 1 day old. The said
legitimate children of the aforementioned spouses Hinlo and Jamandre were in
possession of the said mortgaged agricultural land, and when the payment of the
debt was demanded of them, they did not pay it.
ISSUE:
WON they are liable to pay the debt;
HELD:
ART. 992 (Now 1044). Any person having the free disposal of his property may
accept or repudiate an inheritance.
An inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted in the

manner prescribed in number 10 of article 269. Should the guardian accept by
himself, the acceptance should be considered as made under benefit of inventory.
In this case, if the parents left other property not acquired or accepted as an
inheritance by these children, no action can be maintained against the latter with a
view of bringing such property under execution, as they have not contracted any
personal obligation with regard to it, not having received it as an inheritance. Also,
in an identical case, judgment could only be enforced against them for the recovery
of an amount equal to the value of the said property, if they had acquired or
accepted it as an inheritance, but not a greater amount, it being unlawful to levy
upon their own property in execution of judgment, inasmuch as, according to law,
since they were minors in 1897, they could receive such inherited property in no
other manner than under benefit of inventory, and the benefit of inventory is for the
purpose of avoiding a confusion of the heir's own property with that of his
predecessor in interest which he has inherited.
If under this substantive provision of the Civil Code under which the mortgage
action of the creditor, RufinoTongoy, should have been brought, the children of the
spouses Hinlo and Jamandre should only have been called upon to deliver the
mortgaged property. No personal liability whatever rested upon the said children,
as none was transmitted to them.
~ 48 ~
Article 1045
DOLORESA. IGNACIO vs. FELISA MARTINEZ and JUAN MARTINEZ
Facts: The plaintiff's ward and the defendants were the owners in equal parts of
the undivided real estate described in the complaint. Dolores Arce Ignacio, as the
guardian of her minor son, instituted this action for the purpose of having the
property divided real estate described in the complaint. Dolores Arce Ignacio, as
the guardian of her minor son, instituted this action for the purpose of having the
property divided and the one-third part belonging to the minor turned over to her.
Judgment was also asked against the defendant, Felisa Martinez, for one-third of
the value of the products of the land during the time the latter had been in the
exclusive possession of the same. The defendant, Felisa Martinez, alleged that she
and her deceased husband bought Crispulo Martinez' interest in the property in
question in 1908.
~ 49 ~
That in a document executed by Crispulo Martinez, he renounced total share that
may belong to him, after the partition of the said property, and assign the said share
to the married couple Luciano Lopez and Felisa Martinez, or to their lawful heirs.
It is claimed by the plaintiff that the document does not have the legal effect of
vesting title in the defendant Felisa and her deceased husband because, "in view of
the terms of this document it has the legal force of a repudiation of inheritance."
Issue: (1) Whether or not Crispulo Martinez accepted the inheritance in this case
(2) Whether or not there is repudiation of inheritance in this case
Ruling: (1) Yes. Crispulo Martinez accepted the inheritance in this case.
Neither can an heir renounce or repudiate his inheritance so as to relieve himself of

all liability after he had accepted the inheritance, without the benefit of an
inventory, and had received the products therefrom as such heir. Acts of mere
conservation or professional administration do not constitute an acceptance of the
inheritance.
In the instant case, Crispulo Martinez had, by taking possession of the property,
exercising act of dominion over it, and receiving products therefrom for a period of
more than eight years, accepted the inheritance without the benefit of an inventory.
(2) No. there is no repudiation in this case.
The trial court was of the opinion that the execution of the above quoted document
was an attempt "to repudiate an inheritance" and that the document does not
produce this effect because it does not meet the requirements of article 1008 of the
Civil Code. In support of this holding the court relied upon the language used in
the fourth paragraph. Crispulo Martinez stated therein that "in consideration of
these expense, I hereby set forth that I renounce totally the share that may belong
to me and assign the said share to Luciano Lopez and Felisa Martinez, or to their
lawful heirs." Under the Civil Code, repudiation of the inheritance is an act entirely
voluntary and free, made without consideration. An heir cannot renounce his
inheritance in favor of a designated heir or heirs, or any other persons. (The
substitute referred to in paragraph 3 of article 1912 is the person designated by the
testator.) Neither can an heir renounce or repudiate his inheritance so as to relieve
himself of all liability after he had accepted the inheritance, without the benefit of
an inventory, and had received the products therefrom as such heir. Acts of mere
conservation or professional administration do not constitute an acceptance of the
inheritance.
In the instant case, Crispulo Martinez had, by taking possession of the property,
exercising act of dominion over it, and receiving products therefrom for a period of
more than eight years, accepted the inheritance without the benefit of an inventory.
He "renounced" his interest in favor of designed persons, one of whom was not an
heir of his deceased parents, and for a valuable consideration. The word"
renounce," used in paragraph 4 of the document does not, under the terms of the
~ 50 ~
document, constitute must be considered together. Words, phrases or clauses
cannot be segregated and given a meaning which is contrary to the terms of the
entire document. "The whole contract must be interpreted or read together in order
to arrive at its true meaning." (Barretto vs. Santa Marina, 26 Phil. Rep., 200.)
It having been clearly shown that Crispulo Martinez owed, on the 30th day of
August, 1908, Luciano Lopez and Felisa Martinez the sum of P2,500, money
loaned him while he was in school, and he being of mature age, Exhibit No. 2 was,
in truth and in law, an assignment by Crispulo of his interest in the property in
question to Felisa Martinez and her husband in payment of his debt. This act is
authorized by article 1175 of the Civil Code.
Aricle 1045
MICHAEL C. GUY vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIXTO

MARELLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 138, Makati City and
minors, KAREN DANES WEI and KAMILLE DANES WEI, represented by
their mother, REMEDIOS OANES
Facts: private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei,
represented by their mother Remedios Oanes (Remedios), filed a petition for letters
of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138. The
case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 4549 and entitled Intestate Estate of Sima Wei
(a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim).
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate
children of Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati City on October 29, 1992,
leaving an estate valued at P10,000,000.00 consisting of real and personal
properties. His known heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children,
Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all surnamed Guy. Private respondents
prayed for the appointment of a regular administrator for the orderly settlement of
Sima Wei's estate. They likewise prayed that, in the meantime, petitioner Michael
C. Guy, son of the decedent, be appointed as Special Administrator of the estate.
In a Manifestation/Motion as Supplement to the Joint Motion to Dismiss, petitioner

and his co-heirs alleged that private respondents' claim had been paid, waived,
abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason of Remedios' June 7, 1993 Release
and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial and educational
assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge the
estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities.
Issue: Whether or not the repudiation of inheritance is valid in this case
Ruling: No. the repudiation of inheritance is not valid in this case.
~ 51 ~
To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms
which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit
which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its
terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right.
In this case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The Release and
Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely
states that Remedios received P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor
daughters "by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all
claims of whatsoever nature and kind x x x against the estate of the late Rufino
Guy Susim." Considering that the document did not specifically mention private
respondents' hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a
waiver of successional rights.
Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of
private respondents, such waiver will not bar the latter's claim. Article 1044 of the
Civil Code, provides:
ART. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his property may accept or
repudiate an inheritance.
Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their

parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to
their wards only by judicial authorization.
The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belong to the persons
designated by the testator to determine the beneficiaries and distribute the property,
or in their default, to those mentioned in Article 1030. (Emphasis supplied)
Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards
without judicial approval. This is because repudiation amounts to an alienation of
property which must pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the
ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in
the instant case is void and will not bar private respondents from asserting their
rights as heirs of the deceased.
Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of

a known right. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which
waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver
cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of
fact.
In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived their
successional rights because they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged
illegitimate children of the deceased. Petitioner himself has consistently denied that
~ 52 ~
private respondents are his co-heirs. It would thus be inconsistent to rule that they
waived their hereditary rights when petitioner claims that they do not have such
right. Hence, petitioner's invocation of waiver on the part of private respondents
must fail.
Article 1046
Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abadilla
~ 53 ~
Facts: The lands in question were originally owned by one Luis Palad, a school
teacher, who obtained title to the land by composicióngratuita in 1894. On January
25, 1892, Palad executed a holographic will partly in Spanish and partly in
Tagalog. Palad died on December 3, 1896, without descendants, but leaving a
widow, the appellant Dorotea Lopez, to whom he had been married since October
4, 1885.
The will contained a clause in Tagalog which, translated into English, reads:
"That the coconut land in Colongcolong, which I have put under cultivation, be
used by my wife after my death during her life or until she marries;
And if the times aforementioned should arrive, I prepare and donate it to a

secondary college to be erected in the capital of Tayabas;
so this will be delivered by my wife and the executors to the Ayuntamiento of this
town, should there be any, and if not, to the civil governor of this province in order
to cause the manager thereof to comply with my wishes for the good of many and
the welfare of the town."
After the death of Luis Palad the widow Dorotea Lopez remained in possession of
the land and in the year 1900 married one CalixtoDolendo. On April 20, 1903, the
aforesaid collateral heirs of Luis Palad brought an action against the widow for the
partition of the lands here in question on the ground that she, by reason of her
second marriage, had lost the right to their exclusive use and possession.
In the same action the municipality of Tayabas intervened claiming the land under
the clause of the Palad will above quoted.
During the pendency of the action an agreement was arrived at by the parties under
which the land which now constitutes lots Nos. 3464 and 3469 were turned over to
the municipality as its share of the inheritance under the will, and the remaining
portion of the land in controversy and which now forms lot No. 3470 was left in
the possession of Dorotea Lopez.
On the strength of the agreement the action was dismissed on November 9,

