THE PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE MISSIONS TO THE

UNITED STATES (1919-1934)

W
IE
BERNARDITA REYES CHURCHILL
EV
PR

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Asian

Studies, The Australian National University,
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

July 1981

U*«**YV)
yim&s
This thesis

conduc ted as
is

a
based

W on

postgraduate
original research

student in the
I
IE
Department o f Asian History and C ivilisations,

Faculty o f Asian S t u d i e s , The A u s t r a l i a n N a ti o n a l

EV

U niversity.
PR

CKjX/^cA jUJU
D e r n a r d i t a Reyes C h u r c h i l l
 ABSTRACT

In 1916 the Filipinos received the promise of independence "as

soon as a stable government can be established." The promise,

contained in the preamble of the Jones Law, provided impetus to

Filipino aspirations for independence. However, the Filipino

leaders did not agitate for independence during the World War as a

gesture of loyalty to the United States. But by the end of the War

in 1913, the Filipinos felt that they had established the stable

government

United States
required

to
by

redeem its W
the Jones Law and that it was time for the

promise of independence to the

IE
Philippines.
EV

Encouraged by the Jones Law and a sympathetic Governor General

in the Philippines, the Filipino leaders concluded that independence

from the United States could be obtained through increased political

PR

pressure and an active campaign in favour of their cause. Before

1913 the demand for independence had been voiced by means of formal

resolutions of the Philippine Assembly (and after 1916, of the

Philippine Legislature) delivered to the American Congress through

Filipino Resident Commissioners in Washington. After 1913, a more

sustained effort to terminate American rule was undertaken, with the

appeal for freedom taken directly by the Filipinos to Washington

through parliamentary missions or legislative committees sent by the

Philippine Legislature.
 Independence Missions were sent to the United States almost

yearly. The first one went in 1919, the last in 1933. The presence

of these Missions in Washington had significant influence on the

final independence act.

In the midst of the Great Depression, the United States finally

decided to terminate her tutelage of the Filipinos and fulfill the

promise of independence given by the Jones Act of 1916. The demand

for independence by the "independence missions" to the United

States, agitation by

persistence of an
American

Wfarm

"anti-colonial
and labour

conscience"
groups,

culminated
and the

in the
IE
passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act in March 1934, which finally

settled the Philippine issue.

EV
PR
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface i

Chapter

I. The Philippine-American Encounter: Building

a Nation 1

II. The First Independence Mission, 1919 20

III. The Philippine Parliamentary Mission, 1922 59

IV. The Cabinet Crisis

W 112
IE
V. The Roxas Special Mission, 1923-1924 156

VI. The Third Pariiamentary Mission (1924) and the

EV

Fairfield Bill:Politics or Patriotism ? 203

VII. The "Crisis" Continues: The Osrnena Legislative

Committee, 1925-1926 251
PR

VIII. The "Crisis" Comes to an End 327

IX. The Quezon-Osmena Mission (1927) Promises

Cooperation 390

X. Free Trade and Independence :The Tariff and

Parliamentary Missions, 1929-1930 427

XI. The Philippine Independence Commission,

1931— 1933 (The OsRox Mission) 526

XII. The Last Independence Mission, 1933-1934 601

Summing Up 639
Bibliography 647

Appendix A 666

Append Lx 3 671

W
IE
EV
PR
 i

PREFACE

Barring t>he years of the Philippine-American War ( 1899-1902),

the Philippine independence movement during the American period

never became the bitter and sometimes bloody struggle that marked

the experience of other colonial regimes in Asia, for the United

States accommodated herself to Philippine nationalism. Indeed the

United States consciously set about to foster the spirit of

Philippine nationalism.

W
The leaders of

were given the freedom and the means to articulate their nationalist
the independence movement
IE
feelings. The appeal for freedom was won through peaceful

constitutional processes afforded the Filipinos by the sovereign

EV

power, which allowed them to move progressively towards autonomy and

independence. The question of ultimate Philippine independence was

an issue settled in principle almost from the beginning. The only

PR

matter to be resolved was the timing of the grant of that

independence.

