Stud Philos Educ (2017) 36:663–682

DOI 10.1007/s11217-017-9576-1

An Approach to Simone Weil’s Philosophy of Education

Through the Notion of Reading

Kazuaki Yoda1

Published online: 15 March 2017

 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017

Abstract This paper introduces Simone Weil’s notion of reading and some of its impli-
cations to education. Weil’s philosophy, in particular her notion of attention has caught
interest of some education scholars; however, the existing studies are still underdeveloped.
Introducing Weil’s notion of reading, which has not been studied almost at all by edu-
cationists but its significance is well-recognized by Weil scholars, I intend to set forth a
more nuanced understanding of Weil’s attention that is necessary to further discuss Weil’s
potential contribution to education research. Attention to other people, hence love of
others, is reframed as ‘‘reading better.’’ We read better not simply by purifying our reading
through detachment and self-negation, which is how the notion of attention is often
understood and thus found problematic, but by incorporating multiple perspectives
(readings) and finding balance among them. Learning to read better, then, is not merely
inward effort of detachment done through introspection, but it also necessarily involves
outward effort of working with other people and the world. It is through interacting with
others, we may learn our own readings, recognize others’ readings, and seeking for just
balance among them. This latter element which has been greatly dismissed is indispensable
for any serious discussions of Weil’s philosophy in education.

Keywords Simone Weil
Reading
Attention
Detachment
Love

An earlier version of the paper was presented at INPE 2016 conference at Warsaw. My acknowledgement
goes to all attendees of the session for valuable questions and comments.

This research is supported by The Uehiro Foundation on Ethics and Education.

& Kazuaki Yoda

kazuaki.yoda@gmail.com
1
Ko 1681-1, Saku, Nagano 384-2104, Japan

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664 K. Yoda

Introduction

Recently a twentieth century French philosopher Simone Weil, particularly her notion of
attention, has been capturing the interest of some education scholars. Attention has been
regarded as the central notion of Weil’s philosophy, and briefly describing it means
openness to the reality of others, a deep receptivity, an attitude of listening, and the love of
others. Edgerton (2002) mentioned Weil and her notion of attention at the end of her article
on listening to others. Noddings (2002) touches on Weil’s attention in discussing caring
relationship in one of her book on moral education. Liston (2008) wrote about her notion of
attention in relation to critical pedagogy. Roberts (2011) introduces Weil’s notions of
attention, gravity, grace, and decreation and claims for the relevancy of her philosophy for
higher education reform, particularly for the revival of arts and humanities. Lewin (2014)
refers to Weil’s attention discussing how to capture students’ attention. Nevertheless, the
existing researches on Weil are still undeveloped. Although their interest in Weil seems
genuine, no one spends fair amount of discussion on Weil except Roberts. After briefly
mentioning the notion of attention, Noddings quickly abandons it with a few notes of
disagreement. Liston touches on Weil but quickly moves to discuss Iris Murdoch and Sara
Ruddick. In general, their understanding seems to be based only two most widely known
books Gravity and Grace and Waiting for God. The former is published by Gustave
Thibon, who edited the book from Weil’s large amount of notebooks, choosing some lines
and discarding others. He re-ordered statements and created new sections in the way he
thought was most relevant. The result, of course, must be inevitably biased. The latter piece
collects the famous essay on school studies and it is edited by Father Perrin. He chose her
letters addressed to him and essays entrusted to him and edited them under the title Waiting
for God. Although both were trustworthy editors of Weil’s writings, serious readers should
bear in mind the possible effect of their process of editing and publishing on the original
works. Furthermore, the existing studies by educationists hardly consult with secondary
literatures on Weil’s philosophy. Because of this, their discussions are inevitably limited.
Only several key notions are taken up such as attention, detachment, gravity and grace, and
consequently they tend to subscribe to a simplistic interpretation of Weil’s philosophy
according to which the basic teaching could be summarized as follows: ‘‘Detach from the
self and be free from the influence of gravity, the internal mechanism that governs our
desires and emotions. Then with the help of grace we can pay attention to others.’’
Although this simplification is not far off the mark, it should invoke questions more than a
conclusion. Before we apply it to education too hastily at least two fundamental problems
shall arise. One is its radical orientation toward self-negation, which is quickly associated
to her peculiar death that was reported to be suicidal.1 Observing this orientation, du
Plessix Gray (2001) categorized Weil’s mind as masochistic. The other is its essentially
religious nature. Weil’s philosophy seems to be built on a religious metaphysics. Religious
themes and languages appear constantly throughout her writings. Furthermore, she writes
in one of her letters to Father Perrin that she had encountered Christ three times.2 Weil’s
thought thus is often received as a theology rather than a philosophy. How we may study
Weil’s thought in a philosophically meaningful manner is a question. Further and more
comprehensive study of Simone Weil has been waited that acknowledges such difficulties

1
Weil died in 1943 from tuberculosis and self-starvation refusing to eat more than the French soldiers in
front line. Several biographies of Weil are available in English. For instance, see Pétrement (1976).
2
See Weil’s letter titled ‘‘Spiritual Autobiography’’ in Waiting for God. The text will be henceforth
abbreviated as WG.

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An Approach to Simone Weil’s Philosophy of Education… 665

and this study attempts it through Weil’s notion of reading. The notion of reading is widely
known among Weil scholars; however, to my knowledge, this notion has never been
mentioned among educationists. Discussing the notion of reading, this paper addresses
only the former problem, i.e. self-negation or detachment, and suggests more nuanced
understanding of attention. The latter problem deserves a separate study and I save it for
another occasion. Development of attention is reframed as the apprenticeship in reading.
This allows us to see that the development of attention is not only about inward effort of
introspection and detachment, but it also requires outward effort. We learn to read better by
actively engaging with the world and working on it. Improvement of reading is in itself an
inherently educational task. The paper ends with further implications to education that
substantiate the relevancy of Weil’s notion of reading.

