September 13

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1. The Family as an Institution (Arts. 149-151) -

• Art. 151
No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verifi ed complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that
the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be
dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil
Code. (222a)
- Magbaleta v. Gonong (G.R. No. L-44903, 22 April 1977)
Magbaleta v. Gonong
G.R. No. L-44903 Date: April 22, 1977 Ponente: Barredo
Key Words: Land Created By: Amanda Francisco
Topic: The Family As An Institution [Article 149-151]
PETITIONERS RESPONDENTS
RUFINO MAGBALETA, ROMANA
HON. ARSENIO M. GONONG
B. MAGBALETA, AND SUSANA
AND CATALINO MAGBALETA
G. BALDOVI
RECIT-READY SUMMARY
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with preliminary injunction for the decision of the CFI
denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint filed against them.
Susana G. Baldovi, one of the petitioners, purchased land from the Rufino Spouses, the other petitioners, for a parcel of
land. However, said parcel of land is sought to be declared as property of the private respondent Catalino Magbaleta,
the brother of Rufino Magbaleta.
Petitioners seek the dismissal of the complaint filed against them alleging that the said order was made in violation of
Article 222 (now Article 151) of the Civil Code. The Court dismissed this case on grounds that Baldovi is a stranger,
hence the legal provision does not apply. The exception shall be applied because one of the parties involved is a
stranger.
DOCTRINE
Article 151.
No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or
petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no
such efforts were in fact made, the same case must be dismissed.
These rules shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code. (222a)
Exception to Article 151

The duty to engage in earnest efforts to compromise, however is not required if included in the suit between family
members is a stranger not in the same family as the interest of such stranger may differ from the interest of the
members of the same family.
Article 222.
No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in article 2035.
FACTS
● Rufino Magbaleta is married to Romana Magbaleta (petitioners).
● Rufino Magbaleta (petitioner) is the brother of Catalino Magbaleta (respondent).
● Catalino Magbaleta sought to have the parcel of land to be declared under his name.
● The land in question was purchased by Susan Baldovi from the petitioner Magbaleta spouses.
● Catalino Magbaleta filed a case against the petitioners.
● Petitioners allege that the complaints filed against them are ungrounded, by virtue of Article 222 (Article 151)
of the Civil Code and Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court which states that no suit between family
members shall prosper unless earnest effort was made. No earnest effort of compromise was made.
● The Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte denied the petitioners’ motion to dismiss the complaint filed against
them.
ISSUES-HELD-RATIO
W/N the decision should be reversed -- NO
No, The Court holds that this ruling of the respondent judge is correct.
Respondent judge premised his refusal to dismiss the complaint upon the sole ground that one of the defendants,
petitioner Susana G. Baldovi, the alleged buyer of the land in dispute, is a stranger, hence the legal provisions above
mentioned do not apply.
It is neither practical nor fair that the determination of the rights of a stranger to the family who just happened to have
innocently acquired some kind of interest in any right or property disputed among its members should be made to
depend on the way the latter would settle their differences among themselves.
Article 151 states that no suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint that a compromise has been made. Moreover, as an exception to the compromise requirement
under Article 151, when a stranger is part of the suit, the compromise requirement shall not be required.
"It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate
and passion in the family"
RULING
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the restraining order issued on November 3, 1976 is hereby lifted.
Costs against petitioners.
2. The Family Home (Arts. 152-162)
Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the
dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated. (223a)
Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence.
From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home
continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the
extent of the value allowed by law. (223a)
Art. 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are:
(1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and
(2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or
illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support.
(226a)
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:
(1) For nonpayment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered service
or furnished material for the construction of the building. (243a)
Art. 156. The family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of
the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter’s consent. It may also be constituted by an unmarried head of a
family on his or her own property.
Nevertheless, property that is the subject of a conditional sale on installments where ownership is reserved by the
vendor only to guarantee payment of the purchase price may be constituted as a family home. (227a, 228a)
Art. 157. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of the three
hundred thousand pesos in urban areas, and two hundred thousand pesos in rural areas, or such amounts as may
hereafter be fixed by law.
In any event, if the value of the currency changes after the adoption of this Code, the value most favorable for the
constitution of a family home shall be the basis of evaluation.
For purposes of this Article, urban areas are deemed to include chartered cities and municipalities whose annual income
at least equals that legally required for chartered cities. All others are deemed to be rural areas. (231a)
Art. 158. The family home may be sold, alienated, donated, assigned or encumbered by the owner or owners thereof
with the written consent of the person constituting the same, the latter’s spouse, and a majority of the beneficiaries of
legal age. In case of conflict, the court shall decide. (235a)
Art. 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the
family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same
unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or
constituted the family home. (238a)
Art. 160. When a creditor whose claims is not among those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in his favor,
and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth more than the maximum amount fixed
in Article 157, he may apply to the court which rendered the judgment for an order directing the sale of the property
under execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum
amount allowed by law as of the time of its constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds the maximum allowed in
Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the
family home, by the owner or owners of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure shall
apply.
At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a family home shall be considered. The proceeds shall be
applied first to the amount mentioned in Article 157, and then to the liabilities under the judgment and the costs. The
excess, if any, shall be delivered to the judgment debtor. (247a, 248a)
Art. 161. For purposes of availing of the benefits of a family home as provided for in this Chapter, a person may
constitute, or be the beneficiary of, only one family home. (n)
Art. 162. The provisions in this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are
applicable. (n)
• De Mesa v. Acero (G.R. No. 185064, 16 January 2012)
7t
De Mesa v. Acero
G.R. No. 185064 Date January 16, 2012 Ponente Reyes
Key Words: [Ex. Inadmissible
Evidence – Gun; Plain View Created By: Sheila delos Angeles
Doctrine]
Topic: Family Home
SPOUSES CLAUDIO D. ACERO,
JR. and
SPOUSES ARACELI OLIVA-DE MA. RUFINA D. ACERO,
MESA and ERNESTO S. DE MESA SHERIFF FELIXBERTO L.
SAMONTE and REGISTRAR
ALFREDO SANTOS
RECIT-READY SUMMARY
● The De Mesas purchased a subject property while they were cohabitating and this eventually became their family
home when they got married. Due to a debt, the property was levied at a public auction and was bought by the
Spouses Acero.
● The property was leased to the De Mesas but when they failed to pay, the Spouses Acero filed a complaint to
evict them and they asserted that they were the lawful owners and thus cannot be evicted. The MTC ruled in
favor of Spouses Acero
● Later on, the De Mesas filed a complaint to nullify Claudio’s title and asserted that the subject property is a
family home, which is exempt from execution under Art. 155 of the Family Code and, thus, could not have been
validly levied upon
● The case reached the CA who denied the petition and stated that the Family Code exemption should have been
raised to Sheriff prior to the sale of the subject property
● The issue of the case is whether or not the CA erred in its decision in refusing to cancel Claudio’s title to which
the Court ruled as no.
● While the Court did acknowledge that the land in question is a Family Home, they stated that the De Mesas
should have raised their right under Art. 155 before the Sheriff in the public auction.
● Their negligence to assert their right within a reasonable time gives rise to the presumption that they have
declined to assert it.
● Thus their petition to cancel Claudio’s title was denied.
DOCTRINE
● Art. 154 of the Family Code - The beneficiaries of a family home are:
○ (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and
○ (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or
illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal
support
● Art. 155 of the Family Code - The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
except:
○ (1) For nonpayment of taxes
○ (2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
○ (3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and
○ (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have
rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.
● August 3, 1988 - effectivity of the Family Code
FACTS
● A parcel of land is situated at Meycauayan, Bulacan, which was formerly covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) issued by the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan and registered under Araceli De Mesa (Araceli)
● The De Mesas jointly purchased on April 17, 1984 the subject property while they were still merely cohabiting
before their marriage then constructed a house on the subject property, which they occupied as their family home
after they got married in January 1987.
● In September 1988, Araceli obtained a loan from Claudio D. Acero, Jr. (Claudio) in the amount of P100,000,
which was secured by a mortgage over the subject property. As payment, Araceli issued a check drawn against
China Banking Corporation payable to Claudio.
● The check was dishonored as the account from which it was drawn had already been closed
● Claudio filed a complaint for violation of B.P. 22 was filed against the petitioners with the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan who acquitted the petitioners but ordered them to pay with legal interest the P100,000
● Sheriff Samonte levied upon the subject property and the subject property was sold on public auction. Claudio
was the highest bidder and the corresponding certificate of sale was issued to him.
● Final Deed of Sale over the subject property was issued to Claudio and the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan,
Bulacan cancelled Araceli’s and issued a title to him.
● Claudio and his wife Ma. Rufina Acero (Rufina) (both Spouses Acero) filed a complaint for ejectment with the
MTC against De Mesas and Juanito (they leased the property but did not pay).
● In their defense, the De Mesas claimed that Spouses Acero have no right over the subject property. They deny
that they are mere lessors but rather they are the lawful owners of the subject property and, thus cannot be evicted
therefrom.
● MTC favored Spouses Acero's complaint and ordered De Mesas and Juanito to vacate the subject property. The
MTC dismissed the De Mesas claim of ownership over the subject property because the title belongs to Claudio.
The MTC also stated that the De Mesas never assailed the validity of the levy made by Sheriff Samonte, and thus
the title that was resultedly issued to Claudio was valid
● In the interregnum, the De Mesas filed a complaint to nullify Claudio’s title and other documents with damages
with the RTC. De Mesas asserted that the subject property is a family home, which is exempt from execution
under Art. 155 of the Family Code and, thus, could not have been validly levied upon
● De Mesas sought a reconsideration but was denied. CA affirmed RTC decision
o The CA stated that the Family Code exemption should have been raised to Sheriff Samonte prior to the
sale
● De Mesas filed an instant petition asserting the exemption and stating that prior demonstration that the subject
property is a family home is not required before it can be exempted from execution.
● Spouses Acero, in their comment, claimed that the petition ought to be denied on the ground of forum-shopping
as the issues raised had already been determined by the MTC
ISSUES-HELD-RATIO
● Basically the question is whether or not the subject property is a family home which the Court ruled as yes BUT
they should have raised it before it was sold in the public auction so too late na to assert this right and the SC
upheld that Claudio owns it now
W/N the petitioners are guilty of forum-shopping
● NO
● Forum-shopping exists when two or more actions involve the same transactions, essential facts, and
circumstances; and raise identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues.
● There is no identity of issues and reliefs prayed for in the ejectment case
and in the action to cancel Claudio’s title.
● The primordial issue in the ejectment case is who among the contending parties has a better right of
possession over the subject property while ownership is the core issue in an action to cancel a Torrens title.
● The judgment rendered in an ejectment case is not a bar to action between the same parties respecting title to
the land or building. Neither shall it be conclusive as to the facts therein.
W/N the lower courts erred in refusing to cancel Claudio's Torrens title over the subject property.
● NO
● Rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from execution
○ Family residences constructed before August 3, 1988 (effectivity of the Family code must be
constituted as a family home either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of
the Civil Code in order to be exempt from execution
○ Family residences constructed after August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be family homes and
thus exempt from execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its
beneficiaries (Art. 154) actually resides therein;
○ Family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home prior
August 3, 1988, but were existing thereafter, are considered as family homes by operation of law and
are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.
● The subject property → YES, it is a family home
○ Became a family residence in January 1987.
○ Not judicially or extrajudicially constituted but when the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988,
the subject property became a family home by operation of law
● The family home's exemption from execution must be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the
property at public auction. (Basis of CA ruling which is affirmed)
● Honrado v. CA - categorically stated that residential house can only be claimed as a family home and prove
its exemption BEFORE THE SALE AT A PUBLIC AUCTION
● This claim for exemption must be set up and proved to the Sheriff.
● Having failed to set up and prove to the sheriff the supposed exemption of the subject property before the sale
thereof at public auction, De Mesas now are barred from raising the same.
● The family home is a real right but this right can be waived or be barred by laches (meaning: delay in making
the assertion or claim) by the failure to set up and prove the status of the property as a family home at the
time of the levy or a reasonable time thereafter.
● Approximately 4 years from the time of the auction sale, did the De Mesas claim the subject property as a
family home
● Their negligence or omission to assert their right within a reasonable time gives rise to the presumption that
they have abandoned, waived or declined to assert it. This renders their assertion doubtful as it appears as a
mere afterthought
● Simple justice and fairness and equitable considerations demand that Claudio's title to the property be
respected. Equity dictates that the petitioners are made to suffer the consequences of their unexplained
negligence.
RULING
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition
is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated June 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 79391, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. 1058-M-99 and dismissed the
complaint for declaration of nullity of TCT No. 221755 (M) and other documents,
and the October 23, 2008 Resolution denying reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
OTHER NOTES/IMPORTANT CONCEPTS

● The elements of forum-shopping are:
○ (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as would represent the same interest in both actions
○ (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts
○ (c) identity of the two preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.
● Judicial constitution of the family home requires the filing of a verified petition before the courts and the
registration of the court's order with the Registry of Deeds of the area where the property is located.
● Extrajudicial constitution involves the execution of a public instrument or a home to be considered a Family
Home under the Family Code which must also be registered with the Registry of Property
• Eulogio v. Bell (G.R. NO. 186322, 8 July 2015)
Eulogio v Bell Sr.

