G.R. No.
77395 November 29, 1988 Petitioner ALU-TUCP, private respondent herein, in its
BELYCA CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
DIR. PURA FERRER CALLEJA, LABOR RELATIONS,
MANILA, MINISTRY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT;
MED-ARBITER, RODOLFO S. MILADO, MINISTRY OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. 10
AND ASSOCIATED LABOR UNION (ALU-TUCP),
MINDANAO REGIONAL OFFICE, CAGAYAN DE ORO
CITY, respondents.
Soriano and Arana Law Offices for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Francisco D. Alas for respondent Associated Labor Unions-
TUCP.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction seeking to annul or to set aside the resolution of
the Bureau of Labor Relations dated November 24, 1986
and denying the appeal, and the Bureau's resolution dated
January 13, 1987 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The dispositive portion of the questioned resolution dated
November 24, 1986 (Rollo, p. 4) reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the
foregoing considerations, the Order is
affirmed and the appeal therefrom
denied.
Let, therefore, the pertinent records of
the case be remanded to the office of
origin for the immediate conduct of the
certification election.
The dispositive portion of the resolution dated January 13,
1987 (Rollo, p. 92) reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by respondent
Belyca Corporation (Livestock Agro-
Division) is hereby dismissed for lack of
merit and the Bureau's Resolution dated
24 November 1986 is affirmed.
Accordingly, let the records of this case
be immediately forwarded to the Office
of origin for the holding of the
certification elections.
No further motion shall hereafter be
entertained.
The antecedents of the case are as follows:
On June 3, 1986, private respondent Associated Labor
Union (ALU)-TUCP, a legitimate labor organization duly
registered with the Ministry of Labor and Employment under
Registration Certificate No. 783-IP, filed with the Regional
Office No. 10, Ministry of Labor and Employment at Cagayan
de Oro City, a petition for direct certification as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank and file
employees/workers of Belyca Corporation (Livestock and
Agro-Division), a duly organized, registered and existing
corporation engaged in the business of poultry raising,
piggery and planting of agricultural crops such as corn,
coffee and various vegetables, employing approximately 205
rank and file employees/workers, the collective bargaining
unit sought in the petition, or in case of doubt of the union's
majority representation, for the issuance of an order
authorizing the immediate holding of a certification election
(Rollo, p. 18). Although the case was scheduled for hearing
at least three times, no amicable settlement was reached by
the parties. During the scheduled hearing of July 31, 1986
they, however, agreed to submit simultaneously their
respective position papers on or before August 11, 1986
(rollo. p. 62).
petition and position paper alleged, among others, (1) that
there is no existing collective bargaining agreement between
the respondent employer, petitioner herein, and any other
existing legitimate labor unions; (2) that there had neither
been a certification election conducted in the proposed
bargaining unit within the last twelve (12) months prior to the
filing of the petition nor a contending union requesting for
certification as the. sole and exclusive bargaining
representative in the proposed bargaining unit; (3) that more
than a majority of respondent employer's rank-and-file
employees/workers in the proposed bargaining unit or one
hundred thirty-eight (138) as of the date of the filing of the
petition, have signed membership with the ALU-TUCP and
have expressed their written consent and authorization to the
filing of the petition; (4) that in response to petitioner union's
two letters to the proprietor/ General Manager of respondent
employer, dated April 21, 1986 and May 8, 1 986, requesting
for direct recognition as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of the rank-and-file workers, respondent employer has
locked out 119 of its rank-and-file employees in the said
bargaining unit and had dismissed earlier the local union
president, vice-president and three other active members of
the local unions for which an unfair labor practice case was
filed by petitioner union against respondent employer last
July 2, 1986 before the NLRC in Cagayan de Oro City (Rollo,
pp. 18; 263).<äre||anº•1àw>
Respondent employer, on the other hand, alleged in its
position paper, among others, (1) that due to the nature of its
business, very few of its employees are permanent, the
overwhelming majority of which are seasonal and casual and
regular employees; (2) that of the total 138 rank-and-file
employees who authorized, signed and supported the filing
of the petition (a) 14 were no longer working as of June 3,
1986 (b) 4 resigned after June, 1986 (c) 6 withdrew their
membership from petitioner union (d) 5 were retrenched on
June 23, 1986 (e) 12 were dismissed due to malicious
insubordination and destruction of property and (f) 100
simply abandoned their work or stopped working; (3) that the
128 incumbent employees or workers of the livestock section
were merely transferred from the agricultural section as
replacement for those who have either been dismissed,
retrenched or resigned; and (4) that the statutory
requirement for holding a certification election has not been
complied with by the union (Rollo, p. 26).
The Labor Arbiter granted the certification election sought for
by petitioner union in his order dated August 18, 1986 (Rollo,
p. 62).
On February 4, 1987, respondent employer Belyca
Corporation, appealed the order of the Labor Arbiter to the
Bureau of Labor Relations in Manila (Rollo, p. 67) which
denied the appeal (Rollo, p. 80) and the motion for
reconsideration (Rollo, p. 92). Thus, the instant petition
received in this Court by mail on February 20, 1987 (Rollo, p.
3).
In the resolution of March 4, 1987, the Second Division of
this Court required respondent Union to comment on the
petition and issued a temporary restraining order (,Rollo, p.
95).
Respondent union filed its comment on March 30, 1987
(Rollo, p. 190); public respondents filed its comment on April
8, 1987 (Rollo, p. 218).
On May 4, 1987, the Court resolved to give due course to
the petition and to require the parties to submit their
respective memoranda within twenty (20) days from notice
(Rollo, p. 225).
The Office of the Solicitor General manifested on June 11,
1987 that it is adopting the comment for public respondents
as its memorandum (Rollo, p. 226); memorandum for
respondent ALU was filed on June 30, 1987 (Rollo, p. 231);
and memorandum for petitioner, on July 30, 1987 (Rollo, p.
435).
The issues raised in this petition are:
I administrative, sales and dispensary departments perform
WHETHER OR NOT THE PROPOSED
BARGAINING UNIT IS AN
APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE STATUTORY
REQUIREMENT OF 30% (NOW 20%)
OF THE EMPLOYEES IN THE
PROPOSED BARGAINING UNIT,
ASKING FOR A CERTIFICATION
ELECTION HAD BEEN STRICTLY
COMPLIED WITH.
In the instant case, respondent ALU seeks direct certification
as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank-
and-file workers of the livestock and agro division of
petitioner BELYCA Corporation (Rollo, p. 232), engaged in
piggery, poultry raising and the planting of agricultural crops
such as corn, coffee and various vegetables (Rollo, p. 26).
But petitioner contends that the bargaining unit must include
all the workers in its integrated business concerns ranging
from piggery, poultry, to supermarts and cinemas so as not
to split an otherwise single bargaining unit into fragmented
bargaining units (Rollo, p. 435).<äre||anº•1àw>
The Labor Code does not specifically define what constitutes
an appropriate collective bargaining unit. Article 256 of the
Code provides:
Art. 256. Exclusive bargaining representative.—The labor
organization designated or selected by the majority of the
employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit shall
be exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for
the purpose of collective bargaining. However, an individual
employee or group of employee shall have the right at any
time to present grievances to their employer.
According to Rothenberg, a proper bargaining unit maybe
said to be a group of employees of a given employer,
comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of
employees, which the collective interests of all the
employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate
to be best suited to serve reciprocal rights and duties of the
parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law
(Rothenberg in Labor Relations, p. 482).
This Court has already taken cognizance of the crucial issue
of determining the proper constituency of a collective
bargaining unit.
Among the factors considered in Democratic Labor
Association v. Cebu Stevedoring Co. Inc. (103 Phil 1103
[1958]) are: "(1) will of employees (Glove Doctrine); (2)
affinity and unity of employee's interest, such as substantial
similarity of work and duties or similarity of compensation
and working conditions; (3) prior collective bargaining
history; and (4) employment status, such as temporary,
seasonal and probationary employees".
Under the circumstances of that case, the Court stressed the
importance of the fourth factor and sustained the trial court's
conclusion that two separate bargaining units should be
formed in dealing with respondent company, one consisting
of regular and permanent employees and another consisting
of casual laborers or stevedores. Otherwise stated,
temporary employees should be treated separately from
permanent employees. But more importantly, this Court laid
down the test of proper grouping, which is community and
mutuality of interest.
Thus, in a later case, (Alhambra Cigar and Cigarette
Manufacturing Co. et al. v. Alhambra Employees'
Association 107 Phil. 28 [1960]) where the employment
status was not at issue but the nature of work of the
employees concerned; the Court stressed the importance of
the second factor otherwise known as the substantial-
mutual-interest test and found no reason to disturb the
finding of the lower Court that the employees in the
work which has nothing to do with production and
maintenance, unlike those in the raw leaf, cigar, cigarette
and packing and engineering and garage departments and
therefore community of interest which justifies the format or
existence as a separate appropriate collective bargaining
unit.
Still later in PLASLU v. CIR et al. (110 Phil. 180 [1960])
where the employment status of the employees concerned
was again challenged, the Court reiterating the rulings, both
in Democratic Labor Association v. Cebu Stevedoring Co.
Inc. supra and Alhambra Cigar and Cigarette Co. et al. v.
Alhambra Employees' Association (supra) held that among
the factors to be considered are: employment status of the
employees to be affected, that is the positions and
categories of work to which they belong, and the unity of
employees' interest such as substantial similarity of work and
duties.
In any event, whether importance is focused on the
employment status or the mutuality of interest of the
employees concerned "the basic test of an asserted
bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is
fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all
employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights
(Democratic Labor Association v. Cebu Stevedoring Co.
Inc. supra)
Hence, still later following the substantial-mutual interest
test, the Court ruled that there is a substantial difference
between the work performed by musicians and that of other
persons who participate in the production of a film which
suffice to show that they constitute a proper bargaining unit.
(LVN Pictures, Inc. v. Philippine Musicians Guild, 1 SCRA
132 [1961]).
Coming back to the case at bar, it is beyond question that
the employees of the livestock and agro division of petitioner
corporation perform work entirely different from those
performed by employees in the supermarts and cinema.
Among others, the noted difference are: their working
conditions, hours of work, rates of pay, including the
categories of their positions and employment status. As
stated by petitioner corporation in its position paper, due to
the nature of the business in which its livestock-agro division
is engaged very few of its employees in the division are
permanent, the overwhelming majority of which are seasonal
and casual and not regular employees (Rollo, p. 26).
Definitely, they have very little in common with the
employees of the supermarts and cinemas. To lump all the
employees of petitioner in its integrated business concerns
cannot result in an efficacious bargaining unit comprised of
constituents enjoying a community or mutuality of interest.
Undeniably, the rank and file employees of the livestock-agro
division fully constitute a bargaining unit that satisfies both
requirements of classification according to employment
status and of the substantial similarity of work and duties
which will ultimately assure its members the exercise of their
collective bargaining rights.
II
It is undisputed that petitioner BELYCA Corporation
(Livestock and Agro Division) employs more or less two
hundred five (205) rank-and-file employees and workers. It
has no existing duly certified collective bargaining agreement
with any legitimate labor organization. There has not been
any certification election conducted in the proposed
bargaining unit within the last twelve (12) months prior to the
filing of the petition for direct certification and/or certification
election with the Ministry of Labor and Employment, and
there is no contending union requesting for certification as
the sole and exclusive bargaining representative in the
proposed bargaining unit.
The records show that on the filing of the petition for
certification and/or certification election on June 3, 1986; 124
employees or workers which are more than a majority of the
rank-and-file employees or workers in the proposed
bargaining unit had signed membership with respondent
ALU-TUCP and had expressed their written consent and
authorization to the filing of the petition. Thus, the Labor
Arbiter ordered the certification election on August 18, 1986
on a finding that 30% of the statutory requirement under Art.
258 of the Labor Code has been met.
But, petitioner corporation contends that after June 3, 1986
four (4) employees resigned; six (6) subsequently withdrew
their membership; five (5) were retrenched; twelve (12) were
dismissed for illegally and unlawfully barricading the
entrance to petitioner's farm; and one hundred (100) simply
abandoned their work.
Petitioner's claim was however belied by the Memorandum
of its personnel officer to the 119 employees dated July 28,
1986 showing that the employees were on strike, which was
confirmed by the finding of the Bureau of Labor Relations to
the effect that they went on strike on July 24, 1986 (Rollo, p.
419). Earlier the local union president, Warrencio Maputi; the
Vice-president, Gilbert Redoblado and three other active
members of the union Carmen Saguing, Roberto Romolo
and Iluminada Bonio were dismissed and a complaint for
unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal etc. was filed by the
Union in their behalf on July 2, 1986 before the NLRC of
Cagayan de Oro City (Rollo, p. 415).<äre||anº•1àw> The
complaint was amended on August 20, 1986 for respondent
Union to represent Warrencio Maputi and 137 others against
petitioner corporation and Bello Casanova President and
General Manager for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal,
illegal lockout, etc. (Rollo, p. 416).
Under Art. 257 of the Labor Code once the statutory
requirement is met, the Director of Labor Relations has no
choice but to call a certification election (Atlas Free Workers
Union AFWU PSSLU Local v. Noriel, 104 SCRA 565 [1981];
Vismico Industrial Workers Association (VIWA) v. Noriel, 131
SCRA 569 [1984]) It becomes in the language of the New
Labor Code "Mandatory for the Bureau to conduct a
certification election for the purpose of determining the
representative of the employees in the appropriate
bargaining unit and certify the winner as the exclusive
bargaining representative of all employees in the unit."
(Federacion Obrera de la Industria Tabaquera y Otros
Trabajadores de Filipinas v. Noriel, 72 SCRA 24 [1976];
Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa v. Noriel, 77 SCRA 414
[1977]); more so when there is no existing collective
bargaining agreement. (Samahang Manggagawa Ng Pacific
Mills, Inc. v. Noriel, 134 SCRA 152 [1985]); and there has
not been a certification election in the company for the past
three years (PLUM Federation of Industrial and Agrarian
Workers v. Noriel, 119 SCRA 299 [1982]) as in the instant
case.
It is significant to note that 124 employees out of the 205
employees of the Belyca Corporation have expressed their
written consent to the certification election or more than a
majority of the rank and file employees and workers; much
more than the required 30% and over and above the present
requirement of 20% by Executive Order No. 111 issued on
December 24, 1980 and applicable only to unorganized
establishments under Art. 257, of the Labor Code, to which
the BELYCA Corporation belong (Ass. Trade Unions (ATU)
v. Trajano, G.R. No. 75321, June 20, 1988).) More than that,
any doubt cast on the authenticity of signatures to the
petition for holding a certification election cannot be a bar to
its being granted (Filipino Metals Corp. v. Ople 107 SCRA
211 [1981]). Even doubts as to the required 30% being met
warrant holding of the certification election (PLUM
Federation of Industrial and Agrarian Workers v. Noriel, 119
SCRA 299 [1982]). In fact, once the required percentage
requirement has been reached, the employees' withdrawal
from union membership taking place after the filing of the
petition for certification election will not affect said petition.
On the contrary, the presumption arises that the withdrawal
was not free but was procured through duress, coercion or
for a valuable consideration (La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette
Factory v. Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, 123
SCRA 679 [1983]). Hence, the subsequent disaffiliation of
the six (6) employees from the union will not be counted
against or deducted from the previous number who had
signed up for certification elections Vismico Industrial
Workers Association (VIWA) v. Noriel 131 SCRA 569
[1984]).<äre||anº•1àw> Similarly, until a decision, final in
character, has been issued declaring the strike illegal and
the mass dismissal or retrenchment valid, the strikers cannot
be denied participation in the certification election
notwithstanding, the vigorous condemnation of the strike and
the fact that the picketing were attended by violence. Under
the foregoing circumstances, it does not necessarily follow
that the strikers in question are no longer entitled to
participate in the certification election on the theory that they
have automatically lost their jobs. (Barrera v. CIR, 107 SCRA
596 [1981]). For obvious reasons, the duty of the employer
to bargain collectively is nullified if the purpose of the
dismissal of the union members is to defeat the union in the
consent requirement for certification election. (Samahang
Manggagawa Ng Via Mare v. Noriel, 98 SCRA 507 [1980]).
As stressed by this Court, the holding of a certification
election is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented.
(George and Peter Lines Inc. v. Associated Labor Unions
(ALU), 134 SCRA 82 [1986]).
Finally, as a general rule, a certification election is the sole
concern of the workers. The only exception is where the
employer has to file a petition for certification election
pursuant to Art. 259 of the Labor Code because the latter
was requested to bargain collectively. But thereafter the role
of the employer in the certification process ceases. The
employer becomes merely a bystander (Trade Union of the
Phil. and Allied Services (TUPAS) v. Trajano, 120 SCRA 64
[1983]).
There is no showing that the instant case falls under the
above mentioned exception. However, it will be noted that
petitioner corporation from the outset has actively
participated and consistently taken the position of adversary
in the petition for direct certification as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative and/or certification election filed by
respondent Associated Labor Unions (ALU)-TUCP to the
extent of filing this petition for certiorari in this Court.
Considering that a petition for certification election is not a
litigation but a mere investigation of a non-adversary
character to determining the bargaining unit to represent the
employees (LVN Pictures, Inc. v. Philippine Musicians
Guild, supra; Bulakena Restaurant & Caterer v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 45 SCRA 88 [1972]; George Peter
Lines, Inc. v. Associated Labor Union, 134 SCRA 82 [1986];
Tanduay Distillery Labor Union v. NLRC, 149 SCRA 470
[1987]), and its only purpose is to give the employees true
representation in their collective bargaining with an employer
(Confederation of Citizens Labor Unions CCLU v. Noriel, 116
SCRA 694 [1982]), there appears to be no reason for the
employer's objection to the formation of subject union, much
less for the filing of the petition for a certification election.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, (a) the petition is DISMISSED
for lack of merit (b) resolution of the Bureau of Labor
Relations dated Nov. 24, 1986 is AFFIRMED; and the
temporary restraining order issued by the Court on March 4,
1987 is LIFTED permanently.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 128845               June 1, 2000
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF
EDUCATORS (ISAE), petitioner,
vs.
HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his
capacity as the Secretary of Labor and
Employment; HON. CRESENCIANO B.
TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting
Secretary of Labor and Employment; DR.
BRIAN MACCAULEY in his capacity as the
Superintendent of International School-
Manila; and INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL,
INC., respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Receiving salaries less than their counterparts
hired abroad, the local-hires of private
respondent School, mostly Filipinos, cry
discrimination. We agree. That the local-hires
are paid more than their colleagues in other
schools is, of course, beside the point. The point
is that employees should be given equal pay for
work of equal value. That is a principle long
honored in this jurisdiction. That is a principle
that rests on fundamental notions of justice. That
is the principle we uphold today.1âwphi1.nêt
Private respondent International School, Inc.
(the School, for short), pursuant to Presidential
Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution
established primarily for dependents of foreign
diplomatic personnel and other temporary
residents. To enable the School to continue
1 
carrying out its educational program and
improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c)
of the same decree authorizes the School to
employ its own teaching and management
personnel selected by it either locally or abroad,
from Philippine or other nationalities, such
personnel being exempt from otherwise
applicable laws and regulations attending their
employment, except laws that have been or will
be enacted for the protection of employees.
Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and
local teachers as members of its faculty,
classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires
and (2) local-hires. The School employs four
tests to determine whether a faculty member
should be classified as a foreign-hire or a local
hire:
a. What is one's domicile?
b. Where is one's home economy?
c. To which country does one owe
economic allegiance?
d. Was the individual hired abroad
specifically to work in the School and
was the School responsible for bringing
that individual to the Philippines?2
Should the answer to any of these queries point
to the Philippines, the faculty member is
classified as a local hire; otherwise, he or she is
deemed a foreign-hire.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits
not accorded local-hires.  These include
1avvphi1
housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes,
and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires
are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent
(25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies
the difference on two "significant economic
disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure,
namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b)
limited tenure. The School explains:
 A foreign-hire would necessarily have to
uproot himself from his home country,
leave his family and friends, and take
the risk of deviating from a promising
career path — all for the purpose of
pursuing his profession as an educator,
but this time in a foreign land. The new
foreign hire is faced with economic
realities: decent abode for oneself
and/or for one's family, effective means
of transportation, allowance for the
education of one's children, adequate
insurance against illness and death, and
of course the primary benefit of a basic
salary/retirement compensation.
Because of a limited tenure, the foreign
hire is confronted again with the same
economic reality after his term: that he
will eventually and inevitably return to
his home country where he will have to
confront the uncertainty of obtaining
suitable employment after along period
in a foreign land.
The compensation scheme is simply the
School's adaptive measure to remain
competitive on an international level in
terms of attracting competent
professionals in the field of international
education. 3
When negotiations for a new collective
bargaining agreement were held on June 1995,
petitioner International School Alliance of
Educators, "a legitimate labor union and the
collective bargaining representative of all faculty
members" of the School, contested the
4  existence of a system of salaries and
difference in salary rates between foreign and
local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of
whether foreign-hires should be included in the
appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a
deadlock between the parties.
On September 7, 1995, petitioner filed a notice
of strike. The failure of the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board to bring the parties to a
compromise prompted the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) to assume jurisdiction
over the dispute. On June 10, 1996, the DOLE
Acting Secretary, Crescenciano B. Trajano,
issued an Order resolving the parity and
representation issues in favor of the School.
Then DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing
subsequently denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration in an Order dated March 19,
1997. Petitioner now seeks relief in this Court.
Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire
classification employed by the School is
discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of
higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial
discrimination.
The School disputes these claims and gives a
breakdown of its faculty members, numbering 38
in all, with nationalities other than Filipino, who
have been hired locally and classified as local
hires. The Acting Secretary of Labor found that
5 
these non-Filipino local-hires received the same
benefits as the Filipino local-hires.
The compensation package given to
local-hires has been shown to apply to
all, regardless of race. Truth to tell, there
are foreigners who have been hired
locally and who are paid equally as
Filipino local hires.
6
The Acting secretary upheld the point-of-hire
classification for the distinction in salary rates:
The Principle "equal pay for equal work"
does not find applications in the present
case. The international character of the
School requires the hiring of foreign
personnel to deal with different
nationalities and different cultures,
among the student population.
We also take cognizance of the
benefits accorded to foreign hired
personnel which system is universally
recognized. We agree that certain
amenities have to be provided to these
people in order to entice them to render
their services in the Philippines and in
the process remain competitive in the
international market.
Furthermore, we took note of the fact
that foreign hires have limited contract of
employment unlike the local hires who
enjoy security of tenure. To apply parity
therefore, in wages and other benefits
would also require parity in other terms
and conditions of employment which
include the employment which include
the employment contract.
A perusal of the parties' 1992-1995 CBA
points us to the conditions and
provisions for salary and professional
compensation wherein the parties agree
as follows:
All members of the bargaining
unit shall be compensated only
in accordance with Appendix C
hereof provided that the
Superintendent of the School
has the discretion to recruit and
hire expatriate teachers from
abroad, under terms and
conditions that are consistent
with accepted international
practice.
Appendix C of said CBA further
provides:
The new salary schedule is
deemed at equity with the
Overseas Recruited Staff
(OSRS) salary schedule. The
25% differential is reflective of
the agreed value of system
displacement and contracted
status of the OSRS as
differentiated from the tenured
status of Locally Recruited Staff
(LRS).
To our mind, these provisions
demonstrate the parties' recognition of
the difference in the status of two types
of employees, hence, the difference in
their salaries.
The Union cannot also invoke the equal
protection clause to justify its claim of
parity. It is an established principle of
constitutional law that the guarantee of
equal protection of the laws is not
violated by legislation or private
covenants based on reasonable
classification. A classification is
reasonable if it is based on substantial
distinctions and apply to all members of
the same class. Verily, there is a
substantial distinction between foreign
hires and local hires, the former enjoying
only a limited tenure, having no
amenities of their own in the Philippines
and have to be given a good
compensation package in order to
attract them to join the teaching faculty
of the School. 7
We cannot agree.
That public policy abhors inequality and
discrimination is beyond contention. Our
Constitution and laws reflect the policy against
these evils. The Constitution in the Article on
8 
Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts
Congress to "give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the
Civil Code requires every person, "in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.
International law, which springs from general
principles of law, likewise proscribes
9 
discrimination. General principles of law include
principles of equity,  i.e., the general principles
10 
of fairness and justice, based on the test of what
is reasonable.  The Universal Declaration of
11 
Human Rights,  the International Covenant on
12 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,  the 13 
International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination,  the Convention
14 
against Discrimination in Education,  the 15 
Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination
in Respect of Employment and Occupation  — 16 
all embody the general principle against
discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and
justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution,
has incorporated this principle as part of its
national laws.
In the workplace, where the relations between
capital and labor are often skewed in favor of
capital, inequality and discrimination by the
employer are all the more reprehensible.
The Constitution  specifically provides that labor
17 
is entitled to "humane conditions of work." These
conditions are not restricted to the physical
workplace — the factory, the office or the field —
but include as well the manner by which
employers treat their employees.
The Constitution  also directs the State to
18 
promote "equality of employment opportunities
for all." Similarly, the Labor Code  provides that
19 
the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities
regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an
affront to both the spirit and letter of these
provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial
obligation to promote and ensure equal
employment opportunities, closes its eyes to
unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions
of employment.  20
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is
frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 135, for
example, prohibits and penalizes  the payment 21 
of lesser compensation to a female employee as
against a male employee for work of equal
value. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor
practice for an employer to discriminate in
regard to wages in order to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor
organization.
Notably, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra, in
Article 7 thereof, provides:
The States Parties to the present
Covenant recognize the right of
everyone to the enjoyment of just and
favourable conditions of work, which
ensure, in particular:
a. Remuneration which provides
all workers, as a minimum, with:
(i) Fair wages and equal
remuneration for work
of equal value without
distinction of any kind,
in particular women
being guaranteed
conditions of work not
inferior to those enjoyed
by men, with equal pay
for equal work;
x x x           x x x          x x x
The foregoing provisions impregnably
institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long
honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal
work." Persons who work with substantially
equal qualifications, skill, effort and
responsibility, under similar conditions, should
be paid similar salaries.  This rule applies to the
22 
School, its "international character"
notwithstanding.
The School contends that petitioner has not
adduced evidence that local-hires perform work
equal to that of foreign-hires.  The Court finds
23 
this argument a little cavalier. If an employer
accords employees the same position and rank,
the presumption is that these employees
perform equal work. This presumption is borne
by logic and human experience. If the employer
pays one employee less than the rest, it is not
for that employee to explain why he receives
less or why the others receive more. That would
be adding insult to injury. The employer has
discriminated against that employee; it is for the
employer to explain why the employee is treated
unfairly.
The employer in this case has failed to
discharge this burden. There is no evidence
here that foreign-hires perform 25% more
efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both
groups have similar functions and
responsibilities, which they perform under similar
working conditions.
The School cannot invoke the need to entice
foreign-hires to leave their domicile to rationalize
the distinction in salary rates without violating
the principle of equal work for equal pay.
"Salary" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (5th
ed.) as "a reward or recompense for services
performed." Similarly, the Philippine Legal
Encyclopedia states that "salary" is the
"[c]onsideration paid at regular intervals for the
rendering of services." In Songco v. National
Labor Relations Commission,  we said that:
24 
"salary" means a recompense or
consideration made to a person for his
pains or industry in another man's
business. Whether it be derived from
"salarium," or more fancifully from "sal,"
the pay of the Roman soldier, it carries
with it the fundamental idea of
compensation for services rendered.
(Emphasis supplied.)
While we recognize the need of the School to
attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used
as an enticement to the prejudice of local-hires.
The local-hires perform the same services as
foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the same
salaries as the latter. For the same reason, the
"dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited
tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the
distinction in salary rates. The dislocation factor
and limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are
adequately compensated by certain benefits
accorded them which are not enjoyed by local-
hires, such as housing, transportation, shipping
costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances.
The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the
rights of workers and promote their welfare,"  "to
afford labor full protection."  The State,
26 
therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the
relations between labor and capital.  These
27 
relations are not merely contractual but are so
impressed with public interest that labor
contracts, collective bargaining agreements
included, must yield to the common
good.  Should such contracts contain
28 
stipulations that are contrary to public policy,
courts will not hesitate to strike down these
stipulations.
In this case, we find the point-of-hire
classification employed by respondent School to
justify the distinction in the salary rates of
foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid
classification. There is no reasonable distinction
between the services rendered by foreign-hires
and local-hires. The practice of the School of
according higher salaries to foreign-hires
contravenes public policy and, certainly, does
not deserve the sympathy of this Court. 1avvphi1
We agree, however, that foreign-hires do not
belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-
hires.
A bargaining unit is "a group of employees of a
given employer, comprised of all or less than all
of the entire body of employees, consistent with
equity to the employer, indicate to be the best
suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of
the parties under the collective bargaining
provisions of the law."  The factors in
29 
determining the appropriate collective bargaining
unit are (1) the will of the employees (Globe
Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees'
interest, such as substantial similarity of work
and duties, or similarity of compensation and
working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests
Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and
(4) similarity of employment status.  The basic
30 
test of an asserted bargaining unit's acceptability
is whether or not it is fundamentally the
combination which will best assure to all
employees the exercise of their collective
bargaining rights. 
31
It does not appear that foreign-hires have
indicated their intention to be grouped together
with local-hires for purposes of collective
bargaining. The collective bargaining history in
the School also shows that these groups were
always treated separately. Foreign-hires have
25 
limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of
tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar
functions under the same working conditions as
the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded
certain benefits not granted to local-hires. These
benefits, such as housing, transportation,
shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel
allowance, are reasonably related to their status
as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the
former from the latter. To include foreign-hires in
a bargaining unit with local-hires would not
assure either group the exercise of their
respective collective bargaining rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE
COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN
PART. The Orders of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment dated June 10, 1996 and March 19,
1997, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
insofar as they uphold the practice of respondent
School of according foreign-hires higher salaries
than local-hires.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 162355               August 14, 2009
STA. LUCIA EAST COMMERCIAL
CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT and STA. LUCIA EAST
COMMERCIAL CORPORATION WORKERS
ASSOCIATION (CLUP LOCAL
CHAPTER), Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 assailing the
Decision2 promulgated on 14 August 2003 as
well as the Resolution3 promulgated on 24
February 2004 of the Court of Appeals
(appellate court) in CA-G.R. SP No. 77015. The
appellate court denied Sta. Lucia East
Commercial Corporation’s (SLECC) petition for
certiorari with prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order. The
appellate court further ruled that the Secretary of
Labor and Employment (Secretary) was correct
when she held that the subsequent negotiations
and registration of a collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) executed by SLECC with
Samahang Manggagawa sa Sta. Lucia East
Commercial (SMSLEC) could not bar Sta. Lucia
East Commercial Corporation Workers
Association’s (SLECCWA) petition for direct
certification.
The Facts
The Secretary narrated the facts as follows:
On 27 February 2001, Confederated Labor
Union of the Philippines (CLUP), in behalf of its
chartered local, instituted a petition for
certification election among the regular rank-
and-file employees of Sta. Lucia East
Commercial Corporation and its Affiliates,
docketed as Case No. RO400-0202-RU-007.
The affiliate companies included in the petition
were SLE Commercial, SLE Department Store,
SLE Cinema, Robsan East Trading, Bowling
Center, Planet Toys, Home Gallery and
Essentials.
On 21 August 2001, Med-Arbiter Bactin ordered
the dismissal of the petition due to
inappropriateness of the bargaining unit. CLUP-
Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation and its
Affiliates Workers Union appealed the order of
dismissal to this Office on 14 September 2001.
On 20 November 2001, CLUP-Sta. Lucia East
Commercial Corporation and its Affiliates
Workers Union [CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates
Workers Union] moved for the withdrawal of the
appeal. On 31 January 2002, this Office granted
the motion and affirmed the dismissal of the
petition.
In the meantime, on 10 October 2001, [CLUP-
SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union]
reorganized itself and re-registered as CLUP-
Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation
Workers Association (herein appellant CLUP-
SLECCWA), limiting its membership to the rank-
and-file employees of Sta. Lucia East
Commercial Corporation. It was issued
Certificate of Creation of a Local Chapter No.
RO400-0110-CC-004.
On the same date, [CLUP-SLECCWA] filed the
instant petition. It alleged that [SLECC] employs
about 115 employees and that more than 20% of
employees belonging to the rank-and-file
category are its members. [CLUP-SLECCWA]
claimed that no certification election has been
held among them within the last 12 months prior
to the filing of the petition, and while there is
another union registered with DOLE-Regional
Office No. IV on 22 June 2001 covering the
same employees, namely [SMSLEC], it has not
been recognized as the exclusive bargaining
agent of [SLECC’s] employees.
On 22 November 2001, SLECC filed a motion to
dismiss the petition. It averred that it has
voluntarily recognized [SMSLEC] on 20 July
2001 as the exclusive bargaining agent of its
regular rank-and-file employees, and that
collective bargaining negotiations already
commenced between them. SLECC argued that
the petition should be dismissed for violating the
one year and negotiation bar rules under pars.
(c) and (d), Section 11, Rule XI, Book V of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
On 29 November 2001, a CBA between
[SMSLEC] and [SLECC] was ratified by its rank-
and-file employees and registered with DOLE-
Regional Office No. IV on 9 January 2002.
In the meantime, on 19 December 2001, [CLUP-
SLECCWA] filed its Opposition and Comment to
[SLECC’S] Motion to Dismiss. It assailed the
validity of the voluntary recognition of [SMSLEC]
by [SLECC] and their consequent negotiations
and execution of a CBA. According to [CLUP-
SLECCWA], the same were tainted with malice,
collusion and conspiracy involving some officials
of the Regional Office. Appellant contended that
Chief LEO Raymundo Agravante, DOLE
Regional Office No. IV, Labor Relations Division
should have not approved and recorded the
voluntary recognition of [SMSLEC] by [SLECC]
because it violated one of the major
requirements for voluntary recognition, i.e., non-
existence of another labor organization in the
same bargaining unit. It pointed out that the time
of the voluntary recognition on 20 July 2001,
appellant’s registration as [CLUP-SLECC and its
Affiliates Workers Union], which covers the
same group of employees covered by
Samahang Manggagawa sa Sta. Lucia East
Commercial, was existing and has neither been
cancelled or abandoned. [CLUP-SLECCWA]
also accused Med-Arbiter Bactin of malice,
collusion and conspiracy with appellee company
when he dismissed the petition for certification
election filed by [SMSLEC] for being moot and
academic because of its voluntary recognition,
when he was fully aware of the pendency of
[CLUP-SLECCWA’s] earlier petition for
certification election.
Subsequent pleadings filed by [CLUP-
SLECCWA] and [SLECC] reiterated their
respective positions on the validity and invalidity
of the voluntary recognition. On 29 July 2002,
Med-Arbiter Bactin issued the assailed Order.4
The Med-Arbiter’s Ruling
In his Order dated 29 July 2002, Med-Arbiter
Anastacio L. Bactin dismissed CLUP-
SLECCWA’s petition for direct certification on
the ground of contract bar rule. The prior
voluntary recognition of SMSLEC and the CBA
between SLECC and SMSLEC bars the filing of
CLUP-SLECCWA’s petition for direct
certification. SMSLEC is entitled to enjoy the
rights, privileges, and obligations of an exclusive
bargaining representative from the time of the
recording of the voluntary recognition. Moreover,
the duly registered CBA bars the filing of the
petition for direct certification.
CLUP-SLECCWA filed a Memorandum
of Appeal of the Med-Arbiter’s Order
before the Secretary.
The Ruling of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment
In her Decision promulgated on 27 December
2002, the Secretary found merit in CLUP-
SLECCWA’s appeal. The Secretary held that the
subsequent negotiations and registration of a
CBA executed by SLECC with SMSLEC could
not bar CLUP-SLECCWA’s petition. CLUP-
SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union
constituted a registered labor organization at the
time of SLECC’s voluntary recognition of
SMSLEC. The dispositive portion of the
Secretary’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED
and the Order of the Med-Arbiter dated 29 July
2002 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, let the entire records of the case be
remanded to the Regional Office of origin for the
immediate conduct of a certification election,
subject to the usual pre-election conference,
among the regular rank-and-file employees of
[SLECC], with the following choices:
1. Sta. Lucia East Commercial
Corporation Workers’ Association –
CLUP Local Chapter;
2. Samahang Manggagawa sa Sta.
Lucia East Commercial; and
3. No Union.
Pursuant to Rule XI, Section II.1 of Department
Order No. 9, appellee corporation is hereby
directed to submit to the office of origin, within
ten (10) days from receipt hereof, the certified
list of its employees in the bargaining unit or
when necessary a copy of its payroll covering
the same employees for the last three (3)
months preceding the issuance of this Decision.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the
Bureau of Labor Relations and Labor Relations
Division of Regional Office No. IV for the
cancellation of the recording of voluntary
recognition in favor of Samahang Manggagawa
sa Sta. Lucia East Commercial and the
appropriate annotation of re-registration of
CLUP-Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation
and its Affiliates Workers Union to Sta. Lucia
East Commercial Corporation Workers
Association-CLUP Local Chapter.
SO DECIDED.5
SLECC filed a motion for reconsideration which
the Secretary denied for lack of merit in a
Resolution dated 27 March 2003. SLECC then
filed a petition for certiorari before the appellate
court.
The Ruling of the Appellate Court
The appellate court affirmed the ruling of the
Secretary and quoted extensively from the
Secretary’s decision. The appellate court agreed
with the Secretary’s finding that the workers
sought to be represented by CLUP-SLECC and
its Affiliates Workers Union included the same
workers in the bargaining unit represented by
SMSLEC. SMSLEC was not the only legitimate
labor organization operating in the subject
bargaining unit at the time of SMSLEC’s
voluntary recognition on 20 July 2001. Thus,
SMSLEC’s voluntary recognition was void and
could not bar CLUP-SLECCWA’s petition for
certification election.
The Issue
SLECC raised only one issue in its petition.
SLECC asserted that the appellate court
commited a reversible error when it affirmed the
Secretary’s finding that SLECC’s voluntary
recognition of SMSLEC was done while a
legitimate labor organization was in existence in
the bargaining unit.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit. We see no reason to
overturn the rulings of the Secretary and of the
appellate court.
Legitimate Labor Organization
Article 212(g) of the Labor Code defines a labor
organization as "any union or association of
employees which exists in whole or in part for
the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing
with employers concerning terms and conditions
of employment." Upon compliance with all the
documentary requirements, the Regional Office
or Bureau shall issue in favor of the applicant
labor organization a certificate indicating that it is
included in the roster of legitimate labor
organizations.6 Any applicant labor organization
shall acquire legal personality and shall be
entitled to the rights and privileges granted by
law to legitimate labor organizations upon
issuance of the certificate of registration.7
Bargaining Unit
The concepts of a union and of a legitimate labor
organization are different from, but related to,
the concept of a bargaining unit. We explained
the concept of a bargaining unit in San Miguel
Corporation v. Laguesma,8 where we stated that:
A bargaining unit is a "group of employees of a
given employer, comprised of all or less than all
of the entire body of employees, consistent with
equity to the employer, indicated to be the best
suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of
the parties under the collective bargaining
provisions of the law."
The fundamental factors in determining the
appropriate collective bargaining unit are: (1) the
will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2)
affinity and unity of the employees’ interest, such
as substantial similarity of work and duties, or
similarity of compensation and working
conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule);
(3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4)
similarity of employment status.
Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, this Court has
categorically ruled that the existence of a prior
collective bargaining history is neither decisive
nor conclusive in the determination of what
constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit.
However, employees in two corporations cannot
be treated as a single bargaining unit even if the
businesses of the two corporations are related.9
A Legitimate Labor Organization Representing
An Inappropriate Bargaining Unit
CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union’s
initial problem was that they constituted a
legitimate labor organization representing a non-
appropriate bargaining unit. However, CLUP-
SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union
subsequently re-registered as CLUP-
SLECCWA, limiting its members to the rank-
and-file of SLECC. SLECC cannot ignore that
CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union
was a legitimate labor organization at the time of
SLECC’s voluntary recognition of SMSLEC.
SLECC and SMSLEC cannot, by themselves,
decide whether CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates
Workers Union represented an appropriate
bargaining unit.1avvphi1
The inclusion in the union of disqualified
employees is not among the grounds for
cancellation of registration, unless such inclusion
is due to misrepresentation, false statement or
fraud under the circumstances enumerated in
Sections (a) to (c) of Article 239 of the Labor
Code.10 Thus, CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates
Workers Union, having been validly issued a
certificate of registration, should be considered
as having acquired juridical personality which
may not be attacked collaterally. The proper
procedure for SLECC is to file a petition for
cancellation of certificate of registration11 of
CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union
and not to immediately commence voluntary
recognition proceedings with SMSLEC.
SLECC’s Voluntary Recognition of SMSLEC
The employer may voluntarily recognize the
representation status of a union in unorganized
establishments.12 SLECC was not an
unorganized establishment when it voluntarily
recognized SMSLEC as its exclusive bargaining
representative on 20 July 2001. CLUP-SLECC
and its Affiliates Workers Union filed a petition
for certification election on 27 February 2001
and this petition remained pending as of 20 July
2001. Thus, SLECC’s voluntary recognition of
SMSLEC on 20 July 2001, the subsequent
negotiations and resulting registration of a CBA
executed by SLECC and SMSLEC are void and
cannot bar CLUP-SLECCWA’s present petition
for certification election.
Employer’s Participation in a Petition for
Certification Election
We find it strange that the employer itself,
SLECC, filed a motion to oppose CLUP-
SLECCWA’s petition for certification election. In
petitions for certification election, the employer is
a mere bystander and cannot oppose the
petition or appeal the Med-Arbiter’s decision.
The exception to this rule, which happens when
the employer is requested to bargain collectively,
is not present in the case before us.13
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We
AFFIRM the Decision promulgated on 14 August
2003 as well as the Resolution promulgated on
24 February 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 77015.
SO ORDERED
[G.R. No. 96189. July 14, 1992.]
UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HON.
PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, Director of
the Bureau of Labor Relations,
Department of Labor and
Employment, and THE ALL U.P.
WORKERS’ UNION, represented by its
President, Rosario del
Rosario, Respondents.
U . P . Office of Legal Services
for Petitioner.
Ruben C . Carranza, Jr . for private
respondent All-U.P. Workers Union.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION;
LABOR LAWS; EXECUTIVE ORDER NO.
180; "HIGH-LEVEL EMPLOYEES,"
DEFINED; PROFESSORS, ASSOCIATE
PROFESSORS, ASSISTANT PROFESSORS,
NOT INCLUDED. — In light of Executive
Order No. 180 and its implementing rules,
as well as the University’s charter and
relevant regulations, the professors,
associate professors and assistant
professors (hereafter simply referred to as
professors) cannot be considered as
exercising such managerial or highly
confidential functions as would justify their
being categorized as "high-level
employees" of the institution.
2. ID.; ID.; EMPLOYMENT; SUPERVISOR
OR MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEE; POWER TO
RECOMMEND MUST NOT ONLY BE
EFFECTIVE BUT ALSO REQUIRE THE
EXERCISE OF INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT.
— In Franklin Baker Company of the
Philippines v. Trajano, this Court
reiterated the principle laid down in
National Merchandising Corp. v. Court of
Industrial Relations, that the power to
recommend, in order to qualify an
employee as a supervisor or managerial
employee "must not only be effective but
the exercise of such authority should not
be merely of a routinary or clerical nature
but should require the use of independent
judgment." Where such recommendatory
powers, as in the case at bar, are subject
to evaluation, review and final action by
the department heads and other higher
executives of the company, the same,
although present, are not effective and
not an exercise of independent judgment
as required by law.
3. ID.; ID.; EXECUTIVE ORDER 180;
"POLICY DETERMINING," TEST IN
SEGREGATING RANK AND FILE
EMPLOYEES FROM MANAGEMENT. —
Executive Order No. 180 is a law
concerning public sector unionism. It must
therefore be construed within that
context. Within that context, the
University of the Philippines represents
the government as an employer.’Policy-
determining’ refers to policy-
determination in university matters that
affect those same matters that may be
the subject of negotiation between public
sector management and labor. The reason
why ‘policy-determining’ has been laid
down as a test in segregating rank-and-
file from management is to ensure that
those who lay down policies in areas that
are still negotiable in public sector
collective bargaining do not themselves
become part of those employees who seek
to change these policies for their collective
welfare.
4. ID.; ID.; LABOR RELATIONS;
BARGAINING UNIT; CONSTRUED. — A
"bargaining unit" has been defined as a
group of employees of a given employer,
comprised of all or less than all of the
entire body of employees, which the
collective interest of all the employees,
consistent with equity to the employer,
indicate to be the best suited to serve the
reciprocal rights and duties of the parties
under the collective bargaining provisions
of the law.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING UNIT; NO SPECIFIC
GUIDELINE FOR DETERMINATION
THEREOF. — Our labor laws do not
however provide the criteria for
determining the proper collective
bargaining unit. Apart from the single
descriptive word "appropriate," in Section
12 of the Industrial Peace Act which was
subsequently incorporated into the Labor
Code with minor changes, no specific
guide for determining the proper collective
bargaining unit can be found in the
statutes. Case law fortunately furnishes
some guidelines.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; MUTUALITY OF INTEREST
TEST; BASIC TEST IN THE
DETERMINATION OF THE APPROPRIATE
BARGAINING UNIT. — The basic test in
determining the appropriate bargaining
unit is that a unit, to be appropriate, must
affect a grouping of employees who have
substantial, mutual interests in wages,
hours, working conditions and other
subjects of collective bargaining (citing
Smith on Labor Laws, 316-317; Francisco,
Labor Laws, 162). . . . The Court further
explained that" (t)he test of the grouping
is community or mutuality of interests.
And this is so because the basic test of an
asserted bargaining unit’s acceptability is
whether or not it is fundamentally the
combination which will best assure to all
employees the exercise of their collective
bargaining rights’ (Rothenberg on Labor
Relations, 490)."cralaw virtua1aw library
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ABSENCE OF
MUTUALITY OF INTERESTS NEGATES
FORMATION OF A SINGLE COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING UNIT; CASE AT BAR. — In
the case at bar, the University employees
may quite easily be categorized into two
general classes: one, the group composed
of employees whose functions are non-
academic, i.e., janitors, messengers,
typists, clerks, receptionists, carpenters,
electricians, ground-keepers, chauffeurs,
mechanics, plumbers; and two, the group
made up of those performing academic
functions, i.e., full professors, associate
professors, assistant professors,
instructors — who may be judges or
government executives — and research,
extension and professional staff. Not much
reflection is needed to perceive that the
community or mutuality of interests which
justifies the formation of a single
collective bargaining unit is wanting
between the academic and non-academic
personnel of the university. It would seem
obvious that teachers would find very little
in common with the University clerks and
other non-academic employees as regards
responsibilities and functions, working
conditions, compensation rates, social life
and interests, skills and intellectual
pursuits, cultural activities, etc. On the
contrary, the dichotomy of interests, the
dissimilarity in the nature of the work and
duties as well as in the compensation and
working conditions of the academic and
non-academic personnel dictate the
separation of these two categories of
employees for purposes of collective
bargaining. The formation of two separate
bargaining units, the first consisting of the
rank-and-file non-academic personnel,
and the second, of the rank-and-file
academic employees, is the set-up that
will best assure to all the employees the
exercise of their collective bargaining
rights. These special circumstances, i.e.,
the dichotomy of interests and concerns
as well as the dissimilarity in the nature
and conditions of work, wages and
compensation between the academic and
non-academic personnel, bring the case at
bar within the exception contemplated in
Section 9 of Executive Order No. 180.
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:
In this special civil action of certiorari the
University of the Philippines seeks the
nullification of the Order dated October
30, 1990 of Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja of
the Bureau of Labor Relations holding that
"professors, associate professors and
assistant professors (of the University of
the Philippines) are . . . rank-and-file
employees . . .;" consequently, they
should, together with the so-called non-
academic, non-teaching, and all other
employees of the University, be
represented by only one labor
organization. 1 The University is joined in
this undertaking by the Solicitor General
who "has taken a position not contrary to
that of petitioner and, in fact, has
manifested . . . that he is not opposing
the petition . . . ." 2
The case 3 was initiated in the Bureau of
Labor Relations by a petition filed on
March 2, 1990 by a registered labor union,
the "Organization of Non-Academic
Personnel of UP" (ONAPUP). 4 Claiming to
have a membership of 3,236 members —
comprising more than 33% of the 9,617
persons constituting the non-academic
personnel of UP-Diliman, Los Baños,
Manila, and Visayas, it sought the holding
of a certification election among all said
non-academic employees of the University
of the Philippines. At a conference
thereafter held on March 22, 1990 in the
Bureau, the University stated that it had
no objection to the election.
On April 18, 1990, another registered
labor union, the "All UP Workers’ Union," 5
filed a comment, as intervenor in the
certification election proceeding. Alleging
that its membership covers both academic
and non-academic personnel, and that it
aims to unite all UP rank-and-file
employees in one union, it declared its
assent to the holding of the election
provided the appropriate organizational
unit was first clearly defined. It observed
in this connection that the Research,
Extension and Professorial Staff (REPS),
who are academic non-teaching
personnel, should not be deemed part of
the organization unit.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
For its part, the University, through its
General Counsel, 6 made of record its
view that there should be two (2) unions:
one for academic, the other for non-
academic or administrative, personnel
considering the dichotomy of interests,
conditions and rules governing these
employee groups.
Director Calleja ruled on the matter on
August 7, 1990. 7 She declared that "the
appropriate organization unit . . . should
embrace all that regular rank-and-file
employees, teaching and non-teaching, of
the University of the Philippines, including
all its branches" and that there was no
sufficient evidence "to justify the grouping
of the non-academic or administrative
personnel into an organization unit apart
and distinct from that of the academic or
teaching personnel." Director Calleja
adverted to Section 9 of Executive Order
No. 180, viz.:
"SEC. 9. The appropriate organizational
unit shall be the employer unit consisting
of rank-and-file employees, unless
circumstances otherwise require."
and Section 1, Rule IV of the Rules
Implementing said EO 180 (as amended
by SEC. 2, Resolution of Public Sector
Labor Management Council dated May 14,
1989, viz.: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x       x       x
"For purposes of registration, an
appropriate organizational unit may refer
to:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x       x       x
d. State universities or colleges,
government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters."
She went on to say that the general intent
of EO 180 was "not to fragmentize the
employer unit, as "can be gleaned from
the definition of the term "accredited
employees’ organization," which refers
to:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . a registered organization of the rank-
and-file employees as defined in these
rules recognized to negotiate for the
employees in an organizational unit
headed by an officer with sufficient
authority to bind the agency, such as . . .
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
cralaw virtua1aw library
cralaw virtua1aw library
states colleges and universities." cralaw virtua1aw library
The Director thus commanded that a
certification election be "conducted among
rank-and-file employees, teaching and
non-teaching" in all four autonomous
campuses of the UP, and that
management appear and bring copies of
the corresponding payrolls for January,
June, and July, 1990 at the "usual pre-
election conference . . . ."  chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
At the pre-election conference held on
March 22, 1990 at the Labor
Organizations Division of the DOLE, 8 the
University sought further clarification of
the coverage of the term, "rank-and-file"
personnel, asserting that not every
employee could properly be embraced
within both teaching and non-teaching
categories since there are those whose
positions are in truth managerial and
policy-determining, and hence, excluded
by law.
At a subsequent hearing (on October 4,
1990), the University filed a Manifestation
seeking the exclusion from the
organizational unit of those employees
holding supervisory positions among non-
academic personnel, and those in teaching
staff with the rank of Assistant Professor
or higher, submitting the following as
grounds therefor: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1) Certain "high-level employees" with
policy-making, managerial, or confidential
functions, are ineligible to join rank-and-
file employee organizations under Section
3, EO 180: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 3. High-level employees whose
functions are normally considered as
policy-making or managerial or whose
duties are of a highly confidential nature
shall not be eligible to join the
organization of rank-and file government
employees;
2) In the University hierarchy, not all
teaching and non-teaching personnel
belong to the rank-and-file: just as there
are those occupying managerial positions
within the non-teaching roster, there is
also a dichotomy between various levels
of the teaching or academic staff;
3) Among the non-teaching employees
composed of Administrative Staff and
Research personnel, only those holding
positions below Grade 18 should be
regarded as rank-and-file, considering
that those holding higher grade positions,
like Chiefs of Sections, perform
supervisory functions including that of
effectively recommending termination of
appointments or initiating appointments
and promotions; and
4) Not all teaching personnel may be
deemed included in the term, "rank-and-
file;" only those holding appointments at
the instructor level may be so considered,
because those holding appointments from
Assistant Professor to Associate Professor
to full Professor take part, as members of
University Council, a policy-making body,
in the initiation of policies and rules with
respect to faculty tenure and promotion. 9
The ONAPUP quite categorically made of
record its position: that it was not
opposing the University’s proffered
classification of rank-and file employees.
On the other hand, the "All UP Workers’
Union" opposed the Universitys’ view, in a
Position Paper presented by it under date
of October 18, 1990.
Director Calleja subsequently promulgated
an Order dated October 30, 1990,
resolving the "sole issue" of "whether or
not professors, associate professors and
assistant professors are included in the
definition of high-level employee(s)" in
light of Rule I, Section (1) of the
Implementing Guidelines of Executive
Order No. 180, defining "high level
employee" as follows:
"1. High Level Employee — is one whose
functions are normally considered policy
determining, managerial or one whose
duties are highly confidential in nature. A
managerial function refers to the exercise
of powers such as: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. To effectively recommend such
managerial actions; chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
2. To formulate or execute management
policies and decisions; or
3. To hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off,
recall, dismiss, assign or discipline
employees." cralaw virtua1aw library
The Director adjudged that said teachers
are rank-and-file employees "qualified to
join unions and vote in certification
elections." According to her —
"A careful perusal of the University
Code . . . shows that the policy-making
powers of the Council are limited to
academic matters, namely, prescribing
courses of study and rules of discipline,
fixing student admission and graduation
requirements, recommending to the Board
of Regents the conferment of degrees,
and disciplinary power over students. The
policy-determining functions contemplated
in the definition of a high-level employee
pertain to managerial, executive, or
organization policies, such as hiring, firing,
and disciplining of employees, salaries,
teaching/working hours, other monetary
and non-monetary benefits, and other
terms and conditions of employment. They
are the usual issues in collective
bargaining negotiations so that whoever
wields these powers would be placed in a
situation of conflicting interests if he were
allowed to join the union of rank-and-file
employees.
The University seasonably moved for
reconsideration, seeking to make the
following points, to wit: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1) UP professors do "wield the most
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph potent managerial powers: the power to
rule on tenure, on the creation of new
programs and new jobs, and conversely,
the abolition of old programs and the
attendant re-assignment of employees." cralaw virtua1aw library
2) To say that the Council is "limited to
(acting on) academic matters" is error,
since academic decisions "are the most
important decisions made in a University .
. . (being, as it were) the heart, the core
of the University as a workplace.
3) Considering the law regards as a "high
level employee, one who performs either
policy-determining, managerial, or
confidential functions, the Director erred
in applying only the "managerial
functions" test, ignoring the policy-
determining-functions" test.
4) The Director’s interpretation of the law
would lead to absurd results, e.g.: "an
administrative officer of the College of Law
is a high level employee, while a full
Professor who has published several
treatises and who has distinguished
himself in argument before the Supreme
Court is a mere rank-and-file employee. A
dormitory manager is classified as a high
level employee, while a full Professor of
Political Science with a Ph. D. and several
Honorary doctorates is classified as rank-
and-file." 10
The motion for reconsideration was denied
by Director Calleja, by Order dated
November 20, 1990.
The University would now have this Court
declare void the Director’s Order of
October 30, 1990 as well as that of
November 20, 1990. 11 A temporary
restraining order was issued by the Court,
by Resolution dated December 5, 1990
conformably to the University’s application
therefor.
Two issues arise from these undisputed
facts. One is whether or not professors,
associate professors and assistant
professors are "high-level employees"
"whose functions are normally considered
policy determining, managerial or . . .
highly confidential in nature." The other is
whether or not, they, and other
employees performing academic functions,
12 should comprise a collective bargaining
unit distinct and different from that
consisting of the non-academic employees
of the University, 13 considering the
dichotomy of interests, conditions and
rules existing between them.
As regards the first issue, the Court is
satisfied that it has been correctly
resolved by the respondent Director of
Bureau Relations. In light Executive Order
No. 180 and its implementing rules, as
well as the University’s charter and
relevant regulations, the professors,
associate professors and assistant
professors (hereafter simply referred to as
professors) cannot be considered as
exercising such managerial or highly
confidential functions as would justify their
being categorized as "high-level
employees" of the institution.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The Academic Personnel Committees,
through which the professors supposedly
exercise managerial functions, were
constituted "in order to foster greater
involvement of the faculty and other
academic personnel in appointments,
promotions, and other personnel matters
that directly affect them." 14 Academic
Personnel Committees at the
departmental and college levels were
organized "consistent with, and
demonstrative of the very idea of
consulting the faculty and other academic
personnel on matters directly affecting
them" and to allow "flexibility in the
determination of guidelines peculiar to a
particular department or college." 15
Personnel actions affecting the faculty and
other academic personnel should,
however, "be considered under uniform
guidelines and consistent with the
Resolution of the Board (of Regents)
adopted during its 789th Meeting (11-26-
69) creating the University Academic
Personnel Board." 16 Thus, the
Departmental Academic Personnel
Committee is given the function of
"assist(ing) in the review of the
recommendations initiated by the
Department Chairman with regard to
recruitment, selection, performance
evaluation, tenure and staff development,
in accordance with the general guidelines
formulated by the University Academic
Personnel Board and the implementing
details laid down by the College Academic
Personnel Committee;" 17 while the
College Academic Personnel Committee is
entrusted with the following functions: 18
1. Assist the Dean in setting up the details
for the implementation of policies, rules,
standards or general guidelines as
formulated by the University Academic
Personnel Board;
2. Review the recommendations submitted
by the DAPCs with regard to recruitment,
selection, performance evaluation, tenure,
staff development, and promotion of the
faculty and other academic personnel of
the College;
3. Establish departmental priorities in the
allocation of available funds for
promotion;
4. Act on cases or disagreement between
the Chairman and the members of the
DAPC particularly on personnel matters
covered by this Order;
5. Act on complaints and/or protests
against personnel actions made by the
Department Chairman and/or the DAPC.
The University Academic Personnel Board,
on the other hand, performs the following
functions: 19
1. Assist the Chancellor in the review of
the recommendations of the CAPC’S.
2. Act on cases of disagreement between
the Dean and the CAPC.
3. Formulate policies, rules, and standards
with respect to the selection,
compensation, and promotion of members
of the academic staff.
4. Assist the Chancellor in the review of
recommendations on academic
promotions and on other matters affecting
faculty status and welfare.
From the foregoing, it is evident that it is
the University Academic Personnel
Committee, composed of deans, the
assistant for academic affairs and the
chief of personnel, which formulates the
policies, rules and standards respecting
selection, compensation and promotion of
members of the academic staff. The
departmental and college academic
personnel committees’ functions are
purely recommendatory in nature, subject
to review and evaluation by the University
Academic Personnel Board. In Franklin
Baker Company of the Philippines v.
Trajano, 20 this Court reiterated the
principle laid down in National
Merchandising Corp. v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 21 that the power to
recommend, in order to qualify an
employee as a supervisor or managerial
employee "must not only be effective but
the exercise of such authority should not
be merely of a routinary or clerical nature
but should require the use of independent
judgment." Where such recommendatory
powers, as in the case at bar, are subject
to evaluation, review and final action by
the department heads and other higher
executives of the company, the same,
although present, are not effective and
not an exercise of independent judgment
as required by law.
Significantly, the personnel actions that
may be recommended by the
departmental and college academic
personnel committees must conform with
the general guidelines drawn up by the
university personnel academic committee.
This being the case, the members of the
departmental and college academic
personnel committees are not unlike the
chiefs of divisions and sections of the
National Waterworks and Sewerage
Authority whom this Court considered as
rank-and-file employees in National
Waterworks & Sewerage Authority v.
NWSA Consolidated Unions, 22 because
"given ready policies to execute and
standard practices to observe for their
execution, . . . they have little freedom of
action, as their main function is merely to
carry out the company’s orders, plans and
policies."
cralaw virtua1aw library

