GUINGONA vs CA

Potenciano Roque, claiming to be an eyewitness and having first-hand information to alleged

involvement of government officials in “jueteng” and other forms of illegal gambling, sought admission
into RA 6981: Witness Protection, Security, and Benefit Program (WPP). DOJ Secretary Guingona
eventually admitted him to the WPP. Roque executed a sworn statement to NBI, alleging that when he
was the Chairman of the Task Force Anti-Gambling, several politicians and gambling lords, including
Respondent Pineda, would offer him bribe money for him to cease raiding their gambling operations.
This was corroborated by a certain Sanchez and Gen. Mateo in their respective sworn statements.
Pineda eventually questioned Roque’s admittance to the WPP so he filed a Petition for Reconsideration,
but this was denied by Sec. Guingona. Meanwhile, State Prosecutors found probable cause against
Pineda and filed 3 informations for corruption of public officials against him with Manila and Pasig Trial
Courts. Pineda then filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus still
questioning Roque’s WPP admission and to enjoin the trial courts to from hearing the criminal actions.
CA granted this and issued a writ of preliminary injunction. The CA also ruled, however, that though the
WPP requires that corroboration must have been a condition precedent to Roque’s admission to WPP.
CA then eventually ruled in favor of the government and denied Pineda’s contentions.

Issue: WON state witness’ testimony requires prior or simultaneous corroboration at the time he is
admitted to the WPP?

Held:

Inasmuch as Roque has already been admitted into the WPP and has actually finished testifying in court,
the issue presented by petitioners has become moot. The Petition must fail. There are 3 requisites for
Judicial Review: 1. There must be an actual case or controversy for the exercise of judicial power 2. The
question must be ripe for adjudication 3. Challenger must have standing, and has personal and
substantial interest in the case Petitioners merely filed this suit fearing that the Decision would frustrate
the purpose of the WPP, which is to encourage witnesses to come out and testify. They aren’t even
asking to reverse the CA ruling! This apprehension is neither justified nor exemplified, and this
apprehension does not give rise to a justiciable controversy. After finding no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Prosecutors, CA allowed Roque’s admission to the WPP. Roque had even testified
already in court against Pineda. Thus, the propriety of Roque’s admission to WPP is already moot and
academic issue that clearly does not warrant judicial review. Considering everything, petitioners failed to
present an actual controversy and to show that this case is ripe for adjudication. Also, it would be an
invasion of the functions of the Executive Department if SC accedes to the government’s wishes to
render an advisory opinion on what the Prosecutors should do – when, how, and whom to grant/deny
admission to the WPP. The decision on whether to prosecute and whom to indict is executive in
character. Only when an information, charging 2+ persons with a certain offense, has already been filed
in court will Rule 119, Sec. 9 of the Rules of Court will come into play

Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, 16 September 1998

[REGALADO, J.]

FACTS: Petitioner Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction
Development Corporation (PROMAT) which participated in the bidding for government construction
projects including those under the First Manila Engineering District (FMED), and private respondent
Nestor V. Agustin, incumbent District Engineer, reportedly taking advantage of his official position,
inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship. After misunderstandings and unpleasant incidents,
Fabian eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case against Agustin in a letter-
complaint. The  Graft Investigator of the Ombudsman issued a resolution finding private respondent
guilty of grave misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits
under the law. On a motion for reconsideration, Agustin was exonerated of the administrative charges.
In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of
1989) pertinently provides that —
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt
of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Emphasis supplied)
 
ISSUE#1: Can the Court resolve the constitutionality of Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 not raised in
the trial?
HELD#1: YES.
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily
rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which case
it may be raised at any time or on the court’s own motion.  The Court ex mero motu may take
cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is developed. The court has a
clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding.
ISSUE#2: Is Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 unconstitutional?
HELD#2: YES.
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the
proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases
the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to
justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which, as correctly explained in First Lepanto
Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al.  was intended to give this Court a measure of control over
cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation
enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as
unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the
provisions of Rule 43.

BENGZON VS. DRILON G.R. 103524 April 15, 1992 208

SCRA 133
BENGZON VS. DRILON
G.R. 103524 April 15, 1992 208 SCRA 133
Gutierrez, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioners are retired justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are currently receiving
pensions under RA 910 as amended by RA 1797. President Marcos issued a decree repealing section 3-
A of RA 1797 which authorized the adjustment of the pension of retired justices and officers and enlisted
members of the AFP. PD 1638 was eventually issued by Marcos which provided for the automatic
readjustment of the pension of officers and enlisted men was restored, while that of the retired justices
was not. RA 1797 was restored through HB 16297 in 1990. When her advisers gave the wrong
information that the questioned provisions in 1992 GAA were an attempt to overcome her earlier veto in
1990, President Aquino issued the veto now challenged in this petition.
It turns out that PD 644 which repealed RA 1797 never became a valid law absent its publication, thus
there was no law. It follows that RA 1797 was still in effect and HB 16297 was superfluous because it
tried to restore benefits which were never taken away validly. The veto of HB 16297 did not also produce
any effect.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the veto of the President of certain provisions in the GAA of FY 1992 relating to the
payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices is constitutional or valid.

