Steven R.

Pavlow vs Cherry Mendenilla

Facts: Petitioner Pavlow, an American citizen and President of Quality

Long Term Care of Nevada, Inc., married Maria Sheila, a Filipino, in
civil rites in Quezon City. Thereafter, they cohabited as husband and
wife. Thereafter, barely 3 months of marriage, Maria Sheila filed a
Complaint-Affidavit against Pavlow for slight physical injuries.

After-which, she filed an Amended ComplaintAffidavit to include

maltreatment in relation to the Anti-VAWC Law as a ground. She
alleged that she and Pavlow had fights over a certain Diane, an
employee of the Manila Peninsula Hotel. As Maria Sheila was told by
Monette Tolentino (Tolentino) and Louise Cruz, two (2) of petitioner's
employees in Quality Long Term Care of Nevada, Inc., Diane liked
Pavlow and was sending him text messages and e-mails. Maria Sheila
added that she and Pavlow quarrelled over their loss of privacy and the
intrusion into their affairs of the same employees. She further claimed
that Pavlow hit her in the stomach and shouted at her for recounting
her marital experiences to her mother, respondent Mendenilla, with
Pavlow telling her that despite their recent marriage there was nothing
to celebrate. She also recalled that she and Pavlow again clashed over
the phone as regards the messages of one (1) of Steven's female
employees, during which, Pavlow slapped her and hit her upper back.
Maria Sheila also disclosed that Pavlow had been compelling her every
night to take two (2) small white tablets, which made her feel dizzy.
She contended that she could not disobey petitioner for fear of being
hit and maltreated. Subsequently, it was dismissed by the Makati
assistant prosecutor for failing to substantiate here allegation.

Following this, Cherry Mendenilla filed with the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court a Petition for Maria Sheila’s benefit, praying for the issuance
of a Temporary Protection Order or Permanent Protection Order under
the Anti-VAWC Law with the same ordeal and added that she had been
aware of her daughter's ordeal and that Maria Sheila was admitted to
St. Agnes General Hospital for injuries borne by Pavlow's alleged acts
of violence. Thus, a temporary restraining order was issued in favor of
Maria Sheila along with order of summon address to Pavlow.
Issue: Whether or not Cherry Mendenilla has the personality to file a
petition for the issuance of protection order after a criminal complaint
under Anti-VAWC law was dismissed by the prosecutor.

Ruling: The mother of a victim of acts of violence against women and

their children is expressly given personality to file a petition for the
issuance of a protection order by Section 9(b) of the Anti-VAWC Law.
However, the right of a mother and of other persons mentioned in
Section 9 to file such a petition is suspended when the victim has filed
a petition for herself. Nevertheless, in this case, respondent Mendenilla
filed her petition after her daughter's complaint-affidavit had already
been dismissed. More basic, the filing of Maria Sheila's complaint-
affidavit did not even commence proceedings on her own petition for
the issuance of a protection order. Preliminary investigation, or
proceedings at the level of the prosecutor, does not form part of trial.
It is not a judicial proceeding that leads to the issuance of a protection
order. Thus, the pendency and subsequent dismissal of Maria Sheila's
Complaint-Affidavit did not engender the risk of either litis pendentia
or res judicata, which would serve the basis of a finding of forum
shopping by her mother.
Sexual Harassment

Dr. Rico Jacutin vs People

Facts: Juliet Q. Yee, then a 22-year old fresh graduate of nursing,

averred that on 28 November 1995 her father accompanied her to the
office of petitioner at the City Health Office to seek employment.
Juliet’s father and petitioner were childhood friends. Juliet was
informed by the doctor that the City Health Office had just then filled
up the vacant positions for nurses but that he would still see if he
might be able to help her.