1904,upon motion by the counsel for the municipality and concurred in by all the
parties, reserving to the collateral heirs the right to bring another action.
In regard to lots Nos. 3464 and 3469, claimed by the appellants Palad and the
appellees, the case presents several problems not directly covered by statutory
provisions or by Spanish or local precedents and, for the solution of which, we
must resort to the underlying principles of the law on the subject
It is a well-known rule that testamentary dispositions must be liberally construed

so as to give effect to the intention of the testator as revealed by the will itself.
Applying this rule of construction it seems evident that by the clause in question
~ 54 ~
the testator proposed to create a trust for the benefit of a secondary school to be
established in the town of Tayabas, naming as trustee the ayuntamiento of the town
or if there be no ayuntamiento, then the civil governor of the Province of Tayabas.
An ayuntamiento corresponds to what in English is termed a municipal corporation

and it may be conceded that the ordinary municipal government in these Islands
falls short of being such a corporation. But we have provincial governors who like
their predecessors, the civil governors, are the chief executives of their respective
provinces.
Issue: Whether or not the Provincial governor may accept an inheritance as a

trustee without the approval of the government
Held: Yes. A provincial governor cannot be regarded as a public establishment

within the meaning of article 748 of the Civil Code and may therefore accept and
receive a testamentary devise in trust without the previous approval of the central
government.
Article 1046
Palad vs. Governor of Quezon Province
Facts: In their complaint plaintiffs-appellants Miguel Palad, Fe Palad, Victoria

Queano, Jose Palomera, Concepcion Palomera, Edgardo Obciana, GaloNosce,
CelsoZafranco and Ernesto Zafranco alleged that they are the remaining immediate
heirs and/or successors-in-interest of the deceased Luis Palad.
That the defendant provincial governor is the trustee and/or administrator and the
defendant municipality of Tayabas the beneficiary of Lots.
That the purpose of the trusteeship of the aforesaid lots as constituted by the last
will and. testament of the deceased Luis £alad dated January 25,1892 and duly
protocolized on July 27, 1897, was to erect or establish a high school in the townof
Tayabas out of the income of the aforesaid two lots for the benefit of the said town
of Tayabas.
~ 55 ~
That the said trust was duly fulfilled upon the complete establishment in or about
1932 of a high school now known as “Luis Palad High School” in the town of
Tayabas financed with the income of said lots and is actually self-supporting, that
the town of Tayabas has been enjoying the income of the said lots as beneficiary
for the last 54 years since November 9, 1904 up to the present time (when
complaint was filed), while the defendant provincial governor continues to be the
trustee and/or administrator of the two lots in violation of Article 605 of the Civil
Code
The plaintiffs were already entitled to the reversion of the two lots in their favor
and to the dissolution and/or termination of the trusteeshipand accordingly prayed
for judgment (1) directing the defendant provincial governor to submit an
accounting of the fruits or income of the two lots from 1932, and to turn over the
funds under his trusteeship to the plaintiffs, (2) terminating or dissolving the
trusteeship
In a decision rendered on December 10, 1924, the Supreme Court held that the said
testamentary disposition in the holographic will of the late Luis Palad dated
January 25, 1892 created a trust for the establishment and maintenance of a
secondary school to be financed with the income of the two lots aforesaid for the
benefit of the inhabitants of the town of Tayabas
Issue: Whether or not the will of Luis Palad is in violation of prohibition against
perpetuities and other provision of Civil code.
Held: No. There is no violation of any rule against perpetuities: the devise does not
prohibit the alienation of the land devised. It does not violate article 670 of the
Code: the making of the will and the continuance or quantity of the estate of the
heir are not left in the discretion of a third party. The devisee is not uncertain and
the devise is therefore not repugnant to article 750 of the Civil Code. The
provincial governor can hardly be regarded as a public establishment within the
meaning of article 748 and may therefore receive the inheritance without the
previous approval of the Government.”
Article 870 of the New Civil Code, which regards as void any disposition of the
testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for more than 20 years, is not
violated by the trust constituted by the late Luis Palad. And even if the trust herein
involved falls within the prohibition of the said Article 870, the same cannot be
given retroactive effect, the testator having died long before the effectivity of the
New Civil Code.
~ 56 ~
ARTICLE 1047 (FOR)
RAMOS V. MARQUEZ
G.R. No. L-4242
April 1, 1908
FACTS:
Angelina Marquez, a resident of Bulacan, died leaving a will which was

probated thereafter and was declared void. Wherefore it could not be legalized in
accordance with the provisions of section 617 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Eugenio Marquez, on behalf of his son Delfin Marquez, filed an application

for the administration and partition of the estate of the said Angelina Marquez,
mother of Mariano Ramos, alleging that Delfin is a son had by him with his wife
Florentina Austria, who in turn is the daughter of Maria Ramos, sister of Mariano
Ramos, and that both the latter were the children of the aforesaid Angelina
Marquez. Subsequently,Delfin, the aforesaid son of the petitioner, died.
On account of Mariano Ramos having presented the will of his mother for
probate, which will, as already stated, was declared void, the proceedings instituted
in connection with the partition were suspended until such time as the
commissioners appointed might comply with their duties. Thus, Mariano Ramos
objected to the estate of his mother being divided for the reason that Eugenio
Marquez was not an heir of the latter.
The trial court declared that the property, rights, and actions left by the late
Angelina Marquez should be divided in two equal parts, one in favor of her son,
Mariano Ramos, as heir under the law and his own right, and the remaining half to
~ 57 ~
Eugenio Marquez as the sole heir of his deceased son, Delfin Marquez, who in his
turn was the heir to the other half of the said property, rights, and actions of
Angelina Marquez as the representative of his late mother and grandmother,
Florentina Austria and Maria Ramos.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Eugenio Marquez is entitled to inherit from Angelina

Marquez
RULING:
Yes. Taking into consideration that the minor, Delfin Marquez, succeeded to
the rights of his mother, Florentina Austria, in the manner as the latter succeeded to
those of Maria Ramos, who was in turn a lawful heir of the common ancestor,
Angelina Marquez; and considering also that the latter's great-grandson, Delfin
Marquez, having died when still a minor, the only person called to the succession
is his legitimate father, Eugenio Marquez; it is unquestionable that the latter is
entitled to claim a share in the inheritance of the said great-grandmother,
transmitted by the action of the law to her daughter Maria Ramos in the first place,
then upon the death of the latter to Florentina Austria, and finally, after the death of
the latter, to the son she had by the claimant, Eugenio Marquez.
In this order of succession, Delfin Marquez is correctly included as being the

legitimate son of Florentina Austria, also the legitimate grandson of Maria Ramos,
sister to Mariano Ramos, the legitimate and great-grandson of Angelina Marquez.
Therefore, if Delfin Marquez were living, his rights to succeed and to take a share
in the inheritance of his said great-grandmother, Angelina Marquez, would be
unquestionable.
As to the other allegations of the respondent, it should be taken into account

that articles 989, and 1006 of the Civil Code provide:
ART. 989. The effects of the acceptance and repudiation shall always retroact to
the moment of the death of the person whose property is inherited.
ART. 1006. Upon the death of the heir, without having accepted or repudiated the
inheritance, the rights he may have had are transmitted to his heirs.
As has been seen, the will said to have been executed by Angelina Marquez
was declared void and was not probated; therefore, she must be considered as
having died without a will and her succession would be intestate, as regards her
heirs.
~ 58 ~
death of Angelina Marquez. Therefore, upon Eugenio Marquez claiming the share
right which belonged to him and in which the law protects him.
~ 59 ~
HINLO V. DE LEON
G.R. No. L-4860
January 7, 1911
FACTS:
Esteban Hinlo and his wife NicasiaJamandre owed RufinoTongoy the sum
of P2,300.30, and as security for their debt gave them a mortgage on a rural
property of 30 hectares in area. Prior to their death, no suit had been instituted for
the recovery of the debt. These spouses at death left five children, the eldest of
whom, Agapito. The said legitimate children of the aforementioned spouses Hinlo
and Jamandre were in possession of the said mortgaged agricultural land, and when
the payment of the debt was demanded of them, they did not pay it.
RufinoTongoy sued them for payment and petitioned for the attachment and
sale of the mortgaged property. During the course of the hearing the plaintiff,
RufinoTongoy, died, the action was continued by his widow, Saturnina de Leon, as
the judicial administratrix of the state of the deceased. The court rendered
judgments against the defendants, directing them to pay to Saturnina de Leon.
Some work animals, belonging to AgapitoHinlo and others of the

defendants, that had been attached by Saturnina de Leon, were sold at auction by
the sheriff. It was likewise stated in the return that, as the amount received from the
sale exceeded that of the judgment, other animals that had been attached were not
sold and were returned to AgapitoHinlo, and that the sheriff also delivered to the
latter P33.93, as surplus over the amount collected on the judgments.
AgapitoHinlo filed a complaint for the recovery of possession of the said

animals which the latter two parties had attached and sold contending that the
attached animals were the personal and exclusive property of AgapitoHinlo, and
not property left by his deceased parents, nor by the latter's heirs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Agapito is liable for the debt incurred by the decedents
RULING:
~ 60 ~
No. But not because a person is an heir of another is he bound to pay the
latter's debts; he is only bound to pay them if he accepts the inheritance; so that the
acceptance of the inheritance is what renders the heir liable for the debts of his
predecessor in interest. The acceptance is either pure and simple, or under benefit
of inventory. (Art. 998.)
Acts of mere preservation, or provincial administration, do not imply the

acceptance of the inheritance, if, at the same time, the title and character of heir
have not been assumed.

