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Calvin on Providence: The Developement

of an Insight

P. H. Reardon

Scottish Journal of Theology / Volume 28 / Issue 06 / December 1975, pp 517 -

533
DOI: 10.1017/S0036930600024601, Published online: 02 February 2009

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Insight. Scottish Journal of Theology, 28, pp 517-533 doi:10.1017/
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Scot. Jour, of Theol. Vol. s8, pp. 517-534

CALVIN ON PROVIDENCE:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INSIGHT
by D R P. H. REARDON
OR the multitude of men John Calvin's name is but a
F synonym for the doctrine of predestination. It makes little
difference that the notion of a twofold predestination (to
heaven, that is, or to hell) was taught and defended as early
as the 5th century A.D. by Augustine of Hippo. It matters
little, also, that Calvin believed and stressed many other
doctrines besides predestination. He is imagined to have so
emphasised that doctrine that little room could be left for
human initiative and industry, although history demonstrates
that his general teaching had precisely the opposite effect on
those who came under its influence. No, to many he remains
the cold, calculating logician of God's ways. This view of
Calvin was expressed once in a letter written by Aldous
Huxley:
There is a mediaeval proverb, The heart makes the theo-
logian. When the heart doesn't function at the full, you
get monstrous heresies, like that of Calvin. . . -1
It would readily be thought, then, that Calvin's doctrine on
Providence is scarcely separable from his theory of predestina-
tion. The present study, by pursuing the evolution of his ideas
on Providence, intends to demonstrate that such is not the
case. To be sure, the two doctrines are closely related in the
Reformer's mind, as indeed they were in the thinking of earlier
theologians.2 None the less it will be seen that his view of
Providence underwent a separate development meriting a
separate treatment. A complete such treatment is still to be
written, though several aspects of Calvin's doctrine of Provi-
dence have been the subject of various brief studies. Strohl's
investigation of the topic, for example, is chiefly limited to a
comparison of the 1539 and 1559 editions of the Institutes with
1
Letters of Aldous Huxley (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 730; cf, also
p. 866.
a
For example, Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, 23.1.

5'7
518 SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY
some valuable reflections on the influence of Calvin's Stras-
bourg experiences upon his evolving thought.1 De Peyer's pur-
suit of the subject, on the other hand, contented itself with too
limited a number of texts and examined these in an uncritical
and purely expository perspective.2 The present treatment does
not pretend to be exhaustive. It purposes merely to trace
chronologically the major lines of the doctrine's develop-
ment in Calvin's mind, and this with a view to discerning
the theological and metaphysical perspective underlying that
development.
T H E YOUNG PHILOSOPHER
Calvin's first published work, a commentary on Seneca's
De dementia, could scarcely have avoided the theme of Provi-
dence. Seneca, after all, was a Stoic, and 'no one in pagan
antiquity spoke of Providence as much as the Stoics'.3 It has
even been said that 'the doctrine of Providence was a capsule
of Stoic thought'.4 It was, in fact, 'the heart of their theology'.5
In his extremely erudite commentary on Seneca, there is much
to suggest that Calvin himself was quite taken with Stoicism.
To begin with, he almost never criticises that school of philo-
sophy, and we find him in a number of instances explicitly
espousing points of view normally associated with Stoicism.
He speaks, for example, of the 'Mistress Reason' (domina ratio)
in a very significant passage.6 He is freely quoting from Plato's
Laws 1.644E and simply interjects the expression which Plato
does not use in that passage. It is, in fact, an expression dear
to the Stoics and corresponds to the Greek to kegemonikon.7 In
1
H. Strohl, 'La pens6e de Calvin sur la Providence divine au temps ou il
6tait reTugiS a Strasbourg', Revue d'histoire et de philosophic religieuse, 22 (1942),
pp. 154-69-
8
Etienne de Peyer, 'Calvin's Doctrine of Divine Providence', Evangelical
Quarterly, 10 (1938), pp. 30-44.
8
K. Priimm, Religionsgeschichtliches Handbuch fur den Raum der altchristlichen
Umwelt (Rome: Biblical Institute, 1954), p. 152.
* C. Fabro, 'Providenza', Enciclopedia Cattolica, Vol. 10 (1953), p- 223.
6
J . Behm, 'Proneo', Kittel's Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, Vol. 4
(Grand Rapids: Eerdman's, 1968), p. 1012.
' Calvin's Commentary on Seneca's De Clementia, edited by Battles and Hugo
(Leiden: Brill, 1969), p. 95 (1.33). Because of differences of designation in the
various editions of this work, references to it will be made by book and paragraph
in parentheses following the page number of the Leiden edition.
7
The expression was readily adopted by the Greek Fathers who shared the
Stoic persuasion regarding man's radical powers of self-determination. It was
frequently translated into Latin as principale mentis, cf. Origen, In Numeros, 1.1;
10.3.
