ACTIVITYliezel

ACTIVITY # 1
(MIDTERM)
VICE AND DRUG EDUCATION
AND
CONTROL
SUBMITTED BY :
LUAD, NOELYN N. BSCRIMINOLOGY III-
A
SUBMITTED TO :
MA’AM LEZEIL ABUAN
CASE # 1
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 250295, March 15, 2021 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. NACI BORRAS Y LASCANO, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
The Case
Petitioner People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), assails the
Decision1 dated October 28, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 159780 entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Hon. Soliman M. Santos, Jr., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 61, Naga City and
Naci Borras y Lascano" upholding private respondent Naci Borras y Lascano's plea bargain sans the
prosecutor's conformity.
Antecedents
By Informations2 dated March 10, 2017, private respondent was charged with violations of Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165), as amended by Republic Act No. 10640 (RA 10640), viz.:
Criminal Case No. 2017-0358
That on March 10, 2017, in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, [did] [then] and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally sell, dispense, and deliver
one (1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet, containing white crystalline substance weighing 0.032
gram, later marked as RCP3-10-17, to poseur buyer PO2 Randy C. Pitallano, which when tested was found
positive for the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride popularly known as "shabu," a dangerous drug, in
violation of the above cited law.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 2014-0359
2|Page
That on March 10, 2017, in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, without authority of law, [did] then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally
have in his possession, custody and control three (3) heat-sealed & masking tape-sealed transparent plastic
sachets, containing white crystalline substances, described and later marked as: 1) RCP-1 3-10-17 weighing
0.1116 gram, 2) RCP-4 3-10-17 weighing 0.037 gram and 3) RCP-3 3-10-17 weighing 0.012 gram; with
aggregate weight of 0.165 [gram]. Said items when tested were found to be Methamphetamine Hydrochloride,
popularly known as "shabu," a dangerous drug, in violation of the above cited law.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
On arraignment, private respondent pleaded not guilty to both charges. Trial ensued.
Meantime, on August 15, 2017, the Court promulgated Estipona v. Lobrigo3 declaring as unconstitutional

Section 234 of RA 9165 for being contrary to the Supreme Court's rule-making authority under Section 5
(5),5 Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Section 23 prohibits a person charged under RA 9165 to avail of
plea bargaining.
Thereafter, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued Department Circular No. 061-17 or the "Guidelines on Plea
Bargaining Agreement for RA 9165 Otherwise Known as the 'Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2000"'
dated November 21, 2017,6 viz.:
Offense charged in Information Acceptable Plea Bargain

Section Penalty Section Penalty
Section 5 Life Imprisonment to No Plea Bargain
Sale, Trading, etc. of Death & Fine from Allowed
Dangerous Drugs Php500k to Php10M
Section 11, par. 3 12 yrs. & 1 day to 20 Sec. 15 6 mos. Rehab (1st
Possession of yrs. and Fine from Use of Dangerous Offense)
Dangerous Drugs Php300k to Php400k Drugs 6 yrs. & 1 day to 12
(Where quantity of yrs. & fine from
"shabu", opium, Php50k to Php200k
morphine, heroin, (for 2nd offense)
cocaine is less than 5
grams, etc.)
Following Estipona, on April 12, 2018, the Court promulgated A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC,7 adopting the plea
bargaining framework in drugs cases, viz.:
Offense Charged Acceptable Plea Bargain

Section Penalty Quantity Section Penalty8
Section 11, par. 3. 12 years & 1 .01 gram to 4.99 Section 12. 6 months and 1
Possession of day to 20 years grams Possession of day to 4 years
Dangerous Drugs and fine ranging Equipment, and a fine
(Where quantity from Instrument, ranging from
of shabu, opium, Php300,000 to Apparatus and Php10,000 to
3|Page
morphine, heroin, Php400,000 Other Php50,0009
cocaine is less than 5 Paraphernalia
grams) for Dangerous
Drugs
Section 5. Life .01 gram to .99 grams Section 12. 6 months and 1
Sale, Trading, etc. of Imprisonment to (methamphetamine Possession of day to 4 years
Dangerous Drugs Death and fine hydrochloride Equipment, and a fine
(Methamphetamine ranging from or shabu only) Instrument, ranging from
hydrochloride Php500,000 to Apparatus and Php10,000 to
or shabu only) Php10,000,000 Other Php50,000 10
Paraphernalia
for Dangerous
Drugs
On May 17, 2018, the DOJ issued Regional Prosecution Office Order No. 027-E-1811 reiterating Department
Circular No. 061-17.
While petitioner was presenting its evidence on May 28, 2018, private respondent filed a plea bargaining
proposal12 to withdraw his earlier plea of not guilty in order to plead guilty to two (2) counts of Illegal
Possession of Drug paraphernalia under Section 12 of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640.
Petitioner objected on ground that DOJ Circular No. 061-17,13 the prevailing circular at that time, proscribed
plea bargaining for the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs under Section 5 of RA 9165, as amended by
RA 10640. The same circular decreed that plea bargaining should be done before the prosecution commenced
its presentation of evidence. Meanwhile, violation of Section 11 of the same law may be the subject of plea
bargaining to the lesser offense of illegal use of dangerous drugs.
Subsequently, on June 26, 2018, the DOJ issued Department Circular No. 027-18 or the "Amended Guidelines
on Plea Bargaining for Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the 'Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2000'" amending Department Circular No. 061-17 dated November 21, 2017. According to this department
circular, private respondent may only plead guilty to a lesser offense, as follows:
Offense charged in the Information Acceptable Plea Bargain