From these provisions it is inferred: (1) That without express acceptance of

the inheritance, the children of the debtor spouses cannot be sued for the payment
of the latter's debts; (2) that, with respect to the mortgaged rural property, they
could, with or without the acceptance of the inheritance, be sued in order that the
mortgage creditor might collect his credit in rem by bringing a real action which is
inherent in a mortgage right; (3) that the act of possessing, preserving and
administering this rural mortgaged property was a natural duty of the children on
the death of their parents, in order that the creditor's right might not be abandoned
and prejudiced, but this act of mere preservation and provisional administration did
not imply an acceptance of the inheritance, inasmuch as thereby they had not
assumed the title or capacity of heirs; (4) that the fact that the said children
consented to the judgment in so far as concerned the sale of the property
mortgaged by their parents does not mean that they also agree to pay all shortage
not covered by the amount realized from such sale, especially if, besides the
mortgaged property, they have not received, preserved or administered other
property of their parents' estate; (5) that if the parents left other property not
acquired or accepted as an inheritance by these children, no action can be
maintained against the latter with a view of bringing such property under
execution, as they have not contracted any personal obligation with regard to it, not
having received it as an inheritance; (6) that, in an identical case, judgment could
only be enforced against them for the recovery of an amount equal to the value of
the said property, if they had acquired or accepted it as an inheritance, but not a
greater amount, it being unlawful to levy upon their own property in execution of
judgment, inasmuch as, according to law, since they were minors in 1897, they
could receive such inherited property in no other manner than under benefit of
inventory, and the benefit of inventory is for the purpose of avoiding a confusion
~ 61 ~
of the heir's own property with that of his predecessor in interest which he has
inherited.

Article 1049
POSITIVE
Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo vs Borromeo

G.R. No L-55000 July 23, 1987
FACTS:
Fortunato claimed a portion of the legitime being an illegitimate son of the
deceased, by incorporating a Waiver of Hereditary Rights supposedly signed by
~ 62 ~
the rest of the Borromeo’s. In the waiver, of the 9 heirs relinquished to Fortunato
their shares in the disputed estate.
The Petitioners opposed this Waiver for the reason that it is without force
and effect because there can be no effective waiver of hereditary rights before there
has benn a valid acceptance of the inheritance from the heirs who intended to
transfer the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a Waiver of Hereditary Rights can be executed without a
valid acceptance from the heirs in question.
RULING:
Yes, the prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is that “the
properties included in an existing inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to
third persons with respect to the heirs, who by fiction of law continue the
personality of the former. The heirs succeed the deceased by the mere fact of
death.”
More or less, time may elapse from the moment of the death of the deceased
until the heirs enter into possession of the hereditary property, but the acceptance
in any event retroacts to the moment of the death, in accordance with Art. 989 of
the Civil Code. The right is vested, although conditioned upon the adjudication of
the corresponding hereditary portion.
~ 63 ~
Aricle 1049
POSITIVE
Antonio Baltazarvs Lorenzo Laxa

G.R. No. 174489 April 11, 2012
FACTS:
Paciencia was a 78 years old spinster when she made her last will and
testament. The will, executed in the house of retired Judge Limpin, was read to
Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the
instrumental witnesses that the document is her last will and testament. She then
affixed her signature at the end of the said document on page 3 and then on the left
margin of pages 1, 2 and 4.
Without any children, brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her
properties to respondent Lorenzo Laxa and his wife Corazon Laza and their
children, Lorenzo is Paciencia’s nephew whom she treated as her own son.
Lorenzo treated Paciencia as his own mother.
Six days after the execution of the Will, Paciencia left for USA. There, she
resided with Lorenzo and his family until her death on Jan. 4, 1996. In the interim,
the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin.
4 years after the death of Paciencia, Lorenzo filed a petition with the RTC of
Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of
Letters of Administration in his favor.
One of petitioners, Antonio Baltazar filed an opposition to Lorenzo’s
petition. Antonio claimed that the properties subject of Paciencia’sWill belong to
NicomedaMangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia had no right
to bequeath them to Lorenzo.
Also, Rosie Mateo testified that Paciencia is in the state of being
“mangulyan” or forgetful making her unfit for executing a will and that the
execution of the will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence.
Petitioners also opposed the issuance of the Letters of Administration in
Lorenzo’s favor arguing that Lorenzo was disqualified to be appointed as such, he
being a citizen and resident of the USA. Petitioners prayed that Letters of
Administration be instead issued in favor of Antonio.
The RTC denies the petition for probate of the will and concluded that when
Paciencia signed the will, she was no longer possessed of the sufficient reason or
strength of mind to have the testamentary capacity.
~ 64 ~
On appeal, CA reversed the decision of the RTC and granted the probate of
the will. The petitioner went up to SC for a petition for review on Certiorari.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the authenticity and due execution of the will was sufficiently
established to warrant its allowance for probate.
2) Whether or not there is a valid acceptance from Lorenzo Laxa
RULING:
1) Yes. A careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful
compliance with the formalities laid down by law. The signatures of the
testatrix, her instrumental witnesses and the notary public, are all present and
evident on the Will.
The attestation clause explicitly states the requirement that the

testatrix and her instrumental witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will
in the presence of the testator and of one another.
In fact, even the petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in

the Will may be authentic although they question of her state of mind when
she signed the same as well as the voluntary nature of said act.
The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time
of the execution of the will lies on the shoulders of the petitioners. The SC
agree with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not
necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to
execute a Will.
2) Yes. There was an execution from Lorenzo Laxa for express

acceptance since he was the one to filed for the petition for the probate of the
Will of Paciencia, and issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor.
As per Article 1049: Acceptance may be express or tacit.
An express acceptance must be made in a public or private document.
A tacit acceptance is one resulting from acts by which the intention to
accept is necessarily implied, or which one would have no right to do
except in the capacity of an heir.
Acts of mere preservation or provisional administration do not imply an
acceptance of the inheritance if, through such acts, the title or capacity of
an heir has not been assumed. (999a)
~ 65 ~
Article 1050
Not Applicable
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.DAVID REY GUZMAN,

represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, LOLITA G. ABELA, and the
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BULACAN, MEYCAUAYAN BRANCH,
G.R. No. 132964 February 18, 2000
Facts:
~ 66 ~
David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is the son of the
spouses Simeon Guzman,3 a naturalized American citizen, and Helen Meyers
Guzman, an American citizen. In 1968 Simeon died leaving to his sole heirs Helen
and David an estate consisting of several parcels of land located in Bagbaguin, Sta.
Maria, Bulacan.
On 29 December 1970 Helen and David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial

Settlement of the Estate of Simeon Guzman dividing and adjudicating to
themselves all the property belonging to the estate of Simeon. The document of
extrajudicial settlement was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds on 8
December 1971. The taxes due thereon were paid through their attorneys-in-fact,
Attys. Juan L. Austria and Lolita G. Abela, and the parcels of land were
accordingly registered in the name of Helen Meyers Guzman and David Rey
Guzman in undivided equal shares.
On 10 December 1981 Helen executed a Quitclaim Deed assigning,

transferring and conveying to her son David her undivided one-half (1/2) interest
on all the parcels of land subject matter of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of
the Estate of Simeon Guzman. Since the document appeared not to have been
registered, upon advice of Atty. Lolita G. Abela, Helen executed another
document, a Deed of Quitclaim, on 9 August 1989 confirming the earlier deed of
quitclaim as well as modifying the document to encompass all her other property in
the Philippines.4
On 18 October 1989 David executed a Special Power of Attorney where he

acknowledged that he became the owner of the parcels of land subject of the Deed
of Quitclaim executed by Helen on 9 August 1989 and empowering Atty. Lolita G.
Abela to sell or otherwise dispose of the lots. On 1 February 1990 Atty. Lolita G.
Abela, upon instruction of Helen, paid donor's taxes to facilitate the registry of the
parcels of land in the name of David.
Issue:
Whether or not the inheritance was deemed accepted and cannot be renounce
anymore
Ruling:
No,There is no valid repudiation of inheritance as Helen had already