 CALVIN ON PROVIDENCE 519
this passage Calvin is, as it were, explicitly Stoicising on
Plato. In a similar vein he frequently speaks of the body as the
servant of the soul and makes the standard Stoic parallel
between the body and the civil corporation.1 His pursuit, like-
wise, of metis bene composita2 is of Stoic inspiration, not to mention
his constant recourse to the principle of moderation.3 Since the
very work on which he is commenting is concerned with re-
straint, it is not surprising to find Calvin laying great stress on
that typically Stoic virtue.4 There is everywhere question, in
short, of'the Stoic dogmas'.5 In the world of Stoic thought the
young Calvin of 1532 was very much at home.
Small wonder, then, that he has something to say in this
work about the Stoic belief in Providence. The Stoic world is
not floating at random; it is under control. There is always
therein the guidance of a 'common good'6 according to which
things take place. There is a 'lot' for each man in life, ex-
pressed by such words as sors,1 fati,8 and fortuna.9 Calvin admits
misgivings about some of these words, as they may on occasion
suggest that things happen by chance. He prefers less ambigu-
ous words like necessitas.10 Our soon-to-be Reformer describes
the difference between the Stoics and the Epicureans in a
passage where he speaks of
the opinion of the Stoics who attribute the superinten-
dence (procurationem) of human affairs to the gods, assert
providence and leave nothing to mere chance (fortunae).
The Epicureans, although they do not deny the existence
of the gods, do the closest thing to it; they imagine the
gods to be pleasure-loving, idle, not caring for mortals . . .;
they deride Stoic providence as a prophesying old woman.
They think everything happens by mere chance (fortuito
cam) . n
The criticism of the Epicureans was not academic. The
revival of that philosophy in the Italian renaissance was all
I
Calvin's Commentary on Seneca's De Clementia, pp. 79 (1.26), 91-3 (1.32), 99-107
a
(1-35-8). ibid., p. 29(1.6).
3
ibid., pp. 39 (i.gf), 73 (1.23), 113-15 (1.41Q, 195 (1-78), etc.
4
cf., for example, this Stoicorum dogma in ibid., p. 365 (2.151).
6 6
ibid., p. 112 (1.141). ibid., p. 372 (2.153).
7 8
ibid., p. 60 (1.18). ibid., p. 62 (1.19).
8
ibid., pp. 64 (1.20), 66 (1.20), 292 (1.120), 300 (1.123), 370 (2.153).
« ibid., p. 33 (1.7).
II
ibid., pp. 29-31 (1.6). On casus cf. also pp. 70 (1.22), 370 (2.153).
520 SCOTTISH J O U R N A L OF THEOLOGY
too real, and during his whole life Calvin would return to his
attack on the Epicureans. In the 1539 edition of the Institutes
he claimed to be so displeased with them that he would not
even speak of them (Taceo Epicureos . . }), but he did so anyway.
In 1546 he blasted them while elucidating 1 Corinthians.2 He
condemned them repeatedly while commenting on Isaiah,3 the
Psalms,4 the Minor Prophets,5 the Acts of the Apostles,6 and
the writings of Paul.7 He became fond of comparing them to
dogs8 and pigs.9 He would not let up on them in his 1552
tract on predestination.10 Why not? 'The Epicureans', after all,
'not only used to despise good and liberal arts, but openly
hated them.'11 This is one Stoic attitude which we shall find
Calvin affording evidence for even to the end.
Was Calvin really a Stoic, however, at the time of his work
on Seneca? And if so, did his ideals remain Stoic during the
rest of his life? To answer these questions, we may best examine
his attitude toward a fundamental Stoic ideal: Apatheia. In his
youthful commentary on Seneca {Seneca noster12) he seems to
have accepted that ideal without theological misgiving:
As partner with reason they (the Stoics) posit tranquillity,
that is a peaceful and quiet constancy: in the other part they
place turbulent emotions—now of wrath, now of desire—
contrary and inimical to reason. Therefore a tranquil
soul is composed, and subject to no emotions, which
the Greeks call pathe, that is, passions. Tranquillity itself,
moderation of mind, and so to speak equanimity: which
our Seneca sometimes calls 'security', sometimes 'peace'.13
I
Joannis Calvini Opera quae supersunt Omnia (hereafter cited as Opp. followed by
volume and column numbers) (Brunswick: Schetschke and Son, 1863), Vol. i,
c. 889.
a
Calvin's New Testament Commentaries (hereafter NTC with volume and page
numbers) (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1958-63), 9.333.
3
John Calvin, Commentary on the Prophet Isaiah (hereafter Com. Isaiah with volume
and page numbers) (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1958), 1.184; 2.126.
4
John Calvin, Commentary on the Book of Psalms (hereafter Com. Psalms with volume
and page numbers) (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1949), 1.117, 142, 164, 549;
2-171; 3-'37f, 378;4- l 6 4. 266, 345; 5.17, 65, 83, 114.
6
John Calvin, Commentaries on the Twelve Minor Prophets (hereafter Com. Min. Pr.
th volume and page numbers) (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1950), 4.47, 50.
6 7
Calvin, NTC, 7.106, 234. Calvin, NTC, 8.339.