G.R. No. 186322 Date: July 08 2015 Ponente: SERENO, C.J.
Key Words: Created By: Tristan De Vera
Topic: Family Home [Art. 152-162]
Paterno C. Bell Sr., Rogelia
Enrico S. Eulogio and Natividad Calingasan-Bell, Paterno Ferdinand
Eulogio Bell III, and Paterno Beneraño Bell
IV
RECIT-READY SUMMARY
This is a case assailing the CA decision which enjoined the execution of sale awarded by the RTC to herein petitioners.
Respondents, spouses-Bell executed a contract of sale of their property to the Eulogios. The Bell-siblings filed a
complaint in which sought for the annulment of such contract of sale and was ruled by the court that said property was
“family home” to the Bell siblings and spouses-Bell. RTC directed the issuance of new sale on execution of the said
property in dispute because the present value exceeded statutory limit. The issue in this case is W/N the respondent’s
family home may be sold on execution under Art. 160. The SC held that no, the requirements that would warrant the
execution sale of respondents' family home under Article 160 were not present/proved to be true.
DOCTRINE
It has been said that the family home is a real right that is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment. The family
home cannot be seized by creditors except in special cases. The nature and character of the property that debtors may
claim to be exempt, however, are determined by the exemption statute.
FACTS
● Respondents Paterno William Bell, Jr., Florence Felicia Victoria Bell, Paterno Ferdinand Bell III, and Paterno
Beneraño IV (the Bell siblings) are the unmarried children of respondent Spouses Paterno C. Bell and Rogelia
Calingasan-Bell (Spouses Bell)
● In 1995, the Bell siblings lodged a complaint in the RTC-Batangas City against petitioners Enrico S. Eulogio
and Natividad Eulogio (the Eulogios) which sought:
○ The annulment of the contract of sale executed by spouses Bell over their 329-meter house and lot
○ The cancellation of the title obtained by petitioners by virtue of the Deed of Sale
● The RTC granted respondents' prayers, but declared Spouses Bell liable to petitioners in the amount of P1
million plus 12% interest per annum and ruled:
○ The house and lot in question is free from any and all encumbrances by virtue of said equitable
mortgage or the purported sale
○ The said equitable mortgage is deemed to be an unsecured mortgage
○ The Deed of Sale is null and void for being contrary to law and public policy
○ TCT under the name of Eulogios are cancelled ; Reconstitute TCT as “family home” to Bell siblings
and spouses-Bell
● CA affirmed decision of the RTC, hence was brought to the SC
○ SC dismissed petition for failure to show reversible error by CA; thereafter, entry of judgement was
made
● June 9 2004 - RTC issued a Writ of Execution under the new TCT (under Bell siblings and spouses-Bell)
which was levied on execution
○ August 31 2004 - Under motion for reconsideration by respondents RTC lifted WoE on the ground that
the property was a family home
○ Petitioners argue that under Art 160 of Family Code, current market value of property exceeded 300k
since it was sold at 1M.
● November 25, 2004 - RTC directed the issuance of new sale on execution of the said property in dispute
because the present value exceeded statutory limit
● CA found that RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the sale on execution; CA denied
petitioner’s motion, hence this present petition.
ISSUES-HELD-RATIO
W/N RESPONDENTS’ FAMILY HOME MAY BE SOLD ON EXECUTION UNDER ARTICLE 160? -- NO
NO , as earlier discussed, it has been judicially determined with finality that the property in dispute is a family
home, and that its value at the time of its constitution was within the statutory limit.
● Moreover, respondents have timely claimed the exemption of the property from execution. On the other
hand, there is no question that the money judgment awarded to petitioners falls under the ambit of Article
160.
Notwithstanding petitioners' right to enforce the trial court's money judgment, however, they cannot obtain its
satisfaction at the expense of respondents' rights over their family home
To warrant the execution sale of respondents' family home under Article 160, petitioners needed to establish these
facts: (1) there was an increase in its actual value; (2) the increase resulted from voluntary improvements on
the property introduced by the persons constituting the family home, its owners or any of its beneficiaries; and
(3) the increased actual value exceeded the maximum allowed under Article 157. **IMPORTANT: pls check full
provision in other notes for values
● During the execution proceedings, none of those facts was alleged — much less proven — by
petitioners.
● Evidently, when petitioners and Spouses Bell executed the Deed of Sale in 1990, the price stated therein was
not the actual value of the property in dispute
● Deed of Sale was null, and the transaction was an equitable mortgage
RULING
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87531, enjoining the trial court from proceeding with the sale of the family
home of respondents, is AFFIRMED. cSEDTC
ARTICLE 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered service or
furnished material for the construction of the building.
ARTICLE 157. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of
three hundred thousand pesos in urban areas, and two hundred thousand pesos in rural areas, or such amounts as
may hereafter be fixed by law.
at least equals that legally required for chartered cities. All others are deemed to be rural areas. [Underscoring supplied]
ARTICLE 160. When a creditor whose claims is not among those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in his
favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth more than the maximum amount
fixed in Article 157, he may apply to the court which rendered the judgment for an order directing the sale of the
property under execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the actual value of the family home exceeds the
maximum amount allowed by law as of the time of its constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds the
maximum allowed in Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by the person or
persons constituting the family home, by the owner or owners of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same
rule and procedure shall apply.
excess, if any, shall be delivered to the judgment debtor.
3. Rights and Obligations Between Husband and Wife (Arts. 68-73)
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual
help and support. (109a)
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and
compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the
solidarity of the family. (110a)
Art. 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for such support and other
conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the absence thereof, from the income or fruits
of their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be
satisfied from the separate properties. (111a)
Art. 71. The management of the household shall be the right and the duty of both spouses. The expenses for such
management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70. (115a)
Art. 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or commits acts which tend to bring
danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the court for relief. (116a)
Art. 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity without the consent of
the other. The latter may object only on valid, serious, and moral grounds.
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not:
(1) The objection is proper; and
(2) Benefit has occurred to the family prior to the objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to the
objection, the resulting obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of the spouse who has not obtained
consent.
The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in good faith. (117a)
• Mariano Arroyo v. Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo, G.R. No. L-17014 (August 11, 1921) - it is not within
the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and
render conjugal rights to, the other
Eulogio v Bell Sr.

G.R. No. 186322 Date: July 08 2015 Ponente: SERENO, C.J.
Key Words: Created By: Tristan De Vera
Topic: Family Home [Art. 152-162]
Paterno C. Bell Sr., Rogelia
Enrico S. Eulogio and Natividad Calingasan-Bell, Paterno Ferdinand
Eulogio Bell III, and Paterno Beneraño Bell
IV
RECIT-READY SUMMARY
This is a case assailing the CA decision which enjoined the execution of sale awarded by the RTC to herein petitioners.
Respondents, spouses-Bell executed a contract of sale of their property to the Eulogios. The Bell-siblings filed a
complaint in which sought for the annulment of such contract of sale and was ruled by the court that said property was
“family home” to the Bell siblings and spouses-Bell. RTC directed the issuance of new sale on execution of the said
property in dispute because the present value exceeded statutory limit. The issue in this case is W/N the respondent’s
family home may be sold on execution under Art. 160. The SC held that no, the requirements that would warrant the
execution sale of respondents' family home under Article 160 were not present/proved to be true.
DOCTRINE
It has been said that the family home is a real right that is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment. The family
home cannot be seized by creditors except in special cases. The nature and character of the property that debtors may
claim to be exempt, however, are determined by the exemption statute.
FACTS
● Respondents Paterno William Bell, Jr., Florence Felicia Victoria Bell, Paterno Ferdinand Bell III, and Paterno
Beneraño IV (the Bell siblings) are the unmarried children of respondent Spouses Paterno C. Bell and Rogelia
Calingasan-Bell (Spouses Bell)
● In 1995, the Bell siblings lodged a complaint in the RTC-Batangas City against petitioners Enrico S. Eulogio
and Natividad Eulogio (the Eulogios) which sought:
○ The annulment of the contract of sale executed by spouses Bell over their 329-meter house and lot
○ The cancellation of the title obtained by petitioners by virtue of the Deed of Sale
● The RTC granted respondents' prayers, but declared Spouses Bell liable to petitioners in the amount of P1
million plus 12% interest per annum and ruled:
○ The house and lot in question is free from any and all encumbrances by virtue of said equitable
mortgage or the purported sale
○ The said equitable mortgage is deemed to be an unsecured mortgage
○ The Deed of Sale is null and void for being contrary to law and public policy
○ TCT under the name of Eulogios are cancelled ; Reconstitute TCT as “family home” to Bell siblings
and spouses-Bell
● CA affirmed decision of the RTC, hence was brought to the SC
○ SC dismissed petition for failure to show reversible error by CA; thereafter, entry of judgement was
made
● June 9 2004 - RTC issued a Writ of Execution under the new TCT (under Bell siblings and spouses-Bell)
which was levied on execution
○ August 31 2004 - Under motion for reconsideration by respondents RTC lifted WoE on the ground that
the property was a family home
○ Petitioners argue that under Art 160 of Family Code, current market value of property exceeded 300k
since it was sold at 1M.
● November 25, 2004 - RTC directed the issuance of new sale on execution of the said property in dispute
because the present value exceeded statutory limit
● CA found that RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the sale on execution; CA denied
petitioner’s motion, hence this present petition.
ISSUES-HELD-RATIO
W/N RESPONDENTS’ FAMILY HOME MAY BE SOLD ON EXECUTION UNDER ARTICLE 160? -- NO
NO , as earlier discussed, it has been judicially determined with finality that the property in dispute is a family
home, and that its value at the time of its constitution was within the statutory limit.
● Moreover, respondents have timely claimed the exemption of the property from execution. On the other
hand, there is no question that the money judgment awarded to petitioners falls under the ambit of Article
160.
Notwithstanding petitioners' right to enforce the trial court's money judgment, however, they cannot obtain its
satisfaction at the expense of respondents' rights over their family home
To warrant the execution sale of respondents' family home under Article 160, petitioners needed to establish these
facts: (1) there was an increase in its actual value; (2) the increase resulted from voluntary improvements on
the property introduced by the persons constituting the family home, its owners or any of its beneficiaries; and
(3) the increased actual value exceeded the maximum allowed under Article 157. **IMPORTANT: pls check full
provision in other notes for values
● During the execution proceedings, none of those facts was alleged — much less proven — by
petitioners.
● Evidently, when petitioners and Spouses Bell executed the Deed of Sale in 1990, the price stated therein was
not the actual value of the property in dispute
● Deed of Sale was null, and the transaction was an equitable mortgage
RULING
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87531, enjoining the trial court from proceeding with the sale of the family
home of respondents, is AFFIRMED. cSEDTC
ARTICLE 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered service or
furnished material for the construction of the building.
ARTICLE 157. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of
three hundred thousand pesos in urban areas, and two hundred thousand pesos in rural areas, or such amounts as
may hereafter be fixed by law.
at least equals that legally required for chartered cities. All others are deemed to be rural areas. [Underscoring supplied]
ARTICLE 160. When a creditor whose claims is not among those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in his
favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth more than the maximum amount
fixed in Article 157, he may apply to the court which rendered the judgment for an order directing the sale of the
property under execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the actual value of the family home exceeds the
maximum amount allowed by law as of the time of its constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds the
maximum allowed in Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by the person or
persons constituting the family home, by the owner or owners of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same
rule and procedure shall apply.
excess, if any, shall be delivered to the judgment debtor.
• Aleko Lilius v. Manila Railroad, G.R. No. L-39587 (March 24, 1934) - inasmuch as a wife's domestic
assistance and conjugal companionship are purely personal and voluntary acts which neither of the
spouses may be compelled to render, it is necessary for the party claiming indemnity for the loss of such
services to prove that the person obliged to render them had done so before he was injured and that he
would be willing to continue rendering them had he not been prevented from so doing
Aleko Lilius v. Manila Railroad

G.R. No. 42551 September 4, 1935 Goddard
Key Words: Railroad, Train,
Created By: Cruz
Collision, Consortium
Rights and Obligations Between Husband and Wife (Arts. 68-73)
Aleko Lillus Manila Railroad Company (MRC)
RECIT-READY SUMMARY
The Lilius family went on a road trip to Pagsanjan, Laguna. It was Aleko’s first time driving there. Having
reached the crossing in question (Dayap), he noticed an auto truck parked on the left side of the road wherein people
who alighted were walking on the opposite side. He then slowed down and sounded his horn for people to get out of the
way. With his attention occupied, he did not see the crossing but heard 2 short whistles immediately preceding the
collision. The locomotive No. 713 of MRC struck their car right in the center and even dragged it. The impact was so
great that the plaintiff's wife and daughter were thrown from the car and were seriously hurt. The Court of First
Instance found MRC to be liable for damages due to their negligence. They were ordered to pay the family by way of
indemnity. Plaintiff appealed the amount adjudicated to them but to no avail. Hence, this petition.
The main issue here is W/N THE ALEKO CAN CLAIM DAMAGES FOR THE LOSS OF HIS WIFE’S
CONSORTIUM (NO).
The Court held that all the sums adjudicated to them by the lower court were reasonable. With regard to his
claim of damages on loss of his wife’s services (business and domestic services), he failed to provide sufficient
evidence to prove the value of her services. Similarly, inasmuch as a wife’s domestic assistance and conjugal
companionship are purely personal and voluntary acts which neither of the spouses may be compelled to render, it is
necessary for the party claiming indemnity for the loss of such services to prove that the person obliged to render them
had done so before he was injured and that he would be willing to continue rendering them had he not been prevented
from so doing. Here, he has not proven such.
DOCTRINE
● Goitia v Campos Rueda: The above quoted provisions of the Law of Civil Marriage and the Civil Code fix the
duties and obligations of the spouses. The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and support each other
(consortium).
○ Under the law and the doctrine of this court, one of the husband's rights is to count on his wife's
assistance (domestic services).
● Inasmuch as a wife's domestic assistance and conjugal companionship are purely personal and voluntary acts
which neither of the spouses may be compelled to render, it is necessary for the party claiming indemnity for
the loss of such services to prove that the person obliged to render them had done so before he was injured and
that he would be willing to continue rendering them had he not been prevented from so doing.
FACTS
● Aleko E. Lilius was a well-known and reputed journalist, author, and photographer. At the time of the incident,
he was a staff correspondent for the magazines The American Weekly (NY) and The Sphere (London).
● He utilized the linguistic ability of his wife, Sonja Maria Lilius, who translated his articles and books into
English, German, and Swedish. She also acted as his secretary.
● On May 10, 1931, the plaintiff along with his wife and 4-year old daughter, Brita Marianne Lilius, left Manila
in their Stude-baker car for Pagsanjan, Laguna, on a sight-seeing trip. It was their first time going there.
● Where the road was clear and unobstructed, the plaintiff drove at the rate of from 19-25 mph. He was entirely
unacquainted with the conditions of the road at said points and was not aware of the existence of a railroad
crossing there at Dayap (Calauan -> Pagsanjan).
● Before reaching the crossing in question, there was nothing to indicate its existence and inasmuch as there
were many houses, shrubs, and trees along the road, it was impossible to see an approaching train.
● At about 7 or 8 meters from the crossing, coming from Calauan, the plaintiff saw an auto truck parked on the
left side of the road. Several people, who seemed to have alighted from the said truck, were walking on the
opposite side. He slowed down to about 12 miles an hour and sounded his horn for people to get out of the
way.
● With his attention thus occupied, he did not see the crossing but heard 2 short whistles. Immediately
afterwards, he saw a huge black mass fling itself upon him, which turned out to be locomotive No. 713 of the
defendant company’s train coming eastward from Bay to Dayap station. It struck the plaintiff’s car right in the
center ☹. After dragging the said car, the locomotive threw it upon a siding. The force of the impact was so great
the plaintiff’s wife and daughter were thrown from the car and were picked up from the ground unconscious and
seriously hurt.
● In spite of the efforts of the engineer Basilio, he was unable to stop the locomotive until after it had gone about
70 meters from the crossing.
● On the same day, the family entered St. Paul’s Hospital in the City of Manila where they were treated by Dr.
Waterous.
○ Aleko: fractured nose, contusion above left eyes, lacerated wound on right leg; multiple contusions and
scratches on various parts of the body; became highly nervous and irritated - affected his
work/livelihood because he couldn’t focus
○ Sonja: fractures of the pelvic bone, the tibia and fibula of the right leg, below the knee, and received a
large lacerated wound on the forehead; 2 operations on leg - deformity is permanent and would make
walking difficult; lacerated wound on forehead left a disfiguring scar
○ Brita: 2 lacerated wounds (forehead and left side of face), fractures on legs and above and below the
knees, she almost died but ty to a surgery she survived her wounds :’)
● Important: There was no notice nor sign of existence of the crossing, nor was there anybody to warn the
public about the approaching trains. The flagman or switchman arrived after the collision, coming from the
station with a red flag in one hand and a green one in the other, both of which were wound on their respective
sticks.
○ The said flagman and switchman had many times absented himself from his post and switchman
had many times absented himself from his post at the crossing upon the arrival of a train. The train left
Bay station a little late and therefore traveled at great speed.
● Manila Railroad Company was ordered to pay plaintiffs by way of indemnity for material and moral damages
suffered by them through the fault and negligence of the said defendant entity's employees, the sum of P 30,865
with the costs of the suit. (P 10,000 personally to Sonja, P 5,000 to Brita, P 250 to Dr. Marfori). Hence, this
petition.
ISSUES-HELD-RATIO
W/N THE ACCIDENT WAS DUE TO NEGLIGENCE ON PART OF MANILA RAILROAD CO (YES)
Yes, the Court is of the opinion that the accident was due to the negligence on the part of the
defendant-appellant company.
1. The company did not employ the diligence of a good father of a family which includes inspection of
their work and supervision of the discharge of their duties.
a. There was no semaphore at the crossing at Dayap, to serve as a warning to passers-by of its existence.
b. The employees, the flagman and the switchman, for not having remained at their post at the crossing
in question to warn passers-by of the approaching train.
c. The station master, for failure to send the said flagman and switchman to his post on time.
d. The engineer, for not having taken the necessary precautions to avoid an accident, in view of the
absence of said flagman and switchman, by slackening his speed and continuously ringing the bell and
blowing the whistle before arriving at the crossing.
2. Victim has not, through his own negligence, contributed to the accident.
a. Aleko took all precautions: driving his car at a speed with prudence (19-25 mph), slackening his speed
(12 mph) in the face of an obstacle and blowing his horn upon seeing persons on the road.
b. He did not see the crossing in question, nor anything, nor anybody indicating its existence. The first
and only warning he received was 2 short blows from the whistle of the locomotive immediately
preceding the collision and when the accident had already become inevitable.
W/N THE SUMS OF MONEY FIXED BY THE LOWER COURT AS INDEMNITIES FOR DAMAGES ARE
REASONABLE (YES)
Yes, the Court found them reasonable.