The power or prerogative pertaining to a
high-level employee "to effectively
recommend such managerial actions, to
formulate or execute management policies
or decisions and/or to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay-off, recall, dismiss, assign or
discipline employees" 23 is exercised to a
certain degree by the university academic
personnel board/committees and
ultimately by the Board of Regents in
accordance with Section 6 of the
University Charter, 24 thus:
(e) To appoint, on the recommendation of
the President of the University, professors,
instructors, lecturers and other employees
of the University; to fix their
compensation, hours of service, and such
other duties and conditions as it may
deem proper; to grant them in its
discretion leave of absence under such
regulations as it may promulgate, any
other provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, and to remove them for
cause after investigation and hearing shall
have been had. chanrobles law library : red
Another factor that militates against
petitioner’s espousal of managerial
employment status for all its professors
through membership in the departmental
and college academic personnel
committees is that not all professors are
members thereof. Membership and the
number of members in the committees
are provided as follows:25
Section 2. Membership in Committees. —
Membership in committees may be made
either through appointment, election, or
by some other means as may be
determined by the faculty and other
academic personnel of a particular
department or college.
Section 3. Number of Members. — In
addition to the Chairman, in the case of a
department, and the Dean in the case of a
college, there shall be such number of
members representing the faculty and
academic personnel as will afford a fairly
representative, deliberative and
manageable group that can handle
evaluation of personnel actions.
Neither can membership in the University
Council elevate the professors to the
status of high-level employees. Sections 6
(f) and 9 of the UP Charter respectively
provide: 26
Sec. 6. The Board of Regents shall have
the following powers and duties . . . .: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library x       x       x
(f) To approve the courses of study and
rules of discipline drawn up by the
University Council as hereinafter
provided: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Sec. 9. There shall be a University Council
consisting of the President of the
University and of all instructors in the
university holding the rank of professor,
associate professor, or assistant professor.
The Council shall have the power to
prescribe the courses of study and rules of
discipline, subject to the approval of the
Board of Regents. It shall fix the
requirements for admission to any college
of the university, as well as for graduation
and the receiving of a degree. The Council
alone shall have the power to recommend
students or others to be recipients of
degrees. Through its president or
committees, it shall have disciplinary
cralaw:red power over the students within the limits
prescribed by the rules of discipline
approved by the Board of Regents. The
powers and duties of the President of the
University, in addition to those specifically
provided in this Act shall be those usually
pertaining to the office of president of a
university.
It is readily apparent that the policy-
determining functions of the University
Council are subject to review, evaluation
and final approval by the Board of
Regents. The Council’s power of discipline
is likewise circumscribed by the limits
imposed by the Board of Regents. What
has been said about the recommendatory
powers of the departmental and college
academic personnel committees applies
with equal force to the alleged policy-
determining functions of the University
Council.
Even assuming arguendo that UP
professors discharge policy-determining
function through the University Council,
still such exercise would not qualify them
as high-level employees within the context
of E.O. 180. As correctly observed by
private respondent, "Executive Order No.
180 is a law concerning public sector
unionism. It must therefore be construed
within that context. Within that context,
the University of the Philippines
represents the government as an
employer. `Policy-determining’ refers to
policy-determination in university matters
that affect those same matters that may
be the subject of negotiation between
public sector management and labor. The
reason why `policy-determining’ has been
laid down as a test in segregating rank-
and-file from management is to ensure
that those who lay down policies in areas
that are still negotiable in public sector
collective bargaining do not themselves
become part of those employees who seek
to change these policies for their collective
welfare." 27
The policy-determining functions of the
University Council refer to academic
matters, i.e. those governing the
relationship between the University and its
students, and not the University as an
employer and the professors as
employees. It is thus evident that no
conflict of interest results in the professors
being members of the University Council
and being classified as rank-and-file
employees.
Be that as it may, does it follow, as public
respondent would propose, that all rank-
and-file employees of the university are to
be organized into a single collective
bargaining unit?
A "bargaining unit" has been defined as a
group of employees of a given employer,
comprised of all or less than all of the
entire body of employees, which the
collective interest of all the employees,
consistent with equity to the employer,
indicate to be the best suited to serve the
reciprocal rights and duties of the parties
under the collective bargaining provisions
of the law. 28
Our labor laws do not however provide the
criteria for determining the proper
collective bargaining unit. Section 12 of
the old law, Republic Act No. 875
otherwise known as the Industrial Peace
Act, simply reads as follows: 29
Section 12. Exclusive Collective Bargaining
Representation for Labor Organizations. —
The labor organization designated or
selected for the purpose of collective
bargaining by the majority of the
employees in an appropriate collective
bargaining unit shall be the exclusive
representative of all the employees in
such unit for the purpose of collective
bargaining in respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment; Provided, That
any individual employee or group of
employees shall have the right at any time
to present grievances to their employer.
Although said Section 12 of the Industrial
Peace Act was subsequently incorporated
into the Labor Code with minor changes,
no guidelines were included in said Code
for determination of an appropriate
bargaining unit in a given case. 30 Thus,
apart from the single descriptive word
"appropriate," no specific guide for
determining the proper collective
bargaining unit can be found in the
statutes.
Even Executive Order No. 180 already
adverted to is not much help. All it says,
in its Section 9, is that" (t)he appropriate
organizational unit shall be the employer
unit consisting of rank-and-file employees,
unless circumstances otherwise require"
Case law fortunately furnishes some
guidelines.
When first confronted with the task of of employees in other plants of the same
determining the proper collective employer, or other employers in the same
bargaining unit in a particular controversy, industry; the skill, wages, work, and
the Court had preforce the rely on working conditions of the employees; the
American jurisprudence. In Democratic desires of the employees; the eligibility of
Labor Association v. Cebu Stevedoring the employees for membership in the
Company, Inc., decided on February 28, union or unions involved; and the
1958, 31 the Court observed that "the relationship between the unit or units
issue of how to determine the proper proposed and the employer’s organization,
collective bargaining unit and what unit management, and operation. . . .
would be appropriate to be the collective
bargaining agency." . . "is novel in this ". . . In said report, it is likewise
jurisdiction; however, American emphasized that the basic test in
precedents on the matter abound . . . (to determining the appropriate bargaining
which resort may be had) considering that unit is that a unit, to be appropriate, must
our present Magna Carta has been affect a grouping of employees who have
patterned after the American law on the substantial, mutual interests in wages,
subject." Said the Court:chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph hours, working conditions and other
subjects of collective bargaining (citing
". . . Under these precedents, there are Smith on Labor Laws, 316-317; Francisco,
various factors which must be satisfied Labor Laws, 162). . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

and considered in determining the proper

constituency of a bargaining unit. No one The Court further explained that" (t)he
particular factor is itself decisive of the test of the grouping is community or
determination. The weight accorded to mutuality of interests. And this is so
any particular factor varies in accordance because `the basic test of an asserted
with the particular question or questions bargaining unit’s acceptability is whether
that may arise in a given case. What are or not it is fundamentally the combination
these factors? Rothenberg mentions a which will best assure to all employees the
good number, but the most pertinent to exercise of their collective bargaining
our case are: (1) will of the employees rights’ (Rothenberg on Labor Relations,
(Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unit of 490)." Hence, in that case, the Court
employees’ interest, such as substantial upheld the trial court’s conclusion that two
similarity of work and duties, or similarity separate bargaining units should be
or compensation and working conditions; formed, one consisting of regular and
(3) prior collective bargaining history; and permanent employees and another
(4) employment status, such as consisting of casual laborers and
temporary, seasonal and probationary stevedores.
employees. . . .
Since then, the "community or mutuality
x       x       x of interests" test has provided the
standard in determining the proper
constituency of a collective bargaining
"An enlightening appraisal of the problem unit. In Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette
of defining an appropriate bargaining unit Manufacturing Company, Et. Al. v.
is given in the 10th Annual Report of the Alhambra Employees’ Association (PAFLU),
National Labor Relations Board wherein it 107 Phil. 23. The Court, noting that the
is emphasized that the factors which said employees in the administrative, sales and
board may consider and weigh in fixing dispensary departments of a cigar and
appropriate units are: the history, extent cigarette manufacturing firm perform work
and type of organization of employees; which have nothing to do with production
the history of their collective bargaining; and maintenance, unlike those in the raw
the history, extent and type organization lead (malalasi), cigar, cigarette, packing
(precintera) and engineering and garage
departments, authorized the formation of
the former set of employees into a
separate collective bargaining unit. The
ruling in the Democratic labor Association
case, supra, was reiterated in Philippine
Land-Air-Sea Labor Union v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 110 Phil. 176, where
casual employees were barred from
joining the union of the permanent and
regular employees.
Applying the same "community or
mutuality of interests" test, but resulting
in the formation of only one collective
bargaining unit is the case of National
Association of Free Trade Unions v. Mainit
Lumber Development Company Workers
Union-United Lumber and General
Workers of the Phils., G.R. No. 79526,
December 21, 1990, 192 SCRA 598. In
said case, the Court ordered the formation
of a single bargaining unit consisting of
the Sawmill Division in Butuan City and
the Logging Division in Zapanta Valley,
Kitcharao, Agusan Norte of the Mainit
Lumber Development Company. The Court
reasoned: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Certainly, there is a mutuality of interest
among the employees of the Sawmill
Division and the Logging Division. Their
functions mesh with one another. One
group needs the other in the same way
that the company needs them both. There
may be difference as to the nature of their
individual assignments but the distinctions
are not enough to warrant the formation
of a separate bargaining unit." cralaw virtua1aw library
In the case at bar, the University
employees may, as already suggested,
quite easily be categorized into two
general classes: one, the group composed
of employees whose functions are non-
academic, i.e., janitors, messengers,
typists, clerks, receptionists, carpenters,
electricians, grounds-keepers, chauffeurs,
mechanics, plumbers; 32 and two, the
group made up of those performing
academic functions, i.e., full professors,
associate professors, assistant professors,
instructors — who may be judges or
government executives — and research,
extension and professorial staff. 33 Not
much reflection is needed to perceive that
the community or mutuality of interests
which justifies the formation of a single
collective bargaining unit is wanting
between the academic and non-academic
personnel of the university. It would seem
obvious that teachers would find very little
in common with the University clerks and
other non-academic employees as regards
responsibilities and functions, working
conditions, compensation rates, social life
and interests, skills and intellectual
pursuits, cultural activities, etc. On the
contrary, the dichotomy of interests, the
dissimilarity in the nature of the work and
duties as well as in the compensation and
working conditions of the academic and
non-academic personnel dictate the
separation of these two categories of
employees for purposes of collective
bargaining. The formation of two separate
bargaining units, the first consisting of the
rank-and-file non-academic personnel,
and the second, of the rank-and-file
academic employees, is the set-up that
will best assure to all the employees the
exercise of their collective bargaining
rights. These special circumstances, i.e.,
the dichotomy of interests and concerns
as well as the dissimilarity in the nature
and conditions of work, wages and
compensation between the academic and
non-academic personnel, bring the case at
bar within the exception contemplated in
Section 9 of Executive Order No. 180. It
was grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the Labor Relations Director to have
ruled otherwise, ignoring plain and patent
realities.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Order of
October 30, 1990 is hereby AFFIRMED in
so far as it declares the professors,
associate professors and assistant
professors of the University of the
Philippines as rank-and-file employees of
the University of the Philippines shall
constitute a bargaining unit to the
exclusion of the academic employees. The
Order of August 7, 1990 is MODIFIED in
the sense that the non-academic rank-
and-file employees of the institution - i.e.,
full professors, associate professors,
assistant professors, instructors, and the
research, extension and professorial staff,
who may, if so minded, organize
themselves into a separate collective
bargaining unit; and that, therefore, only
said non-academic rank-and-file personnel
of the University of the Philippines in
Diliman, Manila, Los Baños and the
Visayas are to participate in the
certification election.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-28223           August 30, 1968
MECHANICAL DEPARTMENT LABOR UNION
SA PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
RAILWAYS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and
SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA
CALOOCAN SHOPS, respondents.
Sisenando Villaluz for petitioner.
Gregorio E. Fajardo for respondent Samahan ng
mga Manggagawa sa Caloocan Shops.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Petition by the "Mechanical Department Labor
Union sa PNR" for a review of an order of the
Court of Industrial Relations, in its Case No.
1475-MC, directing the holding of a plebiscite
election to determine whether the employees at
the Caloocan Shops desire the respondent
union, "Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa
Caloocan Shops", to be separated from the
Mechanical Department Labor Union, with a
view to the former being recognized as a
separate bargaining unit.
The case began on 13 February 1965 by a
petition of the respondent "Samahan ng mga
Manggagawa, etc." calling attention to the fact
that there were three unions in the Caloocan
shops of the Philippine National Railways: the
"Samahan", the "Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa
Manila Railroad Company", and the Mechanical
Department Labor Union; that no certification
election had been held in the last 12 months in
the Caloocan shops; that both the "Samahan"
and the Mechanical Department Labor Union
had submitted different labor demands upon the
management for which reason a certification
election was needed to determine the proper
collective bargaining agency for the Caloocan
shop workers.
The petition was opposed by the management
as well as by the Mechanical Department Labor
Union, the latter averring that it had been
previously certified in two cases as sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of the employees
and laborers of the PNR'S mechanical
department, and had negotiated two bargaining
agreements with management in 1961 and
1963; that before the expiration of the latter, a
renewal thereof had been negotiated and the
contract remained to be signed; that the
"Samahan" had been organized only in 21
January 1965; that the Caloocan shops unit was
not established nor separated from the
Mechanical Department unit; that the "Samahan"
is composed mainly of supervisors who had filed
a pending case to be declared non-supervisors;
and that the purpose of the petition was to
disturb the present smooth working labor
management relations.
By an order of 18 August 1967, Judge Arsenio
Martinez, after receiving the evidence, made the
following findings:.
1äwphï1.ñët
The Court, after a cursory examination
of the evidence presented made the
following findings: That petitioner union
is composed of workers exclusively at
the Caloocan shops of the Philippine
National Railways charged with the
maintenance of rolling stocks for repairs;
major repairs of locomotive, engines,
etc. are done in the Caloocan shops
while minor ones in the Manila sheds;
workers in the Caloocan shops do not
leave their station unlike Manila shop
workers who go out along the routes
and lines for repairs; workers both in the
Caloocan shops and Manila sheds are
exposed to hazards occasioned by the
nature of their work; that with respect to
wages and salaries of employees,
categories under the Job Classification
and Evaluation Plan of the company
apply to all workers both in the Caloocan
Shops and Manila sheds; administration
over employees, members of petitioner
union as well as oppositor is under the
Administrative Division of the company;
that from the very nature of their work,
members of petitioner union and other
workers of the Mechanical Department
have been under the coverage of the
current collective bargaining agreement
which was a result of a certification by
this Court of the Mechanical Department
Labor union, first in 1960 and later in
1963. Subsequently, when the latter
contract expired, negotiations for its
renewal were had and at the time of the
filing of this petition was already
consummated, the only act remaining to
be done was to affix the signatures of
the parties thereto; that during the
pendency of this petition, on June 14,
1965, the aforesaid collective bargaining
agreement was signed between the
Philippine National Railways and the
Mechanical Department Labor Union sa
Philippine National Railways (Manila
Railroad Company).
The main issue involved herein is:
Whether or not a new unit should be
established, the Caloocan shops,
separate and distinct from the rest of the
workers under the Mechanical
Department now represented by the
Mechanical Department Labor Union.
The Caloocan Shops, all located at
Caloocan City have 360 workers more
or less. It is part and parcel of the whole
Mechanical Department of the Philippine
National Railways. The department is
composed of four main divisions or
units, namely: Operations, Manila Area
and Lines; Locomotive Crew; Motor Car
Crew; and the Shops Rolling Stocks
Maintenance. (Exhibits "D" and "D-1").
The Locomotive crew and Motor Car
Crew, though part of the Mechanical
Department, is a separate unit, and is
represented by the Union de
Maquinistas, Fogoneros Y Motormen.
The workers under the other two main
units of the departments are
represented by the Mechanical
Department Labor Union. The workers
of the Shops Rolling Stocks
Maintenance Division or the Caloocan
Shops now seek to be separated from
the rest of the workers of the department
and to be represented by the "Samahan
Ng Mga Manggagawa sa Caloocan
Shops." .
There is certainly a community of
interest among the workers of the
Caloocan Shops. They are grouped in
one place. They work under one or
same working condition, same working
time or schedule and are exposed to
same occupational risk.
Though evidence on record shows that
workers at the Caloocan Shops perform
the same nature of work as their
counterparts in the Manila Shed, the
difference lies in the fact that workers at
the Caloocan Shops perform major
repairs of locomotives, rolling stocks,
engines, etc., while those in the Manila
Shed, works on minor repairs. Heavy
equipment and machineries are found in
the Caloocan Shops.
The trial judge then reviewed the collective
bargaining history of the Philippine National
Railways, as follows: 
1äwphï1.ñët
On several similar instances, this Court
allowed the establishment of new and
separate bargaining unit in one
company, even in one department of the
same company, despite the existence of
the same facts and circumstances as
obtaining in the case at bar.
The history of the collective bargaining
in the Manila Railroad Company, now
the Philippine National Railways shows
that originally, there was only one
bargaining unit in the company,
represented by the Kapisanan Ng
Manggagawa sa MRR. Under Case No.
237-MC, this Court ordered the
establishment of two additional units, the
engine crew and the train crew to be
represented by the Union de
Maquinistas, Fogoneros, Ayudante Y
Motormen and Union de Empleados de
Trenes, respectively. Then in 1961,
under Cases Nos. 491-MC, 494-MC and
 507-MC three new separate units were
established, namely, the yard crew unit,
station employees unit and engineering
department employees unit,
respectively, after the employees
concerned voted in a plebiscite
conducted by the court for the
separation from existing bargaining units
in the company. Then again, under
Case No. 763-MC, a new unit,
composed of the Mechanical
Department employees, was established
to be represented by the Mechanical
Department Labor Union. Incidentally,
the first attempt of the employees of the
Mechanical Department to be separated
as a unit was dismissed by this Court of
Case No. 488-MC.
In the case of the yard crew, station
employees and the Engineering
Department employees, the Supreme
Court sustained the order of this Court in
giving the employees concerned the
right to vote and decide whether or not
they desire to be separate units (See
G.R. Nos. L-16292-94, L-16309 and L-
16317-18, November, 1965).
In view of its findings and the history of "union
representation" in the railway company,
indicating that bargaining units had been formed
through separation of new units from existing
ones whenever plebiscites had shown the
workers' desire to have their own
representatives, and relying on the "Globe
doctrine" (Globe Machine & Stamping Co., 3
NLRB 294) applied in Democratic Labor Union
vs. Cebu Stevedoring Co., L-10321, 28 February
1958, Judge Martinez held that the employees in
the Caloocan Shops should be given a chance
to vote on whether their group should be
separated from that represented by the
Mechanical Department Labor Union, and
ordered a plebiscite held for the purpose. The
ruling was sustained by the Court en
banc; wherefore, the Mechanical Department
Labor Union appealed to this Court questioning
the applicability under the circumstances of the
"Globe doctrine" of considering the will of the
employees in determining what union should
represent them.
Technically, this appeal is premature, since the
result of the ordered plebiscite among the
workers of the Caloocan shops may be adverse
to the formation of a separate unit, in which
event, as stated in the appealed order, all
questions raised in this case would be rendered
moot and academic. Apparently, however, the
appellant Mechanical Department Labor Union
takes it for granted that the plebiscite would
favor separation.
We find no grave abuse of discretion in the
issuance of the ruling under appeal as would
justify our interfering with it. Republic Act No.
875 has primarily entrusted the prosecution of its
policies to the Court of Industrial Relations, and,
in view of its intimate knowledge concerning the
facts and circumstances surrounding the cases
brought before it, this Court has repeatedly
upheld the exercise of discretion of the Court of
Industrial Relations in matters concerning the
representation of employee groups (Manila
Paper Mills Employees & Workers' Association
vs. C.I.R. 104 Phil. 10; Benguet Consolidated vs.
Bobok Lumber Jack Association, 103 Phil.
1150).
Appellant contends that the application of the
"Globe doctrine" is not warranted because the
workers of the Caloocan shops do not require
different skills from the rest of the workers in the
Mechanical Department of the Railway
Company. This question is primarily one of facts.
The Industrial Court has found that there is a
basic difference, in that those in the Caloocan
shops not only have a community of interest and
working conditions but perform major repairs of
railway rolling stock, using heavy equipment and
machineries found in said shops, while the
others only perform minor repairs. It is easy to
understand, therefore, that the workers in the
Caloocan shops require special skill in the use of
heavy equipment and machinery sufficient to set
them apart from the rest of the workers. In
addition, the record shows that the collective
bargaining agreements negotiated by the
appellant union have been in existence for more
than two (2) years; hence, such agreements can
not constitute a bar to the determination, by
proper elections, of a new bargaining
representative (PLDT Employees' Union vs.
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., 51 Off.
Gaz., 4519).
As to the charge that some of the members of
the appellee, "Samahan Ng Manggagawa", are
actually supervisors, it appears that the question
of the status of such members is still pending
final decision; hence, it would not constitute a
legal obstacle to the holding of the plebiscite. At
any rate, the appellant may later question
whether the votes of those ultimately declared to
be supervisors should be counted.
Whether or not the agreement negotiated by the
appellant union with the employer, during the
pendency of the original petition in the Court of
Industrial Relations, should be considered valid
and binding on the workers of the Caloocan
shops is a question that should be first passed
upon by the Industrial Court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the order
appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
appellant Mechanical Department Labor Union
sa Philippine National Railways.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Sanchez, Cas
G. R. NO. L-10321. FEB
28, 1958
[G. R. No. L-10321, February
28, 1958] DEMOCRATIC
LABOR ASSOCIATION,
PETITIONER, VS. CEBU
STEVEDORING COMPANY,
INC. ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N BAUTISTA
ANGELO, J.:
The Cebu stevedores Association,
a legitimate labor union with
Registration Permit No. 357, filed
on March 8, 1954 with the Court of
Industrial Relations a petition for
certification election for the
purpose of determining the
collective bargaining unit that
should represent the employees
and laborers of the cebu
stevedoring Co., Inc. The latter
was made party respondent as the
employer. In the process, three
other labor unions intervened, to
wit; the Democratic Labor
Association, the Cebu Trade
Union, and the Katubsanan sa
Mamumuo, who also asserted
their right to take part in the
certification election.
As the parties could not agree on
the union that should be
designated as the appropriate
collective bargaining agency,
hearings were held and evidence
adduced not only on what should
be the proper bargaining unit but
also on the membership of each
labor organization. Thereafter,
Judge Jose S. Bautiata, who has
been designated to receive the
evidence, issued an order
declaring the Democratic labor
Association as the collective
bargaining agency for all the
regular and permanent workers of
respondent company considering
that it has more employees
belonging to this class than the
other unions. He found that the
Cebu stevedores Association has
more casual laborers affiliated
with it but that it is not a union
registered under the provisions of
the law and so it cannot take part
in the certification election. He
also found that the Katubsanan Sa
Mamumuo is no longer interested
in the election and that Judging
from the attitude of its president it
can be implied that it has waived
its claim, in favor of the Cebu
Stevedores Association.
Consequently, Judge Bautiata
ordered that an election be
conducted by the Department of
Labor among the casual laborers
whose names appear on pages 1
and 3-24 of Exhibit 4-respondent
designating as the only labor
organizations that may be voted in
said election the Democratic labor
Association and the Cebu Trade
Union, two legitimate labor
organizations registered in
accordance with law.
Dissatisfied with this order,
respondent Cebu Stevedoring Co.,
Inc., as well as the Cebu
Stevedores Association and the
Katubsanan sa Mamumuo, filed
each a motion
for reconsideration disputing the
finding of the trial judge that there
should be two collective
bargaining units thafe would
represent two sets of workers
baaed on their terms of
employment, as well as the finding
that the two labor unions above-
mentioned are ineligible to take
part or be voted for in the
certification elsetion. These
motions having been submitted to
the court en bane, a split vote
resulted, 3 voting in favor of
revoking the order and two in
favor of upholding it. In other
words, Judge Juan L. lenting, with
Judges Arsenio I. Martinez and
Bienvenldo Tan concurring, with
the dissent of Judge Jose S.
Bautista, concurred in by Judge
Jimenez Yanson, issued a
resolution setting aside the order
aforesaid and containing the
following dispositive part: (1)
declaring that the appropriate
collective bargaining unit is the
employer's unit, embracing all the
employees and workers therein
involved; and (2) ordering the
holding of an election wherein the
four labor unions should take part,
namely, the Cebu Stevedores
Association, Democratic labor
Association, Katubsanan Sa
Mamumuo and Cebu Trade Union.
Hence the present petition for
review.
The facts as found by the trial
court are: The Cebu Stevedoring
Co., Inc. is a corporation engaged
principally in stevedoring work
consisting of loading and
unloading of cargoes to and from
the foreign ocean-going vessels
that dock in the port of Cebu and,
secondarily, in the lighterage
business consisting of hauling and
storing copper, gypsum, oil
products and other merchandise
to and from the port of Cebu and
neighboring islands and provinces.
In the operation of these two kinds
of business, the company employs
two sets of workers, namely, the
regular and permanent on one
hand, and the daily or casual on
the other. The first set of laborers
work continuously and are paid
either semi-annually, monthly or
weekly, are given annual bonuses,
sick leave ani vacation leave for
cvery year of service, and are given
overtime compensation for
overtime work ranging from 25%
to 50%. The casual laborers are the
stevedores who work solely on the
loading and unloading of cargoes,
are paid daily, are laid off from
time to time, and work as they
please depending on the arrival of
foreign vessels in the port of Cebu.
They do not enjoy any vacation or
sick leave, bat when they work
overtime, they are paid 100%
additional compensation.
Considering these factors and
following American precedents,
the trial court deemed it proper
that two separate bargaining units
be certified, namely, one
consisting of the regular and
permanent employees ana the
other consisting of the casual
laborers or stevedores of the
employer.
In this connection, the trial court
also found that the Democratic
Labor Association had a majority
of the regular and permanent
employees among its members
because, of a total of 211 workers
of that class, 128 thereof are
affiliated with said union. And so,
the trial court deemed it proper to
certify said union as the
appropriate bargaining unit for
regular and permanent employees,
the trial court also found that the
Cebu Stevedores Association has
among its members more casual
laborers or stevedores than the
other unions but because it is not
registered as required by law, it
cannot be certified as the collective
bargaining unit of a aid. class of
laborers. The trial court finally
found thet the Katubanan Sa
Mamumuo was no longer
interested in taking part in the
election because its president and
counsel, Jose Muana, made it
known tto t he was giving the
claim of that union in favor of the
cebu Stevedores Association. It is
for this reason that the trial court
only considered the Democratic
Labor Association and the Cebu
Trade Union as the only ones
qualified to take part In the
clection of the bargaining unit for
casual la- borers or stevedores.
Some of these facts however were
found by the court en banc to be
incorrect because they are
contrary to the evidence. Thus, the
evidence is not clear whether the
Democratic Labor Union has
among its members more regular
and permnont employees than the
other labor uniors which doubt,
according to the court en bane,
should be resolved in favor of
holding a certification election, "It
is not also correct that the Cebu
Stevedores Association Is not a
registered labor union for the
record shows that this union was
formally registered under
Commonwealth Act No. 813 but
that such registration expired on
January 31, 1955. Later, however,
its permit was renewed and
Certificate of Registration No.
1477-IP was issued on September
7, 1955. It is therefore a legitimate
labor organization entitled to take
part in the certification election.
With regard to the finding that
Katubsanan Sa Mamuinuo waived
its claim in favor of the Cebu
Stevedores Association, the court
en banc also found that the same
is not borne out by the evidence
and concluded that that union is
entitled to take part in the
certification clection.
The issue now to be determined is:
Considering that there are two sets
of employees or laborers working
in respondent company, one
regular and permanent and the
other casual or temporary, is it
proper and, convenient that there
should be onc collective
bargaining unit for each, aa held
by the trial court, or only one
collective bargaining unit for all
the workers and employees of said
respondent company regardless of
their terms of employment, as held
by the court en banc?
In determining the appropriate
collective bargaining unit in the
present case, the court en banc
took Into account the fact that as
early as March 4, 1947 a collective
bargaining agreement was
enforced between the petitioning,
union and respondent company
and that such agreement was
substituted by another on
November 1, 3950, which was
renewed for another two years on
November 1, 1952. An examination
of the contract executed on
November 1, 1950 reveals,
according to said court, that it
covers "laborers on daily wage,
officers and members of the crew
of launches, tugboats, barges, and
lighters" or, in short, all the
working force employed in
respondent company. There is
therefore a collective bargaining
history to reckon with according to
which all the employees of the
company have always belonged to
only one collective bargaining unit,
and considering that that
collective bargaining; agreement
haa stabilized or at least has
contributed to the stabilization of
labor relations between the
company and its employees from
1947 to 1952, no reason is seen
why suoh historical precedent
should not control the present
case.
While it may be true that a
collective bareaining agreement
has for sometime existed between
the petitioning union and
respondent company and the same
has served the purpose for whleh it
has been concluded, it does not
follow that the same situation
should continue even if there are
supervening factors tha t press for
a different treatment or other
cogent reasons that would justify a
different course in the
determination of the appropriate
collections bargaining agency.
While the existence of a bargaining
history is a factor that may bo
reckoned with in determining the
appropriate bargaining unit, the
same is not decisive nor
conclusive. There are other factors
that aisy be considered depending
upon the circumstances of each
case. One of them is the fact that
since the conclusion of said
collective bargaining agreement
there have arisen several other
labor unions composed of
employees and laborers of the
same company whose relations
have become so diverse and
conflicting that a re-evaluation of
the labor relations has become
imperative in order that they may
not be jeopardized. This moment
has come when the petitioning
union brought the matter to court
for oefctifieation election and the
situation with which the court was
confronted was: there wore four
labor unions composed of
employees and laborers working in
the same company with diverse
and conflicting interest and there
was no collective bargaining
agency to represent them. Hence
the need for certification election.
And the crucial issue is how to
determine the proper collective
bargaining unit and what unit
would be appropriate to be the
collective bargaining agency. This
is now the crux in the present ease.
This issue is novel in this
jurisdiction. No other case has
arisen before involving a similar
issue and which may serve as a
guide for the detersiination of the
controversy. However, American
precedents on the matter abound
and to them we should resort
considering that our present
Magna Carta has been patterned
after the American law on the
subject. Under these precedents,
there are various factors which
must be satisfied and considered
in determining the proper
constituency of bargaining unit.
No one particular factor is itself
decisive of the determination. The
weight accorded to any particular
factor varies in accordance with
the particular question or
questions that may arise in a given
case. What are these factors?
Rothenberg mentions a good
number, but the most pertinent to
our caae are: (1) will of employees
(Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and
unity of employees' interest, such
as substantial similarity of work
and duties, or similarity of
compensation and working
conditions; (3) prior collective
bargaining history; and (4)
employment status, such as
temporary, seasonal and
probationary employees
(Rothenberg on labor Relations,
pp. 488-510). A brief discussion of
the nature of each of these factors
becomes necessary.
By reason of the modern
complexity of both employer and
union structure, it frequently
becomes difficult to determine
from the evidence alone whioh of
several claimant groups form a
proper bargaining unit. It then
becomes necessary to give
consideration to the express will or
desire of the employees. This
practice of considering the
employees' will has been,
designated as the Globe doctrine.
This doctrine arose in a case where
there were four contending labor
groups, three claiming to be the
proper bargaining units for
employees coming within each of
their three separate categories of
work, and the fourth claiming the
right to be designated as the
bargaining unit for all employees
on a plant-wide basis. The
National labor Relations Board,
finding that each of the competing
units have an equally valid basis
for their respective claims, decided
to hold a series of clections, not for
the purpose of allowing the group
receiving an overall majority of
votes to represent all employees,
but for the specific purpose of
permitting the employees in each
of the several categories of work to
select the group which each chose
as a bargaining unit (p. 483,
Idem.).
The second factor is perhaps one
of the most conclusive in
determining the proper bargaining
unit. Inasmuch, as the basic test of
a bargaining unit's acceptability is
whether it will best assure to all
employees the exercise of their
collective bargaining rights,
industrial experience indicates
that the most efficacious
bargaining unit is one which is
comprised of constituents enjoying
a community of interest and
economic or occupational unity.
This community of interest is
reflected in groups having
substantial similarity of worlc and
duties or similarity of
compensation and working
conditions (pp. 490-494, Idem.).

