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Mysticism As Morality
Mysticism As Morality
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Religious Ethics
Paul L. Heck
ABSTRACT
who would challenge the virtue of selfless action? At the same time, at
stake in this question is insight into the nature of Islam - a particularly
urgent task these days - as a way to supplement and even correct both
popular and scholarly perception.
That Sufism has a particular moral vision has been suggested in
studies of individual Sufi masters (for example, Bowering 1984; Chittick
1994; Sells 2002; and Huda 2004), and this squares with reflection
on the moral dimensions of mysticism in general (for example, Katz
1983; Barnard and Kripal 2002). This is not the place to ask whether
mystical religiosity is different only in degree or also in kind from
nonmystical religiosity (see Hallamish 1999, 1-16), nor whether different
mystical traditions can be fruitfully compared but rather to survey the
mystical tradition of Islam more broadly, here in the classical period, to
capture recurring conceptions of moral character.1
Sufism has played a pervasive and unparalleled role in shaping
Muslim society (for an overview of Sufism, see Knysh 2000). Its moral
vision, while exhibiting elitist tendencies (Awn 1983), cannot be limited
to higher echelons, whether social or religious (Lewisohn 1999b notes
Suf ism's combination of spiritual elitism and social popularism): works
on ethics from a Sufi point of view continue to be composed for pop-
ular consumption (for example, al-Samarra'I 2000; Fatima 2001). It is
the vast influence of Sufism, continuing today despite rationalist and
fundamentalist challenges (Sirriyeh 1999), that makes it impossible,
when speaking of Islam as a whole, to reduce its moral vision to the
commands and prohibitions of its law (Reinhart 1983). The expansive
networks and institutional organization of Sufism brought its higher
morality, cultivated intensely by its spiritual adepts, to wider circles of
Muslims, mainly through orally communicated instruction from sheikh
to followers, eventually set down in manuals that enjoy wide prestige
and authority in the Islamic world today, for example, the works of
al-Sarraj (d. 378AH/988CE), al-Qushayrl (d. 465/1073), and Abu Najlb
al-Suhrawardl (d. 563/1 168).2
To be sure, Islam contains multiple ethical traditions (Fakhry 1991;
Vadet 1995), with overlap and amalgamation among the various cul-
tural and intellectual strands of the Islamic heritage - philosophical and
courtly no less than legal and mystical. The legal tradition, for its part,
1 Sufism, both intellectual discipline and social institution, offers a multivalent vision
of morality that includes both moral character (khulq, pl. akhldq) and fraternal etiquette
(adab, pl. dddb). Although the two are connected and at times used interchangeably in
the literature, here the focus will be on khulq as moral disposition toward created reality
entirely and not on the behavior (that is, way of life) expected of members of a Sufi group
in their mutual interactions and shared activities.
2 The last one clearly speaks to popular participation in the Sufi way of life (see Malamud
1994).
community, while the aim of the second is realization of God with a moral
vision potentially as unlimited as the unbounded presence of God. Those
believed to have reached this mystical awareness have come to be reck-
oned as Muslim saints, known as allies of God (awliyd' alldh) on account
of their closeness to Him. They have been viewed as agents who afford
access to the divine presence, providing meaning, even if hidden, for the
entire cosmos. As a result, they have been given such titles as "axis of
the age" (qutb al-zamdn) and "perfect human" (al-insdn al-kdmil) who,
clothing themselves with the divine presence as the only true reality,
become heirs, and sometimes rivals, of the prophets (Radtke 1999).
The legal and mystical traditions of Islam - shari'a and sufiyya,
respectively - are not at odds. The latter is generally divided into
intoxicated and sober forms - the first associated with a certain degree
of antinomian behavior; moreover, Sufi masters, such as Sheikh Arslan
(d. middle of 6th/12th century, patron saint of Damascus) in his letter
on divine unity, have criticized legalistic religiosity as an obstacle to
life in God (Geoffroy 2002, 75-78). Still, Sufi adherents, aligning their
practices with qur'anic language and outlook (Massignon 1922; Nwyia
1970), view the mystical path (al-tanqa) that leads to a realization of
true reality (al-haqiqa) as beginning in and based upon the revealed
law (al-sharT'a, a point emphasized by Ahmad al-Sirhindi, d. 1034/1624,
major figure of the Naqshbandi group; see J.G.J. Ter Haar 1992, 47-57);
revealed law, then, even if not the final end of religion for Sufism, can
never be marginalized since it constitutes the unique starting point for
knowledge of divine truth (understood as fulfillment of the purpose of
the law). Revelation, God's communication that initiates the venture of
Islam, is viewed by religio-legal specialists as divine command (amr)
and by religio-spiritual adepts as divine communion (wisdl), making
of Sufism not an antinomian force by which the dictates of the law are
supplanted by the passions of the heart as moral guide but rather a
hypernomian force for surpassing, without abandoning, legal rulings
for the sake of a loving kindness toward all creatures (see Cooperson
2000, 159, for early Sufi caution toward those who would abandon
law for mysticism). Mysticism, then, has something more to offer than
simple repudiation of normative convention (cf. Woods 2002, 177, on the
difference between mystical and political antinomianism in medieval
Christianity), as suggested by Ibn Arab! (d. 638/1234), towering figure
of mystical philosophy, in a letter on the universal purview of moral
character in the Sufi sense ('umum makdrim al-akhldq):
Kindly moral character (husn al-akhldq) is obligatory ... for the Prophet
(God's peace and blessing upon him) said, "Indeed I have been sent to
bring to fulfillment noble traits of character." . . . and since it is impossible
[by human effort] to be of a noble character that pleases all creatures . . . God
introduced Himself into companionship with His servants (adkhala alldh
He (God) brought the saints onto the earth, in order that He might
make them a mercy to (all) created beings
What, then, are the implications of the Sufi emphasis on inner life?7
The moral vision of Sufism will be considered by exploring (1) its aim
and practice, (2) its specific conception of religious knowledge, and (3)
the popularization of its moral vision in anecdotes and tales. We will
conclude with remarks on the socio-moral relevance of Sufism today.
