CIVIL PROCEDURE

1. General Concepts
a. Substantive vs Procedural Law
b. Classification of Courts
c. Rule on Liberal Construction
d. Article VIII, Section 5 of the Philippine Constitution (and its limitations)
e. Jurisdiction (Concept, Kinds, How Acquired)
f. Important principles/doctrines (such as Judicial Heirarchy; Judicial
Stability/Non-Interference; Adherence of Jurisdiction; Primary Jurisdiction;
Ancillary Jurisdiction; Residual Jurisdiction)

2. General Law on Jurisdiction (Constitution, Judiciary Act of 1948, BP 129 and its
amendments).
a. Supreme Court
b. Court of Appeals
c. Regional Trial Court (note: focus on what constitutes the different kinds of
actions)
d. MTC/MTCC
e. Family Courts
f. Shari’a Courts

CASES:

Alfonso Singson Cortal et al vs Larrazabal Enterprises, G.R. No. 199107

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation, G.R. No. 159593
Salvador Estipona, Jr. v. Hon. Frank E. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679
Senator Leila de Lima vs Hon. Juanita Guerrero, et al, G.R. No. 229781
Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29
Supapo v. Sps. De Jesus, G.R. No. 198356

RULE 1

Classifications of Actions
Ordinary v Special Civil
In personam, In Rem, Quasi In Rem
Real v Personal v Mixed
Actions Incapable of Pecuniary Estimation
Commencement of Action

Biaco v Philippine Countryside Rural Bank, G.R. No. 161417

Brgy. San Roque v Pastor, G.R. No. 138896
Barrido v Nonato, G.R. No. 176492
Manchester Development v CA, 149 SCRA 562
Alindao vs Joson , G.R. No. 14132
RULE 2

Cause of Action
Right of Action v Cause of Action
Single Cause of Action v Splitting a Cause of Action
Doctrine of Anticipatory Breach
Joinder vs Misjoinder of Causes of Action
Totality Rule (BP 129 v ROC)

Chua v Metrobank, G.R. No. 182311

Montaner v Sharia District Court, G.R. No. 174975
Umale vs Canoga Park Development Corporation, G.R. No. 167246
Quioge et al vs Bautista et al, G.R. No. L-13159
Blossom & Co. Inc vs Manila Gas, G.R. No. L-32958
Arreza vs Diaz, 364 SCRA 88
Irene Sante vs Edilberto Claravall, G.R. No. 173915
Flores v. Mallare-Phillips, 144 SCRA 377

RULE 3

Legal Capacity v Legal Personality, (to Sue)

Parties in Interest (Indispensable, Necessary, Representative, Pro Forma, Quasi)
Permissive Joinder of Parties
Compulsory Joinder of Ind Parties
Class Suit

Substitution of Parties

Rayo vs Metrobank, G.R. No. 165142

Oposa v Factoran, G.R. No. 101083
Valdez-Tallorin vs Heirs of Juanito Tarona, G.R. No. 177429
Agro Conglomerates, Inc. vs CA, G.R. No. 117660
Juana Complex 1 Homeowners Association, Inc. vs Fil-Estate Land,, Inc., G.R. No.
152272

The Facts:

On January 20, 1999, Juana Complex I Homeowners Association,

Inc. (JCHA), together with individual residents of Juana Complex I and other
neighboring subdivisions (collectively referred as JCHA, et al.), instituted a
COMPLAINT 5 FOR DAMAGES, in its own behalf and as a class SUIT
representing the regular commuters and motorists of Juana Complex I and
neighboring subdivisions who were DEPRIVED OF THE USE OF LA PAZ
ROAd, (Fil-Estate), (FEEC), La Paz Housing & Development Corporation (La Paz),
and Warbird Security Agency and their respective officers (collectively referred
as FIL-ESTATE, ET AL.). DEcTCa

COMPLAINT ALLEGED
- JCHA, et al., had been using La Paz Road for more than ten (10) years;
that in August 1998, Fil-estate excavated, broke and deliberately
ruined La Paz Road that led to SLEX so JCHA, et al.,
- would not be able to pass through the said road;
- act of Fil-estate in excavating La Paz Road caused damage, prejudice,
inconvenience, annoyance, and loss of precious hours to them, to the
commuters and motorists because traffic was re-routed to narrow
streets that caused terrible traffic congestion and hazard; and that its
permanent closure would not only prejudice their right to free and
unhampered use of the property but would also cause great damage
and irreparable injury.
Accordingly, JCHA, et al., also prayed for the immediate issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or a writ of preliminary
injunction (WPI) to enjoin Fil-Estate, et al., from stopping and intimidating
them in their use of La Paz Road.
TRO was issued -(20) days
Subsequently, the RTC conducted several hearings to determine the
propriety of the issuance of a WPI.
Fil-Estate, et al., filed a motion to dismiss 
- the complaint failed to state a cause of action and that it was
- improperly filed as a class suit.
RTC : Order 10 granting the WPI and required JCHA, et al., to post a bond.
CA - petition for certiorari  and prohibition
- contended that the complaint failed to state a cause of action ;and
 - that it was improperly filed as a class suit. With regard to the issuance
of the WPI, the defendants averred that
- JCHA, et al., failed to show that they had a clear and unmistakable right
to the use of La Paz Road;
CA’s DECISION
- writ of preliminary injunction is hereby ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE
- complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action when JCHA, et al., alleged
in their complaint that they had been using La Paz Road for more than ten (10) years
and that their right was violated when Fil-Estate closed and excavated the road .
- properly filed as a class suit as it was shown that the case was of
common interest and that the individuals sought to be represented
were so numerous that it was impractical to include all of them as
parties. Th

The Court's Ruling

In the present case, the Court finds the allegations in the complaint
sufficient to establish a cause of action. First, JCHA, et al.'s averments in the complaint show a
demandable right over La Paz Road. These are: (1) their right to use the road on the basis of their allegation
that they had been using the road for more than 10 years; and (2) an easement of a right of way has been
constituted over the said roads. There is no other road as wide as La Paz Road existing in the vicinity and it is
the shortest, convenient and safe route towards SLEX Halang that the commuters and motorists may
use. Second, there is an alleged violation of such right committed by Fil-Estate, et al., when they excavated the
road and prevented the commuters and motorists from using the same. Third, JCHA, et al., consequently
suffered injury and that a valid judgment could have been rendered in accordance with the relief sought
therein.