Some Key Notions of Weil’s Philosophy

Before we get into the discussion of the notion of reading, I would like to introduce some
key notions of Weil’s philosophy such as attention, gravity, grace, and decreation that are
relatively known among educationists. As I noted in the introduction, attention has been
regarded as the central notion of Weil’s philosophy. In explaining the notion of attention,
Weil often uses the metaphor of ‘‘waiting’’ and characterizes it as openness.3 It is an
openness with which we wait until the reality of an object presents itself. To pay attention
to something means to make ourselves available to the reality of it. Weil thinks it is very
hard to wait and pure attention is so rare because our mind functions otherwise, being ruled
by what she calls gravity—the internal mechanism of our mind that rules our desires and
emotions. Weil writes, ‘‘all the natural movements of the soul are controlled by laws
analogous to those of physical gravity. Grace is the only exception.’’4 Gravity drives a
human mind to a lower state just as a physical body is pulled down by physical gravity.
Here, lower states mean those defined by lower ideals and feelings that originate in placing
ourselves at the center of importance. Some examples Weil mentions would be helpful
here. She writes, ‘‘the same suffering is much harder to bear for a high motive than for the
base one (the people who stood motionless from one to eight o’clock in the morning for the
sake of having an egg, would have found it difficult to do so in order to save a human life)’’
(GG, 46). Satisfying one’s appetite for food has more appeal than fulfilling one’s moral
duties. People are more easily motivated by lower aims because they are more concerned
about their advantage. Weil also gives examples of lower feelings such as fear, cov-
etousness, desire to break records, outward honors, envy, and resentment (Ibid., 52–53).
These also are the result of placing ourselves at the center of importance. Weil thus claims
that in order to practice attention and make ourselves available to the reality of others, we
need to learn to be free from the influence of gravity and achieve detachment from the self
that strives to hold itself at the center of importance. This abdication of the self is
decreation. Only then, with the help of grace can we truly practice attention. Not much can
be said about grace except that it is contrary to gravity and it alone can allow us act freely
from its control. Weil occasionally writes as if it is supernatural energy that feeds us and
enables us act morally: ‘‘The source of man’s moral energy is outside him, like that of his

3
See, for instance, Weil’s essay ‘‘Reflection on the Right Use of School Studies’’ included in WG. In
French, the verb ‘‘attendre’’ means to wait.
4
Simone Weil, Gravity and Grace. Citations are from the UNP edition, 45. The book will be henceforth
referred as GG.

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666 K. Yoda

physical energy (food, air, etc.)’’ (Ibid., 47). I do not think Weil is here thinking of some
occult power influencing us. Rather her point is that a moral action does not come about
solely from within the self, but it requires a sort of commitment to something outside and
beyond the self. This comes back to why Weil uses the metaphor of waiting. All we can do
is to wait (after achieving some freedom from the influence of gravity).

The Notion of Reading

The notion of reading appears broadly throughout Weil’s texts. However, one essay
thoroughly deals with this notion and it is simply titled ‘‘Essay on the Notion of Reading.’’5
Winch (1989) counts this essay as one of the most important of Weil’s texts, and scholars
such as, Allen (1993), Andic (1993) and Springsted (2015) have written about it. Thus, I
will rely heavily on this essay in discussing the notion of reading.
Before delving into what reading exactly is for Weil, a rough overview would be helpful
to see the significance of the notion and I will do so by relating it to Amélie Rorty’s
treatment of reading (1997). In her essay on reading, she writes at the beginning: ‘‘virtually
all we do involves reading’’ (1997, 85). Although the article devotes much space to tips for
reading books and other texts, Rorty views reading as a much broader notion. Asking
‘‘Why bother learning to read well?’’ Rorty concludes, ‘‘Learning to read well is on the
way to learning to live well’’ (1997, 89). Similarly, Weil formulates the notion of reading
broadly and relates it to how we live. She considers that the reality is what we read, and by
changing how we read, we change how we act, love, and live in this world.
Thus reading is more than just reading of books, newspapers, magazines, and other
forms of texts. What reading is then and the reason she names the notion ‘‘reading’’ could
be understood best by consulting with her examples.
Two women each receive a letter, announcing to each that her son is dead. The first,
upon just glancing at the paper, faints, and until her death, her eyes, her mouth, her
movements will never again be as they were. The second woman remains the same:
her expression, her attitude do not change; she cannot read…. It is not the sensation
but the meaning which has grabbed hold of the first woman, reaching directly,
brutally into her mind, without her participation, as sensations grab hold of us.
Everything happens as if the pain resided in the letter and sprang up from it into the
reader’s face. As for the sensations themselves, such as the colour of the paper or of
the ink, they don’t even appear. What is presented to the sight is the pain itself. (ER,
297–298)
Weil names the notion reading because the example that captures the notion is literally
about reading. Unlike ‘‘seeing,’’ which is usually understood as the mere reception of sense
data through the eyes, one needs to be literate in order to read. Thus, Weil’s notion of
reading assumes that one who reads is already immersed in the system of language.6 In
addition, as in this example of reading bad news, our experience of reading is not
procedural—it is not like: we first get a sensation from a series of letters (presumably this

5
Simone Weil, ‘‘Essay on the Notion of Reading.’’ The essay was written in 1941, one of her late writings
as she died 1943, and originally published in 1946 as ‘‘Essai sur la Notion de Lecture’’ in Les Études
Philosophiques. This will henceforward be abbreviated as ER.
6
This resonates with Wittgenstein’s idea of language game and Heidegger’s thrown-ness of being in the
world.

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An Approach to Simone Weil’s Philosophy of Education… 667

alone is what seeing commonly means), understand this meaning, and then are grabbed by
them. Weil claims all these steps occur immediately as we read. ‘‘If I hate someone, there
is not him on one side, my hatred on the other; when he approaches me something hateful
approaches me’’ (ER, 299). Reading then is thus neither sensation nor interpretation. It is
not mere sensation because there is no bare sensation separated from the meaning. It is also
different from interpretation because interpretation implies something to be interpreted,
given in advance by a bare sensation. Moreover, unlike interpretation that comes from
inside (i.e., an interpreter gives/adds meaning to the thing interpreted), meaning, even if
not fully, arrives from outside in reading—we receive meaning (Ibid., 301).
It is not the purpose of this paper to examine this notion in detail by situating it within
various theories of knowledge and philosophies of language. I cannot do justice to this
book length topic in the space of this article. It requires a separate study.7 Since our present
concern is how the notion of reading helps us understand Weil’s notion of attention and
consequently her understanding of the development of our love of others, I would like to
limit the discussion within the following three points that seem most significant.

Reading and Attention

The first point is that reading concerns our perspective and by improving our manner of
reading we may nurture attention and love of others with which Weil equates justice and
forgiveness.8 ‘‘What we call the world are the meanings we read’’ (ER, 298). Weil thinks
that ‘‘reality’’ is what we read from a perspective, and without proper training we are
inclined to read from a self-centered perspective. Weil writes, for example:
A beloved being who disappoints me. I wrote to him. It is impossible that he should
not reply by saying what I have said to myself in his name. Men owe us what we
imagine they will give us. We must forgive them this debt. To accept the fact that
they are other than the creatures of our imagination…. I also am other than what I
imagine myself to be. To know this is forgiveness. (GG, 54)
We see others from our egocentric perspective and hope them to be as we imagine them to
be. We would feel saddened, angry or disappointed when our expectations are betrayed.
We are naturally inclined to take this perspective because of the binding influence of
gravity.9 ‘‘Gravity. Generally what we expect of others depends on the effect of gravity
upon ourselves; what we receive from them depends on the effect of gravity upon them.
Sometimes (by chance) the two coincide, often they do not’’ (GG, 45). Reading untrained,
our reading is ruled by gravity and we impose on others what we expect to read in them.
We do not allow them to be as they are; we do not receive others’ reality as they are.
Some examples would help clarify the point. We tend to read a bank-teller as someone
or something that is interchangeable with an ATM machine.10 We are not interested in his
person—whether he prefers footfall to basketball, or if he is a father of a daughter. All we
expect him is accurate and quick transactions, and we will be irritated if he is slow and dull

7
As Andic (1993) mentions, Wittgenstein’s account of reading in Philosophical Investigations, relating
Weil’s notion of reading to Wittgenstein’s account, might be a useful way to situate it in the scholarship of
philosophy. See Andic’s essay ‘‘Discernment and Imagination’’.
8
Diogenes Allen summarizes: ‘‘We usually read from a perspective. The meanings we receive are not false.
Given a perspective, what we read is indeed what ought to be read from that perspective’’ (1993, 99).
9
See the previous section for how Weil defines gravity more generally.
10
Weil in the essay on Iliad (1965) writes that force turns human beings into a thing.