HELD:
The veto of these specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary ot its funds
should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. Pursuant to constitutional mandate, the
Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law.
Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to former Justices on the ground
that there should be no grant of distinct privileges or “preferential treatment” to retired Justices ignores
these provisions of the Constitution and in effect asks that these Constitutional provisions on special
protections for the Judiciary be repealed.
The petition is granted and the questioned veto is illegal and the provisions of 1992 GAA are declared
valid and subsisting.

EN BANC

[G.R No. 202143 : July 03, 2012]

FAMELA R. DULAY v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND PAQUITO N. OCHOA,

JR., AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY.

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution dated JULY 3, 2012,
which reads as follows: 

"G.R No. 202143 (Famela R. Dulay v. Judicial and Bar Council and Paquito N.
Ochoa, Jr., as Executive Secretary.). - This is a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order, filed by petitioner Famela R. Dulay against the Judicial
and Bar Council (JBC) and Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., raising the
following issues:

A. Whether the respondent Honorable JBC can legitimately, validly and

constitutionally accepts (sic) application for nomination and interview of
nominees for the position of a Chief Justice of the Honorable Court and,
thereafter, submits (sic) short list of nominees to the President of the Republic of
the Philippines for the appointment of a Chief Justice of the Honorable Court;
 
B. Whether the President of the Republic of the Philippines may legitimately, validly
and constitutionally appoint a Chief Justice of the Honorable Court, in
 replacement of the removed and impeached Honorable Renato C. Corona;
 
C. Whether the respondent Honorable JBC can constitutionally be headed by a
retired Associate Justice of the Honorable Court, instead of an incumbent Chief
Justice of the Honorable Court.[1]

Petitioner claims that the President of the Republic of the Philippines cannot
legitimately, validly, and constitutionally appoint the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, because the 1987 Constitution only empowers him to appoint members or
Justices but not the Chief Justice.[2] She adds that the Chief Justice should be replaced
and designated exclusively from among their peers.[3] Petitioner also contends that the
JBC cannot be validly, legally and constitutionally headed by a retired Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court, because the Constitution specifically provides that it be headed
by the incumbent Chief Justice and no other.[4]

We dismiss the petition.

At the outset, we look into the locus standi of petitioner to institute the present petition.

As held in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council:[5]  

xxx In public or constitutional litigations, the Court is often burdened with the
determination of the locus standi of the petitioners due to the ever-present need to
regulate the invocation of the intervention of the Court to correct any official action or
policy in order to avoid obstructing the efficient functioning of public officials and offices
involved in public service. It is required, therefore, that the petitioner must have a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.[6]

Indeed a liberal approach had been adopted in several notable cases. Petitioner may
not be as adversely affected by the action complained against as are others provided
that she sufficiently demonstrates in her petition that she is entitled to protection or
relief from the Court in the vindication of a public right. The assertion of a public right
as a predicate for challenging an official action rests on the theory that the petitioner
represents the public in general.[7]

In this case, however, petitioner has not shown in her petition that she is entitled to
protection or relief from the Court. She did not even explain her capacity in instituting
the present special civil action for  certiorari and prohibition. Nowhere in her petition did
she assert her right either as citizen or taxpayer filing her petition on behalf of the
public who are directly affected by the issues. Accordingly, she is wanting in legal
standing to institute the instant petition. Outright dismissal of the present petition is,
therefore, warranted.

Even if we ignore the technical defect and we look into the merits of the case, the
petition is still bound to be dismissed.

Simply stated, petitioner seeks the resolution of two substantive issues: (1) whether or
not the President of the Philippines has the constitutional power to appoint the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court; and (2) whether or not the JBC can validly be headed by
a person other than the incumbent Chief Justice.

We answer in the affirmative to both questions.

Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, provides for the appointment of Justices and
Judges, to wit: 

Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court  and judges of lower courts shall be
appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. x
x x (Emphasis supplied)

In interpreting the above-stated constitutional provision, petitioner considers only the

Associate Justices as the "members of the Supreme Court" thereby excluding the Chief
Justice from the President's appointing power. Said interpretation is baseless.

A plain reading of the constitutional provisions on the Judicial Department in Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution clearly shows that the phrase "Members of the Supreme Court"
and the words "Members" and "Member" are repeatedly used to refer to the Justices of
the Supreme Court without distinction whether he be the Chief Justice or any of the
Associate Justices or all fifteen Justices.

