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Mirowski's Machine Dreams

Article  in  European Journal of the History of Economic Thought · February 2003

DOI: 10.1080/0967256032000137766 · Source: RePEc

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 Mirowski’s Machine Dreams

by

Alexander J. Field
Department of Economics
Santa Clara University
Santa Clara, CA 95053
email: afield@scu.edu

Machine Dreams is a unique and provocative book. It would be an understatement to say

that it represents a breath of fresh air in the field of the history of economic thought: it is
perhaps better described as a sirocco blowing in off the plains of Indiana. But if
Mirowski offers us intellectual history with an edge, we should not be distracted by the
flash. This is serious scholarship evidencing deep reflection, and anyone who has
attempted something comparable can appreciate the enormous amount of work that has
gone into identifying, developing, and sustaining its argument. We can best honor this
effort by getting below its surface distractions, reading it closely, and probing its
unresolved tensions.

Let there be no mistake about it, however: this is not your father’s history of thought.

The Basic Argument

Those unfamiliar with Mirowski’s earlier writings may have difficulty initially figuring
out what this book is about. In previous works, the author has criticized economic
theorists for the often inappropriate borrowing of metaphors and analytical tools from
the physical sciences, a borrowing sometimes done unaware, but one, he has argued,
with generally adverse consequences for the discipline. Machine Dreams carries this
story forward into the second half of the twentieth century, but with some unexpected
twists.

Here, roughly, is the argument. In the supercharged and heavily militarized research
environment of the Second World War, a number of gifted scholars outside of economics
developed concepts and approaches that have had (or perhaps should have had) greater
impact on the development of the discipline than has heretofore been recognized. Who
were these scholars and what were the commonalities in their ideas? The term “Cyborg”
was first used as shorthand for cybernetic organization, but Mirowski also uses it freely
to characterize those who advance the study of such organizations. The original cyborg
scientists were operations researchers and systems analysts, whose work emerged in
response to the challenges of military communication, organization, command, and
control. Artificial intelligence, theories of computation, and complexity studies are more
recent offspring. Machine Dreams concerns the influence of these areas of inquiry on the
economics profession over the past half century.

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The cyborg sciences comprise a variety of approaches and concerns, but most generally,
Mirowski argues, they are distinguished by an interest in the emergence of order from
chaos, in “organized complexity.” Their salient feature has been the use of the computer
as metaphor for the thought processes of individual actors, or for the institutions at the
organizational or societal level (e.g., market rules) that govern or influence behavior, and
as a tool, a machine, for pursuing scientific inquiry. Machine Dreams are therefore to be
understood as research agendas intending to model human actors as automata and market
mechanisms as themselves forms of computers, or both; to use computers for simulation
and Monte Carlo approaches in cases where there is no clear analytical solution; and
finally, although this receives less emphasis in the text, to exploit computers for data
analysis, as in econometric inquiry.

The vertices of Mirowski’s “cyborg triangle” are Norbert Wiener, who coined the term
cybernetics, Claude Shannon, progenitor of information theory, and John von Neumann,
who is the central figure in this story (p. 68). Mirowski is primarily interested, however,
not in what von Neumann is best known for among economists – the proof of the
minimax-maximin theorem for zero sum games, or the axiomatization of the expected
utility treatment of choices involving gambles. Rather, it is von Neumann’s later work on
the theory of automata, along with his contributions to the architecture of the stored
program computer that receive the most attention. Because of the emphasis on the theory
of computation, Alan Turing also figures prominently in the narrative.

Few economists, or others, would dispute the proposition that the computer has, since its
invention, changed the way we live and work. To the extent that von Neumann helped in
its design, he has clearly influenced our lives as citizens and as economists. But
Mirowski is after a much broader range of intellectual influence than this. And here the
argument is more problematic. As Mirowski admits, neoclassical economics after the
Second World War presented anything but a united front. He distinguishes between three
dominant but “wildly divergent” approaches, the Chicago school, which essentially
ignored the von Neumann agenda, the Cowles Commission, which tried to assimilate it
within the context of neoclassical themes, and the MIT school, which tried actively to
purge it. On balance, then, by Mirowski’s own account, mainstream economics
remained relatively hostile to “cyborg themes” at least until the 1980s (pp. 191, 227,
231). Indeed, his narrative provides more compelling evidence for this lack of influence
up through the early 1980s than it does for the claim that in the last two decades cyborg
themes have extensively intruded. This latter argument, central to the view that
economics has become or is about to become a cyborg science, is really only sketched
out.