The major prerequisites set for independence were the

establishment of good government and Filipino preparedness for

independent statehood. With this in mind, the period from 1901 to

1913 saw the "political education" of the Filipinos, under

Republican Administrations which saw this as a necessary step for

independence in the future. This was followed by a period

characterized by the " filipinization" of the insular government and

the encouragement of nationalism, under a Democratic Administration

(1913-1921 ).
 ii

When the independence campaign was taken up in earnest in 1918,

the Filipinos did so with the conviction that they were then already

politically mature enough to handle their own affairs. The leaders

who involved themselves in this campaign had been on the Philippine

political scene since 1907, all members of the educated elite and

all products of American tutelage. After two decades of American

direction, these politically active Filipinos felt confident that

they were sufficiently advanced in experience and participation in

public affairs to enable them to manage their country on their own.

there was considerable

W
The Filipino stand on independence was not always very clear —

confusion and vacillation on the matter —

IE
and American administration officials felt that much of the

agitation was artificial and insincere and tied up with insular

EV

politics. Political leaders often vied with one another to

demonstrate the intensity of their advocacy of independence, yet

seemed to shrink from it when its attainment seemed imminent.

PR

Though there was ambivalence in the Filipino approach to

independence, perhaps part of the uncertainty was due to the fact

that the United States also had no consistent answer to the

Philippine request for independence — the only matter that was

definite was the promise to grant independence. The Democrats, it

was said, were afraid to do what they said they would do, while the

Republicans were afraid to say what they would do.

This is a study of the circumstances which attended the sending

of independence missions to the United States, despatched almost

yearly from 1919 to 193'4, and the reactions, or response of the

 iii

American Administration and the United States Congress to the

petitions of the Filipinos. The independence missions had great

significance for the Filipinos, as they dramatized the peaceful

continuation of their struggle for freedom, begun in 1896 when they

rose in revolt against Spanish colonialism and continued in

1899-1902 against the Americans.

The Filipino leaders who led these Missions have been portrayed

as uncompromising nationalists of the "complete, absolute, and

immediate independence" variety. The events and circumstances

W
described in this study reveal that this was not always so.

Hopefully, this study will result in a more realistic evaluation and

IE
appreciation of the complexities of their efforts to attain the goal

of national freedom.
EV

While independence was the primary objective of the Missions to

the United States, other matters that needed threshing out with

Washington also preoccupied the delegations. From 1923 to 1927,

PR

during the regime of Governor Wood, the Missions devoted themselves

to easing the "crisis" with the Governor General. During the period

from 1928 to 1933, the tariff question and racial discrimination as

it affected immigration became Mission concerns. The Missions

generally were concerned with protecting Philippine interests —

whether political or economic — against discriminatory forces or

legislation .

The approach has been primarily chronological, and the

exposition has been limited as much as possible to the affairs of

the Missions in the Philippines and in the United States. The

 iv

emphasis has been necessarily political, because independence is a

political issue. The focus has been on the metropolitan level — on

Filipino leadership on the national level; on relations between the

leadership in Manila and the Washington officialdom; on colonialism

and nationalism on the metropolitan level. I have not attempted to

articulate what the average Filipino, especially outside the

political centre (Manila), felt about the issue, for that belongs to

an entirely different study. What is clearly evident in this study

is only that the political leaders, who presented themselves for

election periodically, were elected, or re-elected, because the

issue of independence had a

Whether the Filipino masses actually knew what W powerful appeal to the electorate.

independence really
IE
meant is another matter, and to find this out would mean research in

a different direction, using entirely different materials than were

EV

used in this study.

There were many varied groups in the Philippines which

PR

expressed their stand on independence— non-political groups such as

the Catholic Church and other religious denominations, labour

organisations, peasant leaders, the Communist Party and other

radical groups, the Moros and non-Christian groups. Indeed, there

are files in the Bureau of Insular Affairs of letters and petitions

for and against independence. In this study, I have focussed only

on the more vocal and influential, elements for or against

independence— the Filipino political leaders, American business and

economic groups in the Philippines and the United States, official

Americans, and a number of prominent and influential private

citizens from both countries.

 V

Very little has been written on the independence missions,

especially for the period from 1919 to 1929. The only materials

available are sketchy and make only slight reference to the

activities of the missions, As source materials, I have drawn on

the huge file of the Bureau of Insular Affairs of the War

Department, the closest the United States had to a "Colonial

Office."* These records are now stored in the National Archives in

Washington, D.C. Congress was very much involved in the final

disposition of the Philippine problem, and I found the congressional

W
records, both in the Archives and the Library of Congress invaluable

in this study. I also consulted the personal and official papers of

IE
American officials and "old Philippine hands" in the Manuscript

Division of the Library of Congress, as well as in several

EV

university libraries in the United States.

The bulk of the research was undertaken in the United States.

Many valuable public and personal records in the Philippines were

PR

destroyed during the last war; others were lost through

degeneration in tropical conditions. Fortunately the Bureau of

Insular Affairs Records are available to fill in the gaps.

