Philosophy: The Big Questions Series Editor: James P. Sterba, University of Notre Dame, Indiana Designed to elicit a philosophical response in the mind of the student, this distinctive series of anthologies provides essential classical and contemporary readings that serve to make the central questions of philosophy come alive for today’s students. It presents complete coverage of the Anglo-American tradition of philosophy, as well as the kinds of questions and challenges that it confronts today, both from other cultural traditions and from theoretical movements such as feminism and postmodernism. Aesthetics: the Big Questions Edited by Carolyn Korsmeyer Epistemology: the Big Questions Edited by Linda Martin Alcoff Ethics: the Big Questions Edited by James P, Sterba Metaphysics: the Big Questions Edited by Peter van Inwagen and Dean W. Zimmerman Philosophy of Language: the Big Questions Edited by Andrea Nye Philosophy of Religion: the Big Questions Edited by Eleonore Stump and Michael J. Murray Race, Class, Gender, and Sexuality: the Big Questions Edited by Naomi Zack, Laurie Shrage, and Crispin SartwellEPISTEMOLOGY: The Big Questions EDITED BY LINDA MARTIN ALCOFF BLACKWE LLCopyright © Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1998 First published 1998 24681097531 Blackwell Publishers Ine. 350 Main Street Malden, Massachusetts 02148 USA Blackwell Publishers Ltd 108 Cowley Road Oxford OX4 LF UK All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purposes of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. Except in the United States of America, this book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, resold, hired out, or otherwise circulated without the publisher's prior consent in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser. Library of Congress Cataloging in-Publication Data Epistemology : the big questions / edited by Linda Martin Alcoff. p. cm. — (Philosophy, the big questions ; 3) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-631-20579-9 — ISBN 0-631-20580-2 (pbk.) 1. Knowledge, Theory of. 1. Alcoff, Linda. II, Serics BD161.E63 1998 121—de21 97-51452 cir British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ppeset in 10% on 12% pt Galliard by Ace Filmsetting Ltd, Frome, Somerset Printed in Great Britain by T.J. International, Padstow, Cornwall This book is printed on acid-free paperCONTENTS Preface Acknowledgments PART ONE WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE? Introduction Meditations RENE DESCARTES On Certainty Lopwic Wrrrcensteis The Right to Be Sure A.J. AYER Epistemology’s End CATHERINE Z. ELGIN PART TWO HOW ARE BELIEFS JUSTIFIED? 10 Introduction Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology Wittiam P. Atston The General Conditions of Knowledge: Justification Care GINET What is Justified Belief? Atvin GotpMan Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions KertH DeRose Taking Subjectivity into Account LorRAINE Cope The Practices of Justification ALESSANDRA TANESINI viii xi 20 26 41 43 45 fe 89 109 124 152CONTENTS PART THREE WHAT IS THE STRUCTURE OF KNOWLEDGE? Introduction The Myth of the Given Roperick CHISHOLM ‘The Raft and the Pyramid Ernesr Sosa The Elements of Coherentism Laurence BonJour The Hermeneutic Circle Hans-GrorG GADAMER PART FOUR WHAT IS NATURALIZED EPISTEMOLOGY? Introduction Epistemology Naturalized W. V.O. Quine Whaat is “Naturalized Epistemology”? Jaecwon Kim Putting Naturalized Epistemology to Work Puviuis Rooney PART FIVE WHAT IS TRUTH? 18 19 20 Introduction ‘The Minimal Theory Paut Horwictt Language, Truth and Reason Tay Hackinc Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism Rucuiarp Rorry PART SIX WHAT IF WE DON'T KNOW ANYTHING AT ALL? 21 22 23 Introduction Cartesian Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation JonaTHAN VOGEL Skepticism and the Possibility of Knowledge Bargy STROUD Othello’s Doubt/Desdemona’s Death: The Engendering of Scepticism Naomi ScHEMAN PART SEVEN HOW IS EPISTEMOLOGY POLITICAL? 24 Introduction The “Maleness” of Reason Genevieve Lioyp. 165, 167 169 187 210 232 249 251 253 265 285 307 309 311 322 336 349 351 352 360 365 383 385 387CONTENTS 25 Alternative Epistemologies 392 ‘Cartes W. MILs 26 Idols of the Cave 411 Mary Ties AND Jim TILES Index 440 viPREFACE Epistemology is a philosophical inquiry into the nature of knowledge, what justifies a belief, and what we mean when we say that a claim is true. As such, epistemology may scem daunting, but actually epistemological questions face us everyday. IfI read something in the newspaper and believe what I have read, can I then be said to “know” it? Am I justified in believing what a teacher tells me, or what I remember of a past event, or only that which I can “see with my own eyes”? Is the most recently accepted scientific theory “true,” even though it is likely to be modified or rejected in the future? If we cannot rely on science for the truth, how do we know we know anything at all? Epistemology in the context of western philosophy is often thought to have begun with Plato, especially in the Theaetetus, where knowledge is first formu- lated as justified true belief; but as a self-conscious area of inquiry and as a coherent, developing conversation, it is usually dated from René Descartes’ Meditations, a section of which opens this volume. Descartes initiated a radical challenge to tradition, and thus was a major influence on later Enlightenment philosophers, by calling all of his beliefs into doubt. Taking their lead from Descartes, many epistemologists since have been preoccupied with refuting skepticism and establishing both the possibility as well as the limits of human knowledge. For the last hundred years or so, however, epistemologists have shifted away from such ambitions toward more delimited questions, particu- larly those concerned with problems of justification, the organizational struc- ture of knowledge, the meanings of epistemic terms, and the psychology of belief formation. ‘The twentieth-century linguistic turn, which translated traditional philosophi- cal problems into questions about language, had a significant impact on episte- mology as well as other fields, suggesting that the problem of knowledge was at bottom a problem concerning how to use the verb “to know” correctly, and that a close analysis of linguistic practice could answer most if not all of our epistemological questions. Perhaps most dramatic was the impact on accounts of truth, which came to be widely understood as a sort of exclamation point on a sentence without substantive meaning. Alternative to the focus on language was a focus on psychology and the scientific study of cognition, instigated by viiiPREFACE W. V. O. Quine’s argument that epistemology could find its answers by simply studying how believers actually justify their beliefs. This development, known today as the naturalized approach to epistemology, is also included in this vol- ume. These two twentieth-century trends in epistemology ~ the trend toward lin- guistic analysis and the trend toward a naturalistic approach ~ drove a broad wedge between the conversations about knowledge that were occurring mostly among Anglo-American philosophers and those occurring mostly among other European philosophers. Within the latter conversation, represented in this vol- ume by Hans-Georg Gadamer, Ian Hacking, and Mary and Jim Tiles, the prob- lem of history looms large for knowledge. That is, if our processes of knowing (or, as Hacking puts it, “styles of reasoning”) evolve historically, and if we as knowers are historically conditioned by the available modes of perception and self-reflection present in our cultural era, then how can we rely on even our best methods as routes to truth? Actually, such a skeptical conclusion as this rhetori- cal question might scem to invite is not the general European (or “continen- tal”) response to the problem of history in relation to knowledge, but rather a reconfigured metaphysical account of what our claims to truth in reality entail. ‘The differences between Anglo-American and continental approaches to phi- losophy sometimes divert attention from the significant differences that exist within Anglo-American philosophy itself. The centrality of the problem of skepticism to epistemology is a case in point. Some have thought that episte- mology is fundamentally or at least unavoidably concerned with skepticism. David Hume believed, for example, that sustained reflection about knowledge will eventually generate a skeptical attitude toward any claims to certainty. This reminds us of the adage about Socrates, that he knew enough to know that he didn’t really know much at all. If Hume is correct, and epistemology is under- stood to be a sustained reflection about knowledge, then the need to consider and refute skepticism would seem to be its necessary core project. One result of this approach is that some proposed theories of knowledge, such as coherentism, will be rejected on the grounds that they cannot supply such a refutation. Coherentists hold that belief are justified on the basis of their ability to cohere with our web of beliefs, but what if the whole web is itself false? Unless coherentism can justify the web of beliefs as a whole, the coherentist procedure does not guarantee epistemic justification at all. However, not all Anglo-American epistemologists agree about the centrality of skepticism in this way. Some hold that we know that we know at least some things, and the best way to ascertain the features of knowledge is then to ex- plore what it is about the knowledge we do have that makes it knowledge. Going more on the offensive, others have argued that the concept of skepticism. does not make sense, that it is incoherent in itself or self-refuting, since it re- quires some beliefs to generate a skeptical doubt in the first place, or because the skeptic is forced into a performative contradiction between the doxastic requirements of everyday life (“there is a truck barreling towards me”) and their putative philosophical commitments. More recently, in this century, some have argued that the project to refute skepticism presupposes the possibility of char-acterizing all of our beliefs in one totalizing heap, of standing back from them as it were and assessing their status as a group. Thus, if sustained reflection on knowledge leads one to entertain general skeptical doubts, perhaps we should reflect, as Wittgenstein suggests, on how we are going about the process of reflection itself, and with what questions, concepts, and methodological com- mitments we begin. For this volume, essays are collected from a wide range of philosophical start- ing points in order to generate a more comprehensive exploration of epistemo- logical problems. My eye has been toward the future, and for that reason I have not included essays dealing with the Gettier problem, a chapter of epistemology that looks (thankfully) to be closing. Itis my hope that in the future, twentieth- century impediments to conversations across diverse approaches in epistemol- ogy can be overcome. The fruitful results of this new dialogue will likely invigorate the field and resolve some stalemated debates. My graduate students at Syracuse University, to whom I dedicate this book, have inspired me to think creatively and optimistically about the future of philosophy. I would like especially to thank Heather Battaly, Marc Hight, and Eric Ramirez-Weaver for their invalu- able editorial assistance. I am also very grateful to William Alston and Nancy Tuana for their helpful advice.