Section 5 Sale, Life Imprisonment to Section 11, par. 3 12 yrs. & 1 day to 20
Trading, etc. of Death & Fine from Possession of yrs. and Fine from
Dangerous Drugs Php500k to Php10M Dangerous Drugs (Plea Php300k to Php400k
bargaining is allowed
only if the drugs
involved are "shabu"
and/or marijuana and
the quantity of "shabu"
is less than 5 grams
and the quantity of
marijuana is less than
300 grams)
4|Page
Section 11, par. 3 12 yrs. & 1 day to 20 Section 12 Possession 6 months & 1 day to 4
Possession of yrs. and Fine from of Equipment, years and a Fine
Dangerous Drugs Php300k to Php400k Apparatus & Other Ranging from Php10k
(Where quantity of Paraphernalia for to Php50k
"shabu", opium, Dangerous Drugs
morphine, heroin,
cocaine, et al. is less
than 5 grams;
marijuana is less than
300 grams)
The Trial Court's Ruling
By Resolution14 dated July 20, 2018, the trial court granted private respondent's plea bargaining proposal and
ordered his re-arraignment despite petitioner's objection, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 061 dated [November] 21,
2017, DOJ Circular No. 027 dated June 26,2018 and Regional Prosecution Office (RPO) Order No. 027-E-18
dated May 17, 2018 are hereby DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID for being in
contravention to or undermining the rule-making power of the SC, its Estipona Decision, its A.M. No. 18-03-
16-SC Resolution (Adopting the Plea Bargaining Framework in Drug Cases), and the equal protection clause in
their (the said DOJ issuances) application if not in their design. The defense Proposal for Plea Bargaining is
ALLOWED over the "vigorous" objection of the prosecution. RE-ARRAIGN the accused in accordance
therewith at the next scheduled hearing (on July 23).15
Too, the trial court motu proprio declared as unconstitutional DOJ Circular Nos. 061-17 and 027-18, and RPO
Order No. 027-E-18 (DOJ Issuances) on the following grounds:
First. These issuances were contrary to the landmark case of Estipona and A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC;
Second. The same effectively blocked the otherwise allowable plea bargains in numerous Section 5 cases
involving miniscule amounts of dangerous drugs;
Third. They encroach on the Supreme Court's rule-making power under Article VIII, Section 5(5)16 of the 1987
Constitution; and
Fourth. They undermine the state policy behind RA 9165 to balance repression and punishment on the one
hand, with treatment, rehabilitation, and reintegration on the other.
According to the trial court, since the opposition to private respondent's plea bargaining proposal was based on
the DOJ issuances that had already been declared unconstitutional, there was no more need to require the
prosecutor's consent thereto.
Petitioner's subsequent motion for reconsideration17 was denied under Resolution18 dated August 25, 2018.
Meantime, on July 23, 2018, private respondent was re-arraigned, during which he pleaded guilty to two (2)
counts of Illegal Possession of Drug Paraphernalia under Section 1219 of RA 9165, as amended by RA
10640.20
5|Page
Thereafter, the trial court rendered a verdict of conviction per Judgment21 dated August 31, 2018, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered FINDING the accused NACI BORRAS y
LASCANO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt:
[a] In Crim. Case No. 0358 as principal in the special offense of violation of R.A. 9165, Sec. 12 and is
SENTENCED to an indeterminate prison term of THREE (3) YEARS as minimum to FOUR (4) years as
maximum, and a FINE of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00); and
[b] In Crim. Case No. 0359 as principal in the special offense of violation of R.A. 9165, Sec. 12 and is
SENTENCED to an indeterminate prison term of TWO (2) years as minimum to THREE (3) YEARS as
maximum, and a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00).22
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
On certiorari,23 petitioner charged the trial court with Grave Abuse of Discretion when it granted private
respondent's proposal to plead guilty to lesser offenses over the prosecution's vigorous objection. It insisted that
the prosecutor's consent in plea bargaining was a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilt to a lesser offense.
Too, the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it unilaterally voided the relevant DOJ issuances.
In his comment,24 private respondent supported the trial court's dispositions. He countered that the trial court
was authorized to overrule the prosecution's objections to a plea bargaining. At any rate, the trial court did not
gravely abuse its discretion when it declared the relevant DOJ issuances as unconstitutional. For one, the
validity of these DOJ issuances was already ripe for adjudication. For another, the trial court had locus standi to
pass upon the validity of the DOJ issuances because the same were of transcendental significance.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Through its assailed Decision25 dated October 28, 2019, the Court of Appeals affirmed, with modification, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DENIED. The Judgment
dated August 31, 2018 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Naga City finding private respondent
Naci Borras y Lascano guilty of two (2) counts of violation of Section 12, Article II of RA No. 9165 and
sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate prison term of three (3) years, as minimum, to four (4) years, as
maximum, and a fine of P30,000.00 for the first count of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia; and, two (2)
years, as minimum, to three (3) years, as maximum, and a fine of P20,000.00 for the second count,
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the portions of the Plea Bargaining Resolutions dated July 20,
2018 and August 25, 2018, respectively, which declared as unconstitutional the Department of Justice (DOJ)
Circular Nos. 061 and 027 are DELETED.
SO ORDERED.26
Citing the Resolution dated April 2, 2019 in Re: Letter of Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta on the
Suggested Plea Bargaining Framework Submitted by the Philippine Judges Association, the Court of Appeals
held that judges may allow plea bargaining even over the prosecution's objection where the sole ground for the
objection was that it would weaken the government's campaign against illegal drugs. According to the Court of
Appeals, petitioner failed to allege, much less, prove that private respondent was a recidivist, habitual offender,
or known in the community as a drug addict and a troublemaker. There was also no showing that private
6|Page
respondent had undergone rehabilitation. There was no reason, therefore, to deny respondent's plea bargain. At
any rate, the consent of the prosecutor is not required at all times.
The Court of Appeals, however, found that the trial court committed Grave Abuse of Discretion when it motu
proprio passed upon the constitutionality of the relevant DOJ issuances. For the issue of whether to grant the
plea bargaining may be resolved by simply applying A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC. Consequently, it deleted from the
trial court's ruling the pronouncement declaring the DOJ issuances unconstitutional.
The Present Petition
Petitioner27 now seeks affirmative relief from the Court. It insists that the prosecutor's consent must be secured
before an accused can validly plead guilty to a lesser offense. Meanwhile, it was error for the Court of Appeals
to have relied on this Court's Resolution dated April 2, 2019 in Re: Letter of Associate Justice Diosdado M.
Peralta on the Suggested Plea Bargaining Framework Submitted by the Philippine Judges Association in
support of the trial court's action which overruled the prosecution's objection to private respondent's plea
bargaining proposal. For one, the resolution cannot be applied retroactively to private respondent whose original
plea was entered way back in 2018. For another, the resolution does not at all totally dispense with the
prosecutor's consent.
In his comment,28 private respondent defends the Court of Appeals' dispositions. He counters that neither the
consent of the prosecutor nor the consent of the offended party is indispensable to the validity of a plea to a
lesser offense. A contrary position would be tantamount to a surrender of the court's sole and supreme authority
to command the course of a case. Under A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, judges may allow plea bargaining even over
the prosecution's objection. Since he was allowed to bargain under A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, the prosecution had
no basis to oppose it.
Issue
Is the consent of the prosecutor indispensable to a valid plea bargain in drugs cases?
Our Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process where the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant pleading guilty to
a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence
than that for the graver charge.29 Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
SECTION 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended
party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is
necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed
to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or
information is necessary.30
The provision ordains that with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, plea bargaining to a lesser
offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged,31 may be allowed.
7|Page
Contrary to the position taken by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the conformity of the prosecutor to
the proposed plea bargaining in drugs cases is not optional, nay, to be disregarded. For the prosecutor has full
control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser
or graver one, based on what the evidence on hand can sustain.32 As guardian of the rights of the people, the
State files the criminal action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The prosecutor who represents the
government is duty bound to defend the public interests, threatened by crime, to the point that it is as though he
or she were the person directly injured by the offense. Viewed in this light, the consent of the offended
party, i.e. the State, will have to be secured from the prosecutor who acts on its behalf.33
As early as the 1992 case of People v. Villarama, Jr.,34 the Court already clarified that the acceptance of an
offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter that
is addressed entirely to the trial court's sound discretion.Ꮮαwρhi ৷ The Court ratiocinated:
x x x x Section 2, Rule 116 is clear. The consent of both the Fiscal and the offended party is a condition
precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense. The reason for this is obvious. The Fiscal has full control
of the prosecution of criminal actions. Consequently, it is his duty to always prosecute the proper offense, not
any lesser or graver one, when the evidence in his hands can only sustain the former.
It would not also be correct to state that there is no offended party in crimes under RA 6425 as amended. While
the acts constituting the crimes are not wrong in themselves, they are made so by law because they infringe
upon the rights of others. The threat posed by drugs against human dignity and the integrity of society is
malevolent and incessant. Such pernicious effect is felt not only by the addicts themselves but also by their
families. As a result, society's survival is endangered because its basic unit, the family, is the ultimate victim of
the drug menace. The state is, therefore, the offended party in this case.
The same doctrine was reiterated in the recent case of Sayre v. Xenos,35 where the Court emphasized that a
plea bargain still requires mutual agreement of the parties and remains subject to the approval of the court. The
acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right
but is a matter addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court.
Verily, the trial court here acted with grave abuse of discretion when it disregarded the prosecutor’s vigorous
objection to private respondent's plea bargaining proposal. In view of the parties' failure to strike a mutual
agreement on the matter, the trial court should have ordered the continuation of the proceedings instead of
rendering a verdict of conviction based on private respondent's invalid pleas of guilty to two (2) counts of
Illegal Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.
Considering the foregoing irregularity, the Court is constrained to declare as invalid both pleas of private
respondent and the consequent verdict of conviction and reinstate the charges against private respondent for
violations of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640.
Section 7, Rule 11736 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure is clear. The conviction of the accused shall not be a
bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former
complaint or information if the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the
prosecutor and of the offended party.
In closing, to dispel any lingering doubts on the validity of DOJ Department Circular No. 027-18 which
superseded Department Circular No. 061-17, the Court takes this opportunity to reiterate Sayre:37
8|Page
x x x x DOJ Circular No. 27 did not repeal, alter, or modify the Plea Bargaining Framework in A.M. No. 18-03-
16-SC.
Therefore, the DOJ Circular No. 27 provision pertaining to acceptable plea bargain for Section 5 of R.A. 9165
did not violate the rule-making authority of the Court. DOJ Circular No. 27 merely serves as an internal
guideline for prosecutors to observe before they may give their consent to proposed plea bargains.
So must it be.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision38 of the Court of Appeals dated October 28,
2019 in CA-G.R. SP No. 159780 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The twin pleas of "guilty" entered by Naci
Borras y Lascano to two (2) counts of Illegal Possession of Drug Paraphernalia under Section 12 of RA 9165, as
amended by RA 10640, and the Decision dated August 3 1, 2018 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Naga
City in Criminal Case Nos. 2017-0358 and 2017-0359 are INVALIDATED. The cases are REMANDED to the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Naga City for resumption of the proceedings on the original charges of
violations of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640.
SO ORDERED.
Perlas-Bernabe, S.A.J., (Chairperson), Gesmundo, Lopez, and Rosario, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Penned by Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia and concurred in by Associate Justices Victoria Isabel
A. Paredes and Tita Marilyn B. Payoyo-Villordon, all members of the Eight Division, rollo, pp. 37-51.
2 Id. at 38.
3 816 Phil. 789, 817 (2017).
4 Section 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision.-Any person charged under any provision of this Act regardless
of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea-bargaining.
(Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, Republic Act No. 9165, .June 7, 2002).
5 Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxxx (5) Promulgate rules concerning
the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such
rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved
by the Supreme Court. (The 1987 Constitution, February 2, 1987)
6 DOJ Department Circular No. 061-17, November 21, 2017.
7 A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, April 10, 2018.
9|Page
8 In all instances, whether or not the maximum period of the penalty imposed is already served, drug
dependency test shall be required. If accused admits drug use, or denies it but is found positive after
drug dependency test, he/she shall undergo treatment and rehabilitation for a period of not less than 6
months. Said period shall be credited to his/her penalty and the period of his after-care and follow-up
program if penalty is still unserved. If accused is found negative for drug use/dependency, he/she will be
released on time served, otherwise, he/she will serve his sentence in jail min us the counseling period at
rehabilitation center. However, if accused applies for probation in offenses punishable under RA No.
9165, other than for Illegal Drug Trafficking or pushing under Section 5 in relation to Sec. 24 thereof,
then the law on probation shall apply.
9 The court is given the discretion to impose a minimum period and a maximum period to be taken from
the range of the penalty provided by law. A straight penalty within the range of 6 months and 1 day to 1
year may likewise be imposed.
10 The court is given the discretion to impose a minimum period and a maximum period to be taken
from the range of the penalty provided by law. A straight penalty within the range of 6 months and 1 day
to 1 year may likewise be imposed.
11 Not part of the records.
12 Rollo, pp. 52.
13 "Guidelines on Plea Bargaining Agreement for RA No. 9165 Otherwise Known as the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2000," DOJ Department Circular No. 061-17, November 21,
2017.
14 Rollo, pp. 5-59
12 Id. at 59.
16 Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (The 1987 Constitution, February 2,
1987)
17 Rollo, pp. 61-69.
18 Rollo, pp. 70-75.
19 Section 12. Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous
Drugs.- The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and
a fine ranging from Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) to Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or have under his/her control
any equipment, instrument apparatus and other paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming,
administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into the body: Provided, That in
the case of medical practitioners and various professionals who are required to carry such equipment,
10 | P a g e
instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia in the practice of their profession, the Board shall
prescribe the necessary implementing guidelines thereof.
The possession of such equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia fit or intended
for any of the purposes enumerated in the preceding paragraph shall be prima facie evidence that
the possessor has smoked, consumed, administered to himself/herself, injected, ingested or used
a dangerous drug and shall be presumed to have violated Section 15 of this Act. (Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, Republic Act No. 9165, June 7, 2002)
20 Rollo, p. 44.
21 Id at 76-77.
22 Id. at 75.
23 Id. at 78-98.
24 Id. at 102-116.
25 Id. at 37-51.
26 Id. at 50.
27 Id. at 10-28.
28 Id. at 124-138.
29 See People v. Villarama, Jr., 285 Phil. 723, 730 (1992).
30 Rules of Court, July 1, 1997.
31 See Daan v. Sandiganbayan, 573 Phil. 368, 376 (2008).
32 Supra note 3 at 815.
33 Supra note 29 at 732.
34 Id. at 730.
35 G.R. Nos. 244413 & 244415-16, February 18, 2020.
36 Section 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been convicted
or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient
in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution
for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.
11 | P a g e
However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense
which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any
of the following instances:
(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or
omission constituting the former charge;
(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after a
plea was entered in the former complaint or information; or
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the prosecutor
and of the offended party except as provided in section 1 (f) of Rule 116.
In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in whole or in part the
judgment, he shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction for the graver offense.
(7a)
37 See note 34.
38 Rollo, pp. 37-51.
12 | P a g e
CASE # 2
[ G.R. Nos. 244413 & 244415-16, February 18, 2020 ]
NURULLAJE SAYRE Y MALAMPAD @ "INOL", PETITIONER, VS. HON. DAX GONZAGA

XENOS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
PANABO CITY, DAVAO DEL NORTE, BRANCH 34; HON. MENARDO I. GUEVARRA,
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARANDANG, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Order2 dated
December 6, 2018 of public respondent Hon. Dax Gonzaga Xenos (Presiding Judge Xenos), Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Panabo City, Davao del Norte, Branch 34, in Crim. Case Nos. CRC 416-
2017, 417-2017, and 418-2017, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Plea Bargain is DENIED. Set the pretrial to 31 January 2018 [sic] at 1:00 p.m.
SO ORDERED.3 (Italics and underscoring in the original.)
In an Order4 dated January 23, 2019, the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration5 of Nurullaje Sayre y
Malampad @ "Inol" (Sayre).
The Antecedents
Sayre was charged with violation of Sections 5, 11, and 12, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165,6 in
three separate Information,7 which respectively read as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. CRC 416-2017
That on or about 09 June 2017, within the City of Panabo, Davao del Norte, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did then and
13 | P a g e
there, willfully, unlawfully and willingly traded, delivered and sold zero point one zero two nine (0.1029) grams
of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) which is a dangerous drug, contained in a sachet marked as JSC-
BB to PO2 Jefferjun Cabantuan who acted as poseur buyer in a legitimate buy-bust operation, and received
from said poseur buyer marked money consisting of one thousand peso (P1,000.00) bill bearing serial number
X114893 with the initials JSC on the forehead of Vicente Lim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
That on or about 09 June 2017 within the City of Panabo, Davao del Norte, Philippines and within the
there, willfully, unlawfully, willingly[,] knowingly had in his possession, control and custody of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug, contained in four (4) separate heat sealed
transparent [sic] cellophane with their respective markings:
Marking Weight
JSC-P1 0.087 zero point zero eight seven zero
JSC-P2 0.6543 zero point six five four three
JSC-P3 0.0545 zero point zero five four five
JSC-P4 0.0531 zero point zero [five] three one
CONTRARY TO LAW.9
That on or about 09 June 2017, within the City of Panabo, Davao del Norte, Philippines and within the
there, willfully, unlawfully, willingly[,] knowingly had in his possession, control and custody, one (1) tooter, an
equipment, instrument, apparatus and paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering,
injecting, ingesting or introducing dangerous drugs into the body.
CONTRARY TO LAW.10
On November 9, 2017, Sayre filed a Proposal for Plea Bargaining11 and manifested as follows:
Today, he wanted to plea bargain Section 5 and 11 to a lesser offense under Section 12, which carries with [it] a
penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months and 1 day to four (4) years. Moreover, for Section 12, penalty of
compulsory 6-month rehabilitation. These proposals are without prejudice however to the guidelines on plea
bargaining yet to be released by the Supreme Court, whichever is most favorable and beneficial to the accused;
x x x12
Pursuant to Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) Circular No. 90-2018, adopting the Court En Banc
Resolution dated April 10, 2018 in Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 18-03-16-SC (Adoption of the Plea
Bargaining Framework in Drug Cases), Sayre filed a Motion for Approval of Plea-Bargaining Proposal with
Modification.13 Sayre proposed the following:
14 | P a g e
xxxx
4. That in the said Plea-Bargaining Framework for Drug Cases, the offense under Section 5 with
quantity of shabu from 0.1 to 0.99 grams the same can be plea bargain under Section 12 of RA 9165
fro:m Life Imprisonment to 6 months and 1 day to 4 years;
5. That also, the offense under Section 11 par. 3 with quantity of shabu from .01 gram to 4.99 grams the
same can be plea bargain under Section 12 of RA 9165 from 12 years and 1 day to 20 years to 6 months
and 1 day to 4 years;
6. That finally, the offense under Section 12 can now be plea bargain under Section 15 from 6 months
and 1 day to 4 years to: (1) 6 months treatment and rehabilitation (if accused admits drug use, or denies
drug use but found positive after drug dependency test); or (b) Undergo counselling program at
rehabilitation center (if accused is found negative for drug use/dependency);
7. That on September 18, 2018, Dra. Rachel Jan Inojada submitted her Drug Dependency Test (DDT) on
accused Sayre and found him negative on shabu;
8. That in view thereof, accused Sayre is praying for the approval of his Plea-Bargaining Proposal for
the offense under Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165 to Section 12 with a penalty of 6 months and 1 day to 4
years; and
9. That however, for the offense under Section 12, the plea bargaining under Section 15 be approved
with a modified penalty of "Undergoing counselling at the rehabilitation center" for being negative on
drug use.14 (Italics and underscoring in the original; citations omitted)
Sayre proposed that he be allowed to file an Application for Probation for the penalty of 6 months and 1 day to
4 years considering that the maximum penalty therein is less than 6 years and that he be released from the
custody of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology City Jail upon its approval.15 The proposal of Sayre is
summarized as follows:
PLEA BARGAIN PROPOSED BY

