FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 151942. November 27, 2003.]

Spouses GREGORIO GO and JUANA TAN GO, petitioners, vs.

JOHNSON Y. TONG; COURT OF APPEALS; and Honorable
Judge JUAN NABONG of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32,
Manila, respondents.

Marbibi and Associates Law Office for petitioners.

Efren Dela Cruz for private respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner Juana Tan Go issued a cashier's check bearing the words "Final
Payment/Quitclaim," payable to private respondent. Private respondent
deposited the check but the same was dishonored because the words "Final
Payment/Quitclaim" was already erased. His request for the replacement of the
check was not granted, so he filed a complaint for sum of money, damages and
attorney's fees. During the pendency of the case, petitioners' son filed a
criminal complaint against private respondent for falsification of the check, but
the same was dismissed. Subsequently, a supplemental complaint was filed by
private respondent praying for an increased amount of damages sought to be
recovered due to the damages caused by the filing of a criminal complaint for
falsification against him by petitioners' son. Thereafter, petitioners deposited to
the court the money representing the amount of the check which was later on
released to private respondent by an order issued by public respondent.
Considering the huge amount involved, the public respondent issued another
order allowing private respondent to pay the docket fees on staggered basis.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. Petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) alleging that respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the said orders, but the CA ruled
that the orders were not issued with grave abuse of discretion. Hence, this
petition.
In denying the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that private respondent
was entitled to the deposit because it represented the amount indicated on the
check that undeniably belonged to him. Moreover, there was an understanding
between the parties that petitioners would deposit the amount, which private
respondent could withdraw if he so desired. Lastly, petitioners failed to assail,
within the prescribed period, the order allowing the release of the money
because they allowed more than one year to lapse before assailing it.
The Court also held that while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is
a jurisdictional requirement, even its nonpayment at the time of filing does not
automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within
the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when the party
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 involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such
payment.
While the cause of action of private respondent was supposed to
prescribe in four (4) years, he was allowed to pay, and he in fact paid the
docket fee in a year's time. This period cannot be deemed unreasonable. The
Court sustained the CA's findings absolving respondent judge of any capricious
or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; RULE 65 NOT A SUBSTITUTE

FOR RULE 45. — Rule 45 of the Rules of Court specifically states that in all
cases, the CA's decisions, final orders or resolutions — regardless of the nature
of the action or proceedings involved—may be appealed to this Court through a
petition for review, which is just a continuation of the appellate process
involving the original case. On the other hand, a special civil action under Rule
65 is an independent suit based on the specific grounds provided therein. As a
general rule, certiorari cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy
of an ordinary appeal, including that under Rule 45.
2. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; PRIOR MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION, NECESSARY. — [B]efore certiorari may be availed of, a
petitioner must have filed with the lower court a motion for reconsideration of
the act or order complained of. This requirement enables the lower court to
pass upon and correct its mistakes in the first instance, without the
intervention of the higher tribunal. While there are exceptions to this rule,
petitioners have not convinced this Court that they are entitled thereto.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONDITIONS THEREFOR TO LIE; NOT PRESENT IN CASE
AT BAR. — [F]or certiorari to lie against respondent judge, the abuse of
discretion committed must be grave, as when power is exercised arbitrarily or
despotically by reason of passion or personal hostility; and such exercise must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or to a
virtual refusal to perform it or to act in contemplation of law. These conditions
are absolutely wanting in the present case.