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The editor and publishers gratefully acknowledge the following for permission to reproduce copyright material: Cambridge University Press: for “Meditations” in Descartes: Philosophical Writ- ings, Vol. 2, translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. Reprinted with the permission of Cambridge University Press; for Ernest Sosa, “The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge,” pp. 165-91 in Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Copyright © 1991, Cambridge University Press, reprinted with the permission of Cambridge University Press; Blackwell Publishers: for Ludwig Wittgenstein, “On Certainty;” for Paul Horwich, “The Minimal Theory,” pp. 1-14 in Truth (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990); for Mary Tiles and Jim Tiles, “Idols of the Cave,” pp. 1-6 and 169-212 in An Introduction to Historical Epistemology: The Authority of Knowledge (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993); The Estate of A. J. Ayer: for “The Right to Be Sure,” pp. 25-6, 31-5, and 41- 4 in The Problem of Knowledge by A. J. Ayer (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1956); Princeton University Press: for Catherine Elgin, “Epistemology’s End,” pp. 3~ 20 in Considered Judgment (1996). Copyright © 1996 by Princeton University Press, reprinted by permission of Princeton University Press; Philosophical Topics. for William P. Alston, “Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology from Philosophical Topics, 14, No. 1 (1986), pp. 185-226; Kluwer Academic Publishers: for Carl Ginet, “The General Conditions of Knowl- edge: Justification,” pp. 28-39 and 63-4 in Knowledge, Perception, and Memory (D. Reidel, 1975). Reproduced with kind permission from Kluwer Academic Publishers; for Alvin Goldman, “What is Justified Belief” pp. 1-23 in Justifica- xiACKNOWLEDGMENTS tion and Knowledge, edited by George Pappas (D. Reidel, 1979). Reprinted with kind permission from Kluwer Academic Publishers; Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: for Keith DeRose, “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions” in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52 (December 1992), pp. 913-29. Reprinted by kind permission of the publish- ers; Routledge, Inc.: for Lorraine Code, “Taking Subjectivity into Account,” pp. 23-57 in Rhetorical Spaces (Routledge, 1993). Copyright © 1993. Reproduced by permission of Routledge, Inc.; Alessandra Tanesini: for “The Practices of Justification;” The Trustees of Princeton University: for Roderick Chisholm, “The Myth of the Given” in The Foundations of Knowing. Copyright © 1983 The Trustees of Princeton University. Reprinted with the permission of the Trustees of Princeton University; Harvard University Press: for Laurence BonJour, “The Elements of Coherentism,” pp. 87-110 in Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985). Copyright © 1985 by the President and Fellows of Harvard University. Reprinted by permission of the publisher; The Continuum Publishing Company: for Hans-Georg Gadamer, “The Hermeneutic Circle and the Problem of Prejudices,” pp. 265-85 in Truth and Method (1989). English translation copyright © 1975 by Sheed and Ward Ltd, second revised edition copyright © 1989 by The Continuum Publishing Com- pany, reprinted by permission of The Continuum Publishing Company; Columbia University Press: for W. V. O. Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized,” pp. 69-90 in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, Copyright © 1969 by Columbia University Press. Reprinted with permission of the publisher; Ridgeview Publishing Company: for Jaegwon Kim, “What is ‘Naturalized Epis- temology’?” pp. 381-405 in Philosophical Perspectives, 2, Epistemology, 1988, edited by James E. Tomberlin (copyright by Ridgeview Publishing Co., Atascadero, CA). Reprinted by permission of Ridgeview Publishing Company; Phyllis Rooney: for “Putting Naturalized Epistemology to Work;” MIT Press: for Ian Hacking, “Language, Truth and Reason,” pp. 48-66 in Rationality and Relativism, edited by Hollis (MIT Press). Reprinted by per- mission of the publisher; American Philosophical Association: for Richard Rorty, “Pragmatism, Relativ- xiACKNOWLEDGMENTS ism, and Irrationalism” in Proceedings and Addresses, Vol. 50, No. 6, pp. 719- 38, reprinted by kind permission of the American Philosophical Association and the author; The Journal of Philosophy. for Jonathan Vogel, “Cartesian Skepticism and Infer- ence to the Best Explanation” in The Journal of Philosophy, LXXXVI, 11, (No- vember 1990), pp. 658-66, reprinted by kind permission of the publishers and the author; The Journal of Philosophy. for Barry Stroud, “Skepticism and the Possibility of Knowledge” in The Journal of Philosophy, LXXXI, 11, (October 1984), pp. 545— 51, reprinted by kind permission of the publishers; Academic Printing and Publishing: for Naomi Scheman, “Othello’s Doubt/ Desdemona’s Death: The Engendering of Scepticism,” pp. 57-74 in Power, Gender, Values, edited by Judith Genova (Edmonton, AB: Academic Printing and Publishing, 1987). Reprinted by kind permission of Academic Printing and Publishing; University of Minnesota Press: for Genevieve Lloyd, “The ‘Maleness’ of Rea- son,” pp. 103-10 and p. 122 in The Man of Reason: “Male” and “Female” in Western Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). Re- printed by kind permission of the University of Minnesota Press; Social Theory and Practice: for Charles W. Mills, “Alternative Epistemologies” in Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 14, No. 3, (Fall 1988), pp. 237-63, re- printed by kind permission of the publisher and the author; Every effort has been made to trace the copyright holders but if any have been inadvertently overlooked the publishers will be pleased to make the necessary arrangements at the first opportunity. The publishers apologize for any errors or omissions in the above list and would be gratcful to be notified of any correc- tions that should be incorporated in the next edition or reprint of this book. xiPART ONE WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE? Introduction 1 Meditations RENE DESCARTES 2 On Certainty Lupwic Wir tGENsTEIN 3. The Right to Be Sure A.J. AYER 4 Epistemology’s End CATHERINE Z.. ELGINIntroduction René Descartes (1596-1650) was a French philosopher, mathematician, and scientist who, although writing well before the Enlightenment, had the cour- age and audacity to challenge the validity of all his beliefs, including his belief in God. Ironically, in pursuing the farthest reaches of what can be doubted, Descartes found the basis of knowledge itself. Descartes’ meditations upon which of his beliefs might survive the test of rational doubt created a legacy that em- phasized the need to justify our beliefs through tests of reason, logic, and clar- ity. Thus, for Descartes, only those beliefs which have survived the rigor of such tests can be called knowledge. The two essays following the section taken from Descartes’ Meditations offer representative twentieth-century approaches to knowledge through considera- tions of how and when we use the verb “to know.” A. J. Ayer (1910-89) un- derstands the question of knowledge as a question of meaning, since knowledge must be expressed in meaningful sentences before its status can be evaluated. Ayer then uses the norms of everyday language to flesh out and ultimately sup- port the classical definition of knowledge as justified true belief. One’s “right to be sure,” or to be confident in making knowledge claims, can best be elucidated through an account of the rules of language. Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), writing before Ayer, was actually the in- stigator behind this linguistic approach to philosophical problems, However, in this excerpt from his late work, On Certainty, Wittgenstein suggests some rather different conclusions to Ayer. It is not so much that philosophical problems can be solved through a turn toward linguistic practice, but that they can thereby be revealed as specious. He suggests we ask, when does doubt arise in the course of everyday knowledge, and when does it not arise. Wittgenstein seems to be mis- chievously suggesting that sustained philosophical reflections have only con- fused our understanding of what is necessary in order to have the “right to be See Catherine Elgin’s essay elegantly distinguishes between three types of episte- mological approach, thus introducing the range of contemporary positions run- ning from forms of foundationalism and positivism on the one hand all the way toward forms of idealism and postmodernism on the other. She organizes this range of options into three general conceptions of what knowledge is, and con- trasts these with regard to their real-world applicability and whether they avoid relativism or skepticism. Taking issue with Ayer and Wittgenstein, Elgin argues that our choice between these approaches will be largely based on, not just linguistic rules, but our metaphysical intuitions and accounts of the real. ‘What, then, is knowledge? Perhaps this term itself admits of more than one valid definition, depending on what project one is engaged in. Below is a range of such projects. Further Reading Cottingham, John. Descartes. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986.INTRODUCTION Dancy, Jonathan. An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985. Hacker, P. M.S. Insight and Illusion: Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein. Revised edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986. Russell, Bertrand. The Problems of Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1912.1 Meditations René Descartes MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY in which are demonstrated the existence of God and the distinction between the human soul and the body First Meditation What can be called into doubt Some years ago I was struck by the large number of falsehoods that I had ac- cepted as true in my childhood, and by the highly doubtful nature of the whole edifice that I had subsequently based on them. I realized that it was necessary, once in the course of my life, to demolish everything completely and start again right from the foundations if I wanted to establish anything at all in the sciences that was stable and likely to last. But the task looked an enormous one, and I began to wait until I should reach a mature enough age to ensure that no subsequent time of life would be more suitable for tackling such inquiries. This led me to put the project off for so long that I would now be to blame if by pondering over it any further I wasted the time still left for carrying it out. So today I have expressly rid my mind of all worries and arranged for myselfa clear stretch of free time. I am here quite alone, and at last I will devote myself sincerely and without reservation to the general demolition of my opinions. But to accomplish this, it will not be necessary for me to show that all my opinions are false, which is something I could perhaps never manage. Reason now leads me to think that I should hold back my assent from opinions which are not completely certain and indubitable just as carefully as I do from those which are patently false. So, for the purpose of rejecting all my opinions, it will be enough if I find in each of them at least some reason for doubt. And to do this I will not need to run through them all individually, which would be an endless task. Once the foundations of a building are undermined, anything built on them collapses of its own accord; so I will go straight for the basic principles on which all my former beliefs rested. Whatever I have up till now accepted as most true I have acquired either from the senses or through the senses. But from time to time I have found that the senses deceive, and it is prudent never to trust completely those who have de- ceived us even once. Yet although the senses occasionally deceive us with respect to objects which are very small or in the distance, there are many other beliefs about which doubtRENE DESCARTES is quite impossible, even though they are derived from the senses — for example, that I am here, sitting by the fire, wearing a winter dressing-gown, holding this piece of paper in my hands, and so on. Again, how could it be denied that these hands or this whole body are mine? Unless perhaps I were to liken myself to madmen, whose brains are so damaged by the persistent vapours of melancholia that they firmly maintain they are kings when they are paupers, or say they are dressed in purple when they are naked, or that their heads are made of earthen- ware, or that they are pumpkins, or made of glass. But such people are insane, and I would be thought equally mad if T took anything from them as a model for myself. ‘A brilliant piece of reasoning! As if I were not a man who sleeps at night, and regularly has all the same experiences! while asleep as madmen do when awake ~ indeed sometimes even more improbable ones. How often, asleep at night, am I convinced of just such familiar events — that I am here in my dressing- gown, sitting by the fire - when in fact I am lying undressed in bed! Yet at the moment my eyes are certainly wide awake when I look at this piece of paper; I shake my head and it is not asleep; as I stretch out and feel my hand I do so deliberately, and I know what I am doing. All this would not happen with such distinctness to someone asleep. Indeed! As if I did not remember other occa- sions when I have been tricked by exactly similar thoughts while asleep! As I think about this more carefully, I see plainly that there are never any sure signs by means of which being awake can be distinguished from being asleep. The result is that I begin to feel dazed, and this very feeling only reinforces the notion that I may be asleep. ‘Suppose then that I am dreaming, and that these particulars ~ that my eyes are open, that I am moving my head and stretching out my hands - are not true. Perhaps, indeed, I do not even have such hands or such a body at all. Nonetheless, it must surely be admitted that the visions which come in sleep are like paintings, which must have been fashioned in the likeness of things that are real, and hence that at least these general kinds of things — eyes, head, hands and the body as a whole ~ are things which are not imaginary but are real and exist. For even when painters try to create sirens and satyrs with the most extraordi- nary bodies, they cannot give them natures which are new in all respects; they simply jumble up the limbs of different animals. Or if perhaps they manage to think up something so new that nothing remotely similar has ever been seen before - something which is therefore completely fictitious and unreal — at least the colours used in the composition must be real. By similar reasoning, al- though these general kinds of things eyes, head, hands and so on ~ could be imaginary, it must at least be admitted that certain other even simpler and more universal things are real. These are as it were the real colours from which we form all the images of things, whether true or false, that occur in our thought. This class appears to include corporeal nature in general, and its extension; the shape of extended things; the quantity, or size and number of these things; the place in which they may exist, the time through which they may endure? and so on. Soa reasonable conclusion from this might be that physics, astronomy, medi- 6MEDITATIONS. cine, and all other disciplines which depend on the study of composite things, are doubtful; while arithmetic, geometry and other subjects of this kind, which deal only with the simplest and most general things, regardless of whether they really exist in nature or not, contain something certain and indubitable. For whether I am awake or asleep, two and three added together are five, and a square has no more than four sides. It seems impossible that such transparent truths should incur any suspicion of being false. And yet firmly rooted in my mind is the long-standing opinion that there is an omnipotent God who made me the kind of creature that I am. How do I know that he has not brought it about that there is no earth, no sky, no ex- tended thing, no shape, no size, no place, while at the same time ensuring that all these things appear to me to exist just as they do now? What is more, since I sometimes believe that others go astray in cases where they think they have the most perfect knowledge, may I not similarly go wrong every time I add two and three or count the sides of a square, or in some even simpler matter, if that is imaginable? But perhaps God would not have allowed me to be deceived in this way, since he is said to be supremely good. But if it were inconsistent with his goodness to have created me such that I am deceived all the time, it would seem equally foreign to his goodness to allow me to be deceived even occasionally; yet this last assertion cannot be made. Perhaps there may be some who would prefer to deny the existence of so powerful a God rather than believe that everything else is uncertain, Let us not argue with them, but grant them that everything said about God is a fiction. According to their supposition, then, I have arrived at my present state by fate or chance or a continuous chain of events, or by some other means; yet since deception and error seem to be imperfections, the less powerful they make my original cause, the more likely it is that I am so imperfect as to be deceived all the time. I have no answer to these arguments, but am finally compelled to admit that there is not one of my former beliefs about which a doubt may not properly be raised; and this is not a flippant or ill-considered conclusion, but is based on powerful and well thought-out reasons. So in future I must withhold my assent from these former beliefs just as carefully as I would from obvious falschoods, if I want to discover any certainty.* But it is not enough merely to have noticed this; I must make an effort to remember it. My habitual opinions keep coming back, and, despite my wishes, they capture my belief, which is as it were bound over to them as a result of long occupation and the law of custom, I shall never get out of the habit of confi- dently assenting to these opinions, so long as I suppose them to be what in fact they are, namely highly probable opinions — opinions which, despite the fact that they are in a sense doubtful, as has just been shown, it is still much more reasonable to believe than to deny. In view of this, I think it will be a good plan to turn my will in completely the opposite direction and deceive myself, by pretending for a time that these former opinions are utterly false and imaginary. I shall do this until the weight of preconceived opinion is counter-balanced and the distorting influence of habit no longer prevents my judgement from per- ceiving things correctly. In the meantime, I know that no danger or error willRENE DESCARTES result from my plan, and that I cannot possibly go too far in my distrustful attitude. This is because the task now in hand does not involve action but merely the acquisition of knowledge. I will suppose therefore that not God, who is supremely good and the source of truth, but rather some malicious demon of the utmost power and cunning has employed all his energies in order to deceive me. I shall think that the sky, the air, the earth, colours, shapes, sounds and all external things are merely the delu- sions of dreams which he has devised to ensnare my judgement. I shall consider myself as not having hands or eyes, or flesh, or blood or senses, but as falsely believing that I have all these things. I shall stubbornly and firmly persist in this meditation; and, even if it is not in my power to know any truth, I shall at least do what is in my power; that is, resolutely guard against assenting to any false- hoods, so that the deceiver, however powerful and cunning he may be, will be unable to impose on me in the slightest degree. But this is an arduous undertak- ing, and a kind of laziness brings me back to normal life. Iam like a prisoner who is enjoying an imaginary freedom while asleep; as he begins to suspect that he is asleep, he dreads being woken up, and goes along with the pleasant illusion as Jong as he can. In the same way, I happily slide back into my old opinions and dread being shaken out of them, for fear that my peacefil sleep may be followed by hard labour when I wake, and that I shall have to toil not in the light, but amid the inextricable darkness of the problems I have now raised. Second Meditation The nature of the human mind, and how it is better known than the body So serious are the doubts into which I have been thrown as a result of yester- day’s meditation that I can neither put them out of my mind nor see any way of resolving them. It feels as if I have fallen unexpectedly into a deep whirlpool which tumbles me around so that I can neither stand on the bottom nor swim up to the top. Nevertheless I will make an effort and once more attempt the same path which I started on yesterday. Anything which admits of the slightest doubt I will set aside just as if I had found it to be wholly false; and I will proceed in this way until I recognize something certain, or, if nothing else, until Tat least recognize for certain that there is no certainty. Archimedes used to demand just one firm and immovable point in order to shift the entire earth; so I too can hope for