8 9
Calvin, NTC, 6.233. Calvin, Com. Isaiah, 3.193.
10
Calvin, De Aeterna Dei Praedestinatione, Opp. 8.353f.
II
Calvin, NTC, 7.106.
1S
Calvin's Commentary on Seneca's De Clementia, p . 40 (1.10).
18
ibid.; cf. also p. 59 (1.17).
 CALVIN ON PROVIDENCE 5 ai

If that was Calvin's ideal in 1532, however, it did not long

remain so. Apatheia in the Stoic sense, the influence of which
was so strong throughout the history of monastic thought and
experience, became a term unbearable to Calvin as the years
went on. Commenting on Acts in 1552 he wrote:
Now that mad philosophy must be repudiated which re-
quires men to be utterly impassive (stupidos) in order to be
wise. The Stoics of long ago must have been devoid of
common sense for they used to keep all feelings away from
a man. Today there are certain fanatics who would gladly
introduce the same ideas into the Church. 1
This statement signals quite a reversal of Calvin's humanism.
He contrasts apatheia here with common sense, but actually his
repudiation of that Stoic ideal would seem to have been of
specifically Christian inspiration. In 1548 he had already
claimed that 'Christian patience is very different from philo-
sophical obstinacy, and still more from the stubborn and fierce
sternness of the Stoics'.2 He had apparently become aware that
apatheia was not recommended in the Gospels and the example
of Jesus. Did not Jesus display those very emotions which the
Stoics eschewed? Indeed, 'Christ's example alone should be
sufficient for rejecting the unbending hardness of the Stoics'.3
He found the latter ideal equally opposed to the attitude of the
Apostle Paul. Commenting on 1 Thessalonians 4. i3f in 1550,
Calvin wrote: 'Those who misuse this statement for the purpose
of establishing among Christians a Stoic indifference, i.e., a
hardness of iron, will find nothing of this nature in the words
of Paul.' 4 Calvin had apparently stopped going to Seneca for
his moral ideals. His book now was the Bible, and in the Bible
full play is given to human emotion. A Stoic would be obliged
to condemn the anger of Moses, but Calvin's assessment is
different:
By the praise which is given to the anger of Moses, the
imagination of the Stoics is refuted, with whom indiffer-
ence (de n'avoir nulle passion) is the highest of virtues.5
1 2
Calvin, NTC, 6.228. Calvin, JVTC, 11.264.
> Calvin, NTC, 5.12. * Calvin, NTC, 8.363.
6
John Calvin, Commentaries on the Last Four Books of Moses (hereafter Com. Pent.
with volume and page numbers) (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1950), 4.270.
522 SCOTTISH J O U R N A L OF THEOLOGY
T h e Stoic and biblical ideals of humanism, according to the
later Calvin, are not only different: they are even opposed to
one another. T h e Stoic pursuit, he believed, was a figment of
the imagination: it glorified reason at the expense of God-given
emotions. Consequently Calvin was persuaded that c the prin-
ciple which the Stoics assume, that all the passions are perturba-
tions and like diseases, is false . . .'. 1 He could not insist enough
that 'nothing is more opposed to true patience than the loftiness
of heart of which the Stoics boast'. 2
The rejection ofapatheia was not the only way in which J o h n
Calvin later gave evidence of his break with Stoicism. As he
turned to the simple and lucid words of the Bible as the source
of his religious thought, he became impatient with the para-
doxes and subtleties of Stoicism. T h e latter led nowhere:
'. . . the Stoics were wont, in ancient times to amuse themselves
with their paradoxes'. 3 Yes, such were 'the crazy paradoxes of
the Stoics'. 4 Calvin would even speak of 'the ravings of the
Stoics'. 5 T h e tone of such remarks is quite different from the
young philosopher's brilliant commentary on 'our Seneca' back
in 1532.
In his growing rejection of Stoicism, did Calvin also alter
his views about Providence in later years? T h e answer to that
question will take u p the rest of this study. Before leaving the
Commentary on Seneca's De dementia, however, a few more ob-
servations seem in order. In reading this work of Calvin, some
have felt that the seeds of Calvin's thinking on Providence can
be found therein. Professor Wendel, for example, has sug-
gested that 'it is quite possible that the importance he after-
wards attributed to this notion of providence was at least partly
of Stoic origin'.6 If this be true we shall presently see. One
1
Com. Pent., 3.346.
2
Calvin, Com. Psalms, i.57if. (cf. also 495C); Com. Min. Pr., 5.130.
3
John Calvin, Commentary on a Harmony of the Evangelists (hereafter Com. Syn. with
volume and page numbers) (Grand Rapids:
6
Eerdmans, 1956), 1.260.
« Calvin, JVTC, 5.269. Calvin, Com. Syn., 1.266.
6
Francois Wendel, Calvin: The Origins and Development of His Religious Thought
(London: Collins, 1963), p. 29. This same author cites passages from the com-
mentary on the De Clementia to show that, even at this early period, Calvin did not
totally accept Seneca's ideal of apatheia (p. 32). To the present writer, however,
the texts in question demonstrate principally Calvin's doubt that such an ideal was
practical. He was also, it would seem, pointing up a contradiction in Seneca
himself, who was simultaneously praising a passion (pity!) and freedom from
passion. The least one can say, however, is that Calvin's tone toward Stoicism
is far more positive than it eventually became.