In the Philippines I consulted the Quezon Papers in the

National Library,the richest source for this period, which contains

cables, memoranda, transcripts of press conferences, press

* For a study of the functions performed by the Bureau of Insular

Affairs, see Romeo V. Cruz, America1s Colonial Desk and the
Philippine s , 1893- 1934 (Quezon City, 1974).
 vi

c l i p p i n g s , public d o c um en ts , letters, and speeches of Que zo n and

o t h er p ro m i n e n t figures of the P hi l i p p i n e political scene in the

t w e n t i e s and thirties.

T h i s thesis would c e r t a i n l y not be pos si bl e were it not for the

kind assistance extended to me while I was doing r e s e a r c h in

p r e p a r a t i o n for this manuscript. I am deeply g ra te fu l to the

d i r e c t o r s , librarians, and a rc hi ve s of the following i n s t i t u t i o n s in

the

especially
U ni te d States:

the Social
the

and
W
N ational

E conomic
Archives,

Bra nc h
W a s hi ng to n,

and
D.C.,

the L e g i s l a t i v e
IE
Section; the Library of Congress, especially the Manuscript

Division and the Orientalia D ivision; the Sterling M emorial

EV

L ib ra ry , Yale Unive rs it y; the Mic hi ga n H istorical Colle ct io ns ,

B e n t l e y H i s t o r i c a l Library, U n i v e r s i t y of Michigan; the F ra nk li n D.

Rooosevelt Memorial Library, Hyde Park, New York; the Ohio

PR

Historical Society, Inc., Columbus, Ohio; the John M. Olin

L ib ra ry , Cornell U ni ve rs it y; the H ou gh to n Library, Harvard

University; and the B ancroft Library, U n i v e r s i t y of C a l if or ni a at

Berkeley.

In Manila, I would like to thank the staff of the Filipiniana

Division of the N ational Library; the F i l i p in ia na and S e r i a l s

S e c t i o n s of the U n i v e r s i t y of the P h i l i p p i n e s Library; and the Jose

P. Lau re l Memorial F ou nd at io n.
 vii

In C a n b e r r a , t h e s t a f f s o f th e N a t i o n a l L i b r a r y and the Menzies

L i b r a r y , th e A u s t r a l i a n N a ti o n a l U n i v e r s i t y , have been most h e l p f u l .

Many c o l l e a g u e s and f r i e n d s have a l s o been invol ved in se ei n g

this s tu d y to com pletion. Prof. Teodoro A. A g o n c i l l o , former

Chairman of the Department of H istory, University of th e

Philippines, encouraged me to u n d e r ta k e t h i s s tu d y ; Dr. Ceci l

Hobbs and A. Kohar Rony, as we ll as a d ea r f r i e n d , Leodyne T. King,

assisted me g r e a t l y d u r i n g my r e s e s a r c h in Washington, D . C . ; Lulu

and J e f f Host , and C. Suan Tan gave me i n v a l u a b l e a s s i s t a n c e at a

most d i f f i c u l t time.

W
My p a r e n t s l o v i n g l y a t t e n d e d to my e v e r y need

w h il e I was doing r e s e a r c h in Manila. To a l l o f them I say many

IE
thanks.
EV

S p e c i a l acknowledgements a r e due to Dr. H.H.E. Loofs-Wissowa,

Department of Asian History and C i v i l i s a t i o n s , F a c u l t y o f Asian

S t u d i e s , and Dr. Hector K in lo c h, Department o f H i s t o r y , F a c u l t y of

PR

Arts, fo r s u p e r v i s i o n and d i s c i p l i n e , and e s p e c i a l l y f o r t h e i r kind

concern in the c o m p le ti o n o f th e t h e s i s .

And l a s t l y , I am d e e p l y g r a t e f u l to my husband, Malcolm, fo r

c h e e r f u l and i n s t r u c t i v e e d i t i n g and h e l p i n g me r e i u c e the t h e s i s to

manageable p r o s e . To Malcolm, and my c h i l d r e n , Paul and Tina, fo r

patient endu ran ce and lo v i n g a t t e n t i o n d u r i n g moments o f c r i s i s , I

must say I cou ld not have done t h i s w i t h o u t them.