great things if I manage to find just one thing, however slight, that is certain and unshakeable. T will suppose then, that everything I see is spurious. I will believe that my memory tells me lies, and that none of the things that it reports ever happened. Thave no senses. Body, shape, extension, movement and place are chimeras. So what remains true? Perhaps just the one fact that nothing is certain. Yet apart from everything I have just listed, how do I know that there is not something else which does not allow even the slightest occasion for doubt? Is 8MEDITATIONS there not a God, or whatever I may call him, who puts into me® the thoughts I am now having? But why do I think this, since I myself may perhaps be the author of these thoughts? In that case am not I, at least, something? But I have just said that I have no senses and no body. This is the sticking point: what follows from this? Am I not so bound up with a body and with senses that I cannot exist without them? But I have convinced myself that there is absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Does it now follow that I too do not exist? No: if I corivinced myself of something’ then I certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. So after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that this propo- sition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind. But I do not yet have a sufficient understanding of what this “I” is, that now necessarily exists. So I must be on my guard against carelessly taking something else to be this “I”, and so making a mistake in the very item of knowledge that I maintain is the most certain and evident of all. I will therefore go back and meditate on what I originally believed myself to be, before I embarked on this present train of thought. I will then subtract anything capable of being weak- ened, even minimally, by the arguments now introduced, so that what is left at the end may be exactly and only what is certain and unshakeable. What then did I formerly think I was? A man. But what is a man? Shall I say “a rational animal”? No; for then I should have to inquire what an animal is, what rationality is, and in this way one question would lead me down the slope to other harder ones, and I do not now have the time to waste on subtleties of this kind, Instead I propose to concentrate on what came into my thoughts spontaneously and quite naturally whenever I used to consider what I was. Well, the first thought to come to mind was that I had a face, hands, arms and the whole mechanical structure of limbs which can be seen in a corpse, and which I called the body. The next thought was that I was nourished, that I moved about, and that I engaged in sense-perception and thinking; and these actions I attributed to the soul. But as to the nature of this soul, either I did not think about this or else I imagined it to be something tenuous, like a wind or fire or ether, which permeated my more solid parts. As to the body, however, I had no doubts about it, but thought I knew its nature distinctly. If I had tried to describe the mental conception I had of it, I would have expressed it as follows: by a body I understand whatever has a determinable shape and a defin- able location and can occupy a space in such a way as to exclude any other body; it can be perceived by touch, sight, hearing, taste or smell, and can be moved in various ways, not by itself but by whatever else comes into contact with it. For, according to my judgement, the power of self:movement, like the power of sensation or of thought, was quite foreign to the nature of a body; indeed, it was a source of wonder to me that certain bodies were found to contain facul- ties of this kind.RENE DESCARTES But what shall I now say that I am, when I am supposing that there is some supremely powerful and, if it is permissible to say so, malicious deceiver, who is deliberately trying to trick me in every way he can? Can I now assert that I possess even the most insignificant of all the attributes which I have just said belong to the nature of a body? I scrutinize them, think about them, go over them again, but nothing suggests itself; it is tiresome and pointless to go through the list once more. But what about the attributes I assigned to the soul? Nutri- tion or movement? Since now I do not have a body, these are mere fabrications. Sense-perception? This surely docs not occur without a body, and besides, when asleep I have appeared to perceive through the senses many things which I afterwards realized I did not perceive through the senses at all. Thinking? At last Ihave discovered it - thought; this alone is inseparable from me. I am, I exist - that is certain. But for how long? For as long as I am thinking. For it could be that were I totally to cease from thinking, I should totally cease to exist. At present I am not admitting anything except what is necessarily true. I am, then, in the strict sense only a thing that thinks;* that is, I am a mind, or intelligence, or intellect, or reason — words whose meaning I have been ignorant of until now, But for all that I am a thing which is real and which truly exists. But what kind of a thing? As I have just said - a thinking thing. What else am I? I will use my imagination.’ I am not that structure of limbs which is called a human body. I am not even some thin vapour which permeates the limbs - a wind, fire, air, breath, or whatever I depict in my imagination; for these are things which I have supposed to be nothing. Let this supposition stand,” for all that I am still something. And yet may it not perhaps be the case that these very things which I am supposing to be nothing, because they are unknown to me, are in reality identical with the “I” of which I am aware? I do not know, and for the moment I shall not argue the point, since I can make judgements only about things which are known to me. I know that I exist; the question is, what is this “I” that I know? If the “I” is understood strictly as we have been taking it, then itis quite certain that knowledge of it does not depend on things of whose existence I am as yet unaware; so it cannot depend on any of the things which I invent in my imagination. And this very word “invent” shows me my mistake. It would indeed be a case of fictitious invention if I used my imagination to establish that I was something or other; for imagining is simply contemplating the shape or image of a corporeal thing, Yet now I know for certain both that I exist and at the same time that all such images and, in gen- eral, everything relating to the nature of body, could be mere dreams [and chimeras). Once this point has been grasped, to say “I will use my imagination to get to know more distinctly what I am” would seem to be as silly as saying “I am now awake, and sce some truth; but since my vision is not yet clear enough, I will deliberately fall asleep so that my dreams may provide a truer and clearer representation.” I thus realize that none of the things that the imagination enables me to grasp is at all relevant to this knowledge of myself which I pos- sess, and that the mind must therefore be most carefully diverted from such things" if it is to perceive its own nature as distinctly as possible. But what then am I? A thing that thinks, What is that? A thing that doubts, 10MEDITATIONS understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory perceptions. This is a considerable list, if everything on it belongs to me. But does it? Is it not one and the same “I” who is now doubting almost everything, who none- theless understands some things, who affirms that this one thing is true, denies everything else, desires to know more, is unwilling to be deceived, imagines many things even involuntarily, and is aware of many things which apparently come from the senses? Are not all these things just as true as the fact that I exist, even if | am asleep all the time, and even if he who created me is doing all he can to deceive me? Which of all these activities is distinct from my thinking? Which of them can be said to be separate from myself? The fact that it is I who am doubting and understanding and willing is so evident that I see no way of mak- ing it any clearer. But it is also the case that the “I” who imagines is the same “[>, For even if, as I have supposed, none of the objects of imagination are real, the power of imagination is something which really exists and is part of my thinking. Lastly, it is also the same “I” who has sensory perceptions, or is aware of bodily things as it were through the senses. For example, I am now seeing light, hearing a noise, fecling heat. But I am asleep, so all this is false. Yet I certainly seem to sce, to hear, and to be warmed. This cannot be false; what is called “having a sensory perception” is strictly just this, and in this restricted sense of the term it is simply thinking. From all this I am beginning to have a rather better understanding of what I am. But it still appears — and I cannot stop thinking this ~ that the corporeal things of which images are formed in my thought, and which the senses inves- tigate, are known with much more distinctness than this puzzling “I” which cannot be pictured in the imagination. And yet it is surely surprising that I should have a more distinct grasp of things which I realize are doubtful, un- known and foreign to me, than I have of that which is true and known ~ my own self, But I see what it is: my mind enjoys wandering off and will not yet submit to being restrained within the bounds of truth. Very well then; just this once let us give it a completely free rein, so that after a while, when itis time to tighten the reins, it may more readily submit to being curbed. Let us consider the things which people commonly think they understand most distinctly of all; that is, the bodies which we touch and see. I do not mean bodies in general — for general perceptions are apt to be somewhat more con- fused - but one particular body. Let us take, for example, this piece of wax. It has just been taken from the honeycomb; it has not yet quite lost the taste of, the honey; it retains some of the scent of the flowers from which it was gath- ered; its colour, shape and size are plain to see; it is hard, cold and can be handled without difficulty; if you rap it with your knuckle it makes a sound. In short, it has everything which appears necessary to enable a body to be known as distinctly as possible. But even as I speak, I put the wax by the fire, and look: the residual taste is eliminated, the smell goes away, the colour changes, the shape is lost, the size increases; it becomes liquid and hot; you can hardly touch it, and if you strike it, it no longer makes a sound. But does the same wax remain? It must be admitted that it does; no one denies it, no one thinks rtRENE DESCARTES otherwise. So what was it in the wax that I understood with such distinctness? Evidently none of the features which I arrived at by means of the senses; for whatever came under taste, smell, sight, touch