CIA 1

NUCLEAR LAW

Documentary Review

CHERNOBYL

Submitted by: Submitted to:

Vineeth Prasad 1950541
Shainy Pancrasius
Nitika Gowri 1950370
Assistant Professor,
Class- 7BBA-LLB-B, 7BA-LLB-C
School of Law Christ
(Deemed to be) University
SYNOPSIS

The series Chernobyl produced by HBO follows the ill-fated incidents that occurred on 1986 in the
Soviet Union. The show dramatizes the nuclear accident in the civil nuclear power plant in Chernobyl.
The Chernobyl nuclear power plant tragedy in Ukraine in April 1986 was caused by a defective
Soviet reactor design combined with severe blunders made by the facility operators. It was a direct
outcome of Cold War seclusion and the lack of a safe culture that resulted. The Chernobyl reactor was
devastated by the catastrophe, which killed 30 operators and firefighters within three months and
resulted in several more deaths. The disaster resulted in the largest uncontrolled radioactive leak into
the environment ever recorded for civilian activity, with enormous amounts of radioactive compounds
spilt into the air for roughly ten days. For vast populations in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine, this
wreaked havoc on their social and economic lives. The show follows the people involved in the
incident and the brave sacrifices made by some. Over the span of 5 episodes, we are taken on a
journey that starts with the explosions and their effects that eventually ends with the containment
plants and the prosecution of those held responsible. The show makes the viewers sympathize with
the people involved. There are the test participants, most of whom are untrained and misinformed
about what they're doing, and who are led by incompetent personnel who encourages them to make
mistakes. Local emergency personnel, such as firefighters, rush in to put out the fires, completely
ignorant that they are running to their deaths. Then there are the government officials, some of whom
rush in to concoct cover tales in order to protect Russia's international image, pretending that nothing
particularly heinous has occurred despite the fact that they know differently.

RESPONSIBILITY PRINCIPLE

As we can see with the example of Chernobyl, there are numerous parties involved in a nuclear
operation. Therefore, who would be accountable for an event of nuclear harm given the number of
parties involved in nuclear-related activities? The operator of the nuclear installation is strictly liable
for the nuclear damage in accordance with the major civil nuclear liability conventions, including the
Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, the Paris Convention on Third Party
Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, 1960, and other similar conventions and protocols, which is
dealt with further in the article. As a result, even in situations when the operator's negligence cannot
be shown, he would still be responsible for paying damages for nuclear harm. This principle is called
the Responsibility Principle, which assigns responsibility and liability in case of nuclear mishaps and
disasters
COMPENSATION PRINCIPLE

The Chernobyl disaster, however, made it abundantly clear that a nuclear accident could cause
significant harm thousands of kilometres away in addition to in the Installation State. As a result, it
became clear that the long-dormant Vienna Convention might be a useful tool for resolving the
claims of foreign victims in cases like these. Everyone quickly realised how crucial it was to adapt the
Vienna Convention's provisions to take into account the technological advancements of the previous
25 years. Some people believed that if the Soviet Union had been a party to the Vienna Convention,
foreign victims would have at least had a chance to get some compensation after the Chernobyl
tragedy. It is known that the then Soviet Union refused to pay compensation to any foreign victims.
Of course, the question of whether the final compensation under the Vienna Convention would have
been sufficient in light of the size of the catastrophe to cover even a small portion of the claims is a
distinct one. From this, we can see the need for the embodiment of the Compensation Principle.

NUCLEAR LAWS POST-CHERNOBYL

This Chernobyl incident was the catalyst for a wave of agreements that quickly followed. Several
features of how the crisis and its effects were handled caused the rest of the world to recognise the
gaps in the rules in effect at the time. This resulted in a shift in public perception of the regulations
controlling the use of nuclear power, as well as the adoption of new conventions. The conventions
that were bought into force immediately following the incident in 1986 were the convention on an
early notification and the convention on assistance. The early notification convention outlines the
affected governments' duty to notify and inform those states that have been or are likely to be
impacted by a nuclear disaster. The convention also covers all operations and stipulates explicitly
that the state to which the reactor, conveying business, and other entities belong is responsible for
notifying and informing. The Convention on assistance stipulates that parties are required under the
agreement to collaborate in order to reduce the consequences of a nuclear accident or other
radiological emergencies. It also deals with the cost of assistance and the burden of the said cost.
The next convention to come into place was the joint protocol convention in 1988. This convention
was mainly to bring together the Vienna and Paris agreements. This protocol deals with the liability
and compensation mechanism. The following convention was the Protocol to Amend the Vienna
Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage in 1997. This amendment was intended to make
more money available to compensate more individuals for a broader variety of damages caused by
nuclear accidents, as well as to secure greater compliance from both nuclear and non-nuclear
power-generating governments. This was further amended in 2004 according to the Protocols to
amend the Paris Convention and the Brussels Convention on Supplementary Compensation. Despite
the incentives provided by most nuclear liability accords, the majority of nuclear power-producing
nations are not members of any of them. China, Canada, India, Japan, Korea, Switzerland, and the
United States of America are among the most important nations not present in the conventions.