SAYRE PURSUANT TO
Criminal Case No. OFFENSE CHARGED
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER NO.
18-03-16-SC
SECTION PENALTY SECTION PENALTY
CRC Sec. 5 Illegal Sale Life Sec. 12 Imprisonment of 6
416-2017 of Dangerous Imprisonment [to Possession of months and 1 day
Drugs (0.1029 death] and a fine Paraphernalia for to 4 years
gram of shabu) ranging from dangerous drugs
P500,000.00 to
P10,000,000.00
(0.01-0.99 gram
of shabu)
CRC Sec. 11 Illegal 12 years and 1 Sec. 12 Imprisonment of 6
417-2017 Possession of day to 20 years Possession of months and 1 day
Dangerous Drugs and a fine ranging Paraphernalia for to 4 years
15 | P a g e
(0.0870 gram, from Dangerous Drugs
0.6543 gram, P300,000.00-
0.0545 gram, and P400,000.00
0.0531 gram (0.01-4.99 gram
of shabu) of shabu)
CRC Sec. 12 6 months and 1 Sec. 15 Use of Penalty of
418-2017 Possession of day to 4 years and Dangerous Drugs Compulsory 6-
Paraphernalia for a fine ranging month
Dangerous Drugs from P10,000.00 Rehabilitation
to P50,000.00
City Prosecutor Jennifer B. Namoc-Yasol (City Prosecutor Namoc-Yasol) filed a Comment and Counter-
Proposal16 in accordance with Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 27 dated June 26, 2018, otherwise
known as the "Amended Guidelines on Plea Bargaining for Republic Act No. 9165,"17 summarized as follows:
COUNTER-PROPOSAL BY THE
OFFENSE CHARGED PROSECUTION PURSUANT TO
Criminal Case No. DOJ CIRCULAR NO. 27
SECTION PENALTY SECTION PENALTY
CRC Sec. 5 Illegal Sale Life Section 11 Indeterminate
416-2017 of Dangerous Imprisonment and paragraph 3 Penalty of 12
Drugs (0.1029 a fine ranging Illegal Possession years and 1 day to
gram of shabu) from P500,000.00 of Dangerous 14 years and 8
to P10,000,000.00 Drugs months and a fine
(0.01-0.99 gram of P300,00018
of shabu)
CRC Sec. 11 Illegal 12 years and 1 Sec. 12 Imprisonment
417-2017 Possession of day to 20 years Possession of Penalty of 6
Dangerous Drugs and a fine ranging Paraphernalia for months and 1 day
(0.0870 gram, from Dangerous Drugs to 4 years and a
0.6543 gram, P300,000.00- fine of
0.0545 gram, and P400,000.00 P25,000.0019
0.0531 gram (0.01-4.99 gram
of shabu) of shabu)
CRC Sec. 12 6 months and 1 Plead to the crime Indeterminate
418-2017 Possession of day to 4 years and as charged Penalty of 6
Paraphernalia for a fine ranging months and 1 day
Dangerous Drugs from P10,000.00 to 4 years and a
to P50,000.00 fine of P25,000.00
City Prosecutor Namoc-Yasol recommended that for the charge under Section 5 (Illegal Sale of Dangerous
Drugs), the plea bargain prescribed in DOJ Circular No. 27 is the offense under Section 11, paragraph 3 (Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs) with an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years to fourteen (14) years and
eight (8) months and a fine of P300,00.00. For the charge under Section 11 (Illegal Possession of Dangerous
Drugs), the City Prosecutor recommended the plea of guilty to the offense under Section 12 (Illegal Possession
16 | P a g e
of Drug Paraphernalia with an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and a
fine of P25,000.00, as prescribed in DOJ Circular No. 27. As to the charge under Section 12 (Illegal Possession
of Drug Paraphernalia), the City Prosecutor recommended that Sayre plead guilty to the crime as charged with
an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and a fine of
P25,000.00.21
The relevant offenses and their corresponding acceptable plea bargain for each offense, pursuant to A.M. No.
18-03-16-SC, are reproduced below:
Offense Charged Acceptable Plea Bargain

Remarks
Section Penalty Quantity Section Penalty
Section 5. Sale, Life .01 gram to .99 Section 12. 6 month In all
Trading, etc. of Imprisonment grams Possession of sand 1 day instances,whether
Dangerous Drugs to Death and (metamphetamine Equipment, to 4 years or not the
(Methampetamine fine ranging hydrochloride Instrument, and a fine maximum period
hydrochloride or from or shabu only) Apparatus and ranging of the penalty
shabu) P500,000.00 to Other from imposed is already
P10,000,000.00 Paraphernalia P10,000 to served, drug
for Dangerous P50,000 dependency test
Drugs shall be required. If
N.B.: The accused admits
court is drug use, or denies
given the it but is found
discretion positive after drug
to impose dependency test
a he/she shall
minimum undergo treatment
period and and rehabilitation
a for a period of not
maximum less than 6 months.
period to Said period shall
be taken be credited to
from the his/her penalty and
range of the period of his
the penalty after-care and
provided follow-up program
by law. A if penalty is still
straight unserved. If
penalty accused is found
within the negative for drug
range of 6 use/dependency,
months he/she will be
and 1 day released on time
to 1 year served, otherwise,
may he/she will serve
likewise his sentence in jail
be minus the
imposed. counseling period
17 | P a g e
at rehabilitation
center. However, if
accused applies for
probation in
offenses
punishable under
R.A. No. 9165,
other than for
illegal drug
trafficking or
pushing under
Section 5 in
relation to Sec. 24
thereof, then the
law on probation
shall apply.
1.00 gram and above No plea
(methamphetamine bargaining
hydro-chloride allowed.
or shabu only)
Section 11, par. 3. 12 years & 1 .01 gram to 4.99 Section 12. 6 months In all instances,
Possession of day to 20 years grams Possession of and 1 day whether or not the
Dangerous Drugs and fine Equipment, to 4 years maximum period
(Where quantity ranging from Instrument, and a fine of the penalty
of shabu, opium, P300,000 to Apparatus and ranging imposed is already
morphine, heroin, P400,000 Other from served, drug
cocaine is less than Parapher- P10,000 to dependency test
5 grams) naliafor P50,000 shall be required. If
Dangerous accused admits
Drugs N.B.: The drug use, or denies
court is it but is found
given the positive after drug
discretion dependency test,
to impose he/she shall
a undergo treatment
minimum and rehabilitation
period and for a period of not
a less than 6
maximum months.Said period
period to shall be credited to
be taken his/her penalty and
from the the period of his
range of after-care and
the penalty follow-up program
provided if penalty is still
by law. A unserved. If
straight accused is found
penalty negative for drug
18 | P a g e
within the use/dependency,
range of 6 he/she will be
months released on time
and 1 day served, otherwise,
to 1 year he/she will serve
may his sentence in jail
likewise minus the
be counseling period
imposed. at rehabilitation
center. However, if
Section 11, par. 2. 20 years to life 5 grams to 9.99 Section 11, 12 years accused applies for
Possession of imprisonment grams par. 3. and 1 day probation in
Dangerous Drugs and fine Possession of to 20 years offenses
(Where quantity ranging from Dangerous and a fine punishable under
of shabu, opium, P400,000 to Drugs ranging R.A. No. 9165,
morphine, heroin, P500,000 from other than for
cocaine is 5 grams P300,000 illegal drug
or more but not to trafficking or
exceeding 10 P400,000 pushing under
grams) Section 5 in
N.B.: The relation to Sec. 24
court is thereof, then the
given the law on probation
discretion shall apply.
to impose
a
minimum
period and
a
maximum
period to
be taken
from the
range of
the penalty
provided
by law.
10 grams and above No plea
bargaining
allowed
Meanwhile, the pertinent offenses of the guidelines for plea bargaining in cases involving R.A. 9165 set by the
DOJ Circular No. 27 are reproduced below:
Offense Charged in Information Acceptable Plea Bargain

19 | P a g e
Section 5 Sale, Trading, Life Imprisonment to Section 11, par. 3 12 yrs & 1 day to20 yrs
etc. of Dangerous Drugs Death & Fine from Php Possession of Dangerous and Fine from Php 300k
(No volume required) 500k to Php 10M Drugs to Php 400k
(Plea bargaining is
allowed only if the drugs
involved are "shabu"
and/or marijuana and the
quantity of "shabu" is less
than 5 grams and the
quantity of the marijuana
is less than 300 grams)
Section 11, par. 1 Life Imprisonment & Fine No Plea Bargain Allowed
Possession of Dangerous from Php 400k to Php
Drugs (Where quantity 500k
of shabu is 10 grams or
more but less than 50
grams)
Section 11, par. 2 20 yrs and 1 day to Life No Plea Bargain Allowed
Possession of Dangerous Imprisonment & Fine
Drugs (Where quantity from Php 400k to Php
of shabu, opium, 500k
morphine, heroin, cocain,
et al is 5 grams or more
but less than 10 grams;
300 grams or more but
less than 500 grams of
marijuana)
Section 11, par. 3 12 yrs & 1 day to 20 yrs Section 12 Possession of 6 months & 1 day to 4
Possession of Dangerous and Fine from Php 300k Equipment, Apparatus & years and a Fine Ranging
Drugs (Where quantity of to Php 400k Other Paraphernalia for from Php 10k to Php 50k
"shabu", opium, Dangerous Drugs
morphine, heroin,
cocaine, et al is less than
5 grams; marijuana is less
than 300 grams)
Section 12 Possession of 6 months & 1 day to 4 Section 15 Use of 6 months Rehab
Equipment, Apparatus & years and a Fine Ranging Dangerous Drugs (1st offense)
Other Paraphernalia for from Php 10k to Php 50k
Dangerous Drugs (An alternative is to allow 6 months & 1 day to 4
the accused to change his years and a Fine Ranging
plea to "guilty" and avail from Php 50k to Php 200k
of the mitigating (for 2nd offense)
circumstance of voluntary
plea of guilty)
20 | P a g e
Since the parties failed to reach a consensus insofar as Criminal Case No. CRC 416-2017 for violation of
Section 5 of R.A. 9165 (Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs), the RTC deferred the pre-trial to afford Sayre another
opportunity to convince the prosecution to accept his proposal.22
Sayre reiterated his proposal to plea bargain the charge of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs to the lower offense
of Possession of Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs under Section 12 in accordance with the guidelines
provided by the Court in OCA Circular No. 90-2018.23 On the other hand, the City Prosecutor argued that they
are bound by DOJ Circular No. 27, rejecting Sayre's plea bargain from Illegal Sale of dangerous Drugs to
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, and insisting that "any plea bargaining outs1de the DOJ circular is not
acceptable."24
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
While the prosecution agreed to the plea bargain in Criminal Case Nos. CRC 417-2017 (Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs) and CRC 418-2017 (Illegal Possession of Drug Paraphernalia), to one count each for
possession of drug paraphernalia under Section 12 of R.A. 9165, there was no agreement in Criminal Case No.
416-2016 (Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs).25 In an Order26 dated December 6, 2018, the RTC denied Sayre's
Motion to Plea Bargain and set the case for Pre-Trial.
Sayre filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration27 arguing that the RTC should abide by and follow OCA
Circular No. 90-2018 dated May 4, 2018.28 His Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the Order29 dated
January 23, 2019.
In the present petition, Sayre seeks to declare DOJ Circular No. 27 unconstitutional for being in contravention
with the provisions of OCA Circular No. 90-2018.30 Citing the case of Estipona v. Judge Lobrigo,31 Sayre
argues that OCA Circular No. 90-2018 is a rule of procedure adopted by the Supreme Court under its
constitutional mandate to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts.
Therefore, OCA Circular No. 90-2018 is deemed incorporated in the Rules of Court.32 Denying his offer to
plea bargain the charge against him for illegal sale of shabu with a total weight of 0.1029 gram to illegal
possession of drug paraphernalia, Presiding Judge Xenos acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when he disregarded the provisions of under
OCA Circular No. 90-2018.33 Sayre argues that the provision in DOJ Circular No. 27 pertaining to plea
bargaining under Section 5 to Section 11 of R.A. 9165, penalized with imprisonment ranging from twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from P300,000.00 to P400,000.00, is
unconstitutional as it repealed, altered, or modified the more favorable plea bargaining provision under OCA
In the Comment34 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the Secretary of Justice, the OSG
moves to dismiss the petition as Sayre violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.35 In justifying the issuance
of DOJ Circular No. 27, the OSG argues that: (a) it is an administrative issuance which enjoys the presumption
of validity36; (b) the DOJ has the authority to issue and implement it37; and (c) it did not repeal, alter, or
modify OCA Circular No. 90-2018 and they can be harmonized.38 The OSG posits that while A.M. No. 18-03-
16-SC sets the limits to be observed in plea bargaining in drugs cases, "Acceptable Plea Bargain" therein merely
refers to the lowest possible "lesser crime" the court may allow an accused to plead guilty to. Consequently, the
OSG opines that the trial court may allow a plea of guilty to a more serious offense but which is still lesser than
the offense originally charged.39
The Issues
The issues to be resolved are:

