Eur Arch Psychiatry Clin Neurosci (2013) 263 (Suppl 2):S177–S187
DOI 10.1007/s00406-013-0453-9
ORIGINAL PAPER
Automatic metaphor processing in adults with Asperger
syndrome: a metaphor interference effect task
Ismene Hermann • Verena Haser • Ludger Tebartz van
Elst • Dieter Ebert • Daniel Müller-Feldmeth •
Andreas Riedel • Lars Konieczny
Received: 31 August 2013 / Accepted: 16 September 2013 / Published online: 1 October 2013
Ó Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013
Abstract This paper investigates automatic processing of
novel metaphors in adults with Asperger Syndrome (AS)
and typically developing controls. We present an experi-
ment combining a semantic judgment task and a recogni-
tion task. Four types of sentences were compared: Literally
true high-typical sentences, literally true low-typical sen-
tences, apt metaphors, and scrambled metaphors (literally
false sentences which are not readily interpretable as
metaphors). Participants were asked to make rapid deci-
sions about the literal truth of such sentences. The results
revealed that AS and control participants showed signifi-
cantly slower RTs for metaphors than for scrambled met-
aphors and made more mistakes in apt metaphoric
sentences than in scrambled metaphors. At the same time,
there was higher recognition of apt metaphors compared
with scrambled metaphors. The findings indicate intact
automatic metaphor processing in AS and replicate
Ismene Hermann and Verena Haser have contributed equally to the
paper.
Andreas Riedel and Lars Konieczny are senior authors who have
contributed equally to the paper.
I. Hermann
L. T. van Elst
D. Ebert
A. Riedel (&)
Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, University
Medical Center Freiburg, Hauptstraße 5, 79104 Freiburg,
Germany
e-mail: andreas.riedel@uniklinik-freiburg.de
V. Haser
Department of English Linguistics, University of Freiburg,
Freiburg, Germany
D. Müller-Feldmeth
L. Konieczny
Center for Cognitive Science, University of Freiburg, Freiburg,
Germany
previous findings on automatic metaphor processing in
typically developing individuals.
Keywords Asperger syndrome
Nonliteral
language
Novel metaphors
Metaphor
comprehension
Metaphor interference effect

Autism spectrum disorders (ASD)
Pragmatic
language
Introduction
Nonliteral language processing in ASD and AS
Nonliteral language comprehension in everyday commu-
nication does not seem to pose particular difficulties for
typical language users [1]. However, for individuals diag-
nosed with autism spectrum disorders (ASD), including
individuals with Asperger Syndrome (AS), understanding
nonliteral language is often reported to be challenging.
Metaphors, irony, and idioms seem to cause problems both
in children [2–4] and adults [5–7] with ASD, though a
number of recent papers argue that deficits are not specific
to autism and that not all persons with ASD experience
difficulties (e.g., [8, 9]).
Although there is no language delay described in the
diagnostic criteria of AS [10], the difficulties in nonliteral
language comprehension have been described for AS as
well: Impairment of novel metaphor comprehension in AS
has been observed in 10–41-year-old individuals with AS
[6]. Martin and McDonald [11] observed poor performance
of young adults with AS in the interpretation of nonliteral
utterances or ironic jokes. Furthermore, neural processes
during semantic integration of metaphors and right hemi-
sphere contribution to metaphor processing in individuals
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with AS seem to be different from typically developing
participants [12, 13].
Nonliteral language impairment in ASD is often con-
strued as evidence of a more general deficit in pragmatic
language understanding, which in turn is frequently
attributed to theory-of-mind (ToM) deficits [2, 14], weak
central coherence (WCC) [15], and executive dysfunc-
tioning [16]. Pragmatic ability refers to the use and com-
prehension of language in context, which involves
parameters such as the linguistic context of utterances
(previous utterances), social variables (e.g., the speakers’
relationship toward each other), the role of common ground
(background assumptions shared by interlocutors), the role
of interlocutors’ intentions, and many further aspects of
social context [17].