Another important factor is the
precedent history of collective
bargaining between the proposed
bargaining unit and the employer.
When this precedent exists, it may
be assumed that the court will not
disturb the composition of a
consolidated bargaining unit
which has an established existence
and has, in its past dealings with
the employer, demonstrated its
service to the collective bargaining
purposes of the act. However,
where the circumstances have
been so altered or where the
reciprocal relationship of the
employer and the bargaining unit
has been so changed that the past
mutual experience in collective
bargaining cannot be reasonably
said to establish a reliable guide to
the present constituency of the
bargaining unit, then prior
collective bargaining history
cannot be considered a factor in
the determination. In such an
event, the determination must be
made entirely upon the basis of
existing facts and with due
consideration to all of the
remaining factors (pp. 496-498,
Idem.)
The status of employment is
another important factor in the
determination of which employees
shall be included or excluded from
a proposed bargaining unit. There
are certain positions and
categories of work which, by their
very nature, place the employees
in a position wherein a eonflict of
duties and interest exists. There
are several categories of
employment which have so far
received the special attention of
congress, the courts and the board,
among them supervisory
employees, confidential
employees, guards and plant
policemen and temporary,
seasonal and probationary
employees. With respect to suck
employees, there frequently arises
the question of the right to include
or exclude them from bargaining
units composed of pemanent
employees. It was hold that
employees hired on a brief, caaual
or day to day basis or for a short,
definite term, and who have no
reasonable basis for continued or
renewed employment for any
appreciable substantial time, are
considered to have no such
mutuality of interest with
permanent employees as to justify
their interest in a bargaining unit
composed of such permanent
oaployees (pp. 500- 511, Idem.).
An enlightening appraisal of the
problem of defining an
appropriate bargaining unit is
given in the 10th Annual Report of
the National labor Relations Board
wherein it is emphasized that the
factors which said board may
consider and weigh in fixing
appropriate units are: tho history,
extent and type of organization of
employees; the history of their
collective bargaining; the history,
extent and type of organization of
employees in other plants of the
same employer, or other
employers in the same industry;
the skill, wages, work, and working
conditions of the employees; the
desires of the employees; the
eligibility of the employees for
membership in the union or
unions involved; and the
relationship between the unit or
units proposed and the employer's
organization, management, and
operation. In said report, it is
likewise emphasized that the basic
test in determining the
appropriate bargaining unit is that
a unit, to be appropriate, must
effect a grouping of employees
who have substantial, mutual
interests in wages, hours, working
conditions and other subjects of
olleetive bargaining (Smith, Labor
Law, 316-317 ;Francisco, labor
Laws, 162).
We have therefore seen that the
mere existence of a prior collective
bargaining history is not a decisive
factor in the determination of a
collective bargaining agency.
Where the circamstances had been
so altered or where the reciprocal
relationship of the employer and
the particular bargaining unit has
been so changed that the past
mutual experience cannot be
considered as a reliable guide to
the present determination of the
bargaining unit, then prior
collective bargaining history
should be brushed aside and only
the prevailing facts and factors
should control the determination.
We have also seen that an
important factor to consider is the
employment status of the workers
and employees to be affected by
the collective bargaining agency.
The positions or categories of work
to which, they belong ahould also
be considered. This rule requires
that temporary, seasonal or
probational employees bc grouped
as one category and bc treated
separately from psrinanent
employees. The test of the
grouping is ccmiaunity or
mutuality of interest. And this is so
because ffthe basic test of an
asserted bargaining unit's
acceptability is whether or not it is
fundamentslly the combination
which will best assure to all
employees the exercise of their
collective bargaining rights"
(Rothenberg on Labor Relations,
490).
We therefore find that the
conclusion reached by the trial
court to the effect that two
separate bargaining units should
be formed in dealing with the
respondent company, namely, one
consisting of regular and
permanent employees, and the
other consisting of casual laborers
or stevedores, is correct, it being
supported by precedents on the
matter. We also find correct the
finding that the Democratic Labor
Association, having among its
members more regular and
permanent employees, should be
designated as the collective
bargaining unit for this group.
Certain facts, however, found by
the trial court should be corrected:
The Cebu Stevedores Association
is now a legitimate labor union, its
permit having been renewed and
should be allowed to take part in
the certification election for the
group of casual or temporary
employees. The Katubsanan Sa
Mamumuo has not waived its right
to take part in the election and it
must be allowed to take part
therein, and with the facts thus
modified, the ruling of the trial
court should be upheld.
Wherefore, the decision of the
industrial court en banc dated
November 7, 1955 is hereby
modified as follows: (1) the
Democratic labor Association is
hereby declared as the collective
bargaining agent for the regular
and permanent employees and
workers of respondent company;
and (2) let certification election be
held for casual or temporary
employees and workers in which
the following organizations should
participate: Cebu Stevedores
Association, Democratic Labor
Association, Katubsanan Sa

Mamumuo and Cebu Trade Union.
No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 100485 September 21, 1994
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE BIENVENIDO E.
LAGUESMA and NORTH LUZON MAGNOLIA
SALES LABOR UNION-
INDEPENDENT, respondents.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for
petitioner.
E.N.A. Cruz & Associates for private
respondent.
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) prays
that the Resolution dated March 19, 1991 and
the Order dated April 12, 1991 of public
respondent Undersecretary Bienvenido E.
Laguesma declaring respondent union as the
sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the
Magnolia sales personnel in northern Luzon be
set aside for having been issued in excess of
jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion.
On June 4, 1990, the North Luzon Magnolia
Sales Labor Union (respondent union for brevity)
filed with the Department of Labor a petition for
certification election among all the regular sales
personnel of Magnolia Dairy Products in the
North Luzon Sales Area.  1
Petitioner opposed the petition and questioned
the appropriateness of the bargaining unit
sought to be represented by respondent union. It
claimed that its bargaining history in its sales
offices, plants and warehouses is to have
a separate bargaining unit for each sales office.
The petition was heard on November 9, 1990
with petitioner
being represented by Atty. Alvin C. Batalla of the
Siguion Reyna law office. Atty. Batalla withdrew
petitioner's opposition to a certification election
and agreed to consider all the sales offices in
northern Luzon as one bargaining unit. At the
pre-election conference, the parties agreed inter
alia, on the date, time and place of the consent
election. Respondent union won the election
held on November 24, 1990. In an Order dated
December 3, 1990,   Mediator-Arbiter Benalfre J.
2
Galang certified respondent union as the sole
and exclusive bargaining agent for all the regular
sales personnel in all the sales offices of
Magnolia Dairy Products in the North Luzon
Sales Area.
Petitioner appealed to the Secretary of Labor. It
claimed that
Atty. Batalla was only authorized to agree to the
holding of certification elections subject to the
following conditions: (1) there would only be one
general election; (2) in this general election, the
individual sales offices shall still comprise
separate bargaining units.  3
In a Resolution dated March 19, 1991,   public
4
respondent, by authority of the Secretary of
Labor, denied SMC's appeal and affirmed the
Order of the Med- Arbiter.
Hence this petition for certiorari.
Petitioner claims that:
THE HONORABLE
UNDERSECRETARY
LAGUESMA ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN HE
IGNORED AND TOTALLY
DISREGARDED
PETITIONER'S VALID AND
JUSTIFIABLE GROUNDS WHY
THE ERROR MADE IN GOOD
FAITH BY PETITIONER'S
COUNSEL BE CORRECTED,
AND INSTEAD RULED:
 A bargaining unit, and (2) whether or not petitioner
is bound by its lawyer's act of agreeing to
THAT PRIVATE consider the sales personnel in the north Luzon
RESPONDENT sales area as one bargaining unit.
IS "THE SOLE
AND Petitioner claims that in issuing the impugned
EXCLUSIVE Orders, public respondent disregarded its
BARGAINING collective bargaining history which is to have
AGENT FOR a separate bargaining unit for each sales office.
ALL THE It insists that its prior collective bargaining
REGULAR history is the  most persuasive criterion  in
SALES determining the appropriateness of the collective
OFFICES OF bargaining unit.
MAGNOLIA
DAIRY There is no merit in the contention.
PRODUCTS,
NORTH LUZON A bargaining unit is a "group of employees of a
SALES AREA", given employer, comprised of all or less than all
COMPLETELY of the entire body of employees, consistent with
IGNORING equity to the employer, indicate to be the best
THE suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of
ESTABLISHED the parties under the collective bargaining
BARGAINING provisions of the law." 
5

HISTORY OF
PETITIONER
SMC. The fundamental factors in determining the
appropriate collective bargaining unit are: (1) the
will of the employees (Globe Doctrine);   (2)
6

B affinity and unity of the employees' interest, such

as substantial similarity of work and duties, or
THAT similarity of compensation and working
PETITIONER IS conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule);
ESTOPPED (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4)
FROM similarity of employment status. 7

QUESTIONING
THE Contrary to petitioner's assertion, this Court has
"AGREEMENT" categorically ruled that the existence of a prior
ENTERED collective bargaining history is neither decisive
INTO AT THE nor conclusive  in the determination of what
HEARING ON constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit.  8

9 NOVEMBER
1990, IN
CONTRAVENTI Indeed, the test of grouping is mutuality or
ON OF THE commonality of interests. The employees sought
ESTABLISHED to be represented by the collective bargaining
FACTS OF THE agent must have substantial mutual interests in
CASE AND terms of employment and working conditions as
THE evinced by the type of work they perform.
APPLICABLE
LAW ON THE In the case at bench, respondent union sought
MATTER. to represent the sales personnel in the various
Magnolia sales offices in northern Luzon. There
We find no merit in the petition. is similarity of employment status for only the
regular sales personnel in the north Luzon area
are covered. They have the same duties and
The issues for resolution are: (1) whether or not responsibilities and substantially similar
respondent union represents an appropriate
compensation and working conditions. The
commonality of interest among he sales
personnel in the north Luzon sales area cannot
be gainsaid. In fact, in the certification election
held on November 24, 1990, the employees
concerned accepted respondent union as their
exclusive bargaining agent. Clearly, they have
expressed their desire to be one.
Petitioner cannot insist that each of the sales
office of Magnolia should constitute only one
bargaining unit. What greatly militates against
this position is the meager number of sales
personnel in each of the Magnolia sales office in
northern Luzon. Even the bargaining unit sought
to be represented by respondent union in the
entire north Luzon sales area consists only of
approximately
fifty-five (55) employees.   Surely, it would not be
9
for the best interest of these employees if they
would further be fractionalized. The adage "there
is strength in number" is the very rationale
underlying the formation of a labor union.
Anent the second issue, petitioner claims that
Atty. Batalla was merely a substitute lawyer for
Atty. Christine Ona, who got stranded in Legaspi
City. Atty. Batalla was allegedly unfamiliar with
the collective bargaining history of its
establishment. Petitioner claims it should not be
bound by the mistake committed by its substitute
lawyer.
We are not persuaded. As discussed earlier, the
collective bargaining history of a company is not
decisive of what should comprise the collective
bargaining unit. Insofar as the alleged "mistake"
of the substitute lawyer is concerned, we find
that this mistake was the direct result of the
negligence of petitioner's lawyers. It will be
noted that Atty. Ona was under the supervision
of two (2) other lawyers, Attys. Jacinto de la
Rosa, Jr. and George C. Nograles. There is
nothing in the records to show that these two (2)
counsels were likewise unavailable at that time.
Instead of deferring the hearing, petitioner's
counsels chose to proceed therewith. Indeed,
prudence dictates that, in such case, the lawyers
allegedly actively involved in SMC's labor case
should have adequately and sufficiently briefed
the substitute lawyer with respect to the matters
involved in the case and the specific limits of his
authority. Unfortunately, this was not done in this
case. The negligence of its lawyers binds
petitioner. As held by this Court in the case
of Villa Rhecar Bus v. De la Cruz:  10
. . . As a general rule, a client is
bound by the mistakes of his
counsel. Only when the
application of the general rule
would result in serious
injustice should an exception
thereto be called for.
In the case at bench, petitioner insists that each
of the sales offices in northern Luzon should be
considered as a separate bargaining unit for
negotiations would be more expeditious.
Petitioner obviously chooses to follow the path of
least resistance. It is not, however, the
convenience of the employer that constitutes the
determinative factor in forming an appropriate
bargaining unit. Equally, if not more important, is
the interest of the employees. In choosing and
crafting an appropriate bargaining unit, extreme
care should be taken to prevent an employer
from having any undue advantage over the
employees' bargaining representative. Our
workers are weak enough and it is not our social
policy to further debilitate their bargaining
representative.
In sum, we find that no arbitrariness or grave
abuse of discretion can be attributed to public
respondents certification of respondent union as
the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the
regular Magnolia sales personnel of the north
Luzon sales area.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
challenged Resolution and Order of public
respondent are hereby AFFIRMED in toto, there
being no showing of grave abuse of discretion or
lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado and Mendoza,
JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
G.R. No. 110399 August 15, 1997
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION SUPERVISORS
AND EXEMPT UNION AND ERNESTO L.
PONCE, President, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA IN
HIS CAPACITY AS UNDERSECRETARY OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, HONORABLE
DANILO L. REYNANTE IN HIS CAPACITY AS
MED-ARBITER AND SAN MIGUEL
CORPORATION, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the
Issuance of Preliminary Injunction seeking to
reverse and set aside the Order of public
respondent, Undersecretary of the Department
of Labor and Employment, Bienvenido E.
Laguesma, dated March 11, 1993, in Case No.
OS MA A-2-70-91  entitled "In Re: Petition for
1
Certification Election Among the Supervisory
and Exempt Employees of the San Miguel
Corporation Magnolia Poultry Plants of
Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis, San Miguel
Corporation Supervisors and Exempt Union,
Petitioner." The Order excluded the employees
under supervisory levels 3 and 4 and the so-
called exempt employees from the proposed
bargaining unit and ruled out their participation in
the certification election.
The antecedent facts are undisputed:
On October 5, 1990, petitioner union filed before
the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) a Petition for Direct Certification or
Certification Election among the supervisors and
exempt employees of the SMC Magnolia Poultry
Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando and
Otis.
On December 19, 1990, Med-Arbiter Danilo L.
Reynante issued an Order ordering the conduct
of certification election among the supervisors
and exempt employees of the SMC Magnolia
Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San
Fernando and Otis as one bargaining unit.
On January 18, 1991, respondent San Miguel
Corporation filed a Notice of Appeal with
Memorandum on Appeal, pointing out, among
others, the Med-Arbiter's error in grouping
together all three (3) separate plants, Otis,
Cabuyao and San Fernando, into one bargaining
unit, and in including supervisory levels 3 and
above whose positions are confidential in nature.
On July 23, 1991, the public respondent,
Undersecretary Laguesma, granted respondent
company's Appeal and ordered the remand of
the case to the Med-Arbiter of origin for
determination of the true classification of each of
the employees sought to be included in the
appropriate bargaining unit.
Upon petitioner-union's motion dated August 7,
1991, Undersecretary Laguesma granted the
reconsideration prayed for on September 3,
1991 and directed the conduct of separate
certification elections among the supervisors
ranked as supervisory levels 1 to 4 (S1 to S4)
and the exempt employees in each of the three
plants at Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis.
On September 21, 1991, respondent company,
San Miguel Corporation filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with Motion to suspend
proceedings.
On March 11, 1993, an Order was issued by the
public respondent granting the Motion, citing the
doctrine enunciated in Philips Industrial
Development, Inc.  v. NLRC   case. Said Order
2
reads in part:
. . . Confidential employees, like
managerial employees, are not
allowed to form, join or assist a
labor union for purposes of
collective bargaining.
In this case, S3 and S4
Supervisors and the so-called
exempt employees are
admittedly confidential
employees and therefore, they
are not allowed to form, join or
assist a labor union for
purposes of collective
bargaining following the above
court's ruling. Consequently,
they are not allowed to
participate in the certification
election.
 WHEREFORE, the Motion is
hereby granted and the
Decision of this Office dated 03
September 1991 is hereby
modified to the extent that
employees under supervisory
levels 3 and 4 (S3 and S4) and
the so-called exempt employees
are not allowed to join the
proposed bargaining unit and
are therefore excluded from
those who could participate in
the certification election. 
3
Hence this petition.
For resolution in this case are the following
issues:
1. Whether
Supervisory
employees 3
and 4 and the
exempt
employees of
the company
are considered
confidential
employees,
hence ineligible
from joining a
union.
2. If they are not
confidential
employees, do
the employees
of the three
plants constitute
an appropriate
single
bargaining unit.
On the first issue, this Court rules that said
employees do not fall within the term
"confidential employees" who may be prohibited
from joining a union.
There is no question that the said employees,
supervisors and the exempt employees, are not
vested with the powers and prerogatives to lay
down and execute management policies and/or
to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall,
discharge or dismiss employees. They are,
therefore, not qualified to be classified as
managerial employees who, under Article
245   of the Labor Code, are not eligible to join,
4
assist or form any labor organization. In the very
same provision, they are not allowed
membership in a labor organization of the rank-
and-file employees but may join, assist or form
separate labor organizations of their own. The
only question that need be addressed is whether
these employees are properly classified as
confidential employees or not.
Confidential employees are those who (1) assist
or act in a confidential capacity, (2) to persons
who formulate, determine, and effectuate
management policies in the field of labor
relations.   The two criteria are cumulative, and
5
both must be met if an employee is to be
considered a confidential employee — that is,
the confidential relationship must exist between
the employee and his supervisor, and the
supervisor must handle the prescribed
responsibilities relating to labor relations.  6
The exclusion from bargaining units of
employees who, in the normal course of their
duties, become aware of management policies
relating to labor relations is a principal objective
sought to be accomplished by the ''confidential
employee rule." The broad rationale behind this
rule is that employees should not be placed in a
position involving a potential conflict of
interests.   "Management should not be required
7
to handle labor relations matters through
employees who are represented by the union
with which the company is required to deal and
who in the normal performance of their duties
may obtain advance information of the
company's position with regard to contract
negotiations, the disposition of grievances, or
other labor relations matters."  8
There have been precedents in this regards,
thus in Bulletin Publishing Company
v.  Hon.  Augusto Sanchez,    the Court held that
9
"if these managerial employees would belong to
or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not
be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of
evident conflict of interest. The Union can also
become company-dominated with the presence
of managerial employees in Union membership."
The same rationale was applied to confidential
employees in "Golden Farms, Inc.  v. Ferrer-
Calleja"   and in the more recent case of "Philips
10
Industrial Development, Inc. v.  NLRC"   which
11
held that confidential employees, by the very
nature of their functions, assist and act in a confidential from the business standpoint, such
confidential capacity to, or have access to as financial information   or technical trade
18

confidential matters of, persons who exercise secrets, will not render an employee a
managerial functions in the field of labor confidential employee."  19

relations. Therefore, the rationale behind the

ineligibility of managerial employees to form, Herein listed are the functions of supervisors 3
assist or join a labor union was held equally and higher:
applicable to them.  12

1. To undertake
An important element of the "confidential decisions to
employee rule" is the employee's need to use discontinue/tem
labor relations information. Thus, in determining porarily stop
the confidentiality of certain employees, a key shift operations
question frequently considered is the employee's when situations
necessary access to confidential labor relations require.
information.  13

2. To effectively
It is the contention of respondent corporation oversee the
that Supervisor employees 3 and 4 and the quality control
exempt employees come within the meaning of function at the
the term "confidential employees" primarily processing lines
because they answered in the affirmative when in the storage of
asked "Do you handle confidential data or chicken and
documents?" in the Position Questionnaires other products.
submitted by the Union.   In the same
14

questionnaire, however, it was also stated that 3. To administer

the confidential information handled by efficient system
questioned employees relate to product of evaluation of
formulation, product standards and product products in the
specification which by no means relate to "labor outlets.
relations." 
15

4. To be directly
Granting arguendo that an employee has access responsible for
to confidential labor relations information but the recall,
such is merely incidental to his duties and holding and
knowledge thereof is not necessary in the rejection of
performance of such duties, said access does direct
not render the employee a confidential manufacturing
employee.   "If access to confidential labor
16

materials.
relations information is to be a factor in the
determination of an employee's confidential
status, such information must relate to the 5. To
employer's labor relations policies. Thus, an recommend and
employee of a labor union, or of a management initiate actions
association, must have access to confidential in the
labor relations information with respect to his maintenance of
employer, the union, or the association, to be sanitation and
regarded a confidential employee, and hygiene
knowledge of labor relations information throughout the
pertaining to the companies with which the union plant. 
20

deals, or which the association represents, will

not cause an employee to be excluded from the
bargaining unit representing employees of the
union or association."   "Access to information
17
which is regarded by the employer to be
It is evident that whatever confidential data the
questioned employees may handle will have to
relate to their functions. From the foregoing
functions, it can be gleaned that the confidential
information said employees have access to
concern the employer's internal business
operations. As held in Westinghouse Electric
Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Board,   "an employee may not be excluded
21
from appropriate bargaining unit merely because
he has access to confidential information
concerning employer's internal business
operations and which is not related to the field of
labor relations."
It must be borne in mind that Section 3 of Article
XIII of the 1987 Constitution mandates the State
to guarantee to "all" workers the right to self-
organization. Hence, confidential employees
who may be excluded from bargaining unit must
be strictly defined so as not to needlessly
deprive many employees of their right to bargain
collectively through representatives of their
choosing.  22
In the case at bar, supervisors 3 and above may
not be considered confidential employees
merely because they handle "confidential data"
as such must first be strictly classified as
pertaining to labor relations for them to fall under
said restrictions. The information they handle are
properly classifiable as technical and internal
business operations data which, to our mind,
has no relevance to negotiations and settlement
of grievances wherein the interests of a union
and the management are invariably adversarial.
Since the employees are not classifiable under
the confidential type, this Court rules that they
may appropriately form a bargaining unit for
purposes of collective bargaining. Furthermore,
even assuming that they are confidential
employees, jurisprudence has established that
there is no legal prohibition against confidential
employees who are not performing managerial
functions to form and join a union.  23
In this connection, the issue of whether the
employees of San Miguel Corporation Magnolia
Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San
Fernando, and Otis constitute a single
bargaining unit needs to be threshed out.
It is the contention of the petitioner union that the
creation of three (3) separate bargaining units,
one each for Cabuyao, Otis and San Fernando
as ruled by the respondent Undersecretary, is
contrary to the one-company, one-union policy.
It adds that Supervisors level 1 to 4 and exempt
employees of the three plants have a similarity
or a community of interests.
This Court finds the contention of the petitioner
meritorious.
An appropriate bargaining unit may be defined
as "a group of employees of a given employer,
comprised of all or less than all of the entire
body of employees, which the collective interest
of all the employees, consistent with equity to
the employer, indicate to be best suited to serve
the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties
under the collective bargaining provisions of the
law." 
24
A unit to be appropriate must effect a grouping
of employees who have substantial, mutual
interests in wages, hours, working conditions
and other subjects of collective bargaining.  25
It is readily seen that the employees in the
instant case have "community or mutuality of
interests," which is the standard in determining
the proper constituency of a collective
bargaining unit.   It is undisputed that they all
26
belong to the Magnolia Poultry Division of San
Miguel Corporation. This means that, although
they belong to three different plants, they
perform work of the same nature, receive the
same wages and compensation, and most
importantly, share a common stake in concerted
activities.
In light of these considerations, the Solicitor
General has opined that separate bargaining
units in the three different plants of the division
will fragmentize the employees of the said
division, thus greatly diminishing their bargaining
leverage. Any concerted activity held against the
private respondent for a labor grievance in one
bargaining unit will, in all probability, not create
much impact on the operations of the private
respondent. The two other plants still in
operation can well step up their production and
make up for the slack caused by the bargaining
unit engaged in the concerted activity. This
situation will clearly frustrate the provisions of
the Labor Code and the mandate of the
Constitution. 27
The fact that the three plants are located in three
different places, namely, in Cabuyao, Laguna, in
Otis, Pandacan, Metro Manila, and in San
Fernando, Pampanga is immaterial.
Geographical location can be completely
disregarded if the communal or mutual interests
of the employees are not sacrificed as
demonstrated in UP v. Calleja-Ferrer where all
non-academic rank and file employee of the
University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon
City, Padre Faura, Manila, Los Baños, Laguna
and the Visayas were allowed to participate in a
certification election. We rule that the distance
among the three plants is not productive of
insurmountable difficulties in the administration
of union affairs. Neither are there regional
differences that are likely to impede the
operations of a single bargaining representative.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Order of March 11,
1993 is hereby SET ASIDE and the Order of the
Med-Arbiter on December 19, 1990 is
REINSTATED under which a certification
election among the supervisors (level 1 to 4) and
exempt employees of the San Miguel
Corporation Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of
Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis as one
bargaining unit is ordered conducted.
SO ORDERED.
R. No. 92357 July 21, 1993
PHILIPPINE SCOUT VETERANS SECURITY
AND INVESTIGATION AGENCY (PSVSIA),
GVM SECURITY AND INVESTIGATION
AGENCY (GVM) and ABAQUIN SECURITY
AND DETECTIVE AGENCY, INC.
(ASDA), petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR RUBEN
D. TORRES AND PGA BROTHERHOOD
ASSOCIATION-UNION OF FILIPINO
WORKERS, respondents.
V.E. Del Rosario & Associates for petitioners.
German N. Pascua, Jr. for private respondent.
NOCON, J.:
The sole issue presented for resolution in this
petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary
injunction is whether or not a single petition for
certification election or for recognition as the
sole and exclusive bargaining agent can validly
or legally be filed by a labor union in three (3)
corporations each of which has a separate and
distinct legal personality instead of filing three (3)
separate petitions.
On April 6, 1989, private respondent labor union,
PGA Brotherhood Association - Union of Filipino
Workers (UFW), hereinafter referred to as "the
Union " filed a petition for Direct
Certification/Certification Election among the
rank and file employees of Philippine Scout
Veterans Security and Investigation Agency
(PSVSIA), GVM Security and Investigations
Agency, Inc. (GVM). and Abaquin Security and
Detective Agency, Inc. (ASDA). These three
agencies were collectively referred to by private
respondent Union as the "PGA Security
Agency," which is actually the first letters of the
corporate names of the agencies.
On April 11, 1989, summons was issued to the
management of PSVSIA, GVM, ASDA (PGA
Security Agency) at 82 E. Rodriquez Avenue,
Quezon City.
On April 11, 26, 1986, petitioners filed a single
comment alleging therein that the said three
security agencies have separate and distinct
corporate personalities while PGA Security
Agency is not a business or corporate entity and
does not possess any personality whatsoever;
the petition was unclear as to whether the rank-
and-file employees mentioned therein refer to
those of the three security agencies collectively
and if so, the labor union cannot seek a
certification election in three separate bargaining
units in one petition; the labor union included in
their organization "security supervisors," in
violation of R.A. 6715; and though R.A. 6715 is
already in effect, there were still no
implementing rules therefor.
On May 4, 1989, the security agencies filed a
Consolidated Motion to Dismiss on the grounds
that the 721 supporting signatures do not meet
the 20% minimum requirement for certification
election as the number of employees totals 2374
and that there are no implementing rules yet of
R.A. 6715.
On May 8, 1989, the Union filed an Omnibus
Reply to Comment and Motion to Dismiss
alleging that it is clear that it is seeking a
certification election in the three agencies; that
the apparent separate personalities of the three
agencies were used merely to circumvent the
prohibition in R.A. 5847, as amended by P.D. 11
and P.D. 100, that a security agency must not
have more than 1,000 guards in its employ; that
the three security agencies' administration,
management and operations are so intertwined
that they can be deemed to be a single entity;
and that the security supervisors cannot be
deemed part of management since they do not
meet the definition of "supervisory employees"
found in Articles 212(m), Labor Code, as
amended by Section 4, R.A. No. 6715.
On May 18, 1989, the security agencies filed a
Rejoinder claiming that there is no violation of
R.A. 5487, as amended by P.D. 11 and P.D. 100
since the three agencies were incorporated long
before the decrees' issuance; that mere
duplication of incorporators does not prove that
the three security agencies are actually one
single entity; and that security guard
supervisors, most especially detachment
commanders, fall within the definition of the term
"supervisors."
On July 6, 1989, Med-Arbiter Rasidali C.
Abdullah issued an Order in favor of the labor
union finding that PSVSIA, GVM and ASDA
should be deemed as a single entity and
bargaining unit for the purpose of union
organizing and the holding of a certification
election. The dispositive portion of the Order
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, let a certification
election be conducted among
the rank and file security guards
of PSVSIA, GVM and ASDA
within twenty (20) days from
receipt hereof with the usual
pre-election conference of the
parties. The list of eligible voters
shall be based on the security
agencies' payroll three (3)
months prior to the filing of this
petition with the following
choices:
a) PGA Brotherhood
Association-Union of Filipino
Workers (UFW); and
b) No union.
SO ORDERED. 1
On July 21, 1989, the security agencies
appealed the Med-Arbiter's Order to the
Secretary of Labor and Employment claiming
that said Order was issued with grave abuse of
discretion when it ruled that the three security
agencies could be considered as a single
bargaining entity for purposes of the holding of a
certification election.
On December 15, 1989, the Labor Secretary
Franklin M. Drilon denied the appeal for lack of
merit while at the same time affirming the Med-
Arbiter's Order of July 6, 1989. He also ordered
the immediate conduct of a certification election.
The dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the Appeal of
respondents Security agencies
is hereby denied for lack of
merit and the Order dated 6 July
affirmed.
Let therefore, the pertinent
records of this case be
immediately forwarded to the
Regional Office for he
immediate conduct of the
certification election.
SO ORDERED.  2
On January 5, 1990, the three security agencies
filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that
they were denied their rights to due process and
that jurisdiction was not acquired over them by
the labor authorities.
On January 26, 1990, the succeeding Labor
Secretary, Ruben D. Torres, likewise denied the
Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit and
reiterated the directive that a certification
election be conducted without further delay.
On March 14, 1990, the instant petition was filed
by the three security agencies, raising the
following grounds:
I
 SERIOUS ERRORS IN THE
FINDINGS OF FACTS.
II
GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION ON THE PART
OF THE SECRETARY OF
LABOR.  3
Petitioners insist that there are three (3)
corporations in this petition, each of which has a
separate and distinct corporate personality of its
own with separate registrations with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
and different Articles of Incorporation and By-
Laws; with separate sets of corporate officers
and directors; and no common business address
except for GVM and ASDA which are located at
1957 España corner Craig Streets, Sampaloc,
Manila.
Petitioners claim that the facts and
circumstances of the case of La Campana
Coffee Factory, Inc. v. Kaisahan Ng Mga
Manggagawa sa La Campana   which public
4
respondent claims to be on all fours with the
instant case, are very distinct from the facts and
circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. As to
form of business organization, in the  La
Campana case, only one of two (2) businesses
was a corporation i.e., the La Campana Coffee
Factory, Inc. and the other, the La Campana
Gaugau Packing, is a "non-entity," being merely
a business name. In the case at bar, all three (3)
agencies are incorporated. Moreover, the issue
involved in the instant case is one of
representation while in the  La Campana case,
the issue involved is the validity of a demand for
wage increases and other labor standards
benefits.
Petitioners likewise contend that it was error to
hold that the three companies should be treated
as one in a single bargaining unit in one petition
for certification elections resulting in a violation
of the right to due process of each corporation
as no notice of hearing and other legal
processes were served on each of said
corporations. Consequently, no jurisdiction was
acquired on them by the Department of Labor
and Employment.
Petitioners' arguments deserve scant
consideration. The facts and circumstances
extant in the record indicate that the Med-Arbiter
and Secretaries Drilon and Torres were not
mistaken in holding that the three security
companies are in reality a single business entity
operating as a single company called the "PGA
Security Group" or "PGA Security Services
Group." Factual findings of labor officials are
conclusive and binding on the Court when
supported by substantial evidence. 5
The public repondent noted the following
circumstances in the La Campana case similar
to the case at bar, as indicative of the fact that
the La Campana Coffee Factory and La
Campana Gaugau Packing were in reality only
one business with two trade names: (1) the two
factories occupied the same address, wherein
they had their principal place of business; (2)
their signboards, advertisements, packages of
starch, delivery truck and delivery forms all use
one appellation, "La Campana Starch and
Coffee Factory"; (3) the workers in either
company received their pay from a single
cashier, and (4) the workers in one company
could easily transfer to the other company, and
vice-versa. This Court held therein that the veil
of corporate fiction of the coffee factory may be
pierced to thwart the attempt to consider it part
from the other business owned by the same
family. Thus, the fact that one of the businesses
is not incorporated was not the decisive factor
that led the Court to consider the two factories
as one. Moreover, we do not find any materiality
in the fact that the La Campana case was
instituted to demand wage increases and other
labor standards benefits while this case was filed
by the labor union to seek recognition as the
sole bargaining agent in the establishment. If
businesses operating under one management
are treated as one for bargaining purposes,
there is not much difference in treating such
businesses also as one for the preliminary
purpose of labor organizing.
Indeed, the three agencies in the case at bar
failed to rebut the fact that they are managed
through the Utilities Management Corporation
with all of their employees drawing their salaries
and wages from said entity; that the agencies
have common and interlocking incorporators and
officers; and that the PSVSIA, GVM and ASDA
employees have a single Mutual Benefit System
and followed a single system of compulsory
retirement.
No explanation was also given by petitioners
why the security guards of one agency could
easily transfer from one agency to another and
then back again by simply filling-up a
common pro forma slip called "Request for
Transfer". Records also shows that the PSVSIA,
GVM and ASDA always hold joint yearly
ceremonies such as the "PGA Annual Awards
Ceremony". In emergencies, all PSVSIA
Detachment Commanders were instructed in a
memorandum dated November 10, 1988 to get
in touch with the officers not only of PSVSIA but
also of GVM and ASDA. All of these goes to
show that the security agencies concerned do
not exist and operate separately and distinctly
from each other with different corporate
directions and goals. On the contrary, all the
cross-linking of the three agencies' command,
control and communication systems indicate
their unitary corporate personality. Accordingly,
the veil of corporate fiction of the three agencies
should be lifted for the purpose of allowing the
employees of the three agencies to form a single
labor union. As a single bargaining unit, the
employees therein need not file three separate
petitions for certification election. All of these
could be covered in a single petition.
Petitioners' claim of alleged defect in the petition
for certification election which although
addressed to the three security agencies merely
alleged that there are only 1,000 employees
when the total number of employees in said
security agencies is about 2,374 (PSVSIA -
1252; GVM - 807; and ASDA - 315) thereby
failing to comply with the legal requirement that
at least twenty percent (20%) of the employees
in the bargaining unit must support the petition,
betrays lack of knowledge of the amendments
introduced by R.A 6715 which became effective
on March 21, 1989, prior to the filing of the
petition for certification election on April 6, 1989.
Under the amendments, there is no need for the
labor union to prove that at least 20% of the
security guards in the three agencies supported
the petition. When a duly organized union files a
petition for certification election, the Med-Arbiter
has the duty to automatically conduct an
election. He has no discretion on the matter.
This is clearly the mandate of Article 257 of the
Labor Code, as amended by Section 24 of R.A.
6715, which now reads:
Art. 257. Petitions in
unorganized establishments. —
In any establishment where
there is no certified bargaining
agent, a certification election
shall automatically be
conducted by the Med-Arbiter
upon the filing of a petition by a
legitimate labor organization.
The designation of the three agencies
collectively as "PGA Security Agency" and the
service of summons to the management thereof
at 82 E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City did not
render the petition defective. Labor Secretary
Franklin Drilon correctly noted the fact that the
affidavits executed separately and under oath by
the three managers of the three security
agencies indicated their office address to be at
PSVSIA Center II, E. Rodriguez Sr. Blvd.,
Quezon City. Besides, even if there was
improper service of summons by the Med-
Arbiter, the three (3) security agencies
voluntarily submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the labor authorities. The
summons were clearly sent to and received by
their lawyer who filed motions and pleadings on
behalf of the three security agencies and who
always appeared as their legal counsel. It
puzzles this Court why petitioners, who claim to
be separate entities, continue to be represented
by one counsel even in this instant petition.
Finally, except where the employer has to file a
petition for certification election pursuant to
Article 258 of the Labor Code because of a
request to bargain collectively, it has nothing to
do with a certification election which is the sole
concern of the workers. Its role in a certification
election has aptly been described in Trade
Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services
(TUPAS) v. Trajano,  as that of a mere by-
6
stander. It has no legal standing in a certification
election as it cannot oppose the petition or
appeal the Med-Arbiter's orders related thereto.
An employer that involves itself in a certification
election lends suspicion to the fact that it wants
to create a company union.
This Court's disapprobation of management
interference in certification elections is even
more forceful in Consolidated Farms, Inc. v.
Noriel,  where we held:
7
On a matter that should be the
exclusive concern of labor, the
choice of a collective bargaining
 representative, the employer is
definitely an intruder. His
participation, to say the least,
deserves no encouragement.
This Court should be the last
agency to lend support to such
an attempt at interference with a
purely internal affair of labor.
Indeed, the three security agencies should not
even be adverse parties in the certification
election itself. We note with disapproval the title
given to the petition for certification election of
the Union by the Med-Arbiter and the Secretary
of Labor naming the three security agencies as
respondents. Such is clearly an error. While
employers may rightfully be notified or informed
of petitions of such nature, they should not,
however, be considered parties thereto with
concomitant right to oppose it. Sound policy
dictates that they should maintain a strictly
hands-off policy.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the
questioned decision of the Secretary of Labor,
the instant petition for certiorari is hereby
DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS;
INDUSTRIAL PEACE ACT; RIGHT OF
SUPERVISORS TO BARGAIN
COLLECTIVELY; INSTANT CASE. — Where
petitioner failed to appeal in due course
respondent court’s en banc resolution
upholding the right of the supervisors and
confidential employees to organize
respondent association and to compel
petitioner to negotiate and bargain
collectively with it, petitioner’s contention
that supervisors form part of management
and are not considered as employees
entitled to bargain collectively is
untenable.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CLEAR INTERPRETATION
OF STATUTE INVOLVED. — Petitioner’s
argument that the express provisions of
section 3 of our Industrial Peace Act must
give way to the intendment of the Taft-
Hartley Act which exempts employers
from the legal obligation to recognize and
negotiate with supervisors is tenuous and
groundless. The language of our own
statute is plain and unambiguous and
admits of no other interpretation.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; DUAL STATUS OF
SUPERVISOR. — Petitioner’s argument
that since supervisors form part of
management, to allow them to bargain
collectively would be tantamount to
management bargaining with itself may be
a well-turned phrase but ignores the dual
status of a supervisor as a representative
of management and as an employee. If
indeed the supervisor is absolutely
undistinguishable from management, then
he would be beyond removal or dismissal,
for as respondent association counters
"how can management remove or dismiss
itself?"
4. ID.; ID.; COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
UNIT; IDENTITY OF INTEREST BETWEEN
SUPERVISORS AND CONFIDENTIAL
EMPLOYEES. — Where the confidential
employees are very few in number and
are by practice and tradition identified
with the supervisors in their role as
representatives of management vis-a-vis
the rank and file employees, such identity
of interest allows their inclusion in the
bargaining unit of supervisors-managers
for purposes of collective bargaining in
turn as employees in relation to the
company as their employer.
5. ID.; COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS; WIDE DISCRETION IN
ADOPTING PROCEDURE TO DETERMINE
APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT. — The
industrial court enjoys a wide discretion in
determining the procedure necessary to
insure the fair and free choice of
bargaining representations by employees,
and that its action in deciding upon an
appropriate unit for collective bargaining
purposes is discretionary and its judgment
in this respect is entitled to almost
complete finality, unless its action is
arbitrary or capricious.
DECISION
TEEHANKEE, J.:
The present appeal questions the right of
supervisors and confidential employees to
organized the respondent labor
association and to bargain collectively with
their employer, petitioner corporation
herein, as upheld by respondent court of
industrial relations in its appealed order
and resolution.
Respondent association is a labor
organization duly registered with the
Department of Labor. It is composed
exclusively of the supervisory and
confidential employees of petitioner
corporation. There exists another entirely
distinct labor association composed of the
corporation’s rank-and-file employees, the
Filoil Employees & Workers Association
(FEWA) with which petitioner executed a
collective bargaining agreement. This
collective bargaining agreement expressly
excluded from its coverage petitioner’s
supervisory and confidential employees,
who in turn organized their own labor
association, respondent herein.
Respondent association filed on February
18, 1965 with the industrial court its
petition for certification as the sole and
exclusive collective bargaining agent of all
of petitioner’s supervisory and confidential
employees working at its refinery in
Rosario, Cavite.
Petitioner corporation filed a motion to
dismiss the petition on the grounds of lack
of cause of action and of respondent
court’s lack of jurisdiction over the
subject-matter, under its claim that
supervisors are not employees within the
meaning of Republic Act 875, the
Industrial Peace Act, and that since they
are part of management, they do not have
the right to bargain collectively although
they may organize an organization of their
own.
Respondent court in its order of May 26,
1965 denied the dismissal motion. It ruled
that under the express provisions of
section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act,"
(I)ndividuals employed as supervisors
shall not be eligible for membership in a
labor organization of employees under
their supervision but may form separate
organizations of their own." 1
It rejected petitioners claim against
respondent association’s right to bargain
collectively, holding that such right was
expressly granted under section 24 of the
Industrial Peace Act, and asserting that "if
Congress deemed it wise for supervisors
not to have the right to strike, then it
should have been so expressly stated as
in the case of government employees.
Section 11 of the Industrial Peace Act
gives to government employees the right
to belong to any labor organization
provided no obligation to strike or join a
strike is imposed by such labor
organization. The denial to government
employees of the right to strike is
significant in the controversy before this
Court because it manifests to all that
Congress in enacting Republic Act No. 875
was aware of the implications that when
supervisors were given the right to
organize themselves into a labor
organization, they have correlative right to
declare a strike. In the case of
supervisors, they were enfranchised by
Congress to organize themselves into a
labor organization and were not denied
the right to strike. This means that the
right to strike was not denied them since
no special reason obtains among the
supervisors as it does obtain among
government employees." 2
The industrial court likewise dismissed
petitioner’s objection against the
composition of respondent association in
that it included as members technical men
and confidential employees in this wise:"
(A)t this point, it may be stressed that
supervisors as a general rule should form
an association of their own and should
exclude all other types of personnel unless
a special consideration exists, like for
example, that they are so few in number
and that there are other technical men or
confidential men equally few in number.
In the latter case, the supervisors,
technical men and confidential employees
may be constituted into one unit." 3
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of
said order of May 26, 1965 was denied by
respondent court en banc per its
resolution dated September 7, 1965 which
affirmed the said order. No appeal having
been taken from the resolution, the
petition was accordingly set for hearing
and the parties submitted their stipulation
of facts, stipulating inter alia that
respondent association "has forty-seven
(47) members among the supervisory,
technical men and confidential employees
of the company" and that "all the forty
seven (47) members of the (respondent
association) are being checked-off by the
company for union dues pursuant to the
individual check-off authorization
submitted to the company." cralaw virtua1aw library
The parties could not agree, however, on
the composition of the appropriate
bargaining unit with petitioner corporation
proposing that the 47 members of
respondent association should be broken
up into five (5) separate collective
bargaining units, viz, the supervisors
should form a distinct unit separate from
the rest of the personnel who in turn
would be divided into separate and
independent units or confidential
employees, professional personnel,
"fringe" employees consisting of five
firemen, and twelve (12) office and
clerical employees.
Evidence was received by respondent
court and it was satisfied that executive
personnel handling personnel matters for
the employer were duly excluded from
respondent association. Thus, per
respondent court’s order of July 23, 1966,
it is noted that "not one of the employees
listed under Groups I and II including
‘(their supervisor) Leonardo R. Santos
under Group III, is a member of
(respondent association)", since" (I)t
appears that the personnel listed under
Groups I and Group II . . . are in the
category of executives who have
supervision over the supervisors who are
members of (respondent association) and
that Marcelo Bernardo handles personnel
matters of the employer . . . All of them
should, therefore, be excluded from the
appropriate bargaining unit." 4
Respondent court in its said order of July
23, 1966 consequently cast aside
petitioner’s sedulous objections against
the inclusion of the confidential employees
in the supervisors’ respondent association,
thus:" (F)rom the memorandum and
manifestation of the company, a
persistent assault against the inclusion of
the confidential employees with
supervisors under one bargaining unit
would seem to be evident. Although this
inclusion has already been raised in the
motion to dismiss filed by the company
and which has already been resolved by
the Court en banc, with no appeal to the
Supreme Court having been taken by the
company, we shall try once more to show
why such inclusion. It is admitted by the
company that confidential employees are
outside the coverage of the existing
collective bargaining agreement between
the respondent company and the rank and
file union (FEWA) by specific agreement.
Since the confidential employees are very
few and are, by practice and tradition,
identified with management, the NLRB,
because of such ‘identity of interest’
(Wilson & Co., 68 NLRB 84), has allowed
their inclusion in the bargaining unit of
supervisors who are likewise identified
with management. This Court, a
counterpart of the NLRB, for the same
reason, should also allow the inclusion of
the confidential employees in the
bargaining unit of supervisors, except of
course Marcelo Bernardo who, pursuant to
the Order of May 26, 1965, as affirmed by
the Court en banc, should be excluded
because he handles personnel matters for
the employer." 5
Respondent court pointed out that "in fact,
out of the forty-three (43), excluding the
twelve (12) executive personnel under
Groups I and II, the company proposes
five (5) bargaining units or eight 1(8)
employees per unit. This Court will be
creating, fragmentary units which would
not serve the interest of industrial peace,
much less in an industry indispensable to
the national interest like the one at bar, as
is now obtaining in the Philippine National
Railways also an industry indispensable to
the national interest (Union de
Maquinistas, Fogoneros y Motormen v.
Philippine National Railways, Case No. 67-
IPA), with thirteen (13) unions, if it breaks
up the petitioner union into five (5)
bargaining units. The Court is likewise
aware of the ineffectiveness of a small
union with a scanty members as
bargaining unit. The breaking up of
bargaining agents into tiny units will
greatly impair their organizational value.
It has always been the policy of the United
States National Labor Relations Board
that, in deciding upon whether to include
or exclude a group of employees from a
bargaining unit, the Board has always
allowed itself to be guided by the
determination as to whether its action ‘will
insure to the employees of the Company
the full benefit of their right to self-
organization and to collective bargaining
and otherwise effectuate the policies of
the Act’ (20 NLRB 705). We see no reason
why this Tribunal whose basic functions
are the same as that of the NLRB, should
do less or otherwise depart from this
sound policy." 6
Since respondent association "clearly
represents the majority of the employees
in the appropriate bargaining unit,"
respondent court therefore certified it as
the sole and exclusive bargaining agent
for all the employees in the unit.
Respondent court per its resolution en
banc dated September 15, 1966 dismissed
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration,
holding that "as to the question of the
right of supervisors and confidential
employees to compel their employer to
bargain collectively, this has already been
passed upon by the Trial Court in its Order
dated May 26, 1965 which Order was
affirmed by the Court en banc in a
resolution dated September 7, 1965. The
Company did not appeal this resolution to
the Supreme Court. Hence, this matter, as
far as we are concerned, has already been
resolved. We find it, therefore,
unnecessary to pass upon the same
again," and that it found no sufficient
justification to alter or modify the trial
court’s order upholding the
appropriateness of the bargaining unit. On
this latter point, Judge Salvador, while
concurring with the supervisors’ right of
self-organization and collective bargaining,
cast a dissenting vote on the ground that
the Industrial Peace Act did not
contemplate nor provide for supervisors
and confidential employees to be under
one bargaining unit and as to "executive
personnel" who have supervision over the
supervisors being excluded from any
representation, urged that "another
supervisors’ unit must be created for
these executive personnel." The second
point is not in contention at bar since the
"executive personnel" concerned have not
appealed their exclusion.
In this appeal, petitioner pursues anew its
contention that supervisors form part of
management and are not considered as
employees entitled to bargain collectively,
arguing that "as supervisors form part and
parcel of management, it is absurd for
management to bargain collectively with
itself." Petitioner further argues that under
the American concept, supervisors are not
considered employees and that since our
Congress copied verbatim the Taft-Hartley
Acts definition of supervisor, 7 its act of
"incorporating the definition in the Taft-
Hartley Act" must be deemed an
expression of its intention "to follow the
intendment of said Act." cralaw virtua1aw library