IS A CLASS SUIT
Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a class suit, as follows:
Sec. 12. Class suit. — When the subject matter of the
controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons
so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number
of them which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous and
representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may
sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have
the right to intervene to protect his individual interest.

The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are: 1) the
subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many
persons; 2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to
bring them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing the class suit are
sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully protect the
interests of all concerned. 24
In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and
motorists who use La Paz Road. As succinctly stated by the CA:
 The subject matter of the instant case, i.e., the closure and
excavation of the La Paz Road, is initially shown to be of common or
general interest to many persons. The records reveal that
numerous individuals have filed manifestations with the lower
court, conveying their intention to join private respondents in the
suit and claiming that they are similarly situated with private
respondents for they were also prejudiced by the acts of petitioners
in closing and excavating the La Paz Road. Moreover, the individuals
sought to be represented by private respondents in the suit are
so numerous that it is impracticable to join them all as parties
and be named individually as plaintiffs in the complaint. These
individuals claim to be residents of various barangays  in Biñan,
Laguna and other barangays in San Pedro, Laguna.

WPI ISSUE
In the case at bench, JCHA, et al., failed to establish a  prima facie  proof
of violation of their right to justify the issuance of a WPI. Their right to the use
of La Paz Road is disputable since they have no clear legal right therein
Consequently, the case should be further heard by the RTC so that the
parties can fully prove their respective positions on the issues.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. Accordingly, the July 31, 2001
Decision and February 21, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 60543 are AFFIRMED.  AcDaEH

Newsweek, Inc. v IAC, G.R. No. L-63559

In 1981, private respondents, incorporated associations of sugarcane planters in Negros Occidental claiming to have
8,500 members and several individual sugar planters, filed a civil case in their own behalf and/or as a class suit in
behalf of all sugarcane planters in the province of Negros Occidental, against petitioner Newsweek Inc. and two of
petitioners' non-resident correspondents/reporters Fred Bruning and Barry Came. The complaint alleged that
petitioner and the other defendants committed libel against them by the publication of the article "An Island of
Fear" in the February 23, 1981 issue of petitioner's weekly news magazine Newsweek.
The article supposedly portrayed the island province of Negros Occidental as a place dominated by big landowners
or sugarcane planters who not only exploited the impoverished and underpaid sugarcane workers/laborers, but also
brutalized and killed them with impunity.
Newsweek filed MR.- DENIED
Petiotion of certiorari – Denied
(issued with such a grave abuse of discretion as amounting to lack of jurisdiction)
ISSUE: Whether a civil case for defamation can be filed under a class suit. (NO)
RULING:
LIBEL SUIT- essential that the victim be identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named." In an earlier
case, this Court declared that "x x x defamatory matter which does not reveal the identity of the person upon whom
the imputation is cast, affords no ground of action unless it be shown that the readers of the libel could have
identified the personality of the individual defamed."

The SC however held that the case at bar is not a class suit. It is not a case where one or more may sue for the
benefit of all (Mathay vs. Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, 58 SCRA 559) or where the representation of
class interest affected by the judgment or decree is indispensable to make each member of the class an actual party
(Borlaza vs. Polistico, 47 Phil. 348). We have here a case where each of the plaintiffs has a separate and distinct
reputation in the community. They do not have a common or general interest in the subject matter of the
controversy.
Mathay vs Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, G.R. No. L-23136

Samuel Mathay, et.al. were former stockholders of Consolidated Mines Inc. (CMI).
Petitioners filed a case for a class suit against CMI containing six causes of action.
Petitioners alleged that in violation of the Board resolution, the defendants unlawfully
acquire stockholdings in the defendant Bank in excess of what they were lawfully
entitled, hence DEPRIVING the petitioners of their right to subscribe at par value, in
proportion to their equities established under their respective "Pre-Incorporation
Agreements to Subscribe" to the capital stock and that the Articles of Incorporation were
fraudulently amended by the defendants.
Trial Court – DISMISSED.
NOT A CLASS SUIT
- absence of a showing in the complaint that the plaintiffs-appellants were
sufficiently numerous and representative, and that the
- complaint failed to state a cause of action.
The CA affirmed the ruling, hence, the appeal
ISSUE: Whether or not the instant action is a class suit.
HELD:
The action at bar is not a class suit.
A class suit does not require a commonality of interest in the questions involved in the
suit.
What is required by the Rules is a common or general interest in the subject matter of the
litigation. The “subject matter” of the action is meant the physical, the things real or
personal, the money lands, chattels, and the like, in relation to the suit which is
prosecuted and not the delict or wrong committed by the defendant.
The INTEREST that appellants, plaintiffs and intervenors, and the CMI
stockholders had in the subject matter of this suit — the portion of stocks
offering of the Bank left unsubscribed by CMI stockholders who failed to
exercise their right to subscribe on or before January 15, 1963 — was
several, not common or general in the sense required by the statute.
Each one of the appellants and the CMI stockholders had determinable
interest; each one had a right, if any, only to his respective portion of the
stocks. No one of them had any right to, or any interest in, the stock to which
another was entitled.

Insurance Company of North America vs United States Lines Co., G.R. No. L-21839

RULE 4

Venue v Jurisdiction
Venue of Actions
Exception to Rule on Venue

Sweet Lines vs Teves, G.R. No. L-37750

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-37750. May 19, 1978.]

SWEET LINE, INC.,  petitioner, vs. HON. BERNARDO TEVES,

Presiding Judge, CFI of Misamis Oriental, Branch VII,
LEOVIGILDO TANDOG, JR., and ROGELIO TIRO,  respondents.

Filiberto Leonardo, Abelardo C. Almario & Samuel B. Abadiano for

petitioner.
Leovigildo Vallar for private respondents.
 SYNOPSIS

Two passengers of an inter-island vessel sued petitioner company in

the Court o First Instance of Misamis Oriental for breach of contract of
carriage. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
improper venue. The motion was premised on the condition printed att
he back of the tickets that actions arising from "the provisions of this
ticket shall be filed in the competent courts in the City oif Cebu.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss as well as the motion
for reconsideration. The Supreme Court sustained the trial court and
declared the condition void and unenforceable as contrary to public policy
which is to make the courts accessible to all who may have need of their
services.