Sufism in principle aims (1) to bridle the evil inclinations of one's sou
by waging jihad against its baser elements, the via purgativa, and (2) to
examine the movements of the soul, to determine which communicate
a concern for self and which a concern for God. Renunciation (zuhd),
particularly of self-interest, while a necessary preparation, is not enough
since even the ascetic might take pride in his or her sincerely performed
action. Sincerity, the wolf in sheep's clothing for Sufism, can actually lead
to an exaltation of the self out of an arrogant disdain for others whose
religious deeds may appear to be performed hypocritically - that is, only
in outward form.8 Sufis have thus long realized that there can be no "I"
at all if action is to have any moral worth; ascetical self-renunciation
must finally yield to God's possession of the soul, which is (1) initiated
7 For the rise and formation of Sufism, as movement and religious science, see Knysh
2000. It is worth spelling out here that Sufism draws heavily upon the Qur'an, source o
all Muslim religiosity: it is God's spirit that is in the human being (Q 15:29; 38:7) and His
signs that are manifest in creation (45:3) and human beings (41:53) as the noblest of Hi
creatures (17:70). Life in God as the final end is attained only via a struggle (hence, th
inner jihad) to live entirely oriented to the way of God (22:78). The preexistential covenan
made between humans in God, sealed by humankind's recognition of God's lordship (7:172)
makes humans disposed to seek God as final end in all things (2:115), His face being th
only enduring reality (28:88). The human being, created weak (4:27), is in need of prophetic
guidance to remember his true nature, and the soul must be prepared for this by recallin
God at all times (3:41, 4:103, and 76:25); the soul comes to abandon its evilly inclined state
(12:53) by reproach (75:2, understood by Sufism as self-renunciation), moving to a state -
referred to as the contented soul (89:27-28) - in which it is satisfied with God alone and
ambitious of nothing save His cause.
8 This is not to confuse Sufism with a contemporary religiosity that limits itself to
intellectual belief without concrete adherence to religio-moral norms. There are, of course,
forms of "new age" Sufism, especially in the West, that cultivate Sufi sensibilities through
ceremony and meditation with little or no interest in the legal tradition of Islam.
9 This is not to suggest a single way of imagining the mystical path in the history of
Sufism. For the mystical path without ascetical preparation, see, for example, Lawrence
1983 (on the musical dimensions of Sufism, see Lewisohn 1997).
10 Although considered foreign to "orthodox" Islam, this idea is justified by the state-
ment, found in the canonical collections of prophetic reports, that the human is created in
the image of God (surat alldh). See al-Bukhari 1999, "Kitab al-Isti'dhan," ch. 1, no. 6227:
"God created Adam in his image
13 As Lanzetta says in her study of Julian of Norwich and Teresa of Avila (Lanzetta
2005), ". . .the intention of contemplative ethics is to transform or deconstruct traditional
views of human behavior in order to bring the divine vision into the human sphere: amor
mundi."
14 See Jones 1993, 193: "The enlightened have internalized a set of factual beliefs which
permits no self-centered option to occur - they cannot commit an immoral act, that is,
an act overwhelmingly self-regarding rather than other-regarding." See also Katz 1983,
193: "There is even a special moral texture to this postmystical-event morality: it has a
special quality of selflessness. Now in harmony with God's will it is fully 'other-directed'
and unconcerned with self. It is described by Teresa and others in ways reminiscent of the
Mahayana description of the bodhisattva."
15 It is common Sufi wisdom that orientation (tawajjuh) toward God alone is only pos-
sible through a complete detachment (inqitd') from oneself and all its concerns, including
not merely the worldly but even the religious and spiritual!
considers his self to be more entitled to the thing by possessing it. How-
ever, altruistic preference is the mark of those who consider all things to
belong to God" (Abu Hafs al-Suhrawardi 1973, 250).