1. With respect to Aleko Lilius
a. The sum of Php 5,000 is reasonable. His claim of a net income of P1,500.00 a month is exaggerated.
2. The trial court has already proven that the sum of P10,635 awarded to plaintiffs by way of indemnity
for damages and other fees is not excessive, taking into consideration the circumstances in which the
said expenses have been incurred.
a. The sum of P 10,000 adjudicated to Sonja by way of indemnity for patrimonial and oral damages is
not excessive.
i. They saw her at the trial - young and beautiful and the big scar, which she has on her forehead
caused by the lacerated wound received by her from the accident, disfigures her face and that
the fracture of her left leg has caused a permanent deformity which renders it very difficult for
her to walk.
ii. They also considered her social standing.
iii. Gutierrez v Gutierrez: court reduced the indemnity to him in spite of the fact that said plaintiff
was neither young nor good-looking, nor had he suffered any facial deformity, nor did he have
the social standing that Sonja enjoys
b. The sum of P 5,000 adjudicated to Brita by way of indemnity is not excessive.

i. The lacerations left deep scars that permanently disfigured her face.
ii. The fractures of both her legs permanently render it difficult for her to walk freely, continuous
extreme care being necessary in order to keep her balance in addition to the fact that all of this
unfavorably and to a great extent affect her matrimonial future.
W/N THE ALEKO CAN CLAIM DAMAGES FOR THE LOSS OF HIS WIFE’S SERVICES IN HIS
BUSINESS AND CONSORTIUM? (NO)
No, the Court held that there was insufficient evidence of her services in his business. And he has not
presented evidence showing the existence of domestic services and their nature, rendered by her prior to the
accident in order that it may serve as a basis in estimating their value.
1. It is necessary for the party claiming indemnity for the loss of such services to prove that the person
obliged to render them had done so before he was injured and that he would be willing to continue
rendering them had he not been prevented from so doing.
a. He seeks to recover damages for the loss of “consortium of his wife”, that is, “her services, society
and conjugal companionship", as a result of personal injuries which she had received from the
accident.
i. Goita v Campos Rueda: The Law of Civil Marriage and the Civil Code fix the duties and
obligations of the spouses. The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and support each other
(Civil Marriage Law of 1870).
b. Under the law and doctrine of this court, one of the husband’s rights is to count on his wife’s
assistance.
i. This comprises the management of the home and the performance of household duties.When
the wife's mission was circumscribed to the home, it was not difficult to assume, by virtue of
the marriage alone, that she performed all the said tasks and her physical incapacity always
redounded to the husband's prejudice inasmuch as it deprived him of her assistance.
ii. However, nowadays when women are demanding greater civil rights, marriage has ceased to
create the presumption that a woman complies with the duties to her husband and children,
which the law imposes upon her, and he who seeks to collect indemnity for damages resulting
from deprivation of her domestic services must prove such services.
c. In this case, he cannot recover damages for deprivation of his wife’s assistance during her illness from
the accident because he has not proven the existence of such assistance and his wife’s willingness to
continue rendering it had she not been prevented from doing so by her illness.
i. Apart from her services as translator and secretary, the value of which has not been proven, he
has not presented any evidence showing the existence of domestic services and their nature,
rendered prior to the accident in order that it may serve as a basis in estimating their value.
ii. Inasmuch as a wife’s domestic assistance and conjugal companionship are purely personal and
voluntary acts which neither of the spouses may be compelled to render, it is necessary that the
party claiming indemnity for such loss of services prove that the person had done them before
they were injured and would be willing to continue rendering them had they not been
prevented from so doing.
RULING
● In view of the foregoing considerations this court is of the opinion and so holds:
(1) That a railroad company which has not installed a semaphore at a crossing and does not see to it that its
flagman and switchman faithfully complies with his duty of remaining at the crossing when a train arrives, is
guilty of negligence and is civilly liable for damages suffered by a motorist and his family who cross its line
without negligence on their part
(2) that an indemnity of P10,000 for a permanent deformity on the face and on the left leg, suffered by a young
and beautiful society woman, is not excessive
(3) that an indemnity of P5,000 for a permanent deformity on the face and legs of a four-year old girl belonging
to a well-to-do family, is not excessive
(4) that in order that a husband may recover damages for deprivation of his wife's assistance during her illness
from an accident, it is necessary for him to prove the existence of such assistance and his wife's willingness to
continue rendering it had she not been prevented from doing so by her illness.
● Wherefore, not finding any error in the judgment appealed from, it is hereby affirmed in toto, with the sole
modification that interest of 6 per cent per annum from the date of the appealed judgment until this judgment
becomes final will be added to the indemnities granted, with the costs of both instances against the appellant. So
ordered.
4. Care and Education of Children (Arts. 356-363, Civil Code)
Article 356. Every child:
(1) Is entitled to parental care;
(2) Shall receive at least elementary education;
(3) Shall be given moral and civic training by the parents or guardian;
(4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his physical, moral and intellectual development.
Article 357. Every child shall:
(1) Obey and honor his parents or guardian;
(2) Respect his grandparents, old relatives, and persons holding substitute parental authority;
(3) Exert his utmost for his education and training;
(4) Cooperate with the family in all matters that make for the good of the same.
Article 358. Every parent and every person holding substitute parental authority shall see to it that the rights of the
child are respected and his duties complied with, and shall particularly, by precept and example, imbue the child with
highmindedness, love of country, veneration for the national heroes, fidelity to democracy as a way of life, and
attachment to the ideal of permanent world peace.
Article 359. The government promotes the full growth of the faculties of every child. For this purpose, the government
will establish, whenever possible:
(1) Schools in every barrio, municipality and city where optional religious instruction shall be taught as part of
the curriculum at the option of the parent or guardian;
(2) Puericulture and similar centers;
(3) Councils for the Protection of Children; and
(4) Juvenile courts.
Article 360. The Council for the Protection of Children shall look after the welfare of children in the municipality. It
shall, among other functions:
(1) Foster the education of every child in the municipality;
(2) Encourage the cultivation of the duties of parents;
(3) Protect and assist abandoned or mistreated children, and orphans;
(4) Take steps to prevent juvenile delinquency;
(5) Adopt measures for the health of children;
(6) Promote the opening and maintenance of playgrounds;
(7) Coordinate the activities of organizations devoted to the welfare of children, and secure their cooperation.
Article 361. Juvenile courts will be established, as far as practicable, in every chartered city or large municipality.
Article 362. Whenever a child is found delinquent by any court, the father, mother, or guardian may in a proper case be
judicially admonished.
Article 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children the latter's welfare shall be
paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling
reasons for such measure.
5. Parental Authority (Arts. 209-233)
Art. 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their unemancipated
children, parental authority and responsibility shall include the caring for and rearing them for civic consciousness and
efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being. (n)
Art. 210. Parental authority and responsibility may not be renounced or transferred except in the cases authorized by
law. (313a)
Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children.
In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and are obliged to obey them as long as the
children are under parental authority. (311a)
Art. 212. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority.
The remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints
another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children. (n)
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the
Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years
of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. (n)
Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the
surviving grandparent. In case several survive, the one designated by the court, taking into account the same
consideration mentioned in the preceding article, shall exercise the authority. (355a)
Art. 215. No descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against his parents and grandparents, except
when such testimony is indispensable in a crime against the descendant or by one parent against the other. (315a)
Chapter 2. Substitute and Special Parental Authority
Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following person shall exercise substitute parental
authority over the child in the order indicated:
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214;
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and
(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified.
Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the property of the child becomes necessary, the same order of
preference shall be observed. (349a, 351a, 354a)
Art. 217. In case of foundlings, abandoned neglected or abused children and other children similarly situated, parental
authority shall be entrusted in summary judicial proceedings to heads of children's homes, orphanages and similar
institutions duly accredited by the proper government agency. (314a)
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall
have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or
custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school,
entity or institution. (349a)
Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily
liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the
persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they
exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on
quasi-delicts. (n)
Chapter 3. Effect of Parental Authority
Upon the Persons of the Children
Art. 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with the respect to their unemancipated
children on wards the following rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good example,
and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;
(2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding;
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline,
self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties
of citizenship;
(4) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities, recreation and
association with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their
health, studies and morals;
(5) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;
(6) To demand from them respect and obedience;
(7) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circumstances; and
(8) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and guardians. (316a)
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages
caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental
authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. (2180(2)a and (4)a )
Art. 222. The courts may appoint a guardian of the child's property or a guardian ad litem when the best interests of the
child so requires. (317)
Art. 223. The parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the individual, entity or institution exercising parental authority,
may petition the proper court of the place where the child resides, for an order providing for disciplinary measures over
the child. The child shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel, either of his choice or appointed by the court, and a
summary hearing shall be conducted wherein the petitioner and the child shall be heard.
However, if in the same proceeding the court finds the petitioner at fault, irrespective of the merits of the petition, or
when the circumstances so warrant, the court may also order the deprivation or suspension of parental authority or
adopt such other measures as it may deem just and proper. (318a)
Art. 224. The measures referred to in the preceding article may include the commitment of the child for not more than
thirty days in entities or institutions engaged in child care or in children's homes duly accredited by the proper
government agency.
The parent exercising parental authority shall not interfere with the care of the child whenever committed but shall
provide for his support. Upon proper petition or at its own instance, the court may terminate the commitment of the
child whenever just and proper. (391a)
Chapter 4. Effect of Parental Authority
Upon the Property of the Children
Art. 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of the unemancipated
common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail,
unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000, the parent concerned shall
be required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine, but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the
value of the property or annual income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for general
guardians.
A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the proper court of the place where the child resides, or, if
the child resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the place where the property or any part thereof is situated.
The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding in which all incidents and issues regarding the
performance of the obligations referred to in the second paragraph of this Article shall be heard and resolved.
The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory except when the child is under substitute parental
authority, or the guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which case the ordinary rules on guardianship shall
apply. (320a)
Art. 226. The property of the unemancipated child earned or acquired with his work or industry or by onerous or
gratuitous title shall belong to the child in ownership and shall be devoted exclusively to the latter's support and
education, unless the title or transfer provides otherwise.
The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the child's property shall be limited primarily to the child's
support and secondarily to the collective daily needs of the family. (321a, 323a)
Art. 227. If the parents entrust the management or administration of any of their properties to an unemancipated child,
the net proceeds of such property shall belong to the owner. The child shall be given a reasonable monthly allowance in
an amount not less than that which the owner would have paid if the administrator were a stranger, unless the owner,
grants the entire proceeds to the child. In any case, the proceeds thus give in whole or in part shall not be charged to the
child's legitime. (322a)
Chapter 5. Suspension or Termination of Parental Authority
Art. 228. Parental authority terminates permanently:
(1) Upon the death of the parents;
(2) Upon the death of the child; or
(3) Upon emancipation of the child. (327a)
Art. 229. Unless subsequently revived by a final judgment, parental authority also terminates:
(1) Upon adoption of the child;
(2) Upon appointment of a general guardian;
(3) Upon judicial declaration of abandonment of the child in a case filed for the purpose;
(4) Upon final judgment of a competent court divesting the party concerned of parental authority; or
(5) Upon judicial declaration of absence or incapacity of the person exercising parental authority. (327a)
Art. 230. Parental authority is suspended upon conviction of the parent or the person exercising the same of a crime
which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction. The authority is automatically reinstated upon service of the
penalty or upon pardon or amnesty of the offender. (330a)
Art. 231. The court in an action filed for the purpose in a related case may also suspend parental authority if the parent
or the person exercising the same:
(1) Treats the child with excessive harshness or cruelty;
(2) Gives the child corrupting orders, counsel or example;
(3) Compels the child to beg; or
(4) Subjects the child or allows him to be subjected to acts of lasciviousness.

The grounds enumerated above are deemed to include cases which have resulted from culpable negligence of the parent
or the person exercising parental authority. lawphi1.net
If the degree of seriousness so warrants, or the welfare of the child so demands, the court shall deprive the guilty party
of parental authority or adopt such other measures as may be proper under the circumstances.
The suspension or deprivation may be revoked and the parental authority revived in a case filed for the purpose or in
the same proceeding if the court finds that the cause therefor has ceased and will not be repeated. (33a)
Art. 232. If the person exercising parental authority has subjected the child or allowed him to be subjected to sexual
abuse, such person shall be permanently deprived by the court of such authority. (n)
Art. 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over the person of the child
as the parents.
In no case shall the school administrator, teacher of individual engaged in child care exercising special parental
authority inflict corporal punishment upon the child. (n)
• Tamargo v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 85044, 3 June 3, 1992)
Tamargo V. CA
G.R. No. 85044 June 3 1992 Feliciano
Key Words: Parental Authority over
Choa
Adopted Child (Torts)
Topic: Parental Authority
Tamargo CA and Bondoc
RECIT-READY SUMMARY
● Adelburto Bondoc shot with an air rifle and killed Jennifer Tamargo. Adoptive parents of Tamargo filed a civil
case against natural parents of Bondoc-Celso and Aurelia.
● Natural parents contend that the liability should be with the adoptive parents-Sabas and Felisa Rapisura since the
petition was filed before the shooting incident.
● RTC: ruled that liability not with natural parents. CA: dismissed appeal of Tamargo’s parents due to procedural
issue.
● SC: Liability is with natural parents since:
○ Art. 221-parents/other persons exercising parental authority civilly liable for injuries and damages
caused by acts of unemancipated children living in their company
○ Retroactive parental authority is only considered for circumstances favorable to the adoptive children.
DOCTRINE
● Art. 221
○ Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and
damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company
and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law."
● Article 2176
○ "Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict . . . ."
● Article 2180
○ "The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
○ The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by
the minor children who live in their company
○ The responsibility treated in this Article shall cease when the person herein mentioned proves that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage."
FACTS
● Adelburto Bundoc, 10 years old, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle and caused her death.
● Bundoc’s natural parents are Celso and Aurelia Tamargo. Adoptive parents are Sabas and Felisa Rapisura.
● Bundoc shot Tamargo on Oct 20 1982 before the adoption petition was granted on November 18 1982.
Procedural
● Criminal case for reckless imprudence was dismissed due to lack of discernment by Bundoc
● Civil Case was filed by adoptive parents of Tamargo vs. Natural parents of Bondoc. Bondoc’s parents alleges
that the parental authority of Adelburto was transferred to adoptive parents retroactively since the petition for
adoption was filed on Dec 10 1981.
● RTC: Liability not with Natural Parents
● CA: Dismissed due to loss the right to appeal (procedural)
ISSUES-HELD-RATIO
W/N Parental Authority (as an effect of adoption) can be retroactively passed to Adoptive Parents when the
Custody has not been transferred yet ? -NO
No,
Retroactive Application of Parental Authority
- Retroactive effect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to
permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child.
- Cannot burden the adoptive parents for liabilities incurred during the period where the natural parents still
have custody.
Liability of Bondoc Natural Parents
- Adelburto was still in their custody
- Adoptive parents were in the US during the accident
- The Trial Custody period for adoptive parents has not yet started
Under Article 221, Mr and Mrs. Bondoc should be held liable as Adelburto
1. Parental Authority not yet transferred to adoptive parents (original parental authority ceases to exist only after
adoption)
2. Still in their custody.
RULING
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE and the Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated 6 September 1988, in C.A.-G.R. No. SP-15016 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioners' complaint filed before the trial court is hereby REINSTATED and this case is REMANDED to that court
for further proceedings consistent with this Decision. Costs against respondent Bundoc spouses. This Decision is
immediately executory.