 CHAPTER I

THE PHILIPPINE-AKERICAN ENCOUNTER: BUILDING A NATION

In 1898 when t he d e c i s i o n was made by t he United States to

acquire t he Phi 1 i p p i n e s , ( 1 ) a F i l i p i n o n a t i o n was s t r u g g l i n g f or

existence ami ds t a revolution against S p a i n . (2) The Filipino

revolutionaries came close to achieving their goal of n a t i o n a l

f r eedom, but American i n t e r v e n t i o n p r e v e n t e d i t s r e a l i z a t i o n . While

t he Filipinos i n i t i a l l y looked t o t he Uni t ed S t a t e s f or ai d in t he

W
s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t S p a i n , b a s i n g t h e i r hopes upon t he T e l l e r Amendment
IE
(1) The l i t e r a t u r e on American i m p e r i a l i s m a t t he t u r n of t he
c e n t u r y i s immense. Some u s e f u l r e f e r e n c e s a r e t he f o l l o w i n g :
EV

E r n e s t R. Kay, American I m p e r i a l i s m : A S p e c u l a t i v e Essay (Mew

York, 1968); David Heal y, U,S. Ex p a n s i o n i s m: The I m p e r i a l i s t
Urge in t he 1890 *s (Madison, 1970); Ri chard H o f s t a d t e r ,
" Ma n i f e s t De s t i n y and t he P h i l i p p i n e s , " in Dani el Aaron, e d .,
America in C r i s i s (New York, 1952); V/alter L a F e b e r , The New
PR

Empire: An I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of American E x p a n s i o n , 1860-1898

( I t h a c a , N.Y., 1963); and H. Wayne Morgan, America *s Road t o
Emp i r e : The VJar wi t h Spain and Over s eas Expansi on (New York,
1965).
There ar e a l s o some u s e f u l a r t i c l e s on t h i s s u b j e c t :
Paol o E. C o l e t t e , "McKinley , t he Peace N e g o t i a t i o n s , and t he
A c q u i s i t i o n of t he P h i l i p p i n e s , " P a c i f i c H i s t o r i c a l Revi ew,XXX
(November 1961), pp. 3*11-350; Thomas McCormick, " I n s u l a r
I m p e r i a l i s m and t he Open Door: t he China Market and t he
Spani s h- Amer i c an War," I q c . c i t ., XXXII (May 1963), p p .
155-169; and J o n a t h a n Fa s t and Luz.viminda Francisco,
"Philippine Historiography and a De-Mystification of
I m p e r i a l i s m , A Review E s s a y , " J o u r n a l of Contemporary A s i a , IV,
3 (197*0, pp. 3*1*1-358.

(2) For an acc ount of t he h i s t o r y of t he n a t i o n a l i s t movement in

t he Philippines, t he f o l l o wi n g are useful: John N.
Schumacher, The Propaganda Movement: 1880-1895 ( Ma ni l a , 1973);
Teodoro A. A g o n c i l l o , The Revol t of t h e Ma s s e s : The S t o r y of
B o n i f a c i o and t he Kat i punan (Quezon C i t y , 1956); Teodoro M.
Kalaw, The P h i l i p p i n e Re v o l ut i on ( Ma ni l a , 1925; r e p r i n t e d
1969).
 Page 2

(which promi sed i nde pendence t o Cuba) , t h e McKinley Administration

opposed acknowl e dgi ng any o b l i g a t i o n s t o accede t o t he wi s hes of t he

Filipino revolutionists. Shattered hopes and misunderstanding

between t he two n a t i o n s f i n a l l y t r a n s f o r m e d t he r e v o l u t i o n a g a i n s t

Spain i n t o F i l i p i n o - A m e r i c a n armed c o n f l i c t . (3)

Despite American rhetoric of "benevolent assimilation,"

"tutelage," and "protection," t he F i l i p i n o n a t i o n a l i s t s f ought a

b i t t e r and c o s t l y war t o r e g a i n t h e i r i nde pe nde nc e , pr oc l a i me d on

June 12, 1898, by Gener al Emi l i o F. Agui nal do.

W
Conf r ont ed by i n s u r mo u n t a b l e odds , Filipino armed resistance
IE
eventually yielded to superior American military forces. The

P h i l i p p i n e r e v o l u t i o n was e v e n t u a l l y s u p p r e s s e d a f t e r the capture,

EV

in March 1901, of Gener al Ag ui na l do, who had been i n a u g u r a t e d

p r e s i d e n t of t h e P h i l i p p i n e Re p u b l i c , a t Mal ol os, Bulacan Province,

on J a n u a r y 23, 1899. On J u l y 4, 1902, P r e s i d e n t Theodore R o o s e v e l t

PR

o f f i c i a l l y p r o c l a i me d t he e x i s t e n c e of peace and order and t he