21 | P a g e
1. Whether petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts by filing his petition directly with the
Supreme Court;
2. Whether the provision in DOJ Circular No. 27 pertaining to plea-bargaining under Section 5 to
Section 11 of R.A. 9165, penalized with imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day
to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from P300,000.00 to P400,000.00, is unconstitutional as it
repealed, altered, or modified the more favorable plea bargaining provision under OCA Circular No. 90-
2018, a procedural rule promulgated by the Supreme Court En Banc, in violation of the rule-making
power of the Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and
3. Whether Presiding Judge Xenos acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when he disregarded the provisions of OCA
The Court's Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
Serious and compelling reasons justify the direct resort to the Court.
There are serious and compelling reasons to warrant direct resort to the Court. Considering that what is invoked
here is the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 27 that continues to be implemented in the prosecution of cases
involving dangerous drugs, Sayre is justified in seeking the immediate action of the Court. The outcome of the
present petition will certainly affect hundreds of on-going plea bargaining in dangerous drugs cases.
Plea bargaining was required during pre-trial conference in all criminal cases cognizable by the Municipal Trial
Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Metropolitan Trial Court, the RTC, and the Sandiganbayan40 with
the objective of promoting fair and expeditious trial. In Estipona v. Lobrigo,41 the Court, speaking through
the ponencia of then Associate Justice Diosdado Peralta, now Chief Justice, explained:
x x x plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out
a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval." There is give-and-take
negotiation common in plea bargaining. The essence of the agreement is that both the prosecution and the
defense make concessions to avoid potential losses. Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged
because the chief virtues of the system - speed, economy, and finality - can benefit the accused, the offended
party, the prosecution, and the court.42 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
Plea bargaining is a vital component of restorative justice. In giving preference to working out a mutually
satisfactory resolution of the case sanctioned by the court over lengthy and protracted trial, both the state and
the accused benefit. The plea bargaining mechanism affords speedy disposal and cost efficiency which
significantly contribute to the restorative justice process. By shortening the time between the original charge
and the disposition, it enhances the rehabilitative prospects and redeeming characteristics of the offender when
the trial court approves the plea bargain to a lesser offense.
We adopt the view of Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen in his Separate Opinion in Estipona v.
Lobrigo43 that the aim is to rehabilitate, not punish, drug offenders. Citing his ponencia in People v.
Holgado,44 he stated:
22 | P a g e
It is lamentable that while our dockets are clogged with prosecutions under Republic Act No. 9165 involving
small-time drug users and retailers, we are seriously short of prosecutions involving the proverbial "big fish."
We are swamped with cases involving small fry who have been arrested for miniscule amounts. While they are
certainly a bane to our society, small retailers are but low-lying fruits in an exceedingly vast network of drug
cartels. Both law enforcers and prosecutors should realize that the more effective and efficient strategy is to
focus resources more on the source and true leadership of these nefarious organizations. Otherwise, all these
executive and judicial resources expended to attempt to convict an accused for 0.05 gram of shabu under
doubtful custodial arrangements will hardly make a dent in the overall picture. It might in fact be distracting our
law enforcers from their more challenging task: to uproot the causes of this drug menace. We stand ready to
assess cases involving greater amounts of drugs and the leadership of these cartels.45
While it is the government's mandate to "pursue an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the trafficking
and use of dangerous drugs and other similar substances,"46 it is equally important to highlight "the policy of
the State to provide effective mechanisms or measures to re-integrate into society individuals who have fallen
victims to drug abuse or dangerous drug dependence."47 In consonance with the State policy of restorative and
compassionate justice, the confusion created by DOJ Circular No. 27 must immediately be clarified in order to
guide the trial courts in addressing offers of the accused to plea bargain in drugs cases and afford offenders an
opportunity to rehabilitate and become productive members of society again.
In view of the urgency posed by the issuance of DOJ Circular No. 27, there are sufficient justifications to
deviate from the strict application of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
The provision in DOJ Circular No. 27 pertaining to plea-bargaining under Section 5 to Section 11 of R.A. 9165,
penalized with imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine
ranging from P300,000.00 to P400,000.00, did not contravene the Plea Bargaining Framework found in A.M.
No. 18-03-16-SC.
The rule-making authority of the Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution states:
Sec 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved
by the Supreme Court.48 (Emphasis supplied.)
In this petition, A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC is a rule of procedure established pursuant to the rule-making power of
the Supreme Court that serves as a framework and guide to the trial courts in plea bargaining violations of R.A.
9165.
Nonetheless, a plea bargain still requires mutual agreement of the parties and remains subject to the approval of
the court. The acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a
matter of right but is a matter addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court.49
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court expressly states:
23 | P a g e
Sec 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party
and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily
included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead
guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or
information is necessary. (Emphasis supplied.)
The use of the word "may" signifies that the trial court has discretion whether to allow the accused to make a
plea of guilty to a lesser offense. Moreover, plea bargaining requires the consent of the accused, offended party,
and the prosecutor. It is also essential that the lesser offense is necessarily included in the offense charged.
Taking into consideration the requirements in pleading guilty to a lesser offense, We find it proper to treat the
refusal of the prosecution to adopt the acceptable plea bargain for the charge of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs
provided in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC as a continuing objection that should be resolved by the RTC. This
harmonizes the constitutional provision' on the rule making power of the Court under the Constitution and the
nature of plea bargaining in Dangerous Drugs cases. DOJ Circular No. 27 did not repeal, alter, or modify the
Plea Bargaining Framework in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC.
Therefore, the DOJ Circular No. 27 provision pertaining to acceptable plea bargain for Section 5 of R.A. 9165
did not violate the rule-making authority of the Court. DOJ Circular No. 27 merely serves as an internal
guideline for prosecutors to observe before they may give their consent to proposed plea bargains.
Presiding Judge Xenos did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when he disregarded the provisions of OCA Circular No. 90-
2018.
There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is: (1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence; or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal
bias.50 Manifest disregard of the basic rules and procedures constitutes a grave abuse of discretion.51 In this
case, Presiding Judge Xenos did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in not approving the plea bargain of Sayre. There was a
continuing objection on the part of the prosecution. Because of this continuing objection, the parties failed to
arrive at a "mutually satisfactory disposition of the case" that may be submitted for the court's approval. The
RTC correctly ordered the continuation of the proceedings because there was no mutual agreement to plea
bargain.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is DENIED. The Regional Trial Court of Panabo
City, Davao del Norte, Branch 34 is hereby ORDERED to proceed with the criminal cases filed against
petitioner Nurullaje Sayre y Malampad @ "Inol."
SO ORDERED.
Peralta, C. J., Perlas-Bernabe, A. Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo, J. Reyes, Jr., Hernando, Inting, Delos Santos,
and Gaerlan, JJ., concur.
Leonen, J., See separate opinion (concurring)
Caguioa, J., See Dissenting Opinion.
Lazaro-Javier, J., Please see Concurring Opinion.
24 | P a g e
Zalameda, J., With Separate Concurring Opinion.
Lopez, J., Please see Concurring Opinion.
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on February 18, 2020 a Decision, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the Supreme
Court in the above-entitled cases, the original of which was received by this Office on July 2, 2020 at 3:20 p.m.
Very truly yours,
(SGD) EDGAR O. ARICHETA

Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 3-29.
2 Penned by Presiding Judge Dax Gonzaga Xenos; id. at 70-71.
3 Id. at 71.
4 Penned by Presiding Judge Dax Gonzaga Xenos; id. at 77.
5 Id. at 72-74.
6 Otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
7 Rollo, pp. 32-34.
8 Id. at 32.
9 Id. at 33.
10 Id. at 34.
11 Not attached to the rollo.
12 Rollo, pp. 9-10.
13 Id. at 55-58.
14 Id. at 56-57.
25 | P a g e
15 Id. at 57.
16 Id. at 60-61.
17 Id. at 68
18 Id. at 61.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Penned by Presiding Judge Dax Gonzaga Xenos; id. at 62-63.
23 Id. at 64-65.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Supra note 2.
27 Rollo, pp. 72-74.
28 Id. at 73.
29 Supra note 4.
30 Rollo, pp. 26-27.
31 816 Phil. 789 (2017).
32 Rollo, pp. 18-20.
33 Id. at 21.
34 Id. at 112-152.
35 Id. at 119-121.
36 Id. at 125.
37 Id. at 125-128.
38 Id. at 128-130.
39 Id. at 139.
26 | P a g e
40 Section 2 of R.A. 8493 states:
Sec. 2. Mandatory Pre-Trial in Criminal Cases. - In all cases cognizable by the Municipal Trial
Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, and the
Sandiganbayan, the Justice or judge shall, after arraignment, order a pre-trial conference to
consider the following:
(a) Plea bargaining;
(b) Stipulation of Facts;
(c) Marking for identification of evidence of parties;
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial.
41 Supra note 31.
42 Id. at 813.
43 Supra note 31.
44 741 Phil. 78 (2014).
45 Id. at 100.
46 R.A. 9165, Sec. 2.
47 Id.
48 CONSTITUTION, Sec. 5.
49 Daan v. Sandiganbayan, 573 Phil. 368, 377 (2008).
50 Almario v. Executive Secretary, 714 Phil. 127, 169 (2013).
51 Cruz v. People, 812 Phil. 166, 174 (2017), citing Crisologo v. JEWM Agro-Industrial Corporation,
728 Phil. 315 (2014).
27 | P a g e
CASE # 3
EN BANC
G.R. No. 226679 August 15, 2017
SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Legazpi City,
Albay, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition1 is the constitutionality of Section 23 of Republic

Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, "2 which provides:
SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under any provision of this Act regardless of the
imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea-bargaining.3
The facts are not in dispute.
Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in Criminal Case No. 13586 for violation of
Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs). The Information alleged:
28 | P a g e
That on or about the 21st day of March, 2016, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use any
regulated drug and without the corresponding license or prescription, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have, in his possession and under his control and custody, one (1) piece heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachet marked as VOP 03/21/16- l G containing 0.084 [gram] of white crystalline substance, which when
examined were found to be positive for Methamphetamine Hydrocloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining
Agreement,5 praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of
Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other
Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender
and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession. He argued that Section 23 of R.A. No.
9165 violates: (1) the intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; (2) the rule-making
authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and (3) the principle
of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the government.
In its Comment or Opposition6 dated June 27, 2016, the prosecution moved for the denial of the motion for
being contrary to Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which is said to be justified by the Congress' prerogative to
choose which offense it would allow plea bargaining. Later, in a Comment or Opposition7 dated June 29, 2016,
it manifested that it "is open to the Motion of the accused to enter into plea bargaining to give life to the intent
of the law as provided in paragraph 3, Section 2 of [R.A. No.] 9165, however, with the express mandate of
Section 23 of [R.A. No.] 9165 prohibiting plea bargaining, [it] is left without any choice but to reject the
proposal of the accused."
On July 12, 2016, respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Legazpi
City, Albay, issued an Order denying Estipona's motion. It was opined:
The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165, which prohibits plea bargaining, encroaches on
the exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure because plea
bargaining is a "rule of procedure." Indeed, plea bargaining forms part of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,
particularly under Rule 118, the rule on pre-trial conference. It is only the Rules of Court promulgated by the
Supreme Court pursuant to its constitutional rule-making power that breathes life to plea bargaining. It cannot
be found in any statute.
Without saying so, the accused implies that Sec. 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is unconstitutional because it, in
effect, suspends the operation of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court insofar as it allows plea bargaining as part of
the mandatory pre-trial conference in criminal cases.
The Court sees merit in the argument of the accused that it is also the intendment of the law, R.A. No. 9165, to
rehabilitate an accused of a drug offense. Rehabilitation is thus only possible in cases of use of illegal drugs
because plea bargaining is disallowed. However, by case law, the Supreme Court allowed rehabilitation for
accused charged with possession of paraphernalia with traces of dangerous drugs, as held in People v. Martinez,
G.R. No. 191366, 13 December 2010. The ruling of the Supreme Court in this case manifested the relaxation of
an otherwise stringent application of Republic Act No. 9165 in order to serve an intent for the enactment of the
law, that is, to rehabilitate the offender.
29 | P a g e
Within the spirit of the disquisition in People v. Martinez, there might be plausible basis for the declaration of
Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which bars plea bargaining as unconstitutional because indeed the inclusion of the
provision in the law encroaches on the exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court.
While basic is the precept that lower courts are not precluded from resolving, whenever warranted,
constitutional questions, the Court is not unaware of the admonition of the Supreme Court that lower courts
must observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions. Upon which admonition, it is thus not
for this lower court to declare Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165 unconstitutional given the potential ramifications that
such declaration might have on the prosecution of illegal drug cases pending before this judicial station.8
Estipona filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in an Order9 dated July 26, 2016; hence, this
petition raising the issues as follows:
I.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, WHICH PROHIBITS PLEA BARGAINING IN
ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE SAID LAW, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
II.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT ENCROACHED