To be sure, game theory is now experiencing one of its periodic revivals, and economists
such as recent Nobelists George Akerlof, Michael Spence, and Joseph Stiglitz have been
honored for work encouraging us to pay more attention to the uneven distribution of
information. But few economists today evidence interest in cybernetic theory, and much
as Shannon’s research has helped in developing compression algorithms and error
correction protocols, it plays essentially no role in recent economics work. In any event,
recognizing our now more sophisticated treatment of information asymmetries is a far cry

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from acknowledging that von Neumann’s program, particularly its extension to the study
of markets as automata that Mirowski advocates, has been widely embraced by the
profession. This is a criticism Mirowski apparently encountered in presenting earlier
versions of this book (p. 545).

Although most economists are aware of von Neumann, Wiener, and Shannon, most also
continue to view them as peripheral to the development of economics, with the possible
exception of those aspects of von Neumann’s work with which Mirowski is least
interested. This raises two questions: has the influence on economics of this triumvirate
been broader than that which the popular perception has accorded it? Secondly, if the
influence has indeed been peripheral up until now, is this a situation that is being or
should be reversed? Before trying to address these issues, however, we must detour to
discuss the tone and stylistic features of Mirowski’s work, because both present obstacles
to deciphering its substance.

Style and Substance

In reviewing this book, it is simply impossible to avoid addressing Mirowski’s stylistic

affectations. If you are going to read this volume, you had best do so with at least one
dictionary by your side, and even that will not suffice in a number of cases. Here, for
example, are a few of the author’s favorite words: mumpsimus, flocculent, rodomontade,
appanage, allocution, uberous, ambage, laminar, keeking, anisotropic, coruscate, epopee,
gonfalons, protopadeutic, proleptic, pinquefied, perscrutation, stylobate, deliquescence,
zaddick, surd, scrum, and gloze.

Forsaking simple, one syllable words like “part”, Mirowski opts instead for three syllable
obscurity: “moiety”. Rarely satisfied with a simple declarative sentence, he insists on
adding adjectives or adverbs in order to maintain a critical tone that fuels much of the
prodigious intellectual effort underlying this inquiry. Thus instead of writing “yet, in
1932, there were few economists who thought that the disarray and failures of economics
could be resolved by a reconsideration of the foundations of the demand function … ” ,
he feels compelled to write “yet, in 1932, there were a paltry few economists who
thought that the ubiquitous disarray and patent failures of economics could be promptly
resolved by an abstract reconsideration of the scientific foundations of the demand
function…” (p. 192, my italics). And this is a relatively tame example. A good 5 cent
filter eliminating gratuitous modifiers would have been of great value.

Mirowski’s obsession with language does not stop with English. Indeed, the phrase with
which he is most enamored – by my count it appears more than twenty times in the
narrative – is fin de siècle, as in, for example, fin de siècle economics, meaning
economics as it was practiced at the end of the twentieth century. Mirowski loves this
expression, he loves the way it curls off his keyboard, dripping with disdain, redolent of
decadence, sex, and corruption. Sexual imagery is uncommonly frequent for a work in
the history of thought. Ideas are promiscuous, or better yet, ontologically promiscuous
(p. 442); camp followers “lust” after a mathematical theory of information (p. 76);
neoclassical economists have “wet dreams” (p. 525). The lurid language and the

3
conflation of the cultural atmospheres of the end of our most recent centuries conjure up
images of consumptive Parisian cabaret singers sipping absinthe with Nobel Memorial
Prize winners – Nicole Kidman meets Kenneth Arrow… perhaps not so far fetched given
that both could be seen on the most recent Academy Awards show. It’s a flashy side
show, but how much, if at all, does it really advance the narrative?