A number of scholars offer arguments in favor of the
view that impairment of metaphor processing in AS
cannot exclusively be ascribed to pragmatic impairment in
the sense of deficient integration of contextual informa-
tion. Thus, Gold et al. [12] have compared reaction pat-
terns for metaphoric and non-metaphoric expressions
using event-related potentials (ERP). The authors used
two-word expressions to examine metaphors regardless of
context. They found a different pattern of linguistic
information processing between individuals with AS and
control subjects: In comparison with the control group,
AS participants showed significantly larger N400s for
novel metaphors. For literal and unrelated word pairs, on
the other hand, no differences in N400s were found. The
authors conclude that in addition to the pragmatic deficits
described in AS, metaphor processing during the stage of
semantic integration is disrupted. Another study by Gold
and Faust [13], using the divided field paradigm to
examine right hemisphere recruitment during novel met-
aphor processing, showed lack of right hemisphere
advantage in the AS group, supporting the hypothesis that
the neural processes during metaphor processing in AS
are different from typically developing controls. These
studies are compatible with the idea of an impairment in
the early automatic stage of metaphor processing, which
might represent a further factor disrupting metaphor
interpretation, in addition to the above-mentioned prag-
matic factors.
Models of metaphor comprehension
The so-called multi-stage model of metaphor interpretation
espoused by various philosophers and psychologists (see
[18, 19] for overviews) postulates that literal meaning has
priority over metaphorical meaning. Metaphor interpreta-
tion is construed as a multi-stage process. In the first stage,
metaphors and other nonliteral expressions are interpreted
literally. The patent violation of conversational maxims
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Eur Arch Psychiatry Clin Neurosci (2013) 263 (Suppl 2):S177–S187
[20, 21] and the incompatibility of the initial interpretation
with the surrounding context allow interpreters to recog-
nize that this literal interpretation is inadequate. This leads
them to revise their initial interpretation in a final stage
involving the construction of an alternative, nonliteral,
interpretation [18].
The traditional view of metaphor interpretation has been
challenged by a number of experiments (see, e.g., [18, 19,
22]). For example, reading metaphors does not necessarily
take longer than reading literal expressions, especially in
cases where sufficient context is provided [23]. Glucksberg
et al. [24] showed that automatic processing of metaphor-
ical meanings interferes with literal false decisions in a
semantic judgment task. They concluded that metaphors
are processed even in situations where metaphor processing
is neither requested nor helpful. This experiment intro-
duced the metaphor interference task (see Sect. ‘‘The
metaphor interference task’’) as a method for studying
automatic metaphor processing; the task was also used in
several later studies [25–28].
The metaphor interference task
Glucksberg et al. [24] used a sentence-verification proce-
dure, which we have adopted, with slight modifications, in
our experiment. They compared five types of sentences:
(a) True high-typical sentences, e.g., Some birds are rob-
ins. (b) True low-typical sentences, e.g., Some birds are
penguins. (c) Standard false sentences, e.g., Some birds are
apples. (d) Metaphors, e.g., Some jobs are jails, Some flutes
are birds. Sentences of type (d) were literally false cate-
gory-membership statements, but they were readily inter-
pretable if taken nonliterally. (e) Scrambled metaphors,
e.g., Some jobs are birds, Some flutes are jails; these sen-
tences were also literally false, but were not readily inter-
pretable. The scrambled metaphors were produced by re-
distributing topic and vehicle terms of the apt metaphors
used (i.e., category (d)); in other words, two apt metaphors
Some jobs (topic) are jails (vehicle) and Some flutes (topic)
are birds (vehicle) yield the scrambled metaphors Some
jobs are birds and Some flutes are jails).