UPON THE POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE RULES OF PROCEDURE.
III.
WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS PRESIDED BY HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO,

COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO DECLARE SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 AS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.10
We grant the petition.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), contends that the petition
should be dismissed outright for being procedurally defective on the grounds that: (1) the Congress should have
been impleaded as an indispensable party; (2) the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 cannot be
attacked collaterally; and (3) the proper recourse should have been a petition for declaratory relief before this
Court or a petition for certiorari before the RTC. Moreover, the OSG argues that the petition fails to satisfy the
requisites of judicial review because: (1) Estipona lacks legal standing to sue for failure to show direct injury;
(2) there is no actual case or controversy; and (3) the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is not
the lis mota of the case.
On matters of technicality, some points raised by the OSG maybe correct.1âwphi1 Nonetheless, without much
further ado, it must be underscored that it is within this Court's power to make exceptions to the rules of court.
Under proper conditions, We may permit the full and exhaustive ventilation of the parties' arguments and
positions despite the supposed technical infirmities of a petition or its alleged procedural flaws. In discharging
30 | P a g e
its solemn duty as the final arbiter of constitutional issues, the Court shall not shirk from its obligation to
determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications. 11
Likewise, matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a backseat when issues of substantial and
transcendental importance are present.12 We have acknowledged that the Philippines' problem on illegal drugs
has reached "epidemic," "monstrous," and "harrowing" proportions,13 and that its disastrously harmful social,
economic, and spiritual effects have broken the lives, shattered the hopes, and destroyed the future of thousands
especially our young citizens.14 At the same time, We have equally noted that "as urgent as the campaign
against the drug problem must be, so must we as urgently, if not more so, be vigilant in the protection of the
rights of the accused as mandated by the Constitution x x x who, because of excessive zeal on the part of the
law enforcers, may be unjustly accused and convicted."15 Fully aware of the gravity of the drug menace that has
beset our country and its direct link to certain crimes, the Court, within its sphere, must do its part to assist in
the all-out effort to lessen, if not totally eradicate, the continued presence of drug lords, pushers and users.16
Bearing in mind the very important and pivotal issues raised in this petition, technical matters should not deter
Us from having to make the final and definitive pronouncement that everyone else depends for enlightenment
and guidance.17 When public interest requires, the Court may brush aside procedural rules in order to resolve a
constitutional issue.18
x x x [T]he Court is invested with the power to suspend the application of the rules of procedure as a necessary
complement of its power to promulgate the same. Barnes v. Hon. Quijano Padilla discussed the rationale for
this tenet, viz. :
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle.
The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which
this Court itself has already declared to be final, x x x.
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this
Court has consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice. 19
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Rule-making power of the Supreme

Court under the 1987 Constitution
Section 5(5), A1iicle VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
31 | P a g e
by the Supreme Court.
The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Our exclusive domain and no longer
shared with the Executive and Legislative departments.20 In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 21 then Associate
Justice (later Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced the history of the Court's rule-making power and
highlighted its evolution and development.
x x x It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was granted
by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without
independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as
champions of justice." Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for it enhances its
independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to
the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:
"Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading,
practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of
the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in
the Philippines."
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re:
Cunanan Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the
practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 which considered as a passing grade, the average of 70%
in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71 % in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court
struck down the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that "x x x the disputed law is
not a legislation; it is a judgment - a judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting
the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for
justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that
may do so. Any attempt on the part of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the
case with the law in question." The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate
power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress
on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for
the license." By its ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in
the Philippines.
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution
reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts, x x x which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa x x x."
More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:
xxxx
"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
xxxx
32 | P a g e
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of
law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang
Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights."
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the judiciary by giving
to it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar.
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced

the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
xxxx
"Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and
by the Supreme Court. "
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted
for the .first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But
most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. x x x.22
Just recently, Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)23 further elucidated:
While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is, by constitutional
design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this
Court. Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
xxxx
In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice (Echegaray), the Court traced the evolution of its rule-making authority,
which, under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, had been priorly subjected to a power-sharing scheme with
Congress. As it now stands, the 1987 Constitution textually altered the old provisions by deleting the
concurrent power of Congress to amend the rules, thus solidifying in one body the Court's rule-making
powers, in line with the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a " [ s] tronger and more independent
judiciary."
The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would show that the Framers debated on
whether or not the Court's rulemaking powers should be shared with Congress. There was an initial suggestion
33 | P a g e
to insert the sentence "The National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice
and concurrence of the Supreme Court," right after the phrase "Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged[,]" in the enumeration of powers
of the Supreme Court. Later, Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to delete the former sentence and,
instead, after the word "[under]privileged," place a comma(,) to be followed by "the phrase with the
concurrence of the National Assembly." Eventually, a compromise formulation was reached wherein (a) the
Committee members agreed to Commissioner Aquino's proposal to delete the phrase "the National Assembly
may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court"
and (b) in turn, Commissioner Aquino agreed to withdraw his proposal to add "the phrase with the concurrence
of the National Assembly." The changes were approved, thereby leading to the present lack of textual
reference to any form of Congressional participation in Section 5 (5), Article VIII, supra. Theprevailing
consideration was that "both bodies, the Supreme Court and the Legislature, have their inherent
powers."
Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure.x x x.24
The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an impregnable
wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of
this Court.25 The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively
repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court.26 Viewed from this perspective,
We have rejected previous attempts on the part of the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to
amend the Rules of Court (Rules), to wit:
1. Fabian v. Desierto27 -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative
disciplinary case should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules instead of
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as provided in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.
2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. 28 - The Cooperative Code
provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on summons under Rule 14 of the Rules.
3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal Fees; 29 Baguio Market
Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes;30 In Re: Exemption of
the National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees; 31 and Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon.
Mangotara, et al. 32 - Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not exempt from
the payment of legal fees imposed by Rule 141 of the Rules.
4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)33 - The first paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770,
which prohibits courts except the Supreme Court from issuing temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as it
contravenes Rule 58 of the Rules.
Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted its discretion to amend,
repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of
government. To reiterate, the Court's authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is
exclusive and one of the safeguards of Our institutional independence.34
Plea bargaining in criminal cases
34 | P a g e
Plea bargaining, as a rule and a practice, has been existing in our jurisdiction since July 1, 1940, when the
1940 Rules took effect. Section 4, Rule 114 (Pleas) of which stated:
SEC. 4. Plea of guilty of lesser offense. - The defendant, with the consent of the court and of the fiscal, may
plead guilty of any lesser offense than that charged which is necessarily included in the offense charged in the
complaint or information.
When the 1964 Rules became effective on January 1, 1964, the same provision was retained under Rule 118
(Pleas).1âwphi1 Subsequently, with the effectivity of the 1985 Rules on January 1, 1985, the provision on plea
of guilty to a lesser offense was amended. Section 2, Rule 116 provided:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - The accused with the consent of the offended party and the fiscal,
may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is necessarily
included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No
amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (4a, R-118)
As well, the term "plea bargaining" was first mentioned and expressly required during pre-trial. Section 2, Rule
118 mandated:
SEC. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects. - The pre-trial conference shall consider the following:
(a) Plea bargaining;
(b) Stipulation of facts;
(c) Marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. (n)
The 1985 Rules was later amended. While the wordings of Section 2, Rule 118 was retained, Section 2, Rule
116 was modified in 1987. A second paragraph was added, stating that "[a] conviction under this plea shall be
equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy."
When R.A. No. 8493 ("Speedy Trial Act of 1998 ') was enacted,35 Section 2, Rule 118 of the Rules was
substantially adopted. Section 2 of the law required that plea bargaining and other matters36 that will promote a
fair and expeditious trial are to be considered during pre-trial conference in all criminal cases cognizable by the
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, and the
Sandiganbayan.
Currently, the pertinent rules on plea bargaining under the 2000 Rules37 are quoted below:
RULE 116 (Arraignment and Plea):
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party
and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily
included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead
35 | P a g e
guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or
information is necessary. (Sec. 4, Cir. 38-98)
RULE 118 (Pre-trial):
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. - In all criminal cases cognizable by

the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal
Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment and within thirty (30) days from
the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in
special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of the case. (Sec. 2
& 3, Cir. 38-98)
Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure
The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is limited to the preservation
of substantive rights, i.e., the former should not diminish, increase or modify the latter.38 "Substantive law is
that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the right and duties which
give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to
adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their
invasions."39 Fabian v. Hon. Desierto40 laid down the test for determining whether a rule is substantive or
procedural in nature.
It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes which are procedural, hence
within the scope of this Court's rule-making power, and those which are substantive. In fact, a particular rule
may be procedural in one context and substantive in another. It is admitted that what is procedural and what is
substantive is frequently a question of great difficulty. It is not, however, an insurmountable problem if a
rational and pragmatic approach is taken within the context of our own procedural and jurisdictional system.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower
courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates
procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for
justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested
right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a
substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely
with procedure.41
36 | P a g e
In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule violates substantive rights. For example,
in People v. Lacson, 42 Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules on provisional dismissal was held as a special
procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute, making the time-bar an essence of the given
right or as an inherent part thereof, so that its expiration operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute
the accused.43 Speaking through then Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., the Court opined:
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or two years for
the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused and with a
priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to the
periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the
societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with
minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both the State and
of the accused to due process. The Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to
revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The
time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or
insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice. The petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness or
insufficiency of the time-bar.
The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules and approved by the Court en
banc primarily to enhance the administration of the criminal justice system and the rights to due process of the
State and the accused by eliminating the deleterious practice of trial courts of provisionally dismissing criminal
cases on motion of either the prosecution or the accused or jointly, either with no time-bar for the revival
thereof or with a specific or definite period for such revival by the public prosecutor. There were times when
such criminal cases were no longer revived or refiled due to causes beyond the control of the public prosecutor
or because of the indolence, apathy or the lackadaisical attitude of public prosecutors to the prejudice of the
State and the accused despite the mandate to public prosecutors and trial judges to expedite criminal
proceedings.
It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as it usually operates in his favor, especially
if he greatly fears the consequences of his trial and conviction. He is hesitant to disturb the hushed inaction by
which dominant cases have been known to expire.
The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may impair or reduce the capacity of the State to
prove its case with the disappearance or nonavailability of its witnesses. Physical evidence may have been lost.
Memories of witnesses may have grown dim or have faded. Passage of time makes proof of any fact more
difficult. The accused may become a fugitive from justice or commit another crime. The longer the lapse of
time from the dismissal of the case to the revival thereof, the more difficult it is to prove the crime.
On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case does not terminate a criminal
case. The possibility that the case may be revived at any time may disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the chances of
the accused for employment, curtail his association, subject him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him and
his family. He is unable to lead a normal life because of community suspicion and his own anxiety. He
continues to suffer those penalties and disabilities incompatible with the presumption of innocence. He may also
lose his witnesses or their memories may fade with the passage of time. In the long run, it may diminish his
capacity to defend himself and thus eschew the fairness of the entire criminal justice system.
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the administration of
the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused only.44
37 | P a g e
Also, We said in Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al. 45 that Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules, which provides
that an accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies
available against the judgment, does not take away substantive rights but merely provides the manner through
which an existing right may be implemented.
Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se the right of the convicted accused to avail
of the remedies under the Rules. It is the failure of the accused to appear without justifiable cause on the
scheduled date of promulgation of the judgment of conviction that forfeits their right to avail themselves of the
remedies against the judgment.
It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court diminishes or modifies the substantive
rights of petitioners. It only works in pursuance of the power of the Supreme Court to "provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases." This provision protects the courts from delay in the
speedy disposition of criminal cases - delay arising from the simple expediency of nonappearance of the
accused on the scheduled promulgation of the judgment of conviction.46
By the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases in all courts47 that the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a way of disposing
criminal charges by agreement of the parties, plea bargaining is considered to be an "important," "essential,"
"highly desirable," and "legitimate" component of the administration of justice.48 Some of its salutary effects
include:
x x x For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of pleading guilty and limiting the
probable penalty are obvious - his exposure is reduced, the correctional processes can begin immediately, and
the practical burdens of a trial are eliminated. For the State there are also advantages - the more promptly
imposed punishment after an admission of guilt may more effectively attain the objectives of punishment; and
with the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are conserved for those cases in which
there is a substantial issue of the defendant's guilt or in which there is substantial doubt that the State can sustain
its burden of proof. (Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 [1970])
Disposition of charges after plea discussions x x x leads to prompt and largely final disposition of most criminal
cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pretrial confinement for those who are
denied release pending trial; it protects the public from those accused persons who are prone to continue
criminal conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between charge and disposition, it
enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately
imprisoned. (Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 [1971])
The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the anxieties and uncertainties of a trial; he gains a
speedy disposition of his case, the chance to acknowledge his guilt, and a prompt start in realizing whatever
potential there may be for rehabilitation. Judges and prosecutors conserve vital and scarce resources. The public
is protected from the risks posed by those charged with criminal offenses who are at large on bail while
awaiting completion of criminal proceedings. (Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 [1977])
In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the accused and the prosecution
work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval."49 There is give-and-take
negotiation common in plea bargaining.50 The essence of the agreement is that both the prosecution and the
defense make concessions to avoid potential losses.51 Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be
encouraged because the chief virtues of the system - speed, economy, and finality - can benefit the accused, the
offended party, the prosecution, and the court.52
38 | P a g e
Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage,53 the rules on plea bargaining neither create a right nor take
away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and
redress for a disregard or infraction of them.
The decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by the defendant's appraisal of the prosecution's case
against him and by the apparent likelihood of securing leniency should a guilty plea be offered and
accepted.54 In any case, whether it be to the offense charged or to a lesser crime, a guilty plea is a "serious and
sobering occasion" inasmuch as it constitutes a waiver of the fundamental rights to be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved, to be heard by himself and counsel, to meet the witnesses face to face, to bail (except
those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong), to be convicted
by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself.55
Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying him rather
than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial.56 Under the
present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends on the consent of
the offended party57 and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser
offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged.58 The reason for this is that the prosecutor has full
control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser
or graver one, based on what the evidence on hand can sustain.59
[Courts] normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to prosecute. The reasons for judicial
deference are well known. Prosecutorial charging decisions are rarely simple. In addition to assessing the
strength and importance of a case, prosecutors also must consider other tangible and intangible factors, such as
government enforcement priorities. Finally, they also must decide how best to allocate the scarce resources of a
criminal justice system that simply cannot accommodate the litigation of every serious criminal charge. Because
these decisions "are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake," we
have been "properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute. "60
The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which may allow the accused to plead
guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The word may denotes an
exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make such plea.61 Trial courts are
exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to
be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused.62
Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point when the prosecution
already rested its case.63 As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial court's exercise of
discretion should not amount to a grave abuse thereof.64 "Grave abuse of discretion" is a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
because of passion or hostility; it arises when a court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence.65
If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after the prosecution
rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to
establish the guilt of the crime charged.66 The only basis on which the prosecutor and the court could rightfully
act in allowing change in the former plea of not guilty could be nothing more and nothing less than the evidence
on record. As soon as the prosecutor has submitted a comment whether for or against said motion, it behooves
the trial court to assiduously study the prosecution's evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the
accused made his change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of the public will be served.67 The
39 | P a g e
ruling on the motion must disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence.68 Absent any finding
on the weight of the evidence on hand, the judge's acceptance of the defendant's change of plea is improper and
irregular.69
On whether Section 23 of R.A. No.