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unfulfilling that expectation. Another example is how a problem child reads her teacher.
She read him as a person bound with his role as a teacher. Her typical readings of teachers:
teachers will not understand her, won’t listen beyond their formal duty, don’t really care
about her future, and what teachers care is their evaluation. Yet another illustrating
example is a taxi driver in NYC. What we expect from them is a safe but swift trans-
portation without a rip-off. Our readings are loaded not only with our expectation about the
profession, but also our prejudice about race, nationality, linguistic background, and per-
haps even gender, age group, etc. Reading is also affected by situational elements. We are
often irritated when we need to change our plan because things do not turn as we expect.
For instance, imagine a person who is traveling overseas and waiting for a bus to visit the
museum. It is her last day and the museum will be closed in 1 h, but the bus is late. She has
been waiting it for 30 min. She gets irritated, starts to blame the incompetent bus driver
and the malfunctioning transportation system of the country. Dominated by such frustra-
tion, her reading is bound by the self-centered perspective and cannot afford to imagine
that the bus driver, for instance, may have a sick passenger. Further, most of us know how
easily we get angry when we are hungry and how easily we feel anxious or depressed when
it is cold. These examples tell how our reading is loaded with physic-psychological ele-
ments as well as socio-cultural values and situations.
We need to stop reading from the self-centered perspective and allow others to be as
they are. Weil calls this as forgiveness and justice. Unlike our common use of the word,
forgiveness is not about pardoning someone for an action that harmed us. It is forgiving the
very existence of other people, freeing them from our judgments and appreciating their
value. It thus carries a special meaning.11 Weil relates this specific sense of forgiveness to
justice. As she writes:
One reads, but also one is read by others. Interpositions of such readings. To force
somebody to read himself as you read him (slavery). To force others to read you as
you read yourself (conquest)…. Justice. To be continually ready to admit that
another person is something other than what we read when he is there (or when we
think about him). Or rather: to read in him also (and continually) that he is certainly
something other than what we read—perhaps something altogether different….
Every being silently clamours to be read otherwise. Not to be deaf to such cries.12
We naturally impose our reading on each other. Weil thinks it is unjust to do so and believe
that one’s own reading is the only true reading, rejecting others. Justice is to be open to
other possible readings, stop reading only from a self-centered perspective and find balance
between one’s reading with others’. In discussing justice and love of others, Weil puts
priority on their receptive aspect so much as to claim that it alone constitutes them.
Weil thinks we need to learn how to read better. Changing how we read and fighting
against the natural inclination toward self-centered perspective, one becomes capable of
practicing attention, which for Weil is the touchstone of loving others. Moreover, Weil
even claims that nurturing attention is the central (if not sole) aim of education.13 I
included an example particularly related to classroom—a student’s reading of her teacher.

11
This does not mean Weil always understands forgiveness in this sense. For instance, when she talks about
forgiveness in her discussion of revenge, it means a usual sense of forgiveness. It seems that, for Weil,
forgiveness has a broader sense just as love and justice do.
12
Simone Weil, The Notebooks of Simone Weil, 43. This will henceforward be abbreviated as N. See also
GG, 188.
13
Simone Weil, ‘‘Reflections on the Right Use of School Studies with a View to the Love of God,’’ in WG.

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We may think of the teacher’s reading of the student and apply the notion of reading to
consider teacher-student relation. Indeed, Noddings finds in Weil’s notion of attention the
quality that the caring relation should embody (2002, 17). I will explore these further in the
last section of this article where some implications to education are discussed.

Non-reading is Impossible

The second point I would like to note on the notion of reading is that Weil thinks it is
impossible not to read. This point is important particularly for this study that promises to
address the problem of self-negation. Her notion of attention is often found problematic by
reason that she recommends us to be completely detached from the self and suggest the
possibility of absolute pure reading or reading from nowhere in the absence of the subject.
In fact, we find passages that indicate as if Weil advocated such a total detachment. She
writes:
The reality of the world is made up for us of our attachment. It is the reality of the ‘I’,
which is transferred by us into material objects. It is in no sense external reality. The
latter only becomes discernible through total detachment. Should but a thread
remain, there is still attachment. (N, 318)14
She claims that reality is independent of our perspective and different from the ‘‘reality’’
seen from a self-centered perspective. It thus seems as if she was advocating a ‘‘view from
nowhere.’’ In another passage describing attention, Weil writes: ‘‘the soul empties itself of
all its own contents in order to receive into itself the being it is looking at, just as he is, in
all his truth’’ (WG, 115). Moreover, she often claims attention to be the vision of the
‘‘naked’’ truth (Ibid., 112).15 All of these descriptions seem to imply that Weil is thinking
of the possibility of ‘‘non-reading’’ (N, 42; N, 63).
Interpreting Weil along this ideal of non-reading, one is tempted to claim too sim-
plistically that one should purify one’s reading and achieve non-reading. What we need is
to silence our internal noises created by our expectations, desires, and emotions as if we
can be completely free from them. But important questions are left as Edgerton herself asks
at the end of her article: ‘‘Is it possible to approach that level of non-projection to the
other… without such melting away of the self? Is it possible at all? What are the
boundaries?’’ (2002, 415) Weil’s language around the notion of attention does sound as if it
suggests such radical detachment and self-effacement.
Nevertheless, it is simplistic and perhaps irresponsible to say: quite the inner voice of
desires and emotions of the self, then we can listen to other people and love them. The idea
of the view from nowhere is impossible and it should be problematized if Weil were
actually heading toward that direction. Studying the notion of reading, we actually see that
Weil is neither pressing us to be free from any perspectives nor believing the possibility of
non-reading. She writes, ‘‘As for not reading at all—it’s impossible; one cannot look at a
text printed in a language one knows, appropriately placed, and read nothing’’ (ER, 298).
The statement confirms the basic point about reading that it is neither sensation nor
interpretation, which I noted earlier in this paper. Further, what is more important here is
that Weil clearly says non-reading is impossible. In reading it is impossible not to receive

14
Also see GG, 59. There, the passage continues, ‘‘Attachment is a manufacture of illusions and whoever
wants reality ought to be detached’’ (GG, 59).
15
Also see N, 120. There she claims that true renunciation of the self requires achieving spiritual nakedness
by renouncing spiritual goods as well as material goods.