Its starting point in the examination and assessment of the inner
attitudes with which one performs religious and other actions, Sufism
can serve as a decimating critique of greed. Are our actions, including
religious ones, prompted by a desire for gain in some shape or form?
Good actions, if performed for self-interest (for example, generosity for
the sake of fame), become morally dubious. In his letter on divine unity,
Sheikh Arslan (see above), criticizes religiosity oriented to law as one of
self-interest (that is, seeking to gain a reward by performing God's com-
mands), praising instead religiosity oriented to love as one of selfless-
ness. The question is not one of religious duty but motive in performing
it. In short, Sufism was fundamentally concerned with the greed unwit-
tingly valorized by a religion of reward and punishment. Epitomizing
this is the popular story of the early female mystic Rabi'a al- Adawiyya
(d. 185/801), who reportedly went about with a bucket of water in one
hand, to douse the fires of hell, and a torch in the other, to burn the
gardens of paradise, so that people would love only God without concern
for recompense due them for performing their religious duties. Similarly,
the Persian mystical poet Attar (d. early 7th/13th) speaks of the promise
of heaven and threat of hell as forms of bribery, a distraction that keeps
believers from pursuing God alone (Attar 1984, 157). He depicts God
saying to David:
to say that true religiosity is interior, that is, beyond "objective" norms
determined by reason or law or scripture? Again, we are not suggesting a
religiosity of disembodied mind. Sufism has been an embodied religiosity
(hence, its keen appreciation of morals) but one oriented to the inner life
no less than the outer. This raises important questions about knowledge
used for moral decision making. We cannot detail here Sufi conceptions
of knowledge but it is necessary to touch upon them for the sake of un-
derstanding more fully the Sufi moral vision that is at once potentially
universally and still specifically religious.
Sufism has been charged, as much of religiously informed morality in
Islam, with theodicy (Awn 1983), a just morality in the mind of God that
may or may not be comprehensible to humans - in other words, a phe-
nomenon of cult potentially useful to the whims of religious and political
tyranny. Certainly all religions struggle with the sometimes contradic-
tory claims of revelation and reason but such dismissal overlooks the
Sufi insistence on mind Caql) as human organ designed for reception
of divine address. As a result, although its purpose is to engage godly
speech and not worldly ways, mind still remains mind as cognitive link
between the speech of God and its reasonable articulation in the world.18
By seeking a religiosity that goes beyond, even if not transgressing, the
law, Sufism opened the door to a sphere in which the human mind, illu-
minated by divine revelation, was licensed to discern what was best in a
given set of historical circumstances: the insight (basira) of the divinely
illuminated mind (a grace-nature amalgam) became agent of moral de-
cision making - described by Rumi as "faith-filled mind" ('aql-e imam, a
Persian coupling of two Arabic terms):
Nature desires revenge on its adversary./ Mind is like an iron chain on the
carnal soul./ It comes, preventing it, restraining it./ Mind is like a police-
inspector of good and bad./ The faith-filled mind {'aql-e imdnT) is like a
just police-inspector,/ the guardian and magistrate of the city of the heart
(shahr-e del) [Rumi 1940, 4: 721, translated edition 382].
The Sufi rendition of the story of the mind's journey to God extends
across the classical period of Islam, including such names as al-Muhasibi
(d. 243/857), Abu 1-Hasan al-'Amiri (d. 381/992), Abu Hayyan al-Tawhidi
(d. 414/1023), and al-Ghazali (d. 505/1111), culminating in many ways
in the work of Ibn Arab! (d. 638/1240, see Chittick 1994), which will
not be treated here. The significance of this story lies in its offering a
corrective to existing scholarly analysis of Sufi morality and, perhaps
more importantly, insight into the way mysticism functions within and
18 Legally minded religious scholars, it should be said, did permit room for the ratio-
cinative workings of the human mind, but within the sphere of jurisprudence and not, in
principle, as arbiter of right and wrong. Other forms of Muslim religiosity, Mu'tazili and
Shl'I, did recognize mind as arbiter of good and bad, but not without heavy criticism.
19 See Soroush 2000, 150: "The arguments concerning the primacy of religious law,
however, presuppose the dependency of human rationality on prophetic instruction and
thus the paralysis of the collective reason in dealing with worldly facts and values."
top of which stood the Isma'ih imam as divine mediator whose authority
surpassed that of the law (see Walker 1974). The Brethren of Purity, a
4th/10th century group with Gnostic leanings, used Neoplatonic ideas
to affirm the transitory character of the sensory world (including legal
rulings applicable to it) and the permanent character of the intellectual
world (see Baffioni 1998; Netton 1980). There were still others, scholars
with mystical leanings, who used a Neoplatonic body/soul-sense/intellect
duality to defend the supremacy of a decidedly Sunni vision of law in all
its details - hence, the close intellectual association in Islam between the
mystical outlook and the legal tradition.