(3) The F i l i p i n o r e v o l u t i o n i s t s and t he American m i l i t a r y f o r c e s

were ne r vous a l l i e s confronting a common enemy — S p a i n .
I n i t i a l f r i e n d l y a ppr oa c he s t o Agui nal do by American c o n s u l a r
officials in Si n g a p o r e and Hong Kong encouraged him t o
c o o p e r a t e wi t h t h e Americans a g a i n s t t he S p a n i a r d s in t he
Philippines. Agui nal do and h i s r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o l l e a g u e s were
w i t t i n g l y ( or u n w i t t i n g l y ) made t o b e l i e v e t h a t t he Uni t ed
States would r e c o g n i z e P h i l i p p i n e i ndependence upon t he
c o n c l u s i o n of p e a c e .
As t h e McKinley A d m i n i s t r a t i o n firmed i t s p o l i c y to
a c q u i r e t he P h i l i p p i n e s from S p a i n , F i l i p i n o - A m e r i c a n r e l a t i o n s
turned c ol d, and e v e n t u a l l y , hostile, c u l m i n a t i n g in t he
o u t b r e a k of t h e P h i l i p p i n e - A m e r i c a n War on F e b r u a r y 4, 1899,
when an American s e n t r y s hot a F i l i p i n o s o l d i e r . See James H.
Blount, The American Occupat i on of t he P h i l i p p i n e s , 1898-1912
(New York, 1913; r e p r i n t e d 1968), C h a p t e r s I - X I I I .
 Page 3

termination of the war in the Philippines.(4) By 1903 most Filipino

revolutionary leaders of consequence had reconciled themselves to

the reality of American sovereignty. The struggle for freedom from

1896 to 1902 had failed, but the emotional and political issue of

independence remained dominant and widespread even in the face of

initial American attempts to restrain nationalist sentiment.(5)

(4) For a detailed account of the Philippine-American War and the

Malolos Republic, see ibid., Chapters XI-XIII; also Teodoro A.
Agoncillo, Malolos: The Crisis of the Republic (Quezon City,
1960); Reports of the Major-General Commanding the Army
(Washington, 1899-1902); Marion Wilcox, Harper1s History of

W
the War in the Philippines (New York and London, 1900); Leon
Wolff, Little Brown Brother: How the United States Purchased
and Pacified the Philippine Islands at the Century1s Turn (New
York, 1961); John M. Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags: The
IE
United States Army in the Philippines,, 1898-1902 (Westport,
Conn., 1972); Jane S. Ragsdale, "Coping with the Yankees:
The Filipino Elite, 1898-1903," (Ph.D. diss., University of
Wisconsin, 1974); and Richard E. Welch, Jr., Response to
EV

Imperialism: The United States and the Philippine-American

War, 1899-1902 (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1979).
More recent studies of the Philippine-American War have
looked into the other dimensions of the war against the United
States on the regional level. See for instance, Milagros C.
PR

Guerrero, "Luzon at War: Contradictions in Philippine Society,

1898- 1902," (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1977);
Reynaldo C. Ileto, Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements
in the Phi1ippines, 1840-1910 (Quezon City, 1979); Glenn A.
May, "Filipino Resistance to American Occupation: Batangas,
1899- 1902," Pacific Historical Review, XLVIII, 4 (November
1979), pp. 531-556; and Norman G. Owen, "Windng Down the War
in Albay, 1900-1903," loc. c it., pp . 557-589.

(5) During the first few years of American rule, until 1907, the
Filipino struggle to regain their independence was discouraged
by the American authorities. All attempts by patriotic
Filipinos to organize political parties with independence
platforms were suppressed. Nationalist literature critical of
the imposition of American sovereignty on the Filipinos was
subject to censorship and suppression. During this period of
"suppressed nationalism" the American colonial administration
sought to remove, through legislation, any real or imagined
threat to American rule in the Philippines. See Dapen Liang,
The Development of Philippine Political Parties (Hong Kong,
1939), pp. 66-70. (This book has been revised and republished
as Philippine Parties and Politics, A Historical Study of
National Experience in Democracy, San Francisco, 1970). See
also Amelia Lape?Ta-Bonifacio, The "Seditious" Tagalog
Playwrights: Early American Occupation (Manila, 1972).
 Page 4