● Example of favorable to adoptive children to apply parental authority
○ Maybe wills and succession?
• Sagala-Eslao v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 116773, 16 January 1997)

Facts:
Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married. After their marriage, the couple stayed with Teresita Eslao,
mother of Reynaldo. The couple had two children namely Leslie and Angelica. Leslie was entrusted to the care and
custody of Maria's mother while Angelica was entrusted with her parents at Teresita's house. Reynaldo died 4 years
later. Maria intended to bring Angelica to her mother's place but Teresita prevailed and entrusted to the custody of
Angelica. Maria returned to her mother's house and stayed with Leslie. Years later, Maria married James
Manabu-Ouye, a Japanese-American orthodontist, and she migrated to US with him. A year after the marriage, Maria
returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her children and bring them to US. Teresita, however, resisted by way of
explaining that the child was entrusted to her when she was 10 days old and accused Maria of having abandoned
Angelica. The trial court rendered a decision where Teresita was directed to cause the immediate transfer of custody of
the child to Maria. CA affirmed with the lower court's decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Teresita has the right to the custody of the child?
Ruling:
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized
by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority
only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution. When a parent
entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely
temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is
manifest, the law still disallows the same.
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep
them in their custody and company. In this case, when Maria entrusted the custody of her minor child to Teresita, what
she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental
authority.
Thus, Teresita does not have the right to the custody of the child.
• Dempsey v. RTC (G.R. Nos. 77737-38, 15 August 1988)
Dempsey v. RTC
G.R. No. 77737-38 August 15, 1988 GUTIERREZ, JR., J
Key Words: Parental support, PD 603 Created By: Chrissy
Christina Marie Dempsey,
RTC of Olongapo City and Joel
represented by mother Janalita
Dempsey
Rapada
RECIT-READY SUMMARY
● Janalita Rapada, in her cohabitation with Joel Dempsey, without the benefit of marriage, gave birth to Christina
Marie on October 01, 1984, at the St. Jude's Family Clinic, Olongapo City where she delivered the child.
● Her birth certificate bears an entry of the name of the accused as the father.
● At the present, the child receives a monthly support from the accused in the sum of $150.00.
● On January 30, 1986, two separate informations were filed against respondent Joel Dempsey before the
Municipal Trial Court, Branch II, Olongapo City charging him with violation of Article 59 (par. 2) of P.D. 603
and Article 46, par. 8 of P.D. 603.
○ Charged with abandonment of a minor child and violation of the obligation to give adequate support
● Municipal trial court found him guilty, but the RTC reversed this decision
● W/N Christina Dempsey is entitled to parental support - YES
○ Family Code does not distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate children
DOCTRINE
● PD 603
o Article 69 of P.D. 603 penalizes abandonment of a minor child by its parent, as provided in Article 59,
with imprisonment from two to six months or a fine not exceeding five hundred pesos or both. Article
210 penalizes a violation of the obligation to give adequate support found in Article 46 with
imprisonment not exceeding one month or a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or both, unless a
higher penalty is provided for in the Revised Penal Code or special laws.
o Article 3 provides that "all children shall be entitled to the rights herein set forth without distinction as to
legitimacy or illegitimacy, sex, social status, religion, political antecedents, and other factors."
● Article 211 of the Family Code
o The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common
children. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the
contrary. Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and are obliged to
obey them as long as the children are under parental authority.
o Article 211 of the Family Code, whose date of effectivity is approaching, merely formalizes into statute
the practice on parental authority.
SUBSTANTIVE FACTS
● Janalita Rapada, in her cohabitation with Joel Dempsey, without the benefit of marriage, gave birth to Christina
Marie on October 01, 1984, at the St. Jude's Family Clinic, Olongapo City where she delivered the child.
● Her birth certificate bears an entry of the name of the accused as the father.
● At the present, the child receives a monthly support from the accused in the sum of $150.00 thru the child's
mother, Janalita Rapada.
● Aside from this monthly support, Janalita Rapada obtained a promise from the accused to declare Christina Marie
as his dependent and also a commitment to declare the child after his citizenship.
o This will entitle the child for all the benefits and privileges extended to dependents of American US
Navy servicemen like free medical check-up.
● Efforts were made with the Naval Legal Service Office, US Naval Facilities, Subic Bay, Philippines to compel
the accused to fulfill these commitments but to no avail.
PROCEDURAL FACTS
● This is a petition denominated as one for review on certiorari and/or a special civil action for certiorari from the
decision rendered by the respondent court on November 28, 1986 in Criminal Cases Nos. 460-86 and 461-86,
entitled "The People of the Philippines v. Joel Dempsey."
● On January 30, 1986, two separate informations were filed against respondent Joel Dempsey before the
Municipal Trial Court, Branch II, Olongapo City charging him with violation of Article 59 (par. 2) of P.D. 603
and Article 46, par. 8 of P.D. 603.
● Upon arraignment, the private respondent freely, voluntarily, and spontaneously entered a plea of guilty to the
offense charged in the Information.
● Municipal trial court found him guilty.
o "For the civil liability, judgment is rendered against accused Joel Dempsey confirming the payment of
US $150.00 monthly support to Christina Marie and to continue payment thru Janalita Rapada, to be
used solely for the needs of the child until she reaches the age of majority; to recognize the child
Christina Marie as his natural child…”
● Dempsey appealed the municipal trial court's decision to the regional trial court and prayed that the award on
civil liability be set aside and the penalty of imprisonment be reduced to a penalty of fine only.
● RTC reversed the Municipal TC’s decision.
o Parental authority to which certain parental obligations are attached pertains only to legitimate and
adopted children unlike petitioner who is an acknowledged illegitimate minor child of private
respondent; that in cases of abandonment of minors, the proper forum is the Department of Social
Welfare where the person to whom the minor has been left must report immediately (Art. 161, P.D. 603).
o A person cannot be held criminally liable for failure to support a minor child.
o The Municipal Trial Court had determined a matter not within its competence and authority.
ISSUES-HELD-RATIO
W/N Christina Dempsey is entitled to parental support even if she is an illegitimate child - YES
The respondent court further ruled that Christina Dempsey is not entitled to the rights arising from the parental
responsibility of her father, she being an illegitimate child. Reliance was made on Art. 17 of P.D. 603 which defines
the joint parental authority of parents over their legitimate or adopted children. The respondent court's observations
are wrong because the law itself protects even illegitimate children. Illegitimate children have rights of the same
nature as legitimate and adopted children. This is enunciated in Art. 3, P.D. 603 which provides that "all children
shall be entitled to the rights herein set forth without distinction as to legitimacy or illegitimacy, sex, social status,
religion, political antecedents, and other factors." Rights must be enforced or protected to the extent that it is possible
to do so.
The Solicitor General points out that the new Family Code promulgated as Executive Order No. 209, July 17, 1987
erases any distinction between legitimate or adopted children on one hand and acknowledged illegitimate children on
the other, insofar as joint parental authority is concerned. Article 211 of the Family Code, whose date of effectivity is
approaching, merely formalizes into statute the practice on parental authority.
The respondent court would shift jurisdiction over the case from the municipal trial court to the Department of Social
Services and Development. It is readily apparent that the DSSD cannot take cognizance of and enforce the criminal
sanctions of P.D. 603. Besides, Christina Marie Dempsey is not an abandoned child in the strict sense of the word as
she is still in the custody and care of her mother.
Art. 141 of P.D. 603 defines an abandoned child as follows: ". . . An abandoned child is one who has no parental care
or guardianship or whose parents or guardians have deserted him for a period of at least six continuous months . . ."
Article 161 cannot, therefore, be applied to the case at bar. Thus, it is not the Department of Social Services and
Development which has jurisdiction but the Municipal Trial Court.
There is one other point which has to be corrected. As part of the civil liability in its judgment, the trial court required
the accused to recognize Christina Marie as his natural child. This should not have been done. The recognition of a
child by her father is provided for in the Civil Code and now in the new Family Code. In this criminal prosecution,
where the accused pleaded guilty to criminal charges and the issue of recognition was not specifically and fully heard
and tried, the trial court committed reversible error when it ordered recognition of a natural child as part of the civil
liability in the criminal case.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 75 of the Third Judicial
Region is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of Branch II of the Municipal Trial Court of Olongapo
City is REINSTATED with the modification that in Criminal Case No. 6886, Joel Dempsey is sentenced to
imprisonment of One (1) month and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) while in Criminal Case No. 69-86
he is ACQUITTED.
OTHER INFO: ERRORS OF THE RTC

The respondent court committed reversible error when it failed to take into account that the decision of the municipal
trial court was based on the private respondent's plea of guilty. Respondent Joel Dempsey did not and does not
challenge the validity of Presidential Decree No. 603, Articles 46 and 59 on certain obligations of parents to their
children and Articles 60 and 210 penalizing violations of mandatory provisions. As a matter of fact, respondent
Dempsey's appeal impliedly recognizes the validity of the judgment of conviction because he asked that the penalty of
imprisonment be changed to fine, not that the trial court's decision was void or that he be acquitted.
The respondent court erred in its ruling that the trial court determined a matter not within its competence and authority.
There is likewise no basis for its gratuitous finding that a parent cannot be held criminally liable under P.D. 603 for
withholding support from his minor child.
The records show, however, that Joel Dempsey's plea of guilt to the charge of withholding support from his minor
daughter was made without a full understanding of that particular charge. Janalita Rapada herself testified that she is
receiving $150.00 a month for the support of the minor Christina Marie Dempsey. The amount of P3,000.00 monthly
appears to fulfill the requirement of "adequate support" found in Par. 8, Art. 46 of P.D. No. 603. What Rapada wants is
a judicial declaration for this support to continue. This cannot be the basis of a criminal conviction.
As to the information charging abandonment, the private respondent entered his plea of guilt with full knowledge of the
consequences and meaning of his act and with the assistance of his counsel. The reversal of conviction based on a plea
of guilty is an act which is not at all explained by the respondent court and, therefore, in excess of its jurisdiction. It is
well settled as a general rule that a plea of guilt is sufficient to sustain conviction without introduction of further
evidence. Only in such exceptional cases as capital offenses is evidence still required.
• Cang v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 105308, 25 September 1998)  
Cang v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998 Ponente: J. Romero
Key Words: Custody Created By: Daena Tuazon
Herbert Cang Court of Appeals
RECIT-READY SUMMARY
● Petitioner and his wife legally separated in the Philippines and were also issued a decree of divorce by the District
Court of the State of Nevada. This left the custody of the 3 minor children to the wife, Anna Marie. The brother
and sister-in-law of Anna Marie filed for the adoption of their children since Anna Marie will be leaving for the
U.S. to attend to the family business. The RTC granted this, however, the petitioner opposed stating that he did
not give his written consent for the adoption. The issue in this case is whether or not the children of the petitioner
may be adopted despite the absence of his written consent. The Court held that it is required for the written
consent of the natural parents of the children to be issued and that the petitioner may not be deprived of his
parental authority in the absence of the authorized reasons provided for by law. The petitioner sufficiently proved
that he did not abandon his children.
DOCTRINE
● Parental Authority is inalienable - may not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law.
● The waiver of parental authority is done in adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children’s home or orphan
institution
FACTS
● The present case is a review on the Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decree of adoption of
the minors Keith, Charmaine, and Joseph Anthony
● Their parents are Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano
○ Anna Marie learned that her husband has an affair with their family friend, Wilma Soco
○ Filed for legal separation - approved by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Cebu
○ Petitioner Herbert Cang went to the U.S. to file for a divorce in the 2nd Judicial District Court of the
State of Nevada
● Custody of three minor children was awarded to Anna Marie but reserved visitation rights to petitioner
○ Petitioner also remitted a portion of his salary for the expenses of the kids
● The brother (Ronald Clavano) and sister-in-law (Maria Clara Clavano) of Anna Marie filed for the adoption of
the children of the couple since Anna Marie will be going to the U.S. to attend to family business
● Anna Marie filed an affidavit stating that petitioner evaded his legal obligation to support the children and that
her siblings helped in taking care of the kids
● Petitioner went to the Philippines to oppose this since allowing the Clavano couple to adopt his children would
strip him of parental authority
● Petitioner also filed for petition to reacquire custody since Anna Marie will leave her children to Clavano
couple
○ RTC of Cebu City, Branch 19 found that Anna Marie relinquished her custody, therefore, it shall be
transferred to the father
● Later on, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 14 issued a decree of adoption since it found that the petitioner
abandoned his children:
○ Being an “improvident father”
○ Since he is a naturalized American citizen, he is considered an alien from the standpoint of PH laws
● RTC also noted that the children themselves manifested their desire to be adopted by Clavanos
○ The couple had substantial income
○ Close ties with the Clavano family
● Petitioner moved to reconsider
○ That the finding that he was not fit to rear and care for his children was belied by the award of custody
to him
○ Anna Marie initiated joint complaint for divorce
○ Adoption was defective as it did not have his written consent as a natural father
ISSUES-HELD-RATIO
W/N the children of the petitioner may be adopted without his written
consent? - NO
● Art 31, EO 91 (this is the law in effect when the action was initiated)
The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be
necessary:
1. The person to be adopted, if 14 y/o or over
2. The natural parents of the child or his legal guardian after
receiving counselling and appropriate social services from the
Ministry of Social Services and Development or from a duly
licensed child-placement agency
3. The Ministry of Social Services and Development or any duly
licensed child-placement agency under whose care and legal
custody the child may be
4. The natural children, 14 y/o and above, of the adopting parents
● Even if the Family Code took effect during the pendency of the
petition, it still required the written consent of the natural parent to the
adoption for it to be valid
Exception to written consent rule for natural parents:

● If the parent has abandoned the child
● If parent is insane or hopelessly intemperate
Did the petitioner abandon his children? - NO