The following day, 29 November 1995, Juliet and her father returned
to the City Health Office, and they were informed by petitioner that a
medical group from Texas, U.S.A., was coming to town in December to
look into putting up a clinic in Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro, where she
might be considered. On 01 December 1995, around nine o’clock in
the morning, she and her father went back to the office of petitioner.
The latter informed her that there was a vacancy in a family planning
project for the city and that, if she were interested, he could interview
her for the job. Petitioner then started putting up to her a number of
questions. When asked at one point whether or not she already had a
boyfriend, she said “no.” Petitioner suggested that perhaps if her
father were not around, she could afford to be honest in her answers
to the doctor. The father, taking the cue, decided to leave. Petitioner
then inquired whether she was still a virgin, explaining to her his
theory on the various aspects of virginity. He “hypothetically” asked
whether she would tell her family or friends if a male friend happened
to intimately touch her. Petitioner later offered her the job where she
would be the subject of a “research” program. She was requested to
be back after lunch.

Before proceeding to petitioner’s office that afternoon, Juliet dropped

by at the nearby church to seek divine guidance as she felt so
“confused.” When she got to the office, petitioner made several
telephone calls to some hospitals to inquire whether there was any
available opening for her. Not finding any, petitioner again offered her
a job in the family planning research undertaking. She expressed
hesitation if a physical examination would include “hugging” her but
petitioner assured her that he was only kidding about it. Petitioner
then invited her to go bowling. Petitioner told her to meet him at Borja
Street so that people would not see them on board the same car
together. Soon, at the designated place, a white car driven by
petitioner stopped. She got in. Petitioner held her pulse and told her
not to be scared. After dropping by at his house to put on his bowling
attire, petitioner got back to the car.

While driving, petitioner casually asked her if she already took her
bath, and she said she was so in a hurry that she did not find time for
it. Petitioner then inquired whether she had varicose veins, and she
said “no.” Petitioner told her to raise her foot and lower her pants so
that he might confirm it. She felt assured that it was all part of the
research. Petitioner still pushed her pants down to her knees and held
her thigh. He put his hands inside her panty until he reached her pubic
hair. Surprised, she exclaimed “hala ka!” and instinctively pulled her
pants up. Petitioner then touched her abdomen with his right hand
saying words of endearment and letting the back of his palm touch her
forehead. He told her to raise her shirt to check whether she had
nodes or lumps. She hesitated for a while but, eventually, raised it up
to her navel. Petitioner then fondled her breast. Shocked at what
petitioner did, she lowered her shirt and embraced her bag to cover
herself, telling him angrily that she was through with the research. He
begged her not to tell anybody about what had just happened. Before
she alighted from the car, petitioner urged her to reconsider her
decision to quit. He then handed over to her P300.00 for her expenses.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of the crime of sexual

harassment as defined and punished under R.A. 7877.

Held:The questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case

No. 23799, finding Dr. Rico Jacutin y Salcedo GUILTY of the crime of
Sexual Harassment defined and punished under Republic Act No. 7877,
particularly Sections 3 and 7 thereof, and penalizing him with
imprisonment of six (6) months and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand
(P20,000.00) Pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, is AFFIRMED.

Rationale: Section 3 of Republic Act 7877 provides:

“SEC. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment
Defined. – Work, education or training-related sexual harassment is
committed by an employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of
the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other
person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over
another in a work or training or education environment, demands,
requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other,
regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for
submission is accepted by the object of said Act.

“(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment

is committed when:

“(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the

employment, re-employment or continued employment of said
individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation,
terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the
sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee
which in any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee.”

While the City Mayor had the exclusive prerogative in appointing city
personnel, it should stand to reason, nevertheless, that a
recommendation from petitioner in the appointment of personnel in
the municipal health office could carry good weight. Indeed, petitioner
himself would appear to have conveyed, by his words and actions, an
impression that he could facilitate Juliet’s employment. Indeed,
petitioner would not have been able to take undue liberalities on the
person of Juliet had it not been for his high position in the City Health
Office of Cagayan de Oro City. The findings of the Sandiganbayan were
bolstered by the testimony of Vivian Yu, petitioner’s secretary between
1979 to 1994, of Iryn Lago Salcedo, Public Health Nurse II, and of
Farah Dongallo y Alkuino, a city health nurse, all of whom were said to
have likewise been victims of perverse behavior by petitioner.
MA. LOURDES T. DOMINGO, petitioner, vs. ROGELIO I. RAYALA,
respondent. G.R. No. 155831, February 18, 2008

