Love and Law - Hegel's Critique of Morality

Love and Law: Hegel's Critique of Morality
Author(s): J. M. BERNSTEIN
Source: Social Research, Vol. 70, No. 2 (summer 2003), pp. 393-432
Published by: New School
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Love and Law:
Hegel's Critique
of Morality / J.M. BERNSTEIN
L
X he SpiritofChristianity and itsFate" (hereafter "Spirit")pro-

videsthe mostdirectand eloquentpresentation of the logical
structure and moralcontentof Hegel's ethicalvision.This is a
visionofethicallifeitself,ofhowHegel conceivesofthemeaning
of ethics,whatit is aboutand itsinternaldynamiclogic,and of
ethicalityso understoodas constitutive of our relationto our-
selves,others,and the naturalworld.In workingout the sub-
stanceofethicalliving, aboveall in oppositionto Kant'smorality
of universallaw,Hegel is simultaneously elaboratingthe struc-
turalcontoursofhumanexperience.Hegelianidealismis consti-
tutedbythisidentification of the normative logicof ethicallife
withthestructure ofexperiencein general.Hegel'sethicalvision
is hence thevisionof the demandsand fatalities of ethicallife
becomingthe pivotand underlying logicforthe philosophical
comprehension of human experienceuberhaupt. It is onlyslightly
hyperbolic to saythatin the"Spirit"essayHegel is interrogating
and proposingthepossibility of ethicsas firstphilosophy, where
the idea of ethicsas firstphilosophyprovidesthe governing
impulseand ultimatemeaningof Hegelianobjective(absolute)
idealism.Ifthisis right,whatHegelhas tosayaboutsubjectssuch
as knowledge,reason,and objectivity mustbe keyedto the
dynamics ofethical life.1
The greatadvantageof beginningwiththisessayis thatit
presentsHegel'svisionin an undilutedform:itsexpressesmost
fullywhatHegel willwantto sayabout ethicality and the con-
stitutive
structures ofexperienceconsequentupon thatethical-
SOCIAL RESEARCH, Vol. 70, No. 2 (Summer2003)
394 SOCIAL RESEARCH
ity.Thereis aboutthevision,or so I shallargue,something eth-

icallydeep and compelling;thecompellingness ofthisoriginal
the
vision, thought that it capturessomething about whyethi-
cal lifematters, abouthowand whywe haveethicalconcernsat
all,abouthowtheachievements and fatalities
ofethicalexperi-
ence can appear as whatmattersmostin a life,providesthe
motivation forHegel's attempts, aboveall in thePhenomenology
ofSpirit,to secure against inadequaciesofitsarticulation
it the
in the "Spirit"essay.At the centerof Hegel's ethicalvisionin
the "Spirit"essayis the idea of a causalityof fate,an ethical
logicofactionand reaction:to act againstanotherpersonis to
destroymyownlife,to call downupon myself revenging fates;
I cannot(ethically)harmanotherwithout(ethically)harming
myself.In thiswaythe flourishing and founderingof each is
intimately boundup withtheflourishing and foundering ofall.
Social space is alwaysconstituted ethically, in
as a space which
subjects are necessarily formed or deformed, freed or
oppressed throughthe structuresof interactiongoverning
everyday life.It is thisthatis Hegel's greatidea sinceit reveals
how ethicallifemattersindependentof any particularmoral
norms,laws,ideals,principles, or ends.Ethicallifeis not,in the
firstinstance,about moral principles,but about the waysin
whichbothparticular actionsand wholeformsofactioninjure,
wound,and deformrecipientand actoralike; it is about the
secretbonds connectingour weal and woe to the livesof all
thosearoundus.
In theessay,ethicallifeas constituted bya causalityoffateis
logicallyand historically unfoldedin relationto an inadequate
holisticmetaphysics of love and life.In puttingthe matterthis
way,I have twothoughtsin mind.First,the metaphysics of the
"Spirit"essayis emphatically a metaphysicsoflifeand love- life
and love are Hegel's firstidea about the natureof the secret
bonds connectingus together - and hence anti-theological.
ChristianGod-talkin the essayis Hegel's meansforexpressing
the metaphysics of lifeand love,and so of revealingthatsuch
HEGEL'S CRITIQUE OF MORALITY 395
God-talkhas itsultimatesubstancesolelyin ethicallife.Hegel's

modelhere is, of course,Kant'sReligion within theLimitsofRea-
sonAlone.Hegel thinksthereis an ethicalcontentembeddedin
the emergenceof Christianity, above all in theJesusnarrative,
thatKant missesand misrepresents altogether;so fullydoes
Kantmistakethefundamental ethicallogic of Christianity that
hisdoctrineis notChristian at all,butrathera rationalized ver-
sion oftheveryJudaismbiblicalChristianity aimedto supplant.
Hegel's methodis nonethelessakin to Kant's,witha twist:his
ambitionis not to interpretChristianity in the light of an
already secured moral theory, as Kant did, but ratherto make
manifestthe ethicallogic,the ethicalcontentof the logic of
experience,implicitin earlyChristianity. Hegel'shermeneutical
practice can be baffling misleadingbecause he perceives
and
Jesus as doing practicallythe same activityof attemptingto
unlockthe ethicalcontentof theologicaldiscoursethathe is
forHegel,Jesustoo is engagedin an anti-the-
doingtheoretically;
ological enterpriseof ethicaldecoding,and thusJesustoo is
usingGod-talkas a fumbling, indeterminate linguisticwayof
expressing whatis a holisticethicalvision.The hubrisofHegel's
identificationof his endeavorwithJesus'has not gone unno-
ticed(see Hamacher,1998); however, once one recognizesthat
Hegel takesJesusto be an hermeneutician and performative
decoder, a kind of philosopher, then thathubris can be some-
whatsoftened.Still,the model forHegel's essayis Kant'sreli-
gionbook; in thislightwe mightretitleHegel's essay:"Religion
withintheLimitsofLifeAlone."So suggesting requiresone fur-
ther acknowledgement: while Kant's philosophycontains a
momentof religiousor theologicalexcess,Hegel's does not.2
Because he thinksthe ethicalcontentis, howeverindetermi-
nately,availablefromtheoutset,thenforhimthereis no excess
or remainder. This too can lead to confusionsinceHegel does
notconstruehis interpretive effort as reducingreligionto ethi-
or
cality reinterpreting religiousthoughtin termsof secular
notionsand ideals;rather, hisaim,likethatofJesus,is to expli-
396 SOCIAL RESEARCH
cate whatGod is, to makemanifest the implicitcontentof the

conceptofGod.
Second, the holisticmetaphysicsof life espoused in the
"Spirit"essayis inadequate,butnotcompletely false.Takinghis
cue fromAristotle(and Holderlinand Schelling),Hegel wants
to construepractical,ethicallifeas somehowcontinuouswith
organic,biologicallife,withthelivingworld;havinga lifeas in
the expression"geta life!" - is a formation of living,of being
alive.This accountof ethicalexperiencethencerequiresboth
theholisticassumptions operativein speakingaboutorganicliv-
ing things,aboveall thenormative exigenciesthatfollowupon
an organicconceptionof thelogicof partand whole,and, the
vitalisticconceptuality of life and death,of injury,hurt,and
woundingthatlifediscourseso understoodcarrieswithit. The
depthofHegel'sethicalvisiondependson theappropriation of
life discoursein these two registersfor ethicalexperience -
practicallifeas a formof living.The inadequacyofhis account
derivesfromtheimmediacy oftheappropriation; organism/life
discourseis adoptedbut not philosophically earned.Nonethe-
less,as we shall see, Hegel's deployment of lifein "Spirit"has
profoundconsonanceswithNietzsche'scritiqueof morality.
More important, the ethicaldepththe metaphysics of lifepro-
videsto Hegel's accountof ethicalexperiencesetsthe agenda
forwhathe meansto resourcethroughthenotionsof recogni-
tionand spiritin thePhenomenology. The fundamental taskofthe
Phenomenology on thisinterpretation is to makegood theinade-
quaciesin theoriginalholisticmetaphysics oflifein the"Spirit"
essaywhilesustaining the samefundamental ethicallogic.The
Phenomenology conceptuallyactualizes,throughthe notionsof
recognition and spirit,theethicalvisionfirstdisplayedin "The
Spiritof Christianity and itsFate."3Hence, the logic of ethical
lifedisplayedin the"Spirit"essayremains,themetaphysics sup-
portingit changes.
/. TheSpiritofJudaism:
Notesfora Genealogy Idealism
ofTranscendental
Hegel interprets biblicalJudaismas the coming-to-be of tran-

scendental idealismas a formoflife,or,whatis thesame,he inter-
pretsJudaismas thegenealogicaloriginofWesternreasonin its
fundamentalPlatonic and Kantian dispensation.4Hence,
althoughHegel regardsAbrahamas the"trueprogenitor of the
Jews"(182),5itmatters to theoverallambitionofhisprojectthat
he beginswithstory the flood,and witha contrastbetween
of
Noah and Nimrod,and betweenthem and Deucalion and
Pyrrha.6The stateofnature,thattimewhenmanand naturestill
livedin a stateof harmony, comes to end withthe flood;its
"destructive,invincible,irresistible
hostility. . . [and] manslaugh-
ter"revealthe indifference of physicalnatureto humanends,
leading to the necessity for control and mastery. Westernratio-
nalityemergesin responseto the need to masterthreatening
nature;itis thecontoursofthisnature-mastering reasonthatwill
come to structure Judaic life.But thisis equallyto saythatthe
deforming and perversequalityofJewish life,and henceofKant-
ian reason,derivesfromthe factthatit appropriates a formof
rationalitydesignedtomaster hostilenature,and appliesit to the
humansubject,itsself-relation, and itsrelationswithitshuman,
as wellas nonhuman,others.7 The logicofmastery overnature,
thelogicoffirst separationand thendomination thatHegel per-
ceivesas the debilitating and self-destructive featureof Kantian
rationalism hasitsintelligiblesourcein thefirst humanresponses
to theappearanceof natureas itselfcoldlyindifferent and bru-
tallyantagonisticto human life.
Judaic reason is an instrumental
generatedas a meanstohumansurvival
rationality turnedintoan
integralform oflife.8
Hegel proposesthatarejust twobasic waysone can master
nature:through"somethingreal" (183)- thatis, throughcol-
lectivepracticalactivity like the buildingof a cityor a tower
-
(Nimrod'ssolution) or through"something thought."Noah's
398 SOCIAL RESEARCH
solution,here presentedas the inventionof theJewishGod,