Petitioner’s contentions are untenable,
prescinding from the fact of its failure to
appeal in due course respondent court’s
en banc resolution of September 7, 1965
upholding the right of the supervisors and
confidential employees to organize
respondent association and to compel
petitioner to negotiate and bargain
collectively with it. Petitioner’s argument
that since supervisors form part of
management, to allow them to bargain
collectively would be tantamount to
management bargaining with itself may be
a well-turned phrase but ignores the dual
status of a supervisor as a representative
of management and as an employee.
If indeed the supervisor is absolutely
undistinguishable from management, then
he would be beyond removal or dismissal,
for as respondent association counters,
"how car management remove or dismiss
itself?"
As stated for the Court by the now Chief
Justice in AG & P Co. of Manila, Inc. v.
C.I.R., 8 section 3 of the Industrial Peace
Act "explicitly provides that ‘employees’ —
and this term includes supervisors — ‘shall
have the right to self-organization, and to
form, join or assist labor organizations of
their own choosing for the purpose of
collective bargaining through
representations of their own choosing and
to engage in concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining and other
mutual aid or protection’ and that
‘individuals employed as supervisors . . .
may form separate organizations of their
own’. Indeed, it is well settled that ‘in
relation to his employer,’ a foreman or
supervisor ‘is an employee within the
meaning of the Act’ . . . For this reason,
supervisors are entitled to engage in union
activities and any discrimination against
them by reason thereof constitutes an
unfair labor practice."
cralaw virtua1aw library
Petitioner’s arguments go in reality to the
wisdom and policy of the Industrial Peace
Act which expressly grants supervisors the
right to organize and bargain collectively,
which are beyond the Court’s power of
review. Thus, the argument that "it is
axiomatic in the law of self-interest that
an employer must give a ‘better deal’ to
those who act in his interest and in whom
he has trust and confidence. These are the
supervisors and confidential employees" 9
and that "In the United States there was a
move to have a part of the supervisory
group to be aligned with labor But the
enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act put an
end to this move." 10
So with petitioner’s thesis that" (T)o then
give supervisors the right to compel
employers to bargain would in effect align
labor and management together against
stockholders and bondholders (capital)
and inexorably tilt the balance of power in
favor of these hitherto conflicting forces.
This is contrary to the nature and
philosophy of free enterprise." 11 This
further serves to point up the validity and
rationale of the Industrial Peace Act’s
provision, since the supervisors and
confidential employees, even though they
may exercise the prerogatives of
management as regards the rank and file
employees are indeed employees in
relation to their employer, the company
which is owned by the "stockholders and
bondholders (capital)" in petitioner’s own
words, and should therefore be entitled
under the law to bargain collectively with
the top management with respect to their
terms and conditions of employment.
Petitioner’s argument that the express
provisions of section 3 of our Industrial
Peace Act must give way to the
intendment of the Taft-Hartley Act which
exempts employers from the legal
obligation to recognize and negotiate with
supervisors is tenuous and groundless.
The language of our own statute is plain
and unambiguous and admits of no other
interpretation.
The other principal ground of petitioner’s
appeal questioning the confidential
employees’ inclusion in the supervisors’
bargaining unit is equally untenable.
Respondent court correctly held that since
the confidential employees are very few in
number and are by practice and tradition
identified with the supervisors in their role
as representatives of management vis-a-
vis the rank and file employees, such
identity of interest has allowed their
inclusion in the bargaining unit of
supervisors-managers for purposes of
collective bargaining in turn as employees
in relation to the company as their
employer.
No arbitrariness or grave abuse of
discretion can be attributed against
respondent court’s allowing the inclusion
of the confidential employees in the
supervisors’ association for as admitted by
petitioner itself, supra, the supervisors
and confidential employees enjoy its trust
and confidence This identity of interest
logically calls for their inclusion in the
same bargaining unit and at the same
time fulfills the law’s objective of insuring
to them the full benefit of their right to
self-organization and to collective
bargaining, which could hardly be
accomplished if the respondent
association’s membership were to be
broken up into five separate ineffective
tiny units, as urged by petitioner.
Respondent court’s action not being
vulnerable to challenge as being arbitrary
or capricious is therefore sustained, in line
with the Court’s consistent rulings that the
industrial court "enjoys a wide discretion
in determining the procedure necessary to
insure the fair and free choice of
bargaining representations by employees,"
and that its action "in deciding upon an
appropriate unit for collective bargaining
purposes is discretionary . . . and (that)
its judgment in this respect is entitled to
almost complete finality, unless its action
is arbitrary or capricious" 12 and that
absent any grave abuse of discretion as to
justify the Court’s intervention, "this Court
has repeatedly upheld the exercise of the
Court of Industrial Relations in matters
concerning the representation of employee
groups." 13
ACCORDINGLY, the orders and resolution
appealed from are hereby affirmed and
the petition at bar is dismissed. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L.,
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Barredo,
Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ.,
concur.
G.R. No. 143616       May 9, 2001
NEGROS ORIENTAL ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE 1 (NORECO1), represented
by ATTY. SUNNY R.A. MADAMBA, as General
Manager, petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT (DOLE), and
PACIWU-NACUSIP, NORECO 1 Chapter of
Bindoy, Negros Oriental, respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Petitioner assails the Decision of the Court of
Appeals1 dated August 20, 1999 dismissing its
petition for certiorari in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 50295
and the order denying its Motion for
Reconsideration therefrom.
The antecedents are recited by the Court of
Appeals as follows:
"It appears that on December 4, 1997,
some employees of the petitioner
organized themselves into a local
chapter of the Philippine Agricultural
Commercial and Industrial Workers'
Union - Trade Union Congress of the
Philippines (PACIWU-TUCP). The
private respondent-union submitted its
charter certificate and supporting
documents on the same date. 1âwphi1.nêt
On December 10, 1997, PACIWU-TUCP
filed a petition for certification election
on behalf of the NORECO 1 chapter,
seeking to represent the seventy-seven
(77) rank-and-file employees of
NORECO 1. PACIWU-TUCP alleged in
 its petition that it had created a local
chapter in NORECO 1 which had been
duly reported to the DOLE Regional
Office (Region VII) on December 4,
1997. It was further averred therein that
NORECO 1 is an unorganized
establishment, and that there is no other
labor organization presently existing at
the said employer establishment.
The Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition
in an order dated December 23, 1997,
which stated that:
'It appears in the records of this
Office that the petitioner has just
applied for registration. The
corresponding certificate has
not yet been issued.
Accordingly, it has not yet
acquired the status of a
legitimate labor organization.
The instant petition, not having
been filed by legitimate labor
organization, the same is
hereby DENIED.
WHEREFORE, this case is
DISMISSED.
1âwphi1.nêt
Motion for Reconsideration of the above
decision was denied. Hence this petition for
review on certiorari which submits the following
arguments in support thereof:
"I. THE COURT OF APPEALS
HAS DEPARTED FROM THE
ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE THAT
THE PERIOD TO APPEAL
CANNOT BE EXTENDED AND
THUS THE RESPONDENT
SECRETARY OF LABOR HAS
NO JURISDICTION TO
REVERSE THE DECISION OF
THE MED-ARBITER,
BECAUSE THE APPEAL HAS
NOT BEEN PERFECTED ON
TIME;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS
DECIDED THIS CASE
CONTRARY TO THE
DECISION OF THE SUPREME
COURT IN THE CASE OF
TOYOTA MOTOR
PHILIPPINES VS. TOYOTA
MOTOER PHILIPPINES
CORPORATION UNION AND
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT, G.R. NO.
121084, FEBRUARY 19, 1997,

BY COMPLETELY IGNORING
SO ORDERED.' THE TOYOTA CASE WHICH IS
ON FOUR SQUARE WITH
PACIWU-TUCP filed a Motion for THIS CASE, WHEN THE
Reconsideration of the said order, which COURT OF APPEALS
was treated as an appeal by the public SUSTAINED THE ORDER FOR
respondent. On July 31, 1998, the public CERTIFICATION ELECTIONS
respondent rendered the assailed IN SPITE OF THE EXISTENCE
judgment as previously quoted.2 The OF SUPERVISORY
petitioner filed a Motion for EMPLOYEES IN THE RANK
Reconsideration on August 24, 1998, AND FILE UNION OF THE
but the same was denied in a Resolution RESPONDENT PACIWU-
dated September 21, 1998."3 NACUSIP NORECO 1
CHAPTER;
The appellate court ruled that the Secretary of
Labor properly treated PACIWU-TUCP's Motion III. THE COURT OF APPEALS
for Reconsideration as an appeal, and held that ERRED IN ALLOWING
the said chapter is deemed to have acquired CERTIFICATION ELECTIONS
legal personality as of December 4, 1997 upon WHEN ALL THE MEMBERS OF
submission of the documents required under the THE UNION ARE MEMBERS
Omnibus Rules for the creation of a local OF THE COOPERATIVE."4
chapter. The said court also dismissed
petitioner's contention assailing the composition The first contention was correctly resolved by
of the private respondent union. the Court of Appeals. Petitioner reiterates that
the Motion for Reconsideration from the
Decision of the Med-Arbiter was filed by
PACIWU-NACUSIP out of time, i.e. beyond the
ten (10) days allowed for filing such motion for
reconsideration. The allegation of late filing is
bare, it does not even specify the material dates,
nor furnish substantiation of the said allegation.
The Court of Appeals noted that the original
record does not disclose the actual date of
receipt by the private respondent of the order of
the Med-Arbiter dismissing the petition for
certification election, and hence it "cannot
conclude that the Med-Arbiter's Decision had
already become final and executory pursuant to
Section 14, Rule XI Book V of the Omnibus
Implementing Rules". Neither the present
Petition or the Reply to Comment of Solicitor
General for public respondent attempts to supply
the omission and we are accordingly constrained
to dismiss this assigned error concerning the
timeliness of respondent's appeal to the
Secretary of Labor.
In its Petition for Certiorari filed in the Court of
Appeals dated November 7, 1998, the allegation
that the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
respondent PACIWU-NACUSIP was "filed out of
time" was similarly unsubstantiated. Moreover,
the issue was raised below for the first time in
the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
NORECO I (Motion dated August 22, 1998), and
the Secretary of labor rejected the petitioner's
contention for not having been seasonably filed;
the DOLE Resolution stated categorically that:
"there being no question as to the
timeliness of the filing of appellant's
Motion for Reconsideration which was
elevated to us by the Regional Office,
the same can be treated as an appeal
xxx".5
We find no cogent justification to reverse the
finding on the basis of the records before us.
The second argument posited by petitioner is
also without merit. Petitioner invokes Article 245
of the Labor Code and the ruling in Toyota Motor
Philippines Corp. vs. Toyota Motor Philippines
Corporation Labor Union6 which declare the
ineligibility of managerial or supervisory
employees to join any labor organization
consisting of rank and file employees for the
reason that the concerns which involve either
group "are normally disparate and
contradictory". Petitioner claims that it
challenged the composition of the union at the
earliest possible time after the decision of the
Med-Arbiter was set aside by the DOLE; and
that the list of the names of supervisory or
confidential employees was submitted with the
petition for certiorari filed in the Court of
Appeals, which did not consider the same.
Petitioner further argues that the failure of the
Secretary of Labor and the Court of Appeals to
resolve this question constituted a denial of its
right to due process.
The contentions are unmeritorious.
The issue was raised for the first time in
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision of the Secretary of Labor dated July 13,
1998 which set aside the Order of the Med-
Arbiter dated December 23, 1997 dismissing the
PACIWU-TUCP's petition for certification
election.7 In its Resolution dated September 21,
1998, denying the Motion for Reconsideration,
the Secretary of Labor categorically stated:
"On the fourth ground, in the cited case
of Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation
v. Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation
Labor Union, 268 SCRA 573, the
employer, since the beginning opposed
the petition indicating the specific names
of the supervisory employees and their
respective job descriptions. In the
instant case, movant not only belatedly
raised the issue but miserably failed to
support the same. Hence, between the
belated and bare allegation of movant
that "there are supervisory and
confidential employees in the union" vis-
à-vis the open and repeated declaration
under oath of the union members in the
minutes of their organizational meeting
and the ratification of their Constitution
and By-Laws that they are rank and file
employees, we are inclined to give more
credence to the latter. Again,
in Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao
City, Inc. vs. Ferrer-Calleja, supra, the
Supreme Court held:
'the Court upholds the findings
of said public respondent that
no persuasive evidence has
been presented to show that
two of the signatories in the
 petition for certification election
are managerial employees who
under the law are disqualified
from pursuing union activities.'
In the instant case, there is no
persuasive evidence to show that there
are indeed supervisory and confidential
employees in appellant union who under
the law are disqualified to join the
same."8
The above finding was correctly upheld by the
Court of Appeals, and we find no cogent basis to
reverse the same. Factual issues are not a
proper subject for certiorari which is limited to
the issue of jurisdiction and grave abuse of
discretion.1âwphi1.nêt
Indeed, the Court of Appeals cannot be
expected to go over the list of alleged
supervisory employees attached to the petition
before it and to pass judgment in the first
instance on the nature of the functions of each
employee on the basis of the job description
pertaining to him. As appropriately observed by
the said court, the determination of such factual
issues is vested in the appropriate Regional
Office of the Department of Labor and
Employment and pursuant to the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, the Court should refrain from
resolving such controversies. The doctrine of
primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to
arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a
controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially
lodged with an administrative body of special
competence.9
The petitioner questions the remedy suggested
by the Court of Appeals i.e., to file a petition for
cancellation of registration before the
appropriate Regional Office arguing that the
membership of supervisory employees in the
rank-and-file is not one of the grounds for
cancellation of registration under the Omnibus
Rules. Whether the inclusion of the prohibited
mix of rank-and-file and supervisory employees
in the roster of officers and members of the
union can be cured by cancellation of
registration under Article 238 et seq. of the
Labor Code vis-à-vis Rule VIII of the Omnibus
Rules, or by simple inclusion-exclusion
proceedings in the pre-election conference,10 the
fact remains that the determination of whether
there are indeed supervisory employees in the
roster of members of the rank-and-file union has
never been raised nor resolved by the
appropriate fact finding body, and the petition for
certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals cannot
cure the procedural lapse. It bears notice that
unlike in Toyota Motor Philippines Corp. vs.
Toyota Motor Philippines Corp. Labor
Union11 where the objection that "the union was
composed of both rank-and-file and supervisory
employees in violation of law" was promptly
raised in the position paper to oppose the
petition for certification election, and this
objection was resolved by the Med-Arbiter, this
issue was belatedly raised in the case at bar and
was sought to be ventilated only before the
Court of Appeals in the petition for certiorari.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that factual
matters are not proper subjects for certiorari. 12
The above observations are in point with respect
to the last assigned error challenging the
inclusion of members of the cooperative in the
union. The argument that NORECO I is a
cooperative and most if not all of the members of
the petitioning union are members of the
cooperative was raised only in the Motion for
Reconsideration from the Decision of the
Secretary of Labor dated July 31, 1998. The
Secretary of Labor ruled that the argument
should be rejected as it was not seasonably
filed. Nevertheless the DOLE resolved the
question in this wise:
"On the third ground, while movant
correctly cited Cooperative Bank of
Davao City, Inc. vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 165
SCRA 725, that "an employee of a
cooperative who is a member and co-
owner thereof cannot invoke the right to
collective bargaining…" it failed to
mention the proviso provided by the
Supreme Court in the same decision:
'However, in so far as it involves
cooperatives with employees
who are not members or co-
owners thereof, certainly such
employees are entitled to
exercise the rights of all workers
to organization, collective
bargaining, negotiations and
others as are enshrined in the
constitution and existing laws of
the country.
 The questioned ruling therefore
of public respondent Pura
Ferrer-Calleja must be upheld in
so far as it refers to the
employees of petitioner who are
not members or co-owners of
petitioner.'
Not only did movant fail to show any
proof that anyone of the union members
are members or co-owners of the
cooperative. It also declared that not all
members of the petitioning union are
members of the cooperative".13
The ruling was upheld by the appellate court
thus:
"The petitioner is indeed correct in
stating that employees of a cooperative
who are members-consumers or
members-owners, are not qualified to
form, join or assist labor organizations
for purposes of collective bargaining,
because of the principle that an owner
cannot bargain with himself. However,
the petitioner failed to mention that the
Supreme Court has also declared that in
so far as it involves cooperatives with
employees who are not members or co-
owners thereof, certainly such
employees are entitled to exercise the
rights of all workers to organization,
collective bargaining, negotiations and
others as are enshrined in the
Constitution and existing laws of the
country.
The public respondent found that
petitioner failed to show any proof that
any member of the private respondent
was also a member or co-owner of the
petitioner-cooperative. Hence the
members of the private respondent
could validly form a labor organization."14
In the instant petition, NORECO 1 fails to
controvert the statement of the Court of Appeals
that the petitioner "failed to show any proof that
any member of the private respondent was also
a member or co-owner of the petitioner
cooperative." More important, the factual issue is
not for the Court of Appeals to resolve in a
petition for certiorari. Finally, the instant petition
ambiguously states that "NORECO1 is an
electric cooperative and all the employees of the
subject union are members of the cooperative",
but submitted "a certified list of employees who
are members-co-owners of the petitioner electric
cooperative." Impliedly, there are rank-and-file
employees of the petitioner who are not
themselves members-co-owners, or who are the
ones qualified to form or join a labor
organization. Again, the core issue raises a
question of fact that the appellate court correctly
declined to resolve in the first instance.
1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Vitug, Panganiban, and Sandoval-
Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 74262 October 29, 1987
GENERAL RUBBER and FOOTWEAR
CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNION OF
MONTHLY PAID EMPLOYEES-
NATU, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the
business of manufacturing rubber sandals and
oilier rubber products. In 1985, the Samahang
Manggagawa sa General Rubber Corporation —
ANGLO was formed by the daily paid — rank
and file employees as their union for collective
bargaining, after the expiration on October 15,
1985 of the collective bargaining agreement
previously executed by petitioner with General
Rubber Workers Union (Independent) on
October 15, 1982. Be it noted however that on
July 17, 1985, the monthly — paid employees of
the petitioner-corporation, after forming their own
collective bargaining unit the National
Association of Trade Unions of Monthly Paid
Employees-NATU, filed a petition for direct
certification with tile Bureau of Labor Relations
which petition was opposed by herein petitioner.
On September 2, 1985, the Med-Arbiter issued
an Order for the holding of a certification election
after finding that a certification election is in
order in this case and observing that it is the
fairest remedy to determine whether employees
of petitioner desire to have a union or not. On
appeal, the Bureau of Labor Relations denied
both the appeal and motion for reconsideration
interposed by petitioner and affirmed the ruling
of the Med-Arbiter. Hence, the present petition,
imputing serious error's of law and grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the Bureau of Labor
Relations in issuing the assailed order which
sanctioned the creation of two (2) bargaining
units within petitioner-corporation with the
following:
GROUNDS FOR REVIEW
I
The Bureau of Labor Relations
committed serious error of law
and grave abuse of discretion in
ordering the creation of a new
bargaining unit at petitioner,
notwithstanding that there is
already an existing bargaining
unit, whose members are
represented for collective
bargaining purposes by
Samahang Manggagawa sa
General Rubber Corporation-
ANGLO.
II
The Bureau of Labor Relations
committed serious error of law
in holding that managerial
employees or those employees
exercising managerial functions
can legally form and join a labor
organization and be members of
the new bargaining unit.
III
The Bureau of Labor Relations
committed grave abuse of
discretion in holding that
supervisors, employees
perform- ing managerial,
confidential and technical
functions and office personnel,
who are negotiated by petitioner
to be excluded from the existing
bargaining unit because they
are performing vital functions to
management, can form and join
a labor organization and be
members of the new bargaining
unit.
Expounding on its position, petitioner argues
that:
1. The order violates the thrust of the Labor
Code insofar as formation of a bargaining unit is
concerned. A policy is in favor of a larger unit
and not the creation of smaller units in one
establishment which might lead to formation,
thus impractical.
2. Article 246 of the Labor Code explicitly
provides that managerial employees are
ineligible to join or form any labor organization.
Since it has been shown by the petitioners that
30% of the monthly-paid employees are
managers or employees exercising managerial
functions, it was grave error for the Bureau of
Labor Relations to allow these monthly paid
employees to form a union and/or a bargaining
unit.
3. The Bureau of Labor Relations overlooked the
fact that these monthly-paid-employees are
excluded from the first existing bargaining unit of
the daily-paid rank and file employees because
in the year 1963, when the employees of
petitioner initially started to exercise their right to
self-organization, herein petitioner bargained for
the exclusion of the monthly-paid employees
from the existing bargaining unit because they
are performing vital functions of management. In
view of this exclusion, petitioner took upon itself
to take care of them and directly gave them the
benefits or privileges without having to bargain
for them or without the aid of the bargaining arm
or force of a union.
Petitioner's contentions are devoid of merit.
Among other issues answered in the assailed
order are the following findings of fact:
Regarding the second issue, we agreement (CBA) which expired
deem it necessary to examine last 15 October 1985 provides
the respective functions of the as follows:
employees. It appears therefrom
that they perform supervisory ARTICLE I
functions. Verily they make
recommendation petitions as to SCOPE
what Managerial actions to take
in disciplinary cases. However,
that fact alone does not make Section
them managerial employees 1. Appropriate
already, It is more a question of bargaining unit.
how effective are those — This
recommendations which aspect Agreement
has not been clearly established covers all
in this case. As defined in the regular
Labor Code, a "managerial employees and
employee is one who is vested workers
with powers or prerogatives to employed by
lay down and execute the company at
management policies and/or to its factory in
hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, Malabon, Metro
recall, discharge, assign or Manila. The
discipline employees, or to words
effectively recommend such "employee,"
managerial actions." Thus, "laborer" and
employees who do not fall within "workers" when
this definition are considered used in this
rank-and-file employees. Agreement shall
be deemed to
refer to those
Lastly, we find that the third employees
issue has been raised for the within the
first time on appeal. It has been bargaining unit.
the policy of the Bureau to Employees who
encourage the formation of an occupy
employer unit "unless managerial,
circumstances otherwise confidential or
require. The proliferation of technical
unions in an employer unit is positions,
discouraged as a matter of supervisors,
policy unless there are contract
compelling reasons which would employees,
deny a certain class of monthly-paid
employees the right to self- employees,
organization for purposes of security as wen
collective bargaining, This case as office
does not fall squarely within the personnel are
exception. It is undisputed that excluded from
the monthlies who are rank-and- the appropriate
file have been historically bargaining unit
excluded from the bargaining (emphasis
unit composed of daily-paid supplied).
rank-and-filers that is, since
1963 when the existing rank-
and- file union was recognized. In view of the above, the
In fact, the collective bargaining monthly-paid rank-and-file
 employees ran form a union of
their own, separate and distinct
from the existing rank-and-file
union composed of daily-paid
workers. (Rollo, pp. 1920)
Thus, it can be readily seen from the above
findings of the Bureau of labor Relations that the
members of private respondent are not
managerial employees as claimed by petitioners
but merely considered as rank-and-file
employees who have every right to self-
organization or to be heard through a duly
certified collective bargaining union. The
Supervisory power of the members of private
respondent union consists merely in
recommending as to what managerial actions to
take in disciplinary cases. These members of
private respondent union do not fit the definition
of managerial employees which We laid down in
the case of Bulletin Publishing Corporation v.
Sanchez (144 SCRA 628). These members of
private respondent union are therefore not
prohibited from forming their own collective
bargaining unit since it has not been shown by
petitioner that "the responsibilities (of these
monthly-paid-employees) inherently require the
exercise of discretion and independent judgment
as supervisors" or that "they possess the power
and authority to lay down or exercise
management policies." Similarly, he held in the
same case that "Members of supervisory unions
who do not fall within the definition of managerial
employees shall become eligible to loin or assist
the rank-and-file labor organization, and if none
exists, to form or assist in the forming of such
rank-and-file organizations.
Perhaps it is unusual for the petitioner to have to
deal with two (2) collective bargaining unions but
there is no one to blame except petitioner itself
for creating the situation it is in. From the
beginning of the existence in 1963 of a
bargaining limit for the employees up to the
present, petitioner had sought to indiscriminately
suppress the members of the private
respondent"s right to self-organization provided
for by law. Petitioner, in justification of its action,
maintained that the exclusion of the members of
the private respondent from the bargaining union
of the rank-and-file or from forming their own
union was agreed upon by petitioner corporation
with the previous bargaining representatives
namely: the General "Rubber Workers Union
PTGWO the General Workers Union — NAFLU
and the General Rubber Workers Union
(independent). Such posture has no leg to stand
on. It has not been shown that private
respondent was privy to this agreement. And
even if it were so, it can never bind subsequent
federations and unions particularly private
respondent-union because it is a curtailment of
the right to self-organization guaranteed by the
labor laws. However, to prevent any difficulty.
and to avoid confusion to all concerned and,
more importantly, to fulfill the policy of the New
Labor Code as well as to be consistent with Our
ruling in the Bulletin case, supra, the monthly-
paid rank-and-file employees should be allowed
to join the union of the daily-paid-rank-and-file
employees of petitioner so that they can also
avail of the CBA benefits or to form their own
rank-and-file union, without prejudice to the
certification election that has been ordered.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 109002             April 12, 2000
DELA SALLE UNIVERSITY, petitioner,
vs.
DELA SALLE UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION (DLSUEA) and
BUENAVENTURA MAGSALIN, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 110072             April 12, 2000
DELA SALLE UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION-NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
TEACHERS AND EMPLOYEES UNION
(DLSUEA-NAFTEU), petitioner,
vs.
DELA SALLE UNIVERSITY and
BUENAVENTURA MAGSALIN, respondents.
BUENA, J.:
Filed with this Court are two petitions for
certiorari, the first petition with preliminary
1 
injunction and/or temporary restraining
order, assailing the decision of voluntary
2 
arbitrator Buenaventura Magsalin, dated
bargaining unit, ruled that ". . . the Computer
Operators assigned at the CSC [Computer
Services Center], just like any other Computer
Operators in other units, [should be] included as
members of the bargaining unit,"  after finding
13 

January 19, 1993, as having been rendered with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. These two petitions have
been consolidated inasmuch as the factual
antecedents, parties involved and issues raised
therein are interrelated. 3
The facts are not disputed and, as summarized
by the voluntary arbitrator, are as follows. On
December 1986, Dela Salle University
(hereinafter referred to as UNIVERSITY) and
that "[e]vidently, the Computer Operators are
presently doing clerical and routinary work and
had nothing to do with [the] setting of
management policies for the University, as [may
be] gleaned from the duties and responsibilities
attached to the position and embodied in the
CSC [Computer Services Center] brochure.
They may have, as argued by the University,
access to vital information regarding the
University's operations but they are not
necessarily confidential."  Regarding the
14 

Dela Salle University Employees Association —
National Federation of Teachers and Employees
Union (DLSUEA-NAFTEU), which is composed
of regular non-academic rank and file
discipline officers, the voluntary arbitrator ". . .
believes that this type of employees belong (sic)
to the rank-and-file on the basis of the nature of
their job."  With respect to the employees of the
15 

employees, (hereinafter referred to as UNION)

4  College of St. Benilde, the voluntary arbitrator
entered into a collective bargaining agreement found that the College of St. Benilde has a
with a life span of three (3) years, that is, from personality separate and distinct from the
December 23, 1986 to December 22, University and thus, held ". . . that the
1989. During the freedom period, or 60 days
5  employees therein are outside the bargaining
before the expiration of the said collective unit of the University's rank-and-file
bargaining agreement, the Union initiated employees."  16

negotiations with the University for a new

collective bargaining agreement which, however, 6 
turned out to be unsuccessful, hence, the Union
filed a Notice of Strike with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board, National
Capital Region. After several conciliation-
7 
mediation meetings, five (5) out of the eleven
(11) issues raised in the Notice of Strike were
resolved by the parties. A partial collective
bargaining agreement was thereafter executed
by the parties. On March 18, 1991, the parties
8 
entered into a Submission Agreement,
identifying the remaining six (6) unresolved
issues for arbitration, namely: "(1) scope of the
On the second issue regarding the propriety of
the inclusion of a union shop clause in the
collective bargaining agreement, in addition to
the existing maintenance of membership clause,
the voluntary arbitrator opined that a union shop
clause ". . . is not a restriction on the employee's
right of (sic) freedom of association but rather a
valid form of union security while the CBA is in
force and in accordance with the Constitutional
policy to promote unionism and collective
bargaining and negotiations. The parties
therefore should incorporate such union shop
clause in their CBA."  17

bargaining unit, (2) union security clause, (3)

security of tenure, (4) salary increases for the
third and fourth years [this should properly read
second and third years] of the collective 9 

bargaining agreement, (5) indefinite union leave,

reduction of the union president's workload,
special leave, and finally, (6) duration of the
agreement."  The parties appointed
10 