One example of that is al-'Amiri,20 who turned to Neoplatonic notions
to demonstrate that intellectual virtues animating the life of the mind
were only fully operable when activated by a light beyond the world of
the senses; divine communication, then, exists to enlighten the mind and
disclose to it the details of the moral life which it could not possibly at-
tain with certainty by its own efforts (for the details of his argument,
see Heck 2006). The crux of his argument, spelled out in The Scope of
Eternity (al-'Amiri 1988), rests on the interconnection he makes between
the practice of religious duties and the refinement of intellectual virtues.
Discipline in the ways of traditional religiosity thus becomes the vehicle
for metaphysical enlightenment. This, however, is a two-way street: the
cultivation of logic leads to the refinement of the soul and recognition
that the norms of the religious community are the most effective means
by which to elevate it beyond the impurities of its worldly ways and
attachments. Religion, not mind alone, offers the blueprint for the meta-
physically elevated human; this journey, however, ends in illuminating
the human mind by a light beyond the sensible world, a light by which
the human being is worthy to be called God's delegate on earth and to
carry out His will for the prosperity of the lower world and the beauty of
the upper one. The Announcement of the Merits of Islam (al-'Amiri 1967),
companion piece to the above-mentioned work, completes the philosophi-
cal defense of traditional religion by arguing that the religion best suited
to elevate the human mind is, in point of fact, Islam.
A similar argument is advanced in The Book of Delight and Convivi-
ality (al-Tawhldi 2002), where the claim is made that the metaphysical
dimension of existence (al-sakma al-ildhiyya) is available to humans
through the cultivation of the light of the mind (nilr al-'aql) and other
intellectual virtues; doing so, works to replace human nature with an an-
gelic one (172). The language is highly reminiscent of Sufism, even if it
is not explicitly mentioned. In other words, human relation to the divine
20 It should be noted that al-'Amiri, although heavily imbued with Neoplatonic thinking,
was also highly proficient in Aristotelian categories of thinking as transmitted by the
Alexandrian school of late antiquity.
21 See Fakhry 1991: ". . .he [al-Ghazali] is emphatic that it is through the conjunction
of reason and revelation {al-'aql wa-l-shar') that the moral perfection of 'moderation' is
achieved. Note also that an important predecessor to al-Ghazali, the legal scholar with
Sufi inclinations, al-Raghib al-Isfahanl (fl. 5th/llth century) emphasized both philosophy
and law, stressing the preeminence of reason (179) in moral decision-making. See ibid., 181:
". . .[al- Isfahan!] observes that some theologians have contended that justice and injustice
can only be known through revelation, whereas others have asserted that they can be
known through reason prior to revelation
The fundamental noble traits of character are therefore these four virtues,
namely wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice; and all other traits con-
stitute branches of these things. A perfectly just equilibrium in these four
has been attained by no one but the Messenger of God (God's peace and
blessing upon him), while others are of divergent degrees of closeness to
them. Thus one is close to God the Exalted in proportion to his closeness
to the Messenger of God (God's peace and blessing upon him). Those who
combine within themselves all of these traits are worthy to be powerful
rulers among humans whom all creatures obey and follow in their deeds
[22].
as closest to God, embodied His will for creation. What we have with
al-Ghazall's oeuvre is essentially a greatly expanded and much more
explicitly Sufi reformulation of al-'Amiri's metaphysical argument: reli-
gious action as prescribed by the revealed law paves the way for mystical
detachment, and revelation, as grasped by the mind, guides one to a godly
character, reflected in one's love of God, which, however, is to be regu-
lated, if necessary, by recourse to Aristotelian equilibrium. It should thus
not surprise us that so much of al-Ghazali's work - above all his magnum
opus, The Revivification of the Religious Sciences - aims to broaden the
moral scope of Islam as defined by the law through a coordination of the
inner dimensions of morality with the outer ones. Mystical at its core,
his argument begins with confidence in the mind's ability to choose god-
liness and to bridge the gap between divine potency and human agency,
defining epistemic subject - not legal or theological objectivity - as the
domain in which religious (that is, religio-moral) knowledge was to be
finally realized.
22 For example, a Sufi manual compiled by Yahya Bakharzi (d. 776/1336), speaks of
three levels of ethics (Waley 1999, 305), in order of rank: the exoteric pursued by worldly
minded people, the religious pursued by the ascetically minded, and the esoteric pursued
by the mystically minded.