or hearing has now altered — yet the wax remains, Perhaps the answer lies in the thought which now comes to my mind; namely, the wax was not after all the sweetness of the honey, or the fragrance of the flowers, or the whiteness, or the shape, or the sound, but was rather a body which presented itself to me in these various forms a little while ago, but which now exhibits different ones. But what exactly is it that I am now imagining? Let us concentrate, take away everything which does not belong to the wax, and see what is left: merely something extended, flexible and changeable. But what is meant here by “flexible” and “changeable”? Is it what I picture in my imagina- tion: that this piece of wax is capable of changing from a round shape to a square shape, or from a square shape to a triangular shape? Not at all; for I can grasp that the wax is capable of countless changes of this kind, yet I am unable to run through this immeasurable number of changes in my imagination, from which it follows that it is not the faculty of imagination that gives me my grasp of the wax as flexible and changeable. And what is meant by “extended”? Is the extension of the wax also unknown? For it increases if the wax melts, increases again if it boils, and is greater still if the heat is increased. I would not be making a correct judgement about the nature of wax unless I believed it capable of being extended in many more different ways than I will ever encompass in my imagination. I must therefore admit that the nature of this piece of wax is in no way revealed by my imagination, but is perceived by the mind alone. (I am speaking of this particular piece of wax; the point is even clearer with regard to wax in general.) But what is this wax which is perceived by the mind alone?” It is of course the same wax which I see, which I touch, which I picture in my imagination, in short the same wax which I thought it to be from the start. And yet, and here is the point, the perception I have of it"? is a case not of vision or touch or imagination - nor has it ever been, despite previous appearances ~ but of purely mental scrutiny; and this can be imperfect and confused, as it was before, or clear and distinct as it is now, depending on how carefully I concen- trate on what the wax consists in. But as I reach this conclusion I am amazed at how [weak and] prone to error my mind is. For although I am thinking about these matters within myself, silently and without speaking, nonetheless the actual words bring me up short, and I am almost tricked by ordinary ways of talking. We say that we see the wax itself, if it is there before us, not that we judge it to be there from its colour or shape; and this might lead me to conclude without more ado that knowledge of the wax comes from what the eye sees, and not from the scrutiny of the mind alone. But then if I look out of the window and see men crossing the square, as I just happen to have done, I normally say that I sce the men themselves, just as I say that I see the wax. Yet do I see any more than hats and coats which could conceal automatons? I judge that they are men. And so something which I thought I was seeing with my eyes is in fact grasped solely by the faculty of judgement which is in my mind. 12 | | | |MEDITATIONS. However, one who wants to achieve knowledge above the ordinary level should feel ashamed at having taken ordinary ways of talking as a basis for doubt. So let us proceed, and consider on which occasion my perception of the nature of the wax was more perfect and evident. Was it when I first looked at it, and believed I knew it by my external senses, or at least by what they call the “common” sense — that is, the power of imagination? Or is my knowledge more perfect now, after a more careful investigation of the nature of the wax and of the means by which it is known? Any doubt on this issue would clearly be foolish; for what distinctness was there in my earlier perception? Was there anything in it which an animal could not possess? But when I distinguish the wax from its outward forms — take the clothes off, as it were, and consider it naked - then although my judgement may still contain errors, at least my perception now requires a human mind. But what am I to say about this mind, or about myself? (So far, remember, I am not admitting that there is anything else in me except a mind.) What, I ask, is this “I” which seems to perceive the wax so distinctly? Surely my awareness of my own self is not merely much truer and more certain than my awareness of the wax, but also much more distinct and evident. For if I judge that the wax exists from the fact that I see it, clearly this same fact entails much more evi- dently that I myself also exist. It is possible that what I see is not really the wax; it is possible that I do not even have eyes with which to see anything, But when I see, or think I see (I am not here distinguishing the two), it is simply not possible that I who am now thinking am not something. By the same token, if Tjudge that the wax exists from the fact that I touch it, the same result follows, namely that I exist. If I judge that it exists from the fact that I imagine it, or for any other reason, exactly the same thing follows. And the result that I have grasped in the case of the wax may be applied to everything else located outside me. Moreover, if my perception of the wax seemed more distinct" after it was established not just by sight or touch but by many other considerations, it must be admitted that I now know myself even more distinctly. This is because every consideration whatsoever which contributes to my perception of the wax, or of any other body, cannot but establish even more effectively the nature of my own mind. But besides this, there is so much else in the mind itself which can serve to make my knowledge of it more distinct, that it scarcely seems worth going through the contributions made by considering bodily things. Isee that without any effort I have now finally got back to where I wanted, I now know that even bodies are not strictly perceived by the senses or the faculty of imagination but by the intellect alone, and that this perception derives not from their being touched or seen but from their being understood; and in view of this I know plainly that I can achieve an easier and more evident perception of my own mind than of anything else. But since the habit of holding on to old opinions cannot be set aside so quickly, I should like to stop here and meditate for some time on this new knowledge I have gained, so as to fix it more deeply in my memory. 13LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN Notes 1“... and in my dreams regularly represent to myself the same things” (French version). . the place where they are, the time which measures their duration” (French version). «... yet I cannot doubt that he does allow this” (French version). in the sciences” (added in French version), nevertheless it is in my power to suspend my judgement” (French version), puts into my mind” (Erench version) or thought anything at all” (French version) The word “only” is most naturally taken as going with “a thing that thinks,” and this interpretation is followed in the French version. When discussing this passage with Gassendi, however, Descartes suggests that he meant the “only” to govern “in the strict sense.” 9... t0 see if I am not something more” (added in French version), 10 Lat. mancat (“let it stand”), first edition. The second edition has the indicative maner. “The proposition still stands, viz. that I am nonetheless something.” The French version reads: “without changing this supposition, I find that I am still certain that I am something.” 11... from this manner of conceiving things” (French version). 12“... which can only be conceived by the understanding or the mind” (French version). 13... .or rather the act whereby it is perceived” (added in French version). 14 The French version has “more clear and distinct” and, at the end of this sentence, “more evidently, distinctly and clearly.” v ean wD 2 On Certainty Ludwig Wittgenstein 1 Ifyou do know that here is one band,! we'll grant you all the rest. When one says that such and such a proposition can’t be proved, of course that does not mean that it can’t be derived from other propositions; any proposition can be derived from other ones. But they may be no more certain than it is itself. (On this a curious remark by H. Newman.) 2. From its seeming to me — or to everyone - to be so, it doesn’t follow that it isso. What we can ask is whether it can make sense to doubt it. 5 Whether a proposition can turn out false after all depends on what I make count as determinants for that proposition. 7 My life shews that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on. - I tell a friend, e.g. “Take that chair over there,” “Shut the door,” etc. etc 14ON CERTAINTY 10 I know that a sick man is lying here? Nonsense! I am sitting at his bedside, Lam looking attentively into his face. - So I don’t know, then, that there is a sick man lying here? Neither the question nor the assertion makes sense. Any more than the assertion “I am here,” which I might yet use at any moment, if suitable occasion presented itself. - Then is “2 x 2 = 4” nonsense in the same way, and not a proposition of arithmetic, apart from particular occasions? “2 x 2 = 4” is a true proposition of arithmetic- not “on particular occasions” nor “always” — but the spoken or written sentence “2x 2 = 4” in Chinese might have a different meaning or be out and out nonsense, and from this is seen that it is only in use that the proposition has its sense. And “I know that there’s a sick man lying here,” used in an unsuitable situation, seems not to be nonsense but rather seems matter-of- course, only because one can fairly easily imagine a situation to fit it, and one thinks that the words “I know that ... ” are always in place where there is no doubt, and hence even where the expression of doubt would be unintelligible. 20 | “Doubting the existence of the external world” does not mean for ex- ample doubting the existence of a planet, which later observations proved to exist. - Or does Moore want to say that knowing that here is his hand is differ- entin kind from knowing the existence of the planet Saturn? Otherwise it would be possible to point out the discovery of the planet Saturn to the doubters and say that its existence has been proved, and hence the existence of the external world as well. 24. The idealist’s question would be something like: “What right have I not to doubt the existence of my hands?” (And to that the answer can’t be: I know that they exist.) But someone who asks such a question is overlooking the fact that a doubt about existence only works in a language-game. Hence, that we should first have to ask: what would such a doubt be like?, and don’t under- stand this straight off. 31 The propositions which one comes back to again and again as if be- witched - these I should like to expunge from philosophical language. 