SYLLABUS

1. CONTRACT; CONTRACTS OF ADHESION, VALIDITY OF. — The

validity or enforceability of contracts of adhesion are to be determined by
the peculiar circumstances obtaining in each case and the nature and
conditions or terms sought to be enforced. For, while generally,
stipulations in a contract come about after deliberate drafting by the
parties thereto, in a contract of adhesion, however, all its provisions have
been drafted only by one party, usually a corporation, and the only
participation of the other party is the signing of his signature or his
adhesion thereto.
2. CIVIL ACTIONS; VENUE; SUBJECT TO PARTIES' AGREEMENT. — A
written agreement of the parties as to venue, as authorized by Section 3,
Rule 4, is not only binding between the parties but also enforceable by the
courts. After an action has been filed, change or transfer of venue by
agreement of the parties is controllable in the discretion of the court.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY. — The Court
may declare the agreement as to venue to be in effect contrary to public
policy, — despite that in general, changes and transfers of venue by
written agreement of the parties are allowable — whenever it is shown
that a stipulation as to venue works injustice by practically denying to the
party concerned designated by the rules.

DECISION

SANTOS, J  :
p
 This is an original action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction
filed October 3, 1973 to restrain respondent Judge from proceeding
further with Civil Case No. 4091, entitled "Leovigildo D. Tandog, Jr. and
Rogelio Tiro v. Sweet Lines, Inc." after he denied petitioner's Motion to
Dismiss the complaint, and the Motion for Reconsideration of said order. 1
Private respondents Atty. Leovigildo Tandog and Rogelio Tiro, a
contractor by professions, bought tickets Nos. 0011736 and 011737 for
Voyage 90 on December 31, 1971 at the branch office of petitioner, a
shipping company transporting inter-island passengers and cargoes, at
Cagayan de Oro City. Respondents were to board petitioner's vessel, M/S
"Sweet Hope" bound for Tagbilaran City via the port of Cebu. Upon
learning that the vessel was not proceeding to Bohol, since many
passengers were bound for Surigao, private respondents per advice, went
to the branch office for proper relocation to M/S "Sweet Town". Because
the said vessel was already filed to capacity, they were forced to agree
"to hide at the cargo section to avoid inspection of the officers of the
Philippine Coastguard." Private respondents alleged that they were,
during the trip," "exposed to the scorching heat of the sun and the dust
coming from the ship's cargo of corn grits," and that the tickets they
bought at Cagayan de Oro City for Tagbilaran were not honored and
they were constrained to pay for other tickets.
private respondents sued petitioner for DAMAGES AND FOR BREACH OF
CONTRACT of carriage before Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental. 2
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of IMPROPER
VENUE.
BACK OF THE TICKETS:
"14. It is hereby agreed and understood that any and all
actions arising out of the conditions and provisions of this
ticket, irrespective of where it is issued, shall be filed in the
competent courts in the City of Cebu." 3
DENIED: in favor of respondents
 Hence, this INSTANT PETITION FOR PROHIBITION WITH PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION, alleging that the respondent judge had departed from the
"accepted and usual course of judicial proceeding" and "had acted without
or in excess or in error of his jurisdiction or in gross abuse of discretion." 
CONTENTION OF THE PARTIES

Petitioner : Condition No. 14 is valid and enforceable, since private

respondents acceded to it when they purchased passage tickets at its
Cagayan de Oro branch office and took its vessel M/S "Sweet Town" for
passage to Tagbilaran, Bohol; that the condition fixing the venue of
actions in the City of Cebu is proper since venue may be validly waived,
citing cases; 10 that is an effective waiver of venue, valid and binding as
 such, since it is printed in bold and capital letters and not in fine print and
merely assigns the place where the action arising from the contract is
instituted, likewise citing cases; 11 and that condition No. 14 is unequivocal
and mandatory, the words and phrases "any and all", "irrespective of
where it is issued," and "shall" leave no doubt that the intention of
Condition No. 14 is to fix the venue in the City of Cebu, to the exclusion of
all other places.
Private respondents : Condition No. 14 is not valid;
- they had no choice but to pay for the tickets and to avail of petitioner's
shipping facilities out of necessity;
- such arrangement requires the "written agreement of the parties",
not to be imposed unilaterally

ISSUE:
WON Is Condition No. 14 printed at the back of the petitioner's
passage tickets purchased by private respondents, which limits the venue
of actions arising from the contract of carriage to the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, valid and enforceable? Otherwise stated, may a
common carrier engaged in inter-island shipping stipulate thru a
condition printed at the back of passage tickets to its vessels that any and
all actions arising out of the contract of carriage should be filed only in a
particular province or city, in this case the City of Cebu, to the exclusion of
all others?
RULING:
ADHESION CONTRACT

We find and hold that Condition No. 14 printed at the back of the
passage tickets should be held as void and unenforceable for the
following reasons
— first, under circumstances obtaining in the inter-island shipping
industry, it is not just and fair to bind passengers to the terms of the
conditions printed at the back of the passage tickets, on which Condition
No. 14 is printed in fine letters, and
second, Condition No. 14 subverts the public policy on transfer of
venue of proceedings of this nature, since the same will prejudice rights
and interests of innumerable passengers in different parts of the country
who, under Condition No. 14, will have to file suits against petitioner only
in the City of Cebu.
1. It is a MATTER OF PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, of which We can take
judicial notice, that there is a dearth of and acute shortage in inter-island
vessels plying between the country's several islands, and the facilities they
offer leave much to be desired. Thus, even under ordinary circumstances,
the piers are congested with passengers and their cargo waiting to be
transported, The conditions are even worse at peak and/or the rainy
seasons, when passengers literally scramble to secure whatever
accommodations may be availed of, even through circuitous routes,
and/or at the risk of their safety — their immediate concern, for the
moment, being to be able to board vessels with the hope of reaching their
destinations. The schedules are — as often as not if not more so —
delayed or altered. This was precisely the experience of private
respondents when they were relocated to M/S "Sweet Town" from M/S
"Sweet Hope" and then allegedly "exposed to the scorching heat of the
sun and the dust coming from the ship's cargo of corn grits," because
even the latter vessel was filled to capacity.
Again, it should be noted that Condition No. 14 was prepared solely
at the instance of the petitioner; respondents had no say in its
preparation. Neither did the latter have the opportunity to take the same
into account prior to the purchase of their tickets. For, unlike the small
print provisions of insurance contracts — the common example of
contracts of adherence — which are entered into by the insured in
FULL AWARENESS of said conditions, since the insured is afforded the
opportunity to examine and consider the same, passengers of inter-island
vessels do not have the same chance, since their alleged adhesion is
presumed only from the fact that they purchased the passage tickets.
Shipping companies, like petitioner, engaged in inter-island
shipping, have a virtual monopoly of the business of transporting
passengers and may thus dictate their terms of passage, leaving
passengers with no choice but to buy their tickets and avail of their
vessels and facilities. Finally, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that
the bulk of those who board these inter-island vessels come from the low-
income groups and are less literate, and who have little or no choice but
to avail of petitioner's vessels.
 cdphil