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any meaning. Reading is always loaded with a meaning because it is always from a
perspective. Weil does not believe the possibility of non-reading and she does not seek
pure sensation devoid of a meaning or a perspective-less vision. Indeed, as I will discuss
soon, what Weil actually suggests is not non-reading, but superposition of multiple
readings.

Immediacy and Physicality

The third point is that a reading is necessarily and immediately tied to certain responses
(visible or not) and in that sense an action is a spontaneous result of a reading. How we
respond in this world depends on how we read. Reading is receptive, but not passive in a
negative way. Reading is active even if it sometimes leads inactive responses. It is beyond
the dichotomy of activity and passivity. Weil writes:
I believe what I read, my judgments are what I read, I act according to what I read,
how could I do otherwise? If I read the possibility of winning honour in a noise, I run
towards the noise; if I read danger and nothing else, I run far from the noise. In both
cases, the necessity of acting in this way, even if I feel some reluctance, forces itself
on me in an obvious and direct way, like the noise, and along with the noise; I read
the necessity in the noise. (ER, 300)
Our response to a situation (including our action) is an immediate result of our reading.
Action is inseparable from our reading. We should notice that Weil’s picture of action is
quite different from a typical process we casually picture in mind: (1) we receive stimuli
and other information, (2) our minds process the information, consult with our knowledge,
and make a decision utilizing our thinking, (3) we then act by our will. Weil’s picture does
not have such steps. There is only a continuum; it is one stroke: we ‘‘read and act.’’
Weil’s language here is again perhaps too strong. It sounds as if Weil neglects the space
for thinking and contemplation behind our conducts and all actions are reactive. Weil
would not dismiss the role of thinking so totally. Behind this difference of the picture lies
her emphasis on the involvement of physical component in our reading. In the casual
picture, mind–body dualism is implied: our body is responsible for receiving stimuli, our
mind processes them, makes a decision, and then our will pushes us to take an action
creating movements of our body. In this picture, the focus is naturally given to our mind
because body’s role is unimportant—it is like a mind’s tool. Meanwhile, in Weil’s picture,
we read and respond with our entire being. Weil highlights body’s involvement in reading
and writes, ‘‘the body plays a part in all apprenticeships’’ and that ‘‘every apprenticeship is
learning to read in a certain way’’ (WG, 132 and ER, 301 respectively). She, then, com-
pares the learning of reading with an apprenticeship in manual labor: ‘‘As one has to learn
to read or to practice a trade [hand work], so one must learn to feel in all things, first and
almost solely, the obedience of the universe to God. It is really an apprenticeship. Like
every apprenticeship, it requires time and effort’’ (WG, 131). This apprenticeship neces-
sarily involves physical dimension. Through it, how you feel, how you act, how you read
changes. This resonates with Aristotle’s ethics that emphasizes the creation of good habits
through repeated practice.16 Ethics is not so much a matter of thinking and contemplation;
it is a matter of practice and the repeated practice changes not only how we act, but it also
changes how we feel and even who we are, i.e. our personal and moral character.

16
See book two of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.

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Reading thus has physical components and it is immediately tied to a response. Our
action is more of a result of our reading than our will. We give too much credit to our will.
It has only limited role in the conduct of our action. We cannot control our action so well
by our will. For instance, one’s will tell one should help a homeless on a street out of love,
but one cannot do so because one physically feels a danger or physiologically feels disgust
and steps away spontaneously before one thinks about what should be done. Such expe-
rience is quite common. We know by experience that our will is not that powerful as we
often seem to assume tacitly. What we can do is to train our manner of reading beforehand
so that our reading at a moment spontaneously leads to a right action. We act virtuously
only when we read well, and such an action is always a spontaneous result of reading. This
is another important reason why Weil’s notion of attention is primarily receptive. The role
of physical component thus cannot be dismissed, which includes elements such as sen-
sations, desires, emotions, and habits. I believe there is no need to argue for the relevancy
of Weil’s notion of reading for the discourse of moral education. It deserves a book length
study and I will keep it for my future assignment.

Reading Better

Thus we have seen that Weil thinks love of others (justice and forgiveness) is available by
changing how we read. One needs to fight against the natural inclination to read from the
self-centered perspective. This, however, does not mean one needs to acquire an innocent
reading or to stop reading altogether. One needs to learn to read better. What we want to
inquire, then, is what is a better reading and how we may improve our reading.
A better reading is a superposition of multiple readings. Weil scholars often cite a
crucial passage in discussing the notion of reading, and it is particularly important for
understanding the superposition of multiple readings.17 ‘‘Supposed readings: we should
read necessity behind sensation, order behind necessity, and God behind order’’ (N, 267).18
Three levels of readings are suggested here: (1) reading necessity behind sensation, (2)
reading order behind necessity, and (3) reading God behind order.19 Let me explain them
by using Weil’s example of the sailor.20
For the sailor, the experienced captain, whose ship has in a sense become like an
extension of his body, the ship is a tool for reading the storm, and he reads quite
differently than the passenger. Where the passenger reads chaos, unlimited danger,
fear, the captain reads necessities, limited dangers, the means of escape from the
storm, a duty to act courageously and honourably. (ER, 301–302)
When a storm hits, the passengers are overwhelmed by the violent forces of nature. Their
reading is limited; they only read necessity behind sensation. They are terrified by the
rocking of the ship and the howls of the wind. They find the storm evil and resent their
suffering without being able to see how such a natural phenomenon happens as a result of
the manifestation of physical laws and order. They complain: I can’t believe this is

17
For example, one can find the passage referenced in the essays by Allen (1993), Andic (1993) and
Springsted (2015) that I already noted.
18
See also GG, 190.
19
Some may point that there is another level implicit: reading merely by sensation below the three levels.
As I pointed earlier in this paper, however, reading is different from mere sensation.
20
Allen also takes up the example of the captain and discusses levels of reading (1993, 100).