33. Thus we expunge the sentences that don’t get us any further. 45 We got to know the nature of calculating by learning to calculate. 46 But then can’t it be described how we satisfy ourselves of the reliability of a calculation? O yes! Yer no rule emerges when we do so. — But the most important thing is: The rule is not needed. Nothing is lacking. We do calculate according to a rule, and that is enough. 47 Thisis how one calculates. Calculating is this. What we learn at school, for example. Forget this transcendent certainty, which is connected with your concept of spirit. 48 However, out of a host of calculations certain ones might be designated as reliable once for all, others as not yet fixed. And now, is this a /agical distinc- tion? 49 But remember: even when the calculation is something fixed for me, this is only a decision for a practical purpose. 74 Can we say: a mistake doesn’t only have a cause, it also has a ground? Le., roughly: when someone makes a mistake, this can be fitted into what he knows aright. |LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN 83. The truth of certain empirical propositions belongs to our frame of ref- erence. 90 “I know” has a primitive meaning similar to and related to “I see” (“wissen,” “videre”). And “I knew he was in the room, but he wasn’t in the room” is like “I saw him in the room, but he wasn’t there.” “I know” is sup- posed to express a relation, not between me and the sense of a proposition (like “I believe”) but between me and a fact. So that the fact is taken into my con- sciousness, (Here is the reason why one wants to say that nothing that goes on in the outer world is really known, but only what happens in the domain of what are called sense-data.) This would give us a picture of knowing as the perception of an outer event through visual rays which project it as itis into the eye and the consciousness. Only then the question at once arises whether one can be certain of this projection. And this picture does indeed show how our imagination presents knowledge, but not what lies at the bottom of this pres- entation. 94 But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false. 95 The propositions describing this world-picture might be part of a kind cof mythology. And their role is like that of rules ofa game; and the game can be learned purely practically, without learning any explicit rules. 109 “An empirical proposition can be tested” (we say). But how? and through what? 110) What counts as its test? - “But is this an adequate test? And, if so, must it not be recognizable as such in logic?” ~ As if giving grounds did not come to an end sometime. But the end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting. 117. Why is it not possible for me to doubt that I have never been on the moon? And how could I try to doubt it? First and foremost, the supposition that perhaps I have been there would strike me as idle. Nothing would follow from it, nothing be explained by it. It would not tie in with anything in my life. When I say “Nothing speaks for, everything against it,” this presupposes a principle of speaking for and against. That is, I must be able to say what would speak for it. 141 When we first begin to believe anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, it is a whole system of propositions. (Light dawns gradually over the whole.) 142 Iis not single axioms that strike me as obvious, it is a system in which consequences and premises give one another mutual support. 160 The child learns by believing the adult. Doubt comes after belief. 166 The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing. 191 Well, if everything speaks for an hypothesis and nothing against it — is it then certainly true? One may designate it as such. — But does it certainly agree with reality, with the facts? - With this question you are already going round in a circle. 16ON CERTAINTY 192 To be sure there is justification; but justification comes to an end. 193 What does this mean: the truth of a proposition is certain? 194 With the word “certain” we express complete conviction, the total ab- sence of doubt, and thereby we seck to convince other people. That is subjective certainty. But when is something objectively certain? When a mistake is not possible. But what kind of possibility is that? Mustn’t mistake be lagically excluded? 195 If I believe that I am sitting in my room when I am not, then I shall not be said to have made a mistake. But what is the essential difference between this case and a mistake? 196 Sure evidence is what we accept as sure, it is evidence that we go by in acting surely, acting without any doubt. What we call “a mistake” plays a quite special part in our language games, and so too does what we regard as certain evidence. 199 The reason why the use of the expression “true or false” has something misleading about it is that it is like saying “it tallies with the facts or it doesn’t,” and the very thing that is in question is what “tallying” is here. 200 Really “The proposition is either truc or false” only means that it must be possible to decide for or against it. But this does not say what the ground for such a decision is like. 203 [Everything? that we regard as evidence indicates that the earth already existed long before my birth. The contrary hypothesis has nothing to confirm it at all. If everything speaks for an hypothesis and nothing against it, is it objectively certain? One can call it that. But does it necessarily agree with the world of facts? At the very best it shows us what “agreement” means. We find it difficult to imagine it to be false, but also difficult to make use of it.] What does this agreement consist in, if not in the fact that what is evidence in these language games speaks for our proposition? (Tractatus Lagico-Philosophicus) 204 Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; ~ but the end is not certain propositions striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game. 205 If the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, nor yet false. 209 The existence of the earth is rather part of the whole picture which forms the starting-point of belief for me. 211 Now it gives our way of looking at things, and our researches, their form. Perhaps it was once disputed. But perhaps, for unthinkable ages, it has belonged to the scaffolding of our thoughts. (Every human being has parents.) 214 What prevents me from supposing that this table either vanishes or alters its shape and colour when no one is observing it, and then when someone looks at it again changes back to its old condition? - “But who is going to suppose such a thing!” - one would feel like saying. 215 Here we see that the idea of “agreement with reality” does not have any clear application. 7LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN 217 If someone supposed that all our calculations were uncertain and that we could rely on none of them (justifying himself by saying that mistakes are always possible) perhaps we would say he was crazy. But can we say he is in error? Does he not just react differently? We rely on calculations, he doesn’t; we are sure, he isn’t. 221 Can I be in doubt at will? 225 What I hold fast to is not one proposition but a nest of propositions. 226 Can I give the supposition that I have ever been on the moon any serious consideration at all? 229 Our talk gets its meaning from the rest of our proceedings. 230 We are asking ourselves: what do we do with a statement “I know .”? For it is not a question of mental processes or mental states. And thar is how one must decide whether something is knowledge or not. 231 If someone doubted whether the earth had existed a hundred years ago, I should not understand, for this reason: I would not know what such a person would still allow to be counted as evidence and what not. 232 “We could doubt every single one of these facts, but we could not doubt them all.” Wouldn’t it be more correct to say: “we do not doubt them all,” Our not doubting them all is simply our manner of judging, and therefore of acting. 243 One says “I know” when one is ready to give compelling grounds. “I know” relates to a possibility of demonstrating the truth. Whether someone knows something can come to light, assuming that he is convinced of it. But if what he believes is of such a kind that the grounds that he can give are no surer than his assertion, then he cannot say that he knows what he believes. 247 What would it be like to doubt now whether I have two hands? Why can’t I imagine it all? What would I believe if 1 didn’t believe that? So far I have no system at all within which this doubt might exist. 248 I have arrived at the rock bottom of my convictions. And one might almost say that these foundation-walls are carried by the whole house. 250 My having two hands is, in normal circumstances, as certain as any- thing that I could produce in evidence for it. ‘That is why I am not in a position to take the sight of my hand as evidence for it. 253. Arthe foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is not founded. 292 Further experiments cannot give the lie to our earlier ones, at most they may change our whole way of looking at things. 336 But what men consider reasonable or unreasonable alters. At certain periods men find reasonable what at other periods they found unreasonable. And vice versa, Bur is there no objective character here? Very intelligent and well-educated people believe in the story of creation in the Bible, while others hold it as proven false, and the grounds of the latter are well known to the former. 341 That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the 18ON CERTAINTY fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn. 342 That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted. 343 Butit isn’t that the situation is like this: We just can’t investigate eve- rything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put. 344 My /ifé consists in my being content to accept many things. 354 Doubting and non-doubting behaviour. There is the first only if there is the second. 357 One might say: “I know’ expresses comfortable certainty, not the cer- tainty that is still struggling.” 358 Now I would like to regard this certainty, not as something akin to hastiness or superficiality, but as a form of life. (That is very badly expressed and probably badly thought as well.) 359 But that means I want to conceive it as something that lies beyond being justified or unjustified; as it were, as something animal. 380 I might go on: “Nothing in the world will convince me of the oppo- site!” For me this fact is at the bottom of all knowledge. I shall give up other things but not this. 382 That is not to say that nothing in the world will in fact be able to convince me of anything else. 383 The argument “I may be dreaming” is senseless for this reason: if | am dreaming, this remark is being dreamed as well - and indeed it is also being dreamed that these words have any meaning. 