#1

Hermogenes De Jesus v
s. G. Urrutia & Co.,
G.R. No. 10863.
January 11, 1916
FACTS:

On October 18, 1906, Diego Liñan, the son-in-law of the appellant, executed a mortgage to the
defendant company, appellee, on certain lands then belonging to the mortgagor to secure the payment of the
sum of P12,591.35, which, by the terms of the mortgage, was to be paid 3 years from the date thereof, with
interest at 9 per cent annually. The mortgage was not paid and judgment of foreclosure was obtained on July
5, 1911, the principal, interest and costs amounting, on that date, to P14,224.53. The property was duly sold
pursuant to the judgment of foreclosure, there resulting a deficiency of P7,874.97, for which the mortgagee
was given a judgment. An execution was issued thereon and, on the 28th of July, 1913, the lands described in
the complaint were levied upon for the satisfaction of said deficiency judgment. The appellant, claiming to be
the owner of the lands levied on, presented to the sheriff who made the levy a claim in pursuance of section
451 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The appellee insisted on the sale of said lands and gave the bond required
in that section. The sheriff thereupon proceeded with the execution of the judgment and, on the 22d of
September, 1913, sold the land for the sum of P4,700.

ISSUES:

Whether or not canthere berecovery of the land so sold

HELD:
No. The trial court found in favor of the appellee and dismissed the action. The claim of appellant to
the lands in question is based on certain conveyances made by Diego Liñan at various times from 1905 to
1908. That article "Contracts by virtue of which the debtor alienates property gratuitously are presumed to be
executed in fraud of creditors.” Alienations for valuable considerations, made by persons against whom a
condemnatory judgment, in any instance, has been previously rendered, or a writ of attachment of property
has been issued, shall also be presumed fraudulent.
The first paragraph does not apply for the reason that the sale was not gratuitous.
The second paragraphs is equally inapplicable as the transfers were made before a judgment had been
obtained or a writ had been issued for the seizure of Liñan’s property. Finally, it is the undisputed evidence in
the case, for that evidence was presented by two of the witnesses for the appellee, that appellant, in
consummation of the sales, took immediate possession of the lands sold to him by Liñan and continued in
possession thereof until the sale by the appellee. Although these witnesses were interested in the result of
this action, they were witnesses for the appellee; and it cannot now be heard to say that their testimony is
worthless because of that interest. The case of Oria v. McMicking (21 Phil. Rep., 243), relied on by appellee, is
not applicable to the facts in this case, as will be seen by referring there to. The plaintiff not having proved any
damages, none can be allowed.
 #2

MAPALO v. MAPALO

G.R. Nos. L-21489 & L-21628

FACTS:
 Spouses MIGUEL Mapalo and Candida Quiba, simple illiterate farmers, were registered owners of a residential
land in Manaoag, Pangasinan.
 Said spouses out of love for MAXIMO Mapalo—MIGUEL’s brother who was about to get married—decided to
donate the eastern half of the land to him.
 As a result, in 1936, they were deceived into signing a deed of absolute sale over the entire land in MAXIMO’s
favor. The document of sale stated a consideration of ₱500 which MIGUEL did NOT receive anything.
 Following the execution of document, MIGUEL and Candida built a fence of permanent structure in the middle
of the land segregating the eastern portion from its western portion.
 13 years later, MAXIMO sold for ₱2,500 the entire land in favor of the Narcisos and they registered the
same. Narcisos filed to be declared owners of the entire land with possession of its western portion.
 MIGUEL contend that the deed of sale of 1936 was procured with fraud and the Narcicos were buyers in bad
faith. Also, it was invoked that the deeds of sale be declared null and void as to the western half of said land for
being fictitious.
 In reversing the ruling of the CFI, the CA averred that having obtained the deed of sale by fraud, the same was
voidable, not void ab initio and the action to annul the same had already prescribed which was within 4 years of
notice of fraud. While they are definitely victims, they lost their right by prescription.

ISSUE:
 Does the contract involve “NO consideration” or “false consideration”?