involvestwosteps:the posingof an ideal to set againsthostile
nature,and thentheascription being.On
to thatideal ofreality,
thisaccount,the transcendent God of the traditionis a reified
and personified ideality.Byascribingrealityto theideal,Noah
it
gives power over mundanereality, nowconceivedas theobject
of God's thought.In thisway,all realityis sublimedinto a
thought-reality - God as the originaltranscendental ego. Still,
thethoughtofsucha God cannot,in fact,provideforan actual
mastery overnature;hence,a certaintypeof conceptualdefer-
ral mustbe builtinto the experienceof such a God's mastery
overnature.The deferralis themediationof God's relationto
naturethroughhisrelationtomanviatheestablishment ofwhat
we mightcall the "TheologicalContract":God promisesto
restrainthe forcesof nature on the conditionthat human
beings mastertheir nature,nature within,our murderous
hearts,byobeyinghislawsofconduct.BecauseGod's relationto
hostilenatureis alwaysconditionalupon human obedience,
thentheebb and flowofnaturein relationto man is onlyever
a register ofhumanobedienceand disobedience.Nature,from
thisperspective, becomesnothingbuta signofman'srelationto
God, thoughtHegel statesunequivocallyin the accountof
a
Abraham:"itwasthroughGod alone thatAbrahamcame intoa
mediaterelationwiththeworld,the onlykindof linkwiththe
worldpossibleforhim"(187).
Againstthehostilepowerofnature,Hegel states,"Noahsaved
himself bysubjecting bothitand himself tosomething morepow-
erful;Nimrod,by tamingit himself'(184). Noah and Nimrod
together are thusmeantto represent thetwostandpoints ofcriti-
cal reason:Nimrodstandsforthestrategy of theunderstanding
( Verstand)in whichnatureis conceivedofas a causalsystem that
is to be engagedwiththroughcausalmanipulation, whileNoah
standsforthe strategy of moralreason ( Vemunfi) in whichthe
relationto the externalworld is mediated throughindividuals'
self-relation, orself-manipulation
theirself-subjection toan exter-
nal authority.9 Noah and Nimrodrepresent twoaspectsofa uni-

vocal,self-defeatingstrategy: "Bothmadea peace of necessity with
thefoeand thusperpetuated thehostility."Thissentenceencap-
sulatesin miniature Hegel's intuitionabout whynature-dominat-
ing reason is necessarilyself-defeating: the logic of causal
and
manipulation self-subjection to external authoritybothinter-
nalizetheconceptionofotheras antagonist. Mastery knowsonly
one solution:domination and control.Becauseno otherrelation
to thenaturalotheris possible,theneventhestateofpeace per-
petuatestherelationofhostility; peace and successfuldomination
are one; or rather,peace can onlybe envisagedas thecomplete
vanquishing of theother: peace and deathare one.
For Hegel, the Abrahamicnarrative is the embodimentand
fulfillmentof theNoah portionof thelogicof mastery. Whatis
involvedin subjecting oneselfto a transcendent externalauthor-
ity?Or,askingthesamequestionfromtheopposingangle,what
in Abraham'sactionsrevealsthattheyare themanifestation ofa
workofself-subjection to transcendent authority?What,in Abra-
ham'sactions,allowsus to perceivein themtheperpetuation of
hostility?
Hegel's answer to these questionsdepends on vindicat-
ingan ethicalgeometry of horizontaland vertical, in whichthe
horizontaland so immanentrelationsof love and lifeare dis-
placed bya verticalrelationto a projectedexternality. Horizon-
tal relationsare internal;the verticalrelationis (purportedly)
external.Because,again,thereis no actualexternalauthority but
onlytheself-subjecting stanceof takingoneselfto be so subject,
then the meaningof the verticalrelationis realizedthrough
whattheattemptto secureit does tothehorizontalrelationsof
loveand life.
Hegel's initialgestureis to describeAbraham'sprojectin the
neutral,whollymodern termsof seeking to becoming an
autonomoussubject;he wantedto become"a whollyself-subsis-
tent,independentman,to be an overlordhimself'(185). Since
autonomy is a worthwhile, indeedindispensable goal,Hegel can-
not condemnAbrahamfor adoptingit. Rather,what is con-
400 SOCIAL RESEARCH
demnedisnotthegoal,butthemannerandformittakesinAbra-
ham.For Hegel,Abraham'sactionof tearinghimself freeof his
family,which may look like the normal mechanism necessary for
becomingautonomous,is carriedout withan intolerablecold-
ness,and itis thatcoldnessorindifference in theactionthatqual-
ifiesitsviolence.10 Abrahamtorehimselffree"without having
been injuredor disowned, without thegriefwhichaftera wrong
or an outragesignifies love'senduringneed,whenlove,injured
indeedbutnotlost,goesin questofa newfatherland in orderto
flourishand enjoyitselfthere."Abrahamic autonomy is tobe dis-
tinguished from other emancipatory projectsby itsutter discon-
nectionfromtheroutinenaturalmotives forsuchundertakings:
hurt,injury,loss,wound. Injury,so understood,occurswhen
humanintersubjective relations, whatHegel here calls love,go
-wrong.Suffering wrong,wheresuffering is thebase criterion for
wrongness, is the intelligible for
reason wanting to free oneself
and setup newrelations.Moralinjuryis an injuryto theconsti-
tutiverelationswith others;legitimateemancipation,then,
involvestherealization ofnoninjurious relations.Hegelconceives
of thebondsof loveas providing thebaselineor modelforour
constitutive relationto others;crudely, in love we realizeour-
selves,and so our for
standing ourselves, throughourrelationto
theother.Butthisis to saythatin loveour relationto an other
mediatesourrelationtoourselves, and thusis a componentofan
extendedself-relation. Hegel's thoughtis thatlove is the condi-
tionforanything likemoral injury:becauseI am dependentupon
the other,theirlovingregard,formystandingformyself, then
anyinterruption in thatlovingregardis an interruption in my
self-regard. is
Moralinjury injury to the internal constitutive rela-
tionsbetweenthe selfand its others.Because Hegel construes
loveas themodelforrelationsto others(otherwise, again,there
wouldbe nothingthatlogicallycould,humanly, be injured),he
construes injury,thequestforemancipation, and therealization
ofnewnoninjurious as
relations, components ofan internal logic
oflove.The monstrous, self-defeating character of Abraham's act
is thatit rendersemptyall thegood reasonsone mighthavefor

seekingto freeoneself:"Abrahamwantednotto love,wantedto
be freebynotloving."Thisis thefundamental act ofdisidentifi-
cationwiththe intimateotherthatallowsa logic of mastery to
intrude.
The fulfillment oftheNoah strategy requiresself-subjectionto
ideal,external, authoritativenormsofconduct.To founda nation
on thisbasisis to displacetheinternalnormsofcommunalsenti-
mentwithmoralprinciple.To makemoralprincipleconstitutive
of one's relationsto selfand othersrequiresthe dissolutionof
familialbonds and theirextensionto the tribe.So the storyof
Abrahamis a versionof the storyof the transformation froma
family-based social systemto an independentpolitical mode of
organization - the transformation thatalso lies behinda good
deal ofGreektragedy. In theJewish case,on Hegel'sreading,itis
theradicaldiscontinuity betweenthetwoformsofsocialorganiza-
tion,familialand political,thatis the sourceof the problem.
Abrahamseeksto founda newnationat thebehestof a purely
abstractidealor norm,whereitis presumedthatwhatthatmeans
is theutterrejectionofthepreviousformofsocialbonding.The
issue,again,is nota matterofcontent, butitsform."Thefirst act
whichmadeAbrahamtheprogenitor ofa nationis a disseverance
whichsnapsthe bonds of communallifeand love."Abraham's
nation-founding actis thewholesaledisplacement ofsentimental
attachment bylaw;or rather, sincefamily cannotreallydisappear,
the mediationof whatonce weresentimental relationsby the
demandsofpositivelaw.If thebondsofcommunallifeand love
are nowconstruedas thehorizontalconditionsthatprovidefor
theintelligibility
in principleofhumanactivity, ofwhatcountsas
injuryand whatnot,ofwhatgroundsthequestforfreedomand
whatneedsto be realizedin sucha quest,thenin severing those
bonds as such Abrahamhas placed himselfand the nationhe
meansto foundin a positionwhereby each further act can only
makeitsagentsevermoreabject(199). Thisstatement shouldbe
construedliterally: Abrahamic, and byextension Jewishagency,
402 SOCIAL RESEARCH
bypursuinga projectpremisedon therepudiation ofthecondi-

in
tionsthatmake humanagencyintelligible principle,"love's
enduringneed,"incrementally destroy thephysiognomyoftheir
practicesas human,renderingthe liveslivedin termsof those
practices borderline,neitherfullyinsidenoroutsidethehuman.
Itis thisnotionofradicalabjectnessthatHegelhasin mindwhen,
at theend of§ i, he saysthat
thegreattragedy oftheJewishpeopleis no Greektragedy;

it can rouseneitherterrornorpity, forbothof thesearise
onlyoutofthefatewhichfollows fromtheinevitableslipof
a beautiful character;it can arousehorroralone. The fate
oftheJewish people thefateofMacbethwhosteppedout
is
ofnatureitself,clungtoalienBeings,and so in theirservice
had to trampleand slayeverything holyin humannature,
had at last to be forsakenby his gods (since thesewere
objectsand he theirslave)and be dashedto pieceson his
faithitself(204-5).
Horroris a responseto what appears as abject; the human

becomesabjectwhenitsteps"outofnatureitself';in so doing,a
humanshedshis or herhumanshapeand appearsas inhuman.
Suchan appearancecan arouseneitherterror norpitybecauseit
humanfate,and hencenota fatewithwhich
is notan intelligible
So whenHegel saysofAbrahamthat
we can in principleidentify.
he becamea "stranger on earth,a strangerto thesoiland tomen
alike"(186), thebeinga stranger is morethana descriptive qual-
its
ity; signifies Abraham becoming so unlikein kind to soil and
menthathe is no longerone ofthem.Abraham, I am temptedto
say,is,forHegel,ontologicallya stranger,a stranger towhatcon-
stitutesthehuman.
The horrorof Abrahamicagencyis thatit is not an internal
modification of humanrelations,a playingout of one of the
darkerfatesofwhatremainsnonetheless humanlife- how-
a fully
everviolent,howevertragic, however - butrathera
self-defeating
repudiation ofwhatmakesrelationsbetweentheselfand others
humanrelations. Thisis theburdenofHegel'sinterpretive track-