dhikr or sama') and the superior noble qualities that result from this
intimate communion with word of God as exemplified in the life of His
prophet. In other words, the Sufi way (tariqa) enables a ritual identifi-
cation with and embodiment (or assumption) of moral knowledge (the
virtues of the Prophet) believed not only to embrace but also to go be-
yond the rules and regulations of the law and, indeed, to be based upon
privileged (that is, experiential) access to the knowledge of God:
. . . from among the classes of the people of knowledge the Sufis enjoy a
distinct place for their active response to the recited verses of the book
of God the Exalted and narrated reports of [the life of] the messenger of
God (God's peace and blessing upon him) . . . that summon to noble moral
qualities (makdrim al-akhldq) and encourage [aspiration to] the heights
of mystical states and virtuous action, informing us of the high stations
and elevated positions occupied by a specific group of the believers [that is,
the Sufis] . . . and that is the ethical behavior of the messenger (God's peace
and blessing upon him) and one of his moral qualities, as he [the Prophet]
said: "It is God who has given me an ethical formation and perfected my
conduct." As God said to the Prophet (Q 68:4): "Indeed you are of great
moral character." That is found in the writings of the religious scholars
and jurists but they do not understand it, nor is it something they can
derive, as they do in the other religious sciences. Apart from Sufis, none
from among those who possess knowledge and concern themselves with just
rectitude (qist ) share in [understanding] that [statement by God] , except to
acknowledge it and believe it to be true [that is, since these moral qualities
of the prophet are metalegal and metatheological and therefore outside
the scope of the exoterically definable) . . . such as the divine realities of
repentance (haqd'iq al-tawba) . . . intricacies of piety . . . [mystical] ranks of
those who have placed their trust entirely [in God] , stations of those who are
satisfied [with God alone], degrees of patience, and, similarly. . .concern
[that is, for the consequences and not only definable status of one's actions] ,
humbleness [before God], fear and hope [which together indicate a constant
awareness of God] , longing [for God] , contemplation [of God's presence] ,
placing oneself [in God's hands] , and [inner] tranquility, mystical certainty,
and contentment [al-Sarraj, 1914, 13-14].
What comes across most strongly in the Sufi manuals is the consen-
sus that the morality of Islam culminates in kindness (ihsdn) toward
others, regardless of outward status, rank or association, resulting in
an altruistic attitude toward other creatures, even one's enemies, with-
out, however, a resulting transgression of legal and theological commit-
ments.23 Allusion to the distinction between the morality of the outer life
(justice) and that of the inner life (kindness) is made in what is perhaps
the most widely respected manual of Sufism, composed by al-Qushayrl
(d. 465/1073) who, in commenting on Q 31:20, says:
The outer aims to straighten moral character [that is, a moral range limited
to the prevention of behavior at odds with the law] . The inner aims to purify
moral character [that is, a moral range not limited to the prevention of
antinomian behavior and productive of a good not circumscribed by law]
[al-Qushayri 2001, 159].
I was with our sheikh [Abu 1-NajIb-that is, his uncle] on his journey to
Damascus when one of the villagers sent food to him in the presence of the
Crusader captives who were in chains. The table was set and the captives
were to wait until he finished but he said to a servant: "Fetch the captives
so that they might sit at the table with the Sufi brethren." He brought
them and seated them at the table in a single row. The sheikh got up from
his rug [a sign of his spiritual authority], walked over to them and sat with
them as if one among them. He ate and they ate, and it was made manifest
to us on his face the humility before God that was at work within him, the
contrition and detachment from pride over them on account of his faith,
knowledge, and action [Abu Hafs al-Suhrawardi 1973, 241].
Even at this time this type of thinking was widely known. Long before
Abu Hafs al-Suhrawardi set pen to paper, Sufism had already speci-
fied a term to designate this other-centered kindness: altruistic prefer-
ence {Tthdr), as described in an anonymous manual on Sufism from the
4th/10th century:
character." And Sufis imitate the Prophet (God's peace and blessing upon
him) in everything, even his character, for it is said that Sufism is kind-
ness. There are signs of the moral character that belongs to Sufis, as he
(God's peace and blessing upon him) said: "Man truly outstrips by his kind-
ness the rank of those who fast and pray [that is, other-centered kindness
has a moral status superior to action prescribed by law]." Those who fast
and pray do so only for themselves [that is, to assure their own stand-
ing before God]. Kindness extends beyond that to the other (ild l-ghayr),
for it is by it [that is, other-centered kindness] that the believer is made
to rejoice and the heart of every Muslim is gladdened. It is said that the
end of Sufism is kindness: By kindness, the infidel comes to desire Islam,
the ignorant are swayed from their ignorance, God comes to be beloved by
His creatures, charity and [social] harmony are achieved, and all good is
realized . . . [Radtke 1991, 44-45].
To be sure, the poor mentioned in the above passage may refer not to all
needy creatures but to other members of one's Sufi group, who are often
designated poor ifaqir) for their renunciation of all save God. In a certain
sense, the other-centered morality of Sufism is primarily meant for one's
Sufi confreres, in whose companionship one learns kindness and comes
to embody it. It is here that one sees the overlap between moral character
and communal etiquette in Sufism. Life within a Sufi group is explicitly
described in terms of companionship (suhba) and service (khidma); this,
however, has moral ramifications beyond the parameters of the Sufi con-
fraternity. That is, surrender to the way of the Sufi group to which one be-
longs, including the demands of companioning and serving its members
and especially its master, cultivates in Sufi associates and adepts alike an
altruistic preference for others in general, as epitomized in yet another
Sufi manual: "One is to prefer others over oneself with an altruism the
grace of which is [meant] for others" (al-Kalabadhi [d. 380/990] 2001, 62).