Buenaventura Magsalin as voluntary

arbitrator.  On January 19, 1993, the voluntary
11 

arbitrator rendered the assailed decision.  12

In the said decision, the voluntary arbitrator, on

the first issue involving the scope of the
On the third issue with respect to the use of the
"last-in-first-out" method in case of retrenchment
and transfer to other schools or units, the
voluntary arbitrator upheld the ". . . elementary
right and prerogative of the management of the
University to select and/or choose its
employees, a right equally recognized by the
Constitution and the law. The employer, in the
exercise of this right, can adopt valid and
equitable grounds as basis for lay-off or
separation, like performance, qualifications,
competence, etc. Similarly, the right to transfer
or reassign an employee is an employer's
exclusive right and prerogative."  18
Regarding the fourth issue concerning salary
increases for the second and third years of the
collective bargaining agreement, the voluntary
arbitrator opined that the ". . .proposed budget of
the University for SY 1992-93 could not
sufficiently cope up with the demand for
increases by the Union. . . . . . . . With the
present financial condition of the University, it
cannot now be required to grant another round
of increases through collective bargaining
without exhausting its coffers for other legitimate
needs of the University as an institution,"  thus,
19 
he ruled that ". . . the University can no longer
be required to grant a second round of increase
for the school years under consideration and
charge the same to the incremental proceeds."  20
On the fifth issue as to the Union's demand for a
reduction of the workload of the union president,
special leave benefits and indefinite union leave
with pay, the voluntary arbitrator rejected the
same, ruling that unionism ". . . is no valid
reason for the reduction of the workload of its
President,"  and that there is ". . . no sufficient
21 
justification to grant an indefinite leave."  Finding
22 
that the Union and the Faculty Association are
not similarly situated, technically and
professionally,  and that "[w]hile professional
23 
growth is highly encouraged on the part of the
rank-and-file employees, this educational
advancement would not serve in the same
degree as demanded of the faculty
members,"  the voluntary arbitrator denied the
24 
Union's demand for special leave benefits.
On the last issue regarding the duration of the
collective bargaining agreement, the voluntary
arbitrator ruled that ". . . when the parties forged
their CBA and signed it on 19 November 1990,
where a provision on duration was explicitly
included, the same became a binding agreement
between them. Notwithstanding the Submission
Agreement, thereby reopening this issue for
resolution, this Voluntary Arbitrator is
constrained to respect the original intention of
the parties, the same being not contrary to law,
morals or public policy."  As to the economic
25 
aspect of the collective bargaining agreement,
the voluntary arbitrator opined that the ". . .
economic provisions of the CBA shall be re-
opened after the third year in compliance with
the mandate of the Labor Code, as amended."  26
Subsequently, both parties filed their respective
motions for reconsideration which, however,
were not entertained by the voluntary arbitrator
"pursuant to existing rules and jurisprudence
governing voluntary arbitration cases."  27
On March 5, 1993, the University filed with the
Second Division of this Court, a petition
for certiorari with temporary restraining order
and/or preliminary injunction assailing the
decision of the voluntary arbitrator, as having
been rendered "in excess of jurisdiction and/or
with grave abuse of discretion."  Subsequently,
28 
on May 24, 1993, the Union also filed a petition
for certiorari with the First Division.  Without 29 
giving due course to the petition pending before
each division, the First and Second Divisions
separately resolved to require the respondents
in each petition, including the Solicitor General
on behalf of the voluntary arbitrator, to file their
respective Comments.  Upon motion by the
30 
Solicitor General dated July 29, 1993, both
petitions were consolidated and transferred to
the Second Division.  31
In his consolidated Comment  filed on 32 
September 9, 1993 on behalf of voluntary
arbitrator Buenaventura C. Magsalin, the
Solicitor General agreed with the voluntary
arbitrator's assailed decision on all points except
that involving the employees of the College of
St. Benilde. According to the Solicitor General,
the employees of the College of St. Benilde
should have been included in the bargaining unit
of the rank-and-file employees of the
University.  The Solicitor General came to this
33 
conclusion after finding ". . . sufficient evidence
to justify the Union's proposal to consider the
University and the CSB [College of St. Benilde]
as only one entity because the latter is but a
mere integral part of the University," to wit:  34
1. One of the duties and responsibilities
of the CSB's Director of Academic
Services is to coordinate with the
University's Director of Admissions
regarding the admission of freshmen,
shiftees and transferees (Annex "3" of
the University's Reply);
2. Some of the duties and
responsibilities of the CSB's
Administrative Officer are as follows:
A. xxx xxx xxx
4. Recommends and implements
personnel policies and guidelines (in
accordance with the Staff Manual) as
well as pertinent existing general
policies of the university as a
whole. . . . .
12. Conducts and establishes liaison
with all the offices concerned at the
Main Campus as well (sic) with other
government agencies on all
administrative-related matters. . . .
B. xxx xxx xxx
7. Handles processing, canvassing and
direct purchasing of all requisitions
worth more than P10,000 or less.
Coordinates and canvasses with the
Main Campus all requisitions worth
more than P10,000. . . .
C. xxx xxx xxx
7. Plans and coordinates with the
Security and Safety Committee at the
Main Campus the development of a
security and safety program during
times of emergency or occurrence of fire
or other natural calamities. . . . (Annex
"4" of the University's Reply).
3. The significant role which the
University assumes in the admission of
students at the CSB is revealed in the
following provisions of the CSB's Bulletin
for Arts and Business Studies
Department for the schoolyear 1992-
1993, thus:
Considered in the process of admission
for a (sic) high school graduate
applicants are the following criteria:
results of DLSU College Entrance
Examination . . . .
Admission requirements for transferees
are: . . . and an acceptable score in the
DLSU admission test. . . .
Shiftees from DLSU who are still eligible
to enroll may be admitted in accordance
with the DLSU policy on shifting.
Considering that there sometimes exist
exceptional cases where a very difficult
but temporary situation renders a DLSU
student falling under this category a last
chance to be re-admitted provided he
meets the cut-off scores required in the
qualifying examination administered by
the university. . . .
He may not be remiss in his study
obligations nor incur any violation
whatsoever, as such will be taken by the
University to be an indication of his loss
of initiative to pursue further studies at
DLSU. In sch (sic) a case, he renders
himself ineligible to continue studying at
DLSU. DLSU thus reserves the right to
the discontinuance of the studies of any
enrolee whose presence is inimical to
the objectives of the CSB/DLSU. . . .
As a college within the university, the
College of St. Benilde subscribes to the
De La Salle Mission." (Annexes "C-1,"
"C-2," and "C-3" of the Union's
Consolidated Reply and Rejoinder)
4. The academic programs offered at
the CSB are likewise presented in the
University's Undergraduate Prospectus
for schoolyear 1992-1993 (Annex "D" of
the Union's Consolidated Reply and
Rejoinder).
5. The Leave Form Request (Annex "F"
of the Union's Position Paper) at the
CSB requires prior permission from the
University anent leaves of CSB
employees, to wit:
 AN EMPLOYEE WHO GOES ON
LEAVE WITHOUT PRIOR
PERMISSION FROM THE
UNIVERSITY OR WHO
OVEREXTENDS THE PERIOD OF HIS
APPROVED LEAVE WITHOUT
SECURING AUTHORITY FROM THE
UNIVERSITY, OR WHO REFUSE TO
BE RECALLED FROM AN APPROVED
LEAVE SHALL BE CONSIDERED
ABSENT WITHOUT LEAVE AND
SHALL BE SUBJECT TO
DISCIPLINARY ACTION.
6. The University officials themselves
claimed during the 1990 University
Athletic Association of the Philippines
(UAAP) meet that the CSB athletes
represented the University since the
latter and the CSB comprise only one
entity.
On February 9, 1994, this Court resolved to give
due course to these consolidated petitions and
to require the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.  35
In its memorandum filed on April 28,
1994,  pursuant to the above-stated
36 
Resolution,  the University raised the following
37 
issues for the consideration of the Court:  38
I.
WHETHER OR NOT GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION WAS COMMITTED
BY THE VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR
WHEN HE INCLUDED, WITHIN THE
BARGAINING UNIT COMPRISING THE
UNIVERSITY'S RANK-AND-FILE
EMPLOYEES, THE COMPUTER
OPERATORS ASSIGNED AT THE
UNIVERSITY'S COMPUTER
SERVICES CENTER AND THE
UNIVERSITY'S DISCIPLINE
OFFICERS, AND WHEN HE
EXCLUDED THE COLLEGE OF SAINT
BENILDE EMPLOYEES FROM THE
SAID BARGAINING UNIT.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION WAS COMMITTED
BY THE VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR
WHEN HE UPHELD THE UNION'S
DEMAND FOR THE INCLUSION OF A
UNION SHOP CLAUSE IN THE
PARTIES' COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION WAS COMMITTED
BY THE VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR
WHEN HE DENIED THE UNION'S
PROPOSAL FOR THE "LAST-IN-
FIRST-OUT" METHOD OF LAY-OFF IN
CASES OF RETRENCHMENT.
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION WAS COMMITTED
BY THE VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR
WHEN HE RULED THAT THE
UNIVERSITY CAN NO LONGER BE
REQUIRED TO GRANT A SECOND
ROUND OF WAGE INCREASES FOR
THE SCHOOL YEARS 1991-92 AND
1992-93 AND CHARGE THE SAME TO
THE INCREMENTAL PROCEEDS.
V.
WHETHER OR NOT GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION WAS COMMITTED
BY THE VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR
WHEN HE DENIED THE UNION'S
PROPOSALS ON THE DELOADING
OF THE UNION PRESIDENT,
IMPROVED LEAVE BENEFITS AND
INDEFINITE UNION LEAVE WITH PAY.
The Union, on the other hand, raised the
following issues, in its memorandum,  filed
39 
pursuant to Supreme Court Resolution dated
February 9, 1994,  to wit; that the voluntary
40 
arbitrator committed grave abuse of discretion
in:
(1) FAILING AND/OR REFUSING TO
PIERCE THE VEIL OF CORPORATE
FICTION OF THE COLLEGE OF ST.
BENILDE-DLSU DESPITE THE
PRESENCE OF SUFFICIENT BASIS
TO DO SO AND IN FINDING THAT
THE EMPLOYEES THEREAT ARE
OUTSIDE OF THE BARGAINING UNIT
OF THE DLSU'S RANK-AND-FILE
EMPLOYEES. HE ALSO ERRED IN
HIS INTERPRETATION OF THE
APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE;
(2) DENYING THE PETITIONER'S
PROPOSAL FOR THE "LAST-IN
FIRST-OUT" METHOD OF LAY-OFF IN
CASE OF RETRENCHMENT AND IN
UPHOLDING THE ALLEGED
MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE TO
SELECT AND CHOOSE ITS
EMPLOYEES DISREGARDING THE
BASIC TENETS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE
AND EQUITY UPON WHICH THIS
PROPOSAL WAS FOUNDED;
(3) FINDING THAT THE
MULTISECTORAL COMMITTEE IN
THE RESPONDENT UNIVERSITY IS
THE LEGITIMATE GROUP WHICH
DETERMINES AND SCRUTINIZES
ANNUAL SALARY INCREASES AND
FRINGE BENEFITS OF THE
EMPLOYEES;
(4) HOLDING THAT THE 70% SHARE
IN THE INCREMENTAL TUITION
PROCEEDS IS THE ONLY SOURCE
OF SALARY INCREASES AND
FRINGE BENEFITS OF THE
EMPLOYEES;
(5)
FAILING/REFUSING/DISREGARDING
TO CONSIDER THE RESPONDENT
UNIVERSITY'S FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS FACTUALLY TO
DETERMINE THE FORMER'S
CAPABILITY TO GRANT THE
PROPOSED SALARY INCREASES
OVER AND ABOVE THE 70% SHARE
IN THE INCREMENTAL TUITION
PROCEEDS AND IN GIVING WEIGHT
AND CONSIDERATION TO THE
RESPONDENT UNIVERSITY'S
PROPOSED BUDGET WHICH IS
MERELY AN ESTIMATE.
(6) FAILING TO EQUATE THE
POSITION AND RESPONSIBILITIES
OF THE UNION PRESIDENT WITH
THOSE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
FACULTY ASSOCIATION WHICH IS
NOT EVEN A LEGITIMATE LABOR
ORGANIZATION AND IN
SPECULATING THAT THE
PRESIDENT OF THE FACULTY
ASSOCIATION SUFFERS A
CORRESPONDING REDUCTION IN
SALARY ON THE ACCOUNT OF THE
REDUCTION OF HIS WORKLOAD; IN
FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE
EQUAL RIGHTS OF THE MEMBERS
OF THE UNION AND OF THE
FACULTY FOR PROFESSIONAL
ADVANCEMENT AS WELL AS THE
DESIRABLE EFFECTS OF THE
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE
SPECIAL LEAVE AND WORKLOAD
REDUCTION BENEFITS.  41
The question which now confronts us is whether
or not the voluntary arbitrator committed grave
abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed
decision, particularly, in resolving the following
issues: (1) whether the computer operators
assigned at the University's Computer Services
Center and the University's discipline officers
may be considered as confidential employees
and should therefore be excluded from the
bargaining unit which is composed of rank and
file employees of the University, and whether the
employees of the College of St. Benilde should
also be included in the same bargaining unit; (2)
whether a union shop clause should be included
in the parties' collective bargaining agreement,
in addition to the existing maintenance of
membership clause; (3) whether the denial of
the Union's proposed "last-in-first-out" method of
laying-off employees, is proper; (4) whether the
ruling that on the basis of the University's
proposed budget, the University can no longer
be required to grant a second round of wage
increases for the school years 1991-92 and
1992-93 and charge the same to the incremental
proceeds, is correct; (5) whether the denial of
the Union's proposals on the deloading of the
union president, improved leave benefits and
indefinite union leave with pay, is proper; (6)
whether the finding that the multi-sectoral
committee in the University is the legitimate
group which determines and scrutinizes the
annual salary increases and fringe benefits of
the employees of the University, is correct; and
(7) whether the ruling that the 70% share in the
incremental tuition proceeds is the only source
of salary increases and fringe benefits of the
employees, is proper.
Now, before proceeding to the discussion and
resolution of the issues raised in the pending
petitions, certain preliminary matters call for
disposition. As we reiterated in the case
of Caltex Refinery Employees
Association (CREA)  vs. Jose S. Brillantes,  the
42 
following are the well-settled rules in a petition
for certiorari involving labor cases. "First, the
factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies (such
as the Department of Labor and Employment),
when supported by substantial evidence, are
binding on this Court and entitled to great
respect, considering the expertise of these
agencies in their respective fields. It is well-
established that findings of these administrative
agencies are generally accorded not only
respect but even finality. 
43
Second, substantial evidence in labor cases is
such amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind will accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion. 
44
Third, in Flores vs. National Labor Relations
Commission,  we explained the role and
45 
function of Rule 65 as an extraordinary remedy:
It should be noted, in the first place, that
the instant petition is a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court. An
extraordinary remedy, its use is
available only and restrictively in truly
exceptional cases — those wherein the
action of an inferior court, board or
officer performing judicial or quasi-
judicial acts is challenged for being
wholly void on grounds of jurisdiction.
The sole office of the writ of certiorari is
the correction of errors of jurisdiction
including the commission of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. It does not include
correction of public respondent NLRC's
evaluation of the evidence and factual
findings based thereon, which are
generally accorded not only great
respect but even finality.
No question of jurisdiction whatsoever is
being raised and/or pleaded in the case
at bench. Instead, what is being sought
is a judicial re-evaluation of the
adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence
on record, which is certainly beyond the
province of the extraordinary writ
of certiorari. Such demand is
impermissible for it would involve this
Court in determining what evidence is
entitled to belief and the weight to be
assigned it. As we have reiterated
countless times, judicial review by this
Court in labor cases does not go so far
as to evaluate the sufficiency of the
evidence upon which the proper labor
officer or office based his or its
determination but is limited only to
issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. (emphasis supplied).
With the foregoing rules in mind, we shall now
proceed to discuss the merit of these
consolidated petitions.
We affirm in part and modify in part.
On the first issue involving the classification of
the computer operators assigned at the
University's Computer Services Center and
discipline officers, the University argues that
they are confidential employees and that the
Union has already recognized the confidential
nature of their functions when the latter agreed
in the parties' 1986 collective bargaining
agreement to exclude the said employees from
the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees.
As far as the said computer operators are
concerned, the University contends that ". . . the
parties have already previously agreed to
exclude all positions in the University's
Computer Services Center (CSC), which include
the positions of computer operators, from the
collective bargaining unit. . . . . . . . "  The
46 
University further contends that ". . . the nature
of the work done by these Computer Operators
is enough justification for their exclusion from the
coverage of the bargaining unit of the
University's rank-and-file
employees. . . . . . . ."  According to the
47 
University, the Computer Services Center,
where these computer operators work, ". . .
processes data that are needed by management
for strategic planning and evaluation of systems.
It also houses the University's confidential
records and information [e.g. student records,
faculty records, faculty and staff payroll data,
and budget allocation and expenditure related
data] which are contained in computer files and
computer-generated reports. . . . . . . . Moreover,
the Computer Operators are in fact the
repository of the University's confidential
information and data, including those involving
and/or pertinent to labor relations. . . . . . . ." 
48
As to the discipline officers, the University
maintains that " . . . they are likewise excluded
from the bargaining unit of the rank-and-file
employees under the parties' 1986 CBA. The
Discipline Officers are clearly alter egos of
management as they perform tasks which are
inherent in management [e.g. enforce discipline,
act as peace officers, secure peace and safety
of the students inside the campus, conduct
investigations on violations of University
regulations, or of existing criminal laws,
committed within the University or by University
employees] . . . . . . . "  The University also
49 
alleges that "the Discipline Officers are privy to
highly confidential information ordinarily
accessible only to management."  50
With regard to the employees of the College of
St. Benilde, the Union, supported by the Solicitor
General at this point, asserts that the veil of
corporate fiction should be pierced, thus,
according to the Union, the University and the
College of St. Benilde should be considered as
only one entity because the latter is but a mere
integral part of the University. 51
The University's arguments on the first issue fail
to impress us. The Court agrees with the
Solicitor General that the express exclusion of
the computer operators and discipline officers
from the bargaining unit of rank-and-file
employees in the 1986 collective bargaining
agreement does not bar any re-negotiation for
the future inclusion of the said employees in the
bargaining unit. During the freedom period, the
parties may not only renew the existing
collective bargaining agreement but may also
propose and discuss modifications or
amendments thereto. With regard to the alleged
confidential nature of the said employees'
functions, after a careful consideration of the
pleadings filed before this Court, we rule that the
said computer operators and discipline officers
are not confidential employees. As carefully
examined by the Solicitor General, the service
record of a computer operator reveals that his
duties are basically clerical and non-confidential
in nature.  As to the discipline officers, we agree
52  organization. Nothing in this
with the voluntary arbitrator that based on the
nature of their duties, they are not confidential
employees and should therefore be included in
the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees.
The Court also affirms the findings of the
voluntary arbitrator that the employees of the
College of St. Benilde should be excluded from
the bargaining unit of the rank-and-file
employees of Dela Salle University, because the
two educational institutions have their own
separate juridical personality and no sufficient
evidence was shown to justify the piercing of the
veil of corporate fiction.  53
On the second issue involving the inclusion of a
union shop clause in addition to the existing
maintenance of membership clause in the
collective bargaining agreement, the University
avers that ". . . it is in the spirit of the exercise of
the constitutional right to self-organization that
every individual should be able to freely choose
whether to become a member of the Union or
not. The right to join a labor organization should
carry with it the corollary right not to join the
same. This position of the University is but in
due recognition of the individual's free will and
capability for judgment."  The University assails
54 
the Union's demand for a union shop clause as
". . . definitely unjust and amounts to oppression.
Moreover, such a demand is repugnant to
democratic principles and the constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of individuals to join or not
to join an association as well as their right to
security of tenure, particularly, on the part of
present employees."  55
The Union, on the other hand, counters that the
Labor Code, as amended, recognizes the
validity of a union shop agreement in Article 248
thereof which reads:
Art. 248. Unfair labor practices of
employers. —
x x x           x x x          x x x
(e) To discriminate in regard to
hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of
employment in order to
encourage or discourage
membership in any labor
Code or in any other law shall
prevent the parties from
requiring membership in a
 recognized collective bargaining
agent as a condition for
employment, except of those
employees who are already
members of another union at
the time of the signing of the
collective bargaining agreement.
. . . . . . ." (emphasis supplied)
We affirm the ruling of the voluntary
arbitrator for the inclusion of a union
shop provision in addition to the existing
maintenance of membership clause in
the collective bargaining agreement. As
the Solicitor General asserted in his
consolidated Comment, the University's
reliance on the case of Victoriano
vs.  Elizalde Rope Workers' Union  is 56 
clearly misplaced. In that case, we ruled
that ". . . the right to join a union includes
the right to abstain from joining any
union. . . . . . . . The right to refrain from
joining labor organizations recognized
by Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act
is, however, limited. The legal protection
granted to such right to refrain from
joining is withdrawn by operation of law,
where a labor union and an employer
have agreed on a closed shop, by virtue
of which the employer may employ only
members of the collective bargaining
union, and the employees must continue
to be members of the union for the
duration of the contract in order to keep
their jobs. . . . . . . ." 
57
On the third issue regarding the Union's
proposal for the use of the "last-in-first-
out" method in case of lay-off,
termination due to retrenchment and
transfer of employees, the Union relies
on social justice and equity to support its
proposition, and submits that the
University's prerogative to select and/or
choose the employees it will hire is
limited, either by law or agreement,
especially where the exercise of this
prerogative might result in the loss of
employment.  The Union further insists
58 
that its proposal is ". . . in keeping with
the avowed State policy '(q) To ensure
the participation of workers in decision
and policy-making processes affecting
their rights, duties and welfare' (Art. 211,
Labor Code, as amended)."  59
On the other hand, the University
asserts its management prerogative and
counters that "[w]hile it is recognized
that this right of employees and workers
to 'participate in policy and decision-
making processes affecting their rights
and benefits as may be provided by law'
has been enshrined in the Constitution
(Article III, [should be Article XIII],
Section 3, par. 2), said participation,
however, does not automatically entitle
the Union to dictate as to how an
employer should choose the employees
to be affected by a retrenchment
program. The employer still retains the
prerogative to determine the reasonable
basis for selecting such employees."  60
We agree with the voluntary arbitrator
that as an exercise of management
prerogative, the University has the right
to adopt valid and equitable grounds as
basis for terminating or transferring
employees. As we ruled in the case
of Autobus Workers' Union (AWU) and
Ricardo Escanlar vs.  National Labor
Relations Commission,  "[a] valid
61 
exercise of management prerogative is
one which, among others, covers: work
assignment, working methods, time,
supervision of workers, transfer of
employees, work supervision, and the
discipline, dismissal and recall of
workers. Except as provided for, or
limited by special laws, an employer is
free to regulate, according to his own
discretion and judgment, all aspects of
employment." (emphasis supplied)
On the fourth issue involving the
voluntary arbitrator's ruling that on the
basis of the University's proposed
budget, the University can no longer be
required to grant a second round of
wage increases for the school years
1991-92 and 1992-93 and charge the
same to the incremental proceeds, we
find that the voluntary arbitrator
committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. As we ruled in the case
of Caltex Refinery Employees
Association (CREA) vs. Jose
S. Brillantes,  ". . . . . . . [w]e believe that
62 
the standard proof of a company's
financial standing is its financial
statements duly audited by independent
and credible external
auditors."  Financial statements audited
63 
by independent external auditors
constitute the normal method of proof of
profit and loss performance of a
company.  The financial capability of a
64 
company cannot be based on its
proposed budget because a proposed
budget does not reflect the true financial
condition of a company, unlike audited
financial statements, and more
importantly, the use of a proposed
budget as proof of a company's financial
condition would be susceptible to abuse
by scheming employers who might be
merely feigning dire financial condition in
their business ventures in order to avoid
granting salary increases and fringe
benefits to their employees.
On the fifth issue involving the Union's
proposals on the deloading of the union
president, improved leave benefits and
indefinite union leave with pay, we agree
with the voluntary arbitrator's rejection of
the said demands, there being no
justifiable reason for the granting of the
same.
On the sixth issue regarding the finding
that the multi-sectoral committee in the
University is the legitimate group which
determines and scrutinizes the annual
salary increases and fringe benefits of
the employees of the University, the
Court finds that the voluntary arbitrator
did not gravely abuse his discretion on
this matter. From our reading of the
assailed decision, it appears that during
the parties' negotiations for a new
collective bargaining agreement, the
Union demanded for a 25% and 40%
salary increase for the second and third
years, respectively, of the collective
bargaining agreement.  The University's
65 
counter-proposal was for a 10%
increase for the third year.  After the
66 
meeting of the multi-sectoral committee
on budget, which is composed of
students, parents, faculty, administration
and union, the University granted
across-the-board salary increases of
11.3% and 19% for the second and third
years, respectively.  While the voluntary
67 
arbitrator found that the said committee
". . . decided to grant the said increases
based on the University's viability which
were exclusively sourced from the tuition
fees. . . . . . . .," no finding was made as
to the basis of the committee's decision.
Be that as it may, assuming for the sake
of argument that the said committee is
the group responsible for determining
wage increases and fringe benefits, as
ruled by the voluntary arbitrator, the
committee's determination must still be
based on duly audited financial
statements following our ruling on the
fourth issue. 1âwphi1
On the seventh and last issue involving
the ruling that the 70% share in the
incremental tuition proceeds is the only
source of salary increases and fringe
benefits of the employees, the Court
deems that any determination of this
alleged error is unnecessary and
irrelevant, in view of our rulings on the
fourth and preceding issues and there
being no evidence presented before the
voluntary arbitrator that the University
held incremental tuition fee proceeds
from which any wage increase or fringe
benefit may be satisfied.
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the petitions in these consolidated
cases, G.R. No. 109002 and G.R. No.
110072 are partially GRANTED. The
assailed decision dated January 19,
1993 of voluntary arbitrator
Buenaventura Magsalin is hereby
AFFIRMED with the modification that
the issue on salary increases for the
second and third years of the collective
bargaining agreement be REMANDED
to the voluntary arbitrator for definite
resolution within one month from the
finality of this Decision, on the basis of
the externally audited financial
statements of the University already
submitted by the Union before the
voluntary arbitrator and forming part of
the records.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
 4. BLR Order signed by Director
Cresenciano Trajano dated
June 26, 1986; and

5. BLR Order dated October 29,

1986 signed by Director Pura
Ferrer-Calleja in BLR Case No.
A-034-81 (NCR-LRD-M-9-361-
80).

Petitioner prays for the issuance of a restraining

order enjoining the respondent BLR Director
from proceeding with the certification election in
BLR Case No. 034-81 (NCR-LRD-M-9-361-80)
and moves to dismiss the petition for certification
PART V election filed by Philippine Airlines Non-
Managerial Employees Association (PANOMEA-
1. G.R. No. 76673 June 22, 1988 FUR).

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES EMPLOYEES' The records show that prior to the effectivity of
ASSOCIATION (PALEA), petitioner, the Labor Code on November 1, 1974, there
vs. were four collective bargaining agents in the
HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, Director of Philippine Airlines, Inc., namely: 1) the Airline
the Bureau of Labor Relations, PHILIPPINE Pilots Association of the Philippine (ALPAP),
AIRLINES NON-MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES representing pilots; 2) Flight Attendants and
ASSOCIATION (PANOMEA-FUR), and Flight Stewards Association of the Philippines,
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents. (FASAP), representing flight attendants and
stewards; 3) Philippine Airlines Supervisors'
Association (PALSA), representing ground
Juanito R. Carlos, Jr. for private respondent
supervisory personnel, and 4) petitioner
PANOMEA-FUR.
(PALEA) representing ground rank-and-file
personnel.
Cenon S. Cervantes, Jr. for respondent PAL.
Pursuant to Section II, Rule II of the Labor Code,
in relation to Articles 212(k) and 246, Labor
Code as amended, the continued existence of
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.: PALSA was rejected, because a supervisory
union could not organize as a labor unit separate
Petitioner in this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, alleges from that of the rank-and-file organization. In
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Bureau of Labor Relations in
issuing the following orders: anticipation of PALSA's dissolution, the
Philippine Airlines Personnel Association
1. NCR Med-Arbiter Edgardo (PALPA-Legayada) filed on November 19, 1974
dela Cruz' Resolution dated a petition for certification election under BLR
January 13, 1981; Case No. 0013. In this case, the BLR Director
ruled on November 24,1975 that "all employees
with the positions of division heads or above
2. BLR Resolution dated
shall be considered "managerial employees" and
November 27,1981 signed by
ineligible to vote, and all others shall be declared
OIC Romeo Young;
rank and file."

3. BLR Order signed by Director

Cresenciano Trajano dated April
4, 1986;
On April 27,1977, a certification election was
held among: (1) PALPA, (2) PALEA, and (3) No
Union. PALEA, as the winner in that election,
was certified by the BLR as the exclusive
bargaining agent of all the rank-and-file
employee of the Philippine Airlines, Inc.
PALEA and PAL signed a 3-year collective
bargaining agreement effective October 1, 1976
up to September 30, 1979. Its life was, by
agreement of the parties, extended up to
September 30, 1980.
Before the expiration of the agreement in
September, 1980, the respondent Philippine
Airlines Non-Managerial Employees' Association
(PANOMEA-FUR) filed a petition for certification
election among the "administrative, supervisory,
licensed mechanics, technical and confidential
employees" of PAL, alleging inter alia  that "there
is no other union existing in the proposed
bargaining unit nor is there a certified collective
bargaining agreement which may be a bar to the
petition." PALEA, which had an existing
collective bargaining agreement with the
Management, was not mentioned in the petition,
nor notified of the filing of the same. Although
PAL had filed its position paper in the said
certification election case, the Med-Arbiter
issued a resolution on January 13, 1981,
granting the petition for a certification election
among the administrative, supervisory, licensed
mechanics, technical and confidential
employees of PAL with the following as the
contending parties: P (1) PANOMEA-FUR and
(2) No Union.
Upon learning of the Med-Arbiters resolution.
PALEA appealed to the BLR Director on
February 9, 1981 as a compulsory intervenor.
The BLR Officer-in-charge affirmed on
November 27, 1981 the Med-Arbiter's resolution
calling for a certification election. PALEA and
PAL filed separate motions for reconsideration of
the BLR resolution.
Meanwhile, PAL and PALEA concluded a
collective bargaining agreement on May 19,
1981, with a three-year life span from October 1,
1980 to September 30, 1983. It was renewed for
another three-year period expiring on September
30, 1986.
While PAL and PALEA's motions for
reconsideration were pending resolution by the
BLR Director, the licensed mechanics whom
PANOMEA-FUR sought to represent, filed their
own petition for certification election on October
16, 1984 under the name of PAL
Licensed/Amalgamated Federation of Labor of
the Philippines (PALMA-AFL).
PAL and PLEA separately filed an
answer/opposition to the petition of PALMA-AFL.
PALEA argued that it was the exclusive
bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees
of PAL, including the members of PALMA-AFL
who are also embraced within the CBA that was
concluded between PAL and PALEA.
On October 11, 1985, the BLR Director
dismissed the petition of the licensed mechanics
only (PALMA-AFL), excluding the administrative,
supervisory, technical and confidential
employees. He ruled that the existing law did not
allow the creation of a separate bargaining unit
for the licensed mechanics at PAL, because they
were considered members of the existing rank-
and-file unit represented for collective bargaining
purposes by PALEA.
However, on April 4, 1986, the BLR Director
ordered the holding of a certification election
among the administrative, supervisory, licensed
mechanics, technical and confidential
employees of PAL and denied PAL's and
PALEA's motions for reconsideration of the
BLR's November 27, 1981 decision.
In his Order of June 26, 1986, BLR Director
Cresciano Trajano denied PAL's and PALEA's
motions for reconsideration. However, finding it
necessary to conduct pre-election conferences
to delineate the proper composition of the
proposed bargaining unit, the BLR on August 15,
1986 temporarily restrained the holding of the
certification election. On October 29, 1986, BLR
Director Calleja lifted the restraining order and
directed the holding of the said election.
Hence, this petition for certiorari by PALEA,
alleging that the BLR Director erred:
1. in ordering a certification election among
PAL's administrative, supervisory, licensed
mechanics, technical and confidential
employees as a separate bargaining unit distinct
from the rank-and-file employees, in violation of
specific provisions of the Labor Code as
amended, particularly Article 256 thereof; and
2. in not dismissing the petition for certification
election filed by respondent PANOMEA-FUR
(NCR-LRD-M-9-361-80) for having been
rendered moot and academic by supervening
factors.
Petitioner claims that PALEA is the exclusive
bargaining representative of all rank-and-file
PAL employees, and that PANOMEA seeks to
dismember or fragmentize the already existing
unit so that another one may be created.
Furthermore, petitioner argues that PANOMEA's
petition for a certification election is fatally
defective, as it is not supported by the
signatures of at least 30% of the bargaining unit
composed of 7,000 rank-and-file employees
(only 369 signatures were allegedly obtained),
contrary to law and national policy.
We are not persuaded that the public
respondent gravely abused her discretion in
issuing the assailed orders.
The rule is that factual findings of the Bureau of
Labor Relations which are supported by
substantial evidence are binding on this Court
and must be respected (Asian Design and
Manufacturing Corp. vs. Deputy Minister of
Labor, 142 SCRA 79). The Bureau of Labor
Relations found that the present CBA between
PALEA and PAL covers only the rank and file
employees but not the licensed mechanics,
administrative, supervisory, technical and
confidential employees of PAL. The petition
failed to prove that PANOMEA's petition lacked
the support of 30% of the employees.
Employees have a constitutional right to choose
their own bargaining representative. The holding
of a certification election is a statutory policy that
should not be circumvented (George and Peter
Lines, Inc. vs. Association of Labor Unions
[ALU], 134 SCRA 92).
Whenever there is doubt as to whether a
particular union represents the majority of the
rank-and-file employees, in the absence of a
legal impediment, the holding of a certification
election is the most democratic method of
determining the employees' choice of their
bargaining representative. It is the appropriate
means whereby controversies and disputes on
representation may be laid to rest, by the
unequivocal vote of the employees themselves.
In lifting the restraining order which her
predecessor had issued, and ordering that the
certification election proceed, respondent Ferrer-
Calleja opened the door for the employees to
express their choice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.
2. G.R. No. L-41937 July 6, 1976
FEDERACION OBRERA DE LA INDUSTRIA
TABAQUERA Y OTROS TRABAJADORES DE
FILIPINAS (FOITAF-ASSOCIATED ANGLO
AMERICAN CHAPTER), petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CARMELO NORIEL, in his
capacity as Director of the Bureau of Labor
Relations, all officers acting in his behalf,
and FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS
(FFW-ANGLO AMERICAN EMPLOYEES
CHAPTER), respondents.
Jose T. Maghari for petitioner.
F.F. Bonifacio Jr. for private respondent.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant
Solicitor General Reynaldo S. Puno and Solicitor
Ramon A. Barcelona for respondent Public
Official.
FERNANDO, J:
An order of respondent Carmelo Noriel Director
of the Bureau of Labor Relations,   for the
1
holding of a certification election is led in this
certiorari proceeding for its alleged failure to
comply with the thirty percent requirement of the
new Labor Code.   It is admitted by petitioner
2
labor union that there were enough signatures
but it is contended that there was a change of
mind on the part of a number of the employees
involved resulting in the requirement of the law
not being met. There is thus, so it is submitted, a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to
arbitrarinesi Respondent public official as well as
private respondent labor union were required to
comment. In such pleading submitted by
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza   on behalf
3
of the former, characterized by a meticulous and
detailed reference to the background facts, there
was an objective narration of what did transpire
It did reduce to the vanishing point whatever
plausibility there was there was in the petition.
What clearly emerged was that petitioner labor
union is loathe to have its former members
transfer their allegiance to private respondent
union, a matter which could be even more
obvious if the certification election were held.
There is thus no justification for sustaining the
stand taken by petitioner. To do so would be to
disregard previous authoritative doctrines on the
matter, involving the basic constitutional right of
freedom of association,   made even more
4
meaningful in labor matters by the statutory
device of certification election. That we are not
disposed to do. We dismiss the petition.
There was barely a mention of the relevant facts
in the petition, the effort being concentrated in
the attempt to make out a case of arbitrary and
improvident exercise of authority on the part of
respondent Director. It is quite gratifying,
therefore, as was mentioned above, to have the
comment of respondent Director setting forth
with accuracy and particularly the events that led
to the challenged order. That it is impressed with
accuracy is not just an assumption. Petitioner
was given a chance to refute the same after
such comment, along with that of private
respondent, was admitted as an answer. It failed
to do so.
According to the comment of i respondent
official: "In order to afford this Honorable Court
with a clear perspective of what actually
transpired summarized hereunder are the
antecedent and salient facts of the case. 1. On
March 20, 1975, the Federation of Free Workers
(Associated Anglo-American Employees
Chapter, hereinafter referred to as FFW), filed a
verified petition for certification election among
the employees and workers of the Anglo-
American Tobacco Corporation (company for
brevity), alleging that more than 30% of its rank
and file workers support the same. 2. On April
14, 1975, the company opposed the petition
alleging that the petitioning union did not have
the support of at least 30% of the more than
1,000 workers of the company. 3. At the hearing
of the case on April 21, 1975, the company
alleged that there are 941 rank and file workers
under its employ. Since respondent FFW had
then already submitted 283 signatures, the Med-
Arbiter ruled that FFW had complied with the
30% written consent requirement On the same
date, Federacion Obrera de la Industria
Tabaquera y Otros Trabajadores de Filipinos
(FOITAF for short) — Associated Anglo-
American Chapter, moved to intervene alleging
legal interest in the case and the latter was
granted time to substantiate its claim by way of
employee's support. 4. Subsequently, at the
hearing on April 24, 1975, the list of the rank and
file employees of the company numbering 941,
based on the payroll as of March 1975, was
submitted and it was agreed at said hearing that
after the petitioner therein (FFW) had submitted
its position paper, and the Intervenor FOITAF its
manifestation, the case will be considered
submitted for resolution .... On the same date,
however, FOITAF filed a motion and
manifestation calling attention to an alleged
retraction or revocation of signatures to the
petition coming from thirteen (13) employees
attaching thereto Annexes A, B, C, D, and E, the
letters of said retracting employees, all claims
that they were forced to sign .... It is worthy of
note that the letters of retraction by the thirteen
(13) employees were not under oath and none of
them was presented during the hearings to
confirm their alleged retractions. 5. Thus, on
April 30, 1975, the Med-Arbiter assigned to the
case, finding that FFW had submitted 283
signatures of the company's labor force of 941,
thereby complying with the 30% consent
requirement, ordered the certification election
with the following contending unions: 1. FFW
Associated Anglo-American Employees
Chapter), 2. Federacion Obrera de la Industria
Tabaquera y Otros Trabajadores de Filipinos
FOITAF and, 3. No union desired .... 6. On May
9, 1975, petitioner FOITAF filed a letter appeal
from the aforesaid order of the Med-Arbiter on
the sole ground that FFW failed to comply with
the 30% requirement. This was opposed by
FFW contending that the alleged retraction of
the 13 employees can only be determined in a
secret balloting in a certification election 7.
Meanwhile on May 29, 1975, acting on a motion
to stop the holding of a certification election filed
by FOITAF, the Bureau of Labor Relations in an
order of even date suspended the holding of a
certification election .... 8. During the pendency
of the appeal, the case was again set for further
hearing on June 10, 1975, whereat four (4)
additional signatures supporting the petition for
certification election were presented by FFW
and at the same time the latter was permitted to
submit its opposition to the list of 941 employees
submitted by the company. On the other hand,
FOITAF was allowed to submit its reply to FFW's
opposition after which the matter was
considered submitted for resolution .... 9. In an
addendum, a manifestation to petitioner's
(FFW's) opposition to appeal dated June 11,
1975, FFW prayed for the exclusion of 124
employees submitted the company's list of 941
employees on the grounds that some have
either resigned, with double name entries,
casual employees with less than six months of
service and still others are confidential
employees or are part of management. ... 10.
FOITAF submitted its memorandum dated July
2, 1975, reiterating that the petition be dismissed
for FFW's failure to meet the 30% requirement
and alleging that an additional number of 32
workers have retracted their signatures to the
petition for certification election. Still later, on
July 9, 1975, FOITAF again filed a motion to
dismiss, this time attaching merely an affidavit of
its president, a certain Timbungeo, to the effect
that a total of 45 workers have retracted their
signatures. It is worthy of note that the
signatures of these alleged 45 retractors were
not presented. 11. Meanwhile, in the subsequent
hearings of the case, the company was
requested to submit the job descriptions or other
proofs relative to the duties of the 124
employees sought to be excluded by FFW from
the company's list of 941 but despite repeated
request therefor, the company submitted only
the job descriptions of only 9 employees.
Likewise, FOITAF did not present proof as to the
alleged retraction of the 45 workers .... 12. On
the basis of the foregoing, therefore, the Bureau
of Labor Relations, on August 29, 1975, issued a
resolution sustaining the previous order of the
Med-Arbiter for a certification election, the
dispositive part of which reads. "Premises
considered, and in order not to delay any further
the exercise of the employee's right to form a
labor organization of their own choosing, the
appealed order is affirmed. The Labor
Organization Division, this Bureau, shall conduct
the election and the necessary exclusion and
inclusion proceedings relative thereto.
Accordingly, the company is enjoined not to deal
with any labor organization until after the
election has been conducted and the results
have been conclusively determined." ... 13. A
motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid
resolution, which was opposed by respondent
FFW was filed by the petitioner herein and on
October 8, 1975, the Bureau of Labor Relations
denied the same.  5
The glaring weakness of the petition is thus fully
exposed. AU mentioned at the outset, it should
be dismissed for lack of merit.
1. Clearly, what is at stake is the constitutional
right to freedom of association on the part of
employees. Petitioner labor union was in the
past apparently able to enlist the allegiance of
the working force in the Anglo-American
Tobacco Corporation. Thereafter, a number of
such individuals joined private respondent labor
union. That is a matter clearly left to their sole
uncontrolled judgment. There is this excerpt
from Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Pan
American Employees Association:   "There is
6
both a constitutional and statutory recognition
that laborers have the right to form unions to
take care of their interests vis-a-vis their
employees. Their freedom to form organizations
would be rendered nugatory if they could not
choose their own leaders to speak on their
behalf and to bargain for them."   It cannot be
7
otherwise, for the freedom to choose which labor
organization to join is an aspect of the
Constitutional mandate of protection to
labor.   Prior to the Industrial Peace Act,   there
8 9
was a statute setting forth the guidelines for the
registration of labor unions.   , As implied
10
in Manila Hotel Co. v. Court of Industrial
Relations,   it was enacted pursuant to what is
11
ordained in the Constitution. Thus in Umali v.
Lovina,   it was held that mandamus lies to
12
compel the registration of a labor organization.
There is this apt summary of what is signified
in Philippine Land-Air-Sea Labor Union v. Court
of Industrial Relations,   "to allow a labor union
13
to organize itself and acquire a personality
distinct and separate from its members and to
serve as an instrumentality to conclude
collective bargaining agreements ... "   It is no
14
coin cadence that in the first decision of this
Court citing the Industrial Peace
Act,   Pambujan United Mine Workers v. Samar
15
Mining Company,   the role of a labor union as
16
the agency for the expression of the collective
will affecting its members both present and
prospective, was stressed. That statute certainly
was much more emphatic as to the vital aspect
of such a right as expressly set forth in the policy
of the law.   What is more, there is in such
17
enactment this categorical provision on the right
of employees to self organization: "Employees
shall have the right to self-organization and to
form, join or assist labor organizations of their
own choosing for the purpose of collective
bargaining through representatives of their own
choosing and to engage in concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining and
other mutual aid or protection,"   The new Labor
18
Code,   is equally explicit on the matter. Thus:
19
"The State shall assure the rights of workers to
self-organization, collective bargaining, security
of tenure and just and humane conditions of
work." 20
2. It is thus of the very essence of the regime of
industrial democracy sought to be attained
through the collective bargaining process that
there be no obstacle to the freedom Identified
with the exercise of the right to self-organization.
Labor is to be represented by a union that can
express its collective will. In the event, and this
is usually the case, that there is more than one
such group fighting for that privilege, a
certification election must be conducted. That is
the teaching of a recent decision, under the new
Labor Code, United Employees Union of
Gelmart Industries v. Noriel.   There is this
21
relevant excerpt: "The institution of collective
bargaining is, to recall Cox a prime manifestation
of industrial democracy at work. The two parties
to the relationship, labor and management,
make their own rules by coming to terms. That is
to govern themselves in matters that really
count. As labor, however, is composed of a
number of individuals, it is indispensable that
they be represented by a labor organization of
their choice. Thus may be discerned how crucial
is a certification election. So our decisions from
the earliest case of PLDT Employees Union v.
PLDT Co. Free Telephone Workers Union to the
latest, Philippine Communications Electronics &
Electricity Workers' Federation (PCWF) v. Court
of Industrial Relations, have made clear."   An
22
even later pronouncement in Philippine
Association of Free Labor Unions v. Bureau of
Labor Relations   speaks similarly: "Petitioner
23
thus appears to be woefully lacking in
awareness of the significance of a certification
election for the collective bargaining process. It
is the fairest and most effective way of
determining which labor organization can truly
represent the working force. It is a fundamental
postulate that the will of the majority, if given
expression in an honest election with freedom
on the part of the voters to make their choice, is
controlling. No better device can assure the
institution of industrial democracy with the two
parties to a business enterprise, management
and labor, establishing a regime of selfrule."  24
3. There can then be no legitimate objection to
the holding of a certification election not only in
the light of the basic theory of labor statutes from
Commonwealth Act 213 to the present Labor
Code, but also in view of the factual finding that
the verified petition by private respondent labor
union had the support of more than thirty percent
of the rank and file employees. Such being the
case, it becomes, in the language of the new
Labor Code, "mandatory for the Bureau to
conduct a certification election for the purpose of
determining the representative of the employees
in the appropriate bargaining unit and certify the
winner as the exclusive collective bargaining
representative of all the employees in the
unit."   It would run counter to the law then, with
25
the duty thus imposed on respondent Director, to
ignore the demand that it be held. It would
follow, therefore, that no grave abuse of
discretion, much leas arbitrariness, could be
imputed to the rejection of the plea of petitioner
to set aside the challenged order, there is
persuasiveness, likewise, to the submission of
Solicitor General Mendoza in the comment filed,
that the thirteen employees who allegedly
retracted were not even present before the
medarbiter and that the alleged additional forty-
five employees who supposedly likewise
changed their minds, were also not called to
testify to that effect, petitioner satisfying itself
with their being named in an affidavit executed
by its president. That would make, so it is
plausibly contended, such alleged retraction to
be highly dubious in character. There is this
reinforcement to the contention of respondent
public official in this closing paragraph of such
comment: "Besides, the best forum for
determining whether there were indeed
retractions from some of the laborers is in the
certification election, itself wherein the workers
can freely express their choice in a secret ballot.
If, wherefore, petitioner herein is confident that it
commands the majority of the workers in the
collective bargaining unit, why then does it
vigorously oppose a certification election."  26
4. The lack of merit in the petition is equally
obvious considering that what asked of this
Court is, in the final analysis, to set aside a
factual finding arrived at by respondent Director
after a careful consideration of all the relevant
matters pertinent to the issue. Again, that is
contrary to the constant holding of this Tribunal
in a host of cases starting from National Labor
Union v. Dinglasan   to Adame v. Court of
27
Industrial Relations. 28
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. This Ferrer-Calleja in BLR Case No.
decision is immediately executory so as to A-034-81 (NCR-LRD-M-9-361-
enable the holding forthwith of the certification 80).
election. The restraining order issued on
November 26, 1975 is hereby lifted. No costs. Petitioner prays for the issuance of a restraining
order enjoining the respondent BLR Director
Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Martin, JJ., from proceeding with the certification election in
concur. BLR Case No. 034-81 (NCR-LRD-M-9-361-80)
and moves to dismiss the petition for certification
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave. election filed by Philippine Airlines Non-
Managerial Employees Association (PANOMEA-
FUR).
3. G.R. No. 76673 June 22, 1988
The records show that prior to the effectivity of
the Labor Code on November 1, 1974, there
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES EMPLOYEES'
were four collective bargaining agents in the
ASSOCIATION (PALEA), petitioner,
Philippine Airlines, Inc., namely: 1) the Airline
vs.
Pilots Association of the Philippine (ALPAP),
HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, Director of
representing pilots; 2) Flight Attendants and
the Bureau of Labor Relations, PHILIPPINE
Flight Stewards Association of the Philippines,
AIRLINES NON-MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES
(FASAP), representing flight attendants and
ASSOCIATION (PANOMEA-FUR), and
stewards; 3) Philippine Airlines Supervisors'
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
Association (PALSA), representing ground
supervisory personnel, and 4) petitioner
Juanito R. Carlos, Jr. for private respondent (PALEA) representing ground rank-and-file
PANOMEA-FUR. personnel.