RULING:
 The rule under the Civil Code, be it the old or the new, is that contracts without a cause or consideration
produce NO effect whatsoever.
 Nonetheless, under the Old Civil Code, the statement of a false consideration renders the contract voidable,
unless it is proven that it is supported by another real and licit consideration. And it is further provided by the
Old Civil Code that the action for annulment of a contract on the ground of falsity of consideration shall last 4
years, the term to run from the date of the consummation of the contract.
 In the present case, the contract of sale has NO consideration and therefore it is void and inexistent for the said
consideration of ₱500 was totally absent. Purchase price which appears thereon as paid has in fact never been
paid by the purchaser to vendor.
 This is contrary to what is meant by a contract that states a false consideration is one that has in fact a real
consideration but the same is NOT the one stated in the document.
 Needless to add, the inexistence of a contract is permanent and incurable and CANNOT be the subject of
prescription

#3
 Fausta Batarra vs. Francisco Marcos

March 20, 2016

G.R. No. 2929  December 7, 1906

FACTS: 

Fausta Batarra filed a complaint in court for the recovery of the damages brought by Francisco Marcos
for the breach of promise of marriage by the latter. The defendant induced the plaintiff to submit herself to
sexual relation with him on account of such promise of marriage.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the plaintiff can recover for the damages brought by the defendant for the breach of
promise of marriage.

RULING: 

 No, because it was contrary with law which stated on “Art. 1411 When the nullity proceeds from the
illegality of the cause or object of the contract, and the set constitutes a criminal offense, both parties being in
pari delicto, they shall have no action against each other, and both shall be prosecuted…” in which the cause
of the action taken by the defendant in making a promise with the plaintiff is based on his immoral act which
constitutes a criminal offense.
The first judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant has brought the case by bill of
exceptions. The judgment of the court below is reversed and the defendant is acquitted of the complaint, with
costs of the first instance. No costs will be allowed to either party in this court.
 #4
Clifford Logan vs. Philippine Acetylene Co.
G.R. No. L-11078, January 14, 1916

FACTS:

Mr. C.H. Logan and the defendant which is PHILIPPINE ACETYLENE CO. entered into an agreement
whereby Mr. H.C. Logan agreed to act as the manager of the Philippine Acetylene Company in the Philippine
Islands for a period of four year, commencing May 1, 1911, and ending April 30, 1915. It also provided that no
action looking to the termination of the contract could be taken by the company except it had been first
authorized by a resolution of its board of directors. Plaintiff was to receive a salary of P500 month.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Philippine Acetylene Co. has to accept the resignation letter and agree to the
conditional offer of Mr. Clifford H. Logan.

RULING:

Yes. The judgement appealed from is hereby reversed and the cause returned to the court whence it
came with instruction to enter a judgement in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for P1,500, with
interest thereon from August 5, 1914. Without costs in this instance. So ordered.
 #5
Aldaba v. CA
G.R. No. L-21676. February 28, 1969.

FACTS:

Two lots owned by Belen Aldaba are being disputed in this case. Petitioners Dr. Vicente Aldaba and his
daughter Jane lived with Belen Aldaba for 10 years and took care of her until her death. Belen had
presumptive heirs, her surviving huscand (Estanislao Bautista) and her brother (Cesar Aldaba), herein
respondents. After the death of Belen, respondents asked the petitioners to leave the premises and upon
refusal, the former instituted an ejectment case. The petitioners argue that Belen really intended to donate
the property to them and the property was for compensation of their services which amounted to PhP
53,000.00. The respondents contend otherwise.

ISSUES:

WON there was a disposition of property by Belen in favour of the petitioners.

RULING:

There is no disposition of property to the petitioners. The note (Exhibit 6) expressed only the intention
to donate. The disposition alone would not make the donation a donation for a valuable consideration. The
Supreme Court does not find in the record that there had been an express agreement between petitioners
and Belen Aldaba that the latter would pay the services of the former.
 #6
Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co. vs. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Company
97 Phil 247
June 1955

FACTS:

On March 24, 1953, defendant-appellant Atlantic granted plaintiff-appellee Southwestern an option

period of ninety days to buy the formers barge No. 10 for the sum of P30,000. On May 11 of the same year,
Southwestern Company communicated its acceptance of the option to Atlantic through a letter, to which the
latter replied that their understanding was that the "offer of option" is to be a cash transaction and to be
effected "at the time the lighter is available." On June 25, Atlantic advised the Southwestern Company that
since there is still further work for it, the barge could not be turned over to the latter company.