4. ID.; ACTIONS; COMMENCEMENT OF; WHERE THE FILING OF THE

INITIATORY PLEADING IS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY PAYMENT OF THE DOCKET FEE,
THE COURT MAY ALLOW PAYMENT OF THE FEE WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME
BUT IN NO CASE BEYOND THE APPLICABLE PRESCRIPTIVE OR REGLEMENTARY
PERIOD; CASE AT BAR. — The Court clarified the rule in Sun Insurance thus: ". .
. It is not simply the filing of the complaint. or appropriate initiatory pleading,
but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of
the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the
court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period." Plainly, while the
payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its
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 nonpayment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of
the case, as long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period; more so when the party involved demonstrates a
willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment. While the cause of
action of private respondent was supposed to prescribe in four (4) years, he
was allowed to pay; and he in fact paid the docket fee in a year's time. We do
not see how this period can be deemed unreasonable. Moreover, on his part
there is no showing of any pattern or intent to defraud the government of the
required docket fee. We sustain the CA's findings absolving respondent judge of
any capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J : p

As a rule, docket fees should be paid upon the filing of the initiatory
pleadings. However, for cogent reasons to be determined by the trial judge,
staggered payment thereof within a reasonable period may be allowed. Unless
grave abuse of discretion is demonstrated, the discretion of the trial judge in
granting staggered payment shall not be disturbed.
The Case
Petitioner assails the September 18, 2001 Decision 1 and the January 21,
2002 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 58942. The
decretal portion of the Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED." 3

The assailed Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise:
"Petitioner Juana Tan Go (petitioner Juana) purchased a cashier's
check dated September 13, 1996 from the Far East Bank and Trust
Company (FEBTC) Lavezares, Binondo Branch in the amount of
P500,000.00, payable to Johnson Y. Tong (private respondent).

"On petitioner Juana's instruction, the cashier's check bore the

words 'Final Payment/Quitclaim' after the name of payee private
respondent allegedly to insure that private respondent would honor his
commitment that he would no longer ask for further payments for his
interest in the 'informal business partnership' which he and she had
earlier dissolved.

"After the check was delivered to private respondent, he

deposited it with the words 'Final Payment/Quitclaim' already erased,
hence, it was not honored.
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 "Private respondent's counsel subsequently wrote the manager
of FEBTC Lavezares Branch informing that the words 'Final
Payment/Quitclaim' on the check had been 'inadvertently erased
without being initialed by your bank or the purchaser thereof' and thus
requesting that the check be replaced with another payable to
'Johnson Tong-Final Settlement/Quitclaim' with the same amount, the
bank charges therefor to be paid by his client-private respondent.
"FEBTC did not grant the request of private respondent's counsel,
hence, private respondent filed a complaint against FEBTC and
petitioner Juana and her husband Gregorio Go at the Manila RTC, for
sum of money, damages, and attorney's fees, subject of the case at
bar.
"Answering the Complaint, therein defendants-herein petitioners
Juana and her husband and FEBTC alleged that the erasure of the
words 'Final Payment/Quitclaim' was intentional on private
respondent's part, reflective of his intention to collect more from
petitioner Juana, hence, the non-issuance of a replacement check was
justified, unless private respondent was sincere in abiding with the
'terms agreed upon.'
"During the pendency of the case, petitioner's son, George Tan
Go, filed a criminal complaint against private respondent for
falsification of the check. The criminal complaint was dismissed,
however, by the Manila Prosecutor's Office.
"On July 17, 1998, private respondent requested public
respondent for leave to file Supplemental Complaint. Acting on the
request, public respondent suggested to him 'to file a Motion to admit'
within fifteen (15) days, copy furnished petitioners who were given the
same number of days from receipt to file their Comment.
"On August 25, 1998, private respondent filed a 'Motion for
Leave to File a Supplemental Complaint and to Admit the Attached
Supplemental Complaint' which Supplemental Complaint alleged that
petitioners 'used' their son to file the criminal complaint for falsification
against him which caused damages, hence, the prayer for an increase
in the amount of moral and exemplary damages sought to be
recovered from P2.5 million to P55 million and praying for the award of
actual damages of P58,075.00. The motion was set for hearing on
September 4, 1998. Copy of the motion to petitioners was sent by
registered mail.

"Public respondent, by Order of September 4, 1998, noting that

petitioners had been furnished copy of the 'Motion for Leave' . . . but
that there had been no comment thereon, granted the motion and
admitted the Supplemental Complaint.