Cenon S. Cervantes, Jr. for respondent PAL. Pursuant to Section II, Rule II of the Labor Code,
in relation to Articles 212(k) and 246, Labor
Code as amended, the continued existence of
PALSA was rejected, because a supervisory
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.: union could not organize as a labor unit separate
from that of the rank-and-file organization. In
Petitioner in this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, alleges anticipation of PALSA's dissolution, the
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Bureau of Labor Relations in
issuing the following orders:
Philippine Airlines Personnel Association
(PALPA-Legayada) filed on November 19, 1974
a petition for certification election under BLR
1. NCR Med-Arbiter Edgardo
Case No. 0013. In this case, the BLR Director
dela Cruz' Resolution dated
ruled on November 24,1975 that "all employees
January 13, 1981;
with the positions of division heads or above
shall be considered "managerial employees" and
2. BLR Resolution dated ineligible to vote, and all others shall be declared
November 27,1981 signed by rank and file."
OIC Romeo Young;
On April 27,1977, a certification election was
3. BLR Order signed by Director held among: (1) PALPA, (2) PALEA, and (3) No
Cresenciano Trajano dated April Union. PALEA, as the winner in that election,
4, 1986; was certified by the BLR as the exclusive
bargaining agent of all the rank-and-file
4. BLR Order signed by Director employee of the Philippine Airlines, Inc.
Cresenciano Trajano dated
June 26, 1986; and

5. BLR Order dated October 29,

1986 signed by Director Pura
PALEA and PAL signed a 3-year collective
bargaining agreement effective October 1, 1976
up to September 30, 1979. Its life was, by
agreement of the parties, extended up to
September 30, 1980.
Before the expiration of the agreement in
September, 1980, the respondent Philippine
Airlines Non-Managerial Employees' Association
(PANOMEA-FUR) filed a petition for certification
election among the "administrative, supervisory,
licensed mechanics, technical and confidential
employees" of PAL, alleging inter alia  that "there
is no other union existing in the proposed
bargaining unit nor is there a certified collective
bargaining agreement which may be a bar to the
petition." PALEA, which had an existing
collective bargaining agreement with the
Management, was not mentioned in the petition,
nor notified of the filing of the same. Although
PAL had filed its position paper in the said
certification election case, the Med-Arbiter
issued a resolution on January 13, 1981,
granting the petition for a certification election
among the administrative, supervisory, licensed
mechanics, technical and confidential
employees of PAL with the following as the
contending parties: P (1) PANOMEA-FUR and
(2) No Union.
Upon learning of the Med-Arbiters resolution.
PALEA appealed to the BLR Director on
February 9, 1981 as a compulsory intervenor.
The BLR Officer-in-charge affirmed on
November 27, 1981 the Med-Arbiter's resolution
calling for a certification election. PALEA and
PAL filed separate motions for reconsideration of
the BLR resolution.
Meanwhile, PAL and PALEA concluded a
collective bargaining agreement on May 19,
1981, with a three-year life span from October 1,
1980 to September 30, 1983. It was renewed for
another three-year period expiring on September
30, 1986.
While PAL and PALEA's motions for
reconsideration were pending resolution by the
BLR Director, the licensed mechanics whom
PANOMEA-FUR sought to represent, filed their
own petition for certification election on October
16, 1984 under the name of PAL
Licensed/Amalgamated Federation of Labor of
the Philippines (PALMA-AFL).
PAL and PLEA separately filed an
answer/opposition to the petition of PALMA-AFL.
PALEA argued that it was the exclusive
bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees
of PAL, including the members of PALMA-AFL
who are also embraced within the CBA that was
concluded between PAL and PALEA.
On October 11, 1985, the BLR Director
dismissed the petition of the licensed mechanics
only (PALMA-AFL), excluding the administrative,
supervisory, technical and confidential
employees. He ruled that the existing law did not
allow the creation of a separate bargaining unit
for the licensed mechanics at PAL, because they
were considered members of the existing rank-
and-file unit represented for collective bargaining
purposes by PALEA.
However, on April 4, 1986, the BLR Director
ordered the holding of a certification election
among the administrative, supervisory, licensed
mechanics, technical and confidential
employees of PAL and denied PAL's and
PALEA's motions for reconsideration of the
BLR's November 27, 1981 decision.
In his Order of June 26, 1986, BLR Director
Cresciano Trajano denied PAL's and PALEA's
motions for reconsideration. However, finding it
necessary to conduct pre-election conferences
to delineate the proper composition of the
proposed bargaining unit, the BLR on August 15,
1986 temporarily restrained the holding of the
certification election. On October 29, 1986, BLR
Director Calleja lifted the restraining order and
directed the holding of the said election.
Hence, this petition for certiorari by PALEA,
alleging that the BLR Director erred:
1. in ordering a certification election among
PAL's administrative, supervisory, licensed
mechanics, technical and confidential
employees as a separate bargaining unit distinct
from the rank-and-file employees, in violation of
specific provisions of the Labor Code as
amended, particularly Article 256 thereof; and
2. in not dismissing the petition for certification
election filed by respondent PANOMEA-FUR
(NCR-LRD-M-9-361-80) for having been
rendered moot and academic by supervening
factors.
Petitioner claims that PALEA is the exclusive
bargaining representative of all rank-and-file
PAL employees, and that PANOMEA seeks to
dismember or fragmentize the already existing
unit so that another one may be created.
Furthermore, petitioner argues that PANOMEA's
petition for a certification election is fatally
defective, as it is not supported by the
signatures of at least 30% of the bargaining unit
composed of 7,000 rank-and-file employees
(only 369 signatures were allegedly obtained),
contrary to law and national policy.
We are not persuaded that the public
respondent gravely abused her discretion in
issuing the assailed orders.
The rule is that factual findings of the Bureau of
Labor Relations which are supported by
substantial evidence are binding on this Court
and must be respected (Asian Design and
Manufacturing Corp. vs. Deputy Minister of
Labor, 142 SCRA 79). The Bureau of Labor
Relations found that the present CBA between
PALEA and PAL covers only the rank and file
employees but not the licensed mechanics,
administrative, supervisory, technical and
confidential employees of PAL. The petition
failed to prove that PANOMEA's petition lacked
the support of 30% of the employees.
Employees have a constitutional right to choose
their own bargaining representative. The holding
of a certification election is a statutory policy that
should not be circumvented (George and Peter
Lines, Inc. vs. Association of Labor Unions
[ALU], 134 SCRA 92).
Whenever there is doubt as to whether a
particular union represents the majority of the
rank-and-file employees, in the absence of a
legal impediment, the holding of a certification
election is the most democratic method of
determining the employees' choice of their
bargaining representative. It is the appropriate
means whereby controversies and disputes on
representation may be laid to rest, by the
unequivocal vote of the employees themselves.
In lifting the restraining order which her
predecessor had issued, and ordering that the
certification election proceed, respondent Ferrer-
Calleja opened the door for the employees to
express their choice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ.,
concur.
4. G.R. No. 102350 June 30, 1994
TRADE UNIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
ALLIED SERVICES WORLD FEDERATION OF
TRADE UNIONS (TUPAS-WFTU), petitioners,
vs.
HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, in his
capacity as Undersecretary of Labor &
Employment and NATIONAL FEDERATION
OF LABOR UNIONS (NAFLU), respondents.
Alfredo L. Bentulan for petitioners.
Bunao, Cadizquilas & Associates for private
respondent.
PUNO, J.:
The records reveal that the rank-and-file
employees of the Philippine Development and
Industrial Corporation (PDIC), represented by
petitioner Trade Unions of the Philippines and
Allied Services (TUPAS), entered into a
collective bargaining agreement with said
company. The CBA expired on April 31, 1991.
On March 8, 1991, PDIC received a letter from
the president of petitioner’s local chapter union.
The company was informed that the union had
resolved to disaffiliate from petitioner and
affiliate with private respondent National
Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU). PDIC
entertained reservations about the validity of the
disaffiliation. It was not clear whether the union’s
board resolution to disaffiliate was ratified by the
majority of its members. Furthermore, PDIC had
received reports that some employees were
coerced to support the disaffiliation.
On April 24, 1991, within the 60-day freedom
period, PDIC and private respondent NAFLU
filed separate petitions for certification election
with the Department of Labor and Employment latter must
(DOLE), Regional Office No. 3 in San Fernando, inform the
Pampanga. Both petitions prayed for the holding former about
of a certification election between NAFLU and the intention of
petitioner TUPAS, to determine the collective their said local
bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees union and to
in PDIC’s plant and quarry. The two petitions settle the matter
were consolidated and docketed as Case No. by themselves.
R033-9104-RU-006, with petitioner TUPAS as If not so settled,
compulsory intervenor. the matter will
be brought to
On May 14, 1991, petitioner TUPAS filed an the attention of
Urgent Motion To Refer Case To LACC the Fraternal
Fraternal Relations Committee, citing paragraph Relations
1(b) of the LACC (Labor Advisory Consultative Committee of
Council) Code of Ethics which provides: the LACC for
final
determination or
1. Non-Union raiding
settlement.  1

xxx xxx xxx

Said Code of Ethics was adopted and signed by
four base organizations, namely: Kilusang Mayo
b. Where company is organized. Uno (KMU), to which private respondent NAFLU
is affiliated; Federation of Free Workers (FFW);
All organized Lakas ng Manggagawa Labor Center (LMLC);
local affiliates or and Philippine World Federation of Trade Unions
unions of any (WFTU) Affiliates, which includes petitioner
LACC member TUPAS.   Petitioner urged the DOLE to "give its
2

must be imprimatur and uphold the binding effect of the

discouraged Code among the LACC members."  3

from
disaffiliating Despite the Urgent Motion, Med-Arbiter Antonio
from their R. Cortez, on June 3, 1991, issued an Order
incumbent labor with the following dispositive portion:
federations/nati
onal union
ACCORDINGLY, let a
affiliation.
certification election be
However, LACC
conducted among the regular
recognizes the
rank-and-file employees of the
ultimate
Philippine Development and
authority and
Industrial Corporation, with the
right of the local
following choices, to wit:
unions to
decide for
themselves 1. National Federation of Labor
during the Unions (NAFLU);
freedom period.
In the event that 2. Trade Unions of the
said local Philippines Allied Services
unions intend to (TUPAS); and
disaffiliate from
any LACC 3. No Union.
member and to
affiliate with
another
member, the
 The January 1991 payrolls shall
be used as the basis to
determine the qualified voters in
this election.
A pre-election conference
intended to thresh out the
mechanics of the aforesaid
election will be called by this
Office after ten (10) days from
receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
The emphasis given by the
Code of Ethics on the right of
the local unions to decide for
themselves during the freedom
period is in accordance with the
provision of the Labor Code
which allows another union to
question the majority status of
the incumbent bargaining agent
within the sixty-day freedom
period. This is embodied in
Article 256 of the Labor code, as
amended by RA 6715, to wit:

"Art.
The Order was appealed to the Secretary of
256. Represent
Labor and Employment, and the case was
ation issue in
docketed as OS-MA-A-7-212-91. On August 15,
organized
1991, the Secretary of Labor and Employment
establishments.
affirmed the Order. Labor Undersecretary
In organized
Laguesma held, viz.:
establishments,
when a verified
The Code of Ethics being petition
invoked by TUPAS is internal to questioning the
the Labor Advisory and majority status
Consultative Council (LACC). In of the
other words, it behooves on the incumbent
signatories to the Code to bargaining
comply and respect its agent is filed
provisions. This Office, before the
therefore, can only take Department of
cognizance of the Code and Labor and
recognize its provisions if the Employment
parties thereto fully and mutually within the sixty-
respect the same Otherwise, we day period
are left with no other recourse before the
but to dispose of the instant expiration of a
case on the basis of existing collective
and applicable laws and rules. bargaining
agreement, the
It appears that total reliance on Med-Arbiter
the Code of Ethics is misplaced. shall
It must be pointed out that no automatically
less than the aforequoted order an
provision of the Code of Ethics election by
recognizes the "ultimate secret ballot
authority and right of the local when the
unions to decide for themselves verified petition
during the freedom period." is supported by
Necessarily, the Code of Ethics the written
itself does not sanction any act consent of at
that would curtail the right of the least twenty-five
workers to institute petitions for per cent (25%)
certification election during the of all the
freedom period, as in the case employees in
at bar. the bargaining
 unit to ascertain
the will of the
employees in
the appropriate
bargaining unit."
It being not disputed that the
petition of NAFLU is sufficient in
form and in substance, a
certification election is indeed
warranted.  4
On October 7, 1991, respondent undersecretary
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
On October 27, 1991, a certification election was
conducted among the rank-and-file workers of
PDIC at Iba, Meycauayan, Bulacan. One
hundred eighteen (118) of the one hundred
thirty-six (136) qualified voters participated in the
elections. Petitioner garnered six (6) votes, while
private respondent got one hundred twelve
(112). On November 5, 1991, Med-Arbiter
Antonio R. Cortez issued an Order certifying
private respondent as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of all rank-and-file workers of
PDIC.  5
Thus, on November 6, 1991, petitioners filed this
original action for Certiorari and Mandamus with
Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction,
"seeking to ANNUL the questioned Resolution
dated August 15, 1991, and the Order dated
October 7, 1991."  6
On November 18, 1991, we issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining respondents from
enforcing the impugned Resolution and Order.
We find no merit in the petition.
Public respondent did not act with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in affirming the Med-Arbiter’s Order,
dated June 3, 1991. The order for the holding of
a certification election among the rank-and-file
employees of PDIC finds legal warrant in Art.
256 of the amended Labor Code, as earlier
quoted. Under said provision, the Med-Arbiter
shall automatically order a certification election
by secret ballot in an organized establishment
such as PDIC, provided the following requisites
are met: (1) that a petition questioning the
majority status of the incumbent bargaining
agent is filed before the DOLE within the sixty-
day freedom period; (2) that such petition is
verified; and (3) that the petition is supported by
the written consent of at least twenty-five (25%)
per cent of all employees in the bargaining unit.
It is undisputed that all these requirements were
met by private respondent NAFLU in its petition
before the DOLE Regional Office No. 3, in San
Fernando, Pampanga. Thus, Med-Arbiter
Cortez, acting in accordance with Art. 256 of the
Labor Code, as amended, had no recourse but
to automatically order the holding of a
certification election at PDIC.
It bears stressing that no obstacle must be
placed to the holding of certification
elections,   for it is a statutory policy that should
7
not be circumvented.   We have held that
8
whenever there is doubt as to whether a
particular union represents the majority of the
rank-and-file employees, in the absence of a
legal impediment, the holding of a certification
election is the most democratic method of
determining the employees’ choice of their
bargaining representative. It is the appropriate
means whereby controversies and disputes on
representation may be laid to rest, by the
unequivocal vote of the employees
themselves.   Indeed, it is the keystone of
9
industrial democracy.
Art. 256 of the Labor Code cannot be supplanted
by the Code of Ethics of the LACC. Said Code
cannot amend or repeal a law. And, as correctly
observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, it
merely provides for a voluntary mechanism to
settle intra-union disputes. It only applies when
both parties to the dispute seek the mediation of
said Committee. However, when one of the
parties decides to avail of the remedy provided
for under Art. 256 of our Labor Code and files
the proper petition with the DOLE, jurisdiction
over the dispute is exclusively acquired by and
cannot be wrenched away from the Med-Arbiter.
It is familiar learning that jurisdiction is vested by
law, and not by agreement between or among
the parties. Moreover, labor disputes involve
public interest, and hence any private agreement
on their settlement cannot prevail over what is
provided for by our laws.
The court also recognizes the fact that the
certification election sought to be stopped by
petitioner is now fait accompli, and the rank-and-
file employees of PDIC have articulated their
choice as to who shall be their collective
bargaining agent in no uncertain terms. In the
certification election legally held before we
issued our temporary restraining order in the
case, the PDIC workers voted, 112 to 6 (with 18
qualified voters not participating in the election),
to make private respondent their sole and
exclusive bargaining agent. This democratic
decision deserves utmost respect, especially
since it was not attended by any legal infirmity.
Again, it bears stressing that labor legislation
seeks in the main to protect the interest of the
members of the working class. It should never
be used to subvert their will.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED
for lack of merit. The Resolution dated August
15, 1991, and the Order dated October 7, 1991
of respondent Department of Labor and
Employment Undersecretary Bienvenido E.
Laguesma in OS-MA-A-7-212-91 is hereby
AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.
5. G.R. No. 172132, July 23, 2014
THE HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA,
ACTING THROUGH ITS OWNER,
GRAND PLAZA HOTEL
CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. SECRETA
RY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT;
MED-ARBITER TOMAS F. FALCONITIN;
AND NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS
IN THE HOTEL, RESTAURANT AND
ALLIED INDUSTRIES–HERITAGE
HOTEL MANILA SUPERVISORS
CHAPTER (NUWHRAIN-
HHMSC), Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Although case law has repeatedly held
that the employer was but a bystander in
respect of the conduct of the certification
election to decide the labor organization to
represent the employees in the bargaining
unit, and that the pendency of the
cancellation of union registration brought
against the labor organization applying for
the certification election should not
prevent  the conduct of the certification
election, this review has to look again at
the seemingly never-ending quest of the
petitioner employer to stop the conduct of
the certification election on the ground of
the pendency of proceedings to cancel the
labor organization’s registration it had
initiated on the ground that the
membership of the labor organization was
a mixture of managerial and supervisory
employees with the rank-and-file
employees.
Under review at the instance of the
employer is the decision promulgated on
December 13, 2005,1 whereby the Court
of Appeals (CA) dismissed its petition
for certiorari to assail the resolutions of 
respondent Secretary of Labor and
Employment sanctioning the conduct of
the certification election initiated by
respondent labor organization.2 cralawlawlibrary
Antecedents
On October 11, 1995, respondent National
Union of Workers in Hotel Restaurant and
Allied Industries-Heritage Hotel Manila
Supervisors Chapter (NUWHRAIN-HHMSC)
filed a petition for certification
election,3 seeking to represent all the
supervisory employees of Heritage Hotel
Manila. The petitioner filed its opposition,
but the opposition was deemed denied on
February 14, 1996 when Med-Arbiter
Napoleon V. Fernando issued his order for
the conduct of the certification election.
The petitioner appealed the order of Med-
Arbiter Fernando, but the appeal was also
denied. A pre-election conference was
then scheduled. On February 20, 1998,
however, the pre-election conference was
suspended until further notice because of
the repeated non-appearance of
NUWHRAIN-HHMSC.4 cralawlawlibrary
On January 29, 2000, NUWHRAIN-HHMSC
moved for the conduct of the pre-election
conference. The petitioner primarily filed
its comment on the list of employees
submitted by NUWHRAIN-HHMSC, and
simultaneously sought the exclusion of
some from the list of employees for
occupying either confidential or
managerial positions.5 The petitioner filed
a motion to dismiss on April 17,
2000,6 raising the prolonged lack of
interest of NUWHRAIN-HHMSC to pursue
its petition for certification election.
On May 12, 2000, the petitioner filed a
petition for the cancellation of
NUWHRAIN-HHMSC’s registration as a
labor union for failing to submit its annual
financial reports and an updated list of
members as required by Article 238 and
Article 239 of the Labor Code, docketed as
Case No. NCR-OD-0005-004-IRD
entitled The Heritage Hotel Manila, acting
through its owner, Grand Plaza Hotel
Corporation v. National Union of Workers
in the Hotel, Restaurant and Allied
Industries-Heritage Hotel Manila
Supervisors Chapter (NUWHRAIN-
HHSMC).7 It filed another motion on June
1, 2000 to seek either the dismissal or the
suspension of the proceedings on the
basis of its pending petition for the
cancellation of union registration.8cralawlawlibrary
The following day, however, the
Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) issued a notice scheduling the
certification elections on June 23, 2000.9
Dissatisfied, the petitioner commenced in
the CA on June 14, 2000 a special civil
action for certiorari,10 alleging that the
DOLE gravely abused its discretion in not
suspending the certification election
proceedings. On June 23, 2000, the CA
dismissed the petition for certiorari for
non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies.11 cralawlawlibrary
The certification election proceeded as
scheduled, and NUWHRAIN-HHMSC
obtained the majority vote of the
bargaining unit.12 The petitioner filed a
protest (with motion to defer the
certification of the election results and the
winner),13 insisting on the illegitimacy of
NUWHRAIN-HHMSC.
Ruling of the Med-Arbiter
On January 26, 2001, Med-Arbiter Tomas
F. Falconitin issued an order,14 ruling that
the petition for the cancellation of union
registration was not a bar to the holding
of the certification election, and disposing
thusly:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
respondent employer/protestant’s protest
with motion to defer certification of results
and winner is hereby dismissed for lack of
merit.
Accordingly, this Office hereby certify
pursuant to the rules that
petitioner/protestee, National Union of
Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied
Industries-Heritage Hotel Manila
Supervisory Chapter (NUWHRAIN-HHSMC)
is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent
of all supervisory employees of the
Heritage Hotel Manila acting through its
owner, Grand Plaza Hotel Corporation for
purposes of collective bargaining with
respect to wages, and hours of work and
other terms and conditions of
employment.
SO ORDERED.
cralawlawlibrary
The petitioner timely appealed to the
DOLE Secretary claiming that: (a) the
membership of NUWHRAIN-HHMSC
consisted of managerial, confidential, and
rank-and-file employees; (b) NUWHRAIN-
HHMSC failed to comply with the
reportorial requirements; and (c) Med-
Arbiter Falconitin simply brushed aside
serious questions on the illegitimacy of
NUWHRAIN-HHMSC.15 It contended that a
labor union of mixed membership of
supervisory and rank-and-file employees
had no legal right to petition for the
certification election pursuant to the
pronouncements in Toyota Motor
Philippines Corporation v. Toyota Motor
Philippines Corporation Labor
Union16(Toyota Motor) and Dunlop
Slazenger (Phils.) v. Secretary of Labor
and Employment17(Dunlop Slazenger).
 Ruling of the DOLE Secretary the matter to the CA by petition
for certiorari.22
cralawlawlibrary

On August 21, 2002, then DOLE Secretary

Patricia A. Sto. Tomas issued a resolution
denying the appeal,18 and affirming the
order of Med-Arbiter Falconitin, viz:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The
Ruling of the CA
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary On December 13, 2005,23 the CA
dismissed the petition for certiorari, giving
its following disquisition: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

order of the Med-Arbiter dated 26 January

2001 is hereby AFFIRMED. The petition for certiorari filed by the
petitioner is, in essence, a continuation of
SO RESOLVED. the debate on the relevance of the Toyota
Motor, Dunlop Slazenger and Progressive
Development cases to the issues raised.
DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas observed that
the petitioner’s reliance on Toyota Motor
Toyota Motor and Dunlop Slazenger are
and Dunlop Slazenger was misplaced
anchored on the provisions of Article 245
because both rulings were already
of the Labor Code which prohibit
overturned by SPI Technologies, Inc. v.
managerial employees from joining any
Department of Labor and
labor union and permit supervisory
Employment,19 to the effect that once a
employees to form a separate union of
union acquired a legitimate status as a
their own.  The language naturally
labor organization, it continued as such
suggests that a labor organization cannot
until its certificate of registration was
carry a mixture of supervisory and rank-
cancelled or revoked in an independent
and-file employees.  Thus, courts have
action for cancellation.
held that a union cannot become a
legitimate labor union if it shelters under
The petitioner moved for reconsideration.
its wing both types of employees.  But
there are elements of an elliptical
In denying the motion on October 21,
reasoning in the holding of these two
2002, the DOLE Secretary declared that
cases that a petition for certification
the mixture or co-mingling of employees
election may not prosper until the
in a union was not a ground for dismissing
composition of the union is settled
a petition for the certification election
therein. Toyota Motor, in particular,
under Section 11, par. II, Rule XI of
makes the blanket statement that a
Department Order No. 9; that the
supervisory union has no right to file a
appropriate remedy was to exclude the
certification election for as long as it
ineligible employees from the bargaining
counts rank-and-file employees among its
unit during the inclusion-exclusion
ranks.  More than four years after Dunlop
proceedings;20 that the dismissal of the
Slazenger, the Court clarified in Tagaytay
petition for the certification election based
Highlands International Golf Club Inc vs
on the legitimacy of the petitioning union
Tagaytay Highlands Employees Union-
would be inappropriate because it would
PTGWO that while Article 245 prohibits
effectively allow a collateral attack against
supervisory employees from joining a
the union’s legal personality; and that a
rank-and-file union, it does not provide
collateral attack against the personality of
what the effect is if a rank-and-file union
the labor organization was prohibited
takes in supervisory employees as
under Section 5, Rule V of Department
members, or vice versa. Toyota
Order No. 9, Series of 1997.21
Motor and Dunlop Slazenger jump into an
cralawlawlibrary

unnecessary conclusion when they foster

Upon denial of its motion for
the notion that Article 245 carries with it
reconsideration, the petitioner elevated
the authorization to inquire collaterally
into the issue wherever it rears its ugly
head.
Tagaytay Highlands proclaims, in the light
of Department Order 9, that after a
certificate of registration is issued to a
union, its legal personality cannot be
subject to a collateral attack.  It may be
questioned only in an independent petition
for cancellation. In
fine, Toyota and Dunlop Slazenger are a
spent force. Since Tagaytay Highlands was
handed down after these two cases, it
constitutes the latest expression of the will
of the Supreme Court and supersedes or
overturns previous rulings inconsistent
with it.  From this perspective, it is
needless to discuss whether SPI
Technologies as a mere resolution of the
Court may prevail over a full-blown
decision that Toyota Motor or Dunlop
Slazenger was.  The ruling in SPI
Technologies has been echoed
in Tagaytay Highlands, for which reason it
is with Tagaytay Highlands, not SPI
Technologies, that the petitioner must
joust.
The fact that the cancellation proceeding
has not yet been resolved makes it
obvious that the legal personality of the
respondent union is still very much in
force.  The DOLE has thus every reason to
proceed with the certification election and
commits no grave abuse of discretion in
allowing it to prosper because the right to
be certified as collective bargaining agent
is one of the legitimate privileges of a
registered union.  It is for the petitioner to
expedite the cancellation case if it wants
to put an end to the certification case, but
it cannot place the issue of the union’s
legitimacy in the certification case, for
that would be tantamount to making the
collateral attack the DOLE has staunchly
argued to be impermissible.
The reference made by the petitioner to
another Progressive Development case
that it would be more prudent for the
DOLE to suspend the certification case
until the issue of the legality of the
registration is resolved, has also been
satisfactorily answered.  Section 11, Rule
XI of Department Order 9 provides for the
grounds for the dismissal of a petition for
certification election, and the pendency of
a petition for cancellation of union
registration is not one of them. 
Like Toyota Motor and Dunlop
Slazenger, the second Progressive case
came before Department Order 9.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
disputed resolutions of the Secretary of
Labor and Employment are AFFIRMED,
and the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
The petitioner sought
reconsideration,24 but its motion was
denied.
Issues
Hence, this appeal, with the petitioner
insisting that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
RULING THAT TAGAYTAY
HIGHLANDS APPLIES TO THE CASE AT
BAR
II
[THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS]
SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT
DISREGARDED PROGRESSIVE
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION – PIZZA
HUT V. LAGUESMA  WHICH HELD THAT IT
WOULD BE MORE PRUDENT TO SUSPEND
THE CERTIFICATION CASE UNTIL THE
ISSUE OF THE LEGALITY OF THE
REGISTRATION OF THE UNION IS FINALLY
RESOLVED
III
BECAUSE OF THE PASSAGE OF TIME,
RESPONDENT UNION NO LONGER
POSSESSES THE MAJORITY STATUS SUCH
THAT A NEW CERTIFICATION ELECTION
IS IN ORDER25
chanrobleslaw

The petitioner maintains that the ruling
in Tagaytay Highlands International Golf
Club Inc v. Tagaytay Highlands Employees
Union-PTGWO26 (Tagaytay Highlands) was
inapplicable because it involved the co-
mingling of supervisory and rank-and-file
employees in one labor organization, while
the issue here related to the mixture of
membership between two employee
groups — one vested with the right to
self-organization (i.e., the rank-and-file
and supervisory employees), and the
other deprived of such right (i.e.,
managerial and confidential employees);
that suspension of the certification
election was appropriate because a finding
of “illegal mixture” of membership during
a petition for the cancellation of union
registration determined whether or not
the union had met the 20% representation
requirement under Article 234(c) of
the Labor Code; 27 and that in holding that
mixed membership was not a ground for
canceling the union registration, except
when such was done through
misrepresentation, false representation or
fraud under the circumstances
enumerated in Article 239(a) and (c) of
the Labor Code, the CA completely
ignored the 20% requirement under
Article 234(c) of the Labor Code.
The petitioner posits that the grounds for
dismissing a petition for the certification
election under Section 11, Rule XI of
Department Order No. 9, Series of 1997,
were not exclusive because the other
grounds available under the Rules of
Court could be invoked; that
in Progressive Development Corporation
v. Secretary, Department of Labor and
Employment,28 the Court ruled that
prudence could justify the suspension of
the certification election proceedings until
the issue of the legality of the union
registration could be finally resolved; that
the non-submission of the annual financial
statements and the list of members in the
period from 1996 to 1999 constituted a
serious challenge to NUWHRAIN-HHMSC’s
right to file its petition for the certification
election; and that from the time of the
conduct of the certification election on
June 23, 2000, the composition of
NUWHRAIN-HHMSC had substantially
changed, thereby necessitating another
certification election to determine the true
will of the bargaining unit.
In short, should the petition for the
cancellation of union registration based on
mixed membership of supervisors and
managers in a labor union, and the non-
submission of reportorial requirements to
the DOLE justify the suspension of the
proceedings for the certification elections
or even the denial of the petition for the
certification election?
Ruling
We deny the petition for review
on certiorari.
Basic in the realm of labor union rights is
that the certification election is the sole
concern of the workers,29 and the
employer is deemed an intruder as far as
the certification election is
concerned.30 Thus, the petitioner  lacked
the legal personality to assail the
proceedings for the certification
election,31 and should stand aside as a
mere bystander who could not oppose the
petition, or even appeal the Med-Arbiter’s
orders relative to the conduct of the
certification election.32 As the Court has
explained in Republic v. Kawashima
Textile Mfg., Philippines,
Inc.33 (Kawashima): chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Except when it is requested to bargain
collectively, an employer is a mere
bystander to any petition for certification
election; such proceeding is non-
adversarial and merely investigative, for
the purpose thereof is to determine which
organization will represent the employees
in their collective bargaining with the
employer. The choice of their
representative is the exclusive concern of
the employees; the employer cannot have
any partisan interest therein; it cannot
interfere with, much less oppose, the
process by filing a motion to dismiss or an
appeal from it; not even a mere allegation
that some employees participating in a
petition for certification election are
actually managerial employees will lend an
employer legal personality to block the
certification election. The employer's only
right in the proceeding is to be notified or
informed thereof.
The petitioner’s meddling in the conduct of
the certification election among its
employees unduly gave rise to the
suspicion that it intended to establish a
company union.34 For that reason, the
challenges it posed against the
certification election proceedings were
rightly denied.
cancellation of union registration should
have cautioned the Med-Arbiter against
conducting the certification election.
The petitioner does not convince us.
In The Heritage Hotel Manila v. National
Union of Workers in the Hotel, Restaurant
and Allied Industries-Heritage Hotel
Manila Supervisors Chapter (NUWHRAIN-
HHMSC),38 the Court declared that the
dismissal of the petition for the
cancellation of the registration of
NUWHRAIN-HHMSC was proper when
viewed against the primordial right of the
workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining negotiations and peaceful
concerted actions, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Under the long established rule, too, the

xxxx
filing of the petition for the cancellation of
NUWHRAIN-HHMSC’s registration should
[Articles 238 and 239 of the Labor Code]
not bar the conduct of the certification
give the Regional Director ample
election.35 In that respect, only a final
discretion in dealing with a petition for
order for the cancellation of the
cancellation of a union's registration,
registration would have prevented
particularly, determining whether the
NUWHRAIN-HHMSC from continuing to
union still meets the requirements
enjoy all the rights conferred on it as a
prescribed by law. It is sufficient to give
legitimate labor union, including the right
the Regional Director license to treat the
to the petition for the certification
late filing of required documents as
election.36 This rule is now enshrined in
sufficient compliance with the
Article 238-A of the Labor Code, as
requirements of the law. After all, the law
amended by Republic Act No.
requires the labor organization to submit
9481,37 which reads:
the annual financial report and list of
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

members in order to verify if it is still

Article 238-A. Effect of a Petition for
Cancellation of Registration. – A petition
for cancellation of union registration shall
not suspend the proceedings for
certification election nor shall it prevent
the filing of a petition for certification
election.
xxxx
Still, the petitioner assails the failure of
NUWHRAIN-HHMSC to submit its periodic
financial reports and updated list of its
members pursuant to Article 238 and
Article 239 of the Labor Code. It contends
that the serious challenges against the
legitimacy of NUWHRAIN-HHMSC as a
union raised in the petition for the
viable and financially sustainable as an
organization so as to protect the employer
and employees from fraudulent or fly-by-
night unions. With the submission of the
required documents by respondent, the
purpose of the law has been achieved,
though belatedly.
We cannot ascribe abuse of discretion to
the Regional Director and the DOLE
Secretary in denying the petition for
cancellation of respondent's registration.
The union members and, in fact, all the
employees belonging to the appropriate
bargaining unit should not be deprived of
a bargaining agent, merely because of the
negligence of the union officers who were
responsible for the submission of the
documents to the BLR.
Labor authorities should, indeed, act with
circumspection in treating petitions for
cancellation of union registration, lest they
be accused of interfering with union
activities. In resolving the petition,
consideration must be taken of the
fundamental rights guaranteed by Article
XIII, Section 3 of the Constitution, i.e.,
the rights of all workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities. Labor authorities should bear in
mind that registration confers upon a
union the status of legitimacy and the
concomitant right and privileges granted
by law to a legitimate labor organization,
particularly the right to participate in or
ask for certification election in a
bargaining unit. Thus, the cancellation of a
certificate of registration is the equivalent
of snuffing out the life of a labor
organization. For without such
registration, it loses - as a rule - its rights
under the Labor Code.
It is worth mentioning that the Labor
Code's provisions on cancellation of union
registration and on reportorial
requirements have been recently
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9481, An Act Strengthening the Workers’
Constitutional Right to Self-Organization,
Amending for the Purpose Presidential
Decree No. 442, As Amended, Otherwise
Known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines, which lapsed into law on May
25, 2007 and became effective on June
14, 2007. The amendment sought to
strengthen the workers’ right to self-
organization and enhance the Philippines'
compliance with its international
obligations as embodied in the
International Labor Organization (ILO)
Convention No. 87, pertaining to the non-
dissolution of workers’ organizations by
administrative authority. Thus, R.A. No.
9481 amended Article 239 to read:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ART. 239. Grounds for Cancellation of
Union Registration.--The following may
constitute grounds for cancellation of
union registration: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) Misrepresentation, false statement or
fraud in connection with the adoption or
ratification of the constitution and by-laws
or amendments thereto, the minutes of
ratification, and the list of members who
took part in the ratification;
(b) Misrepresentation, false statements or
fraud in connection with the election of
officers, minutes of the election of officers,
and the list of voters;
(c) Voluntary dissolution by the members.
R.A. No. 9481 also inserted in the Labor
Code Article 242-A, which provides:
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
ART. 242-A. Reportorial Requirements.--
The following are documents required to
be submitted to the Bureau by the
legitimate labor organization
concerned:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) Its constitution and by-laws, or
amendments thereto, the minutes of
ratification, and the list of members who
took part in the ratification of the
constitution and by-laws within thirty (30)
days from adoption or ratification of the
constitution and by-laws or amendments
thereto;
(b) Its list of officers, minutes of the
election of officers, and list of voters
within thirty (30) days from election;
(c) Its annual financial report within thirty
(30) days after the close of every fiscal
year; and
(d) Its list of members at least once a
year or whenever required by the Bureau.
Failure to comply with the above
requirements shall not be a ground
for cancellation of union registration
but shall subject the erring officers or
members to suspension, expulsion
from membership, or any appropriate
penalty.
xxxx