Section 4 (l),[8] Article VIII thereof defines the composition of the Supreme Court,
namely, "a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices" who may sit en banc or, in its
discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members; Section 4 (2)[9] and (3)
[10]
 describe the manner of conducting business in the Court whether it be En Banc or in
division; Section 7 (1)[11] enumerates the qualifications of the Members of the Court and
the other members of the Judiciary; Section 11[12]  provides for the security of tenure in
the Judiciary; Section 12[13] states the prohibition on non-judicial assignments of the
Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts; and Section 13[14]  lays down the
process of decision-making. In all of these provisions, the phrase "Members of the
Supreme Court" was repeatedly used to refer not only to the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court but includes the Chief Justice. Thus, in Section 9 of the same Article
VIII on the appointment of Justices and Judges, the phrase "Members of the Supreme
Court" clearly refers to the fifteen Justices of the Court - one Chief Justice and fourteen
(14) Associate Justices - who are within the appointing power of the President.
Although decided under a different Constitution, we reiterate the Court's
pronouncement in Vargas v. Rilloraza[15] that "there can be no doubt that the Chief
Justice and Associate Justices required x x x to compose the Supreme Court are the
regular members of the Court."[16] 

We, likewise, do not agree with petitioner that the JBC can only be headed by the
incumbent Chief Justice and no other. Petitioner, in effect, argues that the JBC cannot
perform its task without an incumbent Chief Justice. To follow this logic would lead to
an eventuality where a vacancy in the Judiciary will not be filled if a vacancy occurs in
the JBC. We can likewise infer from this argument that if the Office of the Chief Justice
is vacated, the same will not be filled because there will be no "incumbent Chief Justice"
to act as Chairman of the JBC.
We definitely cannot sustain these arguments. The principal function of the JBC is to
recommend appointees to the Judiciary.[17] For every vacancy, the JBC submits to the
President a list of at least three nominees and the President may not appoint anybody
who is not in the list.[18] Any vacancy in the Supreme Court is required by the
Constitution to be filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof.[19]  This 90-day
period is mandatory. It cannot, therefore, be compromised only because the
constitutionally-named Chairman could not sit in the JBC. Although it would be
preferable if the membership of the JBC is complete, the JBC can still operate to
perform its mandated task of submitting the list of nominees to the President even if
the constitutionally-named ex-officio Chairman does not sit in the JBC. This intention is
evident from the exchanges among the Commissioners during the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission of 1986, viz.: 

MR. DE CASTRO. I understand that our justices now in the Supreme Court, together
with the Chief Justice, are only 11. 

MR. CONCEPCION. Yes. 

MR. DE CASTRO. And the second sentence of this subsection reads: "Any vacancy shall
be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof." 

MR. CONCEPCION. That is right. 

MR. DE CASTRO. Is this now a mandate to the executive to fill the vacancy? 

MR. CONCEPCION. That is right. That is borne out of the fact that in the past 30 years,
seldom has the Court had a complete complement. 

MR. DE CASTRO. By that time, upon ratification of this Constitution, the Judicial and Bar
Council shall be in operation. 

MR. CONCEPCION. We hope so. 

MR. DE CASTRO. And one of the members thereof is a Member of Congress. 

MR. CONCEPCION. That is right. 

MR. DE CASTRO. An ex officio member. By the time this is ratified, Congress is not yet
convened and there will still be an election; so there will still be a delay of more than 90
days. Maybe before the vacancies occur in the Supreme Court, they will be filled up by
the President. 

MR. CONCEPCION. That is possible. 

MR. DE CASTRO. Therefore, it will take perhaps until November or December before the
four other justices will be appointed, if we follow the Judicial and Bar Council. Or can
the Judicial and Bar Council function without the presence yet of a member of
Congress who is an ex-officio member? 
MR. CONCEPCION. It can operate without the ex-officio member because a
majority would be enough, although it would be preferable if it were
complete. 

MR. DE CASTRO. So that upon ratification of this Constitution, it is possible, and the
President may do it by appointing the members of the Judicial and Bar Council without
first a representative from Congress. 

MR. CONCEPCION. That is correct. 

MR. DE CASTRO. So that we can immediately fill up the four vacancies in the Supreme
Court. 

MR. CONCEPCION. That is correct. 

MR. DE CASTRO. I am asking this just for the record, that the vacancies in the Supreme
Court be immediately filled up so that our backlog of cases can be immediately
attended to. 

x x x (Emphases supplied)[20]

Considering, however, that complete membership in the JBC is preferable and pursuant
to its supervisory power over the JBC, this Court should not be deprived of
representation. The most Senior Justice of this Court who is not an applicant for the
position of Chief Justice should participate in the deliberations for the selection of
nominees for the said vacant post and preside over the proceedings in the absence of
the constitutionally-named Ex-Officio Chairman, pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act
No. 296, or the Judiciary Act of 1948, to wit: 

Section 12. Vacancy in office of Chief Justice.  - In case of vacancy in the office of

the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, or of his inability to perform the duties and
powers of his office, they shall devolve upon the Associate Justice who is first in
precedence, until such disability is removed, or another Chief Justice is appointed and
duly qualified. This provision shall apply to every Associate Justice who succeeds to the
office of Chief Justice. (Emphasis supplied.)

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, we DISMISS the petition." (Carpio, Velasco, Jr.,

Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Abad and Sereno, JJ., no part, Peralta, J.,
presiding, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-
Bernabe, JJ., present)

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) ENRIQUETA E. VIDAL

Clerk of Court