For each sentence, participants had to decide whether it
was literally true or false. Glucksberg et al. [24] found that
participants had longer response latencies for those types of
literally false statements that were easily interpretable as
metaphors (i.e., type (d) statements), when compared to
those statements which did not intuitively make sense as
metaphors (i.e., type (e) statements). The authors ascribed
this effect to the unintended processing of the metaphoric
meanings of type (d) sentences, which produced a conflict
in truth-value judgments: Though these statements are false
when construed literally, they are true on a nonliteral
reading. This conflict, called the metaphor interference
Eur Arch Psychiatry Clin Neurosci (2013) 263 (Suppl 2):S177–S187
effect (MIE), slowed down the responses to metaphoric
items. Glucksberg et al. [24] also applied a recall task,
which revealed a higher capacity to recall metaphoric items
compared with scrambled metaphors. The authors ascribed
this effect to a deeper processing of metaphors. These
experiments suggest that in some cases at least, the pro-
cessing of metaphors is automatic and non-optional. Later
publications by Glucksberg and others provide further
evidence for automatic metaphor processing, supporting a
model of metaphor comprehension that is opposed to the
traditional account. In Glucksberg’s model, metaphorical
and literal interpretations are processed in parallel, which
contrasts with the traditional account according to which
the metaphorical meaning is accessed only if the literal
meaning is recognized as deficient (see [19] for an
overview).
The present study: do people with AS process
metaphors automatically?
As described in ‘‘Nonliteral language processing in ASD
and AS’’, several studies report anomalous metaphor pro-
cessing in AS. Our hypothesis was that individuals diag-
nosed with AS do not process metaphors automatically and
hence will not display the MIE in a metaphor interference
task.
Following Glucksberg et al. [24], in the present study we
carried out a metaphor interference task in individuals with
AS and healthy controls. Our main goal was to examine the
MIE in both groups by comparing reaction times (RTs) and
error rates for sentence verification of (apt) metaphors and
scrambled metaphors. Based on the results of Glucksberg
et al. [24] and subsequent studies, we expected a significant
MIE in control participants. We expected poor automatic
metaphor processing in AS—and thus no MIE. Error rates
for metaphors should not substantially differ from error
rates for scrambled metaphors in the AS group, while in the
control group, we expected higher error rates for apt met-
aphors than for scrambled metaphors. Furthermore, we did
not expect a higher memory for apt metaphors compared
with scrambled metaphors in the AS group in a subsequent
recall task, while in the control group, we expected a
replication of previous findings showing higher memory
for apt metaphors compared with scrambled metaphors.
Overall, we did not expect participants with AS to process
readily interpretable novel metaphors differently from
scrambled metaphors in an experimental design where the
potential occurrence of metaphoric sentences is not men-
tioned and metaphor comprehension is not requested. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first experiment to use
the metaphor interference task in German language.
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics for the Asperger Syndrome and control
participants: mean age; mean scores of the Raven’s Standard Pro-
gressive Matrices test (SPM) and the Multiple-Choice-Word-Test-B
(MWT-B)
Mean (SD) p
Asperger Controls
Age 42.4 (9.5) 35.1 (12.5) 0.045
SPM 116.0 (11.7) 117.7 (9.5) 0.777
MWT-B 123.1 (13.2) 123.1 (11.8) 0.920
Method
Participants
Twenty persons diagnosed with AS (13 men, 7 women)
and 20 typically developing persons (11 men, 9 women)
participated in this experiment. All participants were right-
handed. There was no significant difference in gender
distribution between groups, v2 = 0.417, p = 0.748. Age
ranged between 22 and 68 years. The t test revealed a
slightly significant group difference in age (Table 1). Since
individual IQ-differences have been described to have an
impact on the performance in semantic decision tasks [28],
two IQ tests were carried out: the short version of Raven’s
Standard Progressive Matrices Test [29] and the Multiple-
Choice-Word-Test-B [30]. AS and control groups did not
differ significantly in mean IQ (Table 1).
At the Freiburg Center for Autism Research, the
clinical diagnosis of autism spectrum disorders and AS is
established as a consensus diagnosis of a multiprofes-
sional team following the recommendations of the NICE
guidelines [31]. The clinical diagnosis includes a thor-
ough history of the patient following the above princi-
ples, a history of carers and behavioral observations in a
diagnostic process that usually takes several sessions of 2
or more hours. Psychometric tools obtained in a routine
procedure prior to clinical assessment comprise the Aut-
ism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) [32], the Empathy Quotient
(EQ) [33], the Australian Scale for Asperger Syndrome
[34], the Social Responsiveness Scale [35], the Bermond-
Vorst Alexithymia Questionnaire [36], the Adult Asperger
Assessment [37], the Wender-Utah-Rating-Scale [38], and
the Beck Depression Inventory [39]. Additionally,
instruments like the Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised
(ADI-R) [40] and the Autism Diagnostic Observation
Schedule (ADOS) [41], as well as additional neuropsy-
chological tests assessing executional and theory-of-mind
capacities, are obtained in selected and unclear cases.