2. Condition No. 14 is subversive of public policy on transfers of

venue of actions. For, although venue may be changed or transferred
from one province to another by agreement of the parties in writing
pursuant to Rule 4, Section 3, of the Rules of Court, such an agreement
will not be held valid where it practically negates the action of the
claimants, such as the private respondents herein. The PHILOSOPHY
underlying the provisions on transfer of venue of actions is the
convenience of the plaintiffs as well as his witnesses and to promote the
ends of justice. 21 Considering the expense and trouble a passenger
residing outside of Cebu City would incur to prosecute a claim in the
City of Cebu, he would most probably decide not to file the action at all.
The condition will thus defeat, instead of enhance, the ends of justice.
 Upon the other hand, petitioner has branches or offices in the respective
ports of call of its vessels and can afford to litigate in any of these places.
Hence, the filing of the suit in the CFI of Misamis Oriental, as was done in
the instant case, will not cause inconvience to, much less prejudice,
petitioner.
Clearly, Condition No. 14, if enforced, will be subversive of the public
good or interest, since it will frustrate in meritorious cases, actions of
passenger claimants outside of Cebu City, thus placing petitioner
company at a DECIDED ADVANTAGE over said persons, who may have
perfectly legitimate claims against it. The said condition should, therefore,
be declared void and unenforceable, as contrary to public policy — to
make the courts accessible to all who may have need of their services.
Raymond vs CA, G.R. No. 80380
[G.R. No. 80380. September 28, 1988.]

CARLOS BELL RAYMOND and AGUSTIN ALBA,  petitioners, vs. HON.

COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO M. ILARDE, etc., and
SANTIAGO BITERA,  respondents.

Lenin R. Victoriano for petitioners.

Cirilo T. Ganzon for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; VENUE IN PERSONAL ACTION.

— Under Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, personal action "may be
commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants
resides as may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs
resides, at the election of the plaintiff."
2. ID.; ID.; VENUE PROVISION; WORDS "RESIDE OR "RESIDENCE" AS
USED THEREIN, CONSTRUED. — it was held in Garcia Fule v. Court of
Appeals, 74 SCRA 189, 199 (citing cases) that the doctrinal rule is that the
term "resides" connotes Ex Vi Termini  "actual residence' as distinguished
from 'legal residence or domicile." Even where the statute uses the word
"domicile," still it construed as meaning residence and not "domicile" in
the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence and "domicile," but as generally used in statutes fixing venue,
the terms are synonymous and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant". In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in
its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode.
 3. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; REFUSAL TO DISMISS
ACTION DESPITE PATENT IMPROPER LAYING VENUE; A REVERSIBLE
ERROR. — Reversible error was committed when both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals did not dismiss the action despite the seasonable
motion to dismiss filed by the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff's
residence is not the place where the action was filed, the improper venue
being clearly established by the affidavit appended to the complaint.

DECISION

NARVASA, J  :
p

The petition for review on certiorari filed with this Court by the

petitioners Raymond and Alba seeks reversal of the decision of the Court
of Appeals which dismissed for lack of merit their petition
for certiorari and prohibition; that petition, in turn, had assailed the
refusal of the respondent Judge to dismiss the action filed against
petitioners by private respondent Santiago Bitera on the ground of
improper venue.
The only one legal issue is raised, the Court has resolved to give due
course to the petition and decide that issue on the merits.  LLpr

Bitera filed a COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES with RTC Iloilo against Carlos
Bell Raymond and Agustin Alba.
Raymond and Alba moved to dismiss the action on the ground of
improper venue.
ARGUMENT: although Bitera's complaint gives his address as 240-C
Jalandoni Street, Iloilo City, he is, and for many years has been actually
residing at the so-called UPSUMCO Compound, Bais City, he being the
officer-in-charge of the business firm known as UPSUMCO, which has
offices at Bais and Manjuyod, Negros Oriental, and that, indeed, his
affidavit, appended to his complaint, contains his affirmation that he is "a
resident of the UPSUMCO Compound, City of Bais," and shows (in
the  jurat) that his residence certificate had been issued at Manjuyod,
Negros Oriental.
MOTION TO DISMISS- Denied
They then filed a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with the
Court of Appeals. - DIMISSED
" We to allow plaintiff to bring suit in Iloilo City instead of in
Dumaguete City on the basis of his allegation that his permanent
place of abode is in Iloilo City and he only temporarily resides in Bais
 City, Dumaguete City, it is, however, the plaintiff who is given the
RIGHT TO ELECT where to bring his action. 1

RULING:
Thus this Court has held that venue was improperly laid in a case where
the complaint was filed in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte by the
plaintiff who was born and reared in that province, but whose actual
residence at time of suit was admittedly at Quezon City. 
Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals 6 definitively explained and settled the
meaning to be put to the words "reside" or "residence" as used in the
venue provisions:
"2.  We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term 'resides'
connotes ex vi termini 'actual residence' as distinguished from 'legal
residence or domicile.' This term 'resides,' like the terms 'residing'
and 'residence,' is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the
object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In
the application of venue statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court is of such nature - residence rather than
domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word
'domicile' still it is construed as meaning residence and not 'domicile' in
the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms
'residence' and 'domicile' but as generally used in statutes fixing
venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as
the term 'inhabitant.' In other words, 'resides' should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this
popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires
bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's
domicile . . ." 7

It therefore clearly appears that both the respondent Judge and the
Court of Appeals, the former in the first instance and the latter on review,
COMMITTED REVERSIBLE LEGAL ERROR, IF NOT GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION, in not dismissing Bitera's action despite the fact that
its venue had clearly been improperly laid, and had been seasonably
objected to on that ground by petitioners in a motion to dismiss. 8
Dacoycoy vs IAC, G.R. No. 74854

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 74854. April 2, 1991.]