Significant, then, is the moral formation one undergoes in the fraternal
life of a Sufi group, where the behavior expected of its members works
to foster self-detachment, an important criterion, as discussed above, for
leading a life animated not by one's own worldly affairs and concerns but
by God and God alone: this close connection between self-detachment and
the mystical life is underlined in a saying attributed to a proto-Sufi, al-
Fudayl b. 'Iyad (d. 187/803), who, when asked about humility, responded:
"Deferring to divine truth (or the divine reality), being led by it, accept-
ing it from those who speak it and from those from whom you hear it -
Whoever gives a value to himself has no portion in humility" (Abu Hafs
al-Suhrawardl 1973, 240).
Certainly, this surrender to a Sufi group and its ways is open to
abuse - not to mention spiritual cronyism but it is fair to say that the
close bonding, aesthetic sensibility, and mutual love nurtured within a
Sufi group fosters a Sufi awareness of the human being primarily as
24 For insightful analysis of Sufi manuals composed during the 5th-6th/llth-12th cen-
turies, see Mojaddedi 2001.
25 See al-Maqdisi 1899, vol. 5, 148, on Sufism as he observed it in the 4th/10th century:
"To sum up their affair: They do not aspire to a known way [of worship] nor a compre-
hensible creed because their religious professions involves interior movements and images
(yadinuna bi-l-khawdtir wa-l-makhd'U), and they shift from one opinion to another. Among
them are those who believe in divine incarnation (hulill). I heard one of them claim that
He [that is, God] dwelt amidst the sides of beardless youth. Among them are those who
believe in libertinism and disregard [of religious duties] (al-ibdha wa-l-ihmdl) and are not
moved by the censure of those who reprimand them. Among them are those who believe in
absolution i'udhr), which means that infidels (kuffdr) are absolved of their infidelity and
refusal to believe since [truth] has not been made manifest to them but remains hidden
from them. Among them are those who say that God does not punish anyone and does not
concern Himself with His creation [but for their prayer, see Q 25:77 - that is, He is inter-
ested not in punishing them but in responding to their prayer]. Among them are those
who completely deny the divine attributes and are committed to pure heresy. They pursue
eating, drinking, listening to music, and the whims of the carnal soul."
26 See Waley 1999, 305, who notes the emphasis in Bakharzi's manual of Sufism that
". . .[a] virtue essential to the Sufi seeker is that of speaking only well of people."
is, freedom from the worldly ambitions of the carnal soul - engenders
not only a profound sense of contentment or conviction (qand'a) but also
humility (tawddu') toward all as the fruit of a love (mahabba) of God
exclusive of oneself.27 Self-detachment, again, demands the absence of
self-concern, which is maintainable only by putting others first in an
attitude of service: "Those who see a value in themselves have not fully
tasted the service of freedom" (90). These words are most likely meant to
signify service within the Sufi group and especially obedience in service
to the directives of its sheikh but the idea of detachment from all but
God (185) does have moral consequences of universal proportion: "If the
servant [of God] has entirely mastered the state of kindness but harms
one of his chickens, he cannot be ranked among those who are kind"28
(157).
Indeed, even those guilty of the cardinal sin in Islam - polytheism -
are to be viewed with such a merciful attitude, as exemplified in a state-
ment attributed to the Prophet, who, when asked to implore God to at-
tack the polytheists, said: "I have been sent as a mercy not a torment"
(160). This universal kindness, which should not be taken as religious
relativism,29 was considered to be closely connected to the Sufi concep-
tion of humility as anecdotally described in a report related elsewhere:
"Whoever knows the hidden depths of his soul does not covet prestige
and honor and travels the path of humility. He does not quarrel with
those who criticize him and is grateful to God for those who commend
him
27 There has been a debate in Sufism over the idea of God loving humans as they did
Him. Some, including al-Qushayri, felt it was going too far to attribute to God a love for
humans of the kind humans have for Him, since it would violate His transcendence (see
Abrahamov 2003, 33-34).
28 See Waley 1999, 306, who summarizes the moral vision of Bakharzi's manual of Su-
fism in the following terms: "Humility, good fellowship, hospitality and service to all kinds
of people are essentials according to Yahya Bakharzl." Such virtues are modeled in the be-
havior of the great Sufi masters, as Waley notes in quoting directly from Bakharzi's manual
(ibid., 306): "Najm al-Din Kubra (d. 618/1221, eponymous founder of the Kubrawiyya con-
fraternity), God's greetings upon him, used to put out a tray upon which he would collect
the clothes of travelers (or guests: musdfirdn), and would wash them with his own blessed
hands."
29 See, for example, al-Ghorab 1993, who argues that Ibn 'Arabi, while promoting a
Sufism that saw all creation (and even non-Muslim forms of belief) as witnessing the
existence of God as singular reality, was clear in maintaining that such a view of existence
was possible only through Islam.