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happening to me! what did I do to deserve this? why me? Some may start blaming the
sailors for not satisfying their job. Others may run for a lifeboat and push others away
seeing them as mere blockades.
The captain can read the storm differently. He feels the rock and hears the howls just as
the passengers do, but he is not overwhelmed by them. He reads order behind necessity that
allows him to stop complaining the situation, carefully observe what is happening around
him and within him, and to start acting properly. Like a physicist, he read order behind the
movement of the ship on the stormy water. He can therefore analyze the situation, measure
the real danger it poses to the ship, then determine what should be done to avoid a
shipwreck. Further, the captain understands that the order of nature makes no exceptions
for anyone. No one is singled out for suffering (or blessing). He understands the over-
whelmed condition of the passengers, tries to calm down and lead them to behave properly.
Moreover, even if he finds the storm is unavoidably fatal, he accepts with calm and
equanimity what will happen to him and his passengers.21 He understands the limitations
of human existence. If he is able to read on the third level, which I touch only slightly for
the reason I mention right below, he sees this limitation as God’s love. He reads God in the
storm. God allowed the existence of human suffering out of his love.
In discussing today’s secular education, it is perhaps unreasonable to suggest the third
level of reading, i.e. reading God and accepting anything in the world as His love. As I
mentioned in the introduction, the religious nature of Weil’s philosophy is a big issue and
deserves a separate study. In the following, I leave aside the problem and the third level of
reading. I argue that it is still very meaningful to discuss the second level of reading, which
is tied to justice and love of others.
Coming back to the first level of reading, i.e., reading necessity behind sensation, one
reads only from a self-centered perspective. One sees people and things in the world only
in terms of the good and evil they bring to him. This is what people do by natural
inclination and Weil claims that we need to realize it and fight against this tendency in
order to practice attention and love others.
In the second level of reading, i.e., reading the order behind necessity, we are aware of
the fact that each one of us reads. First, one must realize that by necessity ‘‘I’’ read from a
self-centered perspective. ‘‘To read, and read at the same time one’s own reading, the
notion of reading, the mechanical or quasi-mechanical necessity for that particular read-
ing’’ (N, 42) As one reads, one should also read ones own reading. It involves awareness of
the fact that one is reading and it is naturally inclined to be from the self-centered per-
spective. In the same way, one notices that other people may read from their own per-
spective. ‘‘A centre from which may be seen the different possible readings—and their
relationship—and our own only as one among them’’ (Ibid., 47). It is indispensable to
notice that ‘‘my’’ reading is one of many other readings, all of which are deficient and
‘‘incorrect’’22 so far as one’s reading is bounded by a self-centered perspective.
The second level of reading, then, does not reject the prior level of readings. It allows
the existence of them. In fact, it is consisted by superposition of multiple readings. This
point is crucial because we can easily misunderstand Weil rejecting the lower level of
readings that are readings by natural inclination, i.e. gravity. Weil actually thinks that the
second level of reading is available after one realizes one’s reading is one of many possible

21
It seems to me that modern physicists—being able to read on the second level—may not be able to accept
what order (necessity) brings to them with this kind of stoic calm. In that sense, there may be sub-divisions
within the second level of reading.
22
I took the word ‘‘incorrect’’ from Andic’s essay (1993, 126).

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An Approach to Simone Weil’s Philosophy of Education… 673

readings and thus it allows and pardons the existence of the first level of readings from
diverse perspectives. Weil writes, ‘‘We have not to choose between opinions. We have to
welcome them all but arrange them vertically, placing them on suitable levels. Thus:
chance, destiny, Providence’’ (GG, 185). Though she does not use the term reading, the
correspondence is clear between the three levels, chance, destiny, Providence, and the three
levels of reading. With this remark, Weil is very clear that she is not disregarding the value
of diverse perspectives. Further Weil writes, ‘‘That which distinguishes higher states from
lower ones is the co-existence in the higher states of several superposed planes’’ (GG, 101).
This quotation comes from Weil’s notebooks and is an independent block for which we
find no context. I cannot tell what ‘‘state’’ she is talking about, but I take this passage to
involve perspective and reading, as illustrated in the image of the man on the mountaintop
below. This image appears in Weil’s explanation of the notion of attention and it allows us
to picture how the higher level of reading involves the lower readings.
Attention consists of suspending our thought, leaving it detached, empty, and ready
to be penetrated by the object; it means holding in our minds, within reach of this
thought, but on a lower level and not in contact with it, the diverse knowledge we
have acquired which we are forced to make use of. Our thought should be in relation
to all particular and already formulated thoughts, as a man on a mountain who, as he
looks forward, sees also below him, without actually looking at them, a great many
forests and plains. (WG, 111–112)
In this passage, Weil explains that attention consists of detachment and she uses the image
of the man on the mountaintop to describe it more vividly. The point is that the perspective
of a man on a mountaintop does not exclude the views of the forests and plains he saw
when he walked through them nor does it remove the lower perspectives he had taken
before reaching the mountaintop. It is because we ourselves read on the first level that we
may understand how other people read on that level. Detachment does not indicate a
complete cut-off from the views we have acquired, but it does place them on their proper
(lower) level. To be able to read on a higher level, one needs to superpose readings on the
lower level. If one stops reading all together being totally detached and free from the
subject, there is nothing to be balanced.
Revisiting the example of the captain of the ship, his reading should not exclude the first
level of readings. Reading on the second level does not mean absence of fear at all. It is
necessary for him to read the storm on the first level. He should feel proper amount of fear
without being overwhelmed by it. Because he feels it, he can understand the passengers’
readings that are dominated by it. If he did not understand their readings, he would blame
them for being silly cowards. Their self-centered readings would only make him frustrated
and angry. Because he understands their readings, he does not judge them nor blame them.
Instead, he can calm them and direct them out of the danger.
Justice becomes available on this second level of reading. As we saw earlier in this
paper, justice requires us to stop reading only from a self-centered perspective, to be open
to other possible readings, and try to find balance between one’s reading with others’. We
do not need to reject the value of first level of readings altogether. Instead, we may admit
others’ readings as equally acceptable as our own, superpose them, and find a point of
balance between different readings. ‘‘To regard one’s own reading and that of another
person as equivalent (like the perspectives)’’ (N, 39). Considering one’s reading with
others’ as equivalent does not mean all readings are equal in value. As we saw above, there
are levels in readings and there is no doubt it implies value judgment. The captain’s
reading is higher in value than the passengers’. What Weil means by that statement is that

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(1) so far as one’s reading is on the first level, it is equal with others’ readings in the sense
both are on the same level, and more importantly (2) the fact that each one of us reads is a
worthy thing even if some readings are not well trained.23
The discussion, however, is still unclear about the superposition of multiple readings
and their balance. As it was pointed earlier, the superposition is not simple the addition of
diverse readings without any value judgments. It does not suggest mere admission of
diverse perspectives crediting them equal value. Instead, it requires us finding a balancing
point between them that necessarily involves value judgments about them. But how do we
do so? Do we have a standard of value there? The questions seem to be ongoing for Weil
herself as she suggests at the end of the essay.
The problem of value developed around this notion of reading is related to truth and
beauty as well as to the good, without it being possible to separate them. Perhaps in
this way their relationship, which is a mystery, might be clarified somewhat. We do
not know how to think about them together, and they cannot be thought about
separately. (ER, 303)
In order to tackle with these questions, it will be necessary to discuss the second problem
concerning Weil’s philosophy, i.e. how we interpret its religious dimension. I will keep the
discussion for another occasion.