ing of the Abrahamnarrative: he mustshow,by redescription,
in
how, severing the bonds of communal lifeand loveas thereal-
izationof the Noah strategy of masteryovernature,Abraham
comesto constitute himself and thenationhe foundsas ontolog-
icalstrangers, as objectstowhomouronlyresponsecan be one of
horror. To saythattheonlyresponsepossibleis horroris toclaim
thatit is a formof lifethatis notfurther transformable (187-8),
wherethefactthatitis notinternally transformable providesthe
premisetoJesus'intervention (205-6).
Because the bulk of Hegel's case turnson a comparison
betweentheJewish and Christian understanding oftransgression,
only two moments need be mentioned as thisjuncture.The first
is Hegel's analysisof Judaicautonomy.On thisaccount,one
becomesautonomousbyliterally makingoneselfindependent in
principle from the worldly conditions of human action. To pursue
thisstrategy a rigidduality mustbe setin placebetweentheunity
oftheideal and all else;one mustregulateone's actionsbyideal
normsratherthan by the demandsof the thingsthemselves.
Judaicautonomy, then,turnson thedistinction betweentheintel-
ligible and the sensible: no sensible thing, no love nor pain,no
place or person,no feelingor act,can be held of independent
worthor lodge a claimthatwouldinfringe on the authority of
principle. What is independent of the natural world gives mean-
ing to it. This requires that be
ideality utterly non-natural, non-
sensible;hence,theidea of a whollyinvisibleGod (191), whose
namecannotbe spoken,withrespecttowhomeveryimageofhim
countsas a rejectionof his untouchableauthority (192), and
becauseunseen,thennecessarily "unfelt"(193). Thisis theulti-
matesourceofHegel'sclaimthatJudaicideality involves a whole-
sale steppingout of nature.It is equallywhy,conversely, Hegel
appears to make truth a mode of beauty - "truth is beautyintel-
-
lectuallyapprehended"(196) and to consider"the spiritof
beauty"(200) the movingforceof reconciliation (206). Beauty
the
plays pivotal role itdoes in this essaybecause itstands forthe
404 SOCIAL RESEARCH
normativeelementin and hence the normativeauthority of

nature-bound sensibleexperiencenotsubjectto thelogicofmas-
tery.Beauty hencestandsfortheclaimofthesensibleas an inde-
pendentsourceofauthority, as howtheentwinement offactand
normis experienced.11
The radicalness ofthedistinction betweensensibleand intelli-
gibleis whatfinally securestheauthority oftheverticalaxis.It is
thisduality of sensibleand intelligible is thesourceofboth
that
thecoldnessofthelaw,and theperpetuation between
ofhostility
selfand otherin carrying it out: "The wholeworldAbraham
regarded simply opposite:ifhe did nottakeit to be a nul-
as his
he lookedon it as sustainedbytheGod whowasalien to it.
lity,
Nothingin naturewassupposedto haveanypartin God; every-
thingwassimply underGod'smastery" (187). Fromthisperspec-
tive,Mosaic law givingsimplysets in place, in stone, the
independenceof theJewishpeople fromthe life-world (191).
The transcendence oftheJewish God and theunconditionality of
Jewish laware twosidesofthesamecoin.
Second,because nothingcan countagainstthe authority of
God, thenthefactof God, his being,his beingone, his being
thesourceofmeaning,is nota truthapprehendedbut"a com-
mand" (196), a categoricalimperative, an infinitedemand.In
makingcommandpriorto truth, one placesitbeyondtherealm
of evidenceand so rationalcriticism. It is the combinationof
theradicalseparationof natureand ideality, on the one hand,
and thecommandstructure ofself-subjection on theotherthat
turnssentimental lifeintopathology. ForHegel theemblematic
episodein whichthisstructure is realizedis thenearsacrifice of
Isaac.In thisepisodewe find the paradigmatic playing outof the
contestbetweenloveand law;itis,ofcourse,equally,thesource
of Hegel's contentionthatthe structureofJudaiclawfulness
involves,essentially,thesevering ofthebondsoflove.ForHegel
itmatters thatthisis theone momentin theAbrahamic
terribly
narrative in whichhe is troubled,anxious,doubtful,in which
his "all-exclusiveheart" (187) could be caused disquietand
depression.Abraham'shesitationis themarkerthat"lovealone
wasbeyondhispower";Abrahamnaturally perceivedin theper-
son of Isaac all his hopes forthefuture,his hopes forposterity
and the one kindof immortality he mighthave. But thisis as
much to say thatlove is the counterclaimto the authority of
God. For that authority,however,nothing mundane can
count- theverythoughtKierkegaard statesas the"teleological
suspension of the ethical."For Hegel, the teleologicalsuspen-
sion of the ethicalis the truthof the positingof God; so Abra-
hamcan truly accepttheauthority ofGod onlyonce he iswilling
to makethesacrificeofhislove.Thismakessacrificethetypeof
relationbetweenthe claims of mundane particularsagainst
God; practically, subsumptionof the materialworld to the
authority of God is, precisely,the sacrificeof the particularto
theuniversal;sacrificeis howthebondsofloveand lifeare sev-
ered.Abrahamachievespeace in acceptingthenecessity ofsac-
rifice:"and his heartwas quietedonlythroughthe certainty of
the feeling that this love was not so strong as to render him
unable to slayhis belovedson withhis own hand."The surest
evidenceoffaithis a quietself-assurance in theact ofmurder -
and the moreone lovesthe personto be murdered,the more
certainis thefaith.Of course,God staysAbraham'shand; Isaac
lives.So Abrahamand Isaac are stillfatherand son, onlynow
theirrelationis mediatedthroughGod's command.Since the
meaningofthatmediationis nothingbutthesacrifice Abraham
waswillingto make,thenlogicallyand motivationally thesacri-
ficewascommitted: fromhenceforth thefatheris alwaysthelaw
ofdeathand theson foreverdead (188).
Ifthisall soundslikeimplausible materials fornationbuilding,
one shouldrecalltheiroriginwithNoah. This entireelaborate
mediationof relationsbetweenselves,and betweentheJewish
nationand all othernations("thehorribleclaimthatHe alone
was God and thatthisnationwas the onlyone to have a god"
(188)), is motivated byfearofthreatening nature,and theneed
to masterit.The desireformastery becomesthedesireforradi-
406 SOCIAL RESEARCH
cal autonomy, wherethedesireforautonomy is potentiallysatis-

fiedbythesubsumption and sacrificeof the claimof each and
every naturalthingto the authorityof transcendent being.It is
thecomplexofthosefearsand desiresthatare embodiedin the
continualworkof self-subjection,and it is hence further those
samepassionsthatkeep theworkofself-subjection actual.Radi-
cal fearand thecorresponding desireformastery, and thechan-
for
nelingof thoseintothedesire freedomand independence,
make plausiblethe attraction of such a formof life,even its
inevitability.
//.Modifications
ofLife:Ethicswithout
Duty
Byshadingthe meaningof the commandstructure ofJudaic

lawin termsofitsgenealogicalorigin,Hegelintendsthatthevery
idea of positivelaw shouldlose its naturalappearance,thatit
shouldcometo appearas,precisely, a solutionto theproblemof
hostilenature,and henceas a historically conditionedand thus
particular Itis an intelligible
strategy. butfinallynotrationalstrat-
egybecausethelogicofmastery thatis embeddedin theconcep-
tion of positivelawfulness reproducesthe antagonismit was
meantto resolve.Not onlydoes lawfulness reproducethehostil-
ity, it
itexacerbates bydepriving all the composingthe
particulars
naturalworldof anyintrinsic worth;it rendersthemall abject.
Abjectionis theultimate fateofthespiritofJudaism.In § ii and
§ iiiHegelseekstodeepentheaccountoftheself-defeating char-
acterofpositivelaw,whichhe is nowgoingto claimis fullyequiv-
alentto Kant'sconceptionofthemorallaw- thelawofreasonas
constitutive of morality- bycontrasting it withJesus'immanent
ethicofreconciliation.
Hegel'sinitialgesture, andwhathe takestobeJesus'initialges-
ture,is simply tosettheclaimsofhumanneedsandwantsagainst
religious commands in orderto reveal,minimally, thatno com-
mandcan be absoluteor unconditional, thatcircumstance must
make a difference and validity

to the authority of a command;
moreradically,sincetheclaimsofneed and wantmustbe able to
conditiontheappropriateness and applicability
of thelaw,then
theymustbe antecedentto thelaw,hencemustpose a counter-
claimto it.So evenfortheJewsthe"animalwhichfallsintothe
pitdemandsinstantaid" (208) whetheror notit is theSabbath;
but thisshowsthat"need cancelsguilt."But ifneed can trump
law,thenalthougha particular urgencycan makethe claimof
needvivid,theclaimdoes notdependon theurgency buton the
need.Jesusand hisdisciplesshowgeneralcontempt fortheSab-
bath, plucking the ears of corn to their
satisfy hungereven
thoughthathungermighthave been satisfied otherwise.Their
contemptfor the law is meantto revealits arbitrariness and
absurdityin the faceof even themost simplenatural need: "The
satisfactionof the commonesthuman want rises superiorto
actionslikethese[religiousones], because
there
liesdirectly
insucha
wantthesensingor thepreserving
ofa humanbeing,no matterhow
emptyhis beingmaybe" (207; emphasisadded). Naturalneed
and want in themselves,spontaneouslyand automatically,
"directly" raisean ethicalclaimdeserving ofbeingsatisfied inde-
pendently of themoralworthof theindividual whoseneed it is,
thusraisinga counterclaim to Kant'sidea thathappiness(thesat-
isfaction ofnaturaldesires)oughttobe distributed in proportion
to virtue(as ifonlythetruly virtuous deservefeedingwhenhun-
gry). If one failsto her
recognize hungeras thesortof stateof
affairsone respondsto bysatisfying it,givingfood,one has not
recognized her.Hegel begins here because the case of natural
need and wantanswersdirectly to theJudaicemptying ofnature
ofanyintrinsic worth.Jesus'generaldrift is to "liftnature"(208),
to showthatnatureis "holierthanthetemple."
To urgethatnaturalneedsand wantsdirectly raisean ethical
claimis to saythatrecognizing a stateas one ofneed or wantis
to recognizeitas a statedemandingofsatisfaction; the
satisfying
need is theinternal correlative
ofperceiving itas a need.Needsjust
arethingsforwhichtheappropriateresponseis to satisfy them;
408 SOCIAL RESEARCH
failingto do so, assumingone is in a positionto help and there