9165 violates the equal protection
clause
At this point, We shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is contrary to the
constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order not to preempt any future discussion by the Court on
the policy considerations behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165. Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt
the statutory provision in toto or a qualified version thereof, We deem it proper to declare as invalid the
prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is made part of the rules of procedure
through an administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. Section 23 of Republic Act No.
9165 is declared unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

See separate concurring opinion

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
On wellness leave
SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM ANDRES B. REYES, JR.

40 | P a g e
ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes
*
On wellness leave.
1
With Urgent Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.
2
Approved on June 7, 2002.
3
This repealed Section 20-A of R.A. No. 6425 ("Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972"), as amended by R.A.
No. 7659 ("Death Penalty Law"), which was approved on December 13, 1993. It provided: SEC. 20-
A. Plea-bargaining Provisions. - Any person charged under any provision of this Act where the
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea-
bargaining.
4
Rollo, p. 47.
5
Id. at 49-51.
6
Id. at 52.
7
Id. at 53.
8
Id. at 44-45.
9
Id. at 46, 54-55.
10
Id. at 3, 15-16.
11
See Garcia v. Judge Drilon, et al., 712 Phil. 44, 84(2013).
12
GMA Network, Inc. v. COMELEC, 742 Phil. 174, 209-210 (2014).
41 | P a g e
13
See People v. Castro, 340 Phil. 245, 246 (1997); People v. Camba, 302 Phil. 31 I, 323 (1994); People
v. Tantiado, 288 Phil. 241, 258 (1992); Peopie v. Zapanta, 272-A Phil. 161, 166 (1991); People v.
Taruc, 241 Phil. 177, 186 (1988); and People v. Ale, 229 Phil. 81, 87 (1986).
14
People v. Tantiado, supra, as cited in People v. Camba, supra, and People v. Caco, 294 Phil. 54, 65
(1993).
15
People v.Quintana, 256 Phil, 430, 436 (1989).
See People v. Gatlabayan, 669 Phil. 240, 261 (2011); People v. Lagmay, 365 Phil. 606, 632 (1999);
16
and People v. Arcega. G.R. No. 96319, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 681, 688.
17
See GMA NETWORK, Inc. v COMELEC, supra note 12 at 210.
18
Matibag v. Benipayo, 429 Phil 554, 579 (2002)
Philippine Woman's Christian Temperance Union, Inc. v. Teodoro R. Yangco 2nd And 3rd Generation
19
Heirs Foundation, Inc., 731Phil.269, 292 (2014). (Citation omitted and italics supplied)
20
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 361 Phil. 73, 88 (1999), as cited in RE: Petition for Recognition of
the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal Fee, 626 Phil. 93, 106 (2010) and Baguio Market
Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes, 627 Phil. 543,
549 (2010).
21
Supra.
22
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, supra note 20, at 85-88. (Citations omitted). See also RE: Petition
for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal Fee, supra note 20, at 106- 108
and In Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees, 629
Phil. 1, 4-5 (2010).
23
G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015, 774 SCRA 431.
24
Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), supra, at 505-508. (Citations omitted).
25
RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of legal Fee, supra note 20,
at 108.
26
Id.
27
356 Phil. 787 (1998).
28
738 Phil. 37 (2014).
29
Supra note 20.
30
Supra note 20.
31
Supra note 22.
42 | P a g e
32
638 Phil. 353 (2010).
33
Supra note 23.
See Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), supra note 23, at 517-518, citing Baguio

34
Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes,

supra note 20, at 550.
35
Approved on February 12, 1998.
36
Such as stipulation of facts, marking for identification of evidence of parties, and waiver of objections
to admissibility of evidence.
37
Effective December 1, 2001 (People v. Mamarion, 459 Phil. 51, 74 [2003]).
38
CONSTITUTION, A1t. VIII, Sec. 5(5). See also Ogayon v. People, 768 Phil. 272, 288 (2015) and San
Ildefonso Lines, Inc. v. CA, 352 Phil. 405, 415-416 (1998).
39
See Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), supra note 23, at 516-517.
40
Supra note 27.
Fabian v. Desierto, supra at 808-809. See also Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division),
41
supra note 23, at 517; Securities and Exchange Commission v. Judge Laigo, et al., 768 Phil. 239, 269-
270 (2015): Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 751 Phil. 123, 141-142 (2015); Land Bank of the
Phils. v. De Leon, 447 Phil. 495, 503 (2003); and Bernabe v. Alejo, 424 Phil. 933, 94 l (2002).
42
448 Phil. 317 (2003).
43
See Los Banos v. Pedro, 604 Phil. 215, 229 (2009).
44
People v. Lacson, supra note 42, at 387-389. (Citations omitted).
45
Supra note 41.
46
Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., id. at 142-143. (Citation omitted).
47
CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5). See also Neypes v. Court of'Appea/s, 506 Phil. 613, 626
(2005) and San Ildefonso lines, Inc. v. CA, supra note 38, at 415-416.
48
See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (l 977); and the
Majority Opinion and Mr. Justice Douglas' Concurring Opinion in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257
(1971).
49
People v. Villarama, Jr., 285 Phil. 723, 730 (1992), citing Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1979, p.
103 7. See also Gonzales Ill v. Office of the President of the Philippines, et al, 694 Phil. 52, 106
(2012); Atty. Amante-Descallar v. Judge Ramas, 601 Phil. 21, 40 (2009); Daan v. Hon.
Sandiganbayan, 573 Phil. 368, 375 (2008); and People v. Mamarion, supra note 37, at 75.
43 | P a g e
50
Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
51
Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411 (1990).
52
See Santobello v. New York, supra note 48 and Blackledge v. Allison, supra note 48.
53
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
54
Id.
See Brady v. United States, supra, and Mr. Justice Douglas' Concurring Opinion in Santobello v. New
55
York, supra note 48, at 264.