The final consensus diagnosis is made by all persons
involved in the diagnostic process, which will invariably
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include at least two experienced consultant psychiatrists
or psychologists.
In the present study, control participants completed AQ
and EQ prior to the experimental session. In the AQ, all but
one participants with AS scored above 26, which has been
suggested a suitable cut-off to distinguish general popula-
tion from ASD population [42]. In the control group, all
participants scored below 26 in the AQ. The EQ scores
showed the reverse picture—high scores in the control
group (M = 42.6; SD = 12.3) and low scores in the AS
group (M = 18.9; SD = 12.0).
All participants signed a statement of agreement prior to
the experimental session. Control participants were paid for
their participation, AS participants received a compensa-
tion for travel expenses.
Apparatus and materials
Stimuli
The stimulus material consisted of 320 sentences of the
pattern ‘‘Some X are Y’’. Materials were constructed
according to a 2 9 2 design, comprising the experimental
factors Literalness and Goodness plus the between-subjects
factor Group. The factor Literalness indicates whether a
sentence is literally true or false. The factor Goodness
indicates whether a literally true sentence is of high typi-
cality and thus easier to verify (high Goodness) or of low
typicality (low Goodness). In the literally false condition, a
readily understandable metaphor would be of high good-
ness and a scrambled metaphor of low Goodness (Table 2;
for more examples see section ‘‘Appendix’’).
Items were balanced between conditions according to
word frequency. On average, word length did not differ
between apt metaphors and scrambled metaphors; scrambled
metaphors were constructed by re-pairing topic and vehicle
terms of different apt metaphors, yielding literally false
expressions that were difficult to interpret metaphorically.
Goodness and novelty ratings were completed by 10
undergraduate students who did not participate in the
experiment. Literally false sentences (i.e., metaphors and
Table 2 Stimulus types (rough translations from German; predicate
noun phrases correspond to single-word expressions in German)
Goodness Literalness
True False
Good Literally true, high typical Metaphors
Example Some lawyers are juvenile Some lawyers are scale
magistrates rulers
Bad Literally true, low typical Scrambled metaphors
Example Some lawyers are tax Some lawyers are days
advisors of spring
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Eur Arch Psychiatry Clin Neurosci (2013) 263 (Suppl 2):S177–S187
scrambled metaphors) were rated for aptness and novelty,
based on a scale ranging from 1 (bad) to 7 (apt), and 1
(familiar) to 7 (unfamiliar), respectively. All items that were
used in the experiment had a mean rating of 6.0 or higher for
novelty. We only used items as scrambled metaphors whose
mean rating did not exceed 2.0; we only used items as apt
metaphors whose mean aptness rating averaged 6.0 or
higher. We used an analogous scheme for goodness (proto-
typicality) ratings for the literally true sentences.
The test items were distributed over eight lists by means
of a Latin square rotation scheme: Topics and vehicles
appeared only once in a list, and each list contained an
equal amount of items in each condition. Each list con-
sisted of 40 items. Every participant was presented with
one list, and the lists were successively rotated between
participants: participant 1 was presented with list no. 1,
participant 2 was presented with list no. 2, etc. The order of
item presentation was randomized for each participant.
Passive recall task
Participants performed a passive recall task. Therefore, we
constructed four passive recall forms, each one consisting
of two complementary test lists. The items were listed in
random order. Participants received the form which mat-
ched their test lists.