The ruling thereby wrote finis to the
challenge being posed by the petitioner
against the illegitimacy of NUWHRAIN-
HHMSC.
The remaining issue to be resolved is
which among Toyota Motor, Dunlop
Slazenger and Tagaytay Highlands applied
in resolving the dispute arising from the
mixed membership in NUWHRAIN-HHMSC.
This is not a novel matter.
In Kawashima,39 we have reconciled our
rulings in Toyota Motor, Dunlop
Slazenger and Tagaytay Highlands by
emphasizing on the laws prevailing at the
time of filing of the petition for the
certification election.
Toyota Motor and Dunlop
Slazenger involved petitions for
certification election filed on November
26, 1992 and September 15, 1995,
respectively. In both cases, we applied the
Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A.
No. 6715 (also known as the 1989
Amended Omnibus Rules), the prevailing
rule then.
The 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules was
amended on June 21, 1997 by
Department Order No. 9, Series of 1997.
Among the amendments was the removal
of the requirement of indicating in the
petition for the certification election that
there was no co-mingling of rank-and-file
and supervisory employees in the
membership of the labor union. This was
the prevailing rule when the Court
promulgated Tagaytay Highlands,
declaring therein that mixed membership
should have no bearing on the legitimacy
of a registered labor organization, unless
the co-mingling was due to
misrepresentation, false statement or
fraud as provided in Article 239 of the
Labor Code.40 cralawlawlibrary
Presently, then, the mixed membership
does not result in the illegitimacy of the
registered labor union unless the same
was done through misrepresentation, false
statement or fraud according to Article
239 of the Labor Code. In Air Philippines
Corporation v. Bureau of Labor
Relations,41 we categorically explained
that—
Clearly, then, for the purpose of de-
certifying a union, it is not enough to
establish that the rank-and-file union
includes ineligible employees in its
membership. Pursuant to Article 239 (a)
and (c) of the Labor Code, it must be
shown that there was misrepresentation,
false statement or fraud in connection
with the adoption or ratification of the
constitution and by-laws or amendments
thereto, the minutes of ratification, or in
connection with the election of officers,
minutes of the election of officers, the list
of voters, or failure to submit these
documents together with the list of the
newly elected-appointed officers and their
postal addresses to the BLR.
We note that NUWHRAIN-HHMSC filed its
petition for the certification election on
October 11, 1995. Conformably
with Kawashima, the applicable law was
the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules, and
the prevailing rule was the
pronouncement in Toyota
Motor and Dunlop Slazenger to the effect
that a labor union of mixed membership
was not possessed with the requisite
personality to file a petition for the
certification election.
Nonetheless, we still rule in favor of
NUWHRAIN-HHMSC. We expound.
In both Toyota Motor and Dunlop
Slazenger, the Court was convinced that
the concerned labor unions were
comprised by mixed rank-and-file and
supervisory employees. In Toyota
Motor, the employer submitted the job
descriptions of the concerned employees
to prove that there were supervisors in
the petitioning union for rank-and-file
employees. In Dunlop Slazenger, the
Court observed that the labor union of
supervisors included employees occupying
positions that apparently belonged to the
rank-and-file. In both Toyota
Motor and Dunlop Slazenger, the
employers were able to adduce substantial
evidence to prove the existence of the
mixed membership. Based on the records
herein, however, the petitioner failed in
that respect. To recall, it raised the issue
of the mixed membership in its comment
on the list of members submitted by
NUWHRAIN-HHMSC, and in its protest. In
the comment, it merely identified the
positions that were either confidential or
managerial, but did not present any
supporting evidence to prove or explain
the identification. In the protest, it only
enumerated the positions that were
allegedly confidential and managerial, and
identified two employees that belonged to
the rank-and-file, but did not offer any
description to show that the positions
belonged to different employee groups.
Worth reiterating is that the actual
functions of an employee, not his job
designation, determined whether the
employee occupied a managerial,
supervisory or rank-and-file position.42 As
to confidential employees who were
excluded from the right to self-
organization, they must (1) assist or act in
a confidential capacity, in regard (2) to
persons who formulated, determined, and
effectuated management policies in the
field of labor relations.43 In that regard,
mere allegations sans substance would
not be enough, most especially because
the constitutional right of workers to self-
organization would be compromised.
At any rate, the members of NUWHRAIN-
HHSMC had already spoken, and elected it
as the bargaining agent. As between the
rigid application of Toyota
Motors and Dunlop Slazenger, and the
right of the workers to self-organization,
we prefer the latter. For us, the choice is
clear and settled. “What is important is
that there is an unmistakeable intent of
the members of [the] union to exercise
their right to organize. We cannot impose
rigorous restraints on such right if we are
to give meaning to the protection to labor
and social justice clauses of the
Constitution.” 44 cralawlawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the
petition for review
on certiorari; AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on December 13, 2005 by
the Court of Appeals; and ORDERS the
petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED
6. G.R. No. 82260 July 19, 1989
ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS
(ALU), petitioner,
vs.
HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, DIRECTOR,
BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT AND NATIONAL
FEDERATION OF LABOR (NFL), respondents.
GANCAYCO,  J.:
This is a petition for the issuance of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari for the
reversal of the Decision   of the Director of
1
Bureau of Labor Relations ordering the holding
of a certification election among the workers of
Soriano Fruits Corporation.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Associated Labor Unions, ALU for
brevity, had a collective bargaining agreement
with the employer Soriano Fruits Corporation
which expired on September 30,1987. Prior to
the said date, or on June 22, 1987, petitioner
and the employer signed a collective bargaining
agreement which was to take effect on
September 1, 1987 and was to remain so until
August 31, 1990. The said collective bargaining
agreement was unanimously approved and
ratified by the members of the bargaining unit.
However, on August 10, 1987, private
respondent National Federation of Labor (NFL),
filed a petition for certification election
questioning the majority status of the incumbent
union, pursuant to Executive Order 111 and its
Implementing Rules, there being more than
majority of its members who have expressed
doubts on the sincerity of the incumbent
union.   Acting on the said petition the Med-
2
Arbiter scheduled a hearing on August 21, 1987
to determine the majority status of herein
petitioner but the NFL representative failed to
appear despite due notice. Consequently, the
hearing was reset to September 8, 1987 to give
NFL an opportunity to substantiate its claim but
again, the NFL was not represented. Thereafter,
the parties were asked to submit their position
papers. To bolster its claim, ALU submitted
several petitions signed by members of the
bargaining unit to dismiss any petition filed by
any union which seeks to question the majority
status of the incumbent union. The signatories to
the petition also reaffirmed its loyalty to ALU.
On October 2, 1987, the Med-Arbiter
promulgated an Order   dismissing the petition
3
for certification election on the ground of failure
to prosecute. An appeal to the Bureau of Labor
Relations however, proved fruitful. On December
22, 1987 the respondent Director of the Bureau
of Labor Relations held that the Med-Arbiter
erred in dismissing the petition for certification
election. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads thus:
WHEREFORE in view of the
foregoing, the appeal of
petitioner, National Federation
of Labor is hereby given due
course and the Order of the
Med-Arbiter is set aside. Let,
therefore a certification election
proceed at Soriano Fruits
Corporation, after a pre-election
conference to thresh out the list
of eligible voters, with the
following choices:
1. National Federation of Labor
(NFL);
2. Associated Labor Unions
(ALU).
SO ORDERED.  4
ALU sought a reconsideration of the above-cited
decision but to no avail. Hence, the instant
petition for certiorari.
Petitioner alleges that in granting the petition for
certification election, the respondent Director
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in that:
I. THE HONORABLE
DIRECTOR MISSED THE
LEGAL INTENT OF ARTICLE
257 AS AMENDED BY
EXECUTIVE ORDER 111.
II. THE HONORABLE
DIRECTOR ERRED IN
CLAIMING THAT THE
PETITION IS SUPPORTED BY
MORE THAN TWENTY (20%)
OF THE RANK AND FILE.
III. THE RATIFICATION OF
THE CONCLUDED
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT RENDERS THE
CERTIFICATION ELECTION
MOOT AND ACADEMIC.
This Court finds the petition bereft of merit.
Petitioner hinges its claim on Art. 257 of the
Labor Code which provides:
Art. 257. Petitions in
unorganized establishments. In
any establishment where there
is no certified bargaining agent,
the petition for certification
election filed by a legitimate
labor organization shall be
supported by the written
consent of at least twenty (20%)
percent of all the employees in
the bargaining unit. Upon
receipt and verification of such
petition, the Med-Arbiter shall
automatically order the conduct
of a certification election.
But this provision finds no application in the case
at bar primarily because it applies to
unorganized establishments. For the said
provision to apply, the establishment concerned
must have no certified bargaining agent. This is
not the case in the present petition where there
was a collective bargaining agreement entered
into by the management of the Soriano Fruits
Corporation and ALU, the petitioner, which was
then the bargaining agent. This Court however,
finds that it is Article 256 as amended by
Executive Order 111 which must be considered
in the resolution of the present petition. The said
article states:
Article 256. Representation
Issues in Organized
Establishments. In organized
establishments, when a petition
questioning the majority status
of the incumbent bargaining
agent is filed before the
Ministry within the sixty (60) day
period before the expiration of
the collective bargaining
agreement, the Med- Arbiter
shall automatically order an
election by secret ballot to
ascertain the will of the
employees in the appropriate
bargaining unit. (Emphasis
supplied)
A review of the records of this case would
confirm the fact that the petition for certification
election filed by NFL on August 10, 1987 was
well within the prescribed sixty (60) day freedom
period.
Petitioner however maintains that the
respondent Director misconstrued the legal
intent behind the above- cited provision and that
it should not have been given a literal
interpretation. Petitioner insists further that the
light of the members of the bargaining unit to
choose which union should represent them is
not an absolute one since a prior hearing must
be had to ascertain the veracity of the
allegations contained in the petition.
This argument is untenable.
The provision of Article 256 which provides that
the Med-Arbiter shall automatically order an
election is clear and leaves no room for further
interpretation. The mere filing of a petition for
certification election within the freedom period is
sufficient basis for the respondent Director to
order the holding of a certification election. The
fact that NFL did not appear during the hearings
set by the Med-Arbiter is of no moment. As the
Solicitor General correctly pointed out, there is
no prohibition on the conduct of hearings by the
Med-Arbiter on the competing stands of the
unions. Neither does the law require the same to
be held whereby the absence or presence
therefrom of any union representative would
affect the petition for certification election. In
fact, it is the denial of the petition for certification
election grounded solely on the absence of NFL
in the scheduled hearings which is frowned upon
by the law. This is consistent with the principle in
labor legislation that "certification proceedings is
not a litigation in the sense in which the term is
ordinarily understood, but an investigation of
non-adversary and fact finding character. As
such, it is not bound by technical rules of
evidence."  5
Petitioner suggests that to grant the petition for
certification election would "open the floodgates
to unbridled and scrupulous (sic) petitions whose
only objective is to prejudice the industrial peace
and stability existing in the Company."   This
6
Court believes however that the workers' choice
regarding their representative who inevitably
reflects and works for their common interest is of
paramount importance. This policy was lengthily
explained in the concurring opinion of then Chief
Justice Fernando in the case of Confederation
of Citizens Labor Unions (CCLU) vs. National
Labor Relations Commission   where he
7
categorically stated that "the slightest doubt
therefore cannot be entertained that what
possesses significance in a petition for
certification is that through such a device the
employees are given the opportunity to make
known who shall have the right to represent
them. What is equally important is that not only
some but all of them should have the right to do
so." 8
Petitioner next contends that the respondent
Director erred in relying upon the claim of the
respondent Union that the petition for
certification election is supported by more than
twenty percent (20%) of the rank and file
considering that the said petition merely
contained the lone signature of the NFL
representative.
This averment is likewise unmeritorious.
Petitioner bases its argument again on Article
257 which prescribes the twenty percent (20%)
requirement. But it must be reiterated that the
said requirement applies only to unorganized
establishments. It is Article 256 instead which
must be applied. A perusal of the said Article
would confirm the falsity of the claim of
petitioner. Nowhere in the said provision does it
require the written consent of twenty percent
(20%) of the employees in the bargaining unit.
Hence, the issue of whether or not the petition
for certification election is supported by twenty
percent (20%) of the bargaining unit concerned
is immaterial to the case at bar. What is
essential is that the petition was filed during the
sixty-day freedom period.
The petition to dismiss the petition for
certification elections   filed by NFL and signed
9 was to take effect only on September 1, 1987,
by some 224 employees signifying their
satisfaction with the services of the incumbent
union should not be given any weight at all. The
possibility that the workers were merely coerced
to sign the petition such that they did so for fear
of reprisal from the members of ALU is not
remote. However, this does not discount the
possibility that the workers voluntarily signed the
said petition. Whatever reason the workers may
have had for signing the same may be
ascertained once a certification election is held.
It is in this democratic process that the workers
are given the opportunity to freely choose, by
secret ballot, who they want to represent them.
In this manner, the workers are free of any
undue pressure which either competing union
may exert upon them.
Finally, the petitioner assails the decision of the
respondent Director on the ground that "the
ratification of the collective bargaining
agreement renders the certification election
moot and academic."  10
This contention finds no basis in law.
The petitioner was obviously referring to the
contract-bar rule where the law prohibits the
holding of certification elections during the
lifetime of the collective bargaining agreement.
Said agreement was hastily and prematurely
entered into apparently in an attempt to avoid
the holding of a certification election. The
records show that the old collective bargaining
agreement of the petitioner with Soriano Fruits
Corporation was to expire on August 31, 1987.
However, three (3) months and eight (8) days
before its expiry date, or on June 22, 1987, the
petitioner renewed the same with the consent
and collaboration of management. The renewed
agreement was then ratified by the members of
the bargaining unit and was thereafter sent to
the Bureau of Labor Relations for certification. In
the meantime, on August 10, 1987 (21 days
before the expiration of the old collective
bargaining agreement on August 31, 1987) a
petition for certification election was filed by
respondent union, NFL. From the foregoing
facts, it is quite obvious that the renewed
agreement cannot constitute a bar to the instant
petition for certification election for the very
reason that the same was not yet in existence
when the petition for certification election was
filed on August 10, 1987 inasmuch as the same
after the old agreement expires on August 31,
1987.
In the case of  Associated Trade Unions-ATU vs.
Noriel,   this Court held that "it is indubitably
11
clear from the facts heretofore unfolded that
management and petitioner herein proceeded
with such indecent haste in renewing their CBA
way ahead of the sixty-day freedom period in
their obvious desire to frustrate the will of the
rank and file employees in selecting their
bargaining representative. To countenance the
actuation of the company and the petitioner
herein would be violative of the employees
constitutional right to self-organization. 12
The Solicitor General, in his comment, brought
the attention of this Court to the fact that
petitioner had violated the provisions of Article
254  when it renewed the collective bargaining
13
agreement before the commencement of the
sixty-day freedom period. This Court does not
subscribe to this view. What the aforecited rule
prohibits is the modification and alteration of the
present collective bargaining agreement during
its lifetime. In the present case, the alterations
and modifications were to take effect only on
September 1, 1987, i.e., after the expiration of
the old agreement. It must be noted that the new
agreement did not suspend the old one. Neither
did it terminate nor modify the same. Petitioner
therefore did not commit any violation of Article
254 of the Labor Code, contrary to the
allegations of the Solicitor General.
However, it is apparent that certiorari does not
lie in the instant petition for this Court does not
see any substantial reason to withhold the
primordial right of workers to select their
bargaining representative.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
temporary restraining order issued by resolution
of this Court of July 11, 1988 is hereby lifted and
declared to be of no force and effect. The
decision is immediately executory. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
7. G.R. No. 104556 March 19, 1998
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR
(NFL), petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HIJO
PLANTATION INC., (HPI), respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner NFL (National Federation of Labor)
was chosen the bargaining agent of rank-and-file No Union
employees of the Hijo Plantation Inc. (HPI) in
Mandaum, Tagum, Davao del Norte at a
certification election held on August 20, 1989.
Protests filed by the company and three other
unions against the results of the election were
denied by the Department of Labor and
Employment in its resolution dated February 14,
1991 but, on motion of the company (HPI), the
DOLE reconsidered its resolution and ordered
another certification election to be held. The
DOLE subsequently denied petitioner NFL's
motion for reconsideration.
The present petition is for certiorari to set aside
orders of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment dated August 29, 1991, December
26, 1991 and February 17, 1992, ordering the
holding of a new certification election to be
conducted in place of the one held on August
20, 1989 and, for this purpose, reversing its
earlier resolution dated February 14, 1991
dismissing the election protests of private
respondent and the unions.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On November 12, 1988, a certification election
was conducted among the rank-and-file
employees of the Hijo Plantation, Inc. resulting in
the choice of "no union." However, on July 3,
1989, on allegations that the company
intervened in the election, the Director of the
Bureau of Labor Relations nullified the results of
the certification election and ordered a new one
to be held.
The new election was held on August 20, 1989
under the supervision of the DOLE Regional
Office in Davao City with the following results:
Total Votes cast 1,012
Associated Trade Unions (ATU) 39
RUST KILUSAN 5
National Federation of Labor (NFL) 876
Southern Philippines Federation of Labor 4
SANDIGAN 6
UFW 15
55
Invalid 13
The Trust Union Society and Trade Workers-
KILUSAN (TRUST-Kilusan), the United Lumber
and General Workers of the Philippines
(ULGWP), the Hijo Labor Union and the Hijo
Plantation, Inc. sought the nullification of the
results of the certification election on the ground
that it was conducted despite the pendency of
the appeals filed by Hijo Labor Union and
ULGWP from the order, dated August 17, 1989,
of the Med-Arbiter denying their motion for
intervention. On the other hand, HPI claimed
that it was not informed or properly represented
at the pre-election conference. It alleged that, if it
was represented at all in the pre-election
conference, its representative acted beyond his
authority and without its knowledge. Private
respondent also alleged that the certification
election was marred by massive fraud and
irregularities and that out of 1,692 eligible voters,
913, representing 54% of the rank-and-file
workers of private respondent, were not able to
vote, resulting in a failure of election.
On January 10, 1990, Acting Labor Secretary
Dionisio dela Serna directed the Med-Arbiter,
Phibun D. Pura, to investigate the company's
claim that 54% of the rank-and-file workers were
not able to vote in the certification election.
In his Report and Recommendation, dated
February 9, 1990, Pura stated:
1. A majority of the rank-and-file workers had
been disfranchised in the election of August 20,
1989 because of confusion caused by the
announcement of the company that the election
had been postponed in view of the appeals of
ULGWP and Hijo Labor Union (HLU) from the
order denying their motions for intervention. In
addition, the election was held on a Sunday
which was non-working day in the company.
2. There were irregularities committed in the
conduct of the election. It was possible that
some people could have voted for those who did
not show up. The election was conducted in an
open and hot area. The secrecy of the ballot had
been violated. Management representatives
were not around to identify the workers.
3. The total number of votes cast, as duly
certified by the representation officer, did not
tally with the 41-page listings submitted to the
Med-Arbitration Unit. The list contained 1,008
names which were checked or encircled
(indicating that they had voted) and 784 which
were not, (indicating that they did not vote), or a
total of 1,792. but according to the
representation officer the total votes cast in the
election was 1,012.
Med-Arbiter Pura reported that he interviewed
eleven employees who claimed that they were
not able to vote and who were surprised to know
that their names had been checked to indicate
that they had voted.
But NFL wrote a letter to Labor Secretary Ruben
Torres complaining that it had not been informed
of the investigation conducted by Med-Arbiter
Pura and so was not heard on its evidence. For
this reason, the Med-Arbiter was directed by the
Labor Secretary to hear interested parties.
The Med-Arbiter therefore summoned the
unions. TRUST-Kilusan reiterated its petition for
the annulment of the results of the certification
election. Hijo Labor Union manifested that it was
joining private respondent HPI's appeal,
adopting as its own the documentary evidence
presented by the company, showing fraud in the
election of August 20, 1989. On the other hand,
petitioner NFL reiterated its contention that
management had no legal personality to file an
appeal because it was not a party to the election
but was only a bystander which did not even
extend assistance in the election. Petitioner
denied that private respondent HPI was not
represented in the pre-election conference,
because the truth was that a certain Bartolo was
present on behalf of the management and he in
fact furnished the DOLE copies of the list of
employees, and posted in the company
premises notices of the certification election.
Petitioner NFL insisted that more than majority
of the workers voted in the election. It claimed
that out of 1,692 qualified voters, 1,012 actually
voted and only 680 failed to cast their vote. It
charged management with resorting to all kinds
of manipulation to frustrate the election and
make the "Non Union" win.
In a resolution dated February 14, 1991, the
DOLE upheld the August 20, 1989 certification
election. With respect to claim that election could
not be held in view of the pendency of the
appeals of the ULGWP and Hijo Labor Union
from the order of the Med-Arbiter denying their
motions for intervention, the DOLE said: 1
. . . even before the conduct of the
certification election on 12 November
1988 which was nullified, Hijo Labor
Union filed a motion for interventions.
The same was however, denied for
being filed unseasonably, and as a
result it was not included as one of the
choices in the said election. After it has
been so disqualified thru an order which
has become final and executory, ALU
filed a second motion for intervention
when a second balloting was ordered
conducted. Clearly, said second motion
is proforma and intended to delay the
proceedings. Being so, its appeal from
the order of denial did not stay the
election and the Med-Arbiter was correct
and did not violate any rule when he
proceeded with the election even with
the appeal. In fact, the Med-Arbiter need
 not rule on the motion as it has already
been disposed of with finality.
The same is true with the motion for
intervention of ULGWP. The latter
withdrew as a party to the election on
September 1988 and its motion to
withdraw was granted by the Med-
Arbiter on October motion for
intervention filed before the conduct of a
second balloting where the choices has
already been pre-determined.
Let it be stressed that ULGWP and HLU
were disqualified to participate in the
election through valid orders that have
become final and executory even before
the first certification election was
conducted. Consequently, they may not
be allowed to disrupt the proceeding
through the filing of nuisance motions.
Much less are they possessed of the
legal standing to question the results of
the second election considering that
they are not parties thereto.
The DOLE gave no weight to the report of the
Med-Arbiter that the certification election was
marred by massive fraud and irregularities.
Although affidavits were submitted showing that
the election was held outside the company
premises and private vehicles were used as
makeshift precincts, the DOLE found that this
was because respondent company did not allow
the use of its premises for the purpose of holding
the election, company guards were allegedly
instructed not to allow parties, voters and DOLE
representation officers to enter the company
premises, and notice was posted on the door of
the company that the election had been
postponed.
Nor was weight given to the findings of the Med-
Arbiter that a majority of the rank-and-file
workers had been disfranchised in the August
20, 1989 election and that the secrecy of the
ballot had been violated, first, because the NFL
was not given notice of the investigation nor the
chance to present its evidence to dispute this
finding and, second, the Med Arbiter's report
was not supported by the minutes of the
proceedings nor by any record of the interviews
of the 315 workers. Moreover, it was pointed out
that the report did not state the names of the
persons investigated, the questions asked and
the answers given. The DOLE held that the
report was "totally baseless."
The resolution of February 14, 1991 concluded
with a reiteration of the rule that the choice of the
exclusive bargaining representative is the sole
concern of the workers. It said: "If indeed there
were irregularities committed during the election,
the contending unions should have been the first
to complain considering that they are the ones
which have interest that should be protected." 2
Accordingly, the Labor Secretary denied the
petition to annul the election filed by the
ULGWP, TRUST-KILUSAN, HLU and the HPI
and instead certified petitioner NFL as the sole
and exclusive bargaining representative of the
rank-and-file employees of private respondent
HPI.
However, on motion of HPI, the Secretary of
Labor, on August 29, 1991, reversed his
resolution of February 14, 1991. Petitioner NFL
filed a motion for reconsideration but its motion
was denied in an order, dated December 26,
1991. Petitioner's second motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied in another
order dated February 17, 1992. Hence, this
petition.
First. Petitioner contends that certification
election is the sole concern of the employees
and the employer is a mere bystander. The only
instance wherein the employer may actively
participate is when it files a petition for
certification election under Art. 258 of the Labor
Code because it is requested to bargain
collectively. Petitioner says that this is not the
case here and so the DOLE should not have
given due course to private respondent's petition
for annulment of the results of the certification
election.
In his resolution of August 29, 1991, the
Secretary of Labor said he was reversing his
earlier resolution because "workers of Hijo
Plantation, Inc. have deluged this Office with
their letter-appeal, either made singly or
collectively expressing their wish to have a new
certification election conducted" and that as a
result "the firm position we held regarding the
integrity of the electoral exercise had been
somewhat eroded by this recent declaration of
the workers, now speaking in their sovereign
capacity."
It is clear from this, that what the DOLE
Secretary considered in reversing its earlier
rulings was not the petition of the employer but
the letter-appeals that the employees sent to his
office denouncing the irregularities committed
during the August 20, 1989 certification election.
The petition of private respondent was simply
the occasion for the employees to voice their
protests against the election. Private respondent
HPI attached to its Supplemental Appeal filed on
September 5, 1989 the affidavits and appeals of
more or less 784 employees who claimed that
they had been disfranchised, as a result of which
they were not able to cast their votes at the
August 20, 1989 election. It was the protests of
employees which moved the DOLE to
reconsider its previous resolution of February
14, 1991, upholding the election.
Nor is it improper for private respondent to show
interest in the conduct of the election. Private
respondent is the employer. The manner in
which the election was held could make the
difference between industrial strife and industrial
harmony in the company. What an employer is
prohibited from doing is to interfere with the
conduct of the certification election for the
purpose of influencing its outcome. But certainly
an employer has an abiding interest in seeing to
it that the election is clean, peaceful, orderly and
credible.
Second. The petitioner argues that any protest
concerning the election should be registered and
entered into the minutes of the election
proceedings before it can be considered. In
addition, the protest should be formalized by
filing it within five (5) days. Petitioner avers that
these requirements are condition precedents in
the filing of an appeal. Without these requisites
the appeal cannot prosper. It cites the following
provisions of Book V, Rule VI of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Labor Code:
Sec. 3. Representation officer may rule
on any on-the-spot question. — The
Representation officer may rule on any
on-the-spot question arising from the
conduct of the election. The interested
party may however, file a protest with
the representation officer before the
close of the proceedings.
Protests not so raised are deemed
waived. Such protests shall be
contained in the minutes of the
proceedings.
Sec. 4. Protest to be decided in twenty
(20) working days. — Where the protest
is formalized before the med-arbiter
within five (5) days after the close of the
election proceedings, the med-arbiter
shall decide the same within twenty (20)
working days from the date of its
formalization. If not formalized within the
prescribed period, the protest shall be
deemed dropped. The decision may be
appealed to the Bureau in the same
manner and on the same grounds as
provided under Rule V.
In this case, petitioner maintains that private
respondent did not make any protest regarding
the alleged irregularities (e.g., massive
disfranchisement of employees) during the
election. Hence, the appeal and motions for
reconsideration of private respondent HPI
should have been dismissed summarily.
The complaint in this case was that a number of
employees were not able to cast their votes
because they were not properly notified of the
date. They could not therefore have filed their
protests within five (5) days. At all events, the
Solicitor General states, that the protests were
not filed within five (5) days, is a mere
technicality which should not be allowed to
prevail over the workers' welfare. 3 As this Court
stressed in LVN Pictures, Inc. v. Phil.  Musicians
Guild, 4 it is essential that the employees must
be accorded an opportunity to freely and
intelligently determine which labor organization
shall act in their behalf. The workers in this case
were denied this opportunity. Not only were a
substantial number of them disfranchised, there
were, in addition, allegations of fraud and other
irregularities which put in question the integrity of
the election. Workers wrote letters and made
complaints protesting the conduct of the
election. The Report of Med-Arbiter Pura who
investigated these allegations found the
allegations of fraud and irregularities to be true.
In one case this Court invalidated a certification
election upon a showing of disfranchisement,
lack of secrecy in the voting and bribery. 5 We
hold the same in this case. The workers' right to
self-organization as enshrined in both the
Constitution and Labor Code would be rendered
nugatory if their right to choose their collective
bargaining representative were denied. Indeed,
the policy of the Labor Code favors the holding
of a certification election as the most conclusive
way of choosing the labor organization to
represent workers in a collective bargaining
unit. 6 In case of doubt, the doubt should be
resolved in favor of the holding of a certification
election.
Third. Petitioner claims that the contending
unions, namely, the Association of Trade Union
(ATU), the Union of Filipino Workers (UFW), as
well as the representation officers of the DOLE
affirmed the regularity of the conduct of the
election and they are now estopped from
questioning the election.
In its comment, ATU-TUCP states,
. . . The representative of the
Association of Trade Unions really attest
to the fact that we cannot really identify
all the voters who voted on that election
except some workers who were our
supporters in the absence of Hijo
Plantation representatives. We also
attest that the polling precinct were not
conducive to secrecy of the voters since
it was conducted outside of the
Company premises. The precincts were
(sic) the election was held were located
in a passenger waiting shed infront of
the canteen across the road; on the
yellow pick-up; at the back of a car; a
waiting shed near the Guard House and
a waiting shed infront of the Guard
House across the road. Herein private
respondents also observed during the
election that there were voters who
dictated some voters the phrase
"number 3" to those who were casting
their votes and those who were about to
vote. Number 3 refers to the National
Federation of Labor in the official ballot.
ATU-TUCP explains that it did not file any
protest because it expected workers who had
been aggrieved by the conduct of the election
would file their protest since it was in their
interests that they do so.
Fourth. Petitioner points out that the letter-
appeals were written almost two years after the
election and they bear the same dates (May 7
and June 14, 1991); they are not verified; they
do not contain details or evidence of intelligent
acts; and they do not explain why the writers
failed to vote. Petitioner contends that the letter-
appeals were obtained through duress by the
company.
We find the allegations to be without merit. The
records shows that as early as August 22 and
30, 1989, employees already wrote
letters/affidavits/
manifestoes alleging irregularities in the
elections and disfranchisement of workers. 7 As
the Solicitor General says in his
Comment, 8 these affidavits and manifestoes,
which were attached as Annexes "A" to "CC"
and Annexes "DD" to "DD-33" to private
respondent's Supplemental Petition of
September 5, 1989 — just 16 days after the
August 20, 1989 election. It is not true therefore
that the employees slept on their rights.
As to the claim that letters dated May 7, 1991
and June 14, 1991 bear these same dates
because they were prepared by private
respondent HPI and employees were merely
asked to sign them, suffice it to say that this is
plain speculation which petitioner has not proven
by competent evidence.
As to the letters not being verified, suffice it to
say that technical rules of evidence are not
binding in labor cases.
The allegation that the letters did not contain
evidence of intelligent acts does not have merit.
The earlier letters 9 of the workers already gave
details of what they had witnessed during the
election, namely the open balloting (with no
secrecy), and the use of NFL vehicles for polling
precinct. These letters sufficiently give an idea of
the irregularities of the certification election.
Similarly, the letters containing the signatures of
those who were not able to vote are sufficient.
They indicate that the writers were not able to
vote because they thought the election had been
postponed, especially given the fact that the two
unions had pending appeals at the time from
orders denying them the right to intervene in the
election.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is
DISMISSED and the questioned orders of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
8. G.R. No. 115077 April 18, 1997
PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION-PIZZA HUT, petitioner,
vs.
HON. BIENVENIDO LAGUESMA, in his
capacity as Undersecretary of Labor, and
NAGKAKAISANG LAKAS NG
MANGGAGAWA (NLM)-
KATIPUNAN, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
On July 9, 1993, Nagkakaisang Lakas ng
Manggagawa (NLM)-Katipunan (respondent
Union) filed a petition for certification election
with the Department of Labor (National Capital
Region) in behalf of the rank and file employees
of the Progressive Development Corporation
(Pizza Hut) docketed as NCR Case No. NCR-
OD-M-9307-020.  1
Petitioner filed on August 20, 1993, a verified
Motion to Dismiss the petition alleging fraud,
falsification and misrepresentation in the
respondent. Union's registration making it void
and invalid. The motion specifically alleged that:
a) respondent Union's registration was tainted
with false, forged, double or multiple signatures
of those who allegedly took part in the ratification
of the respondent Union's constitution and by-
laws and in the election of its officers that there
were two sets of supposed attendees to the
alleged organizational meeting that was alleged
to have taken place on June 26, 1993; that the
alleged chapter is claimed to have been
supported by 318 members when in fact the
persons who actually signed their names were
much less; and b) while the application for
registration of the charter was supposed to have
been approved in the organizational meeting
held on June 27, 1993, the charter certification
issued by the federation KATIPUNAN was
dated June 26, 1993 or one (1) day prior to the
formation of the chapter, thus, there were
serious falsities in the dates of the issuance of
the charter certification and the organization
meeting of the alleged chapter.
Citing other instances of misrepresentation and
fraud, petitioner, on August 29, 1993, filed a
Supplement to its Motion to Dismiss,   claiming
2
that:
1) Respondent Union alleged
that the election of its officers
was held on June 27, 1993;
however, it appears from the
documents submitted by
respondent union to the BIR-
DOLE that the Union's
constitution and by-laws were
adopted only on July 7, 1993,
hence, there was no bases for
the supposed election of officers
on June 27, 1993 because as of
this date, there existed no
positions to which the officers
could be validly elected;
2) Voting was not conducted by
secret ballot in violation of
Article 241, section (c) of the
Labor Code;
3) The Constitution and by Laws
submitted in support of its
petition were not properly
acknowledged and notarized.  3
On August 30, 1993, petitioner filed a
Petition   seeking the cancellation of the Union's
4
registration on the grounds of fraud and
falsification, docketed as BIR Case No. 8-21-
83.   Motion was likewise filed by petitioner with
5
the Med-Arbiter requesting suspension of
proceedings in the certification election case
until after the prejudicial question of the Union's
legal personality is determined in the
proceedings for cancellation of registration.
However, in an Order dated September 29,
1993,   Med-Arbiter Rasidali C. Abdullah directed
6
the holding of a certification election among
petitioner's rank and file employees. The Order
explained:
 . . . Sumasaklaw sa
Manggagawa ng Pizza Hut is a
legitimate labor organization in
contemplation of law and shall
remain as such until its very
charter certificate is canceled or
otherwise revoked by competent
authority. The alleged
misrepresentation, fraud and
false statement in connection
with the issuance of the charter
certificate are collateral issues
which could be properly
ventilated in the cancellation
proceedings.  7
On appeal to the office of the Secretary of Labor,
Labor Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma
in a Resolution dated December 29,
1993   denied the same.
8 union's Secretary/Treasurer and
A motion for reconsideration of the public
respondent's resolution was denied in his
Order   dated January 27, 1994, hence, this
9 certification election
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court where the principal
issue raised is whether or not the public
respondent committed grave abuse of discretion
in affirming the Med-Arbiter's order to conduct a
certification election among petitioner's rank and
file employees, considering that: (1) respondent
Union's legal personality was squarely put in
issue; (2) allegations of fraud and falsification,
supported by documentary evidence were made;
and (3) a petition to cancel respondent Union's
registration is pending with the regional office of
the Department of Labor and Employment.  10
We grant the petition.
In the public respondent's assailed Resolution
dated December 29, 1993, the suggestion is
made that once a labor organization has filed the
necessary documents and papers and the same
have been certified under oath and attested to,
said organization necessarily becomes clothed
with the character of a legitimate labor
organization. The resolution declares:
Records show that at the time of
the filing of the subject petition
on 9 July 1993 by the petitioner
NLM-KATIPUNAN, for and in
behalf of its local affiliate
Sumasaklaw sa Manggagawa
ng Pizza Hut, the latter has
been clothed with the status
and/or character of a legitimate
labor organization. This is so,
because on 8 July 1993,
petitioner submitted to the
Bureau of Labor Relations
(BLR), this Department, the
following documents: Charter
Certificate, Minutes of the
Organizational Meeting, List of
Officers, and their respective
addresses, financial statement,
Constitution and By-Laws (CBL,
and the minutes of the
ratification of the CBL). Said
documents (except the charter
certificate) are certified under
oath and attested to by the local
President, respectively.
As to the contention that the
proceedings should be
suspended in view of the
pending case for the
cancellation of the petitioner's
certificate of registration, let it be
stressed that the pendency of a
cancellation case is not a
ground for the dismissal or
suspension of a representation
proceedings considering that a
registered labor organization
continues to be a legitimate one
entitled to all the rights
appurtenant thereto until a final
valid order is issued canceling
such registration.  11
In essence, therefore, the real controversy in this
case centers on the question of whether or not,
after the necessary papers and documents have
been filed by a labor organization, recognition by
the Bureau of Labor Relations merely becomes
a ministerial function.
We do not agree.
In the first place, the public respondent's views
as expressed in his December 29, 1993
Resolution miss the entire point behind the
nature and purpose of proceedings leading to
the recognition of unions as legitimate labor
organizations. Article 234 of the Labor Code
provides:
Art. 234. Requirements of
registration. — Any applicant
labor organization, association
or group of unions or workers
shall acquire legal personality
and shall be entitled to the rights
and privileges granted by law to
legitimate labor organizations
upon issuance of the certificate
of registration based on the
following requirements:
(a) Fifty pesos (P50.00)
registration fee;
(b) The names of its officers,
their addresses, the principal
address of the labor
organization, the minutes of the
organizational meetings and the
list of the workers who
participated in such meetings;
(c) The names of all its
members comprising at least
twenty percent (20%) of all the
employees in the bargaining unit
where it seeks to operate;
(d) If the applicant union has
been in existence for one or
more years, copies of its annual
financial reports; and
(e) Four (4) copies of the
constitution and by-laws of the
applicant union, minutes of its
adoption or ratification, and the
list of the members who
participated in it.
A more than cursory reading of the aforecited
provisions clearly indicates that the requirements
embodied therein are intended as preventive
measures against the commission of fraud. After
a labor organization has filed the necessary
papers and documents for registration, it
becomes mandatory for the Bureau of Labor
Relations to check if the requirements under
Article 234 have been sedulously complied with.
If its application for registration is vitiated by
falsification and serious irregularities, especially
those appearing on the face of the application
and the supporting documents, a labor
organization should be denied recognition as a
legitimate labor organization. And if a certificate
of recognition has been issued, the propriety of
the labor organization's registration could be
assailed directly through cancellation of
registration proceedings in accordance with
Articles 238 and 239 of the Labor Code, or
indirectly, by challenging its petition for the
issuance of an order for certification election.
These measures are necessary — and may be
undertaken simultaneously — if the spirit behind
the Labor Code's requirements for registration
are to be given flesh and blood. Registration
requirements specifically afford a measure of
protection to unsuspecting employees who may
be lured into joining unscrupulous or fly-by-night
unions whose sole purpose is to control union
funds or use the labor organization for
illegitimate ends.   Such requirements are a
12
valid exercise of the police power, because the
activities in which labor organizations,
associations and unions of workers are engaged
directly affect the public interest and should be
protected. 13
Thus, in Progressive Development Corporation
vs.  Secretary of Labor and Employment,   we 14
held:
The controversy in this case
centers on the requirements
before a local or chapter of a
federation may file a petition for
certification election and be
certified as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of
the petitioner's employees.
xxx xxx xxx
But while Article 257 cited by
the Solicitor General directs the
automatic conduct of a
certification election in an
unorganized establishment, it
also requires that the petition for
certification election must be
filed by a legitimate labor
organization . . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The employer naturally
needs assurance that the union
it is dealing with is a bona-fide
organization, one which has not
submitted false statements or
misrepresentations to the
Bureau. The inclusion of the
certification and attestation
requirements will in a marked
degree allay these
apprehensions of management.
Not only is the issuance of any
false statement and
misrepresentation or ground for
cancellation of registration (see
Article 239 (a), (c) and (d)); it is
also a ground for a criminal
charge of perjury.
The certification and attestation
requirements are preventive
measures against the
commission of fraud. They
likewise afford a measure of
protection to unsuspecting
employees who may be lured
into joining unscrupulous or fly-
by-night unions whose sole
purpose is to control union
funds or to use the union for
dubious ends.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . It is not this Court's function
to augment the requirements
prescribed by law in order to
make them wiser or to allow
greater protection to the workers
and even their employer. Our
only recourse is, as earlier
discussed, to exact strict
compliance with what the law
provides as requisites for local
or chapter formation.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court's conclusion should
not be misconstrued as
impairing the local union's right
to be certified as the employees'
bargaining agent in the
petitioner's establishment. We
are merely saying that the local
union must first comply with the
statutory requirements in order
to exercise this right. Big
federations and national unions
of workers should take the lead
in requiring their locals and
chapters to faithfully comply with
the law and the rules instead of
merely snapping union after
union into their folds in a furious
bid with rival federations to get
the most number of members
Furthermore, the Labor Code itself grants the
Bureau of Labor Relations a period of thirty (30)
days within which to review all applications for
registration. Article 235 provides:
Art. 235. Action on application.
— The Bureau shall act on all
applications for registration
within thirty (30) days from filing.
All requisite documents and
papers shall be certified under
oath by the secretary or the
treasurer of the organization, as
the case may be, and attested
to by its president.
The thirty-day period in the aforecited provision
ensures that any action taken by the Bureau of
Labor Relations is made in consonance with the
mandate of the Labor Code, which, it bears
emphasis, specifically requires that the basis for
the issuance of a certificate of registration
should be compliance with the requirements for
recognition under Article 234. Since, obviously,
recognition of a labor union or labor organization
is not merely a ministerial function, the question
now arises as to whether or not the public
respondent committed grave abuse of discretion
in affirming the Med-Arbiter's order in spite of the
fact that the question of the Union's legitimacy
was squarely put in issue and that the
allegations of fraud and falsification were
adequately supported by documentary evidence.
The Labor Code requires that in organized and
unorganized   establishments, a petition for
15
certification election must be filed by a legitimate
labor organization. The acquisition of rights by
any union or labor organization, particularly the
right to file a petition for certification election, first
and foremost, depends on whether or not the
labor organization has attained the status of a
legitimate labor organization.
In the case before us, the Med-Arbiter summarily
disregarded the petitioner's prayer that the
former look into the legitimacy of the respondent.
Union by a sweeping declaration that the union
was in the possession of a charter certificate so
that "for all intents and purposes, Sumasaklaw
sa Manggagawa sa Pizza Hut (was) a legitimate
labor organization."   Glossing over the
16
transcendental issue of fraud and
misrepresentation raised by herein petitioner,
Med-Arbiter Rasidali Abdullah held that:
The alleged misrepresentation,
fraud and false statement in
connection with the issuance of
the charter certificate are
collateral issues which could be
ventilated in the cancellation
proceedings.  17
It cannot be denied that the grounds invoked by
petitioner for the cancellation of respondent
Union's registration fall under paragraph (a) and
(c) of Article 239 of the Labor Code, to wit:
(a) Misrepresentation, false
statement or fraud in connection
with the adoption or ratification
of the constitution and by-laws
or amendments thereto, the
minutes of ratification, the list of
members who took part in the
ratification of the constitution
and by-laws or amendments
thereto, the minutes of
ratification, the list of members
who took part in the ratification;
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Misrepresentation, false
statements or fraud in
connection with the election of
officers, minutes of the election
of officers, the list of voters, or
failure to submit these
documents together with the list
of the newly elected-appointed
officers and their postal
addresses within thirty (30) days
from election.
x x x           x x x          x x x
The grounds ventilated in cancellation
proceedings in accordance with Article 239 of
the Labor Code constitute a grave challenge to
the right of respondent Union to ask for
certification election. The Med-Arbiter should
have looked into the merits of the petition for
cancellation before issuing an order calling for
certification election. Registration based on false
and fraudulent statements and documents
confer no legitimacy upon a labor organization
irregularly recognized, which, at best, holds on
to a mere scrap of paper. Under such
circumstances, the labor organization, not being
a legitimate labor organization, acquires no
rights, particularly the right to ask for certification
election in a bargaining unit.
As we laid emphasis in Progressive
Development Corporation Labor,   "[t]he 18
employer needs the assurance that the union it
is dealing with is a bona fide organization, one
which has not submitted false statements or
misrepresentations to the Bureau." Clearly,
fraud, falsification and misrepresentation in
obtaining recognition as a legitimate labor
organization are contrary to the Med-Arbiter's
conclusion not merely collateral issues. The
invalidity of respondent Union's registration
would negate its legal personality to participate
in certification election.
Once a labor organization attains the status of a
legitimate labor organization it begins to possess
all of the rights and privileges granted by law to
such organizations. As such rights and privileges
ultimately affect areas which are constitutionally
protected, the activities in which labor
organizations, associations and unions are
engaged directly affect the public interest and
should be zealously protected. A strict
enforcement of the Labor Code's requirements
for the acquisition of the status of a legitimate
labor organization is in order.
Inasmuch as the legal personality of respondent
Union had been seriously challenged, it would
have been more prudent for the Med-Arbiter and
public respondent to have granted petitioner's
request for the suspension of proceedings in the
certification election case, until the issue of the
legality of the Union's registration shall have
been resolved. Failure of the Med-Arbiter and
public respondent to heed the request
constituted a grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the
instant petition is GRANTED and the Resolution
and Order of the public respondent dated
December 29, 1993 and January 24, 1994,
respectively, are hereby SET ASIDE.
The case is REMANDED to the Med-Arbiter to
resolve with reasonable dispatch petitioner's
petition for cancellation of respondent Union's
registration.
SO ORDERED.
9. [G.R. No. 142000. January 22,
2003.]
TAGAYTAY HIGHLAND’S
INTERNATIONAL GOLF CLUB
INCORPORATED, Petitioner, v.
TAGAYTAY HIGHLANDS
EMPLOYEES UNION-
PGTWO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Before this Court on certiorari under Rule
45 is the petition of the Tagaytay
Highlands International Golf Club
Incorporated (THIGCI) assailing the
February 15, 2002 decision of the Court of
Appeals denying its petition to annul the
Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) Resolutions of November 12, 1998
and December 29, 1998.
On October 16, 1997, the Tagaytay
Highlands Employees Union (THEU) —
Philippine Transport and General Workers
Organization (PTGWO), Local Chapter No.
776, a legitimate labor organization said
to represent majority of the rank-and-file
employees of THIGCI, filed a petition for
certification election before the DOLE
Mediation-Arbitration Unit, Regional
Branch No. IV.
THIGCI, in its Comment 1 filed on
November 27, 1997, opposed THEU’s
petition for certification election on the
ground that the list of union members
submitted by it was defective and fatally
flawed as it included the names and
signatures of supervisors, resigned,
terminated and absent without leave
(AWOL) employees, as well as employees
of The Country Club, Inc., a corporation
distinct and separate from THIGCI; and
that out of the 192 signatories to the
petition, only 71 were actual rank-and-file
employees of THIGCI. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
THIGCI thus submitted a list of the names
of its 71 actual rank-and-file employees
which it annexed 2 to its Comment to the
petition for certification election. And it
therein incorporated the following
tabulation 3 showing the number of
signatories to said petition whose
membership in the union was being
questioned as disqualified and the reasons
for disqualification:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
# of Reasons for Disqualification
Signatures
13 Supervisors of THIGCI
6 Resigned employees of THIGCI
2 AWOL employees of THIGCI
53 Rank-and-file employees of The
Country Club at
Tagaytay Highlands, Inc.
14 Supervisors of The Country Club at
Tagaytay
Highlands, Inc.
6 Resigned employees of The Country
Club at
Tagaytay Highlands, Inc.
3 Terminated employees of The Country
Club at
Tagaytay Highlands, Inc.
1 AWOL employees of The Country Club at
Tagaytay Highlands, Inc.
4 Signatures that cannot be deciphered
16 Names in list that were erased
2 Names with first names only
THIGCI also alleged that some of the
signatures in the list of union members
were secured through fraudulent and
deceitful means, and submitted copies of
the handwritten denial and withdrawal of
some of its employees from participating
in the petition. 4
Replying to THIGCI’s Comment, THEU
asserted that it had complied with all the
requirements for valid affiliation and
inclusion in the roster of legitimate labor
organizations pursuant to DOLE
Department Order No. 9, series of 1997, 5
on account of which it was duly granted a
Certification of Affiliation by DOLE on
October 10, 1997; 6 and that Section 5,
Rule V of said Department Order provides
that the legitimacy of its registration
cannot be subject to collateral attack, and
for as long as there is no final order of
cancellation, it continues to enjoy the
rights accorded to a legitimate
organization.
THEU thus concluded in its Reply 7 that
under the circumstances, the Med-Arbiter
should, pursuant to Article 257 of the
Labor Code and Section 11, Rule XI of
DOLE Department Order No. 09,
automatically order the conduct of a
certification election.
By Order of January 28, 1998, 8 DOLE
Med-Arbiter Anastacio Bactin ordered the
holding of a certification election among
the rank-and-file employees of THIGCI in
this wise, quoted verbatim:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
We evaluated carefully this instant petition
and we are of the opinion that it is
complete in form and substance. In
addition thereto, the accompanying
documents show that indeed petitioner
union is a legitimate labor federation and
its local/chapter was duly reported to this
Office as one of its affiliate local/chapter.
Its due reporting through the submission
of all the requirements for registration of a
local/chapter is a clear showing that it was
already included in the roster of legitimate
labor organizations in this Office pursuant
to Department Order No. 9 Series of 1997
with all the legal right and personality to
institute this instant petition. Pursuant
therefore to the provisions of Article 257
of the Labor Code, as amended, and its
Implementing Rules as amended by
Department Order No. 9, since the
respondent’s establishment is
unorganized, the holding of a certification
election is mandatory for it was clearly
established that petitioner is a legitimate
labor organization. Giving due course to
this petition is therefore proper and
appropriate. 9 (Emphasis supplied)
Passing on THIGCI’s allegation that some
of the union members are supervisory,
resigned and AWOL employees or
employees of a separate and distinct
corporation,: the Med-Arbiter held that the
same should be properly raised in the
exclusion-inclusion proceedings at the
pre-election conference. As for the
allegation that some of the signatures
were secured through fraudulent and
deceitful means, he held that it should be
coursed through an independent petition
for cancellation of union registration which
is within the jurisdiction of the DOLE
Regional Director. In any event, the Med-
Arbiter held that THIGCI failed to submit
the job descriptions of the questioned
employees and other supporting
documents to bolster its claim that they
are disqualified from joining THEU.
THIGCI appealed to the Office of the DOLE
Secretary which, by Resolution of June 4,
1998, set aside the said Med-Arbiter’s
Order and accordingly dismissed the
petition for certification election on the
ground that there is a "clear absence of
community or mutuality of interests," it
finding that THEU sought to represent two
separate bargaining units (supervisory
employees and rank-and-file employees)
as well as employees of two separate and
distinct corporate entities.
chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Upon Motion for Reconsideration by THEU,
DOLE Undersecretary Rosalinda Dimalipis-
Baldoz, by authority of the DOLE
Secretary, issued DOLE Resolution of
November 12, 1998 10 setting aside the
June 4, 1998 Resolution dismissing the
petition for certification election. In the
November 12, 1998 Resolution,
Undersecretary Dimapilis-Baldoz held that
since THEU is a local chapter, the twenty
percent (20%) membership requirement
is not necessary for it to acquire legitimate
status, hence, "the alleged retraction and
withdrawal of support by 45 of the 70
remaining rank-and-file members . . .
cannot negate the legitimacy it has
already acquired before the petition;" that
rather than disregard the legitimate status
already conferred on THEU by the Bureau
of Labor Relations, the names of alleged
disqualified supervisory employees and
employees of the Country Club, Inc., a
separate and distinct corporation, should
simply be removed from the THEU’s roster
of membership; and that regarding the
participation of alleged resigned and
AWOL employees and those whose
signatures are illegible, the issue can be
resolved during the inclusion-exclusion
proceedings at the pre-election stage.
The records of the case were thus ordered
remanded to the Office of the Med-Arbiter
for the conduct of certification election.
THIGCI’s Motion for Reconsideration of the
November 12, 1998 Resolution having
been denied by the DOLE Undersecretary
by Resolution of December 29, 1998, 11 it
filed a petition for certiorari before this
Court which, by Resolution of April 14,
1999, 12 referred it to the Court of
Appeals in line with its pronouncement in
National Federation of Labor (NFL) v. Hon.
Bienvenido E. Laguesma, Et Al., 13 and in
strict observance of the hierarchy of
courts, as emphasized in the case of St.
Martin Funeral Home v. National Labor
Relations Commission. 14
By Decision of February 15, 2000, 15 the
Court of Appeals denied THIGCI’s Petition
for Certiorari and affirmed the DOLE
Resolution dated November 12, 1998. It
held that while a petition for certification
election is an exception to the innocent
bystander rule, hence, the employer may
pray for the dismissal of such petition on
the basis of lack of mutuality of interests
of the members of the union as well as
lack of employer-employee relationship
following this Court’s ruling in Toyota
Motor Philippines Corporation v. Toyota
Motor Philippines Corporation Labor Union
Et. Al. 16 and Dunlop Slazenger [Phils.] v.
Hon. Secretary of Labor and Employment
Et. Al., 17 petitioner failed to adduce
substantial evidence to support its
allegations.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari,
raising the following
"ISSUES/ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RESOLUTION
DATED 12 NOVEMBER 1998 HOLDING
THAT SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES AND
NON-EMPLOYEES COULD SIMPLY BE
REMOVED FROM APPELLEES ROSTER OF
RANK-AND-FILE MEMBERSHIP INSTEAD
OF RESOLVING THE LEGITIMACY OF
RESPONDENT UNION’S STATUS
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RESOLUTION
DATED 12 NOVEMBER 1998 HOLDING
THAT THE DISQUALIFIED EMPLOYEES’
STATUS COULD READILY BE RESOLVED
DURING THE INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION
PROCEEDINGS
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY
ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
ALLEGATIONS OF PETITIONER HAD BEEN
DULY PROVEN BY FAILURE OF
RESPONDENT UNION TO DENY THE SAME
AND BY THE SHEER WEIGHT OF
EVIDENCE INTRODUCED BY PETITIONER
AND CONTAINED IN THE RECORDS OF
THE CASE" 18
The statutory authority for the exclusion
of supervisory employees in a rank-and-
file union, and vice-versa, is Article 245 of
the Labor Code, to wit: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Article 245. Ineligibility of managerial
employees to join any labor organization;
right of supervisory employees. —
Managerial employees are not eligible to
join, assist or form any labor organization.
Supervisory employees shall not be
eligible for membership in a labor
organization of the rank-and-file
employees but may join, assist or form
separate labor organizations of their own.
While above-quoted Article 245 expressly
prohibits supervisory employees from
joining a rank-and-file union, it does not
provide what would be the effect if a rank-
and-file union counts supervisory
employees among its members, or vice-
versa.
Citing Toyota 19 which held that "a labor
organization composed of both rank-and-
file and supervisory employees is no labor
organization at all," and the subsequent
case of Progressive Development Corp. —
Pizza Hut v. Ledesma 20 which held
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Labor Code requires that in
organized and unorganized
establishments, a petition for certification
election must be filed by a legitimate labor
organization. The acquisition of rights by
any union or labor organization,
particularly the right to file a petition for
certification election, first and foremost,
depends on whether or not the labor
organization has attained the status of a
legitimate labor organization.
In the case before us, the Med-Arbiter
summarily disregarded the petitioner’s
prayer that the former look into the
legitimacy of the respondent Union by a
sweeping declaration that the union was in
the possession of a charter certificates so
that ‘for all intents and purposes,
Sumasaklaw sa Manggagawa sa Pizza Hut
(was) a legitimacy organization," ‘ 21
(Emphasis supplied),
petitioner contends that, quoting Toyota,"
[i]t becomes necessary . . ., anterior to
the granting of an order allowing a
certification election, to inquire into the
composition of any labor organization
whenever the status of the labor
organization is challenged on the basis of
Article 245 of the Labor Code." 22
Continuing, petitioner argues that without
resolving the status of THEU, the DOLE
Undersecretary "conveniently deferred the
resolution on the serious infirmity in the
membership of [THEU] and ordered the
holding of the certification election" which
is frowned upon as the following ruling of
this Court shows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
We also do not agree with the ruling of
the respondent Secretary of Labor that
the infirmity in the membership of the
respondent union can be remedied in "the
pre-election conference thru the
exclusion-inclusion proceedings wherein
those employees who are occupying rank-
and-file positions will be excluded from
the list of eligible voters." Public
respondent gravely misappreciated the
basic antipathy between the interest of
supervisors and the interest of rank-and-
file employees. Due to the irreconcilability
of their interest we held in Toyota Motor
Philippines v. Toyota Motors Philippines
Corporation Labor Union, viz: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘x       x       x
"Clearly, based on this provision Article
245, a labor organization composed of
both rank-and-file and supervisor
employees is no labor organization at all.
It cannot, for any guise or purpose, be a
legitimate labor organization. Not being
one, an organization which carries a
mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory took part in the ratification;
employees cannot posses any of the rights
of a legitimate labor organization, (b) Failure to submit the documents
including the right to file a petition for mentioned in the preceding paragraph
certification election for the purpose of within thirty (30) days from adoption or
collective bargaining. It becomes ratification of the constitution and by-laws
necessary, therefore, anterior to the or amendments thereto;
granting of an order allowing a
certification election, to inquire into the (c) Misrepresentation, false statements or
composition of any labor organization fraud in connection with the election of
whenever the status of the labor officers, minutes of the election of officers,
organization is challenged on the basis of the list of voters, or failure to subject
Article 245 of the Labor Code." (Emphasis these documents together with the list of
by petitioner) (Dunlop Slazenger (Phils.), the newly elected/appointed officers and
v. Secretary of Labor, 300 SCRA 120 their postal addresses within thirty (30)
[1998]; (Emphasis supplied by days from election;
petitioner.) chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