FACTS: Rogelio Rayala was an appointee by the President of the

Philippines as the Chairman of the NLRC. Meanwhile, Ma. Lourdes T.
Domingo was a Stenographic Reporter III at the same office. Domingo
filed a Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala before
Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE). She supplied an affidavit containing her narration
of events to support her claim. She filed the Complaint for sexual
harassment on the basis of Administrative Order No. 250, the Rules
and Regulations Implementing RA 7877 in the Department of Labor
and Employment. DOLE Secretary referred the Complaint to the Office
of the President (OP). The OP, through then Executive Secretary
Ronaldo Zamora, ordered Secretary Laguesma to investigate the
allegations. The Office of the President, having found that the
allegations were true, found Rayala guilty and DISMISSED him from
his office. Upon raising the appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the
penalty imposed by the OP. Instead of dismissal, it imposed the
penalty of suspension for 1 year, as it is the proper penalty stated in
Administrative Order 250. Domingo assailed the CA’s resolution. She
argues that the power to remove Rayala, who is a presidential
appointee, is lodged with the President.

ISSUE: Can the President use his power to remove appointees in the
case at bar?

RULING: No. The President cannot instantly remove Rayala from

office. Under the Labor Code, the Chairman of the NLRC “shall hold
office during good behavior until he or she reaches the age of sixty-
five, unless sooner removed for cause as provided by law or becomes
incapacitated to discharge the duties of the office.” It is evident that
the power of the President to remove someone from office is qualified
by the phrase "for cause as provided by law." Thus, when the OP found
that Rayala was guilty of the crime charged, the Chief Executive did
not have unrestricted discretion to impose a penalty other than the
penalty provided by law for such offense. The imposable penalty for
the first offense of either the administrative offense of sexual
harassment or for

disgraceful and immoral conduct is suspension of six (6) months and

one (1) day to one (1) year. Thus, it was error for the Office of the
President to impose upon Rayala the penalty of dismissal from the
service, a penalty which can only be imposed upon commission of a
second offense.
AQUINO vs. ACOSTA

A.M. No. CTA-01-1. April 2, 2002

FACTS: Complainant alleged several instances when respondent judge

sexually harassed her.

On the first incident, she reported for work after her vacation in the
U.S., bringing gifts for the three judges of the CTA, including
respondent. In the afternoon of the same day, he entered her room
and greeted her by shaking her hand. Suddenly, he pulled her towards
him and kissed her on her cheek.

On the second incident, while respondent was on official leave, he

called complainant by phone, saying he will get something in her
office. Shortly thereafter, he entered her room, shook her hand and
greeted her, "Merry Christmas." Thereupon, he embraced her and
kissed her. She was able to free herself by slightly pushing him away.

On the third incident, respondent phoned complainant, asking if she

could see him in his chambers in order to discuss some matters. When
complainant arrived there, respondent tried to kiss her but she was
able to evade his sexual attempt.

On the fourth incident, after the Senate approved the proposed bill
expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA, while complainant and her
companions were congratulating and kissing each other, respondent
suddenly placed his arms around her shoulders and kissed her.

On the fifth incident, respondent called complainant, requesting her to

go to his office. She then asked Ruby Lanuza, a clerk in the Records
Section, to accompany her. Fortunately, when they reached his
chambers, respondent had left.