Self-assessment questionnaire
Subsequent to the experiment, participants were asked to
answer some questions about their personal ability to
comprehend nonliteral language. For this purpose, we
constructed a questionnaire based on previous accounts of
common difficulties in the field of language and commu-
nication in AS. This enabled us to collect information about
the participants’ subjective perspective on their ability to
interpret nonliteral language. Participants were presented
with several statements such as ‘‘To me, nonliteral language
is confusing’’ or ‘‘I have to reflect deeply in order to
understand nonliteral language’’. Participants were sup-
posed to state to what degree they agree with each statement
(I agree/I rather agree/I rather disagree/I disagree). In the
present article, results of this questionnaire will only be
briefly touched upon, as the experimental groups were too
small to permit extensive questionnaire analysis.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually. There were three
response keys available: One to the left hand index or
middle finger, one to the right hand index or middle finger,
and one to the right hand thumb: the latter initiated the
session. Of the other two response keys, the left one was
Eur Arch Psychiatry Clin Neurosci (2013) 263 (Suppl 2):S177–S187
designated ‘‘true’’ and the right one was designated
‘‘false’’.
The participants were given a brief instruction on the
screen. They were told that they would be presented with
various sentences and that their task was to decide as
quickly and accurately as possible whether each sentence
was literally true or false and that they would have to press
the left or right key depending on their decision. The
sentences were presented word by word via rapid serial
visual presentation. 50 ms per letter were added to the
basic presentation time of 500 ms per word. At the
beginning of each trial, a fixation cross appeared in the
middle of the screen and persisted for 1,000 ms. Prior to
the presentation of the 40 test items, participants were
presented with 20 practice items so that they could get used
to the procedure. In the practice session, participants were
given feedback. A time-out after 2,000 ms was imple-
mented to ensure that participants would answer sponta-
neously. The unannounced passive recall task was carried
out 15 min after the completion of the semantic judgment
task.
Results
Reaction times and error rates
RTs were log-transformed and outliers were removed on
the basis of a linear mixed model (see below) prior to the
analysis. Data points which exceeded the twofold standard
error of the estimated RTs for each participant and condi-
tion were not included in the analysis. 1.79 % of all cases
were removed as outliers. We fitted a linear mixed model
with the fixed factors Literalness, Goodness, and Group
and the random factors Participant and Item on our RT
data. In the analysis of RTs, only correct answers were
included.
Figure 1 illustrates mean RTs for both groups in the
various conditions. We found no significant main effects of
Literalness (t = -0.01; SE = 0.011), Goodness (t =
-0.46; SE = 0.011) or Group (t = -1.31, SE = 0.069).
As illustrated by Fig. 1, there was a significant interaction
of Literalness and Goodness (t = -10.50, SE = 0.023): In
literally false sentences, Goodness is associated with
slower RTs, contrary to its effect in literally true sentences.
This result for literally false sentences is crucial and
expected, given the metaphor interference hypothesis. We
also observed a significant interaction of Literalness and
Group (t = 2.15, SE = 0.023) due to longer RTs in liter-
ally false sentences in the AS group. There was no three-
way interaction of Literalness 9 Goodness 9 Group,
which, in line with the impression given by Fig. 1, suggests
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that there was no difference concerning the MIE between
groups (t = 1.12, SE = 0.045). As three-way interactions
are difficult to interpret, we conducted a separate analysis
of literally false sentences: In literally false sentences, the
main effect of Goodness indicates the difference in RTs for
metaphors and scrambled metaphors. In line with the
metaphor interference hypothesis, the main effect of
Goodness was highly significant in literally false sentences
(t = 7.6; SE = 0.02), irrespective of Group (Good-
ness 9 Group: t = -0.6; SE = 0.03).
As we found a significant group difference in mean age,
we added the factor Age to the linear mixed model in
another analysis. Results show that there was no significant
main effect of Age (t = 0.52; SE = 0.01) and the previ-
ously obtained main effects remained the same.
For the analysis of error rates, we conducted a logistic
regression model with the dichotomized response variable, the
fixed factors Literalness, Goodness, and Group and the ran-
dom factors Item and Participant. Figure 2 shows the pro-
portion of correct answers for group and condition. There was
a significant effect of Literalness due to the very low error rates
in the scrambled condition (z value = -2.404,
Pr([|z|) = 0.016). A highly significant interaction of Literal-
ness 9 Goodness (z value = 3.790, Pr([|z|) \ 0.001) shows
that, in both groups, fewer mistakes were made in the
scrambled condition and the high-typical condition than in the
(apt) metaphor and low-typical condition. There was no sig-
nificant group effect (z value = -1.229, Pr([|z|) = 0.219) or
three-way interaction of Literalness 9 Goodness 9 Group
(z value = -0.244, Pr([|z|) = 0.807).