are no competingclaims,is to failto recognizethemas needs.
The demandingness of needs is of kindthatdoes not require
anything "oughtish"in ordertojustifyactingon the demand.
Perhapsone could saythatit is partoflogicalgrammar ofneed
statements thattheappropriate responseto theperceptionofa
need is satisfying it.12This slightly torturous wayof expressing
Hegel's thesisis intended to open on to his critiqueofmorality
as generallawsthatought to be obeyed.He thinksthereis some-
thingfundamentally corruptabouttheveryidea thatthereare
things ought do, thattheoughtstructure
we to ofmorality ("One
to
ought keep one's promises"; "Thou shalt not kill";etc.) is
inseparablefromtheJudaicidea ofGod and law,and hence that
the oughtstructureof moralityis a perpetuationof hostility
againsttheother.Butthosecriticaltheseswillonlycarryweight
ifHegel can at leastmakeplausiblethe idea thatthereis hori-
zontalethicallogic,a logicofloveand itsrenunciation, thelogic
ofa causality offate,thatcan operateindependentof theverti-
cal demandsofmorality.
"Sincelaws,"Hegel states,"are unifications of oppositesin a
concept,whichthusleavesthemas oppositewhileitexistsitselfin
oppositionto reality, it followsthatthe conceptexpressesan
oughf(209). Bysayinga lawinvolvesa unification of opposites,
he meansthatitbringstogether an action and itsprohibition (or
thenegationof itsprohibition):of theact of killing,do notdo
it; of makinga promise,do notbreakit. Since a lawjust is this
unifying of opposites,the killingand the not doingit, thenit
mustleave itselementsas opposites.A unification of opposites
can occuronlyin a concept, not in hence
reality; a law necessar-
ilystandsoutside,in oppositionto,reality. It is becausethelogi-
cal formoflawinvolvesthisdoublestructure of oppositionthat
lawsstandas oughts.
Hegel contendsthatthereare a variety of waysin whichthe
oppositionof law to life, the oughtishness of laws,can be sus-
tained;forexample,bybecominga civillawdecreedbythestate
(and therefore havingthecoercivepowerofthestatebehindit)

or as God'sfiat.However, thedeepestand mostseductive version
of positivity
occurswhentheoppositionis securedthroughthe
formoflaw;thatis,throughobligatoriness beingthecorollary or
consequent of a law being universal,or universalizable in the
Kantiansense.For Kanttheonlyunconditionally good thingin
theworldis a good will.Whatmakesa good willgood uncondi-
tionally,
absolutely, is notwhatitwills,whichis alwayssomething
particularand thereforeempiricaland contingent, but howit
-
wills wherethe how,ifit does not referto an explicitcontent,
mustreferto form.The formis thatof universality. For the
maximofmyactiontobe moral(eitherfulfilling whatI oughtto
do or,minimally, notcontrary to whatI oughtto do), itmustbe
universalizable, one thatcouldin principlebe a maximofaction
for everyone.So, familiarly enough, the maximof breaking
promises as convenient cannot be universalizedbecauseifevery-
one actedon itthensoon enoughno one wouldtrustothersand
thepracticeofpromising wouldbreakdownaltogether. The con-
tradiction Kantis concernedwithlies not in thisconsequence,
butin thefactthatmymaximofpromisebreakingas convenient
presupposesthe continuingviability of the institutionof promis-
ing; hence, I am committed to universalizingat the same time
boththateveryonekeep theirpromisesand thateveryonebreak
theirpromisesas convenient.Logically,thisjust is a contradic-
tion;morally whatit showsis thatin actingon a nonuniversaliz-
able maximI am makingan exceptionin myowncase,or,what
is thesame,freeridingon thegood willofeveryoneelse. To be
Kantianly immoralis to be a moralparasite.
Hegel concedes thatuniversality does overcomethe abstract
of
positivity civil law (at itsworst) and divinefiatbecause com-
mandhereis "something subjective,and,as subjective,as a prod-
uct of a human power (i.e., of reason as the capacityfor
universality),it loses itsobjectivity, itspositivity,
itsheteronomy,
and thethingcommandedis revealedas groundedin an auton-
omyof thehumanwill"(210-11).Hegel's notionof positivity in
410 SOCIAL RESEARCH
the "Spirit"essaycan nowbe recognizedas a versionof Kant's

notionofheteronomy. HavingconcededthatKant'sconception
of universalityas a productand formof rationalself-determina-
tionis an advanceon thesheerpositivity of civiland divinelaw,
Hegel nonethelesswantsto urge thatit containsan intrinsic
momentofheteronomy The issuehereis complexsincethe
itself.
verythingKantbelievesis the greatachievement of the moral
-
law namely, in
theway which it secures the wholesale indepen-
dence of reasonfromthe dictatesof nature - is equallywhat
Hegel regardsas itsindeliblepositivity, itsultimateheteronomy.
At thisjuncture,the force of Hegel's claim depends on its
genealogicalsetting: we comprehend themeaningand character
of the universality of moralreasonby comprehending it as an
internalization of the command structure of lawfulness
bequeathedbyJudaiclawintoWesternreasongenerally and, in
particular,intoitsconceptionofpolitical rule. This is the source
ofHegel'scontention thatthedifference betweentheEuropean
prelatewhoruleschurchand stateand themanwholistenstothe
commandofdutyis notthat"theformer makethemselves slaves,
whilethelatterisfree,butthattheformer havetheirlordoutside
themselves, whilethelattercarrieshislordin himself, yetas the
sametimeis hisownslave"(211). Hegel can see nothingin Kant-
ian universality otherthana punishingsuperegowhoseappear-
ance as an ego idealis theultimate sourceofitspowerto punish.
It is punishing becauserationaluniversality securestheultimate
separationof particularand universal,the separationwhich,
genealogically, is to be understoodin termsof thelogicof mas-
tery:"For the particular - impulses,inclinations, pathological
love, sensuousexperience,or whateverelse it is called [by
Kant]- the universalis necessarily and alwayssomethingalien
and objective." Since,again,on one level,thisis exactly whatKant
is claimingto be theauthority of themorallaw,namely,thatit
confersrationalmeaningon thenaturally given,thentheobjec-
in
tionmustlie, the instance, comingto see themorallaw
first in
as a progenyof thehistory of mastery: themorallaw continues
thehistoryofmastering nature,makingtherealization ofmoral-

itysimultaneously a formation of self-renunciation. Exactlylike
Nietzschelater,Hegel perceivesthemorallawas a slavemorality
thatopposesto lifean abstract ideal thatis in reality a productof
life,wheretheoppositionbetweenlaw and lifeis logicallyequiva-
lentto theduality between(rational)universality and (sensuous)
Evenwhena desireis compatible
particularity. withthemorallaw
or
the separation duality between universality and particular
remains:whenI am disposedto actbenevolently, itis notmydis-
positionthatis the groundof myactionbut the factthatsaid
(pathological)disposition satisfiesthe generalobligationto aid
thosein distress.The lawconfersreason-giving forceon thedispo-
sitionthat,on itsown,is (rationally)empty.
///. ofLove
A LogicalGrammar
While Hegel's genealogicalaccount mightbe sufficient to

demonstrate theremnant positivityofmoralrationality, and even
torevealhowthatpositivity
sufficient is,as a formofmastery, self-
its
destructive, contention that moral reason is irrational is not
yetcomplete;to makethatchargestickrequiresthattherebe a
viablealternativeto moralreason.The alternative offered bythe
of
spirit Jesus involves a internalization,
further an internalization
thatthroughrealizingor fulfilling the law annulsits remnant
thisidea of a radicalinternalization
positivity; is meantto wed
theworkof Lutheraninwardness, inwardization, to Aristotelian
virtue.Whatwould fulfillthe law of benevolence,love of thy
neighbor, wouldnotbe a commandbutan "is,""a modification
oflife,a modificationwhichis exclusiveand therefore restricted
onlyiflookedat in reference to itsobject"(212). If in theKant-
ian schemetherelationbetweenlawand case is thatofuniversal
thatleavesbothnonethelessseparate,in theChris-
to particular
tianschemethe relationof thevirtuousdispositionto love thy
neighborto lovingthisneighboris one ofpotentiality to actual-
412 SOCIAL RESEARCH
ity- or to use Hegel'sownlanguagehere,borrowedfromBaum-

garten,fulfillment is the"'complement ofpossibility,' sincepos-
sibility is the of
object something as a
thought, universal, while
'is' is thesynthesis ofsubjectand object,inwhichthesubjectand
objecthavelosttheiropposition"(214). For thevirtuousdispo-
sition,theparticular is all occasionand opportunity forsatisfac-
tion. As Knox correctlyclaims in a footnote(212), Hegel
perceivesloveas modification oflife(thatis,of thewholeself),
and hence not a portionof the self takingcommandover
anotherportion.Hegel's consistentlanguage here is that of
"modification": love is a modification of life;reconciliation is a
modification of love; thevirtuesare, collectively, modifications
love.AlthoughHegel does notelaboratehisnotionofmodifica-
tion,the intuitive idea, whichalmostcertainly is based on the
Spinozistconception of modes, is that a living individual
expresseshisor herselfin a variety ofattitudes, dispositions,and
actions.Each such dispositionis an expression,an articulation
and formation, ofthewholeself,inwhichtheselfbothexpresses
and realizesitself. As simply expression and realization, a stateof
theselfjust "is"theselfin one ofitsformations. The command
formbecomessuperfluous because thereis nothingof the self
thereforit to be opposedto,no sourceofresistance or recalci-
trance;butonce theformofcommandbecomessuperfluous in
it
thisway,then it is destroyedsince as form presupposes an
oppositionbetweenitselfand inclination.
Anger and hate and hurt and revulsionand despair and
resentment can also be modifications of lifeand love.Negative
emotionshavea rolein life,and can indeedprovidethemotiva-
tionforworthwhile ends,such as the emancipatory projectof
seekinga newlifeand thefoundingofa newstate(the "endur-
ingneed oflove"Abrahamlacked); fromthestandpoint ofrec-
onciliation, a negativeemotioncan also be a crime(216). What
distinguishes all thesecasesforHegel is thatin themmylifeis
alreadyinternally boundto thelifeoftheother,thatthereis pre-
supposedan equalitybetweenme and the other,and thatmy
reactionis a further workingout,unfolding, or elaboration,a

furtherdeterminationof our indefinitely determinablelife
together. What Hegel is thus opposing is the idea thatour rela-
tionswithothers,all others,be conceivedof as relationswith
objectswhosewealand woeare extrinsic to ourinternalself-rela-
tion.Hegel is not denyingthatthe verypointof Kant'smoral
law- his idea thatwe ought to treatothersas ends-in-them-
selves- is to make our moralworthiness contingent upon our
treatment ofothers.His objectionis notto theintention, butthe
formit takes:whentheauthority of themoraldependsupon a
universalforeverlogicallyand ontologically independentof all
concreteparticulars, thenothersas concreteparticulars become
ancillary to myrelationto thelawitself;othersare mere occasions
foran individualto further enactherobedienceto thetranscen-
dentauthority ofthemorallaw;herworthiness or unworthiness
a
is,finally,private matter between her will and theauthority of
thelaw.Formally, Abraham'sGod-mediated sacrificial
relationto
Isaac genealogicallybecomesthe relationbetweenthe Kantian
good willand itsother.
Love as a modification oflife,thenotionof our lifetogether,
that which gets indefinitely workedand reworked,formed,
deformed and reformed, is itselfmodeledupon theloverelation
thatis one ofitsmodes.Atthisjuncture,lifeis conceivedon anal-
ogywithlove,oflovein itsunconsciousform,whiletherelation
ofloversto one anotheris conceivedin organicterms("eachsep-
arateloveris one organin a livingwhole")(308). ThatHegelpre-
supposesa discourseof love here can seem as bothfatefuland
embarrassing. The embarrassment can be curtailed, atleastsome,
ifwefocuson thelogicalformofloveratherthanitspreciseaffec-
tivecharacter.Fulfillment, I suggestedearlier,should be con-
ceivedalongthelinesofinternalization; hence,thegeneralidea
oftheuniversal being absorbed intothe self and inclination law-
fullyarticulatedyieldslifeas a thoroughgoing synthesis oflawand
inclination, where is
synthesisunderstood notas an externalartic-
ulationofsubject(universal)to object(particular), buta condi-
414 SOCIAL RESEARCH
tion in whichtheiroppositionis lost (214). Hence, we have