On June 27, 1953, the Southwestern Company filed this action to compel Atlantic to sell the barge in line with
the option, depositing with the court a check covering the sum of P30,000, but said check was later withdrawn
with the approval of the court. On June 29, the Atlantic withdrew its "offer of option" with due notices to
Southwestern Company stating that the option was granted merely as a favor. The Atlantic contended that the
option to sell it made to Southwestern Company is null and void because said option to sell is not supported
by any consideration.

The trial court granted herein plaintiff-appellee Southwestern Company’s action for specific performance and
ordered herein defendant-appellant Atlantic to pay damages equivalent to 6 per centum per annum on the
sum of P30,000 from the date of the filing of the complaint.

ISSUE:

Is Atlantic liable for specific performance and to pay damages in favor of Southwestern Company?

RULING:

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision applying Article 1479 of the new Civil Code. The
Court reiterated that "an accepted unilateral promise" can only have a binding effect if supported by a
consideration, which means that the option can still be withdrawn, even if accepted, if said option is not
supported by any consideration. The option that Atlantic had provided was without consideration, hence, can
be withdrawn notwithstanding Southwestern Company’s acceptance of said option.

American jurisprudence hold that an offer, once accepted, cannot be withdrawn, regardless of whether it is
supported or not by a consideration, but the specific provisions of Article 1479 commands otherwise. While
under the "offer of option" in question appellant Atlantic has assumed a clear obligation to sell its barge to
appellee Southwestern Company and the option has been exercised in accordance with its terms, and there
appears to be no valid or justifiable reason for the former to withdraw its offer, the Court cannot adopt a
different attitude because the law on the matter is clear.
 #7
Florencia Cronico vs JM Tuason and Co., Inc.
GR No. L3527 August26, 1977

FACTS:

JM Tuason was the registered owner of Lot 22. Florencio Cronico offered to buy the lot from JM
Tuason with the help of Mary Ven turanza. Cronico was required to present proofs of her rights to the lot, and
indeed presented certain documents showing her priority rights to buy the lot. Claudio Ramirez also learned
that said lot was being sold. Both Cronico and Ramirez then sent individual letters to JM Tuason expressing
their desire to purchase the land and requested information concerning the area, the price, and other terms
and conditions of the contract to sell. JM Tuason sent separate reply letters to the prospective buyers. Cronico
was able to obtain the letter the next day and thus presented the letter to the Head of the Real Estate
Department of JM Tuason; and requested Venturanza to issue a check as down payment, but the same was
refused. Ramirez, on the other hand, received the letter two days after it was sent stating that the lot was
available for sale under the conditions set forth and that said lot was being offered for sale on a first come first
serve basis. He then immediately verbally accepted such, followed by a letter to JM Tuason confirming the
verbal acceptance, the next day. Counsel of Ramirez then wrote JM Tuason for the early execution of the
Contract to Sell with a check as down payment (Mar 31). Counsel of Cronico, however, also wrote JM Tuason
requesting that the lot be sold to him (Mar 27). Subsequently, JM Tuason and Ramirez executed a Contract to
Sell, which resulted an instant suit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not JM Tuason’s promise to sell the lot to Cronico has a consideration separate from the
selling price of the id lot and thus binding upon the promissory to comply with such promise.

HELD:

No, the promise of the respondent company to sell the lot in question to the petitioner, Florencia
Cronico has no consideration separate from the selling price of said lot. It appears that the Compromise
Agreement upon which Cronico predicates her right to buy the lot in question has been rescinded and set
aside. In order that a unilateral promise may be binding upon the promisor, Article
1479, Civil Code of the Philippines, re quires the concurrence of the condition that the promise be “supported
by a consideration distinct from the price.

Accordingly, the promise cannot compel the promisor to comply with the promise, unless the former
establishes the existence of said distinct consideration. The promise has the burden of proving such
consideration.