 CALVIN ON PROVIDENCE 523
must note, however, that at the time of his Seneca commentary,
Calvin seems to have been not particularly interested in Pro-
vidence. He actually says little about it, considering that he
was commenting, after all, on a Stoic. If Providence had oc-
cupied, at this early period, the place in Calvin's thinking that
it was later to assume, we should have seen him commenting
on Seneca's De Providentia instead of the Be dementia. In point
of fact his commentary contains only two quotations from the
former work of Seneca. Nor is there any mention of Epictetus,
whose works Calvin probably hadn't read anyway, as they were
not printed until 1535. In sum we can say that this earliest of
the Reformer's works shows no great preoccupation with the
Stoic doctrine of Providence.
T H E Institutes OF 1539
From the very first edition of the Institutes, in 1536, Calvin
espoused the belief in a twofold predestination.1 By the time
of the 1539 edition he expanded his ideas to a whole chapter,
chapter 8.2 It was entitled 'On the Predestination and Provid-
ence of God', and the very name of this chapter suggests how
Calvin approached Providence at the time. He develops his
ideas on it only after treating the more thorny question of pre-
destination, and it can safely be said that 'the reflections on
predestination have influenced Calvin's teaching concerning
Providence' .3
To begin with, he no longer regards Providence as a philo-
sophical theory, but as a truth known only by faith. Christian
Providence, after all, must preserve two basic truths: God is all-
governing and man is free. According to Calvin it is impossible
for the human mind to maintain both ideas conceptually. It is
a matter for faith. Both insights must 'converge in God'.4 In
man's mind they do not converge, but remain a contradiction
surpassed only in faith.5 Commenting on the Epistle to the
Romans that very year, he stressed the same point.6 He was in
1554, while elucidating the Acts of the Apostles, to insist that
philosophy could not arrive at the proper understanding of
Providence: it was a doctrine known only from the Word of
1
Institutio, 2.4; Opp., 1.74.
8
It was to become chapter 14 of the 1554 edition.
3 4
Strohl, art. cit., p. 162. ibid., p. 169.
5
Institutio, 8.28; Opp., 1.881. • Calvin, NTC, 8.162.
524 SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY
1
God. In 1552 he had already asserted that it was known by a
certain experience of faith ('. . . agnoscitur Jidei sensu . . .' 2 ). This
perspective, of course, rendered it unnecessary and superfluous
to attempt to prove the doctrine of Providence. One had only
to consult the Bible in faith. One does not simply believe that
there is a Providence, according to Calvin: one gives himself
over to it in the full commitment of personal faith. As he was
later to assert in the definitive edition of the Institutes, faith 'is
a firm and sure knowledge of the divine favour toward us,
founded on the truth of a free promise in Christ, and revealed
to our minds, and sealed on our hearts by the Holy Spirit'. 3
In the 1539 edition Calvin took care, therefore, to distinguish
this Christian and Biblical Providence from false notions enter-
tained by various philosophers. 'The ancients,' he tells us,
'variously employed such words as foreknowledge, predestina-
tion, election and providence.'* One must be careful, however,
to formulate certain distinctions. Providence is not a mere fore-
knowledge, as the majority of men seem to think {'Major pars
. . . imaginatur'&). Nor is it a vague 'world machine' (orbis
machina) in which all the parts fit together by a kind of motto
generalise In the same passage he goes on to separate himself
from those who believe that God simply got things started and
then let them be on their own. It would seem that Calvin
already perceived in his own time the seeds of what would
eventually emerge in Deism.7
Calvin is particularly careful, furthermore, to separate him-
self from any form of fatalism, especially of the Stoic variety.
Small wonder, he notes, that his enemies should identify him
as a Stoic, because they did the same to Augustine! He explains
why the accusation is unjust both to him and to Augustine.
The Stoics posited a certain necessitas in existence, flowing from
a 'constant connection of causes' {ex perpetuo causarum nexu).
1
Calvin, jVTC, 7.181.
2
Calvin, De Aeterna Dei Praedestinatione, Opp., 8.349; cf- NTC, 4.190.
8
John Calvin, 1559 Instilutio, 3.2.7; Institutes 0/ the Christian Religion (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966), Vol. 1, p. 475. All references to the 1559 edition will
be according to this translation.
4
Calvin, 1539 Institutio, 8.5; Opp., 1.864.
6
ibid., 8.38; Opp. 1.889.
8
He later, however, does refer to a 'mundi machina'; cf. De Aetema Dei Praedestina-
tione, Opp., 8.347.
7
Cf. the judicious observations of Paul Tillich, A History of Christian Thought
(New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 265.