accepted her share of the inheritance when she, together with David, executed a
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Simeon Guzman on 29 December
1970 dividing and adjudicating between the two (2) of them all the property in
Simeon's estate. By virtue of such extrajudicial settlement the parcels of land were
registered in her and her son's name in undivided equal share and for eleven (11)
years they possessed the lands in the concept of owner. Article 1056 of the Civil
Code provides —
~ 67 ~
The acceptance or repudiation of an inheritance, once made is irrevocable
and cannot be impugned, except when it was made through any of the causes
that vitiate consent or when an unknown will appears.
Nothing on record shows that Helen's acceptance of her inheritance from Simeon
was made through any of the causes which vitiated her consent nor is there any
proof of the existence of an unknown will executed by Simeon. Thus, pursuant to
Art. 1056, Helen cannot belatedly execute an instrument which has the effect of
revoking or impugning her previous acceptance of her one-half (1/2) share of the
subject property from Simeon's estate. Hence, the two (2) quitclaim deeds which
she executed eleven (11) years after she had accepted the inheritance have no legal
force and effect.
Article 1050
Not Applicable
AGAPITO HINLO, vs. SATURNINA DE LEON, administratrix of the estate

of Rufino Tongoy, deceased, ET AL.,
G.R. No. L-4860 January 7, 1911
Facts:
Esteban Hinlo and his wife NicasiaJamandre owed Rufino Tongoy the sum
property of 30 hectares in area. Esteban Hinlo on May 15,1890, and
NicasiaJamandre on June 17, 1897. Prior to their death, no suit had been instituted
for the recovery of the debt. These spouses at death left five children, named
Agapito, Honorato, Perfecto, Guagerio, and Encarnacion, the eldest of whom,
Agapito, at the time of his mother's death in 1897, was but 19 years 3 months and 1
~ 68 ~
day old. The said legitimate children of the aforementioned spousesHinlo and
Jamandre were in possession of the said mortgaged agricultural land, and when the
payment of the debt was demanded of them, they did not pay it.
On July 20, 1906, Rufino Tongoy sued them for payment and petitioned for
the attachment and sale of the mortgaged property. On May 1, 1907, the court
rendered judgments against the defendants, directing them to pay to Saturnina de
Leon, as the administratrix of the state of the deceased Rufino Tongoy, P2,300.30,
with legal interest from the date of the filing of the complaint and the costs of the
suit. On November 4, 1907, the sheriff sold the mortgage property of public
auction including some work animals, belonging to AgapitoHinlo and others of the
defendants after the sale the sheriff also delivered to the latter P33.93, as surplus
over the amount collected on the judgments.
Thereafter, AgapitoHinlo against Saturnina de Leon and the sheriff for the
recovery of possession of the said animals which the latter two parties had attached
and sold: that the attached animals were the personal and exclusive property of
AgapitoHinlo, and not property left by his deceased parents, nor by the latter's
heirs;
The judgment was in plaintiff's favor, the court finding therein that the
personal property claimed was the exclusive and private property of AgapitoHinlo,
and sentencing, as a result of that finding, Saturnina de Leon, as the administratrix
of the estate of the deceased Rufino Tongoy, to pay to AgapitoHinlo the sum of
P2,119.26, hence this petition
Issue:
Whether or not the inheritance was deemed accepted for Agapitoto be liable
for the incurred obligation of his parents to the extent of his personal property.
Ruling:
No, Acts of mere preservation, or provincial administration, do not imply the

Implied acceptance is one made by acts which necessarily imply a wish to

accept, or acts which no one should have a right to execute except in the capacity
of an heir.
Not because a person is an heir of another is he bound to pay the latter's

debts; he is only bound to pay them if he accepts the inheritance; so that the
acceptance of the inheritance is what renders the heir liable for the debts of his
predecessor in interest.
the provisions of the code it inferred: (1) That without express acceptance of
the inheritance, the children of the debtor spouses can not be sued for the payment
of the latter's debts; (2) that, with respect to the mortgaged rural property, they
could, with or without the acceptance of the inheritance, be sued in order that the
~ 69 ~
inherited.
If under these substantive provisions of the Civil Code under which the
mortgage action of the creditor, Rufino Tongoy, should have been brought, the
children of the spouses Hinlo and Jamandre should only have been called upon to
deliver the mortgaged property; no personal liability whatever rested upon the said
children, as none was transmitted to them; the action brought partaking of the
character of a real action, greater still, in the light of the provisions of the Code of
Civil Procedure, is the evidence of the illegal nature of the procedure of extending
the mortgage action to cover property which in no wise is shown to have been left
by those debtors, but which appeared by legitimate and unassailable titles to belong
exclusively to AgapitoHinlo; even if it really had been left by the said debtors,
execution could not have been levied thereon in the manner that it was, against the
legitimate protests of its true owner and possessor.
~ 70 ~
Article 1051
DAMIANA INTO vs. MARIO VALLE, et al.

G.R. NO. 145379
December 9, 2005
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Facts:
Respondent Luisa vda. de Valle as the surviving spouse of the late Victorio Valle
together with their children, namely, Mario, Octavio, Alberto, Oliver and Brenda,
all surnamed Valle (respondents), filed a complaint against petitioner and the
Sheriffs for "Declaration of Nullity of Sheriff’s Sale and/or Recovery of Hereditary
Shares, Damages and Attorney’s fees."
Respondents claim that, Eleanor, daughter of Victorio and Luisa, for valuable
consideration, waived her rights to, interests in and participation in all properties,
real and personal, which include the six parcels of land sold at public auction; that
in June 1992, respondent Luisa, as administratrix of the Estate of her husband
Victorio Valle, was served a Sheriff’s Notice of Sale of Real Properties; that
despite their verbal notice to petitioner that the shares of Eleanor have been
conveyed, waived and ceded to respondents, the Sheriffs proceeded with the public
auction; that the auction sale conducted by the Sheriffs was null and void for being
irregular and illegal as the subject properties were not validly attached and levied,
and, at the time of the sale, judgment debtor Eleanor had no more rights and
interests on the properties subject of the auction sale.
Petitioner together with the defendant Sheriffs filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the repudiation made by Eleanor was invalid as it was not made
pursuant to Article 1051 of the Civil Code
The RTC issued an Order that whether or not there was consideration, there was an
act of repudiation and, therefore, the requirements of the law should have been
~ 71 ~
observed and dismissed the petition stating that it did not follow the requirements
under Article 1051.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid repudiation.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that it cannot resolve this issue at the first instance due
only to the fact that it is not a trier of facts. The SC stated that such questions may
be determined by the RTC only after a full-blown trial of the case.
However, the CA ruled that there was a valid repudiation.
According to the Court of Appeals, the lower court erred in ruling that Eleanor
Valle Siapno’s alleged repudiation of her inheritance is invalid, having been
improperly made. A close scrutiny of the act of Eleanor, taking into consideration
the statements appearing in her "Waiver of Hereditary Shares and/or Rights" shows
that she did not repudiate her inheritance, but had actually accepted the same, but
had waived its enjoyment in exchange for valuable consideration which she had
already received and enjoyed. Furthermore, even if such act may be construed as a
repudiation of her inheritance, the same has been validly made through a public
document pursuant to Article 1051 of the Civil Code, which states:
"Article 1051. The repudiation of an inheritance shall be made in a public or

authentic instrument, or by a petition duly presented to the court having
jurisdiction over the testamentary or intestate proceedings."
It is undeniable that Eleanor’s act was made through a document duly signed by
her and executed before notary public which sufficiently qualifies the same as a
public document. It must be noted that nowhere in the abovequoted article is it
required that in case of the pendency of testamentary or intestate proceedings, any
repudiation of inheritance must be made exclusively by petition in the estate court.
~ 72 ~
Article 1051
SIMEONA BARCELONA, et al. vs. HILARION BARCELONA