"Petitioners and FEBTC's Comment-Opposition were subsequently

filed.

"Petitioners and FEBTC filed their respective Motions for

Reconsideration of the September 4, 1998 Order.
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 "On November 18, 1998, petitioners filed a Manifestation of
Deposit and deposited to the RTC Clerk of Court the amount of
P500,000.00 representing the amount of the check, 'subject to the
condition that it shall remain deposited until the disposition of the
case.'
"Petitioners' and FEBTC's separate Motions for Reconsideration of
the September 4, 1998 Order were later denied by Order of December
4, 1998, hence, petitioners filed their Answer dated December 18,
1998 to the Supplemental Complaint with Counterclaim, alleging as
Special Affirmative defenses the following:
'5. As already intimated, the defendants are not a party
to the aforementioned criminal complaint, but only their son
George who took it upon himself to file it in his own right, without
their involvement in any way, hence, said incident cannot be
pleaded as supplement to the original complaint, much less as a
new cause of action without impleading George Go as party
defendant.
'6. Plaintiff cannot prosecute his Supplemental
Complaint, and the same should be dismissed, unless the
corresponding docket fee and legal fees for the monetary claims
in the amount of P55,057,075.00 are paid for. . . .'
"On February 5, 1999, public respondent, acting on the verbal
manifestation/motion of private respondent's counsel, allowed the
release of petitioners' P500,000.00 deposit to private respondent.
"By order of November 17, 1999, public respondent, 'in the
interest of justice and because of the huge amount of outlay involved
(the Court considers the business climate and the peso crunch
prevailing),' allowed private respondent to first deposit P25,000.00 on
or before December 15, 1999 and P20,000.00 every month thereafter
until the full amount of docket fees is paid, and 'only then shall the
deposits be considered as payment of docket fees.'
"Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the November
17, 1999 Order which was, by Order of April 11, 2000, denied.
"Thus arose the present petition filed on May 30, 2000 which
ascribes to public respondent the commission of grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the Orders of February 5, 1999 (allowing the
release of the P500,000.00 deposit to private respondent), November
17, 1999 (allowing the payment, on staggered basis, of the docket fees
for the Supplemental Complaint) and April 11, 2000 (denying the
Motion for Reconsideration of the November 17, 1999 Order)." 4

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In their Petition for Certiorari before the CA, petitioners alleged that
respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he issued the
Orders dated February 5, 1999, 5 November 17, 1999 6 and April 11, 2000. 7

According to the CA, petitioners failed to assail, within the prescribed

period, respondent judge's February 5, 1999 Order allowing the release of the
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 money deposited by them. It was only in their May 30, 2000 Petition before the
CA that they questioned the Order. Moreover, the appellate court held that,
anyway, private respondent was entitled to the deposit, which represented the
amount indicated on the check that belonged to him.

As to the November 17, 1999 Order allowing private respondent to pay

the docket fee on a staggered basis and the April 11, 2000 Order denying the
Motion for Reconsideration thereof, the CA held that "Sun Insurance Office Ltd. .
. . permits the payment of the prescribed docket fee within a reasonable period
but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or regular period." 8 In that
case, the court a quo opined that the docket fee payment scheme imposed by
the respondent judge "cannot be said to have been issued with grave abuse of
discretion." 9
Hence, this Petition. 10
The Issues
In their Memorandum, 11 petitioners submit the following issues for our
consideration:
"Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave
and serious errors which [are] tantamount to grave abuse of discretion
when it upheld the validity of the Orders dated Feb[ruary] 5, 1999,
November 17, [1999] and April 11, 2000 issued by public respondent
Hon. Judge Juan Nabong of RTC Branch 32 of Manila, in Civil Case No.
97-81935.
"Whether or not public respondent Judge Juan Nabong committed
grave abuse of discretion in not suspending the proceedings pending
appeal with the Honorable Court of Appeals, and in . . . refusing to
inhibit himself." 12