The last incident happened the next day. Respondent called

complainant and asked her to see him in his office to discuss the
Senate bill on the CTA. She again requested Ruby to accompany her.
The latter agreed but suggested that they should act as if they met by
accident in respondent’s office. Ruby then approached the secretary’s
table which was separated from respondent’s office by a transparent
glass. For her part, complainant sat in front of respondent's table and
asked him what he wanted to know about the Senate bill. Respondent
seemed to be at a loss for words and kept glancing at Ruby who was
searching for something at the secretary's desk. Forthwith, respondent
approached Ruby, asked her what she was looking for and stepped out
of the office. When he returned, Ruby said she found what she was
looking for and left. Respondent then approached complainant saying,
me gusto akong gawin sa iyo kahapon pa. Thereupon, he tried to grab
her. Complainant instinctively raised her hands to protect herself but
respondent held her arms tightly, pulled her towards him and kissed
her. She pushed him away, and then slumped on a chair trembling.
Meantime, respondent sat on his chair and covered his face with his
hands. Thereafter, complainant left crying and locked herself inside a
comfort room. After that incident, respondent went to her office and
tossed a note stating, sorry, it won’t happen again.

In the defense of the respondent, judge Acosta denied complainants

allegation that he sexually harassed her six times. He claimed that he
has always treated her with respect, being the head of the CTA Legal
Staff. In fact, there is no strain in their professional relationship.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Acosta is guilty of sexually harassment.

HELD:

No, Judge Acosta is not guilty of sexual harassment. He is exonerated

of the charges against him and is advised to be more circumspect in
his deportment. The complainant failed to

show by convincing evidence that the acts of Judge Acosta in greeting

her with a kiss on the cheek, in a 'beso-beso' fashion, were carried out
with lustful and lascivious desires or were motivated by malice or ill-
motive.

“A mere casual buss on the cheek is not a sexual conduct or favor and
does not fall within the purview of sexual harassment under R.A. No.
7877. Section 3 (a) thereof provides, to wit: Sec. 3. Work, Education
or Training - related Sexual Harassment Defined. - Work, education or
training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer,
employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher,
instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having
authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or
training or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise
requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the
demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the
object of said Act.

In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is

committed when: 1)The sexual favor is made as a condition in the
hiring or in the employment, re-employment or continued employment
of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable
compensation, terms, conditions, promotions or privileges; or the
refusal to grant sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or
classifying the employee which in anyway would discriminate, deprive
or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
said employees; 2) The above acts would impair the employee's right
or privileges under existing labor laws; or 3) The above acts would
result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the
employee.'

"Clearly, under the foregoing provisions, the elements of sexual

harassment are as follows:1) The employer, employee, manager,
supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach,
trainor, or any other person has authority, influence or moral
ascendancy over another;2) The authority, influence or moral
ascendancy exists in a working environment; 3) The employer,
employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher,
instructor, professor, coach, or any other person having authority,
influence or moral ascendancy makes a demand, request or
requirement of a sexual favor.”

Indeed, from the records on hand, there is no showing that respondent

judge demanded, requested or required any sexual favor from
complainant in exchange for favorable compensation, terms,
conditions, promotion or privileges specified under Section 3 of R.A.
7877. Nor did he, by his actuations, violate the Canons of Judicial
Ethics or the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Child Abuse

FELINA ROSALDES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. No.

173988 October 8, 2014 First Division)
PONENTE: BERSAMIN, J.:

MAIN FACTS:
On February 13, 1996, seven yearold Michael Ryan Gonzales, then a
Grade 1 pupil at Pughanan Elementary School located in the
Municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo, was hurriedly entering his classroom
when he accidentally bumped the knee of his teacher, petitioner Felina
Rosaldes, who was then asleep on a bamboo sofa. Roused from sleep,
petitioner asked Michael Ryan to apologize to her. When Michael did
not obey but instead proceeded to his seat, petitioner went to Michael
and pinched him on his thigh. Then, she held him up by his armpits
and pushed him to the floor. As he fell, Michael Ryan’s body hit a desk.
As a result, he lost consciousness. Petitioner proceeded topick Michael
Ryan up by his ears and repeatedly slammed him down on the floor.
Michael Ryan cried.