 JESUS DACOYCOY,  petitioner, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, HON. ANTONIO V. BENEDICTO,
Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXI,
Antipolo, Rizal, and RUFINO DE GUZMAN,  respondents.

FACTS:

May the trial court motu proprio  dismiss a complaint on the ground of

improper venue? This is the issue confronting the Court in the case at bar.
On March 22, 1983, petitioner Jesus Dacoycoy, a resident of Balanti, Cainta,
Rizal, filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXI, Antipolo, Rizal, a
complaint against private respondent Rufino de Guzman praying for the
annulment of two (2) deeds of sale involving a parcel of riceland situated in
Barrio Estanza, Lingayen, Pangasinan, the surrender of the produce thereof
and damages for private respondent's refusal to have said deeds of sale set
aside upon petitioner's demand.
On May 1983, before summons could be served on private respondent as
defendant therein, the RTC Executive Judge issued an order requiring
counsel for petitioner to confer with respondent trial judge on the
matter of venue. After said conference, the trial court dismissed the
complaint on the ground of improper venue. It found, based on the
allegations of the complaint, that petitioner's action is a real action as it
sought not only the annulment of the aforestated deeds of sale but also the
recovery of ownership of the subject parcel of riceland located in Estanza,
Lingayen, Pangasinan, which is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court.
Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals- AFFIRMED the order of
dismissal of his complaint.
PETITION FOR REVIEW
- petitioner faults the appellate court in affirming what he calls an equally
erroneous finding of the trial court that the venue was improperly laid
when the defendant, now private respondent, has not even answered
the complaint nor waived the venue. 2
Petitioner : without the defendant objecting that the venue was
improperly laid, the trial court is powerless to dismiss the case motu proprio.
Private respondent, : dismissal is proper
- (a) real action
- The court can take judicial notice and motu proprio dismiss a suit clearly
denominated as real action and improperly filed before it. . . . hence, the
location of the subject parcel of land is controlling
ISSUE:
May the trial court motu proprio  dismiss a complaint on the ground of
improper venue?- NO
RULING:
We grant the petition.
The motu proprio  dismissal of petitioner's complaint by respondent trial
court on the ground of improper venue is plain error, obviously attributable
to its inability to distinguish between jurisdiction and venue.  llcd

Questions or issues relating to venue of actions are basically governed

by Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. It is said that the laying of venue is
procedural rather than substantive. It relates to the jurisdiction of the court
over the person rather than the subject matter. Provisions relating to venue
establish a relation between the plaintiff and the defendant and not between
the court and the subject matter. Venue relates to trial not to jurisdiction,
touches more of the convenience of the parties rather than the substance of
the case. 4
Jurisdiction treats of the power of the court to decide a case on the merits;
while venue deals on the locality, the place where the suit may be had. 5
In Luna vs.  Carandang,  involving an action instituted before the then Court of
First Instance of Batangas for rescission of a lease contract over a parcel of
agricultural land located in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, which complaint said
trial court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the leased land, we
emphasized:
"(1) A Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over suits involving title
to, or possession of, real estate wherever situated in the Philippines,
subject to the rules on venue of actions (Manila Railroad Company
vs. Attorney-General, etc., et al., 20 Phil. 523; Central Azucarera de
Tarlac vs. De Leon, et al., 56 Phil. 169; Navarro vs. Aguila, et al., 66
Phil. 604; Lim Cay, et al. vs. Del Rosario, etc., et al., 55 Phil. 692);
"(2) Rule 4, Section 2, of the Rules of Court requiring that an action
involving real property shall be brought in the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land lies is a rule on venue of actions,
which may be waived expressly or by implication."

In the instant case, even granting for a moment that the action of petitioner
is a real action, respondent trial court would still have jurisdiction over the
case, it being a regional trial court vested with the exclusive original
jurisdiction over "all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein . . ." in accordance with Section 19 (2)
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
 
Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is certainly not
the appropriate course of action at this stage of the proceeding, particularly
as venue, in inferior courts as well as in the courts of first instance (now RTC),
may be waived expressly or impliedly. Where defendant fails to challenge
timely the venue in a motion to dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4
of the Rules of Court, and allows the trial to be held and a decision to be
rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to
challenge belatedly the wrong venue, which is deemed waived. 11
Thus, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to
dismiss, the venue cannot be truly said to have been improperly laid, as for
all practical intents and purposes, the venue, though technically wrong, may
be acceptable to the parties for whose convenience the rules on venue had
been devised. The trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant's prerogative to
object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the
case.
Indeed, it was grossly erroneous for the trial court to have taken a
PROCEDURAL SHORT-CUT by dismissing motu proprio the complaint on the
ground of improper venue without first allowing the procedure outlined in
the Rules of Court to take its proper course.
SO ORDERED.
RULE 5

Rule on Small Claims

Rule on Summary Procedure

Barangay Conciliation (Katarungang Pambarangay)

A.L. Ang Network, Inc. v. Emma Mondejar, et al., G.R. No. 200804

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 200804. January 22, 2014.]

A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC.,  petitioner, vs. EMMA MONDEJAR,

accompanied by her husband, EFREN
MONDEJAR,  respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE,  J  : p
 The Facts
On March 23, 2011, petitioner filed a COMPLAINT FOR SUM OF
MONEY under the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases 6 before the
MTCC, seeking to collect from respondent the amount of P23,111.71
which represented her unpaid water bills for the period June 1, 2002 to
September 30, 2005. 7  SAHEIc

- a small claims case for sum of money against respondent Emma

Mondejar (respondent).
Petitioner claimed that it was duly authorized to supply water to and
collect payment therefor from the homeowners of subdivision. Including
Petitioner’s
RESPONDENT paid P5,468.38
BALANCE: P23,111.71
Unpaid despite DEMANDS
RESPONDENT : she religiously paid petitioner the agreed monthly flat
rate of P75.00
- adjusted only upon prior notice
- petitioner unilaterally charged her unreasonable and excessive
adjustments
petitioner DISCONNECTED respondent's water line
The MTCC Ruling
Issued a Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC)  on August 7, 2003,
RESNDENT should be CONSIDERED TO HAVE FULLY PAID petitioner. 14  HScCEa

- pet to payP1,200.00 with legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI  before the
RTC
The RTC Ruling
DISMISSED- finding that the said petition was only filed to circumvent the
non-appealable nature of small claims cases
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the RTC erred in
dismissing petitioner's recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court assailing the propriety of the MTCC Decision in the subject small
claims case.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is MERITORIOUS.
 Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states
that:
SEC. 23. Decision. — After the hearing, the court shall render its
decision on the same day, based on the facts established by the
evidence (Form 13-SCC). The decision shall immediately be entered
by the Clerk of Court in the court docket for civil cases and a copy
thereof forthwith served on the parties.  ADSTCa

The decision shall be final and unappealable.

Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision under
the above-stated rule, the remedy of appeal is not allowed, and the
prevailing party may, thus, immediately move for its
execution. 25 Nevertheless, the proscription on appeals in small claims
cases, similar to other proceedings where appeal is not an available
remedy, 26 does not preclude the aggrieved party from filing a
petition for certiorari  under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This
general rule has been enunciated in the case of Okada v. Security Pacific
Assurance Corporation, 27 wherein it was held that:
In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently ruled
that "the extraordinary writ of certiorari is always available
where there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." 
Verily, a petition for certiorari, unlike an appeal, is an original
action 29 designed to CORRECT ONLY ERRORS OF JURISDICTION and not
of judgment. Owing to its nature, it is therefore incumbent upon
petitioner to ESTABLISH THAT JURISDICTIONAL ERRORS TAINTED THE
MTCC DECISION. The RTC, in turn, could either grant or dismiss the
petition based on an evaluation of whether or not the MTCC gravely
abused its discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily
disregarding evidence that is material to the controversy. 30  HaTSDA

In view of the foregoing, the Court thus finds that petitioner

correctly availed of the remedy of certiorari to assail the propriety of the
MTCC Decision in the subject small claims case, contrary to the RTC's
ruling.
Likewise, the Court finds that petitioner filed the said petition before
the proper forum (i.e., the RTC). To be sure, the Court, the Court of
Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue
a writ of certiorari. 31 Such concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not
give a party unbridled freedom to choose the venue of his action lest he
ran afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. REGARD FOR JUDICIAL
HIERARCHY
Hence, considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in
 Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts, 34 certiorari petitions assailing its dispositions should be filed
before their corresponding Regional Trial Courts. This petitioner complied
with when it instituted its petition for certiorari before the RTC which, as
previously mentioned, has jurisdiction over the same.

Jose Audie Abagatnan et al vs.Spouses Jonathan Clarito And Elsa Clarito, G.R. No.
211966

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 211966. August 7, 2017.]

JOSE AUDIE ABAGATNAN, JOSEPHINE A. PARCE, JIMMY

ABAGATNAN, JOHN ABAGATNAN, JENALYN A. DE LEON,
JOEY ABAGATNAN, JOJIE ABAGATNAN, and JOY
ABAGATNAN, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES JONATHAN CLARITO
and ELSA CLARITO, respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J  :p

We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court, assailing the June 20, 2013 Decision 1 and the February
3, 2014 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03283
which dismissed, albeit without prejudice, the Complaint for Unlawful
Detainer and Damages 3 filed by petitioners Jose Audie Abagatnan,
Josephine A. Parce, Jimmy Abagatnan, John Abagatnan, Jenalyn A. De Leon,
Joey Abagatnan, Jojie Abagatnan and Joy Abagatnan against respondents
spouses Jonathan Clarito and Elsa Clarito, for failure to comply with the
mandatory requirement of resorting to prior barangay conciliation, as
required under Section 412 of Republic Act No. 7160, or the Local
Government Code (LGC).
The Antecedent Facts
Wenceslao Abagatnan (Wenceslao) and his late wife, Lydia Capote
(Lydia), acquired a parcel of land designated as Lot 1472-B, with a total
land area of 5,046 square meters, and located at Barangay Cogon, Roxas
City from Mateo Ambrad (Mateo) and Soteraña Clarito (Soteraña), by
virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale 4 executed on August 1, 1967. 5
Lydia died, leaving her children, who are co-petitioners in this case, to
succeed into the ownership of her conjugal share of said property. 6
RESPONDENTS allegedly approached Wenceslao and asked for
permission to construct a residential house made of light materials on
portion of Lot 1472-B (subject property).
Respondent Jonathan Clarito (Jonathan) is a distant relative- ALLOWED
CONDITION: will vacate the subject property should he need the same for
his own use.
PETITIONERS decided to sell portions of Lot 1472-B, including the subject
property
- offered to sell said portion to respondents- DECLINED. 
petitioners sent respondents a Demand Letter  requiring the latter to
vacate – REFUSED
Petitioners filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages against
respondents before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2,
Roxas City.
Complaint alleged that prior barangay conciliation proceedings are not
required as a pre-condition for the filing of the case in court, given that
not all petitioners are residents of Roxas City. (Laguna, Pasay)
Respondents: MANDATORY requirement that cannot be dispensed
- considering that Jimmy and Jenalyn had already executed (SPA) in favor
of their co-petitioner and sister, Josephine A. Parce (Josephine), who is
a resident of Roxas City. 
- mother title: under the name of Nicolas Clarito, et al., Jonathan's
predecessors-in-interest. – DESTROYED DURING WAR.
The Municipal Trial Court in Cities Ruling
- in favor of PETITIONERS and
- ordered respondents to remove the structures
Respondents thereafter appealed the MTCC Decision to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, Roxas City.
The Regional Trial Court Ruling
- RTC DENIED the appeal for lack of merit.
- The RTC, too, held that the lack of barangay conciliation
proceedings cannot be brought on appeal because it was not made
an issue in the Pre-Trial Order. 22
The Court of Appeals Ruling
CA GRANTED the Petition and dismissed the petitioners' Complaint,
albeit without prejudice, for lack of prior referral to
the Katarungang Pambarangay. 25 It pointed out that majority of
petitioners actually resided in Barangay Cogon, Roxas City, while the two
non-residents of Roxas City already executed an SPA in favor of Josephine,
whom they authorized, among others, to enter into an amicable
settlement with respondents. Since respondents also reside in the
same barangay, the dispute between the parties is clearly within the
ambit of the Lupon Tagapamayapa's (Lupon)  authority. 26
Petitioners' Complaint had been prematurely filed with the MTCC, as it
should have been first brought before the Lupon for mandatory
conciliation to accord the parties the chance for amicable settlement. 27
The Issue
WON Petitioners raise the sole issue of whether the CA correctly
dismissed the Complaint for failure to comply with the
prior barangay conciliation requirement under Section 412 of the LGC,
despite the fact that not all real parties in interest resided in the same city
or municipality. 28
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is impressed with merit.
x x x Section 412(a) of the LGC requires the parties to undergo a
conciliation process before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat as a
pre-condition to the filing of a complaint in court.
In the present case, the Complaint filed before the MTCC specifically
alleged that not all the real parties in interest in the case actually reside in
Roxas City: 35 Jimmy resided in Poblacion, Siniloan, Laguna, while Jenalyn
resided in Brgy. de La Paz, Pasig City. 36 As such, the lupon has no
jurisdiction over their dispute, and prior referral of the case for
barangay conciliation is not a pre-condition to its filing in court.
This is true regardless of the fact that Jimmy and Jenalyn had
already authorized their sister and co-petitioner, Josephine, to act as their
attorney-in-fact in the ejectment proceedings before the MTCC. As
previously explained, the residence of the attorney-in-fact of a real
party in interest is IRRELEVANT in so far as the "actual residence"
requirement under the LGC for prior barangay conciliation is
concerned.
Besides, as the RTC correctly pointed out, the lack
of barangay conciliation proceedings cannot be brought on appeal
because it was not included in the Pre-Trial Order.
On this point, it is important to stress that the issues to be tried
between parties in a case is limited to those defined in the pre-trial
order 38 as well as those which may be implied from those written in the
order or inferred from those listed by necessary implication. 39
In this case, a cursory reading of the issues listed in the Pre-Trial
Order easily shows that the parties never agreed, whether expressly or
impliedly, to include the lack of prior barangay conciliation proceedings in
the list of issues to be resolved before the MTCC.
 In effect, THE NON-INCLUSION OF THIS ISSUE IN THE PRE-TRIAL
ORDER BARRED ITS CONSIDERATION DURING THE TRIAL. This is but
consistent with the rule that parties are bound by the delimitation of
issues that they agreed upon during the pre-trial proceedings. 40
Crisanta Alcaraz Miguel v. Jerry D. Montanez, G.R. No. 191336