Detachment and Engagement

Having discussed thus far, I would like to draw attention to two crucial points. First, I
would like to highlight and confirm how detachment, the inward effort, is still crucial for
improvement of reading despite my emphasis of the outward effort in this article.
Emphasizing the superposition of multiple readings and the acceptance of self-centered
perspective, this paper may seem to undermine or even dismiss the crucial element of
detachment. I contend that detachment is still a valid and important characterization of
Weil’s attention and it is a prerequisite for justice as balance.24 In order to find balance
between one’s reading and others’, first one needs to realize the condition of one’s own
reading. Noticing the fact that one reads on the first level involves the awareness of the
inner states and components of one’s reading. It is impossible to name all the components
here. To mention some, one knows from experience how things such as self-pride, various
desires and emotions (such as anxiety, fear, distrust, hatred, jealous, contempt, anger, and
other political emotions), past experience (biographical elements), beliefs and thoughts
(fixed ideas and prejudices), linguistic habits (how we use words) physical conditions, etc.
all affect how one reads.25 Noticing how these components play behind our readings is
crucial in order to read and accept others’ reading. The awareness often loosens one’s
biased and fixed readings and might give them new perspectives. Even if one’s readings do
not change immediately, it may at least trigger examination of them. It is true that
awareness itself is not enough; however, being able to observe the inner states means that

23
Again, she does not negate the value of lower levels of reading.
24
More comprehensive discussion of Weil’s justice is necessary for further clarification of what the balance
of different readings means. It is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is worthy to note here that Weil thinks
justice is manifest in the existence of others’ consent. And consent is available at the balancing point of our
readings. See Weil’s essay ‘‘Are we Struggling for Justice’’ (1987) and Winch (1989).
25
This urge for the analysis of one’s own reading is equivalent to old Socratic teaching: know thyself.

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An Approach to Simone Weil’s Philosophy of Education… 675

one is no longer subjected by them. Detachment, then, does not mean total annihilation of
them, but being in charge of them. Some of the components may dissolve as a conse-
quence, but detachment does not seek annihilation itself. Detachment thus understood is a
prerequisite for the second level of reading. I am not suggesting complete demystification
of one’s reading. It is impossible. All I mean is that the more one becomes aware of the
condition of our readings, the less our readings will be affected by such components.
Detachment or self-effacement does not have to mean negating and deleting all the
components and ultimately one’s own person.
The second crucial point is that learning to read better is not merely inward effort that
detachment implies, but it also involves outward effort. We learn to superpose multiple
readings through actually interacting with other people and the world. The latter element of
Weil’s attention tends to be less noticed, and its former aspects alone are discussed such as
introspecting our inner states and seeking detachment from our desires and emotions. As
discussed above, however, reading better does not mean absolute pure reading of a per-
spective-less totally detached reader. Instead, it is the superposition of multiple readings
that happens only if we try out our readings through actively engaging with other people
and the world. We realize our own readings not only by seeing inward (introspection); we
often learn about ourselves by comparing with other people. Interacting with other people
and bringing our readings out to the reality outside, we realize that they read just as we do
and our readings are limited and only partial. Some may agree with our readings, others
may not. Our readings about how things are in the world may be harshly rejected and it
may demand us proper modifications. Here I should remind the points I made earlier on
reading’s immediacy and physicality.26 There is the necessary connection between reading
and acting: they are continuum. We act on the reality in accordance with our readings and
this pulls out certain reactions or responses, which again we read. Tensions and constant
recreations necessarily arise as we interact with the reality outside. We learn to superpose
multiple readings through such complicated processes. In the example of the captain of the
ship, his reading develops through his active engagement with the reality of the natural
world as well as his crews and passengers. Weil called it apprenticeship because the
necessity of nature, including the movement of the ship and the change of weather, pen-
etrates the captain because of his physical reality and his work onto the world. Improve-
ment of reading thus requires such outward effort of actively engaging with the physical
world. Though there is no doubt inward effort constitutes attention, it is not the whole
story. Learning to read better and finding balance require the effort of acting out and
engaging with others and the reality outside.

Reading in Education

Improvement of reading is in itself an inherently educational task. Learning to read better

involves the development of self-knowledge (awareness of one’s own reading), the cul-
tivation of openness to other possible readings, and the nurturance of justice as the love of
other people. No further words seem necessary to indicate the relevancy and significance of
Weil’s notion of reading to education discourse. In this section, further implications to
education will be discussed in order to briefly envisage Weil’s potential contributions to
education.

26
See the subsection ‘‘Immediacy and Physicality’’ under the section ‘‘The Notion of Reading’’.

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676 K. Yoda

How can we improve our reading? First, it is easy to think of the development of
reading through reading stories and the works of literature. It has been well-documented
that reading books contributes to moral education. For instance, researchers has claimed
that character themed stories are useful in developing children’s morally desirable char-
acters such as generosity, kindness, fairness, gratitude, honesty, respect, and so on (Kil-
patrick et al. 1994; Hester 2001; Hilder 2005). Improvement of reading this article has
discussed, however, is not so much about the inculcation of moral values and character
traits through reading moral tales as about the realization of their own readings and
readings other than their own. Noddings’ words help capturing such dimension of moral
education:
Of course, stories may be inspirational, and they may portray heros. But, more
important, stories may help us to understand what happens—why people who are
usually good sometimes give way to temptation or even evil, how whole tribes or
nations can go wrong, how we are led to betray our friends out of fear, how we try to
be good and become confused over what ‘good’ means, how thoroughly dependent
on one another we are for our moral goodness. If there is a virtue that we hope to
develop through stories, it is sympathy, intelligently guided by moral understanding.
(2002, 9–10)
What Noddings means by ‘‘sympathy, intelligently guided by moral understanding’’ is
synonymous to justice as balance or compassionate love in this article. In reading books,
we are exposed to readings other than our own. We are asked to imagine each character’s
reading in various circumstances. It then has us realize our own reading, particularly how
self-centered our reading often is. It helps us learn to acknowledge that other people also
read, which is the condition of justice. Martha Nussbaum advocates the use of literature in
a similar vein. Suggesting education for the global citizenship, Nussbaum claims: ‘‘the
goals of world citizenship are best promoted by a literacy education’’ (1997, 89). She
discusses how essential it is of cultivating narrative imagination which she defines as ‘‘the
ability to think what it might be like to be in the shoes of a person different from oneself, to
be an intelligent reader of that person’s story, and to understand the emotions and wishes
and desires that someone so placed might have’’ (1997, 10–11). We notice a meaningful
coincidence that Nussbaum also uses the concept of reading here. Imagining to put one’s
foot in the shoes of another person is to set side ones own reading and acknowledge the fact
that she also reads. Nussbaum also explains that it is ‘‘a capacity for sympathetic
imagination that will enable us to comprehend the motives and choices of people different
from ourselves, seeing them not as forbiddingly alien and other, but as sharing many
problems and possibilities with us’’ (1997, 85).27 Cultivation of narrative imagination in
Nussbaum’s term is equal to improvement of reading this paper has discussed. As Weil
considers it necessary for justice (which is synonymous to love), Nussbaum considers
cultivation of imagination, as a crucial element of global citizens who are ‘‘capable of love
and imagination’’ (1997, 14).
Although Nussbaum identifies literature’s contribution to be prominent, she also
acknowledges, ‘‘music, dance, painting and sculpture, architecture—all have a role in
shaping our understanding of the people around us.’’ Indeed, we may expect improvement
of reading through other kinds of art. Learn to appreciate works of art is to learn openness
to the possibility. It frees them from one prefixed reading. Maxine Greene recognized such