After the incident, petitioner proceeded to teach her class. During

lunch break, Michael Ryan, accompanied by two of his classmates,
Louella Loredo and Jonalyn Gonzales, went home crying and told his
mother about the incident. His mother and his Aunt Evangeline
Gonzales reported the incident to their Barangay Captain, Gonzalo
Larroza who advised them to have Michael Ryan examined by a doctor.
Michael Ryan’s aunt and Barangay Councilman Ernesto Ligante brought
him to the Dr. Ricardo Y. Ladrido Hospital where he was examined by
Dr. Teresita Castigador. They, likewise, reported the incident to the
Police Station.
The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of R.A. 7610.

ISSUE: Is the teacher liable?

COURT’S RULING:
Although the petitioner, as a school teacher, could duly discipline
Michael Ryan as her pupil, her infliction of the physical injuries on him
was unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy even fainted from the
violence suffered at her hands.13 She could not justifiably claim that
she acted only for the sake of disciplining him. Her physical
maltreatment of him was precisely prohibited by no less than the
Family Code, which has expressly banned the infliction of corporal
punishmentby a school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in
child care exercising special parental authority (i.e., in loco parentis),
viz:

Article 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall

have the same authority over the person of the child as the parents.
In no case shall the school administrator, teacher or individual engaged
in child care exercising special parental authority inflict corporal
punishment upon the child.

In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the

maltreatment may consist of an act by deeds or by words that
debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a
child as a human being. The act need not be habitual. The CA
concluded that the petitioner “went overboard in disciplining Michael
Ryan, a helpless and weak 7-year old boy, when she pinched hard
Michael Ryan on the left thigh and when she held him in the armpits
and threw him on the floor[; and as] the boy fell down, his body hit
the desk causing him to lose consciousness [but instead] of feeling a
sense of remorse, the accused-appellant further held the boy up by his
ears and pushed him down on the floor.” On her part, the trial judge
said that the physical pain experienced by the victim had been
aggravated by an emotional trauma that caused him to stop going to
school altogether out of fear of the petitioner, compelling his parents to
transfer him to another school where he had to adjust again. Such
established circumstances proved beyond reasonable doubt that the
petitioner was guilty of child abuse by deeds that degraded and
demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of Michael Ryan as a human
being.
People vs Francisco Ejercito

Facts:
AAA, then a fifteen (15) year old, was cleaning the chicken cage at the
back of their house when suddenly, she saw Ejercito pointing a gun at
her and dragged her to a nearby barn. He removed her shorts and
underwear, while he undressed and placed himself on top of her. He
covered her mouth with his right hand and used his left hand to point
the gun at her, as he inserted his penis into her vagina and made back
and forth movements. When he finished the sexual act, Ejercito
casually walked away and warned AAA not to tell anybody or else, her
parents will get killed.

Haunted by her harrowing experience, AAA was unable to focus on her

studies. Wanting to start her life anew, AAA moved to the city to
continue her schooling there. However, Ejercito was able to track AAA
down, and made the latter his sex slave. From 2002 to 2005, Ejercito
persistently contacted AAA, threatened and compelled her to meet
him, and thereafter, forced her to take shabu and then sexually abused
her. Eventually, AAA got hooked on drugs, portrayed herself as
Ejercito’s paramour, and decided to live together. When Ejercito’s wife
discovered her husband’s relationship with AAA, the former filed a
complaint against AAA before the barangay. By this time, even AAA’s
mother, BBB, found out the illicit relationship and exerted efforts to
separate them from each other. Finally, after undergoing rehabilitation,
AAA disclosed to her parents that she was raped by Ejercito back in
2001 and reported the same to the authorities on September 3, 2005.
In his defense, Ejercito pleaded not guilty to the charge against him,
and maintained that he had an illicit relationship with AAA. He averred
that he and AAA frequently had consensual sex and the latter even
abandoned her family in order to live with him. Thus, he was shocked
and dismayed when he was charged with the crime of Rape which
purportedly happened when they were lovers.