The Court's Ruling

The Petition has no merit.
Preliminary Issue:
Mode of Appeal
Private respondent argues that the instant Petition should have been
brought under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court and not under Rule 65. On
the other hand, petitioners maintain that their suit questions interlocutory
orders issued by the RTC and thus falls within the ambit of Rule 65, under which
questions of law and facts may be raised.
We clarify. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court may be filed under the following condition:
"When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law . . . ." 13
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 On the other hand, Rule 45 prevails under this circumstance:
"A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final
order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may
file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. .
. . ." 14

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court specifically states that in all cases, the CA's
decisions, final orders or resolutions — regardless of the nature of the action or
proceedings involved — may be appealed to this Court through a petition for
review, which is just a continuation of the appellate process involving the
original case. 15 On the other hand, a special civil action under Rule 65 is an
independent suit based on the specific grounds provided therein. As a general
rule, certiorari cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an
ordinary appeal, including that under Rule 45. 16

Very recently, in Fortune Guarantee and Insurance Corporation v. CA, 17

this Court had the occasion to discuss this matter. In that case, the petitioner
alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent trial court judge
when the latter issued the assailed Order granting a Motion for Execution
Pending Appeal. Said the Court in that case:
"[I]t must be pointed out that petitioner adopted the wrong mode
of appeal in bringing this case before us. The proper remedy of a party
aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review
under Rule 45 which is not similar to a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. . . . " 18

In the present case, petitioners are appealing a final decision of the CA by

resorting to Rule 65, when their remedy should be based on Rule 45. 19 When
an error of judgment of the CA is brought up to this Court for review, the action
is properly designated as a petition for review and not a special civil action. 20
Thus, while the instant Petition is one for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, the assigned errors are more properly addressed in a petition for
review under Rule 45.
Accordingly, when parties adopt an improper remedy, as in this case,
their petitions may be dismissed outright. 21 However, in the interest of
substantial justice, we deem it wise to overlook procedural technicalities in
order to rule speedily on this case 22 and demonstrate that even without the
procedural infirmity, the Petition should be rejected due to its lack of merits.
First Issue:
Release of the Money Deposited
Petitioners argue that respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion when he issued the February 5, 1999 Order allowing the release of
their P500,000 bank deposit. According to them, he "demonstrated his capacity
for abuse of judicial authority as the release of the money was made in direct
contravention of [their] condition thereto which was that the money shall
remain deposited until the disposition of this case." 23
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 We disagree. As correctly found by the CA, there was a prior
understanding between the parties that petitioners would deposit P500,000,
which private respondent could withdraw if he so desired. 24 Because
petitioners claim that they deposited the money as a sign of good faith, we see
no reason why they should not abide by their earlier agreement with private
respondent. In fact, in their Manifestation of Deposit, 25 they even referred to
the earlier hearing during which the deposit had been agreed upon. This
Manifestation shows that the deposit was indeed made pursuant to their earlier
agreement.
The CA was likewise correct in finding that petitioners had failed to assail,
within the prescribed period, the Order allowing the release of the money. 26
The Manifestation of Deposit was received and approved by the RTC on
November 18, 1998. On February 5, 1999, private respondent, through his
counsel, made his oral manifestation to withdraw the amount deposited. 27 It
was only on May 30, 2000, upon the filing of their Petition for Certiorari with the
CA, when petitioners questioned the Order allowing the withdrawal of the
deposit.

If petitioners honestly believed that respondent judge had acted with

grave abuse of discretion when he issued the Order, why did they allow more
than one year to lapse before assailing it? In fact, they had not even filed a
motion for reconsideration. Elementary is the rule that before certiorari may be
availed of, a petitioner must have filed with the lower court a motion for
reconsideration of the act or order complained of. 28 This requirement enables
the lower court to pass upon and correct its mistakes in the first instance,
without the intervention of the higher tribunal. 29 While there are exceptions to
this rule, 30 petitioners have not convinced this Court that they are entitled
thereto.