27
Nussbaum’s use of the term fluctuates. Beside imagination, she uses narrative imagination, literary
imagination, sympathetic imagination, compassionate imagination, etc.

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An Approach to Simone Weil’s Philosophy of Education… 677

a capacity of art and developed the idea of aesthetic education. Although lengthy, her
example of a student in a museum helps us see how works of art can contribute the change
of reading discussed in this article.
He/she may well move through a room hung with Cezanne paintings and simply take
note of which ones are hanging there and of the fact that they were painted by Paul
Cezanne. Yes, he/or she might recognize an apple here, a pitcher there, the slope of a
mountain, the slant of a roof. But that might very likely be all—that and the mild
pleasure associated with recognition or response to the richness of color or the spaces
of the gallery itself. If the same person were somehow to be released by a teacher to
understand the importance of uncoupling from the ordinary when entering the gal-
lery, of trying to bracket out conventional seeing and expectation for a while, that
individual (answering, perhaps, the appeal of one or two particular paintings) might
take the time to stand in the presence, say, of a still life or a portrait and move
(perceptually and imaginatively) inside the pictorial frame. … Attending to light and
color and form, he/she might be fortunate enough to see some dimension of the
natural world actually taking on visibility before his/her very eyes. If so, the person
as beholder would be understanding in such a fashion as to bring new orders into
being within his/her experience, new connections in that experience never made
before. He/she would (to put it otherwise) be allowing a work of art to emerge within
his/her experience the more he/she attended to particulars, the more he/she allowed
those particulars to compose and give rise to a shimmering, never entirely fixed
totality. (1984, 124)
As I made it clear by italic emphasis, the resonance is evident between Greene’s
illustration with what this article discussed around Weil’s notion of reading. By
encouraging and preparing students (and no doubt ourselves) to encounter works of art,
we are improving their reading—making free of their otherwise one-dimensional reading,
being aware of the ever incomplete readings of ours, and opening them to multiple
perspectives. Greene acknowledges that such deep level of encounter may not happen to
everyone, but ‘‘the deliberate effort to empower individuals to notice what there is to be
noticed in works of art and to become familiar with the range of ‘language’ or symbol
systems involved, can become an effort that moves people’’ (Ibid.).28 Fostering to pay
attention to works of art opens up the possibility to allow a work of art to be as it is, free it
from our pre-fixed reading, which as I pointed earlier, is a kind of forgiveness and justice in
Weil’s language.
What is just said about education through art could be applied to any subject matters by
considering how we teach them. Instead of focusing too much on problem-solving and fact
memorizing, which presuppose one prefixed reading, we could encourage children to
realize that their reading is just one possibility and there are other possible readings that are
valid as theirs. Approached properly, history and geography are great resources for such
learning. Rather than focusing on the memorization of facts and inculcation of one correct
reading of historical incidents or cultural practices, we may encourage children to realize
their own readings as well as others’. We could imagine such manner of teaching even in
mathematics where usually one definite answer is accepted. Even if there is one definite
solution to an equation, there often are many ways to approach it. Some students may want
to draw a diagram in solving an equation; others may need to think of it in a purely abstract

28
We see again a meaningful coincidence between Greene and Weil. Greene refers to language or symbol
systems that are usually the objects of what we read.

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678 K. Yoda

manner. I am not suggesting abandoning problem-solving altogether and telling children

that all their answers are correct. I maintain that it is important to admit that a wrong
answer is wrong. Having said that, we could always be open to questioning the premises
and settings of the question. The Eq. 1 ? 1 = 2 is correct if we only treat numbers as
abstract quantities and interpret signs such as ? and = as defined in mathematical logic. A
child who has three older brothers may think 1 ? 1 = 6 thinking about her family. Weil
often characterizes her notion of attention as the attitude of waiting. In her essay, Weil
claims students should learn the method of waiting, that is, to wait until the truth presents
itself and to be open and available until it does.29 As Weil writes:
In every school exercise there is a special way of waiting upon truth, setting our
hearts upon it, yet not allowing ourselves to go out in search of it. There is a way of
giving our attention to the data of a problem in geometry without trying to find the
solution or to the words of a Latin or Greek text without trying to arrive at the
meaning. (WG, 113)
Waiting is contrasted with searching for the solution. It is not about aggressively looking
for the result, whether it is a solution to a problem, a correct meaning. We could thus
reconsider what is currently done in classroom and ask if we emphasize too much on
problem-solving and fact-memorizing, imposing prefixed knowledge and perspectives,
without allowing alternative ways of looking at the reality. We could teach subject matters
perhaps in different manners that encourage such contemplative or meditative attitude as
suggested in the quotation above.
Such attitude of waiting and openness to other possibilities calls for teachers’ atten-
tiveness to their students. Not rushing into judging right or wrong, we could suggest
teachers to listen to their students and encourage children to do the same by being their role
model.30 Here I would like to return to a passage I quoted earlier in this article:
One reads, but also one is read by others. Interpositions of such readings. To force
somebody to read himself as you read him (slavery). To force others to read you as
you read yourself (conquest)…. Justice. To be continually ready to admit that
another person is something other than what we read when he is there (or when we
think about him). Or rather: to read in him also (and continually) that he is certainly
something other than what we read—perhaps something altogether different….
Every being silently clamours to be read otherwise. Not to be deaf to such cries.31
Because of the excess emphasis of the language of efficiency and performance, it is easy
for teachers to fail to listen to their students. They are under pressure to raise test scores;
their focus lies in achievement and not much attention is available to the students. It is also
possible that a passionate teacher imposes his educational ideals to the students and fails to
listen to them. He quickly makes judgments about the students, identifies their inadequacy

29
I owe the word choice ‘‘available’’ to Eric O. Springsted. He pointed out that Weil uses the French word
‘‘disponible’’ to explain the notion of attention and it is sometimes translated as ‘‘detachment’’ in English
texts, but it literally means ‘‘available.’’
30
Buchmann (1989) asserts, although teacher thinking is often understood as planning and decision
making, that contemplation, a different sort of thinking, is crucial for teachers. She characterizes contem-
plation as careful attention setting aside ones wills and emotions and suspending thoughts and calculations
of utility. She dispels the common belief that contemplation is not practical. Teachers need to pay careful
attention to their subject matter and their students.
31
N, 43.