Yet even while the United States was busy pacifying rebellious

Filipinos, a colonial policy was being formulated that would

demonstrate America's "benevolent imperialism" — a policy that

would win the support of the Filipinos and at the same time

extricate American leadership from an ideologically embarrassing

situation stemming from anti-imperialist opposition to the American

venture in the Philippines.(6) The Republican Party, which was

responsible for the acquisition of the Philippines, adopted a policy

of attraction and conciliation to deal with Filipino demands to

determine their own national destiny. This policy took the form of

and perfecting the new W

"filipinization," Filipino participation in the work

government,
of

combined with a programme of

organizing
IE
social reform and economic and material development. And however

much the Republicans and the Democrats disagreed as to the morality,

EV

the wisdom, or the necessity of acquiring the Philippines as an

American responsibility, both parties agreed that the Filipinos

needed a long (or longer) period of apprenticeship in the ways of

PR

(6) America's expansionist programme in the late 1890's was not the
unanimous decision of all segments of American society. The
Democrats were a formidable opposition to the acquisition of
the Philippines. Along with them was vehement opposition from
some Eastern metropolitan newspapers, prominent liberal
leaders, and a powerful minority within the Republican Party.
For a while, the most organized opposition came from the
Anti-Imperialist League formed in Boston late in 1898. See
Robert L. Beisner, Twelve Against Empire: The
Anti-Imperialists, 1898-1900 (New York, 1968); E. Berkeley
Tompkins, Anti-Imperialism in the United States: The Great
Debate, 1890-1920 (Philadelphia, 1970); Daniel B. Schirmer,
Republic or Empire: Atnerican Resistance to the Philippine War
(Cambridge, Mass., 1972); and Edelwina C. Legaspi, "The
Anti-Imperialist Movement in the United States, 1898-1900,"
Philippine Social Sciences and Humanities Review, XXXIII, 3-4
(September-December 1968; published in 1973).
 Page 5

modern government.

Filipinization, it was thought, while insuring Filipino

cooperation with American objectives, would also provide the

Filipinos with "political education," crucial in preparing them for

self-government. The American Administration, accordingly, took the

view that as soon as practicable, a reasonable amount of autonomy

should be allowed the Filipinos, under close supervision by

Americans — but without prematurely making a definite commitment to

W
ultimate independence. Perhaps as the Filipinos learned more about

America's good intentions as "bearers of good will, protection, and

IE
the richest blessings of liberation," they would be "warmly attached

to the United States by a sense of self-interest and gratitude," and

EV

they would no longer wish for independence.(7)

It is probably safe to assume that this policy of accommodating

some Filipino leaders in the management of colonial affairs had the

PR

immediate effect of moderating Filipino nationalist demands. There

was a willingness to set aside independence for a while in order to

(7) The most recent works on American policy in the Philippines in

the critical first two decades are Peter W. Stanley, A Nation
in the Making: The Philippines and the United States,
1899-1921 (Cambridge, Mass., 197*0 and Glenn A. May, "America
in the Philippines: The Shaping of Colonial Policy,
1898-1913," (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1975), recently
published as Social Engineering in the Philippines: The Aims,
Execution and Impact of American Colonial Policy (Westport,
Conn., 1980). See also Bonifacio S. Salamanca, The Filipino
Reaction to AmericanRule, 1901-1913 (Norwich, Conn., 1968),
p p . 52-5*1, 226, for the opinions expressed by William Howard
Taft and General Arthur MacArthur on what American policy
should be towards the Philippines and the Filipinos. For
Theodore Roosevelt's views on Philippine independence, see
Oscar M. Alfonso, Theodore Roosevelt and the Philippines,
1897-1909 (Quezon City, 1970), pp. *19-76.
 Page 6

cooperate with the Americans to accomplish some immediate political

and socio-economic goals, though there was not, however, a

willingness to forgo independence altogether. It was probably not

lost to the Filipinos that implicit in this programme of "political

education" was graduation eventually to self-rule and independence.

By the time the Americans came in 1898, there already existed

in the Philippines a small elite that was consciously "Filipino" —

the ilustrados of the late Spanish period. This indigenous elite

possessed education, social prominence, and a political

W
sophistication which enabled them to define and articulate Filipino

national aspirations and identity. Leadership in the political life

IE
of the Philippines came initially into the hands of these

politically conservative, hispanized ilustrados, some of whom

EV

stepped forward to support the American authorities, convinced that

the unequal struggle was futile. There is some reason to believe

that this action was also probably motivated by their desire to

PR

assume the political status that collaboration with and allegiance

to the new colonial regime had offered them.(8)

In 1900, Governor William Howard Taft permitted the

establishment of the Partido Federal, composed largely of wealthy

and educated ilustrados, who declared themselves for early autonomy

and ultimate statehood in the American Union. Their collaboration

(8) See Onofre D. Corpuz, The Philippines (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,