Petitioners claim that they learned of the existence of the Order only after
more than one year had passed, and of the withdrawal of the deposit only after
their new counsel had appeared.
We are not persuaded. It is undeniable that petitioners actively
prosecuted their case during the period when they were allegedly still ignorant
of the existence of the Order dated February 5, 1999. Whether such ignorance
was due to negligence or mere oversight will not release them from its effects.
More important, the CA was correct in holding that, ultimately, private
respondent was entitled to the deposit, because it represented the amount
indicated on the check that undeniably belonged to him. In all the pleadings
they filed, petitioners never denied that the amount of P500,000 properly
belonged to him. He correctly argued as follows:
"There is no question, and it is admitted by petitioners in their
Manifestation of Deposit, dated November 16, 1998 . . . that the
amount of P500,000 deposited by them with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, represented the amount covered by Far East Bank & Trust
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 Company Cashier's Check No. 041A-0000032561.
"It is likewise admitted by the parties that the said FEBTC
Cashier's Check No. 041A-0000032561 was paid (payable) to and
belong to private respondent." 31

Second Issue:
Payment of Docket Fee
Petitioners argue that respondent judge and the CA erred in allowing
private respondent to pay the docket fee on a staggered basis. According to
them, the Order dated November 17, 1999 was "unprecedented in the annals
of the Philippine judicial system." 32 They describe the allegedly anomalous
situation in this wise:
"Thus, we have perhaps . . . in the case at bar . . . the only known
case in Philippine judicial history where a supplemental complaint was
admitted without the payment of the FULL docket fees. And not only
that, said fees were made payable over a mind-boggling, over-
expanded period of nearly two (2) years!" 33

Petitioners make contradictory assertions when they aver that the

circumstances in the present case do not meet the parameters set by the Court
in Sun Insurance Office Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, 34 then make a complete volte
face by arguing that the former is inapplicable, because there is no under-
assessment of the docket fee in the instant case.
The Court clarified the rule in Sun Insurance thus:
". . . . It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that
vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of
the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow
payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period." 35 (Emphasis supplied)
Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional
requirement, even its nonpayment at the time of filing does not automatically
cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period; 36 more so when the party involved
demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment. 37

While the cause of action of private respondent was supposed to

prescribe in four (4) years, 38 he was allowed to pay; and he in fact paid the
docket fee in a year's time. 39 We do not see how this period can be deemed
unreasonable. Moreover, on his part there is no showing of any pattern or
intent to defraud the government of the required docket fee. We sustain the
CA's findings absolving respondent judge of any capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Ruled the appellate
court:
"The Sun Insurance Office Ltd. case permits the payment of the
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 prescribed docket fee 'within a reasonable period but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or regular period.' Since the
prescriptive period to file the complaint subject of the present petition
which is an action upon an injury to the right of private respondent, is
four years and the scheme of payment of the docket fees in the
amount of P252,503.50 given by public respondent called for an
implementation thereof within one year, as in fact private respondent
manifested in his Rejoinder that he had fully paid the said amount on
December 12, 2000, then the assailed Orders of November 17, 1999
and April 11, 2000 cannot be said to have been issued with grave
abuse of discretion." 40 (Citations omitted)

To be sure, for certiorari to lie against respondent judge, the abuse of

discretion committed must be grave, as when power is exercised arbitrarily or
despotically by reason of passion or personal hostility; and such exercise must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or to a
virtual refusal to perform it or to act in contemplation of law. 41 These
conditions are absolutely wanting in the present case.

Final Issue:
Inhibition and Suspension of Proceedings
Finally, petitioners ascribe grave abuse of discretion to respondent judge
for not inhibiting himself from this case and for not suspending the proceedings
in the RTC pending the resolution of the Petition for Certiorari before the
appellate court.