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An Approach to Simone Weil’s Philosophy of Education… 679

and tries to fix them one-sidedly. Should they not be deaf to the silent cries of their
students, teachers need to learn to wait and improve their readings. Noddings recognizes
the relevancy of Weil’s notion of attention on this point. She writes:
Dialogue is the most fundamental component of the care model. True dialogue… is
open-ended. The participants do not know at the outset what the conclusions will be.
Both speak; both listen…. The emphasis on dialogue points up the basic phe-
nomenology of caring. A carer must attend to or be engrossed (at least momentarily)
in the cared-for, and the cared-for must receive the carer’s efforts at caring. This
reception, too, is a form of attention. (2002, 16)
Noddings thinks that teaching is a practice based on a caring relation and there should be
dialogue between a teacher (usually a carer) and a student (a cared-for). It is important that
Noddings notes true dialogue is open-ended. We need to listen to each other and it
demands openness or receptivity that allows us to be fully available to the other. Noddings
identifies such quality of receptivity as attention and refers to Weil. Weil’s notion of
reading is perfectly relevant in thinking about teacher-student relations.
Last but not least, I would like to highlight that our reading of what education is needs
to be reconsidered. It is not hard to notice that we read education quite instrumentally
today. Education in many contexts is considered as a means of economic prosperity, at
either the national level or the individual level. We see an appalling statement in the
European Union’s White Paper Teaching and Learning: Towards the Learning Society,
published by European Commission in 1996: ‘‘[D]ebates over the aims of education are
now at an end: the purpose of education is to serve the economy.’’32 More than thirty years
ago, Maxine Greene pointed out the crisis of such reading of what education is.
This is a moment in our history when persons are described as ‘resources,’ when
changes in education are being called for in the name of economic productivity and
national defense. The values of process and choice-making are being repressed or set
aside. Human energies are to be channeled and controlled in the ‘national interest’;
no longer is there talk of what is not yet, of imagined possibility. Along with this
comes a sense of petrification. Publics are asked to accommodate to an objectified
‘reality,’ marked off and demarcated in cost-benefit terms. (1984, 123)
Things have not changed since. Rather, it has worsened under the pressure of a
competitive global economy. Greater emphasis is put on STEM (Science, Technology,
Engineering, and Mathematics) education. Education is read as a means to economic
productivity and educational achievement is solely discussed in terms of efficiency and
performance. Our reading of education is largely reigned by the culture of measurement as
Biesta (2010) rightly problematizes. This reading is so fixed that it allows no other possible
readings imagined.
The overemphasis on test scores and accountability is a result of such reading of
education. Education for children is not about the joyful experience of learning and
studying. It is more a matter of mastering techniques to solve problems and memorizing
facts in order to earn higher test scores. Some children who are good at school studies do
not find this too overwhelming or stressful, feeling happy instead to be able to please their
parents and teachers. Other children who struggle with tests and studying suffer when they
are judged unfairly for their low performance and blamed for their incapacity. Their dislike

32
As cited in Standish (2003, 221).

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680 K. Yoda

for school and studying grows as they are forced to learn and be tested in rigorous and
superficial ways.
The negative atmosphere can be detected among teachers as well. Although some
teachers find beauty in their practice of teaching, their enthusiasm and enjoyment are
challenged as their practice becomes controlled and bounded by education policies, the
primary concern of which is far removed from children’s happiness. Currently in the
United States, many teachers are being pressured by evaluations from school adminis-
trators, who in turn are worried about school evaluations by the state that can deeply affect
their career. To continue one’s career as a teacher, one needs to teach in the way that meets
this evaluation scheme based almost exclusively on raising test scores. Minerip (2011)
reported on how a teacher was unjustly evaluated by the test scores and her career is now
jeopardized as a result. It is natural that many teachers stop thinking about the deep
meaning of their vocation and conclude that they now teach not because of the inherent joy
of teaching but because of the necessity of keeping their jobs. In such a climate, we hear
regrettable news that directly results from their pressure: teachers cheated on the tests so
that their students can earn better scores (Gabriel 2010). Depression is no longer
uncommon among teachers as they contend with the demand of accountability, witness
children’s general unhappiness about test-oriented classes, and are targeted for criticism
from administrators, parents, and the general public.
This disquieting state of affairs over education is not limited to elementary and sec-
ondary school education; higher education is also guided by the instrumental view.
Kronman (2007), a professor of law at Yale Law School, discussed how higher education
has lost its sense of meaning. Stainburn (2013) reported on this situation in a New York
Times article: we now have college ranking based on the income of graduates and more
people are choosing college based on future incomes. The arts and humanities are
undervalued and are compressed almost to oblivion, while STEM (Science, Technology,
Engineering, and Mathematics) fields and practical and business-oriented studies are
favored in higher education institutes (Nussbaum 2010; Cohen 2009).33 Professors are busy
writing application for research grant rather than spending time to prepare for their
teaching.
Such negative atmosphere surrounding education is the result of our neglect and inat-
tention to what education is. The emphasis of standardized tests and accountability based
on them is only one way of reading education (probably the poorest one) and it often
rejects other readings that are valuable, such as a teacher’s experienced, personal, and
perhaps loving readings of students. Changing how we read education is central in
improving all aspects of our practice of education. It will provide invaluable inspirations
for the discussion of what we teach, how we teach subject matters, and how teachers relate
to students.

Conclusion

Weil’s notion of reading is thus perfectly relevant to various dimensions of education

discourse. The discussion of the notion of reading is crucial for more refined understanding
of Weil’s notion of attention. Unlike typical interpretation of Weil’s attention that sim-
plistically suggests the need of detachment and the negation of the self or any perspectives,

33
Nussbaum expresses her concern about the prevalent economic view of education and argues for the need
for humanities in a democratic society.

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An Approach to Simone Weil’s Philosophy of Education… 681

it clarifies that Weil, instead of non-reading, proposes the superposition of multiple

readings and the balance between one’s reading and others’. It also points out that
detachment is only half of the story and attention requires outward effort: we learn to
superpose multiple readings through actively engaging with other people and the reality
outside. Superposition allows us to go beyond a self-centered perspective and leads us to a
comprehensive and the higher level of reading where justice manifests. Learning to read
better in this way is equivalent to nurturing attention and love of others. The discussion of
the paper is far from comprehensive. I had to set aside the question of values as well as the
religiousness of Weil’s philosophy. More comprehensive study of Weil’s notion of reading
and her whole philosophy is due to gain a fuller picture of her not so small contribution to
education studies.

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