G.R. No. L-9014
October 31, 1956
MONTEMAYOR, J.
Facts:
Leoncia Barcelona was the lawful wife of one Canuto Sanchez and they acquired
out of their common funds two parcels of land as well as some jewels. Leoncia
diedand the surviving spouse, Canuto Sanchez, was appointed administrator of the
estate. As he could not afford to pay all the claims against the estate, Hilarion
Barcelona, the eldest brother of the deceased paid all the total indebtedness.
Canuto Sanchez then sold his share in the conjugal properties to Hilarion
Barcelona. Subsequently, Simeona Barcelona and Aniceto San Gabriel, who is
now deceased and the father Quirico San Gabriel and Teodora San Gabriel,
renounced their corresponding share in the intestate estate in favor of Hilarion
Barcelona for having shouldered the claims against the estate. Consequently,
Hilarion aBarcelona commenced to possess actually, openly, publicly,
continuously and under claim of title.
However, Simeona Barcelona, Quirico San Gabriel and Teodora San Gabriel filed
the present action, claiming that in the settlement of the parties in the
aforementioned proceedings, Canuto Sanchez, because of inability or
unwillingness to meet to total indebtedness of the estate of his deceased wife,
agreed to transfer, as a sort of compromise and settlement to Hilarion and his co-
heirs, the entire two parcels of land in question; chan and because the latter was
only one who had shouldered the expenses of litigation and because
said Plaintiff did not have the money with which to reimburse him of their
corresponding share therein, they all agreed that he was to take the possession and
cultivation of the lands until after he would have been reimbursed of his expenses,
in which even partition of the land was to be made.
Appellants Quirico San Gabriel and Teodora San Gabriel now invoke the Statute
of Frauds, claiming that the conveyance or renunciation should be evidenced by a
written instrument and made in a public instrument.
Issue:
Whether or not the renunciation should be in writing and in a public instrument
Ruling:
No, it does not have to be in writing.
~ 73 ~
The rule that it should be in writing is really wise, if not necessary, for otherwise,
thousands and thousands of oral partitions made among heirs in our rural
communities, involving unregistered properties of relatively small value, would
have to be declared null and void. However,it is of general knowledge that in the
provinces, specially in the barrios, when a person dies leaving small parcels of land
not included in the Torrens System of registration, either through ignorance of the
law or in order to avoid expenses in the way of legal services, notarial fees, and
fees of registration, the heirs merely come together, make a list of the properties
included in the estate, pay off small debts and sums advanced by some of the heirs,
specially for expenses incurred during the last illness of the decedent and for his
funeral, and then proceed to assign to each one his share of the estate, even taking
into account the last instructions and wishes of the decedent. So far, this practice
has been found to be not only convenient and inexpensive, but even advisable, and
is accepted by the people, and we find no good reason for disturbing said practice.
Now, when valuable properties, specially those covered by certificates of title, are
involved in the partition, perhaps strict compliance with the law may be advisable,
even necessary.
However, we find and hold that the oral partition or renunciation of inheritance by
Simeona Barcelona for that portion of the conjugal property belonging to her
deceased sister Leoncia, is valid and binding upon her. Not so with respect to
Quirico and Teodora. If they were minors at the time of the oral partition, their
father, Aniceto San Gabriel, not being a judicial guardian duly appointed by the
court and lacking judicial authority, could not validly make the renunciation or
consent to the partition on behalf of his minor children; and if, as insinuated,
Quirico and Teodora were no longer minors at that time, then they cannot be bound
by said partition or renunciation for the simple reason that they did not take part in
it.

Article 1052
Not applicable
LEVISTE VS COURT OF APPEALS
169 SCRA 580
January 30, 1989
FACTS:
On September 7, 1963 Rosa Del Rosario engaged the services of the
Leviste, a practicing lawyer, to represent her in the petition for probate of the
~ 74 ~
holographic will of late Maxima C. Reselva. Under the will, a piece of real
property was bequeathed to Del Rosario. It was agreed that petitioner’s contigent
fee would be 35% of the property that Del Rosario may receive upon the probate of
the will.
Later on, Del Rosario terminated the services of Leviste due to “conflicting
interest.”
On November 23, 1966, Del Rosario and Rita Banu, the Special
adminstratix- legatee, filed a “Motion to WithdrawPetition for Probate” alleging
that Del Rosario waived her rights to the device and that the De Guzman brother
and sister who opposed her petition for probate, shall inherit all the properties left
by the decedent.
Nonetheless, the court disallowed the will, holding that the legal
requirements for its validity was not satisfied.
Leviste appealed the decision of the probate court. Private respondent

opposed such appeal on the ground that Leviste is not a party in interest.
When Court of Appeals dismissed the petition of Leviste, he filed a petition

for certiorari. He argued that by virtue of his contract of services with Del Rosario,
he is a creditor of the latter and that under Art. 1052 of the Civil Code which
provides:
Art. 1052. If the heir repudiates the inheritance to the

prejudice of his own creditors, the latter may petition the court
to authorize them to accept it in the name of the heir.
The acceptance shall benefit the creditors only to an

extent sufficient to cover the amount of their credits. The
excess, should there be any, shall in no case pertain to the
renouncer, but shall be adjudicated to the persons to whom, in
accordance with the rules established in this Code, it may
belong.
He argued that he has a right to accept for his client Del Rosario to the extent
of 35% thereof the device in her favor to protect his contigent attorney’s fee
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not, Leviste is a creditor of the repudiating heir
2. Whether or not Art 1052 presupposes that the obligor is an heir
of the deceased
~ 75 ~
Ruling:
1. No, Leviste is not a creditor of Del Rosario. The payment of his fee is
contigent and dependent upon the successful probate of the holographic will. Since
the petition for probate court was dismissed by the lower court, contingency did not
occur. Attorney Leviste is not entitled to his fee.
2. Yes, Art 1052 presupposes that the obligor is an heir of the deceased.
Rosa Del Rosario is not a legal heir of late Maxima C. Reselva but only a
devisee. Upon the dismissal of her petition for probate of the decedent’s will, she
lost her right to inherit any part of the decedent’s estate.
Mariano RamosVs. Eugenio Marquez

FACTS:
Eugenio Marquez is the father of Delfin Marquez, and the latter is the son of
Florentina Austria and Eugenio Marquez. Florentina Austria is the daughter of
Maria Ramos who full sister to Mariano Ramos, and both the latter are the children
of Angelina Marquez.
Angelina Marquez, a resident of Bulacan, died on the 12th of October, 1902, her
will being presented to the Court of First Instance of said province for probate. By
an order of said court it was declared void.
Eugenio Marquez, on behalf of his son Delfin Marquez, filed an application for the
administration and partition of the estate of the said Angelina Marquez, mother of
Mariano Ramos, alleging that Delfin is a son had by him with his wife Florentina
Austria, who in turn is the daughter of Maria Ramos, sister of Mariano Ramos, and
that both the latter were the children of the aforesaid Angelina Marquez; Delfin,
the aforesaid son of the petitioner, died on the 13th of February of said year.
~ 76 ~
On account of Mariano Ramos having presented the will of his mother, Angelina,
for probate on the 3rd of March, which will, as already stated, was declared void,
the proceedings instituted in connection with the partition were suspended until
such time as the commissioners appointed might comply with their duties, and on
the 20th of October, 1904, Mariano Ramos objected to the estate of his mother
being divided for the reason that Eugenio Marquez was not an heir of the latter.
ISSUE:
Whether Eugenio Marquez, as the legitimate father and sole heir of his deceased
minor child, Delfin Marquez, is entitled to inherit in conjunction with the
granduncle of his late son, Mariano Ramos, from the great-mother of his said son,
Angelina Marquez, Mariano's mother, on the assumption that the latter died
intestate
HELD:
ART. 1006. (Now 1053) Upon the death of the heir, without having accepted or
repudiated the inheritance, the rights he may have had are transmitted to his heirs.
As has been seen, the will said to have been executed by Angelina Marquez was
declared void and was not probated; therefore, she must be considered as having
died without a will and her succession would be intestate, as regards her heirs.
death of Angelina Marquez; therefore, upon Eugenio Marquez claiming the share
right which belonged to him and in which the law protects him, as stated by the
court below in its judgment.
Taking into consideration that the minor, Delfin Marquez, succeeded to the rights
of his mother, Florentina Austria, in the manner as the latter succeeded to those of
Maria Ramos, who was in turn a lawful heir of the common ancestor, Angelina
Marquez; and considering also that the latter's great-grandson, Delfin Marquez,
having died when still a minor, the only person called to the succession is his
legitimate father, Eugenio Marquez; it is unquestionable that the latter is entitled to
claim a share in the inheritance of the said great-grandmother, transmitted by the
action of the law to her daughter Maria Ramos in the first place, then upon the
death of the latter to Florentina Austria, and finally, after the death of the latter, to
the son she had by the claimant, Eugenio Marquez.
~ 77 ~
ELOY IMPERIAL, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a parcel of land covered also known
as Lot 45 of the Cadastral Survey of Albay. He sold the said lot for P1.00 to his
acknowledged natural son, petitioner herein, who then acquired title over the land
and proceeded to subdivide it into several lots. Petitioner and private respondents
admit that despite the contract’s designation as one of "Absolute Sale", the
transaction was in fact a donation.
Barely two years after the donation, Leoncio filed a complaint for annulment of the
said Deed of Absolute Sale on the ground that he was deceived by petitioner herein
into signing the said document. The dispute, however, was resolved through a
compromise agreement, among the stipulations of which was that in case of
Leoncio’s death, it was agreed that the balance of the deposit will be withdrawn by
petitioner to defray burial costs.
When Leoncio died he left only two heirs — the herein petitioner, who is his
acknowledged natural son, and an adopted son, Victor Imperial. Victor was
substituted in place of Leoncio and it was he who moved for execution of
judgment.
Fifteen years thereafter Victor died single and without issue, survived only by his
natural father, Ricardo Villalon, who was a lessee of a portion of the disputed land.
Four years hence, Ricardo died, leaving as his only heirs his two children, Cesar
and Teresa Villalon.
~ 78 ~
Five years thereafter, Cesar and Teresa filed a complaint for annulment of the
donation. They alleged inofficiousness of the donation, resulting in the impairment
of Victor’s legitime, which seeks the annulment, not of the entire donation, but
only of that portion diminishing the legitime.
ISSUE:
WON the private respondents have the right to question the donation;
HELD:
Under Article 772 of the Civil Code, now 1153, only those who at the time of the
donor’s death have a right to the legitime and their heirs and successors in interest
may ask for the reduction of inofficious donations. . .
As correctly argued by petitioner, when Leoncio died on January 8, 1962, it was