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 191336. January 25, 2012.]

CRISANTA ALCARAZ MIGUEL,  petitioner, vs. JERRY D.

MONTANEZ,  respondent.

DECISION

Antecedent Facts

On February 1, 2001, respondent Jerry Montanez (Montanez) secured a

loan of (P143,864.00), payable in one (1) year, or until February 1, 2002, from
the petitioner.
COLLATERAL: HOUSE AND LOT located at Block 39 Lot 39 Phase 3, Palmera
Spring, Bagumbong, Caloocan City.
Respondent's failure to pay the loan
PETITIONER filed a complaint against the respondent before the Lupong
Tagapamayapa  of Barangay  San Jose, Rodriguez, Rizal.
= Kasunduang Pag-aayos 
respondent agreed Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) per month, and in the event
the house and lot given as collateral is sold, the respondent would settle the
balance of the loan in full.
- still failed to pay
- Lupong Tagapamayapa  issued a certification to file action in court in
favor of the petitioner.
PETITIONER filed before (MeTC) of Makati City, Branch 66, a complaint for
Collection of Sum of Money.
RESPONDENT : IMPROPER VENUE
- petitioner was a resident of Bagumbong, Caloocan City while he lived in
San Mateo, Rizal.
MeTC rendered a Decision, 4 which disposes as follows:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] judgment is hereby
rendered ordering defendant Jerry D. Montanez to pay plaintiff

RTC affirmed the MeTC Decision

CA :
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. RTC’s.
RULING: NO NOVATION
When the complaint was filed before the barangay  on
February 2003, the period of the original agreement had long
expired without compliance on the part of petitioner. Hence, there
was nothing to reduce or extendIn other words, the  Kasunduang Pag-
aayos  merely supplemented the old agreement. 9

The CA went on saying that since the parties entered into

a  Kasunduang Pag-aayos  before the Lupon ng Barangay, such settlement has
the force and effect of a court judgment, which may be enforced by
execution within six (6) months from the date of settlement by the Lupon ng
Barangay, or by court action after the lapse of such time. 10 Considering that
more than six (6) months had elapsed from the date of settlement, the CA
ruled that the remedy of the petitioner was to file an action for the execution
of the  Kasunduang Pag-aayos  in court and not for collection of sum of
money. 11 Consequently, the CA deemed it unnecessary to resolve the issue
on venue. 12
The petitioner now comes to this Court.

Issues

(1) Whether or not a complaint for sum of money is the proper remedy

for the petitioner, notwithstanding the  Kasunduang Pag-aayos; 13 and
(2) Whether or not the CA should have decided the case on the merits
rather than remand the case for the enforcement of the  Kasunduang Pag-
aayos. 14

Our Ruling

Because the respondent failed to comply with the terms of

the  Kasunduang Pag-aayos, said agreement is deemed rescinded
pursuant to Article 2041 of the New Civil Code and the petitioner can
insist on his original demand. Perforce, the complaint for collection
of sum of money is the proper remedy.

The petitioner points out that the cause of action did not arise from
the Kasunduang Pag-aayos  but on the respondent's breach of the original
loan agreement. 15
 This Court agrees with the petitioner.
It is true that an amicable settlement reached at
the barangay  conciliation proceedings, like the  Kasunduang Pag-aayos  in this
case, is binding between the contracting parties and, upon its perfection,
is immediately executory insofar as it is not contrary to law, good morals,
good customs, public order and public policy. 16 This is in accord with the
broad precept of Article 2037 of the Civil Code,  viz.:
A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority
of res judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance
with a judicial compromise.