Passive recall task and self-assessment
Recall analysis was performed using a logistic regression
model. In the literally false conditions, fewer items were
memorized than in the literally true conditions
(z value = 8.961, Pr([|z|) \ 0.001) (Fig. 3). This effect
seems to arise from poor memory for scrambled metaphors.
This is confirmed by the highly significant effect of
Goodness (z value = 3.623, Pr([|z|) \ 0.001) which varies
as a function of Literalness (Literalness 9 Goodness: z
value = -4.189, Pr([|z|) \ 0.001). There was no sub-
stantial group effect (z value = 1.690, Pr([|z|) = 0.091)
and no significant three-way interaction of Literal-
ness 9 Goodness 9 Group (z value = -1.091,
Pr([|z|) = 0.275), which suggests no difference in recall of
metaphors and scrambled metaphors in AS and controls
after the semantic judgment task.
As announced in Sect. ‘‘Self-assessment questionnaire,’’
the subject of self-assessment will only briefly be broached
at this point. Merely two examples will be brought up to
show that our participants indeed differed in terms of their
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Fig. 1 RTs as a function of
Goodness (good/bad) 9 Group
(AS/Control (C)) for literally
true and literally false sentences
(error bars ± 2 SE)
subjective assessment of their nonliteral language ability:
In the AS group, 13 of 20 participants stated that they were
confused by figurative utterances made in conversations.
Among controls, only 1 of 20 participants agreed with this
statement. On the other hand, only 3 of 20 AS participants
stated that they understood figurative expressions intui-
tively, whereas 16 of 20 controls agreed with this
statement.
Discussion
This experiment was the first to examine whether indi-
viduals diagnosed with AS show a metaphor interference
effect, which is seen as an indicator for automatic metaphor
processing. Somewhat surprisingly given previous
research, the results revealed no difference in metaphor
interference between AS and control participants. This
indicates that the early automatic stage of metaphor pro-
cessing is unimpaired in AS.
RT analysis showed that both groups took longer to
judge literally false but metaphorically true sentences (apt
metaphors) than scrambled metaphors (literally false sen-
tences which do not comprise a readily understandable
meaning). In line with Glucksberg et al. [24], we found
evidence for automatic metaphor comprehension, even
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Eur Arch Psychiatry Clin Neurosci (2013) 263 (Suppl 2):S177–S187
within an experimental setting with relatively impover-
ished context information. In terms of automatic metaphor
comprehension, participants diagnosed with AS, who are
often reported to have severe difficulties understanding
nonliteral meanings (e.g. [2, 5–7]), did not differ from
healthy controls in our study: For both groups, response
latencies for rejecting apt metaphorically true statements
were significantly longer compared with response latencies
for statements that did not intuitively make sense (scram-
bled metaphors). Furthermore, both experimental groups
made more mistakes in assessing apt metaphors as literally
false compared with scrambled metaphors. This finding
supports the metaphor interference account, indicating that
a semantic decision is more difficult in (apt) metaphoric
sentences, since the metaphorically true interpretations of
these expressions interfere with their literal falsity. In line
with previous research mentioned above, we thus interpret
slower response times for apt as opposed to scrambled
metaphors as indicating participants’ difficulties suppress-
ing automatic activation of metaphorical meanings that
make intuitive sense. Another relevant result is that AS
participants and typically developing controls were both
able to remember more metaphors than scrambled
metaphors.
These findings contrast with the self-assessments we
collected subsequent to the experiment. In line with much
Eur Arch Psychiatry Clin Neurosci (2013) 263 (Suppl 2):S177–S187
Fig. 2 Proportion of correct
answers as a function of
Goodness (good/bad) 9 Group
(AS/Control (C)) for literally
true and literally false sentences
(error bars ± 2 SE)
of the previously cited research, these self-assessments
suggest that adults diagnosed with AS do, at least subjec-
tively, experience difficulties interpreting nonliteral
language.