only Victor who was entitled to question the donation. However, instead of filing
an action to contest the donation, Victor asked to be substituted as plaintiff in the
case and even moved for execution of the compromise judgment therein. law
library
No renunciation of legitime may be presumed from the foregoing acts. It must be

remembered that at the time of the substitution, the judgment approving the
compromise agreement has already been rendered. Victor merely participated in
the execution of the compromise judgment. He was not a party to the compromise
agreement.
More importantly, our law on succession does not countenance tacit repudiation of
inheritance. Rather, it requires an express act on the part of the heir. Thus, under
Article 1051 of Civil Code:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The repudiation of an inheritance shall be made in a public or authentic instrument,

or by petition presented to the court having jurisdiction over the testamentary or
intestate proceedings.
Thus, when Victor substituted Leoncio in the case upon the latter’s death, his act of
moving for execution of the compromise judgment cannot be considered an act of
renunciation of his legitime. He was, therefore, not precluded or estopped from
subsequently seeking the reduction of the donation, under Article 772. Nor are
Victor’s heirs, upon his death, precluded from doing so, as their right to do so is
expressly recognized under Article 772, and also in Article 1053:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
If the heir should die without having accepted or repudiated the inheritance, his
right shall be transmitted to his heirs.
~ 79 ~
Article 1054
AGAPITO HINLO vs. SATURNINA DE LEON, administratrix of the estate

of Rufino Tongoy, deceased, ET AL.
Facts: Esteban Hinlo and his wife Nicasia Jamandre owed Rufino Tongoy the sum
property of 30 hectares in area. Esteban Hinlo on May 15,1890, and Nicasia
Jamandre on June 17, 1897. Prior to their death, no suit had been instituted for the
recovery of the debt. These spouses at death left five children. The said legitimate
children of the aforementioned spouses Hinlo and Jamandre were in possession of
the said mortgaged agricultural land, and when the payment of the debt was
demanded of them, they did not pay it. On July 20, 1906, Rufino Tongoy sued
them for payment and petitioned for the attachment and sale of the mortgaged
property. This suit was filed in the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros,
and, as during the course of the hearing the plaintiff, Rufino Tongoy, died, the
action was continued by his widow, Saturnina de Leon, as the judicial
administratrix of the state of the deceased.
On May 1, 1907, the court rendered judgments against the defendants, directing
them to pay to Saturnina de Leon, as the administratrix of the state of the deceased
Rufino Tongoy, P2,300.30, with legal interest from the date of the filing of the
complaint and the costs of the suit. On November 4, 1907, the sheriff sold the
mortgage property of public auction, and it was adjudicated to the plaintiff's
lawyer, Jose Felix Martinez.
Issue: whether or not the legitimate children of Hinlo and Jamandre accepted as
inheritance the property left by the latter
Ruling: No. They did not accept as inheritance the property.
Not because a person is an heir of another is he bound to pay the latter's debts; he
is only bound to pay them if he accepts the inheritance; so that the acceptance of
the inheritance is what renders the heir liable for the debts of his predecessor in
interest. The acceptance is either pure and simple, or under benefit of inventory.
(Art. 998.)
ART. 1003. Through an acceptance, pure and simple, or without benefit of

inventory, the heir shall be liable for all the charges on the estate, not only with the
property of the same, but also with his own.
~ 80 ~
ART. 1023. The benefit of inventory produces the following effects in favor of the
heir:
1. The heir shall not be bound to pay the debts and other charges on the inheritance
except in so far as the property of the same may go.
2. He retains against the estate all the rights and actions which he may have had
against the deceased.
3. His private property shall not be confused for any purpose whatsoever, to his
injury, with the property belonging to the estate.
ART. 999. Pure and simple acceptances may be express or implied.
xxx xxx xxx
Implied acceptance is one made by acts which necessarily imply a wish to accept,
or acts which no one should have a right to execute except in the capacity of an
heir.
Acts of mere preservation, or provincial administration, do not imply the


~ 81 ~
From these provisions it is inferred: (1) That without express acceptance of the
inheritance, the children of the debtor spouses cannot be sued for the payment of
the latter's debts; (2) that, with respect to the mortgaged rural property, they could,
with or without the acceptance of the inheritance, be sued in order that the
inherited.
If under these substantive provisions of the Civil Code under which the mortgage
action of the creditor, Rufino Tongoy, should have been brought, the children of
the spouses Hinlo and Jamandre should only have been called upon to deliver the
mortgaged property; no personal liability whatever rested upon the said children,
as none was transmitted to them;
~ 82 ~
Guilalas, Christian James S. Student Number2017-167461
Aricle 1054
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO, PATROCINIO

BORROMEO-HERRERA, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO BORROMEO and HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II, respondents.
Facts: Vito Borromeo, a widower and permanent resident of Cebu City, died on
March 13, 1952, in Paranaque, Rizal at the age of 88 years, without forced heirs
but leaving extensive properties in the province of Cebu.
Several parties came before the court filing claims or petitions alleging themselves
as heirs of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo.
~ 83 ~
Respondent Fortunato Borromeo prayed that he be declared as one of the heirs of
the deceased Vito Borromeo, alleging that he is an illegitimate son of the deceased
and that in the declaration of heirs made by the trial court, he was omitted, in
disregard of the law making him a forced heir entitled to receive a legitime like all
other forced heirs. As an acknowledged illegitimate child, he stated that he was
entitled to a legitime equal in every case to four-fifths of the legitime of an
acknowledged natural child. He asserted and incorporated a Waiver of Hereditary
Rights dated July 31, 1967, supposedly signed by Pilar N. Borromeo, Maria B.
Putong, Jose Borromeo, Canuto V. Borromeo, Jr., Salud Borromeo, Patrocinio
Borromeo-Herrera, Marcial Borromeo, Asuncion Borromeo, Federico V.
Borromeo, Consuelo B. Morales, Remedios Alfonso and Amelinda B. TalamIn the
waiver, five of the nine heirs relinquished to Fortunato their shares in the disputed
estate. The motion was opposed on the ground that the trial court, acting as a
probate court, had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim; that respondent
Fortunato Borromeo is estopped from asserting the waiver agreement; that the
waiver agreement is void as it was executed before the declaration of heirs; that the
same is void having been executed before the distribution of the estate and before
the acceptance of the inheritance; and that it is void ab initio and inexistent for lack
of subject matter.
Issue: Whether or not the above-mentioned heirs has validly repudiate the
inheritance
Ruling: No. The above-mentioned heirs does not validly repudiate the inheritance.
For a waiver to exist, three elements are essential: (1) the existence of a right; (2)
the knowledge of the existence thereof; and (3) an intention to relinquish such
right. (People v. Salvador, (CA) 53 O.G. No. 22, p. 8116, 8120). The intention to
waive a right or advantage must be shown clearly and convincingly, and when the
only proof of intention rests in what a party does, his act should be so manifestly
consistent with, and indicative of an intent to, voluntarily relinquish the particular
right or advantage that no other reasonable explanation of his conduct is possible
(67 C.J., 311). (Fernandez v. Sebido, et al., 70 Phil., 151, 159).
The circumstances of this case show that the signatories to the waiver document
did not have the clear and convincing intention to relinquish their rights, Thus: (1)
On October 27, 1967. Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo filed a pleading
entitled "Compliance" wherein they submitted a proposal for the amicable
settlement of the case. In that Compliance, they proposed to concede to all the
eight (8) intestate heirs of Vito Borromeo all properties, personal and real,
including all cash and sums of money in the hands of the Special Administrator, as
of October 31, 1967, not contested or claimed by them in any action then pending
in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. In turn, the heirs would waive and concede
to them all the contested lots. In this document, the respondent recognizes and
concedes that the petitioner, like the other signatories to the waiver document, is an
heir of the deceased Vito Borromeo, entitled to share in the estate. This shows that
the "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" was never meant to be what the respondent now
purports it to be. Had the intent been otherwise, there would not be any reason for
Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo to mention the heirs in the offer to settle
~ 84 ~
the case amicably, and offer to concede to them parts of the estate of the deceased;
(2) On April 21 and 30, 1969, the majority of the declared heirs executed an
Agreement on how the estate they inherited shall be distributed. This Agreement of
Partition was approved by the trial court on August 15, 1969; (3) On June 29,
1968, the petitioner, among others, signed a document entitled Deed of
Assignment" purporting to transfer and assign in favor of the respondent and
Tomas and Amelia Borromeo all her (Patrocinio B. Herrera's) rights, interests, and
participation as an intestate heir in the estate of the deceased Vito Borromeo. The
stated consideration for said assignment was P100,000.00; (4) On the same date,
June 29, 1968, the respondent Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo (assignees in the
aforementioned deed of assignment) in turn executed a "Deed of Reconveyance" in
favor of the heirs-assignors named in the same deed of assignment. The stated
consideration was P50,000.00; (5) A Cancellation of Deed of Assignment and
Deed of Reconveyance was signed by Tomas Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo on
October 15, 1968, while Fortunato Borromeo signed this document on March 24,
1969.
ARTICLE 1056 (FOR)
REPUBLIC V. GUZMAN
G.R. No. 132964
February 18, 2000
FACTS:
David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is the son of the

