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Situation I London Naval Treaty Article 22 and Submarines
Situation I London Naval Treaty Article 22 and Submarines
The thoughts and opinions expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily of the U.S. Government,
the U.S. Department of the Navy or the Naval War College.
SITUATION I
SOLUTION
We have yet to discuss the opinion that has been spread of the
submarine being a barbarous instrument of war. It owes such a
reputation to the use made of it in some quarters against mer-
chant ships, in violation of the principles of humanity which are
the foundation of international laws. But such violation is
ascribable to those who have used the submarine to that effect,
not to the subma.rine itself.
The use of the submarine against merchant ships is not neces-
sarily unlawful. Everything depends on the intention behind it.
There is no weapon which can not be used for criminal pur-
poses. * * *
Since then, the evolution of the submarine has made it still
more capable of carl'ying out extended operations while observing
the rules established for surfa.ce ships. If submarines can fulfill
the same duties, why should they not enjoy the same rights?
The logical conclusion is to treat alike, as far as both rights
and duties are concerned, the submarine and the surface ship,
and this is the conclusion to which the French Government has
come.
The French Government is of opinion that an unrestricted
submarine war against maritime trade should be outlawed. The
right of visit, search, and seizure should be exercised by sub-
m-arines under the rules, both present and future, to be observed
by surface ships. (Ibid., pp. 85, 87.)
Admiral Takara be, of the Japanese delegation, said:
The merits of a submarine are to be judged not by what it did
but by what it is. It is not a ruthless 'veapon to be condemned
in contradistinctiOI) to the surface craft. For that matter, what
"reapons of war can not be put to the merciless use of victimizing
lives and property to no purpose? * * *
As to the necessity of putting an end, once and for all, to the
recurrence of the appalling experiences of the 'Vorld 'Var,
Japan heartily associates herself \Vith the proposal which is
apparently in the minds of all our colleagues to submit this cate-
gory of arms to a strict circumscription by law. It was Japan's
wish that the measure should early be adopted, and she not only
signed the submarine treaty agreed upon at the vVashington Con-
ference but soon ratified it. She wishes m·ost ardently that the
present conference will revive that question and will succeed in
finding a proper and effective formula, but more satisfactory in
its conception than its invalid predecessor, so that all powers
represented at this table should unite in making it operative in
no distant future. Japan gives her full support to an under-
taking to outlaw the illegitimate use of the legitimate and defen-
sive agency of 'var. (Ibid., pp. 91, 92.)
nECOMl\IEKD~\.TION OF JURISTS
ve~sel nu1y be ~unk, provided the crew and vassengers have been
re1noved to a plate of safety. (1916 U. S. For. Hel., Sn11., v.
146.)
rrhe An1erican proposal, in the opinion of the French
a1nbassador, see1ned to raise questions that 'vere not easy.
rrhe ainbassador said:
The chief difficulty will be whn t guaranty shall we have that
the conten1plated agree1nents, ·which are shnply a reenactinent of
old established rules, will henceforth be observed'? Shall we have
yours? If so, well and good, but I doubt you will undertake such
a ri~ky thing. * * * The que~tion of the vlace of snfety is
also a difficult one. Up to now the Gern1ans have understood by
this the packing of veople in snutll lJoats ahanclonecl in the open
sea where they have cUed by the hundred, 1nore than probably a
cruel, lingering dea tll, In any of then1. The Gennan note eoncern-
ing the Frye announces the abandmnnent of this particular part
of the frightful systen1 of that nation. But it is not clear what or
whmn this applies to. It seems as if only ships under the Ainer-
ican flag were to benefit by it. If you could let me know how you
interpret the pron1ise, I should be very thankful and it Inight be
of real use. (Ibid. p.149-.)
The proposal of the United States diclnot seen1 reason-
able to the British Governn1ent, and the An1erican ainbas-
sador in London reported that the pressing of the Alner-
ican proposal w·ould be regarded by the Allies as yield-
ing to Gern1an influences and as 1nore or less unfriendly
interference.
Gern£an. a.ttitttule, 1916.-0n February 4, 1916, just a
year after the announcement of submarine warfare by
Ger1nany, the German ambassador in Washington, in a
con11nunication to the Secretary of State, said that the
Ger1nan subn1arine 'var against England's con11nerce at
sea " is conducted in retaliation of England's inhtnnan
""ar against Ger1nany's commercial and industrial life.
It is generally recognized as justifiable that retaliation
1nay be en1ployed against acts co1nmitted in contraven-
tion of the la'v of nations. Germany is enacting such
retaliation because it is England's endeavor to cut off all
imports from Germany by preventing even legal com-
merce of the neutrals with her and thereby subjecting
ARl\fED MERCHAXT YESSELS, 1914-1918 23
the Ger1nan population to starvation. In answer to
these acts Gennany is tnaking efforts to destroy Eng-
land's co1n1nerce at sea, at least as far as it is carried
on by enemy vessels. I£ Ger1nany has not,vithstanding
li1nited her submarine \Varfare, this \Yas clone in view of
her long-standing friendship \Yith the United States and
in vie\v of the fact that the sinking o£ the Lusitania
caused the death of citizens o£ the United States.
1,hereby the German retaliation affected neutrals which
'\\"as not the intention, as retaliation n1ust not aim at
other than ene1ny subjects." (1916, U. S. For. Rel. Sup.~
p. 157.)