Taken together, these results indicate that despite the
frequently reported nonliteral language impairment of
individuals with AS, automatic processing of novel meta-
phoric expressions seems to be intact.
Thus, our hypothesis that metaphor processing in adults
with AS would be less automatic than in typically devel-
oping individuals could not be confirmed.
Our data are limited by the fact that there was a sig-
nificant group effect in age, which, however, did not turn
out to have a significant effect in the analysis of RTs. Note
as well that there was a significant interaction of Literal-
ness and Group in that AS participants took longer to
assess literally false sentences in general. This is another
interesting finding, though the key result for our purposes is
that AS participants took significantly longer to assess apt
metaphors than scrambled metaphors and hence show a
metaphor interference effect (regardless of the fact that
overall response times for literally false sentences are
slower than for controls).
The presence of the MIE in individuals with AS could
be interpreted in terms of evidence that metaphor
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processing in AS may be less impaired than expected.
There is some independent support for this argument. For
one thing, as already mentioned, previous findings in this
area of research are inconsistent. In fact, there is growing
evidence for what can be interpreted as (at least partially)
intact nonliteral language comprehension in individuals
with AS. For instance, Giora et al. [43] found that young
adults with AS are not biased toward the literal in a
meaningfulness decision task comprising literal and meta-
phorical meanings. The findings of Pijnacker et al. [44]
indicate that children with ASD are not impaired in
deriving scalar implicature, with a potential differentiation
between AS and autistic disorder: participants with AS
performed better than participants with high-functioning
autism. Also, Gold and Faust [13], for example, did not
find a difference in the behavioral data (reaction times and
error rates) for young adults with AS and typically devel-
oping participants in a semantic judgment task involving
literal and metaphorical meanings. Gold et al. [12] repli-
cated this finding. In their review article, Kasari and
Rotheram-Fuller [45] observe that AS and high-functioning
autism are frequently either grouped together in terms of
ASD or else only HFA participants are examined. The
above-mentioned study by Pijnacker et al. [44] shows that
HFA and AS might differ in their nonliteral language
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Fig. 3 Proportion of
recognized items as a function
of Goodness (good/
bad) 9 Group (AS/Control (C))
for literally true and literally
false sentences (error bars ± 2
SE)
ability. This has implications for how to interpret the per-
tinent literature, as studies on language processing in pure
AS populations are relatively rare. Taken together, these
findings seem to indicate that metaphor processing espe-
cially in AS is less impaired than often assumed.
Setting aside the previously mentioned important debate
concerning the nature and extent of nonliteral language
impairments in (at least some) persons with AS, our study
suggests that possible differences in metaphor processing
between individuals with AS and controls do not affect
early automatic stages of metaphor processing. Differences
in metaphor processing might still be found with regard to
the quality of figurative interpretations or the extent to
which linguistic or social context is accessed for interpre-
tation. But in light of previously mentioned research
summarized in [8], these possibilities should be considered
with some caution.
We did not ask participants to explain their understanding
of the expressions. As observed by Gold and Faust [12], it
might be the case that participants with AS do correctly judge
an expression as metaphoric, but still do not properly
understand it, arriving at interpretations which are at odds
with the speaker/writer’s original intentions. It might be
objected that there is generally more than one way of inter-
preting (especially novel) metaphors, yet metaphor inter-
pretations suggested by persons with AS have been argued to
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Eur Arch Psychiatry Clin Neurosci (2013) 263 (Suppl 2):S177–S187
be more idiosyncratic than interpretations proposed by
controls [46]. Hence, one avenue for future research is to
investigate in even greater detail and with regard to many
different linguistic types of metaphors whether individuals
with AS derive interpretations of metaphors that are com-
parable to those of typically developing controls.
Another aspect that might contribute to impaired meta-
phor processing in some persons with AS is reported dif-
ficulties in ignoring irrelevant information. According to
the inhibitory deficit hypothesis, inability to suppress
irrelevant information during metaphor processing results
in greater difficulties in metaphor comprehension.