Hegel'sformulathat"thecorrespondence oflawand inclination
islifeand,as therelationofdifferents toone another, love"(215).
In actsoflove,"inclination (desire,whatI desiremost),and law
(saythedemandthatI regardtheotheras an end in him-or-her-
self,and thustakeherendstobe myends),"are synthesized. But
thisis equivalentto claimingthatin lovetheotheris myend;she
istheunconditioned objectofmydesire,henceistheworthofmy
lifeas such.In lovingtheworthofmylife,so to speak,is realized
in theworthoftheotherwhois separatefromme.
As Jean-LucNancyeloquentlystatesthe idea, love,in all its
forms, always posesitself as thatwhichis notself-love (Nancy,1991:
13
94). Loveis alwaysexperiencedas theimmediate abrogationof
of
self-love, what,spontaneously and all unannounced and unin-
tended,ruptures theegoismofdesire.14 Lovedispossesses theself
fromitself, sendstheselfoutsideitselftillthepointwhereitfinds
itselflodgedin thebeloved;beingso separatedfromitself, being
so boundto theother,is phenomenologically manifested in the
experienceoffindingone's ownwealand woe,one's owncapac-
ityforflourishing andvulnerability tohurt,as boundtotheother,
bothwithrespectto theother'scapacityforflourishing and vul-
nerability to hurt (when the other I
flourishes,flourish; when my
otherhurts, I hurt), andwithrespecttotheother'sregardforme.
If Kantsupposesthatthedeepestand mostsignificant aspectof
the experienceof the morallaw is thatit rupturesmyself-love,
thenHegel's counteris thatsuch rupturing is naturallyexperi-
encedin love,and thusthatthemorallawcan onlybe a reified,
denaturalized formofwhatproperly belongsmylovingrelation
with(all) others.
The secondlogicalaspectof love,accordingto Nancy,is that
"loveis theextrememovement, beyondtheself,ofa beingreach-
. . .
ing completion. Philosophy alwaysthinkslove as an accom-
plishment, arriving at a finaland definitive completion"(Nancy,
1991:86). If theidea of loveposing itselfas not self-loverepre-
sentsthemoralaspectoflove,theidea ofloveas completing or
satisfyingor fulfilling oneselfin and throughthe other,of the

otheras the momentof one's subsistence, is the logical/philo-
sophical claim oflove: love as the of
figure philosophical truth. In
thefragment "Love,"Hegelparsesthisthought bycomparing the
limitations oftheunderstanding, is a
which always unity oppo- of
sitesleftas opposites(thatis,nothingmorethanthejoiningofa
subjectand predicate:S is P), and reason,whichclaimsall deter-
miningpowerforitself,to love. "Love,"he contends,"neither
noris restricted;
restricts itis notfiniteat all ... in love,lifeis pre-
sentas a duplicateofitselfand a singleand unifiedself.Here life
has runthroughthecircleofdevelopment froman immature to
a completely matureunity"(304-5).This is thefirstglimmerof
theHegelianidea ofan immanent infinite,together withtheidea
thatsuchan infinite is theresultofa development sequence.The
cruxof thisconceptionof theinfinite, and so of completion, is
thatitis thedissolution oftheoppositionbetweenselfand other,
so a findingof oneselfin the other.Fromone perspective, the
logicofcompletion looksthoroughly teleological: theotheris my
end;however, thereis a different angle of vision possible.Assume
thattheotherstandsfortheabsolutelimitofmypowers,thatthe
freedomor autonomyor separatenessof the otherfromme
standsforwhatis ultimately separatefromme (becauseherfree-
dom is logicallyindependentfrommyfreedom:it can be domi-
nated,coerced,manipulated, but as freedomit alwaysescapes
me); and, simultaneously, the other'sindependencefromme
entailsthather desiresare intrinsically different frommyown
evenwhen,coincidentally, thetwooverlap.The other'sfreedom
is the absolutelimitof myfreedom,and the other'sdesiresas
whatrestrict and denythe authority of mydesires.This is, of
course,just theHobbesianversionoftherelationbetweenmyself
and othersthatKantinherits. Seen in thisway,theclaimthatlove
rehearsesa logic of completionis an extendedand radicalized
versionofKant'sfoundinginsight, theinsightthatfirst enablesa
wholly immanent conception of selfand world, that the limitsof
experienceare itsconditionofpossibility; thelogicoflovetrans-
416 SOCIAL RESEARCH
formsKantiansubjectiveidealisminto an objectiveor infinite

idealism.Once theself'srelationto theworldis boundto itsrela-
tionto others,and thoseothersbecomebothlimits(as separate
fromtheself)and itsconditionsof possibility (as whatprovides
forthe verypossibility thenthereremainsno
of self-relation),
absolutelimit,no restriction,no perspectiveoutsidetheongoing
exchangebetween selfand othersthat couldbe relevanttoit.But
thisis all thatis meantbyobjective, idealism;idealismis
infinite
thelogicofloveactualizedas thelogicofexperiencein general.
Accordingto Nancy,thereis a thirdaspectto thelogicalform
oflove,namely, thatitsrupturingofself-love ofthe
is a fracturing
selfthatis neverquitesurmounted or sublated.
Lovere-presents broken(and thisis nota rep-

the/toitself
It
resentation). presents this to it: he, thissubject,was
touched,brokeninto,in his subjectivity, and he is from
then,forthetimeoflove,openedby thisslice,brokenor
fractured, He is,whichis tosaythatthe
evenifonlyslightly.
breakorwoundis notan accident,and neitheris ita prop-
ertythatthesubjectcouldrelateto himself. For thebreak
an
as subject;itis,essentially,
is a breakin hisself-possession
interruption oftheprocessofrelationofoneselfto oneself
outsideof oneself.From then on, / is constituted broken
(Nancy,1991:9).
Nancy'swholewayof settingup and articulating thisthesisis

a
intendedas critique of both Hegel's earlyconceptionof com-
pletionthroughloveas wellas hislaterconceptionofsublation,
cancelingand preserving at a higherlevel,whichis hisphenome-
nologicalre-inscription of thelogic of love.To saythatthe I is
constitutedas broken to urgethatthereis a woundor rupture
is
thatdoes heal, thatremainsexposed and vulnerable.If love
involvesour indefinite exposureto theother,and hencea limit-
if love constitutes
less vulnerability, our moralinjurability,our
as human,thenthereis
injurability in lovesomething thatcannot
be conceivedofas completion The conditionof
and satisfaction.
satisfactionthroughtheotheris always,simultaneously,a satisfac-

tionforever ruined;mycompletionin and throughtheotheris
also
always myincompletion, mybrokenness. And,to be sure,in
thefragment "Love"Hegel desperately,whichis to say,romanti-
cally,attemptsto conceiveof all limitation
as external,so that
evendeathis inconsequential, merelyexternal,to theimmortal-
ityof love representedby the child (305-8).The "Spirit"essay,
however, contains
implicitly a darkermoment,one thatis pivotal
fortheformation oftheprojectofthePhenomenology,
TV.TheCausalityofFate:
and theCritique
Transgression ofPunishment
WhenHegel saysthatover"againstthe positivity of theJews,

Jesusset man" (224), I takeithe means by thiscurious claimthat
morality does not concernwhatwe oughtto do or whatdeter-
minesor providessomeultimate forouractions,but
justification
ratherelaborateswhowe are,hencewhatwe are willingto take
responsibility for,whatwe are answerablefor,hence wherewe
standwithrespectto ourothersand whatwe construetheirposi-
tionwithrespecttous to cometo (whatclaimstheyhaveuponus
and hence,again,whatwe are answerable for). To saytoo much
too quickly, byputting man in of
place law,Hegel meansthatin
thoseplaceswherequestionsofmorality seemmosturgent, when
we are called upon tojustify an actionor nonaction,whatis at
stakeis notthevalidity ofmorality as suchor theultimate source
ofitsauthority or,whatis thesame,theextentofitsauthority over
our doingsbut,just and only,"thenatureor qualityof our rela-
tionshiptoone another"(Cavell,1979:268). Thisis nottodesub-
limate moralityinto the human, to reduce a transcendent
morality to a merelyhumanone,butratherto changethetopic,
to suggestthatthe veryidea of morality as a set of ultimately
authoritative normsgoverning humanactionismistaken aboutits
meaning and scope; morality as law displacesresponsibilityfor
418 SOCIAL RESEARCH
thequalityofhumanrelationships fromthewebofcommitments
and undertakings through whichwe elaboratehowwe standwith
respect to one another into subject-transcendent normsand laws.
Changingthetopicis notmeantto makemorality weakeror less
authoritative thanitis in themorality system,butratherto giveit
anotheraspectaltogether - to expose the actualityof its mun-
dane,albeitevery bitas demanding, content:thenatureand qual-
ity of our relationshipto one another.Ethical discourse,
includingmoralargument, is the meansof makingexplicitfor
ourselves andfortheotherwhatthiscomestoandwhatis todone
aboutit,so whoI am and mustbe in myrelations toothersifI am
to sustainwhatI taketo be myfundamental commitments and
ideals. Norms,commitments, responsibilities,values and the
desiresand emotionsthataccompany or revealtheseareall inter-
nal ingredients through whichwe articulate wherewe are in the
-
unfoldingstoryof our life together a storyof selveslost or
found,dejectedor elated,sustainedor spurned,imprisoned or
free,failingor flourishing, needyor needed,indifferent or car-
ing. Everything turns on where we are with respect one
to
another, howwerespondorfailtodo so,and thereis nothingelse
foreitherselfor otherthatethically matters.
The testcase Hegel employsto demonstrate thisthesisis how
weunderstand andwhatwedo withtrespass(crime,vice,offense,
transgression). Forthepurposesofthisargument, Hegelis going
to construecriminal justiceas moraljusticewritlarge:criminal
justice makesexplicitand formal,givesinstitutional shape to,
whattranspires informally in routine occurrences of (deontic)
since,
immorality formally, both arestructuresof law.Hegel's neg-
ativethesisis that criminaljustice has onlyone response tres-
to
pass:punishment. To comprehendthemeaningof punishment
forcriminal justiceencapsulates, whilerendering vivid,themean-
ing of law itselfsince punishment completes claimoflawby
the
revealing itsjurisdiction overthoseactionsthatmostemphatically
deny it. Punishment represents the authority of the law in just
thosecaseswhereitsauthority hasbeen defied,itsclaimstobeing
authoritative abrogated.Punishment, Hegel is goingto claim,is