Issue:
Whether or not Ejercito is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of rape.
Rulings:
YES, Ejercito is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
For a charge of Rape by sexual intercourse under Article 266-A (1) of
the RPC, as amended by RA 8353, to prosper, the prosecution must
prove that: (a) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and
(b) he accomplished this act under the circumstances mentioned in the
provision, e.g., through force, threat or intimidation. The gravamen of
Rape is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will.

In this case, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable

doubt the presence of all the elements of Rape by sexual intercourse
under Article 266-A (1) of the RPC, as amended by RA 8353. Through
AAA’s positive testimony, it was indeed established that in the evening
of October 10, 2001, AAA, then just a fifteen (15)-year old minor, was
cleaning chicken cages at the back of her house when suddenly,
Ejercito threatened her, removed her lower garments, covered her
mouth, and proceeded to have carnal knowledge of her without her
consent.

The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, found AAA’s testimony to be credible,

noting further that Ejercito failed to establish any ill motive on her part
which could have compelled her to falsely accuse him of the aforesaid
act. In this relation, case law states that the trial court is in the best
position to assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses
presented by both parties, and hence, due deference should be
accorded to the same. As there is no indication that the RTC, as
affirmed by the CA, overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the
surrounding facts and circumstances of the case, the Court therefore
finds no reason to deviate from its factual findings.

Ejercito is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.

People v. Noel Caoili

G.R. No. 196342, 8 August 2017, J. Tijam

FACTS: Accused committed the following acts against his daughter,

who at the time of the incident, was 14 years 1 month and 10 days
old: (a) kissed her lips; (b) touched and mashed her breast; (c)
inserted the fourth finger of his left hand into her vagina, and made a
push and pull movement into her vagina with such finger for 30
minutes. Based on these acts, an Information for rape by sexual
intercourse was filed against accused. After trial, the court convicted
accused of rape by sexual intercourse.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the prosecution proved rape
by sexual assault, and not rape by sexual intercourse.

HELD: Accused may not be convicted for rape by sexual assault in an

Information which charges rape by sexual intercourse.

An accused charged in the Information with rape by sexual intercourse

cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual assault, even though the
latter crime was proven during trial. This is due to the substantial
distinctions between these two modes of rape, as follows:

Rape by sexual intercourse Rape by sexual assault

The offender is always a man. The offender may be a man or a woman.

The offended party is always a The offended party may be a man or a

woman. woman.

Rape is committed by inserting the penis

Rape is committed through penile
penetration of the vagina.
Penalty is reclusion perpetua.
·into another person's mouth or anal
orifice, or any instrument or object into
the genital or anal orifice of another
person.
The penalty is prision mayor.
Accused can be convicted of the crime of lascivious conduct under
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610

While accused cannot be convicted of rape by sexual assault based on

the Information which charges him of rape by sexual intercourse, he
may be convicted for the crime of lascivious conduct under Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 which is subsumed in the crime of rape by
sexual intercourse. The elements of which are:

1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious

conduct;

2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or

subject to other sexual abuse; and

3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

The following are the guidelines in designating or charging the proper

offense in case lascivious conduct is committed under Section S(b) of
R.A. No. 7610, and in determining the imposable penalty:

1. The age of the victim is into consideration in designating or charging

the offense, and in determining the imposable penalty.

2. If the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the nomenclature of

the crime should be “Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.”
Pursuant to the second proviso in Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, the
imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period.

3. If the victim is exactly twelve (12) years of age, or more than

twelve (12) but below eighteen (18) years of age, or is eighteen (18)
years old or older but is unable to fully take care of herself/himself or
protect herself/himself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or
discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition,
the crime should be designated as "Lascivious Conduct under Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610," and the imposable penalty is reclusion
temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.