spouses Simeon Guzman and Helen Meyers Guzman. Simeon died leaving to his
sole heirs Helen and David an estate consisting of several parcels of land located in
Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan.
Helen and David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate

of Simeon Guzman dividing and adjudicating to themselves all the property
belonging to the estate of Simeon. The parcels of land were accordingly registered
in the name of Helen Meyers Guzman and David Rey Guzman in undivided equal
shares.
Subsequently, Helen executed a Quitclaim Deed assigning, transferring and

conveying to her son David her undivided one-half (1/2) interest on all the parcels
of land subject matter of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of
Simeon Guzman. Since the document appeared not to have been registered, Helen
executed another document, a Deed of Quitclaim confirming the earlier deed of
quitclaim as well as modifying the document to encompass all her other property in
the Philippines.David executed a Special Power of Attorney where he
~ 85 ~
acknowledged that he became the owner of the parcels of land subject of the Deed
of Quitclaim and empowering Atty. Lolita G. Abela to sell or otherwise dispose of
the lots.
A certain Atty. Mario A. Batongbacal wrote the Office of the Solicitor

General and furnished it with documents showing that David's ownership of the
one-half (1/2) of the estate of Simeon Guzman was defective. On the basis thereof,
the Government filed before the Regional Trial Court of MalolosBulacan a Petition
for Escheat praying that one-half (1/2) of David's interest in each of the subject
parcels of land be forfeited in its favor.
Trial court dismissed the petition holding that the two (2) deeds of quitclaim
executed by Helen Meyers Guzman had no legal force and effect so that the
ownership of the property subject thereof remained with her. The Government
appealed the dismissal of the petition but the appellate court affirmed the court a
quo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the repudiation made by Helen in favor of David is valid
RULING:
No. The inexistence of a donation does not render the repudiation made by
Helen in favor of David valid. There is no valid repudiation of inheritance as Helen
had already accepted her share of the inheritance when she, together with David,
executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Simeon Guzman on 29
December 1970 dividing and adjudicating between the two (2) of them all the
property in Simeon's estate. By virtue of such extrajudicial settlement the parcels
of land were registered in her and her son's name in undivided equal share and for
eleven (11) years they possessed the lands in the concept of owner. Article 1056 of
the Civil Code provides —
The acceptance or repudiation of an inheritance, once made is irrevocable and

cannot be impugned, except when it was made through any of the causes that
vitiate consent or when an unknown will appears.
Nothing on record shows that Helen's acceptance of her inheritance from

Simeon was made through any of the causes which vitiated her consent nor is there
any proof of the existence of an unknown will executed by Simeon. Thus, pursuant
to Art. 1056, Helen cannot belatedly execute an instrument which has the effect of
revoking or impugning her previous acceptance of her one-half (1/2) share of the
subject property from Simeon's estate. Hence, the two (2) quitclaim deeds which
~ 86 ~
she executed eleven (11) years after she had accepted the inheritance have no legal
force and effect.
The repudiation being of no effect whatsoever the parcels of land should

revert to their private owner, Helen, who, although being an American citizen, is
qualified by hereditary succession to own the property subject of the litigation.
~ 87 ~
YUSAYv. YUSAY GONZALES
G.R. No. L-11378
August 20, 1959
FACTS:
MatasYusay died leaving a legitimate son, appellant Jose, and Lilia Yusay,
an acknowledged natural daughter and considerable property, especially real
property. Jose and Lilia executed a document wherein she acknowledged having
receive from her brother Jose, 18 parcels of land with a total area of about 24
hectares as her just and legal share in the estate of her father, Matias, at the same
time declaring any difference what may later be found shall be considered by one
as a gift to the other. In the same document she said:
I further renounce, waive and relinquish to claim, demand or ask for any other
right inclusive, the right to rescind this agreement by reason of lesion and such
other right that the law grants me under the circumstances.
Jose and Lilia executed a project of partition, wherein Lilia again

acknowledged having received from Jose 18 parcels as her reasonable, equitable
and legal participation in the estate of her father and that in consideration of Lilia's
relinquishment of her right to further inheritance, Jose assumed to pay all
outstanding debts, accounts and obligations of her father.
After sometime, Lilia filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of April
10, 1954, alleging that her signatures on the said documents, namely, her
acknowledgment of having received 18 parcels of land as her share of the
inheritance and her relinquishment of her right to further participation in the
inheritance; the project of partition, and the petition for approval of said project of
partition respectively, had been obtained through fraud and false representation;
that the project of partition was unjust and prejudicial to her because it deprived
her about 9/10 of her legal share in the inheritance; that the estate left by her father
consisted of about 900 hectares, with an assessed value of about P310,000; that
according to law she was entitled to receive 1/3 of said estate or about 300 hectares
with an assessed value of not less than P100,000, whereas under the project of
partition she want to receive a share of only about 24 hectares with an assessed
value of about P9,680. that is to say, less than 1/10 of her legal share as an heir;
and that in the project of partition, about 70 parcels of land, consisting of
approximately 400 hectares were omitted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lilia’s acceptance of her inheritance may be impugned

~ 88 ~
RULING:
Yes.Considering all the circumstances attending the case, the Court is

inclined to agree with the trial court that there had been undue influence and fraud
in securing Lilia's signature and approval because she was not made to realize at
the time what rights and interests she had, and equally important, the vast extent of
the estate of her father to which she was entitled by one-third. As already stated,
the estate left by Matias Yusay was considerable and having in mind the relatively
insignificant portion allotted to Lilia, the project of partition was unreasonable,
even unconscionable. She was being given only small part of the one-third portion
of the estate to which she had a valid right.
Another reason the Court surmise why she agreed to the partition and to
renounce her right to question or to seek for an increase of her share, was that she
was not a legitimate child but only an acknowledged natural daughter, unlike Jose,
who was a legitimate son. Therefore, she had what one may call an inferiority
complex. Added to this was the fact that after the death of her father, she went to
live with Jose and his family. To her this must have been a great favor because by
having her in his home, he was giving her not only protection but also sort of
wiping out the disadvantage that she had been laboring under as an illegitimate
child, and elevating her social standing. In other words, by having her in his home,
and with his family, Jose was proclaiming to the world that Lilia was his sister,
daughter of his father, and on the same social plane where he stood.
In view if all these favors, it is understandable why Lilia was prevailed upon
to agree to the project of partition, and consented to forever renounce the full rights
of the law gave her as an heir.She renounced and relinquished not only the right to
claim any other right of inheritance but also the right to rescind said agreement.
And it is hard to understand how a person can agree to such full and complete
renunciation or relinquishment of rights if he or she is fully realized the meaning
thereof.
Lilia did not realize at the same time that she was being deprived of about 9/10 of
her hereditary share. Jose did not show her any inventory of the properties of the
estate. He included in the project of partition only 93 parcels of land with an area
of about 400 hectares, omitting about 92 parcels with an extension of about 505
hectares. In the course of the hearing, Jose told the court that his father left less
than P100 in the bank, for which reason he did not include the same in the project
of partition. This statement of Jose was later refuted by the certificate of the
manager of the Philippine National Bank, Iloilo Branch who upon order of the
court issued a certification stating that Matias Yusay had a demand deposit account
with an outstanding balance of P500 and a savings account with an outstanding
balance of P8,358.46. Therefore, Lilia’s acceptance of her inheritance may be
impugned.
~ 89 ~
ARTICLE 1057
Within thirty days after the court has issued an order for the distribution of the
estate in accordance with the Rules of Court, the heirs, devisees and legatees shall
signify to the court having jurisdiction whether they accept or repudiate the
inheritance.
If they do not do so within that time, they are deemed to have accepted the
inheritance. (n)
APPLICABLE:
WENCESLA CACHO VS. JOHN G. UDAN, AND RUSTICO G. UDAN
G.R. NO. L-19996; APRIL 30, 1965
~ 90 ~
FACTS:
On 13 December 1959 one Silvina G. Udan, single, and a resident of San

Marcelino, Zambales, died leaving a purported will naming her son, Francisco G.
Udan, and one Wencesla Cacho, as her sole heirs, share and share alike.
WenceslaoCacho, filed a petition to probate said Will in the Court of First