The tailor would take it [without remark] . One day, when he had business
away from his shop, the Zoroastrian came and paid counterfeit dirham to
his assistant, who would not accept it; and so the Zoroastrian paid sound
dirham. When the tailor returned, he said to his assistant: "Where is the
shirt of the Zoroastrian?" When the assistant told him what had happened,
he said: "What evil you have done. He has been treating me like that for
some time, and I've borne it patiently, casting the counterfeit money in a
well, lest another be harmed by it" [159].
with impunity and their possessions to be ownerless [lit. licit for all to take] ...
the Sufi's lack of regard for himself and all that is worldly allows him
to transform a potential curse into an actual blessing, as suggested in a
story illustrating the moral character of Qays b. 'Asim al-Minqari: "Once,
when sitting in his house, a female servant passed with a hot skewer,
which dropped from her hand and fell on one of his sons, who died. She
was bewildered but he said: 'Do not be afraid. You are free for the sake
[lit. face] of God the Exalted"' (157). The manumission in response to the
unintended death of his son is meant not only to underscore mystical
detachment but to suggest the moral possibilities at hand when bad
things happen. In other words, the manumission represents not merely
a legal act which frees the servant from the bondage of physical slavery
but also an act of absolution, which both guarantees a more lenient legal
ruling for her unintended act of homicide and, more significantly, orients
her toward God as source of all life:32 mystical insight resulting in moral
fruit.
The moral vision of Sufism was further elaborated in hagiographical
tales, a model for imitation by both Sufi disciples and a more general
audience. In the first of two examples to be given here, it is narrated
(al-Munawwar 1992, 216-18) that one of the pioneers of institutional
Sufism, Abu Sa'id b. Abi 1-Khayr (d. 449/1049), was confronted one day
by an arrogant ascetic who judged the Sufi parties of Abu Sa'id and
his disciples to be a mockery of true religion. This ascetic, however, was
unaware of the many years of austerity that had preceded Abu Sa'id's
entry into the mystical life, the joys of which he now witnessed in song
and dance and communal friendship as well as prayer. The ascetic sought
to humble Abu Sa'id by challenging him to a 40-day fast. The ascetic
fasted according to accepted norms, which allows a certain amount of
daily food but Abu Sa'id abstained from food entirely, and yet - as the
fast proceeded - looked more and more fit and rotund, sang and danced
joyfully with his disciples and commanded them to feast in his sight. The
ascetic became so enfeebled that he could no longer rise to perform even
the prescribed prayers (to say nothing of supererogatory ones), which
built upon three characteristics: devotion to poverty and neediness; realizing sacrifice and
altruistic preference; and abandonment of resistance and choice."
32 For a story of Sufi indifference even to death of children, see Rumi 1940, vol. 3, 471-72
(trans. 101-02). Such a story is not to suggest a callous or uncaring attitude on the part of
Sufis toward their children, but a deeper awareness that all things, including children, are
part of a singular divine reality, regardless of physical death, which, for the mystic, is not a
separation - in the words of the Sufi sheikh to his wife (trans. 102): "Whether they are all
dead or living, when are they absent and hid from the eye of the heart?/ Inasmuch as I see
them distinct before me, for what reason should I rend my face as thou doest?/ Although
they are outside of Time's revolution, they are with me and playing around me./ Weeping
is caused by severance or by parting; I am united with my dear ones and embracing them./
(Other) people see them (their dear ones) in sleep; I see them plainly in (my) waking state."
Abu Sa'id continued to perform in accordance with the law. Finally, the
ascetic admitted defeat and confessed his arrogance.
The story does not end there. Abu Sa'id declared that since he had
agreed to the ascetic's challenge (fasting for 40 days with permission
to use the toilet), the ascetic must now agree to his: eating for 40 days
without permission to use the toilet. Needless to say, Abu Sa'id consumed
all sorts of savory food for 40 days without using the toilet, and the
ascetic - quickly unable to endure the test - renounced his former ways
and placed himself at the service of the Sufi master.
Hagiographical agenda notwithstanding, the point is clear: the re-
formulation of moral judgment via mystical awareness, which, as pre-
sented here in literary form, refuses to hold in disdain or even rebuke
the arrogant ascetic - the possible outcome if the story were limited to
the fasting contest. Rather, the mystical awareness made manifest in
the life of Abu Sa'id works to transform the ascetic's heart by a playful
inversion of accepted attitudes about religion, epitomized in the eating
contest. The ascetic acquired only arrogance from his asceticism, a sign
of attachment to his own sincerity (again, the wolf in sheep's clothing
for Sufism), whereas Abu Sa'id, the mystical comedian, heals the ar-
rogance of the ascetic by helping him to see a truth beyond the law,
namely humble service of others who manifest that divine truth. Rebuk-
ing the other for his or her moral waywardness or lack of sociomoral
politesse is the goal of ordinary moral standards (what one should or
should not do according to recognized sociolegal norms), while inner
transformation of the wayward is the goal of extraordinary morality -
what is beyond "should" and "should not" for the sake of a relation
that can endure all and thus becomes itself the mechanism of moral
conversion. The Sufi is not merely a servant i'abd) to the commands
and prohibitions (awdmir wa-nawdhi, that is, fard'id) of God, but also
an ally (wall) in communion with God through a relation animated by
a spirituality of supererogatory prayer (nawdfil) beyond what the law
prescribes.