56
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977). See also Mr. Justice Scalia's Dissenting Opinion
in Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2011).
The State is the offended party in crimes under R.A. No. 9165. In People v. Villarama, Jr., supra note
57
49, at 732 the Court ruled:
"x x x While the acts constituting the crimes are not wrong in themselves, they are made so by
law because they infringe upon the rights of others. The threat posed by drugs against human
dignity and the integrity of society is malevolent and incessant (People v. Ale, G.R. No. 70998,
October 14, 1986, 145 SCRA 50, 58). Such pernicious effect is felt not only by the addicts
themselves but also by their families. As a result, society's survival is endangered because its
basic unit, the family, is the ultimate victim of the drug menace. The state is, therefore, the
offended party in this case. As guardian of the rights of the people, the government files the
criminal action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The Fiscal who represents the
government is duty bound to defend the public interests, threatened by crime, to the point that it
is as though he were the person directly injured by the offense (see United States v. Samia, 3
Phil. 691, 696). Viewed in this light, the consent of the offended party, i.e. the state, will have to
be secured from the Fiscal who acts in behalf of the government."
58
People v. Villarama, Jr., supra note 49.
59
Id.
60
Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987).
61
Daan v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, supra note 49, at 732. In Capati v. Dr. Ocampo (199 Phil. 230, 234
[1982], citing In Re: Hirsh's Estate SA. 2d 160, 163; 334 Pa. 172; Words & Phrases, permanent edition,
26a.), the Court also held:
"It is well settled that the word 'may' is merely permissive and operates to confer discretion upon
a party. Under ordinary circumstances, the term 'may be' connotes possibility; it does not connote
certainty. 'May' is an auxiliary verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission or possibility."
Daan v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, supra note 49, at 377 and People v. Vil/arama, Jr, supra note 49, at
62
730.
44 | P a g e
See Daan v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, id. at 376; People v. Mamarion, supra note 37, at 75; Ladino v.
63
Hon. Garcia, 333 Phil. 254, 258 (1996); and People v. Villarama, Jr., supra note 49, at 731.
64
See Daan v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, supra note 49, at 378.
65
Sofronio Albania v. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 226792, June 6, 2017.
People v. Villarama, Jr., supra note 49, at 252, as cited in Gonzales III v. Office of the President of the
66
Philippines, et al., supra note 49, at 106 and People v. Mamarion, supra note 37, at 76.
67
People v. Villarama, Jr., supra note 49, at 731.
68
See People v. Villarama, supra.
69
People v. Villarama, Jr., supra note 49.
45 | P a g e
CASE # 4
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 250578, September 07, 2020 ]
BERT PASCUA Y VALDEZ, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated September 13, 2019 and the
Resolution3 dated November 21, 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 160653 which upheld
the Orders dated January 29, 20194 and February 26, 20195 of the Regional Trial Court of Balanga City,
Bataan, Branch 1 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 18805, allowing petitioner Bert Pascua y Valdez (Pascua) to
enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,6 otherwise known
as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," but declared him "ineligible to apply for probation."7
The Facts
The instant case stemmed from two (2) Informations8 filed before the RTC, docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
18805 and 18806, respectively charging Pascua with violations of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 for
selling 0.024 gram and possessing 0.054 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.9 Upon
arraignment, Pascua pleaded "not guilty" to the crimes charged. However, he later filed a Motion to Allow
Accused to Enter into Plea Bargaining Agreement wherein he offered to enter a plea of "guilty" to the lesser
offense of violation of Section 12,10 Article II of RA 9165 for both criminal cases.11 The prosecution filed its
Comment and Opposition thereto, stressing that, per Department of Justice Department Circular No. 027-
18,12 the State's consent is necessary before the accused can plead to a lesser offense.13
The RTC Ruling
On January 29, 2019, the RTC issued separate Orders14 allowing Pascua to enter a plea of guilty to the lesser
offense of violation of Section 12, Article II of RA 9165 in both Criminal Case Nos. 18805 and 18806.
46 | P a g e
However, it was expressly stated in the dispositive portion of the Order pertaining to Criminal Case No. 18805
that Pascua was "ineligible to apply for probation."15
Accordingly, Pascua applied for probation as regards Criminal Case No. 18806, which the RTC acted upon
issuing an Order16 dated February 26, 2019 which, among others, directed the Bataan Parole and Probation
Officer to conduct an investigation on Pascua in accordance with Sections 5 and 7 of Presidential Decree No.
968,17 as amended,18 otherwise known as the "Probation Law of 1976" (Probation Law).
On the other hand, Pascua moved for reconsideration19 as to the Order made in Criminal Case No. 18805,
particularly for declaring him ineligible for probation. He argued that A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC20 only prohibits
probation if the accused is actually found guilty of sale of illegal drugs (Section 5), and not when he is found
guilty to the lesser offense of "possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus, and other paraphernalia for
dangerous drugs" (Section 12).21
In an Order22 dated February 26, 2019, the RTC issued an Order denying the motion for reconsideration for
lack of merit. The RTC held that probation is not a matter of right but a special privilege which is discretionary
upon the court.23 It held that the framers of A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC clearly intended that persons charged with
sale of illegal drugs would not be qualified for probation if they choose to plead guilty to a lesser offense.24
Aggrieved, Pascua filed a petition for certiorari25 with the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision26 dated September 13, 2019, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling. The CA held that a reasonable
interpretation of A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC would lead to the conclusion that the Supreme Court intended for drug
trafficking and pushing (Section 5) to still be covered by the "no probation rule" under Section 24, Article II of
RA 9165.27 It rejected Pascua's contention that A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC should apply to the lesser offense
allowed instead of the offense actually charged.28 The CA opined in this wise: "[t]his interpretation will result
to absurdity, since Section 5 is not among the enumerated lesser offenses to which an accused can admit guilt to
in lieu of being convicted of a higher offense. If this was really the intention of the Supreme Court, it would not
have included this provision since there is no acceptable plea to which this exception to the general rule would
be applicable. It is therefore rational and logical to conclude that persons charged [with] violating Section 5 who
subsequently avail of plea bargaining may not apply for probation[,] x x x it would mean that every person
accused of sale of illegal drugs would simply have to plead guilty to the lesser offense of violation of Section
12, apply for probation, then be released scot-free."29 It likewise held that even assuming Pascua was eligible
for probation, the same is still within the discretion of the lower court.30
Pascua moved for reconsideration31 but was denied in a Resolution32 dated November 21, 2019; hence, this
petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the RTC did not gravely
abuse its discretion in holding that Pascua is ineligible for probation in Criminal Case No. 18805 after pleading
guilty to the lesser offense of violation of Section 12, Article II of RA 9165.
The Court's Ruling
The petition has partial merit.
47 | P a g e
"[G]rave abuse of discretion connotes a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, done in a despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, the character of which being so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in
contemplation of law."33 In this regard, case law instructs that there is grave abuse of discretion when an
act: (a) is done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or executed whimsically, capriciously or
arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will, or personal bias; or (b) manifestly disregards basic rules or procedures.34
Guided by the foregoing considerations and as will be explained hereunder, the Court finds that the CA erred in
finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in declaring Pascua ineligible for probation after
pleading guilty to the lesser offense of violation of Section 12, Article II of RA 9165.
To recall, plea bargaining in cases involving drugs cases was recently allowed through the Court's promulgation
of Estipona, Jr. v. Lobrigo,35 which declared the provision in RA 9165 expressly disallowing plea bargaining in
drugs cases, i.e., Section 23,36 Article II, unconstitutional for contravening the rule-making authority of the
Supreme Court. Following this pronouncement, the Court issued A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC providing for a plea
bargaining framework in drugs cases, which was required to be adopted by all trial courts handling drugs
cases.37
In A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, the Court enumerated, in table format, several violations of RA 9165 which could be
subject to plea-bargaining.38 Included therein is violation of Section 5, Article II thereof, particularly for the
sale, trading, etc. of shabu weighing less than 1.00 gram. The rationale for this particular exception was
explained by the Court in its Resolution dated April 2, 2019 in Re: Letter of Associate Justice Diosdado M.
Peralta on the Suggested Plea Bargaining Framework Submitted by the Philippine Judges Association,39 to wit:
It bears emphasis that the main reason of the Court in stating in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC dated April 10, 2018
that "plea bargaining is also not allowed under Section 5 (Sale, Trading, etc. of Dangerous Drugs) involving all
other kinds of dangerous drugs, except shabu and marijuana" lies in the diminutive quantity of the dangerous
drugs involved. Taking judicial notice of the volume and prevalence of cases involving the said two (2)
dangerous drugs, as well as the recommendations of the Officers of the PJA, the Court is of the view that illegal
sale of 0.01 gram to 0.99 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) is very light enough to be
considered as necessarily included in the offense of violation of Section 12 (Possession of Equipment,
Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs), while 1.00 gram and above is substantial
enough to disallow plea bargaining. The Court holds the same view with respect to illegal sale of 0.01 gram to
9.99 grams of marijuana, which likewise suffices to be deemed necessarily included in the same offense of
violation of the same Section 12 of R.A. No. 9165, while 10.00 grams and above is ample enough to disallow
plea bargaining. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)Ꮮαwρhi ৷
A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC also provides, among others, in the "Remarks" column of the aforesaid offense that "if
accused applies for probation in offenses punishable under R.A. No. 9165, other than for illegal drug trafficking
or pushing under Section 5 in relation to [Section] 24 thereof, then the law on probation apply."40 Notably,
Section 24, Article II of RA 9165 provides that any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under
Section 5 of the law cannot avail of the benefits of the Probation Law, viz.:
Section 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. — Any person convicted
for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail of
the privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended.
48 | P a g e
In this case, the CA construed the aforementioned remark in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC as disqualifying persons
originally charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 but were convicted of the lesser offense of
violation of Section 12, Article II of the same law – such as Pascua – from applying for probation.
However, the CA is mistaken as the said remark should be simply regarded as a recognition and reminder of the
general rule provided in Section 24 that "[a]ny person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this
Act"41 shall be ineligible for probation. Moreover, the CA's view is not supported neither by the very wording
of Section 24, Article II of RA 9165 nor the provisions of the Probation Law. It likewise disregards the legal
consequences of plea bargaining.
It bears stressing that it is only after the trial court arrives at a judgment of conviction can the provisions of the
Probation Law apply.Ꮮαwρhi ৷ "Probation" is defined under Section 3 (a) thereof as "a disposition under which
a defendant, after conviction and sentence, is released subject to conditions imposed by the court and to the
supervision of a probation officer."42 Section 9 thereof, which lists the disqualified offenders, also highlights
that the disqualifications pertain to the nature of the convictions meted out to the prospective applicant:
Section 9. Disqualified Offenders. — The benefits of this Decree shall not be extended to those:
(a) sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six (6) years;
(b) convicted of any crime against the national security;
(c) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of
more than six (6) months and one (1) day and/or a fine of not more than one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00);
(d) who have been once on probation under the provisions of this Decree; and
(e) who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of this Decree became
applicable pursuant to Section 33 hereof." (Emphases supplied)
It is clear from both Section 24, Article II of RA 9165 and the provisions of the Probation Law that in applying
for probation, what is essential is not the offense charged but the offense to which the accused is ultimately
found guilty of.
In this regard, it is worth emphasizing that upon acceptance of a plea bargain, the accused is actually found
guilty of the lesser offense subject of the plea. According to jurisprudence, "[p]lea bargaining in criminal cases
is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case
subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or
some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver
charge."43
Thus, regardless of what the original charge was in the Information, the judgment would be for the lesser
offense to which the accused pled guilty. This means that the penalty to be meted out, as well as all the
attendant accessory penalties, and other consequences under the law, including eligibility for probation and
parole, would be based on such lesser offense. Necessarily, even if Pascua was originally charged with violation
of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 in Criminal Case No. 18805, he was ultimately convicted of the lower
offense of violation of Section 12, Article II of the same law. Since the foregoing effectively removed Pascua's
49 | P a g e
case from the coverage of Section 24, Article II of RA 9165, he should, at the very least, be allowed to apply for
probation.
The foregoing notwithstanding, it is well to clarify that this ruling does not, per se make Pascua eligible for
probation. This ruling is limited to the deletion of the RTC's pronouncement that Pascua is "ineligible to apply
for probation", thereby allowing him to file such application. If he files for the same, the grant or denial thereof
will then lie in the sound discretion of the RTC after due consideration of the criteria laid down in the Probation
Law, e.g., Section 844 thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The Decision dated September 13, 2019 and the Resolution
dated November 21, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 160653 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Order dated January 29, 2019 of the Regional Trial Court of Balanga City, Bataan, Branch 1 in
Criminal Case No. 18805 is hereby MODIFIED, in that the sentence: "Make it of record that the accused is
ineligible to apply for probation" is DELETED. Petitioner Bert Pascua y Valdez is hereby given a period of
fifteen (15) days from notice of this Decision within which to file his application for probation before the
court a quo.
SO ORDERED.
Hernando, and Delos Santos, JJ., concur.
Inting, J., on official leave.
Footnotes
Baltazar-Padilla, J., on leave.
1 Rollo, pp. 11-33.
2 Id. at 40-51. Penned by Acting Presiding Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando with Associate
Justices Samuel H. Gaerlan (now a member of this Court) and Germano Francisco D. Legaspi,
concurring.
3 Id. at 53-55.
4 Id. at 83-85. Penned by Judge Angelito I. Balderama.
5 Id. at 87-89.
6 Entitled "AN ACT INSTITUTING THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002,
REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DANGEROUS DRUGS
ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES," approved on June 7, 2002.
7 Rollo, p. 85.
50 | P a g e
8 Id. at 91 and 93-94.
9 Id. at 42.
10 "Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs."
11 Rollo, p. 42.
12 "RE: AMENDED GUIDELINES ON PLEA BARGAINING FOR REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE 'COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002,'"
issued on June 26, 2018.
13 See rollo, pp. 42-43.
14 Id. at 83-85 and 102-103.
15 Id. at 85.
16 Id. at 106.
17 Entitled "ESTABLISHING A PROBATION SYSTEM, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR

AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" (July 24, 1976).
18 Republic Act No. 10707, entitled "AN ACT AMENDING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 968,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE 'PROBATION LAW OF 1976,' AS AMENDED," approved on
November 26, 2015.
19 Dated Febraury 4, 2019. Rollo, pp. 107-111.
20 Entitled "ADOPTION OF THE PLEA BARGAINING FRAMEWORK IN DRUGS CASES" dated

April 10, 2018.
21 See rollo, pp. 43 and 108.
22 Id. at 87-89.
23 Id. at 88.
24 Id.
25 See id. at 60-81.
26 Id. at 40-51.
27 Id. at 48.
28 Id. at 48-49.
29 Id.
51 | P a g e
30 Id. at 50.
31 Dated October 9, 2019. Id. at 131-138.
32 Id. at 53-55.
33 University of Santo Tomas (UST) v. Samahang Manggagawa ng UST, 809 Phil. 212, 220 (2017),
citing Quebral v. Angbus Construction, Inc.,, 798 Phil. 179, 188-189 (2016).
34 See Sayre v. Xenos, G.R. Nos. 244413, 244415-16, February 18, 2020, citations omitted.
35 816 Phil. 789 (2017).
36 Section 23, Article II of RA 9165 reads:
Section 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. — Any person charged under any provision of this Act
regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea-bargaining.
37 See OCA Circular Nos. 90-2018, subject: "PLEA BARGAINING FRAMEWORK IN DRUGS
CASES" issued on May 4, 2018 and 104-2019 subject: "COURT EN BANC RESOLUTION DATED 4
JUNE 2019 IN A.M. NO. 18-03-16-SC (RE: ADOPTION OF PLEA BARGAINING FRAMEWORK
IN DRUG CASES)" issued on July 5, 2019.
38 See Resolutions issued on April 10, 2018 and June 4, 2019.
39 See also OCA Circular No. 80-2019, subject: "MINUTE RESOLUTION DATED 02 APRIL 2019
IN A.M. NO. 18-03-16-SC (RE: LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ON
THE SUGGESTED PLEA BARGAINING FRAMEWORK SUBMITTED BY THE PHILIPPINE
JUDGES ASSOCIATION)" issued on May 30, 2019.
40 See Resolution dated June 4, 2019.
41 Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
42 Emphasis supplied.
43 Daan v. Sandiganbayan, 573 Phil. 368, 375 (2008).
44 Section 8 of the Probation Law reads:
Section 8. Criteria for Placing an Offender on Probation. — In determining whether an offender

may be placed on probation, the court shall consider all information relative, to the character,
antecedents, environment, mental and physical condition of the offender, and available
institutional and community resources. Probation shall be denied if the court finds that:
(a) the offender is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided most effectively
by his commitment to an institution; or
52 | P a g e
(b) there is undue risk that during the period of probation the offender will commit
another crime; or
(c) probation will depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed.
CASE # 5
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 247575, November 16, 2020 ]