Instance but was subsequently opposed by Rustico G. Udan, legitimate brother of
the testator. Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr., filed his Appearance and Urgent Motion
for Postponement for and in behalf of his client Francisco G. Udan, the appointed
heir in the Will.
Francisco G. Udan died. After the death of the latter, John G. Udan and Rustico
G. Udan, both legitimate brothers of the testatrix Silvina G. Udan, filed their
respective oppositions on the ground that the will was not attested and executed as
required by law, that the testatrix was incapacitated to execute it; and that it was
procured by fraud or undue influence.
Proponent-appellee, through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss Oppositions
filed by the Oppositors, and on 20 February 1962 the Honorable Court of First
Instance of Zambales issued an Order disallowing these two oppositions for lack of
interest in the estate. On its appeal, the oppositor argued that although Francisco
survive his mother, the latter did not actually acquire the said property because of
his failure to accept it.
ISSUE:
Whether FrancsicoUdan acquired the said property absence of express

acceptance.
RULING:
Yes. Whether FrancsicoUdan acquired the said property absence of express

acceptance.
Article 1057 of the New Civil Code provides that; Within thirty days after
the court has issued an order for the distribution of the estate in accordance with
the Rules of Court, the heirs, devisees and legatees shall signify to the court having
jurisdiction whether they accept or repudiate the inheritance.
If they do not do so within that time, they are deemed to have accepted the
inheritance.
~ 91 ~
For the oppositors-appellants it is argued that while Francisco Udan did
survive his mother, and acquired the rights to the succession from the moment of
her death (Art. 777, Civ. Code), still he did not acquire the inheritance until he
accepted it. This argument fails to take into account that the Code presumes
acceptance of an inheritance if the latter is not repudiated in due time (Civ. Code,
Art. 1057, par. 2), and that repudiation, to be valid, must appear in a public or
authentic instrument, or petition to the court. There is no document or pleading in
the records showing repudiation of the inheritance by Francisco Udan. Therefore,
absence of express repudiation, FrancsicoUdan shall be considered to have
accepted the property subject of inheritance.
Article 1057
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO, PATROCINIO

BORROMEO-HERRERAVS. FORTUNATO BORROMEO
G.R. No. L-41171; July 23, 1987
FACTS:
Vito Borromeo, a widower, died on March 13, 1952, at the age of 88 years,
without forced heirs but leaving extensive properties in the province of Cebu. All
his brothers and sisters predeceased him. April 19, 1952, Jose Junquera filed a
petition for the probate of a one page document as the last will and testament,
devising all his properties to Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia, all surnamed
Borromeo, in equal and undivided shares and designating Junquera as executor.
The testate proceedings was converted into an intestate proceedings. Several
parties came before the court filing claims or petitions alleging themselves as heirs
of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo.
On August 25, 1972, respondent Fortunato Borromeo filed a motion to be

declared as one of the heirs of the deceased, alleging that he is an illegitimate son
and that he was omitted in the declaration of heirs. Fortunato filed a motion for
~ 92 ~
reconsideration changing the basis for his claim to a portion of the estate. He
asserted and incorporated a Waiver of Hereditary Rights dated July 31, 1967. In
the waiver, five of the nine heirs relinquished to Fortunato their shares in the
disputed estate.
Petitioner also contends that the document entitled "Waiver of Hereditary

Rights" executed on July 31, 1967, aside from having been cancelled and revoked
on June 29, 1968, by Tomas L. Borromeo, Fortunato Borromeo and Amelia
Borromeo, is without force and effect because there can be no effective waiver of
hereditary rights before there has been a valid acceptance of the inheritance the
heirs intend totransfer.Since the petitioner and her co-heirs were not certain of their
right to the inheritance until they were declared heirs, their rights were, therefore,
uncertain. This view, according to the petitioner, is also supported by Article 1057
of the same Code which directs heirs, devisees, and legatees to signify their
acceptance or repudiation within thirty days after the court has issued an order for
the distribution of the estate.Respondent Fortunato Borromeo on the other hand,
contends that under Article 1043 of the Civil Code there is no need for a person to
be first declared as heir before he can accept or repudiate an inheritance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Waiver of Hereditary Rights shows the intention of

signatories to relinquish their right as to the disputed estate.
RULING:
No. The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is that "the

properties included in an existing inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to
third persons with respect to the heirs, who by fiction of law continue the
personality of the former. Nor do such properties have the character of future
property, because the heirs acquire a right to succession from the moment of the
death of the deceased, by principle established in article 657 and applied by article
661 of the Civil Code, according to which the heirs succeed the deceased by the
mere fact of death. More or less, time may elapse from the moment of the death of
the deceased until the heirs enter into possession of the hereditary property, but the
acceptance in any event retroacts to the moment of the death, in accordance with
article 989 of the Civil Code. The right is vested, although conditioned upon the
adjudication of the corresponding hereditary portion. The heirs, therefore, could
waive their hereditary rights in 1967 even if the order to partition the estate was
issued only in 1969.
~ 93 ~
In this case, however, the purported "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" cannot
be considered to be effective. For a waiver to exist, three elements are essential: (1)
the existence of a right; (2) the knowledge of the existence thereof; and (3) an
intention to relinquish such right. The intention to waive a right or advantage must
be shown clearly and convincingly, and when the only proof of intention rests in
what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of
an intent to, voluntarily relinquish the particular right or advantage that no other
reasonable explanation of his conduct is possible. The circumstances of this case
show that the signatories to the waiver document did not have the clear and
convincing intention to relinquish their rights.
~ 94 ~

Compiled Cases For Succession Project Full Time Students

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ADRIANO, Ernesto III B. (ARTS. 1015, 1041, 1050)

BERNABE, Khristienne Rian C. (ARTS. 1016, 1042, 1051)

DE GUZMAN, Michaela (ARTS. 1017, 1043, 1052)

GALITA, Chloe Anne S. (ARTS. 1018, 1044, 1053)

GUILALAS Christian James S. (ARTS. 1019, 1045, 1054)

MANALASTAS, Joathron O. (ARTS. 1020, 1046, 1055)

SANTOS, Toni Cassandra B. (ARTS. 1021, 1047, 1056)

TORCULAS, Joyce Liezel Q. (ARTS. 1022, 1048, 1057)

URIAN, Joseph Andrew D. (ARTS. 1023, 1049)

Adriano, Ernesto III B. Student Number 2017-167488

In the matter of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez, deceased. MANUEL

G.R. No. L-25966 November 1, 1926

I institute as the only and universal heirs to all my property, my

A distinction is then drawn between incapacity to succeed and incapacity to

HEIRS OF ANTERO SOLIVA,vs. SEVERINO, JOEL, GRACE, CENON,

G.R. No. 159611 April 22, 2015

(2) a 9,447-square meter lot (Parcel 2) under TD No. 24419, (a 1,600-square

(3) a 5,136-square meter Riceland under TD No. 14298.

At the core of the controversy is a 14,609-square meter parcel of land (as

On January 21, 1986, Cenon sold to Roleda a 4,092-square meter portion of

Meanwhile, Cenon died in 1987; he was survived by his children, namely:

Cenon is likewise excluded from the partition of Parcel 2 as he likewise

CA’s DecisionCeferino had no right whatsoever over the 1,600-square meter

In these lights, Cenon validly acquired ownership over a total area of

Cenon’s remaining 6,613.5 square meters share of Parcel 2 shall, in turn, be

Whether the CA correctly applied the concept of accretion, under Article

No,We disagree with Antero’s argument. He obviously misinterprets the

In this regard, the CA said:

However, inasmuch as it is undisputed that Severino is no longer entitled to

Bernabe, Khristienne Rian C. Student Number 2017-101640

In the matter of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez, deceased. MANUEL

No testamentary provision shall be valid when made by a ward in favor of his

It is there declared, in effect, that accretion take place in a testamentary

GIL P. POLICARPIO, ET ALvs. JOSE V. SALAMAT, ET AL.

Defendant Jose V. Salamat avers as special defense that he is the successor-in-

Wherefore, The eleven surviving usufructuaries are hereby declared to be entitled

May 19, 1903

The ninth clause of the will of Doña Honorata is as follows:

Don Enrique Gloria died before the testatrix.

Yes, Don Ramon is entitled to the other half of 3,000 pesos

A legacy of a certain sum to two nephews in equal shares is payable in its

I institute as the only and universal heirs to all my property, my cousin

Issue: Whether or not there was a partial intestate or accretion

In playing the provisions of the Code it is the duty of the court to

Galita, Chloe Anne S. Student Number 2017-167510

Article 1018 (Applicable)

In the matter of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez, deceased. MANUEL

I institute as the only and universal heirs to all my property, my cousin

Issue: Whether or not there is a right of accretion in this case.

As to the contention of Margarita, We are the opinion that this contention is

Guilalas, Christian James S. Student Number 2017-167461

Ynza vs. Rodriguez

Issue: whether or not there is proportional sharing of property received by

Ruling: None. There is no proportional sharing of property received by accretion.

It may not be considered as accretion as apparently contemplated by the testator by

Torres and Lopez de Bueno vs. Lopez

Manalastas, Jiathron O. Student Number 2017-116749

Cruz vs. Cruz

Facts: In an Amended Complaintrespondents Angelito S. Cruz, Concepcion S.

That Amparo and Antonia fraudulently took advantage of Concepcion’s ignorance

Article 1020. The heirs to whom the inheritance accrues shall succeed to