1965), pp. 65-68; and Norman G. Owen (ed.), Compadre
Colonialism,Studies on the Philippines under American Rule (Ann
Arbor, Mich., 1971), pp. 1-12.
 Page 7

p l e a s e d t h e American a u t h o r i t i e s (and facilitated pacification in

t h e P h i l i p p i n e War), who rewarded them with almost complete monopoly

of th e positions in th e colonial government. However, their

programme for a n n e x a ti o n was never ta ke n s e r i o u s l y by th e American

a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , and was s e v e r e l y a t t a c k e d by the p r o - in d e p e n d e n c e

Filipino nationalists. So, in 1905, s e n s i n g th e h o p e l e s s n e s s of

t h e i r a n n e x a ti o n p l a t f o r m , th e F e d e r a l i s t a s adopted a more radical

stance, and as th e Partido N ac ion al P r o g r e s is ta (s in c e January

1907), th ey announced a p l a t f o r m of u l t i m a t e independence " in due

W
t i m e , " a f t e r a p e r i o d of economic and s o c i a l p r o g r e s s . (9)
IE
Once th e Federalistas declared for in d e p en d en ce , it was

inevitable that o t h e r independence p a r t i e s p r e v i o u s l y banned would

EV

a r i s e with more r a d i c a l p l a t f o r m s . By 1907 a l s o , th e United States

felt sufficiently secure in her a u t h o r i t y in th e P h i l i p p i n e s to

adop t a more tolerant view to w ard s political groups openl y

PR

p r o c l a i m i n g t h e i r demand f o r in d e p en d en ce . Hence, in March 1907 th e

P a r t i d o N a c i o n a l i s t a was allowed t o be formed on a platform which

committed th e p a r t y t o th e " a t t a i n m e n t of t h e immediate independence

of t h e P h i l i p p i n e I s l a n d s to c o n s t i t u t e i t i n t o a f r e e and s o v e r e i g n

nation under a d e m o c r a ti c g o ve r n m e n t. " ( 1 0 ) In time, under th e

p r e s s u r e of p a r t i s a n p o l i t i c s , i t d e c l a r e d f o r " c o m p l e te , immediate,

and absolute" independence fo r t h e P h i l i p p i n e s . Having p r o j e c t e d

(9) See Maximo M. Kalaw, The Development o f P h i l i p p i n e P o l i t i c s ,

1872-1920 (M ani la , 1926), pp. 292-304; Lian g, op^ c i t .,
(1970 e d i t i o n ) , p p . 49-59; 62-65; and Salamanca, 0 £ . c i t .,
p p . 156-159.

(10) Kalaw, op. c i t . , p p . 302-305; Lian g, op. c it., pp. 59-62;

Salamanca, op. c i t . , p p . 160-164.
 Page 8

itself as the champion of immediate independence, a popular

electoral issue in the Philippines, the Nacionalista Party (and its

leaders) became virtually invincible at the polls from the time of

its inception in 1907. Thus, the Federalistas were able to enjoy

their favoured position only briefly.

During the first decade and a half of Republican rule

(1898-1913 — often referred to also as the Taft era) in the

Philippines, the filipinization policy was implemented through the

W
established leaders — the Federalistas, and after 1907, the

Nacionalistas — by the steady extension to the Filipinos of

IE
participation in local government. Qualified and competent

Filipinos progressively moved into the civil service and the

EV

national (or insular) government.

The first significant step towards Philippine autonomy, the

Organic Act of 1902, enacted by the United States Congress, paved

PR

the way for the establishment of an elected all-Filipino legislative

body called the Philippine Assembly. The Assembly was inaugurated

on October 16, 1907, and thereafter a new generation of younger

Nacionalista leaders who were vocal for independence assumed a share

in the responsibility of government.

By the end of the Republican regime in 1913, almost complete

filipinization had been achieved at the municipal and provincial

levels. The insular government, however, was top-heavy with

Americans who held important policy-and-decision-making

positions.(11) The emerging Filipino leadership probably perceived

(11) For the structure of colonial bureaucracy until 1913, see

Onofre D. Corpuz, The Bureaucracy in the Philippines (Manila,
 Page 9

that continued American tutelage implied an inferiority or

incapacity which denied them the choice senior positions occupied by

Americans. Increasingly they were dissatisfied with "political

education," the mainstay of Taft's policy, and demanded less

supervision and a larger role in government. After a decade and a

half of American tutorship, the politically active Filipinos were

restless and eager to assume complete domestic autonomy by the grant

of more substantial powers to a Philippine government composed

entirely of Filipinos.(12)

W
The ultimate political relation between the Philippines and the
IE
United States was also a matter of immediate relevance to the

Filipinos. Independence was a sentiment of universal appeal among

EV

the Filipinos, although at times perhaps only vaguely understood and

half-heartedly espoused.