One could go on in this vein. Is Mirowski having fun? No doubt. And perhaps that’s
OK. As my daughter says, “Whatever floats your boat.” But are we? I have read the
text twice, some parts yet again. My judgment is that it could have been trimmed to 400
pages with little loss of intellectual content. It’s not that it’s repetitive, it’s just that there
is too much cleverness and cuteness, obscure references to popular culture, and recherché
puns (“Previews of Cunning Abstractions”, “blastoplasts from the past”, “blipkrieg”,
“send in the clones”). Some may find this amusing, and at one level it is. But as a
reviewer trying to extract the essence of the argument, I found it distracting, and my
concern is that others will as well. By introducing noise into the communication channel,
the author has rendered substance less accessible than it might be.

And unfortunately, Mirowski is often not really interested in explaining difficult

concepts. Although there is little math except in the appendix, much of the material will
be unfamiliar to economists. In terms of helping us understand it, there’s a kind of “if
you need to ask, you can’t afford to know,” attitude. He quotes von Neumann, the figure
the author seems most to admire (if he can come to use this word with respect to any of
his subjects) as advising Shannon to make use of the entropy concept, because “most
people don’t know what entropy really is, and if you use the word “entropy” in an
argument you will win every time!” (p. 68). Is this his own template? Too often, an
interest in displaying erudition and cleverness creates unnecessary barriers to intellectual
entry. If you are not up to speed on the second law of thermodynamics or the features of
a universal Turing machine, this book is unlikely to help you: better and clearer
expositions can be found by doing a Google search on the web.

And when you do know more about a subject, you may well be frustrated in different
ways. I found the exposition of the Nash program in game theory, for example,
particularly uneven. Thus Mirowski expresses puzzlement over John Harsanyi’s
comment that the inability to make binding agreements turned out to be more important
for the Nash solution concept than the prohibition on communication (p. 343). To me
this is no great puzzle: it seems simply to reflect the fact that in many games, such as the
Prisoner’s Dilemma, allowing players to communicate has no effect analytically on the
outcome, whereas allowing players to make binding agreements clearly does.

Similarly, I see little evidence that the Nash concept played much role in stimulating an
interest in cognition as statistical inference (p. 348). A central feature of both Nash and
von Neumann’s approaches to game theory was an emphasis on making forecasts of
counterparty play (when it mattered for one’s own decision) in the absence of any data on
the past behavior of counterparties. Similarly, Mirowski glosses “the obstacles that
confront Nash equilibria – ranging from nonuniqueness to the folk theorem” (p. 348). If

4
we are talking about indefinitely repeated games, these really aren’t two separate issues,
since the latter implies the former.

I know what you did last summer

Part, but by no means all, of the book is suffused with a persistent and, for those who
have read Mirowski’s earlier work, familiar sense of outrage that physicists and
mathematicians have invaded the social sciences, intimidating those less technically
adept, and importing methods and metaphors inappropriate for analysis of the
phenomena under study. Much of the work reads like an exercise in academic
muckraking and appears to be laying groundwork for a manifesto (although those who
await it will be disappointed). Mirowski is often out to push your buttons – he is
outrageous – and you may well be outraged, although different people will be so for
different reasons.

For much of the book, Mirowski luxuriates in the shadowing of major twentieth century
economists, continuing to slip them the equivalent of little notes saying – I know what
you did last summer (you probably spent it in Santa Monica), I’m on to your game, I
know the math and physics as well as you, and I will expose your retailing of second rate
metaphors to a less sophisticated audience. Ah, yes, retail. Ideas are never published,
discussed, or developed. They are invariably retailed. By the end of the book, Mirowski
even has himself in the business (p. 545)! His aim seems to be to bring the “elect” down
a notch, to demythologize them, to portray them (us?) as not much more than hucksters
and glorified salespersons, flogging often questionable merchandise.

There is nothing per se wrong with this. Our profession can only benefit from those who,
from time to time, announce that the emperor has no clothes. If the claims are correct,
blinders will fall from our eyes, we will emerge as if from a fog, we will once again, or
for the first time, see clearly. If the emperor really is not déshabillé, then shifting the
terms of discourse, shifting the burden of proof so that practitioners must demonstrate
that the emperor’s private parts are indeed covered, can be a bracing exercise for a
profession whose behavior often does not measure up to its scientific pretensions. At
best, his stance is a brief for skepticism, a point of view reflected in his dedication: “To
those of the younger generation who resist the confident blandishments of their teachers:
in them resides the hope for the future of economics.”