● The petition alleging the abandonment states:
○ That Herbert Cang left his wife and children when he divorced
the former
○ He abandoned them and lived in the U.S.
● However, the petitioner opposed the adoption
● “Abandon” - to forsake or renounce utterly
● Petitioner’s conduct did not manifest his intent to forego his parental
duties and relinquish parental claims
● Physical estrangement without financial and moral desertion does not
constitute abandonment
○ Maintained regular communication with his wife and children
○ Sends packages
○ Deposits money
● There should be proof that the petitioner emotionally abandoned them
○ To the extent that the children would not miss the parent’s
guidance and counsel if they were to be adopted
● Having an affair is not sufficient basis that the petitioner is an unfit
father
Parental Authority
● Transfer of custody to Anna Marie by virtue of the legal separation
did NOT deprive the petitioner of parental authority
● Parental authority cannot be entrusted to a person simply because he
can provide a larger measure of material comfort than the natural
parent
● It is protected by the Constitution
RULING
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The questioned Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, are SET ASIDE
thereby denying the petition for adoption of Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the spouse
respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. This Decision is immediately executory.
• Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto (G.R. No. 154994, 28 June 2005)
Pablo-Gualberto v Gualberto
G.R. No. 156254 June 28, 2005 Panganiban
Key Words: Parental authority; child
Created By: Marielle Tuason
custody
Jocelyn Pablo-Gualberto Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto
RECIT-READY SUMMARY
● Crisanto Gualberto filed a petition to annul his marriage to Joycelyn Pablo-Gualberto, who had left their conjugal
home with their minor son, Rafaello. He supported his petition for custody pendente lite with testimonies of
Joycelyn’s neglect to care for their son and her alleged relationship with another woman. The RTC granted the
petition but later also granted Pablo-Gualberto’s motion to lift the award. The Court rules that Article 213 of the
Family Code, is of mandatory character which governs the custody of children in case of the separation of
parents. Since Rafaello is under seven years of age, the code provides that he should not be separated from his
mother unless she is proven to be unfit due to “compelling reasons”. The Court further ruled that her sexual
orientation is not a compelling reason as for the exception to apply, it should be demonstrated to have an adverse
effect on Rafaello’s welfare and development, as stated in Article 363 of the Civil Code.
DOCTRINE
● Article 213 of the Family Code provides that in case of a separation, the choice of a child over seven years of
age will be taken into consideration, and that children under seven shall not be separated from their mother
UNLESS chosen parent (or mother) is proven to be unfit due to compelling reasons.
● In connection with Article 363 of the Civil Code which states that the welfare and well-being of children is the
paramount consideration in determining custody arrangements.
FACTS
● On March 12, 2002, respondent Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto (Gualberto) filed a petition for a Declaration of
Nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn Pablo-Gualberto (Pablo-Gualberto), with an ancillary prayer for “Custody
Pendente Lite” of their almost four-year old son, Rafaello -- Pablo-Gualberto pulled out of school and took their
son with her to Mindoro when she left the petitioner and their conjugal home in Paranaque City.
● Since the petitioner failed to appear despite notice, the RTC granted the respondent’s prayer for custody pendente
lite, citing Article 211 of the Family Code and holding that the petitioner’s parental authority is subordinate to
that of the respondent’s.
o Cherry Bastiel, a house helper of the spouses testified that Pablo-Gualberto does not provide care for the
child as she often goes out of the house. The helper also said that she saw the petitioner slapping the
child.
o Gualberto also hired Renato Santos, the President of United Security Logistic to conduct surveillance on
his wife which found that she has been having a relationship with another woman by the name of
Noreen.
o Pablo-Gualberto had no reason to take Rafaello with her, and per Sheriff returns, she is not with him in
Mindoro.
● Pablo-Gualberto filed a motion to lift the awarding of custody to Gualberto before the RTC but she failed to
present any evidence to support her motion. Even so, she was awarded custody of their son.
● Gualberto filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA alleging that the RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion for issuing reversing the order that granted him custody. It was partially granted by the CA in ruling
that the RTC did act with grave abuse of discretion but the RTC judge was not precluded from considering
Pablo-Gualberto’s motion to lift the award of custody
ISSUES-HELD-RATIO
● Whether or not the custody of the minor child should be awarded to the mother
W/N the custody of the minor child should be awarded to the mother
YES, the custody of the minor child should be awarded to the mother as the respondent was unable to provide
sufficient evidence against the fitness of the mother that will compel the court to rule against the mandatory character
of Article 213 of the Family Code.
Article 213 of the Family Code provided that “in case of separation of parents, parental authority shall be exercised
by the parent designated by the court. The court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the
choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. No child under seven years of age shall
be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise”. The Court has held that
when the parents separate (whether legally or not), this article governs the custody of the children. Although it is
mandatory in character, the exception lies in Article 363 of the Civil Code which stated that “in all questions on the
care, custody, education and property of children, the latter’s welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be
separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure”.
Prior court decisions have enumerated the following as compelling reasons: abandonment, unemployment,
immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, or affliction with a
communicable disease.
Gualberto argued that Pablo-Gualberto should not be granted custody citing “immorality” as the compelling reason
because she was found to be in a relationship with another woman. On this, the Court ruled that sexual orientation
alone does not prove parental incompetence. In order to apply the exception to Article 213, he had to establish that
the “moral lapses” have an adverse impact on the welfare and development of their son.
Due the absence of a compelling reason, the Court found no reason to deprive Pablo-Gualberto custody over
Rafaello.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the Petition in G.R. No. 154994 is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and the May 17, 2002 Regional Trial Court Order REINSTATED. The Petition in G.R. No.
156254 is DISMISSED. Costs against Petitioner Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto V.

● Custody Pendente Lite means that the custody is granted while the litigation is pending.
● Gulaberto’s petition for custody was anchored on Article 211 of the Family Code which provides that in case of
a disagreement between the father and the mother, the father’s decision shall prevail UNLESS there is a judicial
order to the contrary
• Beckett v. Sarmiento (A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326, 30 January 2013
Beckett v. Sarmiento
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326 January 30, 2013 VELASCO, JR
Key Words: [Ex. Inadmissible
Evidence – Gun; Plain View Created By: TIONG
Doctrine]
JUDGE OLEGARIO R.
GEOFFREY BECKETT
SARMIENTO, JR.
RECIT-READY SUMMARY
George Becket filed a complaint against Judge Sarmiento for not following the law and being biased by changing his
previous decision with regards to the custodial responsibility of Geoffrey, Jr. from the father to the mother. Whether or
not Judge Sarmiento is guilty of gross ignorance of the law by allowing the custody of Geoffrey, Jr. to the mother. The
Court ruled that the action done by Judge Sarmiento was proper as he followed the jurisprudential command to accord
primacy to the welfare and interest of the child. Given the various reports from DSWD, it showed definite proof that
the choice of the child in wanting to stay with his mother was proper.
DOCTRINE
● In all questions relating to the care, custody, education and property of the children, the latter's welfare is
paramount. This means that the best interest of the minor can override procedural rules and even the rights of
parents to the custody of their children.
FACTS
● Geoffrey Becket, an Australian, was previously married to Eltesa Densing Beckett, a Filipina. On June 29, 2001,
Geoffrey Beckett, Jr. was born.
● Geoffrey and Eltesa did not have a fruitful relationship and they eventually separated and filed numerous cases
against each other.
● In September 2006, Judge Sarmiento rendered judgment based on a compromise agreement of the parties.They
agreed that Beckett shall have full and permanent custody over Geoffrey, Jr., then five (5) years old, subject to the
visitorial rights of Eltesa. As agreed upon, they would also come and see Eltesa in Cebu every Christmas.
● In 2007, Beckett obtained a divorce from Eltesa in Australia, but they would continue to visit Eltesa every
Christmas until 2010 wherein Geoffrey, Jr. would stay with Eltesa but he should be returned on January 9, 2011.
However, Geoffrey, Jr. did not return on said date, prompting Beckett to file a petition against Eltesa for violation
of RA 7610.
● Beckett later applied in Sp. Proc. No. 18182-CEB for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
● Geoffrey, Jr., then nine (9) years old, displayed inside the courtroom hysterical conduct, shouting and crying, not
wanting to let go of Eltesa and acting as the father, was a total stranger. As such, Judge Sarmiento issued an Order
for Eltesa to return Geoffrey, Jr. to Beckett; and Beckett to bring the child in the pre-trial conference set for
March 15, 2001.
● The Order was not followed and Eltesa moved for reconsideration and Becket sought the implementation of the
order but Judge Sarmiento issued another order giving Eltesa provisional custody over Geoffrey, Jr. and at the
same time directing the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to conduct a social case study
on the child.
● Becket filed a motion to reconsider the order issued., but it was postponed due to the delayed report from the
DSWD.
● Beckett has instituted the instant complaint noting that respondent is liable for gross ignorance of the law for
granting Eltesa provisional custody over Geoffrey Jr.; and partiality by committing acts of serious misconduct
and irregularities in the performance of official duties
● OCA recommended that the respondent judge be adjudged liable for gross ignorance of the law and fined with
stern warning, but effectively recommends the dismissal of the charge of manifest partiality and other offenses for
want of sufficient substantiation.
● Hence, the current petition.
ISSUES-HELD-RATIO
W/N Judge Sarmiento is guilty of gross ignorance of the law by allowing the custody of Geoffrey, Jr to the
mother.
NO, the Supreme Court ruled that the actions of Judge Sarmiento exhibited fidelity to jurisprudential command to
accord primacy to the welfare and interest of a minor child by not imposing the rule of res judicata even if there was
a previous final judgment.
In Espritu v. CA, the matter of custody is not permanent and unalterable and can always be re-examined and adjusted.
In a separate opinion in Dacasin v. Dacasin, a custody agreement can never be regarded as "permanent and
unbending," the reason being that the situation of the parents and of the child can change, such that sticking to the
agreed arrangement would no longer be to the latter's best interest.
The Court discussed Art. 213 of Family Code pertaining to the post-separation custody over a minor, is that no child
under seven (7) years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise. And if already over 7 years of age, the child's choice as to which of his parents he prefers to be under
custody shall be respected, unless the parent chosen proves to be unfit.
In the case at hand, it was clearly seen that the child persistently refused to be turned over to his father, who was
already over 7 years of age. With the support of the report from DSWD, the psychologists have noted the following
instances as to the reason for the behavior of Geoffrey, Jr.:
(1) Complainant always leaves him to the care of his older half-brother or his father's girlfriends;
(2) He was at one time sent out of the house by one of complainant's girlfriends and he had to stay in the garage
alone; and
(3) He never wanted to stay with complainant whom he feared and who once locked him in his room without
food.
As such, the Court ruled that the action done by Judge Sarmiento was just and proper.
RULING
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
6. Rule on Guardianship of Minors (A.M. No. 03-02-05-SC)
A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC April 22, 2003
RE: PROPOSED RULE ON CUSTODY OF MINORS AND WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
IN RELATION TO CUSTODY OF MINORS
RESOLUTION
Acting on the letter of the Chairman of the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court submitting for this Court’s
consideration and approval the Proposed Rule on custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody
of Minors, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the same.
The Rule shall take effect on May 15, 2003 following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation not later than
April 30, 2003.
April 22, 2003
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., on official leave.
RULE ON CUSTODY OF MINORS AND WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
IN RELATION TO CUSTODY OF MINORS
SECTION 1. Applicability. - This rule shall apply to petitions for custody of minors and writs of habeas corpus in
relation thereto.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.
Section 2. Petition for custody of minors; who may file.- A verified petition for the rightful custody of a minor may be
filed by any person claiming such right. The party against whom it may be filed shall be designated as the respondent.
Section 3. Where to file petition. - The petition for custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court of the
province or city where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found.
Section 4. Contents of petition. - The verified petition shall allege the following:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and of the respondent;
(b) The name, age and present whereabouts of the minor and his or her relationship to the petitioner and the
respondent;
(c) The material operative facts constituting deprivation of custody; and
(d) Such other matters which are relevant to the custody of the minor.
The verified petition shall be accompanied by a certificate against forum shopping, which the petitioner must sign
personally.
Section 5. Summons; personal service on respondent. - If the court is satisfied that the petition is sufficient in form
and substance, it shall direct the clerk of court to issue summons, which shall be served together with a copy of the
petition personally on the respondent.
Section 6. Motion to Dismiss. - A motion to dismiss the petition is not allowed except on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties. Any other ground that might warrant the dismissal of the petition
may be raised as an affirmative defense in the answer.
Section 7. Verified Answer. - The respondent shall file an answer to the petition, personally verified by him, within five
days after service of summons and a copy of the petition.
Section 8. Case study; duty of social worker. - Upon the filing of the verified answer or the expiration of the period to
file it, the court may order a social worker to make a case study of the minor and the parties and to submit a report and
recommendation to the court at least three days before the scheduled pre-trial.
Section 9. Notice of mandatory pre-trial. - Within fifteen days after the filing of the answer or the expiration of the
period to file answer, the court shall issue an order: (1) fixing a date for the pre-trial conference; (2) directing the parties
to file and serve their respective pre-trial briefs in such manner as shall ensure receipt thereof by the adverse party at
least three days before the date of pre-trial; and (3) requiring the respondent to present the minor before the court.
The notice of its order shall be served separately on both the parties and their respective counsels. The pre-trial is
mandatory.
Section 10. Contents of pre-trial brief. - The pre-trial brief shall contain the following:
(a) A statement of the willingness of the parties to enter into agreements that may be allowed by law, indicating
its terms;
(b) A concise statement of their respective claims together with the applicable laws and authorities;
(c) Admitted facts and proposed stipulations of facts;
(d) The disputed factual and legal issues;
(e) All the evidence to be presented, briefly stating or describing its nature and purpose;
(f) The number and names of the witnesses and their respective affidavits which shall serve as the affiant's
testimony on direct examination; and
(g) Such other matters as the court may require to be included in the pre-trial brief.
Failure to file the pre-trial brief or to comply with its required contents shall have the same effect as failure to appear at
the pre-trial.
Section 11. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial.-
(a) If the petitioner fails to appear personally at the pre-trial, the case shall be dismissed, unless his counsel or a
duly authorized representative appears in court and proves a valid excuse for the non-appearance of the petitioner.
(b) If the respondent has filed his answer but fails to appear at the pre-trial, the petitioner shall be allowed to
present his evidence ex parte. The court shall then render judgment on the basis of the pleadings and the evidence thus
presented.
Section 12. What may be done at pre-trial. - At the pre-trial, the parties may agree on the custody of the minor. If the
parties fail to agree, the court may refer the matter to a mediator who shall have five days to effect an agreement
between the parties. If the issue is not settled through mediation, the court shall proceed with the pre-trial conference,
on which occasion it shall consider such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the petition.
Section 13. Provisional order awarding custody. - After an answer has been filed or after expiration of the period to
file it, the court may issue a provisional order awarding custody of the minor. As far as practicable, the following order
of preference shall be observed in the award of custody:
(a) Both parents jointly;
(b) Either parent, taking into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the minor over seven
years of age and of sufficient discernment, unless the parent chosen is unfit;
(c) The grandparent, or if there are several grandparents, the grandparent chosen by the minor over seven years
of age and of sufficient discernment, unless the grandparent chosen is unfit or disqualified;
(d) The eldest brother or sister over twenty-one years of age, unless he or she is unfit or disqualified;
(e) The actual custodian of the minor over twenty-one years of age, unless the former is unfit or disqualified; or
(f) Any other person or institution the court may deem suitable to provide proper care and guidance for the
minor.
Section 14. Factors to consider in determining custody. - In awarding custody, the court shall consider the best
interests of the minor and shall give paramount consideration to his material and moral welfare. The best interests of
the minor refer to the totality of the circumstances and conditions as are most congenial to the survival, protection, and
feelings of security of the minor encouraging to his physical, psychological and emotional development. It also means
the least detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the growth and development of the minor.
The court shall also consider the following:
(a) Any extrajudicial agreement which the parties may have bound themselves to comply with respecting the
rights of the minor to maintain direct contact with the non custodial parent on a regular basis, except when there
is an existing threat or danger of physical, mental, sexual or emotional violence which endangers the safety and
best interests of the minor;
(b) The desire and ability of one parent to foster an open and loving relationship between the minor and the
other parent;
(c) The health, safety and welfare of the minor;
(d) Any history of child or spousal abuse by the person seeking custody or who has had any filial relationship
with the minor, including anyone courting the parent;
(e) The nature and frequency of contact with both parents;
(f) Habitual use of alcohol, dangerous drugs or regulated substances;
(g) Marital misconduct;
(h) The most suitable physical, emotional, spiritual, psychological and educational environment for the holistic
development and growth of the minor; and
(i) The preference of the minor over seven years of age and of sufficient discernment, unless the parent chosen
is unfit.
Section 15. Temporary visitation rights. - The court shall provide in its order awarding provisional custody appropriate
visitation rights to the non-custodial parent or parents, unless the court finds said parent or parents unfit or disqualified.
The temporary custodian shall give the court and non custodial parent or parents at least five days' notice of any plan to
change the residence of the minor or take him out of his residence for more than three days provided it does not
prejudice the visitation rights of the non-custodial parent or parents.
Section 16. Hold Departure Order. - The minor child subject of the petition shall not be brought out of the country
without prior order from the court while the petition is pending.
The court, motu proprio or upon application under oath, may issue ex parte a hold departure order, addressed to the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, directing it not to allow the departure of the minor from the Philippines
without the permission of the court.
The Family Court issuing the hold departure order shall furnish the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation of the Department of Justice a copy of the hold departure order within twenty-four hours
from its issuance and through the fastest available means of transmittal.
The hold departure order shall contain the following information:
(a) The complete name (including the middle name), the date and place of birth, the nationality and the place of
last residence of the person against whom a hold departure order has been issued or whose departure from the
country has been enjoined;
(b) The complete title and docket number of the case in which the hold departure order was issued;
(c) The specific nature of the case;
(d) The date of the hold departure order; and
(e) A recent photograph, if available, of the party against whom a hold departure order has been issued or whose
departure from the country has been enjoined.
The court may recall the hold departure order motu proprio, or upon verified motion of any of the parties after
summary hearing, subject to such terms and conditions as may be necessary for the best interests of the minor.
Section 17. Protection Order. - The court may issue a Protection Order requiring any person:
(a) To stay away from the home, school, business, or place of employment of the minor, other parent or any
other party, or from any other specific place designated by the court;
(b) To cease and desist from harassing, intimidating, or threatening such minor or the other parent or any person
to whom custody of the minor is awarded;
(c) To refrain from acts of commission or omission that create an unreasonable risk to the health, safety, or
welfare of the minor;
(d) To permit a parent, or a party entitled to visitation by a court order or a separation agreement, to visit the
minor at stated periods;
(e) To permit a designated party to enter the residence during a specified period of time in order to take personal
belongings not contested in a proceeding pending with the Family Court; and
(f) To comply with such other orders as are necessary for the protection of the minor.
Section 18. Judgment. - After trial, the court shall render judgment awarding the custody of the minor to the proper
party considering the best interests of the minor.
If it appears that both parties are unfit to have the care and custody of the minor, the court may designate either the
paternal or maternal grandparent of the minor, or his oldest brother or sister, or any reputable person to take charge of
such minor, or commit him to any suitable home for children.
In its judgment, the court may order either or both parents to give an amount necessary for the support, maintenance
and education of the minor, irrespective of who may be its custodian. In determining the amount of support, the court
may consider the following factors: (1) the financial resources of the custodial and non-custodial parent and those of
the minor; (2) the physical and emotional health, special needs, and aptitude of the minor; (3) the standard of living the
minor has been accustomed to; and (4) the non-monetary contributions that the parents would make toward the care and
well-being of the minor.
The court may also issue any order that is just and reasonable permitting the parent who is deprived of the care and
custody of the minor to visit or have temporary custody.
Section 19. Appeal. - No appeal from the decision shall be allowed unless the appellant has filed a motion for
reconsideration or new trial within fifteen days from notice of judgment.
An aggrieved party may appeal from the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of the
denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial and serving a copy thereof on the adverse parties.
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. - A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of
minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family
Court belongs.
However, the petition may be filed with the regular court in the absence of the presiding judge of the Family Court,
provided, however, that the regular court shall refer the case to the Family Court as soon as its presiding judge returns
to duty.
The petition may also be filed with the appropriate regular courts in places where there are no Family Courts.
The writ issued by the Family Court or the regular court shall be enforceable in the judicial region where they belong.
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so
granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to a Family Court
or to any regular court within the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and
decision on the merits.
Upon return of the writ, the court shall decide the issue on custody of minors. The appellate court, or the member
thereof, issuing the writ shall be furnished a copy of the decision.
Section 21. Confidentiality of proceedings. - The hearings on custody of minors may, at the discretion of the court, be
closed to the public and the records of the case shall not be released to non-parties without its approval.
Section 22. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on May 15, 2003 following its publication in a newspaper of
general circulation not later than April 30, 2003.
7. Support (Arts. 194-208)
Art. 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance,
education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include his schooling
or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority. Transportation shall include
expenses in going to and from school, or to and from place of work. (290a)
Art. 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the following are obliged to support each other to the
whole extent set forth in the preceding article:
(1) The spouses;
(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;