With the introduction of the Assembly in 1907, composed almost

PR

always of a comfortable majority of Nacionalistas, Filipino

nationalism focused on achieving its goal of independence through

the elected leaders of that body, who voiced in an official way the

Filipino desire for freedom. Through the Assembly, the Filipinos

secured a greater say in the management of their government and a

1957), pp. 162, 191, 175-176, 193. See also Report of the
Chief, Bureau of Insular Affairs, Frank McIntyre, to the
Secretary of War (Hereafter SecWar), March 1, 1913, in Bureau
of Insular Aff airs Records, Record Group 350, National
Archives, Washington, D.C., File 119-72 (Hereafter BIA
Records) .

(12) Stanley, op. cit., pp. 139-176; May, op. cit., Chapter
VIII, p. 322.
 Page 10

continuing opportunity to prove their competence for legislative

conduct. More significantly, it provided the political leaders with

a forum where they could cultivate political sentiment for

independence.

Before 1913 Republican officials refused to discuss the

political future of the Philippines. The Republican Administration

regarded the Filipino desire for independence as commendable, but it

consistently maintained the view that independence at that time,

W
after only a brief period of American tutelage, was not in the best

interests of the Filipinos because they had not as yet mastered the
IE
art of democratic self-government. Then, too, there had not been

sufficient economic progress and material development in the country

EV

to warrant severing the ties with the United States. Far better,

the Filipinos were advised, to channel their energies and

aspirations towards the pursuit of political stability, social

PR

reform, and the general economic development of the country and to

give up political agitation momentarily.(13)

Moreover, the demand for independence was not taken seriously

by the Washington authorities because they laboured under the

impression that the cry for independence was no more than a

political slogan — an electoral expediency — which the politicians

exploited to get themselves elected to public office. American

(13) See Stanley, op. cit ., Chapter on "Nation Building," p p .

81-113, passim; see also Robert M. Spector, "W. Cameron
Forbes in the Philippines: A Study in Proconsular Power,'"
Journal of Southeast Asian History, VII, 2 (September 1966),
pp. 7*1-92. The most recent study on Governor Forbes is Rev.
Camillus Gott, "Governor General V/. Cameron Forbes and the
Philippines, 190.4-19*16," (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University,
1974) .
 Page 11

officials were sincerely convinced that the practitioners of party

politics, especially Manuel L. Quezon(14) and Sergio Osmena,(15)

were not urgently committed to "immediate independence," as their

public declarations suggested. In fact, while immediate

independence was called for publicly, the politicos did appear

willing to settle for less— perhaps no more than an American

recognition of the Filipinos' right to independence. In private

conversations with ranking American officials, these Filipino

leaders seemed to waver and hedge when actually confronted with the

W
IE
(14) Manuel L. Quezon (1878-1944) started his political career as
governor of Tayabas (new Quezon) Province in 1906. In 1907 he
was elected to the Philippine Assembly where he became the
majority floor leader. In 1909, he was chosen as one of two
EV

resident commissioners to the United States Congress. He

served in that capacity until 1916, when he returned to Manila
and was elected Senate President of the newly established
Philippine Legislature, a position he held until 1934. In
1935, he became the first President of the Philippine
Commonwealth and served in that capacity until his death in
PR

1944.
There are several biographic works on Quezon, of varying
scholarly quality: Isabelo P. Caballero and M. de Gracia
Concepcion, Quezon (Manila, 1935); Sol H. Gwekoh, Manuel L .
Que zon (Manila, 1935); Elinor Goettel, Eagle of the
Philippines: President Manuel Que zon (New York, 1970); and
Carlos Quirino, Que zon: Paladin of Philippine Freedom (Manila,
1971). Quezon also wrote an autobiography, The Good Fight,
which was published posthumously. (New York, 1946).

(15) Sergio Osmena (1877-1961), from Cebu Province, started his

career as editor of the nationalistic paper El Nuevo Dia in his
native province. He was elected Governor of Cebu in 1906, and
later became Speaker of the Philippine Assembly in 1907 and the
House of Representatives of the Philippine Legislature in 1916.
He held that position until 1922, when he was elected to the
Senate. In 1935 he was elected Vice-President of the
Philippine Commonwealth, and in 1944 he became President on the
death of Quezon. For his biography, see Vicente Albano Pacis,
President Sergio Osmena, A_ Fully Documented Biography (Quezon
City, 1971), 2 vols; and Epidio Valencia, Sergio Osmena
(Manila, 1977).

Reproduced with permission of copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.