418 Is my understanding only blindness to my own lack of understanding? It often seems so to me. 559 You must bear in mind that the language-game is so to say something unpredictable. I mean: it is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or un- reasonable). It is there — like our life. Notes 1 See G. E. Moore, “Proof of an External World”, Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol XXV, 1939; also “A Defence of Common Sense” in Contemporary British Phi- losophy, 2nd Series, ed. J. H. Muirhead, 1925. Both papers are in Moore’s Philosophi- cal Papers, London, George Allen Unwin, 1959. (Editors.) 2. Passage crossed out in ms. (Editors.) 19j INTERNALISM AND EXTERNALISM IN EPISTEMOLOGY sider the popular idea that what justifies me in beliefs about my own current conscious states is that such beliefs are infallible, that is, are such that I couldn’t mistakenly form such a belief, But how could that fact justify those beliefs un- less I were cognizant of the infallibility? If | am unaware of their infallibility, and they have no other justification, am I not proceeding irresponsibly in forming such beliefs? Just as the mere fact that X is about to attack me will not justify my striking X unless I have good reason to suppose that he is about to attack me, so the mere fact that current feeling beliefs are infallible can’t justify me in accept- ing them unless I at least have good reason to regard them as infallible. Pari ‘passu, the mere fact that I am being appeared to treely cannot render me justi- fied in believing that there is a tree in front of me, unless I am justified in believing that I am being appeared to treely. If | am unaware of the existence of the warrant-conferring fact then, for me, it is just as if it did not exist. How can a fact of which I take no account whatever have any bearing on what itis permis- sible for me to do, in the way of action or of belief? Thus it would seem that my being justified in believing that q is at least a necessary condition of q’s playing 2 role in justifying my belief that p. Bur it is also a sufficient condition. Provided I am justified in believing that beliefs about current feelings of the subject are infallible, what more could be required to legitimate those beliefs? Even if they are not in fact infallible, how can that prevent its being permissible for me to accept them? If, so far as I can tell, there are facts that strongly support the supposition that p, then surely it is all right for me to give my assent to p. What more could be demanded of me? I have done all I can. What the actual facts are over and above what I am most justified in believing is something I cannot be held responsible for. Once I have marshaled all the cognitive resources available to me to determine the matter, I have, in my body of justified beliefs, the closest approximation I can make to the actual facts. That is the best I have to go on, and it would be quite unrea- sonable to suggest that I ought to be going on something else instead. What I am justified in believing provides sufficient as well as necessary conditions for the justification of further beliefs.”22 How does this line of argument go beyond simply displaying internalist (PI) intuitions? It does so by grounding those intuitions in a particular conception of justification, one that makes epistemic justification a matter of the subject’s normative situation, a matter of how the subject’s believing that p stands vis-- Vis relevant intellectual norms, standards, obligations, duties, and the like. If S's believing that p is nor in contravention of relevant intellectual obligations, then it is permissible for him to believe that p, he cannot be rightly blamed for doing 50, it is all right for him to hold that belief, he is in the clear in so believing. Let's call this a “deontological” conception of epistemic justification. The argu- ment just presented exhibits the PI constraint as flowing from what justification is, as thus conceived. Since whether I am justified in believing that p depends on whether I could rightfully be blamed or held to account for so believing, then what is crucial for whether I am justified is the way the relevant facts appear from my perspective; justification depends on what the relevant facts are like, 50 {far as I can tell, For that is what is crucial for whether I can be blamed for my 55WILLIAM P. ALSTON belief. If and only if my belief is adequately supported so far as I can tell, 1 cannot be blamed for the belief.28 Elsewhere I have explored the deontological conception and contrasted it with the very different “strong position” (SP) conception, as well as distin- guishing various versions of each.” Roughly speaking, to be SP justified in be- lieving that p is to believe that p in such a way as to be in a strong position thereby to attain the truth and avoid error. It is to believe that p in a “truth conducive” way. It is for one’s belief to have been formed in such a way or on such a basis that one is thereby likely to be believing correctly. Note that each conception omits the crucial emphasis of the other, thereby implicitly denying it to be necessary for justification. Freedom from blameworthiness, being in the clear as far as one’s intellectual duties are concerned, is totally ignored by the “strong position” theorist. So long as one forms one’s beliefin a way that is well calculated to get the truth, it is of no concern how well one is carrying out intellectual duties. Conversely, the deontologist has nothing to say about trath conducivity.* So long as I am not violating any intellectual duties, I am “in the clear” in believing that p, whatever my chances for truth. This is not to say that each side denies the importance of what is crucial for the other. The deontologist need not be indifferent to the truth, nor need the “strong position” theorist be uninterested in intellectual duties. But they differ on how these admittedly im- portant matters relate to epistemic justification. To get a properly rounded picture we should also note a way in which truth- conducivity does typically enter into deontological theories of justification. Even though truth-conducivity does not enter into the meaning of “justified” for the deontologist, he is likely to give ita prominent place when he comes to spell out the content of our most important intellectual obligations. Such theorists typi- cally hold that our basic intellectual obligation is to so conduct our cognitive activities as to maximize the chances of believing the true and avoiding believ- ing the false.2° Thus even though one may be deontologically justified without thereby being in a favorable position to get the truth, if our basic intellectual obligation is to maximize truth and minimize falsity, one cannot be deontologically justified in a belief unless one is believing in such a way that, so far as one can tell, is well calculated to reach the truth. Now we can see that just as the deontological conception supports a PI re- striction, so an SP conception supports its denial. It is obviously not conceptu- ally necessary that one comes to believe that p in a truth-conductive way only if that belief is well supported by other justified beliefs of the subject. It is clearly possible that there are ways of being in a strong position in one’s beliefs other than by basing those beliefs on other justified beliefs. Plausible examples of such other ways are not far to seek. Perceptual beliefs about the physical envi- ronment, for example, that the lilies are blooming in the garden, are based on the subject’s sensory experience, on the way in which things sensorily appear to one. Furthermore let’s make the plausible supposition that one does not typi- cally form beliefs about how one is being sensorily appeared to; the sensory appearance directly gives rise to the belief about the environment, It is not that one says to oneself, even rapidly, implicitly, or below the level of consciousness, 56INTERNALISM AND EXTERNALISM IN EPISTEMOLOGY “I am having a visual experience of such and such a sort; therefore the lilies are blooming in the garden”. No such inference typically takes place, for the premises for such inferences are rarely made objects of belief. Finally, let’s make the plau- sible assumption that our perceptual beliefforming mechanisms are generally reliable, at least for the sorts of perceptual beliefs we typically form, in the sorts of situations we typically encounter. Granting all this, perceptual belief forma- tion constitutes massive support for the thesis that one can form beliefs in a reliable, truth-conducive manner without basing them on other justified be- liefs. Beliefs about one’s current conscious states provide even stronger support. It is very plausible to suppose that we have a highly reliable (some would even say infallible) mechanism for the formation of such beliefs. And yet it would be extremely implausible to suppose that these beliefs are formed or held on the basis of reasons. What would such reasons be? It may be suggested that my reason for supposing that I feel sleepy at the moment is that I do believe this and that such belief are infallible. But many persons who form such beliefs do not even have the relevant concept of infallibility, much less typically believe that such beliefs are infallible whenever they come to believe such things. Once again we have reason to suppose that beliefs can satisfy the SP conception of justification without satisfying the PI constraint on justification. Next let’s note that the argument we have given for PI supports both the lower level and the higher level requirement laid down in (6). The “lower level requirement” is that the justifier for the belief that p consist of other justified beliefs of the subject, and the “higher level requirement” is that the subject justifiably believe that these other justified beliefs provide adequate support for the belief that p. We have been emphasizing the way in which the argument establishes the lower level requirement, but it also lends powerful support to the higher level requirement. For suppose that my belief that p is based on other justified beliefs of mine and, let’s suppose, these other justified beliefs provide adequate support for the belief that p. But suppose further that I do not justifiably believe that these other beliefs do provide adequate support. In that case, so far as I can tell, I do not have within my perspective adequate support for p. Would I not be proceeding irresponsibly in adopting the belief that p? Couldn’t I properly be held accountable for a violation of intellectual obliga- tions in giving my assent to p under those conditions? Therefore if lam to be in the clear in believing that p, the belief must not only be based on other justified beliefs of mine; I must also be justified in supposing those beliefs to provide sufficient support for the belief that p. "That shows that the higher level justified belief is necessary for justification. We can now proceed to argue that it, together with the lower level require- ment, is sufficient. The crucial