(3) Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter;
(4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; and
(5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or half-blood (291a)
Art. 196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately related, whether of the full or half-blood, are likewise bound to support
each other to the full extent set forth in Article 194, except only when the need for support of the brother or sister, being
of age, is due to a cause imputable to the claimant’s fault or negligence. (291a)
Art. 197. In case of legitimate ascendants; descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate; and brothers and sisters,
whether legitimately or illegitimately related, only the separate property of the person obliged to give support shall be
answerable provided that in case the obligor has no separate property, the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership, if financially capable, shall advance the support, which shall be deducted from the share of the spouse
obliged upon the liquidation of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership. (n)
Art. 198. During the proceedings for legal separation or for annulment of marriage, and for declaration of nullity of
marriage, the spouses and their children shall be supported from the properties of the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership. After the final judgment granting the petition, the obligation of mutual support between the
spouses ceases. However, in case of legal separation, the court may order that the guilty spouse shall give support to the
innocent one, specifying the terms of such order. (292a)
Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following
persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)
Art. 200. When the obligation to give support falls upon two or more persons, the payment of the same shall be divided
between them in proportion to the resources of each.
However, in case of urgent need and by special circumstances, the judge may order only one of them to furnish the
support provisionally, without prejudice to his right to claim from the other obligors the share due from them.
When two or more recipients at the same time claim support from one and the same person legally obliged to give it,
should the latter not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the order established in the preceding article shall be
followed, unless the concurrent obligees should be the spouse and a child subject to parental authority, in which case
the child shall be preferred. (295a)
Art. 201. The amount of support, in the cases referred to in Articles 195 and 196, shall be in proportion to the resources
or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient. (296a)
Art. 202. Support in the cases referred to in the preceding article shall be reduced or increased proportionately,
according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person
obliged to furnish the same. (297a)
Art. 203. The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the
same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extra-judicial demand.
Support pendente lite may be claimed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
Payment shall be made within the first five days of each corresponding month or when the recipient dies, his heirs shall
not be obliged to return what he has received in advance. (298a)
Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the
allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support.
The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto. (299a)
Art. 205. The right to receive support under this Title as well as any money or property obtained as such support shall
not be levied upon on attachment or execution. (302a)
Art. 206. When, without the knowledge of the person obliged to give support, it is given by a stranger, the latter shall
have a right to claim the same from the former, unless it appears that he gave it without intention of being reimbursed.
(2164a)
Art. 207. When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give support when urgently needed by
the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement from the person
obliged to give support. This Article shall particularly apply when the father or mother of a child under the age of
majority unjustly refuses to support or fails to give support to the child when urgently needed. (2166a)
Art. 208. In case of contractual support or that given by will, the excess in amount beyond that required for legal
support shall be subject to levy on attachment or execution.
Furthermore, contractual support shall be subject to adjustment whenever modification is necessary due to changes of
circumstances manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties. (n)
• Susan Lim Lua v. Danilo Lua, G.R. No. 175279-80 (5 June 2013) – expenses that may be credited against
accrued support pendente lite
Lim-Lua v. Lua
G.R. No. 175279 June 5, 2013 Villarama, Jr., J
Key Words: spousal support,
Created By: Sam
essential needs
Topic: Article 194-208; Spousal Support
Susan Lim Lua Danilo Y. Lua
RECIT-READY SUMMARY
Susan Lim Lua, mother of two kids, sought ₱250,000 spousal support per month from Danilo Lua while the nullity of
their marriage is still pending in court. The RTC granted her prayer but the CA reduced it to ₱115,000 per month
following receipts that the income of Danilo is lesser than Susan claimed to be. In this case, the amount of monthly
support pendente lite as fixed by the CA was not appealed by either party. The dispute in this case is the deductions
made by Mr. Lua in settling the support in arrears. Respondent’s compliance with the final CA decision indicated that
he deducted from the total amount in arrears (₱2,645,000.00) the sum of ₱2,482,348.16, representing the value of the
two cars for the children, their cost of maintenance and advances are given to the petitioner and his children. The
Supreme Court held that deductions should be limited to those basic needs and expenses considered by the trial and
appellate courts which is ₱648,102.29. This does not include the cars bought by the respondent since it was voluntary
on his part and they are not essential needs.
DOCTRINE
● Sec. 2. Spousal Support. — In determining support for the spouses, the court may be guided by the following
rules:
a) In the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the spouses may be
supported from the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership.
b) The court may award support to either spouse in such amount and for such period of time as the court
may deem just and reasonable based on their standard of living during the marriage.
c) The court may likewise consider the following factors:
1) whether the spouse seeking support is the custodian of a child whose circumstances make it
appropriate for that spouse not to seek outside employment;
2) the time necessary to acquire sufficient education and training to enable the spouse seeking
support to find appropriate employment, and that spouse's future earning capacity;
3) the duration of the marriage;
4) the comparative financial resources of the spouses, including their comparative earning abilities
in the labor market;
5) the needs and obligations of each spouse;
6) the contribution of each spouse to the marriage, including services rendered in home-making,
child care, education, and career building of the other spouse;
7) the age and health of the spouses;
8) the physical and emotional conditions of the spouses;
9) the ability of the supporting spouse to give support, taking into account that spouse's earning
capacity, earned and unearned income, assets, and standard of living; and
10) any other factor the court may deem just and equitable.
d) The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support from the salary of the spouse.
● Sec. 3. Child Support. — The common children of the spouses shall be supported from the properties of the
absolute community or the conjugal partnership.
● Subject to the sound discretion of the court, either parent or both may be ordered to give an amount necessary
for the support, maintenance, and education of the child. It shall be in proportion to the resources or means of
the giver and to the necessities of the recipient.
● In determining the amount of provisional support, the court may likewise consider the following factors:
1. the financial resources of the custodial and non-custodial parent and those of the child
2. the physical and emotional health of the child and his or her special needs and aptitudes;
3. the standard of living the child has been accustomed to
4. the non-monetary contributions that the parents will make toward the care and well-being of the child.
● The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support from the salary of the parent.
● In this case, the amount of monthly support pendente lite as fixed by the CA was not appealed by either party.
The focus here is the deductions made by Mr. Lua in settling the support in arrears.
FACTS
● Susan Lim-Lua filed a petition against Danilo Lua for a declaration of nullity of marriage with a prayer for
support pendente lite for herself and her two children amounting to P500,000.00 per month. She cited
respondent’s huge earnings (millions) from salaries and dividends in several companies and businesses here and
abroad. She is also suffering from scoliosis (needs therapy 3x a week and eye surgery for both eyes because of
old age). She needs to hire another driver and househelper.
● After due hearing, RTC cited Art. 203 of the Family Code, stating that support is demandable from the time the
plaintiff needed the said support but is payable only from the date of judicial demand, and thus also granted
support pendente lite of P250,000.00.
● The husband filed for Motion for Reconsideration asserting that petitioner is not entitled to spousal support
considering that she does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling from their children and respondent has
continued to support the family for their sustenance and well- being in accordance with family’s social and
financial standing.
● The husband also assert that the ₱250,000 monthly support and the ₱1,750,000.00 (7 months x 250,000 from
the filing of case) retroactive support is unconscionable and beyond the intendment of the law for not having
considered the needs of the respondent
● RTC denied his motion thus he appealed to the CA wherein it reduced the monthly support to P115,000.00
which ruling was no longer questioned by both parties.
● The controversy between the parties resurfaced when respondent’s compliance with the final CA decision
indicated that he deducted from the total amount in arrears (₱2,645,000.00) the sum of ₱2,482,348.16,
representing the value of the two cars for the children, their cost of maintenance and advances are given to the
petitioner and his children.
Summary of the subject deductions under Compliance dated June 28, 2005, duly supported by receipt
Car purchases for Angelli Suzanne ₱ 1,350,000.00

Car purchases for Daniel Ryan ₱ 613,472.86
Car Maintenance fees of Angelli Suzanne ₱ 51,232.50
Credit card statements of Daniel Ryan ₱ 348,682.28
Car Maintenance fees of Daniel Ryan ₱ 118,960.52
TOTAL ₱ 2,482,348.16
● CA ruled in favor of the husband that the expenses incurred by the husband be considered advances which may
be properly deducted from the support in arrears due to the petitioner and the two children. Thus ordered the
deduction of the amount of PhP3,428,813.80 from the current total support in arrears of Danilo to his wife,
Susan Lim Lua and their two children.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration further asserting that the following amounts, likewise with
supporting receipts, be considered as additional advances given to petitioner and the children
Medical expenses of Susan Lim-Lua ₱42,450.71

Dental Expenses of Daniel Ryan ₱ 11,500.00
Travel expenses of Susan Lim-Lua ₱14,611.15
Credit card purchases of Angelli Suzanne ₱ 408,891.08
Salon and travel expenses of Angelli ₱ 87,112.70
School expenses of Daniel Ryan Lua ₱ 260,900.00
Cash given to Daniel and Angelli ₱ 121,000.0
TOTAL Php 946,465.64
GRAND TOTAL (from first table) Php 3,428,813.80
ISSUES-HELD-RATIO
W/N the expenses already incurred by the respondent may be deducted from the total support in arrears
owing to the petitioner and her children - NOT ALL
● The SC held that the CA should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by respondent to be credited
against the accrued support pendente lite.
● The monthly support pendente lite granted by the trial court was intended primarily for food, household
expenses such as salaries of drivers and house helpers, and also petitioner's scoliosis therapy sessions.
○ Hence, the value of two expensive cars bought by respondent for his children plus their maintenance
cost, travel expenses of petitioner and Angelli, purchases through credit card of items other than
groceries and dry goods (clothing) should have been disallowed, as these bear no relation to the
judgment awarding support pendente lite.
● While it is true that the dispositive portion of the executory decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 ordered herein
respondent to pay the support in arrears "less than the amount supposedly given by petitioner to the private
respondent as her and their two (2) children monthly support," the deductions should be limited to those
basic needs and expenses considered by the trial and appellate courts.
● While there is evidence to the effect that defendant is giving some forms of financial assistance to his two (2)
children via their credit cards and paying for their school expenses, the same is, however, devoid of any form
of spousal support to the plaintiff, for, at this point in time, while the action for nullity of marriage is still to
be heard, it is incumbent upon the defendant, considering the physical and financial condition of the
plaintiff and the overwhelming capacity of defendant, to extend support unto the latter
Only the following expenses of respondent may be allowed as

deductions from the accrued support pendente lite for petitioner
and her children
Medical expenses of Susan Lim- Lua ₱42,450.71