Gernsbacher et al. [47] conducted a semantic decision task
involving semantic priming and found that ‘‘interpreting a
metaphor involves both enhancing the attributes that are
relevant to the metaphorical interpretation and suppressing
the attributes that are not relevant to the metaphorical
interpretation.’’ Older people seem to suppress irrelevant
information less effectively than younger ones [48]. In an
fMRI study on the neural basis of a simple response inhi-
bition task and an inhibition task involving working
memory, Kana et al. [49] found atypical and less syn-
chronized inhibitory function in autism, while there were
no differences at the behavioral level. They suppose that in
autism as compared with controls, inhibitory processes are
less automatic and more strategic in nature. Therefore,
Eur Arch Psychiatry Clin Neurosci (2013) 263 (Suppl 2):S177–S187 S185

complex inhibitory processes such as the suppression of due to Prof. Sam Glucksberg for sending us his materials for inspi-
irrelevant information could play a role in impaired figu- ration and to Thomas Fangmeier for his expert advice in neuropsy-
chological testing and his assistance in recruiting participants. This
rative language processing in (some persons with) AS. research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the
An alternative explanation for AS’ reported impairment public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
of metaphor processing in everyday life could relate to
deficits with regard to the adequate use of contextual Conflict of interest The authors declare that they have no conflict
of interest.
information in order to find the most appropriate meaning
of a metaphoric expression. A number of studies are con- This article is part of the supplement ‘‘Bridging the gap between
sistent with the possibility that linguistic context is pro- Neurobiology and Psychosocial Medicine’’. This supplement was not
cessed in an unusual way by individuals with ASD (see sponsored by outside commercial interests. It was funded by the
German Association for Psychiatry and Psychotherapy (DGPPN).
[50] for an overview), though again it is unclear whether
autism per se is responsible for impairments in contextual
integration (e.g., [8]). In the present study, we examined
metaphor processing based on relatively impoverished Appendix
stimuli, providing no linguistic or extralinguistic context
for our stimuli sentences. Both groups show evidence of See Table 3.
automatic metaphor processing in this setting. However,
metaphors in ordinary language can only be fully under- Table 3 Examples of the four types of sentences
stood by integrating the expressions into a larger context. It Literally true, Literally true, Metaphors Scrambled
might be interesting to modify the experiment in such a high-typical low-typical metaphors
way as to require participants to use contextual information sentences sentences
for processing the sentences.
Some lawyers are Some lawyers Some lawyers Some lawyers
This study was motivated by the aim to replicate the juvenile are tax are scale are days of
MIE in the German language and in adults with AS. In the magistrates advisors rulers spring
original MI-task by Glucksberg et al. [24], only behavioral Some throats are Some throats Some throats Some throats
data were assessed. More recent studies on metaphor pro- human jaws are predator are sewer are scale
cessing demonstrated a discrepancy between behavioral jaws tunnels rulers
and neural data (e.g. [7, 12]). For example, evidence from Some Some Some Some
confessions are confessions confessions confessions
an ERP study in which participants were supposed to judge accounts of are are deep sea are coma vigil
the meaningfulness of metaphoric and literal expressions crimes statements voyages (plural in
suggests that metaphor processing in AS might be achieved of faith German)
in the same time but not with the same efficiency or ease as Some types of Some types of Some types of Some types of
in typically developing individuals [12]. This has impli- support (single support are support are support are
word in non-cash days of hummingbirds
cations for the interpretability of behavioral data: Even if German) are benefits spring
RTs and error rates are identical, there still might be a cash offerings
covert group difference, which can only be revealed by the
Note that the sentences were translated from German to English.
analysis of neurophysiological data. Given these facts as Predicate noun phrases correspond to single-word expressions in
well as the limitations of basically every psycholinguistic German
method, it seems important to complement our findings and
methodology by future studies addressing these issues from
a neurophysiological perspective.
In summary, the present study demonstrates a striking
similarity in automatic metaphor processing in AS and References
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