question here is whether it is also necessary for justification that the other justified beliefs do in fact provide adequate support, that their propositional contents are indeed so related as to make the one an adequate reason for the other. A consideration of conditions of blame, being in the clear, etc., will support a negative answer. For if, going on what I know or justifiably believe about the world, it is clear to me that other justified beliefs of 57WILLIAM P. ALSTON. mine adequately support the belief that p, what more could be required of me? Even if am mistaken in that judgment, I made it in the light of the best consid- crations available to me. I can’t be held to blame if I proceed in the light of the best reading of the facts of which I am capable. Hence a justified belief that I have adequate support is all that can rightfully be imposed in the way of a higher level requirement. Now that we have a two-level PI internalism-externalism contrast, there is the possibility of being an internalist on one level and an externalist on another. The two parties disagree both over what can be a justifier and over that by virtue of which a particular item justifies a particular belief. A particularly live possibility of a compromise is an internalism as to what can justify and an externalism as to what enables it to justify. One could be a PI internalist about justifiers by virtue of recognizing only mediate justification, but insist that my belief that p is justified by its relations to my belief that q if and only if q does in fact provide adequate support for p. At the end of the paper we shall advocate a similar mediating position, though the internalist component will not be the PI brand. Now let’s consider a way in which what is supported by our argument for PI differs from the formulation of PI with which we have been working. We have represented the deontologist as maintaining that whether $ is justified in believ- ing that p is solely a function of what other justified beliefs $ has. But that cannot be the whole story. Consider a case in which, although the sum total of the justified beliefs I actually possess provides an adequate basis for the belief that p, that would not have been the case had I been conducting myself prop- erly. IfT had looked into the matter as thoroughly as I should have, I would be in possession of effective overriders for my evidence for p, and my total body of evidence would not have given sufficient support for the belief that p. Here the belief that p is adequately supported by the perspective on the world that I actually have, and I justifiably believe that it is; but nevertheless I am not in the clear in believing that p, not justified in the deontological sense. These considerations show that PI must be modified if it is to be supported by a deontological conception of justification. It must include a codicil to the effect that overriders that the subject does not possess, but would have pos- sessed had she been conducting herself as she should have been, also can serve to epistemize beliefs.2” PI now becomes: (7) Only $°s justified beliefs can epistemize $’s belief that p, and then only if S justifiably believes that those other justified belief provide adequate sup- port for §’s belief that p; but overriders that S should have had but didn’t can cancel out justification provided by the preceding.* Going back once more to our argument for PI, I now wish to point out that it utilizes a special form of a deontological conception of justification that is limited in ways that render it either totally inapplicable, or at least severely lim- ited in application. First, it utilizes a concept of justification that assumes belief to be under 58INTERNALISM AND EXTERNALISM IN EPISTEMOLOGY direct voluntary control. The argument takes it that one is justified in believing that pif and only if one is not to blame for believing that p, if and only if in that situation this was a belief that one was permitted to choose, All this talk has appli- cation only if one has direct voluntary control over whether one believes that p at a given moment. If I lack such control, if I cannot believe or refrain from believing that p at will, then it is futile to discuss whether I am permitted to believe that p at ror whether I would be irresponsible in choosing to believe that pat ¢. And it seems that we just don’t have any such control, at least not in general. For the most part my beliefs are formed willy-nilly. When I see a truck coming down the street, I am hardly at liberty either to believe that a truck is coming down the street or to refrain from that belief. Even if there are special cases, such as moral or religious beliefs, where we do have pinpoint voluntary control (and even this may be doubted), it is clear that for the most part we lack such powers. Not only does the argument in question presuppose direct voluntary control of belief; it considers the requirements for justification only for those beliefs that are acquired by an explicit, deliberate choice. For it arrives at the PI con- straint by pointing out that only what I am cognizant of can be taken account of in my decision as to whether to believe that p. “If I am unaware of their infallibility, . . .am I not proceeding irresponsibly in forming such beliefs?” “If, so far as I can tell, there are facts that strongly support the supposition that p, then surely it is all right for me to give my assent to p.” But this fact, that only what I am cognizant of can affect the permissibility of my choice, will imply a ‘general constraint on justification only if justification is confined to beliefs that are chosen by a deliberate voluntary act. But even if beliefs are subject to direct voluntary control, that control need not always be exercised. One can hold that it is always in principle possible to choose whether to believe a given proposi- tion without thereby being committed to the grossly implausible supposition that all our beliefs are in fact acquired by an explicit choice. Even overt actions that are uncontroversially under voluntary control, such as tying one’s shoe- laces, can be, and often are, performed habitually. Likewise, even if beliefs are as subject to direct voluntary control as tying one’s shoelaces, beliefs are often acquired willy-nilly. Hence a concept of epistemic justification that is confined to beliefs acquired by deliberate choice covers only a small part of the territory. Third, it follows from the point just made that the argument utilizes a con- cept of justification that evaluates a belief solely in terms of its original acquisi- tion, for the argument has to do with what can determine the permissibility of the choice of a belief. But it is often noted by epistemologists that the epistemic status of a belief may change after its acquisition, as the subject comes to ac- quire or lose support for it. Suppose that after coming to believe that Susie is quitting her job, on the basis of no evidence worthy of the name and hence unjustifiably, I come into possession of adequate evidence for this supposition; let us further suppose that this new evidence now functions as the basis for my belief. In this case my belief comes to be justified after its acquisition. Thus a concept of justifiably acquired belief is at best only a part of an adequate con- cept of justified belief. 59WILLIAM P. ALSTON To be sure, it is not difficult to modify this very restrictive concept, so as to make it more generally applicable. Let’s begin by showing how the direct volun- tary control assumption can be dropped. It is uncontroversial that our beliefs are under indirect voluntary control, or at least subject to influence from our volun- tary actions, Even if I can’t effectively decide at this moment to stop believing that Reagan is inept, I could embark on a regimen that is designed to improve my assessment of Reagan, and it might even succeed in time. With this possibility of indirect influence in mind, we can reconstrue “intellectual obligations” so that they no longer attach to believings and abstentions therefrom, but to actions that are designed to influence our believings and abstentions. Reinterpreted in this way the argument would be that whether we are justified in believing that p at ¢ would depend on whether prior to ¢ we had done what could reasonably be expected of us to influence that belief, The difference between these two understandings may be illustrated as follows. Suppose that my belief that there is life outside our solar system is inadequately supported by the totality of my justi- fied beliefs. On the direct voluntary control interpretation I have an effective choice, whenever I consider the matter, as to whether to keep believing that or not. Itis my duty to refrain from believing it since it is not adequately supported by my “perspective”; since I continue to believe it in defiance of my duty, I am doing something that is not permitted; my belief is not justified. But the matter sorts out differently on the “indirect voluntary control” construal. It is recog- nized that I lack the capacity to discard that belief at will; at most I have the ability to make various moves that increase the chances of the belief’s being aban- doned. Hence so long as I am doing as much along that line as could reasonably be expected of me, I can’t be faulted for continuing to have the belief; and so it is justified. On either of these interpretations, whether my belief is justified is a function of how things appear in my perspective rather than of how they are in actual fact. So long as life outside the solar system is improbable relative to what I am justified in believing, then my belief is unjustified unless (on the indirect control version) my best efforts have failed to dislodge it. Next consider how we can lift the other restrictions. We can confine this discussion to the direct control version, since on the indirect control version there was no reason to impose them in the first place. Let’s first take the restric- tion to explicitly chosen beliefs. On the direct control version we can say that the belief is justified provided that it was acquired on such a basis that if the agent had chosen to adopt the belief on that basis he could not have been blamed for doing so. In other words, where the belief, or its furtherance, was not explicitly chosen we can evaluate it, on the deontological conception, by considering whether its basis is such that if it or its furtherance was chosen on that basis the agent would have been in the clear in so choosing. Now let’s see how to lift the restriction to the original acquisition of the belief, and extend the concept to the evaluation of one’s continuing to believe that p at times after its original acquisition, Once again the crucial move is to consider what would be the case if we were to make a choice that we did not in fact make. For one thing, we can consider what the judgment would be on my coming to believe this if the belief were voluntarily adopted on the basis of this 60