Dental Expenses of Daniel Ryan ₱11,500.00
Credit card purchases of Angelli (Groceries & Dry ₱365,282.20
Goods) ₱228,869.38
Credit Card purchases of Daniel Ryan
TOTAL ₱648,102.29
RULING
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated April 20, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP Nos. 01154 and 01315 is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. DISMISSING, for lack of merit, the cas
2. e of Petition for Contempt of Court with Damages filed by Susan Lim Lua against Danilo Y. Lua with docket
no. SP. CA - G.R. No. 01154;
3. GRANTING IN PART Danilo Y. Lua's Petition for Certiorari docketed as SP. CA - G.R . No. 01315.
Consequently, the assailed Orders dated 27 September 2005 and 25 November 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 14, Cebu City issued in Civil Case No. CEB-29346 entitled "Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y.
Lua, are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and instead a new one is entered:
a. ORDERING the deduction of the amount of Php648,102.29 from the support pendente lite in arrears of
Danilo Y. Lua to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two (2) children;
b. ORDERING Danilo Y. Lua to resume payment of his monthly support of PhP115,000.00 pesos starting
from the time payment of this amount was deferred by him subject to the deduction aforementioned.
c. DIRECTING the immediate execution of this judgment.
SO ORDERED
• Ma. Belen Mangonon for and in behalf of her minor children Rebecca and Regina Delgado v. Court of
Appeals, Federico and Francisco Delgado, G.R. No. 125041 (30 June 2006) – obligation to support the
children’s college education
Mangonon V. CA
G.R. No. 125041 June 30, 2006 Justice Chico-Nazario
Key Words: Support Created By: Janelle Sy
Topic: Support
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
MA. BELEN B. MANGONON, for JUDGE JOSEFINA
and in behalf of her minor children GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding
REBECCA ANGELA DELGADO Judge, RTC-Makati, Branch 149,
and REGINA ISABEL DELGADO FEDERICO C. DELGADO and
FRANCISCO C. DELGADO
RECIT-READY SUMMAR
● Petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married in Legaspi City, Albay.
o At that time, Petitioner was only 21 years old while respondent Federico was only 19 years old.
o Their marriage was annulled on 11 August 1975 by the Quezon City Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court. (solemnized without the required consent)
● Within seven months after the annulment of their marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina.
o Petitioner, with the assistance of her second husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as private
respondents had totally abandoned them.
● Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the United States of America (USA) where petitioner, together
with her daughters and second husband, had moved to and finally settled in.
o Rica was admitted to the University of Massachusetts (Amherst) while Rina was accepted by the Long
Island University and Western New England College.
o They were, however, financially incapable of pursuing collegiate education .
o Demands were made upon Federico and the latter’s father, Francisco, for general support and for the
payment of the required college education of Rica and Rina.
o The twin sisters even exerted efforts to work out a settlement concerning these matters with respondent
Federico and respondent Francisco, the latter being generally known to be financially well-off.
● PETITIONER: in behalf of her then minor children Rica and Rina, filed a Petition for Declaration of
Legitimacy and Support, with application for support pendente lite with the RTC Makati
● RESPONDENT: birth certificates of Rica and Rina do not bear the signature of respondent Federico, there is
no basis to claim support.
o RESPONDENT (LOLO): Obligation must be borne by those more closely related to the
recipient—petitioner and her second husband, and that he could not be made to answer beyond what
petitioner and the father (Frederico) could afford.
● RESPONDENT (FATHER): petitioner had no cause of action against him.
o He left for abroad and stayed there for a long time. He only came to know about the birth of Rica and Rina
when the twins introduced themselves to him seventeen years later.
o Even assuming that Rica and Rina are, indeed, his daughters, he alleged that he could not give them the
support they were demanding as he was only making P40,000.00 a month.
● TC: respondents directed to provide a monthly support (pendente lite) of P5,000.00 each to be delivered
within the first five days of each month without need of demand.
● PETITIONER: unsatisfied and brought the case to CA
● CA: dismissed the Petition for Certiorari and affirmed the TC decision.
● RESPONDENT: they have the option under the law as to how they could perform their obligation to support
Rica and Rina, respondent Francisco insists that Rica and Rina should move here to the Philippines to study in
any of the local universities.
● ISSUE: W/N respondent Francisco Delgado be held liable for her granddaughter’s educational support -
YES
● SC: YES, as the next immediate relative of Rica and Rina, Francisco is tasked to give support to his
granddaughters in default of their parents, it having been established that respondent Francisco has the
financial means to support his granddaughters’ education.
o Petitioner and respondent are restricted by their financial income
o Under Art 199, Francisco as the next immediate relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to
his granddaughters in default of their parents.
o Respondent Francisco cannot avail himself of the 2nd option in Art 204 since there are circumstances,
legal or moral, between respondent and petitioner which should be considered.
▪ Those who Rina and Rica had considered and claimed as family denied having any familial relationship
with them.
▪ Rica and Rina cannot be obliged to move back here in the Philippines in the company of those who
have disowned them.
● Francisco is liable for half of the amount of school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina as support pendente lite.
● Considering, however, that the twin sisters may have already been done with their education by the time of the
promulgation of this decision, support pendente lite awarded in arrears to be computed from the time they
entered college until they had finished their respective studies.1
● Remanded to TC for trial on merits of respondent’s contention that petitioners cannot invoke PH laws
since they are US citizens in accordance with Article 15 of Civil Code.
DOCTRINE
● ART 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance,
education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include his
schooling or training for some
● ART. 199 Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the
following persons in the order herein provided:
○ (1) The spouse
○ (2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
○ (3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
○ (4) The brothers and sisters.
● Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the
allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive
support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.
FACTS
● 16 February 1975: petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married by then City Court Judge
Eleuterio Agudo in Legaspi City, Albay.
o Petitioner was only 21 years old while respondent Federico was only 19 years old.
o Per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, it was annulled on 11 August 1975 by the Quezon City Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court. (solemnized without the required consent)
● 25 March 1976: Within seven months after the annulment of their marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins Rica
and Rina.
o Petitioner, with the assistance of her second husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as private
respondents had totally abandoned them.
● Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the United States of America (USA) where petitioner, together
with her daughters and second husband, had moved to and finally settled in.
o Rica was admitted to the University of Massachusetts (Amherst) while Rina was accepted by the Long
Island University and Western New England College.
o They were, however, financially incapable of pursuing collegiate education because of the following:
▪ The average annual cost for college education is US$22,000/year or a total of US$44,000.00, more or
less, for both Rica and Rina
▪ General maintenance support each in the amount of US$3,000.00 per year or a total of US$6,000 per
year.
▪ Petitioner’s monthly income from her 2 jobs is merely US$1,200 after taxes which she can hardly give
general support to Rica and Rina, much less their required college educational support.
▪ Petitioner’s present husband has his own son with petitioner and own daughter (also in college) to attend
to.
▪ Rica and Rina’s petitions for Federal Student Aid have been rejected by the U.S. Department of
Education.
1
The issue of applicability of Civil Code and her twin daughters is left to trial court to determine. In case Rica and Rina cannot invoke PH laws and are thus not
entitled to support pendente lite, the court will order return of amounts already paid.
● 17 March 1994: petitioner filed, in behalf of her then minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration
of Legitimacy and Support, with application for support pendente lite with the RTC Makati
o Demands were made upon Federico and the latter’s father, Francisco, for general support and for the
payment of the required college education of Rica and Rina.
o The twin sisters even exerted efforts to work out a settlement concerning these matters with respondent
Federico and respondent Francisco, the latter being generally known to be financially well-off.
▪ Francisco (Grandfather) is the majority stockholder and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Citadel
Commercial, Incorporated (owns and manages twelve gasoline stations, substantial real estate, and is
engaged in shipping, brokerage and freight forwarding)
● Majority stockholder and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Citadel Shipping (does business
with Hyundai of Korea)
● Owns the Citadel Corporation (owns real properties in different parts of the country).
● Chairman of the Board of Directors of Isla Communication Co. and he owns shares of stocks of
Citadel Holdings.
● Owns real properties here and abroad.
● Respondent Francisco (Grandfather) contends that birth certificates of Rica and Rina do not bear the signature
of respondent Federico, legitimacy must be first established as “there is no basis to claim support until a final
and executory judicial declaration has been made as to the civil status of the children.”
o Whatever good deeds he may have done to Rica and Rina, according to respondent Francisco, was founded
on pure acts of Christian charity.
o Obligation must be borne by those more closely related to the recipient—petitioner and her second husband,
the latter having voluntarily assumed the duties and responsibilities of a natural father.
o Even assuming that he is responsible for support, respondent Francisco contends that he could not be made
to answer beyond what petitioner and the father could afford.
● Respondent Frederico (Father) states that petitioner had no cause of action against him.
o He left for abroad and stayed there for a long time “[w]ithin the first one hundred twenty (120) days of the
three hundred days immediately preceding March 25, 1976”
o He only came to know about the birth of Rica and Rina when the twins introduced themselves to him
seventeen years later. In order not to antagonize the two, respondent Federico claimed he did not tell them
that he could not be their father.
o Even assuming that Rica and Rina are, indeed, his daughters, he alleged that he could not give them the
support they were demanding as he was only making P40,000.00 a month.
● Trial Court issued an order where respondents are hereby directed to provide a monthly support (pendente lite)
of P5,000.00 each or a total of P10,000.00 for the education of Rebecca Angela and Regina Isabel Delgado to
be delivered within the first five days of each month without need of demand.
● Petitioner was unsatisfied and brought the case to CA
● CA dismissed the Petition for Certiorari and affirmed the TC decision.
● At the time of the filing of the Petition with CA, Rica had already entered Rutgers University & Rina entered
CQ Post, Long Island University
o Rica was able to obtain tuition fee grant of 1190 USD and Federal Stafford loan of 2615 USD
o Rina was given a financial grant of 2000 USD and Federal Stafford loan of 2625 USD
o Petitioner obtained a loan to cover the remainder of RIca and Rina’s school budget through the Federal
Direct Student Loan Program.
● Francisco and Federico’s claim that they have the option under the law as to how they could perform their
obligation to support Rica and Rina, respondent Francisco insists that Rica and Rina should move here to the
Philippines to study in any of the local universities.
ISSUES-HELD-RATIO
W/N respondent Francisco Delgado be held liable for her granddaughter’s educational support - YES
YES, as the next immediate relative of Rica and Rina, Francisco is tasked to give support to his granddaughters in
default of their parents, it having been established that respondent Francisco has the financial means to support his
granddaughters’ education.
● There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and respondent Federico are the parents of Rica and
Rina, petitioner and respondent Federico are primarily charged to support their children’s college education
but both parties are restricted by their financial income
○ Trial Court and CA’s erred in finding that Frederico is liable to provide monthly support given that
Frederico’s allegations are bereft of evidence to support his assertions regarding his employment and
earning. (PHP 40,000 a month)
○ Fransisco himself stated that his son did not own anything and Frederico admitted he had no property of
his own.
■ His car and place of residence belongs to Citadel Corporation.
○ Petitioner even had to take out a loan in order to cover the remainder of her childrens’ tuition and fees.
■ RESPONDENT: (Francisco) asserts that she has a gainful employment in US and she is qualified for
a parent loan program
■ If petitioner were really making enough money abroad, she certainly would not have felt the need to
apply for said loan. The fact that petitioner was compelled to take out a loan is enough indication that
she did not have enough money to enable her to send her daughters to college by herself.
■ Even Rica and Rina themselves were forced by the circumstances they found themselves in to secure
loans under their names so as not to delay their entrance to college.
● Under Art 199, Francisco as the next immediate relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to
his granddaughters in default of their parents.
○ Respondent Francisco has the financial means to support his granddaughters’ education,(see facts for his
properties and source of income)
● Respondent Francisco cannot avail himself of the 2nd option in Art 204 since there are circumstances,
legal or moral, between respondent and petitioner which should be considered.
○ Art 204. States that the alternative of receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has
a right to receive support cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.
○ Prior to the commencement of this action, the relationship between respondent Francisco, and petitioner
and her twin daughters was indeed quite pleasant.
■ correspondences exchanged among them expressed profound feelings of thoughtfulness and concern
for one another’s well-being.
○ With the filing of this case, and the allegations hurled at one another by the parties, the relationships
among the parties had certainly been affected.
○ Those who Rina and Rica had considered and claimed as family denied having any familial relationship
with them.
○ Given all these, Rica and Rina cannot be obliged to move back here in the Philippines in the
company of those who have disowned them.
● Francisco is liable for half of the amount of school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina as support pendente
lite.
○ Amount of support should be proportionate to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of
the recipient.
○ Considering, however, that the twin sisters may have already been done with their education by the time
of the promulgation of this decision, support pendente lite awarded in arrears to be computed from the
time they entered college until they had finished their respective studies.2
W/N Trial court erred in fixing the amount of the monthly support pendente lite granted to petitioner’s
children at a measly PHP 5000 per child - NO
NO, Because of the provisional nature of a support pendente lite, a court does not need to delve fully into the merits
of the case before it can settle an application for this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is determine the kind
and amount of evidence which may suffice to enable it to justly resolve the application. It is enough that the
2
The issue of applicability of Civil Code and her twin daughters is left to trial court to determine. In case it Rica and Rina cannot invoke PH laws and are thus not
entitled to support pendente lite, the court will order return of amounts already paid.
facts be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record.
● Petitioner was able to establish, by prima facie proof, the filiation of her twin daughters to private
respondents and the twins’ entitlement to support pendente lite.
○ Francisco and the twins maintained constant communication as seen in their exchange of letters where he
wrote their names as Rica and Rina Delgado.
○ He referred to himself as Daddy Paco or Lolo Paco.
○ In a letter on October 13, 1989 he states that “as the grandfather, am extending financial help of 1000
USD”
RULING
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 20 March 1996 and Resolution dated 16 May 1996 affirming the Order dated 12 September 1995 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati, fixing the amount of support pendente lite to P5,000.00 for Rebecca Angela and
Regina Isabel, are hereby MODIFIED in that respondent Francisco Delgado is hereby held liable for support pendente
lite in the amount to be determined by the trial court pursuant to this Decision. Let the records of this case be remanded
to the trial court for the determination of the proper amount of support pendente lite for Rebecca Angela and Regina
Isabel as well as the arrearages due them in accordance with this Decision within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
Concomitantly, the trial court is directed to proceed with the trial of the main case and the immediate resolution of the
same with deliberate dispatch. The RTC Judge, Branch 149, Makati, is further directed to submit a report of his
compliance with the directive regarding the support pendente lite within ten (10) days from compliance thereof.
1. Rule 62. SUPPORT ‘PENDENTE LITE’
SECTION 1. Application.- At the commencement of the proper action or proceeding, or at any time prior to the
judgment or final order, a verified application for support pendente lite may be filed by any party stating the grounds
for the claim and the financial conditions of both parties, and accompanied by affidavits, depositions or other authentic
documents in support thereof.
● It is an amount adjudicated by the trial court during the pendency of an action for support upon application at
the commencement of the action or at anytime afterwards. (117 SCRA 929)
● It is a provisional remedy which grants a person an amount enough for his “sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
medical attendance, education and transportation” while an action is pending in court.
● As enumerated in Article 194 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the following are the coverage for support:
○ Sustenance
○ Dwelling
○ Clothing
○ Medical Attendance
○ Education
○ Transportation in keeping with the financial capacity of families.
SEC. 4. Order.—The court shall determine provisionally the pertinent facts, and shall render such orders as justice and
equity may require, having due regard to the probable outcome of the case and such other circumstances as may aid in
the proper resolution of the question involved. If the application is granted, the court shall fix the amount of money to
be provisionally paid or such other forms of support as should be provided, taking into account the necessities of the
applicant and the resources or means of the adverse party, and the terms of payment or mode for providing the support.
If the application is denied, the principal case shall be tried and decided as early as possible.
• Abella v. Cabañero, G.R. No. 206647 (9 August 2017) - establishing paternity and filiation in the course of
an action for support |
RICHELLE P. ABELLA, FOR AND IN BEHALF OF HER MINOR DAUGHTER, MARL JHORYLLE
ABELLA, PETITIONER, VS. POLICARPIO CABAÑERO, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 206647, August 9, 2017
FACTS:
In a Complaint for Support filed on April 22, 2005, petitioner Richelle alleged that while she was still a minor
in the years 2000 to 2002, she was repeatedly sexually abused by respondent Cabañero inside his rest house at
Barangay Masayo, Tobias Fornier, Antique. [9] As a result, she allegedly gave birth to a child on August 21, 2002.
Richelle added that on February 27, 2002, she initiated a criminal case for rape against Cabañero. This,
however, was dismissed. Later, she initiated another criminal case, this time for child abuse under Republic Act No.
7610 or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act. This, too, was
dismissed. Later, she initiated another criminal case, this time for child abuse under Republic Act No. 7610 or the
Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act. This, too, was dismissed. Richelle
prayed for the child's monthly allowance in the amount of P3,000.00.
In his Answer, Cabañero denied sexually abusing Richelle, or otherwise having any sexual relations with her.
Thus, he asserted that he could not have been the father of Richelle’s child.
After two (2) re-settings, pre-trial was held on February 21, 2007. Only Richelle's counsel appeared. Richelle's
motion to present her evidence ex parte was granted.
In her testimony, Richelle noted that Cabañero was related to her mother and that she treated him as her uncle.
She narrated how she was sexually abused by Cabañero on July 25, 2000, September 10, 2000, and February 8, 2002
and how Cabañero threatened her to keep her silent. She added that during this period, Cabañero sent her three (3)
letters. She testified that she bore her and Cabañero's child, whom she named Marl JhorylleAbella, on August 21, 2002.
She insisted on her certainty that Cabañero was the father of the child as she supposedly had no sexual relations with
any other man.
In its March 19, 2007 Decision, the Regional Trial Court dismissed Richelle's Complaint without prejudice, on
account of her failure to implead her minor child, Jhorylle, as plaintiff.
However, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the Regional Trial Court's basis for dismissing the Complaint. It
emphasized that non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action and added that it
would have sufficed for the Regional Trial Court to have "ordered the amendment of the caption of the Complaint to
implead the minor child." The Court of Appeals still ruled that the dismissal of the Complaint was proper as the
filiation and paternity of the child had not been previously established. As the child's birth certificate did not indicate
that Cabañero was the father and as Cabañero had not done anything to voluntarily recognize the child as his own, the
Court of Appeals asserted that Richelle "should have first instituted filiation proceedings to adjudicate the minor child's
paternity."
Following the denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, Richelle filed this Petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that filiation proceedings should have first been separately
instituted to ascertain the minor child's paternity and that without these proceedings having first been resolved in favor
of the child's paternity claim, petitioner Richelle P. Abella's action for support could not prosper.
HELD:
The Court reverses the Court of Appeals Decision.
While it is true that the grant of support was contingent on ascertaining paternal relations between respondent
and petitioner's daughter, Jhorylle, it was unnecessary for petitioner's action for support to have been dismissed and
terminated by the Court of Appeals in the manner that it did. Instead of dismissing the case, the Court of Appeals
should have remanded the case to the Regional Trial Court. There, petitioner and her daughter should have been
enabled to present evidence to establish their cause of action—inclusive of their underlying claim of paternal
relations—against respondent.
An illegitimate child, "conceived and born outside a valid marriage," as is the admitted case with petitioner's
daughter, is entitled to support. To claim it, however, a child should have first been acknowledged by the putative
parent or must have otherwise previously established his or her filiation with the putative parent." When "filiation is
beyond question, support [shall then follow] as [a] matter of obligation." A liberal application of rules should not be
"without prejudice to the right of the putative parent to claim his or her own defenses."
The recognition of an illegitimate child through a birth certificate, a will, a statement before a court of record, or
in any authentic writing, has been held to be "in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no
further court action is required."
It was improper to rule here, as the Court of Appeals did, that it was impossible to entertain petitioner's child's
plea for support without her and petitioner first surmounting the encumbrance of an entirely different judicial
proceeding. Without meaning to lend credence to the minutiae of petitioner's claims, it is quite apparent that the rigors
of judicial proceedings have been taxing enough for a mother and her daughter whose claim for support amounts to a
modest P3,000.00 every month. When petitioner initiated her action, her daughter was a toddler; she is, by now, well
into her adolescence. The primordial interest of justice and the basic dictum that procedural rules are to be "liberally
construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding impel us to grant the present Petition.
• Gotardo v. Buling, G.R. No. 165166 (15 August 2012) – support as a matter of obligation arising from
filiation
Gotardo v. Buling
G.R. No. 165166 August 15, 2012 Brion, J.
Key Words: Created By: Nic Soriano
Topic: Support
CHARLES GOTARDO DIVINA BULING
RECIT-READY SUMMARY
Charles Gotardo and Divina Buling were co-workers that later entered into in a relationship and started intimate sexual
relations after around 8 months together. After about a year, Divina found out she was pregnant. Charles then made
plans to marry her, and they applied for a marriage license, however, Charles backed out of the wedding plans. Divina
filed a complaint against Charles for breach of a promise to marry, but they ended up amicably settling the case. In
March 1995, Divina gave birth to their son, Gliffze. Charles did not show up and failed to provide support to Gliffze, in
spite of Divina’s letters for demanding support. Thus, she filed for compulsory recognition and support for their child.
Charles denied being the father, but Divina’s testimony as well as the testimony of her uncle was enough to conclude
that Charles was the father of Gliffze. The Court thus ordered Charles to recognize his son and provide a monthly child
support of Php 2,000.
DOCTRINE
● A parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate.
● Filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation.
FACTS
● Evidence showed that Divina met Charles in December 1992 at the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank,
where she had been hired as a casual employee, while Charles worked as an accounting supervisor.
● Charles had started courting her in the 3rd week of December 1992, and they became sweethearts in the last
week of January 1993.
● Charles gave Divina greeting cards on special occasions (Valentine’s Day, her birthday), and Divina
reciprocated his love and took care of him when he was sick.
● Around September 1993, Charles started intimate sexual relations with Divina in his rented room in the
boarding house managed by Rodulfo Lopez, who was Divina’s uncle.
○ Charles rented the room from March 1, 1993 to August 30, 1994.
● The sexual encounters occurred twice a month, and became more frequent in June 1994.
● Eventually, in August 1994, Divina found out that she was pregnant.
● When Divina told Charles about the pregnancy, he was happy and made plans to marry her. They applied for a
marriage license and inquired about the costs of a wedding reception and the bridal gown. Shortly after,
however, Charles backed out of the wedding plans.
● Divina filed a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court for damages against Charles for breach of promise to
marry, but they ended up amicably settling the case.
● Divina gave birth to their son Gliffze on March 9, 1995.
● Charles did not show up and failed to provide support to Gliffze.
● Divina sent a letter on July 24, 1995 demanding recognition of and support for their child. Charles did not
answer the demand.
● Thus, on September 6, 1995, Divina Buling filed a complaint with the RTC of Maasin, Southern Leyte, for
compulsory recognition and support pendente lite, claiming that Charles Gotardo is the father of her child
Gliffze.
● Charles Gotardo denied this, saying that he first had sexual contact with Divina in the first week of August 1994
and she could not have been pregnant for 12 weeks (3 months) when he was informed of the pregnancy in
September.
● Divina testified for herself and presented Rodulfo Lopez as witness.
● During the pendency of the case, the RTC granted a Php 2000 monthly child support, retroactive from March
1995.
● The RTC later ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove Gliffze’s filiation. Divina’s testimony was
inconsistent about when they had their first sexual contact, and did not clearly answer as to her reason for
engaging in sexual contact even after she refused Charles’ initial marriage proposal.
● The CA later on concluded that Divina made an honest mistake in the understanding of the questions. It was
also noted that Charles and Divina had sexual relations even before August 1994, and that Divina only had one
boyfriend- Charles. The CA set aside the RTC decision and ordered Charles to recognize Gliffze, and granted
Php 2000 for monthly child support.
ISSUES-HELD-RATIO
W/N the CA correctly ruled for ordering Charles to recognize and provide legal support to his son Gliffze -
YES
1. A person can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through:

a. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgement
b. An admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned
c. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate child
d. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws
i. Such other proof of one’s filiation may be a “baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a
family bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree,
admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court”
2. There are 4 significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action that parties have to face (Herrera
v. Alba):
a. A prima facie case: exists if a woman declares, supported by corroborative proof, that she had sexual
relations with the putative father; burden of proof shifts to the father
b. Affirmative defenses available to the father: incapability of sexual reations due to physical absence or
impotency OR that the mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of conception
c. Presumption of legitimacy
d. Physical resemblance between the putative father and the child
3. Divina established a prima facie case through her testimony that she was sexually involved with Charles at
the time of conception, and that she only had sexual relations with him. This was corroborated by Rodulfo
Lopez.
4. Charles did not deny that he had sexual relations with Divina, only that it occurred later than what she stated.
Charles failed to substantiate his allegations of infidelity. Therefore, his defense is not credible.
5. Filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation.
6. A parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate.
RULING
In this case, we sustain the award of P2,000.00 monthly child support,
without prejudice to the filing of the proper motion in the RTC for the
determination of any support in arrears, considering the needs of the child,
Gliffze, during the pendency of this case.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. The March
5, 2004 decision and the July 27, 2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA
G.R. CV No. 76326 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

● Support: everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
● The amount of support is variable, thus no final judgement on the amount of support is made. It is usually in
proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient. It may be accordingly
reduced or increased proportionately.
• Mabugay-Otamias v. Republic, G.R. No. 189516 (8 June 2016) - automatic deduction of the amount of
support from the monthly pension of a retired AFP office
Facts:
Edna Mabugay-Otamias was married to Colonel Francisco Otamias on 1978. The couple had five children.
On September 2000, they separated because of Colonel Otamias’ alleged infidelity. After the separation, their
children remained with Edna. She then demanded support equivalent to 75 percent of the colonel’s retirement
benefits. However, Colonel Otamias executed an affidavit stating that he can commit only 50 percent of his
retirement benefits to his children and wife. Because of this, they entered into a compromise agreement. On
February 26, 2003, the colonel executed a Deed of Assignment where he waived 50 percent of his salary and
pension in favor of Edna and his children. Colonel Otamias retired on April 1, 2003, and the agreement had
been honored until January 6, 2006. According to Edna, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) decided
not to honor the agreement.
Issue:
Did Colonel Otamias’ execution of the Deed of Assignment make him effectively waive his rights to 50
percent of his retirement benefits in favor of his family?
Ruling:
Yes. According to Article 6 of the Civil Code, rights may be waived unless it is contrary to law or public
policy. In this case, the waiver was made in order to ensure the support of the retired colonel of his family, a
right granted to them by the Family Code. The waiver is in no way contrary to public policy or any law for
that matter. Thus, it is deemed to be valid.
MODULE 4:
WHO OWNS WHAT? UNDERSTANDING MARRIAGE AND PROPERTY RELATIONS
Learning Outcomes:
1. Identify the applicable property relations given specific case scenarios
2. Apply the appropriate rules on charges, ownership, administration, enjoyment,
and disposition of property
GENERAL PROVISIONS AND MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS (Arts. 74-81)
• Art. 75 -
Efren Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, Sr. and Jose Juanite, Jr. (G.R. No. 164201, 10 December 2012)
DONATIONS BY REASON OF MARRIAGE (Arts. 82-87)
SYSTEM OF ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY

1. General Provisions (Arts. 88-90)
2. What Constitutes Community property (Arts. 91- 93)
• Art. 92 - Spouses Atty. Erlando Abrenica and Joena Abrenica v. Law Firm of Abrenica (G.R. No. 180572,
18 June 2012)
3. Charges upon and obligations of the Absolute Community (Arts. 94-95) • Art. 94 - Lilibeth Sunga-Chan and
Cecilia Sunga v. Court of Appeals, et. al. (G.R. No. 164401, 25 June 2008)
4. Ownership, Administration, Enjoyment and Disposition of the community prop erty (Arts. 96-98)
• Art. 96 - Josefina Nobleza v. Shirley B. Nuega (G.R. No. 193038, 11 March 2015)
5. Dissolution of Absolute Community Regime (Arts 99-104)
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS

1. General Provisions (Arts. 105-108)
2. Exclusive Property of Each Spouse (Art.109- 116)
• Art. 116 - Antonia and Alvin John Dela Pea v. Gemma Avila & Far East Bank (G.R. No. 187490, 8
February 2012)
3. Conjugal Partnership Properties (Art. 117)
3. Conjugal Partnership Properties (Arts. 118-120)
4. Charges upon and obligations of the conjugal partnership (Arts. 121-123) • Art. 121
o Ayala Investment & Abelardo Magsajo v. Court of Appeals & Spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion
Ching (G.R. No. 118305, 12 February 1998) o Joe Ros & Estrella Aguete v. Philippine National
Bank-Laoag Branch (G.R. No. 170166, 6 April 2011)
o Security Bank v. Mar Tierra Corporation, Wilfrido Martinez, Miguel Lacson and Ricardo Lopa
(G.R. No. 143382, 23 February 2004)
o Cordova v. Ty, G.R. No. 246255 (3 February 2021)
5. Administration of the conjugal partnership property (Arts. 124-125) 6. Dissolution of Conjugal
Partnership Regime (Arts. 126-128)
7. Liquidation of the Conjugal Partnership Assets and Liabilities (Arts. 129-133) Augusto v. Dy, G.R. No.
218731 (13 February 2019)

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For articles refer to :

1. The Family as an Institution (Arts. 149-151) -

- Magbaleta v. Gonong (G.R. No. L-44903, 22 April 1977)

Exception to Article 151

W/N the decision should be reversed -- NO

2. The Family Home (Arts. 152-162)

W/N the petitioners are guilty of forum-shopping

OTHER NOTES/IMPORTANT CONCEPTS

• Eulogio v. Bell (G.R. NO. 186322, 8 July 2015)

Eulogio v Bell Sr.

OTHER NOTES/IMPORTANT CONCEPTS

3. Rights and Obligations Between Husband and Wife (Arts. 68-73)

Eulogio v Bell Sr.

OTHER NOTES/IMPORTANT CONCEPTS

Aleko Lilius v. Manila Railroad

Yes, the Court found them reasonable.

b. The sum of P 5,000 adjudicated to Brita by way of indemnity is not excessive.

OTHER NOTES/IMPORTANT CONCEPTS

4. Care and Education of Children (Arts. 356-363, Civil Code)

Article 356. Every child:

(1) Is entitled to parental care;

(2) Shall receive at least elementary education;

Article 357. Every child shall:

(1) Obey and honor his parents or guardian;

(3) Exert his utmost for his education and training;

(2) Puericulture and similar centers;

(3) Councils for the Protection of Children; and

(4) Juvenile courts.

(1) Foster the education of every child in the municipality;

(2) Encourage the cultivation of the duties of parents;

(3) Protect and assist abandoned or mistreated children, and orphans;

(4) Take steps to prevent juvenile delinquency;

(5) Adopt measures for the health of children;

(6) Promote the opening and maintenance of playgrounds;

5. Parental Authority (Arts. 209-233)

Chapter 2. Substitute and Special Parental Authority

(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214;

Chapter 3. Effect of Parental Authority

Upon the Persons of the Children

(5) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;

(6) To demand from them respect and obedience;

Chapter 4. Effect of Parental Authority

Upon the Property of the Children

Chapter 5. Suspension or Termination of Parental Authority

Art. 228. Parental authority terminates permanently:

(1) Upon the death of the parents;

(2) Upon the death of the child; or

(3) Upon emancipation of the child. (327a)

(1) Upon adoption of the child;

(2) Upon appointment of a general guardian;

(1) Treats the child with excessive harshness or cruelty;

(2) Gives the child corrupting orders, counsel or example;

(3) Compels the child to beg; or

(4) Subjects the child or allows him to be subjected to acts of lasciviousness.

• Tamargo v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 85044, 3 June 3, 1992)

OTHER NOTES/IMPORTANT CONCEPTS

• Sagala-Eslao v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 116773, 16 January 1997)

• Dempsey v. RTC (G.R. Nos. 77737-38, 15 August 1988)

OTHER INFO: ERRORS OF THE RTC

• Cang v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 105308, 25 September 1998)

Cang v. Court of Appeals

Exception to written consent rule for natural parents:

• Cang v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 105308, 25 September 1998)  