thefullestrevelation of boththefactthatmorallawfulness is a
of
logic mastery and domination whose fulfillment is death,and,
consequently, thatlaw is dependentupon the very life-world, the
livesof livingagents,thatit necessarily seeksto separateitself
from(all thebetterto rule).
In a sense,Hegelconsidersthepunishments renderedbypenal
justice are a tortured concession by law that there is nothing it can
humanlydo to respondto trespass;thatpunishment is not so
mucha humanresponseto transgression, butwhatwe do when
no further humanresponseis possible.Punishment is theformof
responseto trespassthatis thesevering ofresponse.Why?Atthe
centerof thepuzzleis theabsoluteseparationbetweentheuni-
versality ofthelaw,itseternalauthority, and theactionthatdefies
it. Formally,thesetwobelongto ontologically distinctdomains:
lawbelongsforever to theintelligible,oughtishworldofreason,
whilethecriminalactbelongsto thesenseworldofparticularity
thatis.Actand laware connectedto one another - theactbreaks
thelaw,deniesit- and yetseparate.Hegel'scontention is thatall
thatpunishment accomplishes is thesolidification ofthesepara-
tion of the criminalfromthe law: his imprisonment or death
makesfactual("linkedwithlifeand clothedwithmight"[226])
the separationthatthe criminalact itselfannounced:"The law
hasbeenbrokenbythetrespasser; itscontentno longerexistsfor
him;he has canceledit.Buttheformofthelaw,universality, pur-
sues himand clingsto his trespass;his deed becomesuniversal,
and the rightwhichhe has canceledis also canceledforhim.
Thus the law remains,and a punishment, his desert,remains."
Following Kant,Hegelconstrues eachhumanactionas legislative:
to do X is,at thesametime,to implicitly claimthatI am entitled
to do X, thatX is right,hence doingX is lawful.To commita
criminalact is to pose a lawthatcancelstheexistinglaw.If obe-
dienceis a conditionforright,thenin breakingthelawone puts
oneselfoutsideright;thelawbreaker mustlose hisrights, mustbe
punished, otherwise his actionwould replace the authority of
420 SOCIAL RESEARCH
givenlawwiththelawannouncedinhisaction.ThisiswhatHegel
means when he says that "punishmentlies directlyin the
offended law"(225).
It is the fact that "punishment is inevitably deserved. . .
inescapable"(226) thatraisestheproblem.Whilepunishment is
always both and
necessary deserved, itsexecution is not since itis
alwayssomething contingent and particular.15 On thefaceofit,it
looksplausibleto saythatwe can resistprosecuting theoffense,
or evenpardonthecriminal. Butfromtheperspective oflawand
justiceitself, theseoptionsare notconsistently and truly available
sincethey "do not justice, justice unbending;and so
satisfy for is
longas lawsaresupreme, so longas thereisno escapefromthem,
so longmusttheindividual be sacrificedto theuniversal, i.e.,be
put to death." Because the criminal action is and
particular yet
it a
legislative, represents standing denial of the authority of the
law.Because the criminalhas negatedthe rights of all others,
thenuntilhisclaimtoright(thelegislative character ofhisact) is
canceled,the affront remains.Hegel's bald thesishere is that
nothinglessthancanceling positionas active-legislator
thecriminal's will,
the authority
in actuality,restore of the law itself.Every act that
emphatically breaksthelawnecessarily undermines lawfulnessas
suchbycancelingitsauthority. Hence, "ifthere is no wayof mak-
ing the action undone, if itsrealityis eternal [in supplantingthe
law],thenno reconciliation is possible,noteventhrough suffer-
ingpunishment" (227). Suffering punishment does nothingwith
respecttothecancellation ofthelawinvolved in theoffense. Only
the removalof the legislativeauthority of the criminal,the
authorityrightfully possessed only throughobedience, can
restorethe authority of the law.The death penaltyis not one
optionamongothers;it belongsto theverybeingof law.What
Hegel claimedwasparadigmatic in therelationofAbrahamand
Isaac, comesto realizationin penaljustice:the sacrificeof the
individual to theuniversal, hisdeath,is thetruthoflaw.16
It isworthlingering on thisthought forjusta moment.Hegel's
complaint is thatat theheartofmorality moral-
thereis a terrible
ism.The onlythingmorality can do withtransgression is tojudge

it,or rather,judgmentis theinternalcorollary ofthefactthatfor
morality is the
transgression negation ofthe law,and as suchputs
the violatorof the law outsidethe bindingtermsof human
engagement. So we mightsaytheveryact of transgression calls
downupon itselfa judgment,whereevery judgment is the per-
ception of the violator of law as excludingherself fronl the con-
ditionsthatregulateinteractionin general.Judgmentis the
communalrecapitulation of the self-exclusionoriginally accom-
plishedbythe transgressive-legislative deed. This is theviolence
and moralism ofjudgment, whatmakesmoraljudgmenta moral-
ism: everymoraljudgment says "Guilty!"and in so saying
announcesthepenaltyofdeath.Whichiswhyitis appropriate to
thinkofwhatis transpiring hereas Hegel'scritiqueoftraditional
morality ratherthan,merely, Kant'smoralphilosophy. Hegel's
perceivesin Kant'stheoryonlytheexacerbation ofthemoralism
thatall morality - as a systemof bindinglawsor principlesor
normsor commandments - has been. Morality so understoodis
nothingotherthanjudgmentand death,makingeach of us
transgressive beingsforit,onlydead menwalking.
Punishment as fate,Hegel contends,is quitedifferent in kind
to theoperationofpenal law.I havebeen claimingthatHegel's
ethicalprojectinvolves a generalshiftoforientation, a changing
ofthetopicofmorality fromthequestionoflawand obedience,
verticalmorality, to the qualityand natureof our relationship
withone another,horizontalmorality. Withinhorizontalethical
lifethereis no fundamental cleavagebetweenuniversal and par-
ticular;trespass here cannot be describedin terms oftheparticu-
larslavedefying theauthority ofhisuniversalmaster(229); within
unitedlifenothingoriginalappearsas intrinsically otheror alien.
The following strikesmeas amongthemostpowerful and moving
passagesin Hegel'scorpus:
Onlythrough a departure
fromunitedlifewhichis neither
regulatedbylawnorat variancewithlaw,onlythroughthe
422 SOCIAL RESEARCH
killingoflife,is something alienproduced.Destruction of

lifeis notthenullification oflifebutitsdiremption, and the
destruction consistsin itstransformation intoan enemy.. . .
The illusionoftrespass, itsbeliefthatitdestroys theother's
lifeand thinksitselfenlargedthereby, is dissipatedbythe
factthatthedisembodied spiritofthe injuredlifecomeson
thesceneagainstthetrespass, just as Banquowhocameas
a friendto Macbethwasnotblottedoutwhenhe wasmur-
dered but immediately thereafter tookhis seat,not as a
guest at the feast,but as an evil spirit.The trespasser
intendedtohavetodo [away]withanother'slife,buthe has
onlydestroyed his own,forlifeis not different fromlife,
sincelifedwellsin a singleGodhead.In his arrogancehe
has destroyed indeed,but onlythefriendliness of life;he
has perverted lifeintoan enemy(229).
Entangledin thispassageareboththedepthofHegel'svisionand
thefragilityofitsmetaphysicalpresuppositions. in
If,horizontally,
ethicallifewearedynamically boundtogether, sharinga life,then
in destroying theotherI am doingmorethansimplydestroying
another, althoughI amcertainly doingthat;I amat thesametime
disrupting theveryconditionsthatsustainthelifeof each. The
properdescription of mydestruction is thatit underminesthe
thickweboflife-world conditions thatmakemyownlifepossible;
thereis in myact,nota nullification oflifeas such,sincelifeis
alwayssharedandjoined, but itsdiremption, theruiningof the
friendlinessoflife(whatmakesunitedlifean enablingcondition
ofpossibility),and themakingofit intoan enemy.Diremption,
ruining the of life,makinglifean enemy,are the
friendliness
termsHegel optsforin place of law breakingor disobedience.
Trespasstransforms the qualityand natureof our lifetogether.
Sinceunitedlifeis thebaseline,thenthisdestruction ofit need
notevenassumeevilintention: innocenttrespass(Oedipus [232-
3])17 and eviltrespass(Macbeth)can equallydisruptunitedlife,
unleashingtheavenging fates.
In speakingofpunishment as fate,Hegel contendsthattrans-

gressive actionsare consequential forourongoingexperienceof
ourselvesin relationto others.Fate standsfora logicof action
and reaction,thecoming-to-be oftheexperienceoflifeas hostile
and an enemy.Fatesignalsthereturnofrepressedlife.In classi-
cal tragedy, theavengingfatesreturnin theformofan extended
logicofunintendedactionshavingtheconsequenceof,literally,
bringing downthelifeoftheirperpetrator; in moderntragedy, it
is theexperienceofguiltand suffering bytheevildoerthatrep-
resentsthe returnof diremptedlife- myguiltyconsciencejust
theghostoftheotherhauntingme. Forthepurposeofexempli-
fication, assumethatthenotionof unitedlifeis represented by
thenotionofa generalconditionoftrust betweenmeand myoth-
ers.Assumefurther, pace Hobbes,thattheconditionof general
trustcannotintelligibly be a consequenceof the knowledgeof
each thateveryotherknowsthattheconsequenceoftrespass will
be punishment; thisis implausible because,first,suchknowledge
is nottrustbutmerelya calculationbyeach ofeveryother'scal-
culationof the likelihoodof detection;and second, external
threatof detectionand punishment does not reachfarenough
intothefine-grained detailofeveryday lifein whichthenecessity
oftrustis operative.Generaltrustbyeach ofall itsothersis one
aspectof unitedlife,itsfriendliness. Transgressiveactionscome
to matterto thecontinuing of
experience my relationto others:
ifI havedestroyed thegroundsoftrustbetweenme and myoth-
ers because I knowthat/ cannotbe trusted, howmightI trust
them?Iftrusting themis impossible, thenmyeveryactionwillbe
riddledwithanxietysincethereis nothingI can counton. Anxi-
etyhereisjustguiltdeferred. On thisaccount,theexperienceof
guiltis nota consequenceoflawbreaking, butratherofdisrupt-
ing the conditions of my activelifewithothers. Hegel,then,must
be assumingthatguiltand conscienceare not,or at leastnotonly
ornotbestunderstood as artifacts
ofa repressive psychologyofan
internalized, punishing superego, but rather theactualcomingto
awarenessofhowmylifeofactionis internally boundto thelife
424 SOCIAL RESEARCH
ofothers,and howmytransgressive actionhasseveredthosecon-