J. Peralta, concurring opinion

Applicable laws and imposable penalties for acts of lasciviousness
committed against a child under Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to
R.A. No. 7610:

a. Under 12 years old - Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610, in

relation to Article 336 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 8353, applies
and the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period,
instead of prision correccional.

b. 12 years old and below 18, or 18 or older under special

circumstances under Section 3(a) of R.A. 7610 - Section 5(b), Article
III of R.A. 7610 in relation to Article 336 of the RPC, as amended,
applies and the penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period to
reclusion perpetua.

This is because the proviso under Section 5(b) apply only if the victim
is under 12 years old, but silent as to those 12 years old and below
18; hence, the main clause thereof still applies in the absence of
showing that the legislature intended a wider scope to include those
belonging to the latter age bracket.
DEFINE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN.

“It refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person

against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with
whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with
whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate
or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is
likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or
economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault,
coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. (Section 3 of
R.A. 9262)

Section 3 states that violence against women and children includes,

but is not limited to, the following acts: a) Physical Violence; b)
Sexual violence; c) Psychological violence; d) Economic abuse.

WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF VIOLENCE

AGAINST WOMEN?

The elements of the crime of violence against women through

harassment are:

1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the

offended woman;

2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or

series of acts of harassment against the woman; and

3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or

psychological distress to her. (Rustan Ang Y Pascua vs. Sagud,
G.R. No. 182835, April 20, 2010)

A TPO cannot be issued in favor of a man against his wife under R.A.
No. 9292, known as the Anti- Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004. In one case, the judge was found guilty of gross
ignorance of the law for issuing a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) in
favor of a male petitioner.
WHAT IS THE CONCEPT OF A BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME?

It refers to a scientifically defined pattern of psychological and

behavioral symptoms found in women living in battering relationships
as a result of cumulative abuse.

IS BATTERED WOMEN SYNDROME A PROPER DEFENSE? Section

26 of R.A. 9262 is explicit:

“Victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from

battered woman syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability
notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying
circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.

PEOPLE VS. GENOSA


G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004

RULING:

More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by

the so-called “cycle of violence,” which has three phases: (1) the
tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the
tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.

During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it could

be verbal or slight physical abuse or another form of hostile behavior.
The woman usually tries to pacify the batterer through a show of kind,
nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of his way. What actually
happens is that she allows herself to be abused in ways that, to her,
are comparatively minor. All she wants is to prevent the escalation of
the violence exhibited by the batterer.

The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality,

destructiveness and, sometimes, death. The battered woman deems
this incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable. During this phase,
she has no control; only the batterer may put an end to the violence.
Its nature can be as unpredictable as the

!
time of its explosion, and so are his reasons for ending it. The battered
woman usually realizes that she cannot reason with him, and that
resistance would only exacerbate her condition.

The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute
battering incident ends. During this tranquil period, the couple
experience profound relief. On the one hand, the batterer may show a
tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He knows that he
has been viciously cruel and tries to make up for it, begging for her
forgiveness and promising never to beat her again. On the other hand,
the battered woman also tries to convince herself that the battery will
never happen again; that her partner will change for the better; and
that this “good, gentle and caring man” is the real person whom she
loves.

A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the
emotional stability of the batterer. Sensing his isolation and despair,
she feels responsible for his well-being.

ABUSES may BE COMMITTED BY ANOTHER THRU CONSPIRACY.

(SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN vs. SPOUSES TAN, G.R. No. 168852:
September 30, 2008).

THE CRIME OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND CHILDREN is

considered as a public offense which may be prosecuted upon the filing
of a complaint by any citizen having personal knowledge of the
circumstances involving the commission of the crime.

Under express provision of Section 27 thereof, being under the

influence of alcohol, any illicit drug, or any other mind-altering
substance shall not be a defense under this Act.

II. PROTECTION ORDERS

A protection order is an order issued under this Act for the purpose of
preventing further acts of violence against a woman or her child
specified in Section 5 of this Act and granting other necessary relief.
The protection orders that may be issued are the
barangay protection order (BPO),

temporary protection order (TPO)

and permanent protection order (PPO).