 CALVIN ON PROVIDENCE 525
Their providence was contained within nature itself (in natura
contineatur1). This tended to identify God with natural pro-
cesses. Calvin's Providence, on the other hand, was in God, not
in nature. It lies hidden in God's counsel ('. . . in Dei consilio
latet . . .' 2 ). It is not a temporal process: it pertains to an
absolute eternity ('. . . ab ultima aeternitate . . .' 3 ). Calvin was
later to call it an 'eternal providence',4 because 'for God time
does not exist'.5 As Professor Strohl sagely observes, Calvin 're-
fuses absolutely to insert the notion of time in the notion of
Providence'.6
It will readily be seen to what pains Calvin goes to preserve
two biblical truths: God is active in nature and history, and he
is distinct from them both. If he is not the former, the Epi-
cureans were right: if he is not the latter, the Stoics were right.
The Epicureans lived in a world in which they were totally free,
because there was no meaning nor pattern in which to work out
the terms of one's existence. They were like men at sea on a
boat with no shore. The Stoics inhabited a world in which
there was, if you will, too much meaning. Man could put no
more into it. Everything was programmed and happened on
schedule. They were like men in a boat tied at the shore. The
Epicureans could go nowhere, as there was nowhere to go.
The Stoics could go nowhere, because their craft was tied in a
cosmological blueprint. Calvin was keen to reject both points
of view. He saw that God must be present to creation, but not
too present. God must remain God, while holding all things in
governance by a kind of economy ('. . . omnium gubernatione
oeconomiam tenet''.)1. Only thus can man be free.
No one ever suspected Calvin of being an Epicurean. The
accusation with which he was indicted was that of Stoicism.
The late Paul Tillich has claimed, after all, that 'Christianity
and the Stoics are the great competitors in the whole Western
world'.8 Both have an ordered universe, unlike the Epicurean
and the modern Camuso-Sartre type Existentialists. Stoicism,
in fact, may be the temptation to which the Christian is most
susceptible. But Stoicism amounts to a kind of idolatry, as it
1
8
Calvin, 1539 Institutio, 8.40; Opp., 1.890.
3
4
ibid., 8.41; Opp., 1.891. 5
ibid., 8.40; Opp., 1.890.
Calvin, Com. Min. Pr., 1.401. Strohl, art. cit., p. 163.
8
8
ibid., p. 159. ' Calvin, 153a Institutio, 8.5; Opp., 1.865.
Tillich, op. cit., p. 7.
526 SCOTTISH J O U R N A L OF THEOLOGY
fails sufficiently to distinguish God from his creation.1 Prob-
ably because he was accused of being one, Calvin after 1539
seldom missed a chance to criticise the Stoics for their version
of the doctrine of providence. He wrote, for example, in his
commentary on Acts in 1554:
Although the Stoics said that the world is under the provid-
ence of God, yet they later spoiled that principle of their
teaching with an absurd fiction or rather fantasy. For they
did not acknowledge that God rules the world by His pur-
pose, justice and power, but they constructed a labyrinth
out of a complicated system (complexu) of causes, so that
God Himself was bound by the necessity of fate. . . . 2
The trouble with the Stoics is that they did not leave even
God free from fate, claimed Calvin. Commenting on the
Psalms, he wrote in 1557:
When the Stoics dispute, or rather babble, about destiny,
they not only involve themselves and the thing also of
which they treat in intricate mazes, but, at the same time,
involve in perplexity an indisputable truth: for in im-
agining a concatenation of causes, they divest God of the
government of the world.3
Calvin would return to the same accusation against the Stoics
near the very end of his life:
. . . we do not suppose a fate (une necessite fatale) such as
the Stoics invented: for it is a different thing to say that
things which of themselves incline to various and doubtful
events, are directed by the hand of God whithersoever
He will, and to say that necessity governs them in accord-
ance with the perpetual complication of causes (une necessite
confuse selon des causes entortille'es) and that this happens with
God's connivance: nay, nothing can be more opposite
than that God should be drawn and carried away by a fatal
motive power, or that He tempers all things as He sees fit.4
1
Calvin feared nothing so much as idolatry. Cf. John H. Leith, 'John Calvin's
Polemic Against Idolatry', Soli Deo Gloria: New Testament Studies in Honor of William
Childs Robinson (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1968), pp. 111-24.
1
Calvin, NTC, 7.106.