A second example comes from the pen of Attar and speaks of antino-
mian action in the service of moral truth, namely the fostering of harmo-
nious relations beyond the demands of a legally defined justice (Attar
1984, 57-75). In his widely popular mystical epic, The Conference of the
Birds, Attar tells the tale of a piety-minded sheikh residing in Mecca
and depicted as the leading religious scholar of his day and master of
the law and all the religious sciences. Religious sincerity circumscribed
by the normative tradition, however, does not leave him satisfied. He is
troubled by a dream in which he sees himself in Constantinople bowing
to a Christian idol. Unable to rid himself of this dream, he sets off for the
Byzantine capital, where he encounters a Christian girl with a beauty
33 A reference to the light of God experienced as intoxicating union rather than a sober
engagement with created reality (see below). The intoxication of the mystical union -
rapture - is ultimately judged self-indulgent and spiritually immature. This state is un-
derstood by al-Ghazali as a deceptive veil, which keeps one from true mysticism (see al-
Ghazali 1998, 52). In other words, those in a state of rapture lose control of both sense
(hiss) and mind Caql), the very things necessary for the moral life as established by God
and heard and discerned by human beings. Those who remain in rapture submit not to
God and His ways but to the whims of their own spiritual pleasure, failing to see that the
final goal is not mystical rapture but orientation to God regardless of circumstances or the
state of one's soul.
result, not moral transgression. The goal is not rebellion against the
tradition but its reformulation in light of a higher moral vision.
The truth of the matter comes out when the sheikh's disciples despair
of saving him and return to Mecca to consult with a close companion of the
sheikh, most likely a reference to God. This companion accuses them of
abandoning the sheikh, their friend: "Fair-weather friends who run when
great men fall./ He put on Christian garments - so should you; / He took
their faith - what else had you to do?/ This was no friendship, to forsake
your friend, to promise your support and at the end/ abandon him - this
was sheer treachery./ Friend follows friend to hell and blasphemy./ When
sorrows come, a man's true friends are found" (70). The startling message
here is that the moral good is based exclusively on neither law nor love.
The good cannot be limited to doing the good, however defined but is
fundamentally a matter of living with others, such that one is willing to
endure all, even the evil others can sometimes beget, for the sake of a
relation of commitment to the other. Moral truth lies fundamentally in
a sustained relation with others no less than with God.
Confessing their error, the sheikh's disciples undertake acts of penance
to atone for their sinfulness. They too, no less than their sheikh, had been
guilty of self-commitment, remaining tied to the tug of the carnal soul
that blocks the manifestation of the divine reality within. The poet is
thus making the point that the anxieties we have about our existence
cannot be adequately resolved in a misdirected mysticism by which one
allegedly conquers such anxieties by claiming a mystical knowledge that
goes beyond recognized sociomoral norms and justifies the subjection of
others to one's own needs and inclinations. Rather, as 'Attar suggests,
mysticism can play a role in putting a stop to the perturbations that
these anxieties bring about in the soul by advancing the more accurate
recognition that there is actually nothing at the core of one's heart to
be perturbed, a recognition brought about and borne out by an altruis-
tic orientation of oneself to others rather than self. And so, the acts of
penance performed by the sheikh's disciples have their effect, for upon
returning to their sheikh, they find in their midst "the Prophet, lovely
as the moon,/ whose face, Truth's shadow, was the sun at noon" (71).
It is thus the Prophet, again, who acts as gateway to true relation
with God. One may not be able to gaze directly into the divine light
of the sun - that is, intoxicated union with God and a resultant moral
blindness - but can look at its revealed reflection in the moon. It is in
encountering the Prophet - who for Sufis lives on after his death in a
transformed existence accessible to the faithful (see Meier 1999) - that
one's heart is kindled with a desire to be, like him, close to God and
the moral embodiment of His word.34 It is the Prophet who as locus of
34 It is often said in Sufi works that the Qur'an constitutes the Prophet's moral qualities
(see, for example, Waley 1999, 305 and Abu Najlb al-Suhrawardl 1977, 19).
4. Conclusions
What import does all of this have for today? First, it is importan
to recognize that Sufism has played an integral role in the moral li
of Muslim society as a hypernomian force, seeking ethical meaning
shari'a beyond a simple implementation of its legal rulings. Sufism
35 For the political role played by Sufism, see P.L. Heck (ed.), Sufism and Politics,
forthcoming as an issue of Princeton Papers. Interdisciplinary Journal of Middle Eastern
Studies.
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