Being a by-product of mutual concessions and good faith of the

parties, an amicable settlement has the force and effect of res judicata  even if
not judicially approved.  It transcends being a mere contract binding only
upon the parties thereto, and is akin to a judgment that is subject to
execution in accordance with the Rules. 18 Thus, under Section 417 of the
Local Government Code, 19 such amicable settlement or arbitration award
may be enforced by execution by the Barangay Lupon  within six (6) months
from the date of settlement, or by filing an action to enforce such settlement
in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond the six-month period.
Under the first remedy, the proceedings are covered by the Local
Government Code and the  Katarungang Pambarangay  Implementing Rules
and Regulations. The  Punong Barangay  is called upon during the hearing to
determine solely the fact of non-compliance of the terms of the settlement
and to give the defaulting party another chance at voluntarily complying with
his obligation under the settlement. Under the second remedy, the
proceedings are governed by the Rules of Court, as amended. The cause of
action is the amicable settlement itself, which, by operation of law, has the
force and effect of a final judgment. 20
It must be emphasized, however, that enforcement by execution of the
amicable settlement, either under the first or the second remedy, is only
APPLICABLE if the contracting parties have not repudiated such settlement
within ten (10) days from the date thereof in accordance with Section 416 of
the Local Government Code. If the amicable settlement is repudiated by one
party, either expressly or impliedly, the other party has two options, namely,
to enforce the compromise in accordance with the Local Government
Code or Rules of Court as the case may be, or to consider it rescinded and
insist upon his original demand. This is in accord with Article 2041 of
the Civil Code, which qualifies the broad application of Article 2037,  viz.:
If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the
compromise, the other party may either enforce the compromise or
regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand.
 In the instant case, the respondent did not comply with the terms and
conditions of the  Kasunduang Pag-aayos. Such non-compliance may be
CONSTRUED AS REPUDIATION because it denotes that the respondent did
not intend to be bound by the terms thereof, thereby negating the very
purpose for which it was executed. Perforce, the petitioner has the OPTION
either to enforce the Kasunduang Pag-aayos, or to regard it as rescinded
and insist upon his original demand, in accordance with the provision of
Article 2041 of the Civil Code.Having instituted an action for collection of sum
of money, the petitioner obviously chose to rescind the Kasunduang Pag-
aayos. As such, it is error on the part of the CA to rule that enforcement by
execution of said agreement is the appropriate remedy under the
circumstances.

Considering that the  Kasunduang Pag-aayos  is deemed rescinded by

the non-compliance of the respondent of the terms thereof,
remanding the case to the trial court for the enforcement of said
agreement is clearly unwarranted.

The petitioner avers that the CA erred in remanding the case to the
trial court for the enforcement of the  Kasunduang Pag-aayos  as it prolonged
the process, "thereby putting off the case in an indefinite
pendency." 25 Thus, the petitioner insists that she should be allowed to
ventilate her rights before this Court and not to repeat the same proceedings
just to comply with the enforcement of the  Kasunduang Pag-aayos, in order to
finally enforce her right to payment. 26
The CA took off on the wrong premise that enforcement of
the Kasunduang Pag-aayos  is the proper remedy, and therefore erred in its
conclusion that the case should be remanded to the trial court. The fact that
the petitioner opted to rescind the  Kasunduang Pag-aayos  means that she is
insisting upon the undertaking of the respondent under the original loan
contract. Thus, the CA should have decided the case on the merits, as an
appeal before it, and not prolong the determination of the issues by
remanding it to the trial court. Pertinently, evidence abounds that the
respondent has failed to comply with his loan obligation. In fact,
the  Kasunduang Pag-aayos  is the well nigh incontrovertible proof of the
respondent's indebtedness with the petitioner as it was executed precisely to
give the respondent a second chance to make good on his undertaking. And
since the respondent still reneged in paying his indebtedness, justice
demands that he must be held answerable therefor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 146, Makati City, dated March 14, 2007 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
RULE 6

Pleadings (Definition, Kinds)

Defenses
Counterclaim (Compulsory v Permissive)
Third Party vs Complaint in Intervention

Fernando Medical Enterprises Inc. vs Wesleyan University Philippines, Inc., G.R. No.
207970 (see Rule 8, Section 7)
Lazaro vs Brewmaster International, Inc., G.R. No. 182779
Mongao vs Pryce Properties Corporation, G.R. No. 156474
GSIS v Heirs of Caballero, G.R. No. 158090
Tan vs Go, G.R. No. 146595
Calo vs Ajax International, 22 SCRA 996
Agustin vs Bocalan, 135 SCRA 340

RULE 7

Parts of Pleading
Verification
Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping

Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. vs Santos, G.R. No. 152579

Ma. Luisa Anabelle A. Torres vs Republic and Register of Deeds, Davao, G.R. No.
247490

RULE 8

Ultimate v Evidentiary Facts

Actionable Document (see rule on Rule 6, Section 2)
Definition
How to Contest
Effect of failure to contest
Denial (Types)
Negative Pregnant
Allegations not specifically denied, effect
(new provision) Affirmative Defenses

Canete v Genuino Ice Company, G.R. No. 154080

La Naval Drug Corp vs CA, G.R. No. 103200
Asian Construction and Development Corporation vs Mendoza, G.R. No. 176949

RULE 9
Non-waivable defenses
Default
Declaration of Default
Effects of Declaration of Default
Rights of Party in Default
Partial Default
Cases where default is not allowed

Sablas vs Sablas, G.R. No. 144568

Monarch Insurance vs. CA, G.R. No. 92735
Monzon vs Sps Relova, G.R. No. 171827

RULE 10

Amendments as a matter of right v by leave of court

Formal Amendment
(No) Amendment to conform to evidence
Supplemental Pleadings
Effect of Amended Pleadings

Alpine Lending Investors vs Corpuz, G.R. No. 157107

Zuniga-Santos vs Santos-Gran, G.R. No. 197380
Philippine Ports Authority vs Gothong, G.R. No. 158401
Philippine National Bank vs. Sps Manalo, G.R. No. 174433

Dacoycoy
Sweet Lines
Raymond
WORDS "RESIDE OR "RESIDENCE" AS USED THEREIN, CONSTRUED.
— it was held in Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 74 SCRA 189, 199 (citing
cases) that the doctrinal rule is that the term "resides" connotes Ex Vi
Termini  "actual residence' as distinguished from 'legal residence or
domicile." Even where the statute uses the word "domicile," still it
construed as meaning residence and not "domicile" in the technical sense.
Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence and
"domicile," but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant". In
other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular
sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
actual residence or place of abode.