There are many revealing vignettes in this story. My favorite: Oskar Morgenstern
circulating a petition suggesting that membership in the Econometrics Society be
conditional on the individual “actually (having) done some econometric work.”
Morgenstern suggested that members: “must have been in one way or another in actual
contact with data they have explored and exploited” (p. 395). Allowing perhaps for
mathematical statisticians who have contributed statistical tools, and focusing on the
merits, not the personalities, how could a reasonable person oppose this, given the name
of the society? According to Mirowski, the suggested requirement was indeed supported
by a majority of fellows of the Society, but Tjalling Koopmans managed to have it
defeated. The story sheds light on something that has always puzzled me: why do so

5
many articles in Econometrica lack data or any relation to the development of statistical
estimators, and why are they so often of questionable relevance for empirical inquiry?

As far as established members of the profession are concerned, then, Mirowski takes few
prisoners: he is there, at every step, saying, I will uncover and unmask your hawking of
shoddy goods to a public too confused to understand what the issues are. And I will
show, even if you are reluctant to admit it, how important military influences have been
both in funding your work and in defining the research topics you studied. The theme of
military funding thus supplements that of physics envy carried over from earlier work.

But the task of maintaining a consistent sense of outrage is more difficult than in earlier
work, since Mirowski, with surprising restraint, explicitly eschews any claim that
military funding necessarily tarnishes the caliber of research (p. 158). Moreover, his
attitude toward cyborgs, in particular von Neumann, is considerably more complex than a
superficial reading might suggest. (Hint: when the author treats someone like von
Neumann, whom he admires, or at least doesn’t scorn, the style becomes significantly
less rococo.) Moreover, by the end of the book, after casting doubt on most of the other
goods in the intellectual marketplace, he does finally draw open his cloak to reveal,
somewhat furtively, his own von Neumann Mark II designs. We need, it goes without
saying, to examine them as carefully as he insists we scrutinize other wares (do they carry
the Underwriters Laboratory seal of approval?) – before any money changes hands.

So what we have here is a complex story, one that is more than a simple matter of
inappropriate borrowing of metaphors and methods. Perhaps the clearest statement of
objectives appears towards the conclusion (it would have been welcomed earlier): the
book’s “purpose has been to argue that von Neumann’s machinic hum has haunted the
American economics profession in the postwar period, and that proponents of the
neoclassical orthodoxy have repeatedly conceived and shaped their doctrines in reaction
against the cyborg imperatives that they think they have detected in von Neumann’s
work” (p. 545). It is a story that is told with the benefit of an enormous amount of
intellectual inquiry, much of it archival. But it is also one whose elements are difficult to
extract and simply characterize and whose merits are difficult to evaluate because there
are so many other distractions.

Where are we going?

And by the time one is two thirds of the way through, one is asking, to what end? What
direction does Mirowski want social and behavioral science to take? The lead blurb on
the back cover is from David Warsh of the Boston Globe. Warsh writes that this book is
both news and opinion, and that, with respect to the latter, “Cyborg economics … is not
the sort of science Mirowski wants to see.” Warsh, in my view, has this wrong, although,
to be fair, one has to read carefully to discern the style of inquiry Mirowski does endorse.

Towards the very end of the book, Mirowski finally confronts the question that readers
who have gotten that far will be asking. If the cyborg version of economics requires a
shift from understanding economics as the science of allocating scarce resources to

6
competing ends to the study of the economy as a giant information processor, is this
something that Mirowski supports? “I am repeatedly taken aback at the capacity of the
narrative recounted in this volume to provoke the most overwrought reactions: outrage,
perfervid denial, disgust, but most frequently, the desperate question – are the cyborg
sciences a good thing or a bad thing? … For a long time, I used to plead agnosticism:
isn’t that your job to judge, dear reader?” (p. 560). Well, actually, no. In reading a book
of this length, we have placed some trust in our author to serve as a guide, to point the
way not only through the past but also towards the future.

Mirowski realizes this but, like an opposition politician who loves taking potshots at
those in power, he clearly finds it more difficult to take pleasure in governing. Having
sought throughout the book to avoid the appearance of endorsing any research program,
he finally succumbs to telling us what kind of economics he would like us to pursue, and
indeed, in an appendix, gives us an example of it.

Towards the end of his life, Mirowski suggests, von Neumann’s idea of “economics as
the science of emergent complexity through the hierarchical development of social
organizations began to find its voice” (p. 150). Mirowski’s view seems to be that the
program von Neumann sketched out will inexorably and inevitably take over economics,
but that we have a choice. We can go either in the direction of pursuing the study of
human actors as automata or we can favor an agenda emphasizing the study of market
rules and institutions as types of computers. Market institutions are then to be understood
as self regulating machines. Von Neumann, Mirowski maintains, dreamed of computers
as electronic prostheses that would supplement and ultimately transcend human
rationality, interacting with each other in a world in which strategies were not completely
specified and in which machine evolution occurred.

We discover now, however, that Mirowski also dreams of machines. He advocates

pushing forward with this program, treating different types of markets (such as posted
offer, double auction, or sealed bid) as computers, and developing an ecological approach
to their persistence and frequency distribution through time. As opposed to the attempt to
build up aggregate outcomes from models of individual human behavior, he finds this
approach “ironically, the program more faithful to the humanist impulse” (p. 564),
presumably because it forswears any attempt to impose structure on the psychology or
cognition of human beings.

But what exactly does this version of the von Neumann program really entail? Is it
meaningful to talk about market institutions evolving on their own, independently of
human design? Can we really so easily dispose of vexing issues involving the nature of
man, his motivations, and his cognitive abilities? Mirowski has persuaded me that an
ecological approach to the study of “evolution” of market mechanisms, and the
development of a taxonomy of their complexity, are research agendas worth pursuing. I
do not think, however, that they are the only things we should be doing in the next half
century, any more than I believe that much of what has passed for economic science in
the last much honors the ideals of scientific inquiry.

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But again, on the table at the end of the book are no longer the deficiencies of what we
are or have been doing, but the merits of what Mirowski proposes we should do. The
author himself acknowledges that his program is “vague, poorly linked to empirical
inquiry” (p. 544). These comments raise legitimate concerns, and we should recognize
that the agenda may end up like a number of other cyborg enthusiasms – artificial
intelligence comes to mind – that have never lived up to their apparent promise. Or
worse. Readers can access http://cyborgmanifesto.org for an example of the direction in
which this type of thinking can go – and evidence of how many people take it seriously!

Early in the book Warren Weaver figures significantly as one of most important cyborg
meisters. Mirowski describes initial reactions to some of the projects he supported:
“This may have seemed excessively intangible and imprecise to most readers in 1949 –
Weaver had no concrete examples of problems solved at that point…” (p. 176). Half a
century later, what would that list of examples look like? Is it an empty page, a telephone
book, or something in between? My point is this: if the inevitability or desirability of
further penetration of the discipline by a version of cyborg science is to be advocated, the
question of its prior accomplishments is one we should address more directly.

Mechanisms and psychology

Economists have undoubtedly been paying more attention to issues of information and
cognition in recent years. But rational choice models involve aims and goals as well as
cognition. And while economists have often oversold methodologically individualist
approaches by conflating them with assumptions about human selfishness, we are in
danger here, it seems to me, of losing any great concern with individual actors. Indeed,
in contrast to Duncan Foley’s comments on the back cover, I see precious little attention
to or interest in psychology in this book (see, e.g., p. 341, where the author disclaims
interest in such theorizing).

In this respect, Mirowski mirrors von Neumann, whose views on human nature are at best
opaque. Mirowski quotes him to the effect that: “it is just as foolish to complain that
people are selfish as it is to complain that the magnetic field does not increase unless the
electric field has a curl. Both are laws of nature” (p. 100). Von Neumann was also
prepared to carry the logic of the strict dominance of the defect strategy in a Prisoner’s
Dilemma every bit as far as would John Nash, and indeed further, publicly advocating in
the early 1950s, along with Bertrand Russell, a first strike against the Soviet Union. On
the other hand, von Neumann championed what Nash would later call cooperative game
theory, in which individuals were assumed, without any explanation as to what aspect of
human nature might make this possible, to be able to enter into binding agreements
amongst themselves. This treatment of coalitions in cooperative game theory might
suggest a more nuanced approach to human motivation than Nash’s, but on balance, I
would not turn to either for deep insights into human psychology.

Those steeped in the traditional sociological/anthropological tradition continue to rail

against economists’ love affair with methodological individualism. Mirowski from time
to time endorses this criticism, but not to defend concepts such as norms, social structure,

8
or culture, which in the hands of sociologists have tended to be after the fact
“explanations.” He does, however, seem to see in von Neumann an endorsement of the
meaningfulness of emergent properties: “this theme, that “rationality” gives rise to certain
organizational structures, which then refer back to themselves in a recursive fashion,
redefining the prior notion of rationality in a more complex way, was leitmotiv of the last
decade of his life” (p. 135).

The social sciences have a long tradition of debating the merits of rationality and
methodological individualism. Mirowski is clearly tired of these debates. But we can’t
transcend or at least avoid them by trying to elevate all discussions of rationality to the
level of the institutions that govern organizations and economies, as opposed to the
behavior of individual humans. Mirowski welcomes the increased interest in the economy
as an information processor, and the increased emphasis on cognition in studies of
economic problems. I do as well. But we delude ourselves if we believe that the study of
decisions or behavior – rational or otherwise – begins and ends with cognition. We need
also concern ourselves with goals, motivations, preferences, and these are not ultimately
matters of cognition.

The problem with methodologically individualist approaches, which economists have

traditionally endorsed, but that others, such as sociologists, have excoriated, may not be
in the principle itself, but in its coupling with very restrictive assumptions about human
motivation: that humans are inherently and unidimensionally driven to pursue their own
material self interest. This view, common among economists, is underpinned by an
appeal to popular conceptions of Darwinism – views which serious consideration of
evolutionary theory, in particularly the possibility of selection above the level of the
individual organism, calls into question.

All social and economic organization requires a bifurcation of activity into spheres in
which people are expected to pursue individual gains, and those in which we must
vigorously resist such temptations. That bifurcation has tremendous implications for
economic performance and social welfare, and market systems have generally done
relatively well in this regard. But market systems are part of a continuum – they do not
transcend the division. What must we assume about human nature to explain how this is
possible? We expect firms vigorously to pursue individual gain as profit maximizers, at
the same time that we expect them to refrain from bribery, corruption of political figures,
and phony accounting. We make similar distinctions for individuals.

Extreme public choice types may argue that not only will we bribe, or fudge the numbers
to advance our interests when we can get away with it, but we should. But most recognize
that as a practical matter, market systems simply cannot operate if calculations based on
individual or organizational material interest completely govern behavior in the political
sphere (or even within organizations). This is a point driven home with particular
empirical force by recent experience in transition economies. To the degree that
economics is a behavioral science, there remain important scientific questions as to why
we possess the behavioral predispositions that make possible this bifurcation.

9
 If this line of inquiry is to be pursued, however, it does lead in the direction of modeling
individual behavior, not studies of the ecology of institutions favored by Mirowski.
Mirowski clearly wants to get away from questions about the psychology of individuals –
a line of inquiry he sees as eventually and inevitably dehumanizing. Pursuing an
ecology of markets, nevertheless, also gets him away from any consideration of real
evolutionary theory and history, as opposed to its metaphorical use, which is what he
intends. But tough problems don’t disappear just because we ignore them. Market
mechanisms can only arise if humans have some initial predispositions to avoid harming
each other. Questions of why this might be remain important and should not be swept
away in an enthusiasm for the study of market automata.

Reading this book has made me much more aware of the “machinic hum” of cyborg
science, aware that people are getting funding to pursue studies in complexity theory,
artificial intelligence, and a whole variety of other endeavors. As scholars, however, we
must pick and choose our intellectual investments carefully. While I share Mirowski’s
dissatisfaction with much of economics as it has been practiced in recent years, I also
remain skeptical about the likely payoffs to many cyborg enthusiams. More aware now of
the buzz, I nevertheless continue to filter much of it out, as I suspect, do the majority of
economists. Thus I remain unconvinced that economics has become a cyborg science, or
that we should adopt massive funding initiatives to enable it to become one.

Alexander J. Field is the Michel and Mary Orradre Professor of Economics at Santa Clara University. He
is most recently the author of Altruistically Inclined? The Behavioral Sciences, Evolutionary Theory, and
the Origins of Reciprocity. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001.

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