We need not belabor these questions, because they were never raised
before the CA. It is well-settled that parties are not permitted to raise before
this Court issues that were not taken up below. 42
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Decision
and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. ADCETI

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C .J ., Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Annex "A" of the Petition; rollo, pp. 59–67; penned by Justice Conchita Carpio
Morales (Division chair and now a member of this Court), with the
concurrence of Justices Candido V. Rivera and Juan Q. Enriquez Jr.
(members).

2. Annex "B" of the Petition; id., pp. 68–70.

3. CA Decision, p. 7; id., p. 66.
4. CA Decision, pp. 2–5; id., pp. 61–64.
5. Annex "C" of the Petition; id., p. 71.

6. Annex "D" of the Petition; id., p. 72.

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 7. Annex "E" of the Petition; id., p. 73.
8. CA Decision, p. 7; id., p. 66.
9. Ibid.
10. This case was deemed submitted for decision on December 2, 2002, upon
this Court's receipt of petitioners' Reply to Memorandum, which was signed
by Atty. Teresita C. Marbibi. Earlier or on October 24, 2002, this Court
received petitioners' Memorandum signed by the same counsel. On the other
hand, private respondent's Memorandum, signed by Atty. Efren N. de la Cruz
was filed with this Court on November 5, 2002.
11. Rollo , pp. 311–341.
12. Petitioners' Memorandum, p. 12; rollo, p. 322.
13. §1 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court.

14. §1 of Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court.

15. Heirs of Pagobo v. CA, 345 Phil. 1119, October 16, 1997.
16. Ibid.
17. G.R. No. 110701, March 12, 2002.

18. Id., p. 5, per De Leon Jr., J.

19. The Director of Lands v. CA, 342 Phil. 239, July 28, 1997.
20. Cruz v. CA, 369 Phil. 161, July 2, 1999.
21. Fortune Guarantee and Insurance Corporation v. CA, supra; Sea Power
Shipping Enterprises Inc. v. CA, 360 SCRA 173, June 28, 2001.
22. Ibid.; Caraan v. CA, 289 SCRA 579, April 24, 1998.
23. Petitioners' Memorandum, pp. 13–14; rollo, pp. 323–324.
24. See Order dated November 11, 1998; records, p. 211.
25. Records, pp. 213–214.
26. CA Decision, p. 6; rollo, p. 65.

27. See Order dated February 5, 1999; records, p. 237.

28. Sevillana v. I.T. Corp., 356 SCRA 451, April 16, 2001; Indiana Aerospace
University v. CHED, 356 SCRA 367, April 4, 2001; Seagull Shipmanagement
and Transport Inc. v. NLRC, 388 Phil. 906, June 8, 2000.
29. Abraham v. NLRC, 353 SCRA 739, March 6, 2001; Seagull Shipmanagement
and Transport Inc. v. NLRC, supra.
30. Indiana Aerospace University v. CHED , supra; Marawi Marantao General
Hospital Inc. v. CA, 349 SCRA 321, January 16, 2001.
31. Private respondent's Memorandum, p. 10; rollo, p. 351. Emphasis in the
original.

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 32. Petitioners' Memorandum, p. 18; rollo, p. 328.

33. Id., pp. 19 & 329.

34. 170 SCRA 274, February 13, 1989.

35. Id., p. 285, per Gancayco, J.

36. Suson v. CA , 278 SCRA 284, August 21, 1997.
37. Teofilo Gensoli & Co. v. NLRC, 289 SCRA 407, April 22, 1998.
38. Article 1146 of the Civil Code states:
"Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years:

(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;

(2) Upon a quasi-delict."

39. See Manifestation dated January 15, 2001; records, pp. 394–409.
40. CA Decision, p. 7; rollo, p. 66.
41. Benito v. Comelec, 349 SCRA 705, January 19, 2001; Miranda v. Abaya , 370
Phil. 642, July 28, 1999; Cuison v. CA, 289 SCRA 159, April 15, 1998.

42. Rupa Sr. v. CA, 380 Phil. 112, January 25, 2000.

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