53 | P a g e
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. EDWIN REAFOR y COMPRADO,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Resolutions2 dated December
17, 2018 and May 24, 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 158535, which
dismissed the petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court (Rule 65 Petition) filed before it due to several procedural infirmities.
The Facts
On January 21, 2017, respondent Edwin Reafor y Comprado (respondent) was charged
before the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 24 (RTC) of the crime of Illegal Sale of
Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II ofRepublic Act No. (RA)
9165, for allegedly selling two (2) heat-sealed transparent sachets containing a total of
0.149 gram of shabu. 3 During the presentation of the prosecution's evidence, respondent filed a
Motion to Plea Bargain.4 dated July 26, 2018, contending that as per A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC,5 he
may be allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense of violation of Section 12, Article II of RA 9165,
which is punishable only by imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4)
years, and a fine ranging from Pl0,000.00 to P50,000.00. The prosecution opposed the motion,
invoking Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 27,6 which provides, inter alia, that for the
crime charged against respondent, the acceptable plea bargain is for violation of Section 11 (3),
Article II of RA 9165, punishable by imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day
to twenty (20) years, and a fine ranging from P300,000.00 to P400,000.00.7
In an Order8 dated August 24, 2018, the RTC granted respondent's motion over the
opposition of the prosecution. It opined that since it is only the Supreme Court that has the
power to promulgate rules of procedure, "A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC dated April 10, 2018, which now
forms part of the procedure in all courts[,] must prevail over the said DOJ Circular [No.] 27." 9
Thereafter, respondent was re-arraigned and pled guilty to violation of Section 12, Article II of
RA 9165 over the objection of the prosecution, 10 and was subsequently convicted therefor through
a Judgment11 dated September 6, 2018.
Aggrieved, on November 26, 2018, petitioner People of the Philippines, through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for certiorari12 under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court before the CA, assailing: (a) the RTC Order dated August 24, 2018 granting
respondent's Motion to Plea Bargain; (b) the RTC Order dated August 29, 2018 allowing
respondent to plead guilty to violation of Section 12, Article II of RA 9165; and (c) the RTC
Judgment dated September 6, 2018 convicting respondent of the aforesaid crime. The OSG
argues that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in allowing respondent to undergo plea
bargaining without the consent of the prosecution. Respondent to undergo plea bargaining without
the consent of the prosecution. Thus, it prayed that a temporary restraining order be issued
enjoining the implementation of the assailed Judgment, and that the case be remanded to the
RTC for continuation of proceedings.13
54 | P a g e
The CA Ruling
In a Resolution14 dated December 17, 2018, the CA dismissed the petition on purely
procedural grounds. It held that while the OSG admitted that the last day to file the petition
was on October 28, 2018, it failed to provide sufficient justification as to why it took them
nearly one (1) month to file the same. Moreover, it found that the OSG failed to offer any
explanation as to why no motion for reconsideration (MR) was filed before the RTC prior to the
filing of the said petition, which is a condition precedent before filing a Rule 65 Petition.15
Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied in a Resolution16

dated May 24, 2019; hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in dismissing
the petition for certiorari filed before it.
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, the CA correctly pointed out that the petition filed before it suffers from
procedural defects, in that no prior MR was filed before the RTC, and that the same was filed
out of time. Nonetheless, there have been numerous cases wherein the Court disregarded
procedural lapses in order to resolve a case on the merits. In this regard, case law instructs that
"the rules of procedure need not always be applied in a strict technical sense, since they were
adopted to help secure and not override substantial justice. 'In clearly meritorious cases, the
higher demands of substantial justice must transcend rigid observance of procedural rules." '17 As
will be explained hereunder, the assailed Orders and Judgment of the RTC - all involving
respondent's plea bargain to a lesser offense of violation of Section 12, Article II of RA 9165 -
are void; hence, they can never be final and executory and may be assailed at any time.18
Plea bargaining to a lesser offense is governed by Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:
Section 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - The accused, with the

consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to
plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is necessarily
included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than
the trial court. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary.
"Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution
work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually
involves the defendant pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts
of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge." 19
Essentially, it is a give-and-take negotiation wherein both the prosecution and the defense make
55 | P a g e
concessions in order to avoid potential losses. The rules on plea bargaining neither creates nor
takes away a right; rather, it operates as a means to implement an existing right by regulating
the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly
administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.20
Nonetheless, it is well to clarify that "a defendant has no constitutional right to plea
bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the
prosecutor need not do so ifhe prefers to go to trial. Under the present Rules, the acceptance of
an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends on the consent of the offended party
and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is
necessarily included in the offense charged. The reason for this is that the prosecutor has full
control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the proper
offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the evidence on hand can sustain."21
In view of the foregoing, the basic requisites of plea bargaining are: (a) consent of the
offended party; (b) consent of the prosecutor; (c) plea of guilty to a lesser offense which is
necessarily included in the offense charged; and
(d) approval of the court.22
In drugs cases, plea bargaining was recently allowed through the Court's promulgation
of Estipona, Jr. v. Lobrigo, 23 which declared the provision in RA 9165 expressly disallowing
plea bargaining in drugs cases,i.e., Section 23,24 Article II thereof, unconstitutional, for
contravening the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court. Following this pronouncement,
the Court issued A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC providing for a plea bargainink framework in drugs
cases, which was required to be adopted by all trial court;b handling drugs cases.25 In response to
A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, the Secretary of Justice issued DOJ Circular No. 27 as a guideline to
be observed by thb trial prosecutors nationwide in entertaining plea bargaining offers in dru
cases. 9
Notably, while both A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC and DOJ Circular No. 2]enumerate in
table format several violations of RA 9165 which could b[ subject to plea bargaining, they
differ in the acceptable plea bargain, i.e., thf lesser offense to which the accused may plead
guilty. Naturally, thesE differences would result in plea bargaining deadlocks, especially in
light 1f DOJ Circular No. 27's explicit mandate that "if the proposed plea bargain i not
allowed or goes beyond what is allowed under these guidelines, the tri l prosecutor shall
reject the proposed plea bargain outright and continue with the proceedings." This
notwithstanding, in the recent case of Sayre v. Xenos 6 (Sayre), the Court ruled in favor of the
validity of DOJ Circular No. holding that the same does not contravene the rule-making
authority of the Court, viz.:
In this petition, A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC is a rule of procedure established

21,
pursuant to the rule-making power of the Supreme Court that serves as a
framework and guide to the trial courts in plea bargaining violations of [RAJ
9165.
Nonetheless, a plea bargain still requires mutual agreement of the

parties and remains subject to the approval of the court. The acceptance of
an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the accused
56 | P a g e
as a matter of right but is a matter addressed entirely to the sound
discretion of the trial court.
xxxx
The use of the word "may" signifies that the trial court has discretion
whether to allow the accused to make a plea of guilty to a lesser offense.
Moreover, plea bargaining requires the consent of the accused, offended party,
and the prosecutor. It is also essential that the lesser offense is necessarily
included in the offense charged.
Taking into consideration the requirements in pleading guilty to a lesser offense,

We find it proper to treat the refusal of the prosecution to adopt the acceptable
plea bargain for the charge of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs provided in A.M.
No. 18-03-16-SC as a continuing objection that should be resolved by the
RTC. Tbis harmonizes the constitutional provision on the rule-making power of
the Court under the Constitution and the nature of plea bargaining in Dangerous
Drugs cases. DOI Circular No. 27 did not repeal, alter or modify the Plea
Bargaining Framework in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC.
Therefore, the DOJ Circular No. 27 provision pertammg to acceptable

plea bargain for Section 5 of [RA] 9165 did not violate the rule making authority
of the Court. DOJ Circular No. 27 merely serves as an internal guideline for
prosecutors to observe before they may give their consent to proposed plea
bargains. 27 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In Sayre, the Court concluded that the continuing objection on the part of the prosecution
based on DOJ Circular No. 27 will necessarily result in the parties' failure to arrive at a mutually
satisfactory disposition of the case that may be submitted for the trial court's approval. In light
of the absence of a mutual agreement to plea bargain, the proper course of action would be the
continuation of the proceedings.
In this case, the RTC gravely abused its discretion in granting respondent's motion to
plea bargain notwithstanding the prosecution's opposition to the same which is grounded on
DOJ Circular No. 27. Effectively, respondent's plea of guilty to a lesser offense (to which he
was convicted of) was made without the consent of the prosecution. Since respondent's plea of
guilt and subsequent conviction for a lesser offense clearly lack one of the requisites of a valid
plea bargain, the plea bargaining is void. Resultantly, the judgment rendered by the RTC which
was based on a void plea bargaining is also void ab initio and cannot be considered to have
attained finality for the simple reason that a void judgment has no legality from its inception.28
Thus, since the judgment of conviction rendered against respondent is void, it is only proper to
resume with the trial of Criminal Case No. 2017-0053 - which prior to respondent's filing of his
motion to plea bargain, was at the stage of the prosecution's presentation of evidence - without
violating respondent's right against double jeopardy.29
57 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated December 17, 2018
and May 24, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 158535 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Orders dated August 24, 2018 and August 29, 2018 and the Judgment dated
September 6, 2018 are hereby ANNlJLLED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Criminal Case
No. 2017-0053 is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court ofNaga City, Branch 24 for further
proceedings as indicated in this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Special
Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultatig_n before the case was a gried to the
writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
58 | P a g e

ACTIVITYliezel

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

ACTIVITYliezel

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

ACTIVITY # 1

[ G.R. No. 250295, March 15, 2021 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. NACI BORRAS Y LASCANO, RESPONDENT.

Criminal Case No. 2017-0358

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 2014-0359

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.

Meantime, on August 15, 2017, the Court promulgated Estipona v. Lobrigo3 declaring as unconstitutional

Offense charged in Information Acceptable Plea Bargain

Offense Charged Acceptable Plea Bargain

Offense charged in the Information Acceptable Plea Bargain

The Trial Court's Ruling

Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Present Petition

The petition is meritorious.

Perlas-Bernabe, S.A.J., (Chairperson), Gesmundo, Lopez, and Rosario, JJ., concur.

3 816 Phil. 789, 817 (2017).

6 DOJ Department Circular No. 061-17, November 21, 2017.

7 A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, April 10, 2018.

11 Not part of the records.

29 See People v. Villarama, Jr., 285 Phil. 723, 730 (1992).

30 Rules of Court, July 1, 1997.

31 See Daan v. Sandiganbayan, 573 Phil. 368, 376 (2008).

35 G.R. Nos. 244413 & 244415-16, February 18, 2020.

37 See note 34.

[ G.R. Nos. 244413 & 244415-16, February 18, 2020 ]

NURULLAJE SAYRE Y MALAMPAD @ "INOL", PETITIONER, VS. HON. DAX GONZAGA

SO ORDERED.3 (Italics and underscoring in the original.)

CRIMINAL CASE NO. CRC 416-2017

CRIMINAL CASE NO. CRC 417-2017

CRIMINAL CASE NO. CRC 418-2017

PLEA BARGAIN PROPOSED BY

Offense Charged Acceptable Plea Bargain

Offense Charged in Information Acceptable Plea Bargain

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The issues to be resolved are:

The Court's Ruling

The petition is not meritorious.

Sec 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court expressly states:

Leonen, J., See separate opinion (concurring)

Caguioa, J., See Dissenting Opinion.

Lazaro-Javier, J., Please see Concurring Opinion.

Lopez, J., Please see Concurring Opinion.

Very truly yours,

(SGD) EDGAR O. ARICHETA

2 Penned by Presiding Judge Dax Gonzaga Xenos; id. at 70-71.

4 Penned by Presiding Judge Dax Gonzaga Xenos; id. at 77.

6 Otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

11 Not attached to the rollo.

22 Penned by Presiding Judge Dax Gonzaga Xenos; id. at 62-63.

31 816 Phil. 789 (2017).

(a) Plea bargaining;

(b) Stipulation of Facts;

(c) Marking for identification of evidence of parties;

(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and

44 741 Phil. 78 (2014).

46 R.A. 9165, Sec. 2.

49 Daan v. Sandiganbayan, 573 Phil. 368, 377 (2008).

50 Almario v. Executive Secretary, 714 Phil. 127, 169 (2013).

G.R. No. 226679 August 15, 2017

SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioner,