THE UNITED STATES vs.

GABINO SOLIMAN

G.R. No. L-11555 January 6, 1917

FACTS:

Gabino Soliman, the defendant and appellant in this case is testifying in his
own behalf in the course of another criminal case in which he, with several others,
was charged with estafa, swore falsely to certain material allegations of fact. He
testified false testimony, claiming that the execution of a sworn statement offered as
evidence in support of the charge of estafa—which was effectively an extrajudicial
confession of guilt—had not been voluntary and had not been obtained by the police
through the use of force, intimidation, and prolonged torture. The trial judge who
presided over the former case found the accused not guilty on the grounds that there
was reasonable cause to believe the extrajudicial confession had not been made
voluntarily, and his decision in this regard amply demonstrates the significance of the
false testimony offered in that case. Furthermore, the significance of the evidence is
evident even without taking the trial judge's ruling in that case into account, as if this
false testimony were to be accepted as true, the accused would have been
exonerated. (U.S. v. Estraa, 16 Phil. Rep., 522). The accused violated section 3 of
Act No. 1697, which defines and punishes perjury, and that the trial judge's sentence
of six months in jail and a P300 fine was properly given in accordance with that
statute's provisions.

However, since the judgment was entered in this case on November 23,
1915, section 3 of Act No. 1697 it has been expressly repealed by the enactment of
the Administrative Code, which became effective on July 1, 1916, and it has been
suggested that the judgment convicting and sentencing the accused under the
provisions of that statute should not be sustained, and that the repeal of the statute
should be held to have the effect of remitting and extinguishing the criminal
responsibility of the accused incurred under the provisions of the repealed law prior
to the enactment of the Administrative Code. We cannot agree with the proposition
thus stated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the repealing statute provides or has the effect of providing
new penalties for the commission of the acts penalized under the repealed statute;
should the penalty be imposed in accordance with the old or the new statute.
RULING:

Yes. Section 12 of the Administrative Code (Act No. 2657) which is

found in Article III, [Chapter I] dealing with the form and effect of laws in
general, provides that "when a law which expressly repeals a prior law is itself
repealed the law first repealed shall not be thereby revived unless expressly
so provided." From which it may fairly be inferred that the old rule continues in
force where a law which repeals a prior law, not expressly but by implication,
it itself repealed; and that in such cases the repeal of the repealing law
revives the prior law, unless the language of the repealing statute provides
otherwise.

Applying this rule, the Supreme Court concludes that the express
repeal of section 3 of Act No. 1697 by the enactment of the Administrative
Code (Act No. 2657) revived the provisions of the Penal Code touching
perjury, which were themselves repealed, not expressly but by implication, by
the enactment of Act No. 1697. A comparison of the penalties prescribed in
the Penal Code for the commission of the acts of which the accused in the
case at bar was convicted, giving him as we should the benefit of the
provisions of Act No. 2142, discloses that the penalty prescribed therein is
less than that imposed upon the appellant under the provisions of section 3 of
Act No. 1697, and we conclude from what has been said already that the
penalty imposed by the court below should be revoked and that in lieu thereof
the penalty prescribed in the Penal Code should be imposed upon the convict.

FALLO:

The judgment of conviction entered in the court below should be affirmed but that the
sentence imposed therein should be reversed, and that giving the accused the
benefit of the provisions of Act No. 2142, a penalty of 4 months and 1 day of arresto
mayor and a fine of P75 with subsidiary imprisonment as prescribed by law should be
imposed upon him in lieu of that imposed by the trial judge, with the costs of this
instance de officio.