8
Calvin, Com. Psalms, 4.189; cf. Com. Syn., 1.464^
4
Calvin, Com. Pent., 3.37^
 CALVIN ON PROVIDENCE 527
If Providence is eternal in God, however, we do not see it
according to its plan. Although in his Institutes of 1539 Calvin
denies that there is anyfortuna or necessitas in human life (the
first being Epicurean and the second Stoic), he admits that the
events of history may seem fortuitous to us (nobis) .* Providence,
after all, is known only by faith, a personal faith. Otherwise
things are bound to appear quasi fortuita.2 The Christian life
will be largely occupied, consequently, in putting one's trust
in God's loving Providence. He insists that 'God directs by
His counsel those things which seem to be most fortuitous'.3
Could one find a better example of such trust in Providence
than that given by the biblical Noah? There is a man who
instructs us 'to repose on the Providence of God, even while
He seems to be most forgetful of us'. 4 The Providence of God
is not obvious: it 'watches for our salvation, even when it
seems most to sleep', as Calvin wrote toward the end of his
life.5
Calvin's works abound with exhortations to trust in the Pro-
vidence of God.6 He knows that 'we are so attached to out-
ward means that nothing is harder than to depend on God's
Providence'.7 To live by Providence is, nonetheless, a matter
of salvation. It expresses man's admission of his inability to
save himself. To live by Providence is to live by faith rather
than to attempt to save oneself. In 1554 Calvin said in com-
menting on Acts:
Indeed we all confess that we cannot move even one finger
without His leading. But because so much arrogance holds
sway in men everywhere, that they venture to set God
aside and settle anything, not just for the near future, but
even for many years, we must often ponder over this
religious reverence and prudence, so that we may learn to
submit our purposes to the will and providence of God,
lest, if we make plans, as men, who seem to themselves to
1 s
Calvin, 1539 Inslitutio, 8.41; Opp., 1.891. ibid.
* '. . . Deus suo consilio dirigat quae maxime videntur fortuita'. Calvin,
De Aetema Dei Praedestinatione, Opp., 8.353; cf. NTC, 4.193.
* John Calvin, Commentaries on the First Book of Moses called Genesis (hereafter
Com. Gen. with volume and page numbers) (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1948),
1.276.
6
ibid., 2.232; cf. also Com. Psalms, 3.120-3, 127, 137-9, 410, 497-9, etc.
* For example, NTC, n.288f.; Com. Gen., 2.23; Com. Pent., 1.77; Com. Psalms,
1-54'! 2.9, 33. 95-7; 3-2i8f., etc. ' Calvin, MTC, 4.147.
528 SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY
have fortune in their control, are in the habit of doing, we
may suffer just punishment for our temerity.1
The view of Providence in the 1539 edition of the Institutes
will remain standard in Calvin's thinking for many years.
Even as late as 1552, after he had already made considerable
advances in his speculation about the doctrine in his treatise
Against the Libertines, he will still refer readers back to the In-
stitutes for a 'more ample' treatment of the subject.2 In his
tract on predestination, he will but summarise the doctrine of
the Institutes in order to show that God 'is not a momentary
creator, but a perpetual preserver'.3 And in 1553 he would
write in commentary on John that the evangelist
attributes to Him the preservation of what has been
created: as if he were saying that in the creation of the
world His power did not simply suddenly appear only to
pass away, but that it is visible in the permanence of
the stable and settled order of nature. . . .4
Calvin's refusal, in the 1539 Institutes, simply to identify God's
Providence with his foreknowledge, is also taken up in his later
writings. In commenting on the Acts of the Apostles in 1552
he made the assertion:
Luke deals here with two doctrines, the foreknowledge
and the decree of God. And although the foreknowledge
is first in order, because God sees what He wills to deter-
mine before He determines it, Luke makes it secondary
(cf. Acts 2, 23) to the counsel and decree of God, so that
we may know that God wills or resolves nothing which
He has not long before directed to its particular end. . . .
Therefore the knowledge of God is not the same as the
will of God, whereby He governs and orders all things.5
We clearly have in such a text a good example of how Calvin's
thinking on predestination has influenced his doctrine of Pro-
vidence. Two years later, commenting on the same book of
the New Testament, he went on to remark:
But it must be noted that Paul does not merely attribute
to God bare foreknowledge and cold speculation, as very
1 2
Calvin, NTC, 7.141 f. Calvin, DeAeternaDeiPraedeslinaiione, Opp., 8.347.
3
'. . . ut non unius tantum momenti sit opifex, sed perpetuus moderator.' ibid.
6
* Calvin, NTC, 4.10. Calvin, NTC, 6.65.
 CALVIN ON PROVIDENCE 529
many do in their ignorance, but he bases the course of
things that happen on His purpose and will (cf. Acts 17,
26). For he does not simply say that the times were fore-
seen, but protetagmena, 'previously appointed', that is, dis-
posed with the order that seemed good to Him. 1
THE T R E A T I S E AGAINST THE LIBERTINES
In the Treatise Against the Libertines, written in 1545, Calvin
made certain distinctions in the doctrine of Providence which
are absent in his writings elsewhere and which, due to even
further refinements of his thought later on, he was unable to
assimilate into the definitive edition of the Institutes.
The Libertines did not deny Providence: on the contrary,
they affirmed that there was in the world a single spirit who
was responsible for everything ('. . . que c'est ce seul esprit qui
faict tout'2). They were, therefore, Stoics in the extreme, and
we are right in regarding this tract as part of Calvin's continu-
ing polemic against Stoicism. Calvin concedes to them
that all things are, in fact, done by (par) the will of God, but
he insists that one must make certain distinctions in speaking
of God's governance of the world.3
Calvin elsewhere speaks of various kinds of Providence on
God's part, according to what is being governed. Later, in his
tract on predestination he speaks of a special Providence for
God's most noble work, which is man. 4 But nowhere are his
distinctions on the subject so clear as in the Treatise Against the
Libertines.