Ar1ned rnerchant vessels and subn1.arines.-During the
lVorld 'Var, 1914-1918, there \Yas 111 uch discussion o£ the
relations of anned merchant vessels and submarines. It
\vas readily athnittecl that a shell fron1 a gnn of even
s1nall caliber n1ight destroy a subn1arine. So1ne states
have pern1ittecl arming of Inerchant vessels \Yith guns not
exceeding 6 inches. The right of an ene1ny n1erchant
vessel to resist by force visit and search has long been
recognized and \Vas formerly grounded upon the need
of protection against pirates and privateers. In the days
just before the 'Vorld 'Var British officials had argued
that " the proper reply to an armed 1nerchantman is
another merchanhnan armed in her O\Yn defense," and
that " surely these ships will be quite valueless for the
purpose o£ attacking armed vessels o£ any kind." In
1914 1\ir. Churchill, First Lord of the British Admiralty,
said: " These are armed solely for defensi Ye purposes.
Their guns are mounted in the stern and can fire only on
the pursuer." (59 Parliamentary Debates, Commons,
1914, p. 1925.) In 1916 the Gennan Foreign Office con1-
municated to the American ambassador in Ger1nany what
purported to be copies o£ instructions to British mer-
chant vessels, found on board the English steamer lVood-
field.
In no circumstances is this paper to be allowed to fall into
the hands of the enemy.
24 LONDON NAVAL TREATY, ART. 22, AND SUBMARINES
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OFFICIAL CHARTER 47
to meet American needs on the outbreak of vvar, beca1ne
an agency for organizing the shipping to promote the
ends of the war. As Prof. J. R. Smith, in The Influence
of vVar on Shipping, says: "The official mind replaces
supply and demand." Ships ·were allocated as to routes
and employment. The taking over was on the outbreak
of 'var for 'var purposes and the ships 'vere run for war
ends.
Ships on time aharter.-While the time charter pro-
vides that a vessel operated by the owner for the United
States is not a public ship but shall be subject to the laws
governing merchant ships, this provision relates to do-
mestic rules and might be acceptable to neutrals. This
provision 'vould not determine the attitude of a belliger-
ent to,vard a vessel requisitioned by the United States
and under a time charter, the first provision of which is
that " the stea1nship shall remain in the service of the
United States.'' The United States Shipping Board had
large grants from the Public Treasury for the mainte-
nance of these ships.
Subsidies, bounties, subventions, in one and another
for1n, have been comn1on and have placed vessels under
obligation to the government with a possibility of control.
It had been generally 1naintained that until the control
had been assumed the v-essel vvould be regarded as a pri ·
vate vessel, unless there was evidence to the contrary
other than the existence of a subsidy in time of peace.
Neutral attitud·e.-A neutral state is not concerned with
the public or private ovvnershi p of merchant vessels fly-
ing merchant flags of a belligerent state. It is, ho,vever,
t'esponsible for· the treat1nent which it accords to vessels
which are adapted to carry on hostilities.
B ellig1evrent attitude.-The belligerents are concerned
both as to ownership and as to character of vessels. If
a vessel is a public vessel of an enemy and armed it may
be attacked without warning because it would be 'vithin
the category of vessels of war. If it is an unar1ned pub-
lic vessel (not of an exempt class, such as hospital ships) ,
48 LONDON NAVAL TREATY, ART. 22, AND SUBMARINES
H.-CONTRABAND
prize court, but whether the vessel, having been placed in prize
court, should be restored or condemned. The same ruling was
made in the case of the Sir lVilliant Peel (5 'Vallace, 517). These
cases, therefore, can not be properly cited as supporting the
course of a British captor in taking a vessel into port, there to
obtain extrinsic evidence to justify him in detaining the vessel
for prize proceedings. (10 An1er. Jour. Int. law, 1916 Sup. p. 77.)
This naturally led to an atten1pt to shift the burden of
proof of innocence to the ship seized rather than to place
upon the captor the burden of proof of guilt of the ves-
sel captured. This and other changes, son1e of which
might be reasonable, were made possible in 1914-1918
because of the 'veakness of some neutrals and the con1-
plaisance of others.
Defense and offense.-From the general nature of in-
structions given or supposed to have been given, it would
seem that armed 1nerchant vessels of belligerents were
at liberty to fire upon enemy submarines 'vithout waiting
:for any firing by the submarine. The right of resistance
has long been admitted and n1any argue that the most
effective resistance is "a defensive attack." The differ-
ence between "a defensive attack " and " an offensive at-
tack" seems to be in the intention of the officer ordering
the attack. Intention is not easy to prove, even in time
of peace, and in time of 'var may be even 1nore difficult.
Article 22 of the London naval treaty requires subma-
rines to conform to the rules of international law to
which surface vessels o£ 'var are subject in their action
'vith regard to merchant ships as to sinking or rendering
the merchant vessel incapable of navigation. The mer-
chant vessel may be subject to the use o£ force in case of
persistent refusal to stop after summons or of active
resistance to visit and search. The pointing of a gun
on a vessel flying a belligerent flag at a vessel o£ war o£
an enemy would under the ordinary regulations not
1nerely constitute active resistance but constructive at-
tack which it would be the duty o£ the commander o£ the
submarine to anticipate by his own ·fire.
LONDON" XAYAL TREATY, ART. 22, AND SUBMARINES 65
SOLUTION