ditionsofpossibleaction.
Anxiety and guiltaremyexperienceofbeingcaughtwithinthe
toilsoffate.Whilefateappearsas simply a directconsequenceof
another'sdeed,thisis notquiteso. Trespassis an occasionoffate,
notitshydraulic cause;whatreallyproducesfate,Hegelclaims,uis
the mannerof receiving and reactingagainstthe other'sdeed"
(233). Fate is not a mechanical consequenceof trespass;thatis
merelythe externalperceptionof it, the one bequeathedby
Greektragedy; ratherfateis myawarenessand responseto what
has been done,it is a formof reactionand responsein whichI
cometo awareness ofmyanswerability formydoings,and thusa
further elaborationofthedeed itself. Putting thematterthisway
is equallyto saythatguiltas fateis botha componentin and my
awarenessof thequalityand natureofmyrelationship withoth-
ers.Hegel continues:"Thefatein whichthemansenseswhathe
haslostcreatesa longingforlostlife.Thislonging. . . recognizes
whathas been lostas life,as whatwas once itsfriend,and this
recognition is alreadyan enjoyment oflife"(231). Suffering guilt
is myacknowledgement ofmyanswerability forwhatI havedone;
becausewithguiltI locatemyself withinlife,as lostand desired,
myacknowledgement ofanswerability issimultaneously myaccep-
tanceoflifeas theconditionofmyaction,hence"an enjoyment
of life."In brief,each momentin thisunfolding of mytrespass
revealsitselfto be buta modification oflifeand nothingmore.
becausetrespass
Finally, is herea modification oflife,thenthe
wayis opened to further modifications: on thepartofthetrans-
gressor:confession, apology,repentance, reparation;on thepart
of his others:forgiveness (236).18 In of the restorationof
place
thelawthatrequiresthedeathofthetrespasser, fateannounces
thesensingoflifebylife;reconciliation, which here represents all
thosemodesofactivity in whichthefriendliness oflifeis sought
and accomplished, thustokensthegeneralpossibility thatthefact
oftransgression is notfinal,and hencethattherestoration ofthe
friendliness oflifeis possible:"Andlifecan healitswoundsagain;
thesevered,hostilelifecan returnintoitselfagainand annulthe

bunglingachievement of a trespass, can annul the law and the
punishment" (230). The toilsoffateinvolvean agentbecoming
sensitive towhathe has done,so comingtofeeldifferently about
it, and as a consequencenecessarily coming to redescribe the
nexus of self and contextdifferently. Feeling differently and
appreciating differently are thusintertwined. The movement of
thisintertwining, as thework oflove,maybe describedas conver-
sion or transformation. Whatunderwrites thisnotionis Hegel's
of
gesture distinguishing betweenactionand agent.Withinthe
morality system, an action is a permanent cancellation ofthelaw;
thereis no space availableto considertheagentapartfromthe
obedienceor disobedienceofwhatis done. In fate,an actionis
botha doing,something done,andan expression ofthestanding
of the agent withrespectto others.Ethicallife conceivesof
actionsalwaysalonga double as doingswithconsequences,
register,
andas expressions of ethicalsubjectivity. Actionsare eventsand
expressions; theyare both thesethings,however, onlythrough
thetransformation thatposesactionas a momentwithinunited
lifein whichaffective responseand cognitiveappreciationare
fully and irrevocably entangled.This is how,finally, horizontal
ethicality comes to be the leadingedge forthe comprehension of
objectivity: no adequateappreciation ofwhatis thecase,objectiv-
is
ity, possible outside consideration ofhowan individual is affec-
tively attunedto it.Objectivity without affectivesalienceis empty,
whilesaliencewithout objectivity is blind.
V Transgression:
Concluding
Unscientific
Postscript
Soon afterwritingthe"Spirit"essay,Hegel becameawarethat

itsaccountof unitedlifeillegitimatelydepended on a concep-
tion of societyas havingthe qualitiesof small-scalereligious
communities: a romanticenvisionment of Gemeinschaftlich
com-
munallife.Adam SmithtaughtHegel thatsocietiescould be
426 SOCIAL RESEARCH
bound togetherin relationships ofmutualdependencyin ways

quite other than communalsharing;and thatfurther, such
modernsocietiesacknowledgeda place forthe independence
of individualsfromone anotherthatcommunallifecould not
tolerate.Withoutquestion,itwasthesethoughtsthatled Hegel
to seek to reconstruct his firstaccount of ethicallife in the
morecomplexand robusttermsof recognitionand spirit.Yet,
I thinkthereis a hintof somethingelse occurringevenin the
"Spirit"essay.
At the conclusionof sectionIII in responseto Nancy'sargu-
mentthatthelogicalformoflovecontainsan elementofunsur-
passablebrokenness, I claimedthattherewas implicita darker
momentin theaccountofthecausality offatethatwasresponsive
to thatclaim.WhatI had in mindweresentencessuchas, on the
one hand, "finally, love completelydestroysobjectivity and
thereby annulsand transcends reflection, deprivesman'soppo-
site of all foreigncharacter"(305); and, on the other,"Only
through thedeparture fromthatunitedlife... issomething alien
produced"(229); or "The trespass whichissuesfromlifereveals
thewhole,butas divided,and thehostilepartscan coalesceagain
intothewhole"(232). The first sentencefragment statesthatlove
cancelsobjectivity, reflection,foreignness; but thisimagesour
relations withothersas one thatis all butunconscious, as lacking
all theingredients ofjudgment,discernment, reflectiveconsider-
ationthatare routineelementsof everyday interactions. At this
juncture,it is almostas ifHegel is unable to considereventhe
simplest articulations
reflective ofexperienceas otherthanforms
ofalienationand defect.Andwhilehe does nottruly believethis
tobe thecase or intendus toso construehim,he seemsforcedto
itbyconceiving ofloveas completion, or,to makehisborrowing
fromHolderlinhereclear,"Pure lifeis 19
being'(254).
Ifwe takethetwoopposingstatements at facevalue,theycon-
taina disturbing message:theysuggestthatonlyin thelightofa
transgressive actioncan an aspectofunitedlifebe revealedas a
distinctand separateelementofit;and further, onlyin thelight
ofa transgressive actioncan thewholeofunitedlifeappearas a
wholehavinga claimupon itscomponentparts.In brief,trans-

gressiveaction appears to be a necessaryconditionfor ethical self-con-
sciousness.Sincein Hegel ethicalself-consciousness is a resultofa
development sequence,thenwe couldequallysaythathe is here
beginning insistence
his thatall consciousness formation occurs
through transgressive action,thatcriminality is indeedthemodel
forconsciousness formation in general,and,sinceconsciousness
formation isjust whathe thinksspiritualhistory to be, thenhis-
tory is the work of transgressive deeds.20 From this perspective,
transgressive action is nota localinterruption within an otherwise
harmonious, organic,functioning whole;whatmakestheorganic
modelinadequate - and Nancy'svisionofshattered lovetruebut
sentimental, and Smith'sinvisiblehand a subject-transcendent
butnonetheless fortuitously happymechanism - is notthatitpic-
turessocietyas simpleand smallratherthanlargeand complex,
butthediscovery thatall significant humanactionis necessarily
transgressive (no matter how innocent or well intended),that
transgressiveness belongs to the routinegrammarof human
actionand ethicalself-consciousness, and hence thatindepen-
dence or whathas come to be called subjectivity arises only
through actions that sever (upset,transform, deform and reform)
thebondsofeveryday that
sociality; without the ongoingpossibil-
ityoftransgression all subjectivitywithersand dissipates. None of
thisis meantto challengethecredentials of thecausality offate
doctrine, howitelaboratesa conceptionofethicallifequiteother
than the one imaginedby the morality systembequeathedby
Judaiclaw.On thecontrary, mypoint is rather thatwe missthe
depth of the claim of the doctrine ifwe failto acknowledge that
itsclaimagainstthe morality systemonlybecomesevidentand
operative once the simple whole ofunitedlifeis shattered.
In thebeginning is thecriminaldeed.
Notes
^his is slightly sincea moreaccuratestatement
hyperbolic, wouldbe
thatwhatHegel is seekinga thoroughgoing or unification
synthesis of
theoreticaland practical
reasoninwhichpractical
reasontakesthelead.
428 SOCIAL RESEARCH
2For Kant,the existenceof a transcendent God is a "postulate"