The first kind of Providence is simply une operation universelle,
which is Vordre de nature. Nature, however, is not a closed and
fixed order, for this universal Providence is 'the will of God
which alone rules and moderates (regit et modere) all things'.6
Even the stars, Calvin says, are led by God's hand. In fact,
all creatures are as instruments in God's hand ('. . . comme
instrument estans en sa main'.6), and he cites Acts 17 in demonstra-
tion of this.
The belief that God's Providence rules the universe of nature
1
Calvin, JVTC, 7.117f; cf. the same distinction in the 1539 Institutio, 8.5;
a 8
Opp., 1.865. Calvin, Opp., 7.183. ibid., 7.186.
* Calvin, DeAetema Dei Praedestinatione, Opp., 8.348; cf. also Com. Min. Pr., 2.201;
Com. Gen., 2.337; NTC, 6.373; 10.213.
5
Calvin, Opp., 7.186. • ibid., 7.187.
530 SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY
was dear to Calvin, and he returns to it many times.1 In this
tract Against the Libertines he speaks of that rule with a clarity
not found elsewhere, but which is essential for understanding
what he will later say about God's care of man. He says:
Nevertheless this universal operation of God does not pre-
vent any creature, whether in heaven or on earth, from
having and retaining its own quality and nature, nor from
following the inclination which is proper to it. 2
God's action in nature is of such a kind that nature retains a
kind of autonomy to be itself. This is important to bear in
mind, for it is the principle that Calvin employs to preserve
freedom in human activity. As nature follows its own inclina-
tion, so does history, but both are none the less under the guid-
ance of God. God never, in Calvin's view, is to be identified
with either nature or history. He always remains God. This
perspective of Calvin's, which we have seen earlier, is in keeping
with the Protestant view of external justification. It represents
the absolute refusal to compromise the transcendence of God.
The second kind of Providence, Calvin tells us, is God's
action in man's history. By it he wills 'now to help His servants
then again to punish the wicked, now to try the patience of
His faithful ones, then again to correct them in a fatherly
fashion'. The pagans may call this 'fortune', he goes on, but
the Christian must attribute it to the Providence of God. 3
Beyond the order of nature, God's governance of man is une
ordonnance spe'ciale.* He learns of such a Providence from the
pages of the Bible, particularly in sections that later scholars
would recognise to be the work of the Jahvist. 5 As he would
say toward the end of his life, 'scarcely any more illustrious
representation of Divine Providence is to be found than this
history furnishes'.6 He finds examples in all of Israel's history,7
1
Calvin, NTC, 7.13, 117; 9.187; 10.213; Com. Syn, 1.341; Com. Isaiah, 1.351;
4.29, 7 1 ; Com. Psalms, 1.95-9, 139, 481, 483, 516, 549; 2.43, 216; 4.6f, 257-64;
5->74'
2
'Toutesfois ceste operation universelle de Dieu n'empesche point, que chacune criature,
tant au del comme en la terre, n'ait et ne retienne sa qualiti et nature, et suyve sa propre
3
inclination. Calvin, Opp., 7.187. ibid.
* ibid. It should be noted, however, that Calvin's terminology here is not
constant. Later on, in 1557, he employs the expression 'special providence' to
mean all of God's guidance of nature; cf. Com. Min. Pr., 2.238.
6
Calvin, Opp., 7.i88f. cf. Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology, Vol. 1
(New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 51-4.
8
Calvin, Com. Gen., 2.337. ' ibid., 2.127; NTC, 6.366, 381.
 CALVIN ON PROVIDENCE 531
1
particularly the Exodus, but his favorite story of Old Testa-
ment Providence is the tale ofJoseph.2 In the New Testament
stories Calvin is fond of speaking of Providence in the lives of
Paul 3 and such minor characters as Onesimus.4
In the entire Bible, however, Providence most shines out in
the life of Jesus. In the Gospel account of the Lord, in fact,
we have a mirror which represents for us the universal
providence of God, which extends through the whole
world, and yet shines especially on ourselves who are
members of Christ.5
Calvin sees signs of God's rule all through the life ofJesus. In
speaking, for example, of the raising of Lazarus, Calvin notes
that although the friends of Lazarus 'were moved by neigh-
borhood duty, they were really assembled there by a secret
counsel of God for another purpose . . .'.6 Similarly in regard
to Pilate's refusal to change the inscription he had affixed to
the cross of Jesus, Calvin observes: 'Pilate's firmness must be
ascribed to the providence of God . . .'.' And in regard to the
very death of Jesus, Calvin goes on to claim:
But anyone who considers the story as a whole will be
forced to ascribe it to the secret counsel of God that a
speedier death than could have been expected saved
Christ from having his legs broken.8
This Christocentricity of God's Providence in Calvin's thinking
is not to be overlooked. He can call Christ a 'mirror' of Pro-
vidence precisely because the counsel of God is to bring his
faithful ones to salvation in Christ.