requiredby moral reason in order to secure beliefin thepossibility of
ourrealizingthe"highest good."
3Hegel'searlyJenawritings are,ofcourse,conceptually closerto the
Phenomenology thanthe "Spirit"essay.On myreading,thoseworksare
themselves attempts to workout conceptually the ethicallogicof the
originalvision.For thisveryreason,I preferthevividness, immediacy,
and beautyof the "Spirit"essay;we willnotunderstand whatrequires
conceptualarticulation untilwe havefirst glimpsedthevisionitself.
^Conversely, Hegel must equallythink thatthefundamental impulse
ofbiblicalChristianity is anti-Platonic. The Christianity thattakesitself
to be in relationto a transcendent, creatorGod is fortheyoungHegel
a Judaicmisinterpretation ofit.
5A11 pagereferences in thetextare to Hegel,EarlyTheological Writings
All
(1975). unspecified quotationsreferto thelastpage numbergiven.
"Deucalion,son 01 rrometneus, is tne oreeK JNoan. wnen z,eusis
about to floodthe earthin responseto humanimpiety, Prometheus
warnsDeucalion,giving himtimetobuildan arkforhimself and hiswife
Pyrrha. Aftertheflood,theyare toldto throwovertheirshouldersthe
bonesofDeucalion'smother, fromwhichspringthemenand women
whorepopulatetheearth.ForHegel thisis a workoflove,and hencea
returnto friendship withthe naturalworld (185). Hegel does not
explain how thiswork oflovemightenduringly be a responseto a less
thanfriendly naturalworld.I presumethatthepointof contrast with
Noahand Nimrodis thatDeucalionand Pyrrha do nottakethefloodto
be groundsforsetting up a permanent barrierto nature;theypresume
thatfriendship withnatureremainspossible.
7Taking due accountoftheopeningpagesofthe"Spiritessayreveals
howproximate itsargumentation is to thegenealogy ofreasonthatMax
Horkheimer and T. W.Adornooffer in Dialectic
ofEnlightenment (2002).
8Ifone construes theoriginalimpulseofKant'stranscendental ideal-
-
ism theidea thatwe knowappearancesonlyand notthings in them-
selves- as the Rousseau-inspired attemptto delimitthe authority of
nature-dominating, instrumental reason (whatKant calls the under-
standing)in orderto preservethepossibility ofmorality, thenHegel's
critiqueis,evenat thislevel,a continuation and completion oftheKant-
ian project.Fortheidea thatKant'sprojectwasintendedas a critiqueof
instrumental, scientific reason,see Velkley(1989).
9I meanthisstatement ofthetheologicalcontract to be a genealogi-
cal anticipation of Kant'snotionof the highestgood in whichGod
would,ideally,dispensehappinessin proportionto virtue.Virtueis
whilehappinessis nature"without"
withinourpower,ourself-mastery,
and hence beyondour power;ideallyGod willordernatureso that
harmonizes
whatwe cannotcontrolnormatively withwhatiswithinour
control.
10Oncoldnessas themoodor affect to instrumental
appropriate rea-
Adorno:
son,see Bernstein, and
Disenchantment Ethics(2001:396414).
nForaccountsofhowtheanalysisofnaturalbeautyin Kant'sCritique
ofJudgmentbecamethewedgeforgoingbeyondtherestrictions of the
criticalsystem,see Bernstein,TheFateofArt:Aesthetic fromKant
Alienation
tnDerriAn.
and Adnrn.n
HQQ9. rhan. 1^: and Robert Pinnin (1997^.
12Inthelead essayofMustWeMeanWhatWeSay?(1976:25), Stanley
Cavellstatesthisidea in termsofmoralrulesbeingproperly understood
notas Categorical Imperatives, butas Categorical Declaratives; thesetell
you"part of what you in factdo when you aremoral." So I am suggesting
thattherule"WhenX is hungry, feedX" is a CategoricalDeclarative.
LikeHegel,whatCavellis objectingtoin theoughtcharacter oftheCat-
egoricalImperative is thatitperceives moral rules from the perspective
ofsomeonealreadyalienatedfromtheauthority ofmorality (or feeling
a distancefromGod), hence theverycitingof sucha overriding rule
deepens the alienation, the
making appeal to it look "hypocritical (or
anyway shaky) and the attempts at ... establishment or justification
seemtyrannical (or anyway arbitrary)" (Cavell,1976:24).
13Theidea of love "posingitself as not self-love (Nancy,1991) is
meantto acknowledge thatthephenomenology oflovecan be illusory:
whatposesitselfas notself-love maynonetheless be or becomea form
ofself-love. Lovehasinnumerable pathologies.
14Even eroticlove,themostpossessive formoflove,easilytopplesinto
obsessionbecausetheobjectofdesireis "lifted" to beingofinfinite, or
at leastindefinite, value.It is thislifting thatposeseroticloveas notself-
love;indeedthefierceness oferoticpossessionis theagonyoftherecog-
nitionof thisrupture,its intolerableness, hence the need to possess
absolutely and so overcomethefracture ofselfthatitsuprising causes.
15Which is why,it shouldbe noted,thatfromtheperspective of the
criminal,punishmentinevitably wears the face of vengeanceand
revenge, notjustice.
1
"Hegelis not of courseasserting thatwe do notpardoncriminals,
but onlythatmoral/legalpardon possessesno logical sense in the
morality system. His claimwillbe, rather, thatwhensuchpardonis not
itselflegalistic- Pauline-like atonement - itcomesfromanotherethical
spacealtogether.
430 SOCIAL RESEARCH
17Inconversation, HenryHarrishassuggested thatthereference here

may not be Oedipus and Co., as Knox supposes(Hegel, 1975: 233 fn.),
buttoJesus.
lobutnegative modifications arealso possible;we can turnawayfrom
theviolatorin exasperation or despairor fear;we can,further, and of
course,seekrepayment fordamagesdone in actsofcruelty thatprovide
us withthe pleasuresof the other'ssuffering (as Nietzscheforcefully
remindsus). Whatwilldistinguish theseactsnow,however, is thatthey
are formsofresponse, of
ways going on, which can always waysofnot
be
going on withtheother, of findingno further ofthatand so
possibilities
of despairingof the possibility of other,futureresponses.But in this
case,wereit to transpire, theexclusionof theotherwouldnotbe the
of
way cleaning the slate and so restoring theauthority ofthelaw,but
theannouncement ofand bearingwithan on-goingloss.Thistoo is a
modification oflifeas fornowat leastdamagedbeyondrepair.Which
is whythequestionsucha modification raisesis notabouttheviolator
butaboutthemannerand possibility of ourgoingon, howwe manage
orfailtomanagethisloss,whatbearingsucha losscouldbe and whatit
meansforus. Assumenow thatHegel's severingthe moralinto the
moralism ofthemorality system and ethicallifeis thediscovery ofnot
twoseparateregimesbuttwoideal types, bothofwhichcohabitin the
heartand practicesof each inhabitant ofNorthAdanticcivilization. It
follows since
that, the morality is a
system metaphysical illusion because
therehasneverbeena lawthatisindependent in thewaythatthemoral-
itysystem but
imagines, only the moralistic stance ofpresupposing the
existenceofsucha law,thenthescenarioofdamagedlife,oflifecon-
stituted bythefailuresof thecommunity to finda wayofallowingthe
violatorsoflawbackin,becomesan imageofoursituation inwhichthe
twostancescohabit.We cannotlightly step,as Hegelimagines, fromthe
rigidityofmorality to theresponsiveness ofethicallifein a flash;to the
degreethattheactuality ofmorality belongsto ourpresent, we are bur-
denedbylossesalreadyincurred. Bothhereand later,Hegelignoresthe
cohabitation problemand thedepthofthelossesalreadyincurredas a
problemforthepresent.
iyThedistinction thatHegelis aimingforisworkedoutappropriately
byHeideggerin Beingand Time(1996), withthe distinction between
ready-to-hand (objectsnaturally appearing in the context of their usage)
and present-to-hand (how objectsappear when theyare abstracted
from,or fallout of throughbreakageof theirconstitutive contextof
use), each possessingit own corresponding formof comprehension,
viz.,circumspective interpretation and assertionrespectively. The rea-
sonHegelrunsintoa dilemmahereis thathe hasyettoworkouta con-

ceptionofindividuality or humanseparateness thatis compatible with
hisstrenuousconceptionof unitedlife.Separateness is assumed - it is
whatmakesloveofanotherdifferent fromself-love - butHegeldoesnot
yetknowhowto sustainsuchseparateness without somethought offor-
eignness or defect, or rather,his unease about separateness comes out,
precisely, in his overlyharmonizing, unreflective of
conception loving.
It is as ifhe couldnotthinkofloveexcepton themodelofeitherthe
fusionofinfantand mother, or sexualecstasy.
^Almostall readersof Hegel recognizethatwhatI am herecalling
transgressive actionappearsas the notionof the negativein the Phe-
nomenology.thenotionofnegativity
Yet is usuallyleftas simply thepower
ofmindto negateimmediacy, henceas equivalentto thethought there
is no consciousness without judgment - Holderlin'soriginalinsight into
ourpermanent separation frombeing.Butthisleavesthenotionofthe
negativetooweak,at leastas comparedwiththeidea ofnegativetrans-
gressive acts.In thefirst partofhis TheStruggle forRecognition: TheMoral
Grammar ofSocial (1995),
Conflicts Axel Honneth does recognizethatthe
earlyHegel, after the "Spirit"essay but before the Phenomenology, does
espouse the idea that practicalconflicts can be "understood as an ethi-
cal momentin themovement occurring within a collective sociallife"
(17); and further that "Hegelgranted criminal acts a constructive role
in theformative process ofethical lifebecause they were able to unleash
theconflicts that,forthefirsttime,wouldmakesubjectsawareof the
underlying relations ofrecognition" (26). Whiletheidea ofoffering an
ethicallytexturedconflictmodel of social progressis indeed partof
Hegel's project(the partthatMarxlatchedonto),Honnethdoes not
takeseriously enoughthegenerality ofhisownthesis, and hencemakes
therole of struggle, conflict, and transgression local and interruptive,
ratherthanpervasive and general.
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Love and Law - Hegel's Critique of Morality

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Love and Law: Hegel's Critique of Morality

X he SpiritofChristianity and itsFate" (hereafter "Spirit")pro-

SOCIAL RESEARCH, Vol. 70, No. 2 (Summer2003)

ity.Thereis aboutthevision,or so I shallargue,something eth-

God-talkhas itsultimatesubstancesolelyin ethicallife.Hegel's

cate whatGod is, to makemanifest the implicitcontentof the

Hegel interprets biblicalJudaismas the coming-to-be of tran-

solution,here presentedas the inventionof theJewishGod,

nal authority.9 Noah and Nimrodrepresent twoaspectsofa uni-

is thatit rendersemptyall thegood reasonsone mighthavefor

bypursuinga projectpremisedon therepudiation ofthecondi-

thegreattragedy oftheJewishpeopleis no Greektragedy;

Horroris a responseto what appears as abject; the human

humanrelations. Thisis theburdenofHegel'sinterpretive track-

normativeelementin and hence the normativeauthority of

cal autonomy, wherethedesireforautonomy is potentiallysatis-

Byshadingthe meaningof the commandstructure ofJudaic

make a difference and validity

failingto do so, assumingone is in a positionto help and there

(and therefore havingthecoercivepowerofthestatebehindit)

the "Spirit"essaycan nowbe recognizedas a versionof Kant's

thehistoryofmastering nature,makingtherealization ofmoral-

While Hegel's genealogicalaccount mightbe sufficient to

ity- or to use Hegel'sownlanguagehere,borrowedfromBaum-

reactionis a further workingout,unfolding, or elaboration,a

tion in whichtheiroppositionis lost (214). Hence, we have

satisfyingor fulfilling oneselfin and throughthe other,of the

formsKantiansubjectiveidealisminto an objectiveor infinite

Lovere-presents broken(and thisis nota rep-

Nancy'swholewayof settingup and articulating thisthesisis

satisfactionthroughtheotheris always,simultaneously,a satisfac-

WhenHegel saysthatover"againstthe positivity of theJews,

authoritative abrogated.Punishment, Hegel is goingto claim,is

ism.The onlythingmorality can do withtransgression is tojudge

killingoflife,is something alienproduced.Destruction of

In speakingofpunishment as fate,Hegel contendsthattrans-

ofothers,and howmytransgressive actionhasseveredthosecon-

thesevered,hostilelifecan returnintoitselfagainand annulthe

Soon afterwritingthe"Spirit"essay,Hegel becameawarethat

bound togetherin relationships ofmutualdependencyin ways

wholehavinga claimupon itscomponentparts.In brief,trans-

2For Kant,the existenceof a transcendent God is a "postulate"

17Inconversation, HenryHarrishassuggested thatthereference here

sonHegelrunsintoa dilemmahereis thathe hasyettoworkouta con-

Hamacher,Werner.Pleroma - Readingin HegelTrans.NicholasWalker

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