This brings us to what Calvin calls the 'third species of the
operation of God'. It is that by which 'He governs His faithful
ones, living and reigning in them by His Holy Spirit'.9 It is
by living in communion with this Holy Spirit, says Calvin,
that one comes to perceive the counsels of God:
As, therefore, we are quite unable to come by our own
powers to investigate the secrets of God, so we come to
1
2
Calvin, NTC, 6.183, 185.
a
ibid., 6.181; Com Gen, 2.260, 307, 330, 378-80.
Calvin, NTC, 7.207, 5236, 24if, 267^ 279, 291-4, 306.8
* ibid., 10.399. 8
ibid., 6.64f. ibid., 5.7.
' ibid., 5.179. ibid., 5.185; 11.311. • Calvin, Opp., 7.190.
532 SCOTTISH J O U R N A L OF THEOLOGY
clear and certain knowledge of them by the grace of the
Holy Spirit. 1
God's Providence, according to Calvin, 'shines especially on
ourselves who are the members of Christ'. 2 This most special
guidance of the Church by God's Spirit is what protects her
from the ungodly. 3 It was God's Providence which led the
Gentiles into the Church. 4 God dwells continually in the
Church. 5 H e also acts in her. 6 This is true even of the trials
the Church must undergo. Commenting thus on i Cor. 11. i a.f,
Calvin reflects:
But notice that Paul says 'there must be', for by using
that word he means that this situation does not arise by
chance, but by the reliable providence of God, because
H e wants to test His own people, like gold in the furnace. 7
Among the manifestations of God's care for the Church, readers
of the well-known drama by Robert Bolt will be surprised to
learn that Calvin lists what he considers the justly deserved
beheading of the 'man for all seasons', Thomas More! 8
This third kind of Providence Calvin identifies with the
presence of the Holy Spirit in the People of God. This is the
closest he comes to making Providence a thing within creation,
for God's Spirit is in his faithful ones {en eux*). In view of his
former insistence that Providence is in God, not in creation, we
may regret that he did not elucidate further how this was to be
applied to the troisiesme espece of Providence, saving grace. In
general Calvin accepts the principle that 'action is in the agent',
like his earlier contemporary Cardinal Cajetan, who was on
this point breaking with his master Aquinas. 10 O n e feels reason-
ably sure that Calvin would, in distinguishing God's action in
nature from his action in saving grace, stop well short of
Rahner's distinction between efficient causality and quasi-
formal causality. I n general it must be said that such an ap-
1 a 8
Calvin, NTC, 8.260. ibid., 6.65. ibid., 5.174.
4 6
ibid., 6.350. Calvin, Com. Isaiah, 1.389.
6
Calvin, NTC, 7.124; Com. Psalms, 3.124.
7
Calvin, NTC, 9.239; cf. also Com Psalms, 2.311.
8 8
Calvin, Com. Isaiah 2.i3if. Calvin, Opp. 7.190.
10
For a good discussion of this debate within the Thomistic school, cf. J . Gredt,
Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae, Vol. 1, Barcelona: Herder, 1946,
pp. 226-39.
 CALVIN ON PROVIDENCE 533
proach would be at variance with the Protestant principle of
external justification, which aimed at preserving the transcend-
ence of God in the Christian experience. We can be certain
that Calvin would not believe in any presence of God in man
which would obscure the distinction between the two. One
can only regret that he did not, in connection with Providence,
further elaborate his theology of grace and the Holy Spirit.
CONCLUSION
This writer began his researches on Calvin with the strong
suspicion that the Reformer's doctrine on Providence would be
found to be heavily Stoic. I was impressed by the studies of
Professor Breen (with whom I have no quarrel) and by the fact
that Calvin's first published work was a commentary on Seneca.
My reading of the man's writings, however, has persuaded me
that Calvin, in spite of certain similarities with the Stoic view
of Providence, was moved by a different spirit and directed by
another insight. This insight may be described as Neo-
Platonic, inasmuch as it insisted, probably via Augustine, on an
absolute distinction between Providence and fate. It may be
called simply Platonic too, for it had a moral concern like that
of the Timaeus, the Republic and the Laws. More importantly,
however, it was inspired by the biblical belief in God's action
in history. In this regard Calvin's observations are similar to
those of the early Christian Apologists.1
In the 1559 edition of the Institutes Calvin treated Providence
in the first part, while leaving his discussion of predestination
until the section dealing with Christ. He surely made this
arrangement because of his growing appreciation of the truth
that one is predestined only in Christ. This format, however,
had the disadvantage of prohibiting his threefold distinction
employed fourteen years earlier in the tract Against the Libertines.
His final arrangement, on the other hand, had the further ad-
vantage of removing to some distance from his ever-hardening
position on predestination the more ample and consoling
doctrine of Divine Providence.
1
I may be permitted to refer to my study ' "Providence" in Origen's Contra
Cetsum', Ekklesiastikos Pharos, 1973, pp. 501-16.
DR P. H. REARDON Nashotah House, Nashotah
Wisconsin 53058