(d) Failure to submit the annual financial

The petition fails. After a certificate of report to the Bureau within thirty (30)
registration is issued to a union, its legal days after the losing of every fiscal year
personality cannot be subject to collateral and misrepresentation, false entries or
attack. It may be questioned only in an fraud in the preparation of the financial
independent petition for cancellation in report itself;
accordance with Section 5 of Rule V, Book
IV of the "Rules to Implement the Labor (e) Acting as a labor contractor or
Code" (Implementing Rules) which section engaging in the "cabo" system, or
reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library otherwise engaging in any activity
prohibited by law;
Sec. 5. Effect of registration. The labor
organization or workers’ association shall (f) Entering into collective bargaining
be deemed registered and vested with agreements which provide terms and
legal personality on the date of issuance conditions of employment below minimum
of its certificate of registration. Such legal standards established by law;
personality cannot thereafter be subject to
collateral attack, but may be questioned (g) Asking for or accepting attorney’s fees
only in an independent petition for or negotiation fees from employers;
cancellation in accordance with these
Rules. (Emphasis supplied) (h) Other than for mandatory activities
under this Code, checking off special
The grounds for cancellation of union assessments or any other fees without
registration are provided for under Article duly signed individual written
239 of the Labor Code, as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library authorizations of the members;

Art. 239. Grounds for cancellation of union (i) Failure to submit list of individual
registration. The following shall constitute members to the Bureau once a year or
grounds for cancellation of union whenever required by the Bureau; and
registration: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(j) Failure to comply with the

(a) Misrepresentation, false statement or requirements under Articles 237 and 238,
fraud in connection with the adoption or (Emphasis supplied),
ratification of the constitution and by-laws
or amendments thereto, the minutes of while the procedure for cancellation of
ratification, and the list of members who registration is provided for in Rule VIII,
Book V of the Implementing Rules.
The inclusion in a union of disqualified
employees is not among the grounds for
cancellation, unless such inclusion is due
to misrepresentation, false statement or
fraud under the circumstances
enumerated in Sections (a) and (c) of
Article 239 of above-quoted Article 239 of
the Labor Code.
THEU, having been validly issued a
certificate of registration, should be
considered to have already acquired
juridical personality which may not be
assailed collaterally.
As for petitioner’s allegation that some of
the signatures in the petition for
certification election were obtained
through fraud, false statement and
misrepresentation, the proper procedure
is, as reflected above, for it to file a
petition for cancellation of the certificate
of registration, and not to intervene in a
petition for certification election.
Regarding the alleged withdrawal of union
members from participating in the
certification election, this Court’s following
ruling is instructive:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"‘[T]he best forum for determining
whether there were indeed retractions
from some of the laborers is in the
certification election itself wherein the
workers can freely express their choice in
a secret ballot. Suffice it to say that the
will of the rank-and-file employees should
in every possible instance be determined
by secret ballot rather than by
administrative or quasi-judicial inquiry.
Such representation and certification
election cases are not to be taken as
contentious litigations for suits but as
mere investigations of a non-adversary,
fact-finding character as to which of the
competing unions represents the genuine
choice of the workers to be their sole and
exclusive collective bargaining
representative with their employer." 23
As for the lack of mutuality of interest
argument of petitioner, it, at all events,
does not lie given, as found by the court a
quo, its failure to present substantial
evidence that the assailed employees are
actually occupying supervisory positions.
While petitioner submitted a list of its
employees with their corresponding job
titles and ranks, 24 there is nothing
mentioned about the supervisors’
respective duties, powers and
prerogatives that would show that they
can effectively recommend managerial
actions which require the use of
independent judgment.25 cralaw:red
As this Court put it in Pepsi-Cola Products
Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor: 26
Designation should be reconciled with the
actual job description of subject
employees . . . The mere fact that an
employee is designated manager does not
necessarily make him one. Otherwise,
there would be an absurd situation where
one can be given the title just to be
deprived of the right to be a member of a
union. In the case of National Steel
Corporation v. Laguesma (G. R. No.
103743, January 29, 1996), it was
stressed that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
What is essential is the nature of the
employee’s function and not the
nomenclature or title given to the job
which determines whether the employee
has rank-and-file or managerial status or
whether he is a supervisory employee.
(Emphasis supplied).
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
DENIED. Let the records of the case be
remanded to the office of origin, the
Mediation-Arbitration Unit, Regional
Branch No. IV, for the immediate conduct
of a certification election subject to the
usual pre-election conference. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
SO ORDERED.
 10. FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 157086, February 18,
2013]
LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING
COMPANY, Petitioner, v. THE
LEPANTO CAPATAZ
UNION, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Capatazes are not rank-and-file
employees because they perform
supervisory functions for the
management; hence, they may form
their own union that is separate and
distinct from the labor organization of
rank-and-file employees.
The Case
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company
(Lepanto) assails the Resolution
promulgated on December 18,
2002,1 whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) dismissed its petition
for certiorari on the ground of its
failure to first file a motion for
reconsideration against the decision
rendered by the Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE); and the resolution
promulgated on January 31,
2003,2 whereby the CA denied
Lepanto’s motion for reconsideration.
Antecedents
As a domestic corporation authorized
to engage in large-scale mining,
Lepanto operated several mining
claims in Mankayan, Benguet. On May
27, 1998, respondent Lepanto Capataz
Union (Union), a labor organization
duly registered with DOLE, filed a
petition for consent election with the
Industrial Relations Division of the
Cordillera Regional Office (CAR) of
DOLE, thereby proposing to represent
139  capatazes of Lepanto.3
In due course, Lepanto opposed the
petition,4 contending that the Union
was in reality seeking a certification
election, not a consent election, and
would be thereby competing with the
Lepanto Employees Union (LEU), the
current collective bargaining agent.
Lepanto pointed out that
the capatazes were already members
of LEU, the exclusive representative of
all rank-and-file employees of its Mine
Division.
On May 2, 2000, Med-Arbiter Michaela
A. Lontoc of DOLE-CAR issued a ruling
to the effect that the  capatazes could
form a separate bargaining unit due to
their not being rank-and-file
employees,5viz:
xxxx
We agree with petitioner that its
members perform a function totally
different from the rank-and-file
employees. The word capataz is
defined in Webster’s Third
International Dictionary, 1986 as “a
boss”, “foreman” and “an overseer”.
The employer did not dispute during
the hearing that the capatazes
indeed take charge of the
implementation of the job orders
by supervising and instructing the
miners, mackers and other rank-
and-file workers under them,
assess and evaluate their
performance, make regular
reports and recommends (sic)
new systems and procedure of
work, as well as guidelines for the
discipline of employees. As
testified to by petitioner’s
president, the capatazes are
neither rank-and-file nor
supervisory and, more or less, fall
in the middle of their rank. In this
respect, we can see that indeed
the capatazes differ from the
rank-and-file and can by
themselves constitute a separate
bargaining unit.
While it is claimed by the employer
that historically, the capatazes have
been considered among the rank-and-
file and that it is only now that they
seek a separate bargaining unit such
history of affiliation with the rank-and-
file association of LEU cannot totally
prevent the capatazes from
disaffiliating and organizing
themselves separately. The
constitutional right of every worker to
self-organization essentially gives him
the freedom to join or not to join an
organization of his own choosing.
The fact that petitioner seeks to
represent a separate bargaining unit
from the rank-and-file employees
represented by the LEU renders the
contract bar rule inapplicable. While
the collective bargaining agreement
existing between the LEU and the
employer covering the latter’s rank-
and-file employee covers likewise the
capatazes, it was testified to and
undisputed by the employer that the
capatazes did not anymore participate
in the renegotiation and ratification of
the new CBA upon expiration of their
old one on 16 November 1998. Their
nonparticipation was apparently due
to their formation of the new
bargaining unit. Thus, while the
instant petition was filed on 27 May
1998, prior to the freedom period, in
the interest of justice and in
consonance with the constitutional
right of workers to self-organization,
the petition can be deemed to have
been filed at the time the 60-day
freedom period set in. After all, the
petition was still pending and
unresolved during this period.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
granted and a certification election
among the capataz employees of the
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company
is hereby ordered conducted, subject
to the usual pre-election and
inclusion/exclusion proceedings, with
the following choices:
1. Lepanto Capataz Union;
and
2. No Union.
The employer is directed to submit to
this office within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof a copy of the certified
list of its capataz employees and the
payroll covering the said bargaining
unit for the last three (3) months prior
to the issuance hereof.
SO DECIDED. 6
Lepanto appealed to the DOLE
Secretary.7
On July 12, 2000, then DOLE
Undersecretary Rosalinda Dimapilis-
Baldoz (Baldoz), acting by authority of
the DOLE Secretary, affirmed the
ruling of Med-Arbiter
Lontoc,8 pertinently stating as follows:
xxxx
The bargaining unit sought to be
represented by the appellee are the
capataz employees of the appellant.
There is no other labor organization of
capatazes within the employer unit
except herein appellant. Thus,
appellant is an unorganized
establishment in so far as the
bargaining unit of capatazes is
concerned. In accordance with the last
paragraph of Section 11, Rule XI,
Department Order No. 9 which
provides that “in a petition filed by a
legitimate labor organization involving
an unorganized establishment, the
Med-Arbiter shall, pursuant to Article
257 of the Code, automatically order
the conduct of certification election
after determining that the petition has
complied with all requirements under
Section 1, 2 and 4 of the same rules
and that none of the grounds for
dismissal thereof exists”, the order for
the conduct of a certification election
is proper.
Finally, as to the issue of whether the
Med-Arbiter exhibited ignorance of the
law when she directed the conduct of
a certification election when appellee
prays for the conduct of a consent
election, let it be stressed that
appellee seeks to be recognized as the
sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of all capataz
employees of appellant. There are two
modes by which this can be achieved,
one is by voluntary recognition and
two, by consent or certification
election. Voluntary recognition under
Rule X, Department Order No. 9 is a
mode whereby the employer
voluntarily recognizes the union as the
bargaining representative of all the
members in the bargaining unit sought
to be represented. Consent and
certification election under Rules XI
and XII of Department Order No. 9 is
a mode whereby the members of the
bargaining unit decide whether they
want a bargaining representative and
if so, who they want it to be. The
difference between a consent election
and a certification election is that the
conduct of a consent election is agreed
upon by the parties to the petition
while the conduct of a certification
election is ordered by the Med-Arbiter.
In this case, the appellant withdrew its
consent and opposed the conduct of
the election. Therefore, the petition
necessarily becomes one of a petition
for certification election and the Med-
Arbiter was correct in granting the
same.9
xxxx
In the ensuing certification election
held on November 28, 2000, the
Union garnered 109 of the 111 total
valid votes cast.10
On the day of the certification
election, however, Lepanto presented
an opposition/protest.11 Hence, on
February 8, 2001, a hearing was held
on Lepanto’s opposition/protest.
Although the parties were required in
that hearing to submit their respective
position papers, Lepanto later opted
not to submit its position paper,12 and
contended that the issues identified
during the hearing did not pose any
legal issue to be addressed in a
position paper.13
On April 26, 2001, Med-Arbiter
Florence Marie A. Gacad-Ulep of
DOLE-CAR rendered a decision
certifying the Union as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of
all capatazes of Lepanto.14
On May 18, 2001, Lepanto appealed
the decision of Med-Arbiter Gacad-
Ulep to the DOLE Secretary.
By her Resolution dated September
17, 2002,15 DOLE Secretary Patricia A.
Sto. Tomas affirmed the decision
dated April 26, 2001, holding and
disposing thus:
Appellant accused Med-Arbiter Ulep of
grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction based on her
failure to resolve appellant’s motion to
modify order to submit position papers
and on rendering judgment on the
basis only of appellee’s position paper.
We deny.
Section 5, Rule XXV of Department
Order No. 9, otherwise known as the
New Rules Implementing Book V of
the Labor Code, states that “in all
proceedings at all levels, incidental
motions shall not be given due course,
but shall remain as part of the records
for whatever they may be worth when
the case is decided on the merits”.
Further, the motion to modify order to
submit position papers filed by
appellant is without merit. Appellant
claimed that the issues over which
Med-Arbiter Ulep directed the
submission of position papers were:  agreed thereto.  The minutes of the
(1) failure to challenge properly; (2)
failure (especially of LEU) to
participate actively in the proceedings
before the decision calling for the
conduct of certification election; and
(3) validity of earlier arguments.  clarified the same during the said
According to appellant, the first issue
was for appellee LCU to reply to in its
position paper, the second issue was
for the LEU and the third issue for
appellant company to explain in their
respective position paper.  It was the
position of appellant company that
unless the parties filed their position
paper on each of their respective
issues, the other parties cannot
discuss the issues they did not raise in
the same position papers and have to
await receipt of the others’ position
paper for their appropriate reply.
Section 9, Rule XI of Department
Order No. 9, which is applied with
equal force in the disposition of
protests on the conduct of election,
states that “the Med-Arbiter shall in
the same hearing direct all concerned
parties, including the employer, to
simultaneously submit their respective
position papers within a non-
extendible period of ten days”.  The
issues as recorded in the minutes of
28 February 2001 hearing before the
Med-Arbiter are clear.  The parties,
including appellant company were
required to submit their respective
positions on whether there was proper
challenge of the voters, whether LEU
failed to participate in the
proceedings, if so, whether it should
be allowed to participate at this
belated stage and whether the
arguments raised during the pre-
election conferences and in the
protests are valid. The parties,
including appellant company were
apprised of these issues and they
hearing even contained the statement
that “no order will issue” and that “the
parties are informed accordingly”.  If
there is any matter that had to be
clarified, appellant should have
hearing and refused to file its position
paper simultaneously with LCU and
LEU.  It appears that appellant did not
do so and acquiesced to the filing of
its position paper within fifteen days
from the date of said hearing.
Neither is there merit in appellant’s
contention that the Med-Arbiter
resolved the protest based solely on
appellee LCU’s position paper. Not
only did the Med-Arbiter discuss the
demerits of appellant’s motion to
modify order to submit position papers
but likewise the demerits of its
protest. We do not, however, agree
with the Med-Arbiter that the protest
should be dismissed due to appellant’s
failure to challenge the individual
voters during the election. We take
note of the minutes of the pre-election
conference on 10 November 2000,
thus:
“It was also agreed upon (by union
and management’s legal officer) that
all those listed will be allowed to vote
during the certification election subject
to challenge by management on
ground that none of them belongs to
the bargaining unit”. (Underscoring
supplied)
It is therefore, not correct to say that
there was no proper challenge made
by appellant company. The challenge
was already manifested during the
pre-election conference, specifying
that all listed voters were being
challenged because they do not belong
to the bargaining unit of capatazes.
Likewise, the formal protest filed by
appellant company on the day of the
election showed its protest to the
conduct of the election on the grounds
that (1) none of the names submitted
and included (with pay bracket 8 and
9) to vote qualifies as capataz under
the five-point characterization made in
02 May 2000 decision calling for the
conduct of certification election; (2)
the characterization made in the 02
May 2000 decision pertains to shift
bosses who constitutes another union,
the Lepanto Local Staff Union; and (3)
the names listed in the voters’ list are
members of another union, the
Lepanto Employees Union. This
constitutes proper challenge to the
eligibility of all the voters named in
the list which includes all those who
cast their votes. The election officer
should have not canvassed the ballots
and allowed the Med-Arbiter to first
determine their eligibility.
Notwithstanding the premature
canvass of the votes, we note that
appellant company failed to support its
grounds for challenge with sufficient
evidence for us to determine the
validity of its claim. No job description
of the challenged voters was
submitted by appellant from which we
can verify whether the said voters are
indeed disqualified from the alleged
five-point characterization made in the
02 May 2000 decision, either before
the Med-Arbiter or on appeal. Neither
was the job description of the shift
bosses whom appellant company
claims pertain to the alleged five-point
characterization submitted for our
perusal. The challenge must perforce
fail for lack of evidence.
As to the alleged membership of
appellee LCU’s member with another
union LEU, the issue has been
resolved in the 02 May 2000 decision
of Med-Arbiter Lontoc which we
affirmed on 12 July 2000.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit and
the decision of the Med-Arbiter dated
26 April 2001, certifying Lepanto
Capataz Union as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of all
capataz workers of Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Company,
is AFFIRMED.
SO RESOLVED.16
Ruling of the CA
Still dissatisfied with the result, but
without first filing a motion for
reconsideration, Lepanto challenged in
the CA the foregoing decision of the
DOLE Secretary through a petition
for certiorari.
On December 18, 2002, the CA
dismissed Lepanto’s petition
for certiorari, stating in its first
assailed resolution:
Considering that the petitioner failed
to file a prior motion for
reconsideration of the Decision of the
public respondent before instituting
the present petition as mandated by
Section 1 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended, the
instant “Petition for Certiorari Under
Rule 65 with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Injunction” is
hereby DISMISSED.
Well-settled is the rule that the “filing
of a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 without first moving for
reconsideration of the assailed
resolution generally warrants the
petition’s outright dismissal. As we
consistently held in numerous cases, a
motion for reconsideration by a
concerned party is indispensable for it
affords the NLRC an opportunity to
rectify errors or mistakes it might
have committed before resort to the
courts can be had.
It is settled that certiorari will lie only
if there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law against acts
of public respondents. Here, the plain
and adequate remedy expressly
provided by law was a motion for
reconsideration of the impugned
resolution, based on palpable or
patent errors, to be made under oath
and filed within ten (10) days from
receipt of the questioned resolution of
the NLRC, a procedure which is
jurisdictional. Further, it should be
stressed that without a motion for
reconsideration seasonably filed within
the ten-day reglementary period, the
questioned order, resolution or
decision of NLRC, becomes final and
executory after ten (10) calendar days
from receipt thereof.” (Association
of Trade Unions (ATU), Rodolfo
Monteclaro and Edgar Juesan v.
Hon. Commissioners Oscar N.
Abella, Musib N. Buat, Leon
Gonzaga, Jr., Algon Engineering
Construction Corp., Alex Gonzales
and Editha Yap. 323 SCRA 50).
SO ORDERED.17
Lepanto moved to reconsider the
dismissal, but the CA denied its
motion for reconsideration through the
second assailed resolution.18
Issues
Hence, this appeal by Lepanto based
on the following errors, namely:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
SUMMARILY DISMISSING THE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON THE
GROUND THAT NO PRIOR MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS FILED.
THE DECISION OF THE SECRETARY
BEING FINAL AND EXECUTORY, A
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
WAS NOT AN AVAILABLE REMEDY FOR
PETITIONER.
II
ON THE MERITS, THE SECRETARY OF
LABOR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, [O]R
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN ISSUNG THE
DECISION DATED SEPTEMBER 17,
2002, WHEN SHE DELIBERATELY
IGNORED THE FACTS AND RULED IN
FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT UNION,
DESPITE HER OWN FINDING THAT
THERE HAD BEEN A PREMATURE
CANVASS OF VOTES. 19
Lepanto argues that a motion for
reconsideration was not an available
remedy due to the decision of the
DOLE Secretary being already
classified as final and executory under
Section 15, Rule XI, Book V of
Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code, as amended by
Department Order No. 9, series of
1997;20 that the Union’s petition for
consent election was really a
certification election; that the Union
failed to give a definite description of
the bargaining unit sought to be
represented; and that
the capatazes should be considered as
rank-and-file employees.
The issues to be resolved are, firstly,
whether a motion for reconsideration
was a pre-requisite in the filing of its
petition for certiorari;
and, secondly, whether
the capatazes  could form their own
union independently of the rank-and-
file employees.
Ruling
The petition for review has no merit.
I.
The filing of the motion for
reconsideration
is a pre-requisite to the filing of a
petition for
certiorari  to assail the decision of
the DOLE Secretary
We hold to be untenable and not well
taken Lepanto’s submissions that: (1)
a motion for reconsideration was not
an available remedy from the decision
of the DOLE Secretary because of
Section 15, Rule XI, Book V of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code, as amended; and (2) the
ruling in National Federation of Labor
v. Laguesma21 (recognizing the
remedy of certiorari against the
decision of the DOLE Secretary to be
filed initially in the CA) actually affirms
its position that an immediate
recourse to the CA on certiorari is
proper even without the prior filing of
a motion for reconsideration.
To start with,  the requirement of the
timely filing of a motion for
reconsideration as a precondition to
the filing of a petition for certiorari
accords with the principle of
exhausting administrative remedies as
a means to afford every opportunity to
the respondent agency to resolve the
matter and correct itself if need be.22
And, secondly, the ruling in National
Federation of Labor v. Laguesma
reiterates St. Martin’s Funeral Home
v. National Labor Relations
Commission,23 where the Court has
pronounced that the special civil
action of certiorari is the appropriate
remedy from the decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) in view of the lack of any
appellate remedy provided by
the Labor Code to a party aggrieved
by the decision of the NLRC.
Accordingly, any decision, resolution
or ruling of the DOLE Secretary from
which the Labor Code affords no
remedy to the aggrieved party may be
reviewed through a petition
for certiorari  initiated only in the CA in
deference to the principle of the
hierarchy of courts.
Yet, it is also significant to note
that National Federation of Labor v.
Laguesma also reaffirmed the dictum
issued in  St. Martin’s Funeral Homes
v. National Labor Relations
Commission to the effect that “the
remedy of the aggrieved party is to
timely file a motion for reconsideration
as a precondition for any further or
subsequent remedy, and then
seasonably avail of the special civil
action of certiorari  under Rule 65 x x
x.”24
Indeed, the Court has consistently
stressed the importance of the
seasonable filing of a motion for
reconsideration prior to filing the
certiorari petition. In SMC Quarry 2
Workers Union-February Six
Movement (FSM) Local Chapter No.
1564 v. Titan Megabags Industrial
Corporation25 and Manila Pearl
Corporation v. Manila Pearl
Independent Workers Union,26 the
Court has even warned that a failure
to file the motion for reconsideration
would be fatal to the cause of the
petitioner.27 Due to its extraordinary
nature as a remedy, certiorari is to be
availed of only when there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy or
adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.28 There is no question
that a motion for reconsideration
timely filed by Lepanto was an
adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law in view of the possibility
of the Secretary of Justice
reconsidering her disposition of the
matter, thereby according the relief
Lepanto was seeking.
Under the circumstances, Lepanto’s
failure to timely file a motion for
reconsideration prior to filing its
petition for certiorari in the CA
rendered the September 17, 2002
resolution of the DOLE Secretary
beyond challenge.
II.
Capatazes are not rank-and-file
employees;
hence, they could form their own
union
Anent the second issue, we note that
Med-Arbiter Lontoc found in her
Decision issued on May 2, 2000 that
the capatazes  were performing
functions totally different from those
performed by the rank-and-file
employees, and that
the capatazes were “supervising and
instructing the miners, mackers and
other rank-and-file workers under
them, assess[ing] and evaluat[ing]
their performance, mak[ing] regular
reports and recommend[ing] new
systems and procedure of work, as
well as guidelines for the discipline of
employees.”29  Hence, Med-Arbiter
Lontoc concluded,
the capatazes “differ[ed] from the
rank-and-file and [could] by
themselves constitute a separate
bargaining unit.”30
Agreeing with Med-Arbiter Lontoc’s
findings, then DOLE Undersecretary
Baldoz, acting by authority of the
DOLE Secretary, observed in the
resolution dated July 12, 2000, thus: 31
The bargaining unit sought to be
represented by the appellee are the
capataz employees of the appellant.
There is no other labor organization of
capatazes within the employer unit
except herein appellant. Thus,
appellant is an unorganized
establishment in so far as the
bargaining unit of capatazes is
concerned. In accordance with the last
paragraph of Section 11, Rule XI,
Department Order No. 9 which
provides that “in a petition filed by a
legitimate labor organization involving
an unorganized establishment, the
Med-Arbiter shall, pursuant to Article
257 of the Code, automatically order
the conduct of certification election
after determining that the petition has
complied with all requirements under
Section 1, 2 and 4 of the same rules
and that none of the grounds for
dismissal thereof exists”, the order for
the conduct of a certification election
is proper.32
We cannot undo the affirmance by the
DOLE Secretary of the correct findings
of her subordinates in the DOLE, an
office that was undeniably possessed
of the requisite expertise on the
matter in issue. In dealing with the
matter, her subordinates in the DOLE
fairly and objectively resolved whether
the Union could lawfully seek to be the
exclusive representative of the
bargaining unit of capatazes in the
company. Their factual findings, being
supported by substantial evidence, are
hereby accorded great respect and
finality. Such findings cannot be made
the subject of our judicial review by
petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, because:
x x x [T]he office of a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court requires that it shall
raise only questions of law. The
factual findings by quasi-judicial
agencies, such as the Department of
Labor and Employment, when
supported by substantial evidence, are
entitled to great respect in view of
their expertise in their respective field.
Judicial review of labor cases does not
go far as to evaluate the sufficiency of
evidence on which the labor official’s
findings rest. It is not our function to
assess and evaluate all over again the
evidence, testimonial and
documentary, adduced by the parties
to an appeal, particularly where the
findings of both the trial court (here,
the DOLE Secretary) and the appellate
court on the matter coincide, as in this
case at bar. The Rule limits that
function of the Court to review or
revision of errors of law and not to a
second analysis of the evidence. Here,
petitioners would have us re-calibrate
all over again the factual basis and the
probative value of the pieces of
evidence submitted by the Company
to the DOLE, contrary to the
provisions of Rule 45. Thus, absent
any showing of whimsical or capricious
exercise of judgment, and unless lack
of any basis for the conclusions made
by the appellate court may be amply
demonstrated, we may not disturb
such factual findings.33
In any event, we affirm
that capatazes or foremen are not
rank-and-file employees because they
are an extension of the management,
and as such they may influence the
rank-and-file workers under them to
engage in slowdowns or similar
activities detrimental to the policies,
interests or business objectives of the
employers.34
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the
petition for review for lack of merit,
and AFFIRMS the resolutions the
Court of Appeals promulgated on
December 18, 2002 and January 31,
2003.
Petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
11. [G.R. No. 82260. July
19, 1989.]
ASSOCIATED LABOR
UNIONS (ALU), Petitioner, v.
HON. PURA FERRER-
CALLEJA, DIRECTOR,
BUREAU OF LABOR
RELATIONS, DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT AND
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
LABOR (NFL), Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR LAW; COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING; ART. 257 OF LABOR
CODE APPLIES TO UNORGANIZED
ESTABLISHMENTS WHICH HAVE NO
CERTIFIED BARGAINING UNIT. — Art
257 of the Labor Code finds no
application in the case at bar primarily
because it applies to unorganized
establishments. For the said provision
to apply, the establishment concerned
must have no certified bargaining
agent. This is not the case in the
present petition where there was a
collective bargaining agreement
entered into by the management of
the Soriano Fruits Corporation and
ALU, the petitioner, which was then
the bargaining agent.
2. ID.; ID.; CERTIFICATION
ELECTION; FILING OF PETITION, A
SUFFICIENT BASIS TO GRANT
CERTIFICATION ELECTION. — The
provision of Article 256 which provides
that the Med-Arbiter shall
automatically order an election is clear
and leaves no room for further
interpretation. The mere filing of a
petition for certification election within
the freedom period is sufficient basis
for the respondent Director to order
the holding of a certification election.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ABSENCE OF UNION
FROM HEARING DOES NOT AFFECT
PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
ELECTION; PROCEEDINGS IS NON-
ADVERSARY. — The fact that NFL did
not appear during the hearings set by
the Med-Arbiter is of no moment. As
the Solicitor General correctly pointed
out, there is no prohibition on the
conduct of hearings by the Med-
Arbiter on the competing stands of the
unions. Neither does the law require
the same to be held whereby the
absence or presence therefrom of any
union representative would affect the
petition for certification election. In
fact, it is the denial of the petition for
certification election grounded solely
on the absence of NFL in the
scheduled hearings which is frowned
upon by the law. This is consistent
with the principle in labor legislation
that "certification proceedings is not a
litigation in the sense in which the
term is ordinarily understood, but an
investigation of non-adversary and
fact finding character. As such, it is
not bound by technical rules of
evidence." cralaw virtua1aw library
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; WORKERS’ CHOICE
OF REPRESENTATIVE IS OF
PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE. —
Petitioner suggests that to grant the
petition for certification election would
"open the floodgates to unbridled and
scrupulous (sic) petitions whose only
objective is to prejudice the industrial
peace and stability existing in the
Company." This Court believes
however that the workers’ choice
regarding their representative who
inevitably reflects and works for their
common interest is of paramount
importance. This policy was lengthily
explained in the concurring opinion of
then Chief Justice Fernando in the
case of Confederation of Citizens
Labor Unions (CCLU) v. National Labor
Relations Commission where he
categorically stated that "the slightest
doubt therefore cannot be entertained
that what possesses significance in a
petition for certification is that through
such a device the employees are given
the opportunity to make known who
shall have the right to represent them.
What is equally important is that not
only some but all of them should have
the right to do so."cralaw virtua1aw library
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; 20% REQUIREMENT
APPLIES TO UNORGANIZED
ESTABLISHMENT. — The requirement
of 20% under Art. 257 of the Labor
Code applies only to unorganized
establishments. It is Article 256
instead which must be applied. A
perusal of the said Article would
confirm the falsity of the claim of
petitioner. Nowhere in the said
provision does it require the written
consent of twenty percent (20%) of
the employees in the bargaining unit.
Hence, the issue of whether or not the
petition for certification election is
supported by twenty percent (20%) of
the bargaining unit concerned is
immaterial to the case at bar. What is
essential is that the petition was filed
during the sixty-day freedom period.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ALLEGATION THAT
EMPLOYEES ARE SATISFIED WITH
THE SERVICES OF INCUMBENT UNION
HAS NO RIGHT. — The petition to
dismiss the petition for certification
election filed by NFL and signed by
some 224 employees signifying their
satisfaction with the services of the
incumbent union should not be given
any weight at all. The possibility that
the workers were merely coerced to
sign the petition such that they did so
for fear of reprisal from the members
of ALU is not remote. However, this
does not discount the possibility that
the workers voluntarily signed the said
petition. Whatever reason the workers
may have had for signing the same
may be ascertained once a
certification election is held. It is in
this democratic process that the
workers are given the opportunity to
freely choose, by secret ballot, who
they want to represent them. In this
manner, the workers are free of any
undue pressure which either
competing union may exert upon
them.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONTRACT BAR
RULE; RENEWED AGREEMENT
HASTILY AND PREMATURELY ENTERED
IS NOT A BAR TO THE PETITION FOR
CERTIFICATION ELECTION. — The
collective bargaining agreement was
hastily and prematurely entered into
apparently in an attempt to avoid the
holding of a certification election. The
records show that the old collective
bargaining agreement of the petitioner
with Soriano Fruits Corporation was to
expire on August 31, 1987. However,
three (3) months and eight (8) days
before its expiry date, or on June 22,
1987, the petitioner renewed the
same with the consent and
collaboration of management. The
renewed agreement was then ratified
by the members of the bargaining unit
and was thereafter sent to the Bureau
of Labor Relations for certification. In
the meantime, on August 10, 1987
(21 days before the expiration of the
old collective bargaining agreement on
August 31, 1987) a petition for
certification election was filed by
respondent union, NFL. From the
foregoing facts, it is quite obvious that
the renewed agreement cannot
constitute a bar to the instant petition
for certification election for the very
reason that the same was not yet in
existence when the petition for
certification election was filed on
August 10, 1987 inasmuch as the
same was to take effect only on
September 1, 1987, after the old
agreement expires on August 31,
1987.
8. ID.; ID.; COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT; ART. 254 OF THE LABOR
CODE PROHIBITS MODIFICATION AND
ALTERATION DURING THE
AGREEMENT LIFETIME. — What Art.
254 prohibits is the modification and
alteration of the present collective
bargaining agreement during its
lifetime. In the present case, the
alterations and modifications were to
take effect only on September 1,
1987, i.e., after the expiration of the
old agreement. It must be noted that
the new agreement did not suspend
the old one. Neither did it terminate
nor modify the same. Petitioner
therefore did not commit any violation
of Article 254 of the Labor Code,
contrary to the allegations of the
Solicitor General.
DECISION
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a petition for the issuance of
the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari for the reversal of the
Decision 1 of the Director of Bureau of
Labor Relations ordering the holding of
a certification election among the
workers of Soriano Fruits Corporation.
The antecedent facts of the case are
as follows:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Petitioner Associated Labor Unions,
ALU for brevity, had a collective
bargaining agreement with the
employer Soriano Fruits Corporation
which expired on September 30, 1987.
Prior to the said date, or on June 22,
1987, petitioner and the employer
signed a collective bargaining
agreement which was to take effect on
September 1, 1987 and was to remain
so until August 31, 1990. The said
collective bargaining agreement was
unanimously approved and ratified by
the members of the bargaining unit.
However, on August 10, 1987, private
respondent National Federation of
Labor (NFL), filed a petition for
certification election questioning the
majority status of the incumbent
union, pursuant to Executive Order
111 and its Implementing Rules, there
being more than majority of its
members who have expressed doubts
on the sincerity of the incumbent
union. 2 Acting on the said petition the
Med-Arbiter scheduled a hearing on
August 21, 1987 to determine the
majority status of herein petitioner but
the NFL representative failed to
appear despite due notice.
Consequently, the hearing was reset
to September 8, 1987 to give NFL an
opportunity to substantiate its claim
but again, the NFL was not
represented. Thereafter, the parties
were asked to submit their position
papers. To bolster its claim, ALU
submitted several petitions signed by
members of the bargaining unit to
dismiss any petition filed by any union
which seeks to question the majority
status of the incumbent union. The
signatories to the petition also
reaffirmed its loyalty to ALU.
On October 2, 1987, the Med-Arbiter
promulgated an Order 3 dismissing
the petition for certification election on
the ground of failure to prosecute. An
appeal to the Bureau of Labor
Relations however, proved fruitful. On
December 22, 1987 the respondent
Director of the Bureau of Labor
Relations held that the Med-Arbiter
erred in dismissing the petition for
certification election. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads thus:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the appeal of petitioner,
National Federation of Labor is hereby
given due course and the Order of the
Med-Arbiter is set aside. Let, therefore
a certification election proceed at
Soriano Fruits Corporation, after a
pre-election conference to thresh out
the list of eligible voters, with the
following choices: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. National Federation of Labor (NFL);
2. Associated Labor Unions (ALU).
SO ORDERED." 4
ALU sought a reconsideration of the
above-cited decision but to no avail.
Hence, the instant petition
for certiorari.
Petitioner alleges that in granting the
petition for certification election, the
respondent Director acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or in excess of jurisdiction in that:
"I. THE HONORABLE DIRECTOR
MISSED THE LEGAL INTENT OF
ARTICLE 257 AS AMENDED BY
EXECUTIVE ORDER 111.
II. THE HONORABLE DIRECTOR
ERRED IN CLAIMING THAT THE
PETITION IS SUPPORTED BY MORE
THAN TWENTY (20%) OF THE RANK
AND FILE.
III. THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONCLUDED COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT RENDERS
THE CERTIFICATION ELECTION MOOT
AND ACADEMIC." cralaw virtua1aw library
This Court finds the petition bereft of
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph merit.
Petitioner hinges its claim on Art. 257
of the Labor Code which provides: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Art. 257. Petitions in unorganized
establishments. In any establishment
where there is no certified bargaining
agent, the petition for certification
election filed by a legitimate labor
organization shall be supported by the
written consent of at least twenty
(20%) percent of all the employees in
the bargaining unit. Upon receipt and
verification of such petition, the Med-
Arbiter shall automatically order the
conduct of a certification election." cralaw virtua1aw library
But this provision finds no application
in the case at bar primarily because it
applies to unorganized establishments.
For the said provision to apply, the
establishment concerned must have
no certified bargaining agent. This is
not the case in the present petition
where there was a collective
bargaining agreement entered into by
the management of the Soriano Fruits
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph Corporation and ALU, the petitioner,
which was then the bargaining agent.
This Court however, finds that it is
Article 256 as amended by Executive
Order 111 which must be considered
in the resolution of the present
petition. The said article states: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Article 256. Representation Issues in
Organized Establishments. In
organized establishments, when a
petition questioning the majority
status of the incumbent bargaining
agent is filed before the Ministry
within the sixty (60) day period before
the expiration of the collective
bargaining agreement, the Med-
Arbiter shall automatically order an
election by secret ballot to ascertain
the will of the employees in the
appropriate bargaining unit."
(Emphasis supplied)
A review of the records of this case
would confirm the fact that the
petition for certification election filed
by NFL on August 10, 1987 was well
within the prescribed sixty (60) day
freedom period.
Petitioner however maintains that the
respondent Director misconstrued the
legal intent behind the above-cited
provision and that it should not have
been given a literal interpretation.
Petitioner insists further that the right
of the members of the bargaining unit
to choose which union should
represent them is not an absolute one
since a prior hearing must be had to
ascertain the veracity of the
allegations contained in the petition.
This argument is untenable.
The provision of Article 256 which
provides that the Med-Arbiter shall
automatically order an election is clear
and leaves no room for further
interpretation. The mere filing of a
petition for certification election within
the freedom period is sufficient basis
for the respondent Director to order
the holding of a certification election.
The fact that NFL did not appear
during the hearings set by the Med-
Arbiter is of no moment. As the
Solicitor General correctly pointed out,
there is no prohibition on the conduct
of hearings by the Med-Arbiter on the
competing stands of the unions.
Neither does the law require the same
to be held whereby the absence or
presence therefrom of any union
representative would affect the
petition for certification election. In
fact, it is the denial of the petition for
certification election grounded solely
on the absence of NFL in the
scheduled hearings which is frowned
upon by the law. This is consistent
with the principle in labor legislation
that "certification proceedings is not a
litigation in the sense in which the
term is ordinarily understood, but an
investigation of non-adversary and
fact finding character. As such, it is
not bound by technical rules of
evidence." 5
Petitioner suggests that to grant the
petition for certification election would
"open the floodgates to unbridled and
scrupulous (sic) petitions whose only
objective is to prejudice the industrial
peace and stability existing in the
Company." 6 This Court believes
however that the workers’ choice
regarding their representative who
inevitably reflects and works for their
common interest is of paramount
importance. This policy was lengthily
explained in the concurring opinion of
then Chief Justice Fernando in the
case of Confederation of Citizens
Labor Unions (CCLU) v. National Labor
Relations Commission 7 where he
categorically stated that "the slightest
doubt therefore cannot be entertained
that what possesses significance in a
petition for certification is that through
such a device the employees are given
the opportunity to make known who
shall have the right to represent them.
What is equally important is that not
only some but all of them should have
the right to do so." 8
Petitioner next contends that the
respondent Director erred in relying
upon the claim of the respondent
Union that the petition for certification
election is supported by more than
twenty percent (20%) of the rank and
file considering that the said petition
merely contained the lone signature of
the NFL representative.
This averment is likewise
unmeritorious.
Petitioner bases its argument again on
Article 257 which prescribes the
twenty percent (20%) requirement.
But it must be reiterated that the said
requirement applies only to
unorganized establishments. It is
Article 256 instead which must be
applied. A perusal of the said Article
would confirm the falsity of the claim
of petitioner. Nowhere in the said
provision does it require the written
consent of twenty percent (20%) of
the employees in the bargaining unit.
Hence, the issue of whether or not the
petition for certification election is
supported by twenty percent (20%) of
the bargaining unit concerned is
immaterial to the case at bar. What is
essential is that the petition was filed
during the sixty-day freedom period.
The petition to dismiss the petition for
certification election 9 filed by NFL and
signed by some 224 employees
signifying their satisfaction with the
services of the incumbent union
should not be given any weight at all.
The possibility that the workers were
merely coerced to sign the petition
such that they did so for fear of
reprisal from the members of ALU is
not remote. However, this does not
discount the possibility that the
workers voluntarily signed the said
petition. Whatever reason the workers
may have had for signing the same
may be ascertained once a
certification election is held. It is in
this democratic process that the
workers are given the opportunity to
freely choose, by secret ballot, who
they want to represent them. In this
manner, the workers are free of any
undue pressure which either
competing union may exert upon
them.
Finally, the petitioner assails the
decision of the respondent Director on
the ground that "the ratification of the
collective bargaining agreement
renders the certification election moot
and academic." 10
This contention finds no basis in law.
The petitioner was obviously referring
to the contract-bar rule where the law
prohibits the holding of certification
elections during the lifetime of the
collective bargaining agreement. Said
agreement was hastily and
prematurely entered into apparently in
an attempt to avoid the holding of a
certification election. The records
show that the old collective bargaining
agreement of the petitioner with
Soriano Fruits Corporation was to
expire on August 31, 1987. However,
three (3) months and eight (8) days
before its expiry date, or on June 22,
1987, the petitioner renewed the
same with the consent and
collaboration of management. The
renewed agreement was then ratified
by the members of the bargaining unit
and was thereafter sent to the Bureau
of Labor Relations for certification. In
the meantime, on August 10, 1987
(21 days before the expiration of the
old collective bargaining agreement on
August 31, 1987) a petition for
certification election was filed by
respondent union, NFL. From the
foregoing facts, it is quite obvious that
the renewed agreement cannot
constitute a bar to the instant petition
for certification election for the very
reason that the same was not yet in
existence when the petition for
certification election was filed on
August 10, 1987 inasmuch as the
same was to take effect only on
September 1, 1987, after the old
agreement expires on August 31,
1987.
In the case of Associated Trade
Unions-ATU v. Noriel, 11 this Court
held that "it is indubitably clear from
the facts heretofore unfolded that
management and petitioner herein
proceeded with such indecent haste in
renewing their CBA way ahead of the
sixty-day freedom period in their
obvious desire to frustrate the will of
the rank and file employees in
selecting their bargaining
representative. To countenance the
actuation of the company and the
petitioner herein would be violative of
the employees constitutional right to
self-organization. 12
The Solicitor General, in his comment,
brought the attention of this Court to
the fact that petitioner had violated
the provisions of Article 254 13 when
it renewed the collective bargaining
agreement before the commencement
of the sixty-day freedom period. This
Court does not subscribe to this view.
What the aforecited rule prohibits is
the modification and alteration of the
present collective bargaining
agreement during its lifetime. In the
present case, the alterations and
modifications were to take effect only
on September 1, 1987, i.e., after the
expiration of the old agreement. It
must be noted that the new
agreement did not suspend the old
one. Neither did it terminate nor
modify the same. Petitioner therefore
did not commit any violation of Article
254 of the Labor Code, contrary to the
allegations of the Solicitor General.
However, it is apparent
that certiorari does not lie in the
instant petition for this Court does not
see any substantial reason to withhold
the primordial right of workers to
select their bargaining representative.
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the instant petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. The temporary
restraining order issued by resolution
of this Court of July 11, 1988 is
hereby lifted and declared to be of no
force and effect. The decision is
immediately executory. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
12. G.R. No. 75810 September 9, 1991
KAISAHAN NG MANGGAGAWANG
PILIPINO (KAMPIL-KATIPUNAN), petitioner,
vs.
HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his
capacity as Director, Bureau of Labor
Relations, and VIRON GARMENTS MFG.,
CO., INC., respondents.
Esteban M. Mendoza for petitioner.
 
 R E S O LU T I O N
 
NARVASA, J.:
The propriety of holding a certification election
is the issue in the special civil action
of certiorari at bar.
By virtue of a Resolution of the Bureau of
Labor Relations dated February 27, 1981, the
National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU)
was declared the exclusive bargaining
representative of all rank-and-file employees
of Viron Garments Manufacturing Co., Inc.
(VIRON).
More than four years thereafter, or on April 11,
1985, another union, the Kaisahan ng
Manggagawang Pilipino KAMPIL Katipunan
filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a
petition for certification election among the
employees of VIRON. The petition allegedly
counted with the support of more than thirty
percent (30%) of the workers at VIRON.
NAFLU opposed the petition, as might be
expected. The Med-Arbiter however ordered,
on June 14, 1985, that a certification election
be held at VIRON as prayed for, after
ascertaining that KAMPIL had complied with
all the requirements of law and that since the
certification of NAFLU as sole bargaining
representative in 1981, no collective
bargaining agreement had been executed
between it and VIRON.
NAFLU appealed. It contended that at the
time the petition for certification election was
filed on April 11, 1985, it was in process of
collective bargaining with VIRON; that there
was in fact a deadlock in the negotiations
which had prompted it to file a notice of strike;
and that these circumstances constituted a
bar to the petition for election in accordance
with Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code,  reading as follows:
1
SEC. 3. When to file. — In the
absence of a collective bargaining
agreement submitted in accordance
with Article 231 of the Code, a petition
for certification election may be filed at
any time. However, no certification
election may be held within one year
from the date of issuance of
declaration of a final certification
election result. Neither may a
representation question be entertained
if, before the filing of a petition for
certification election, a bargaining
deadlock to which an incumbent or
certified bargaining agent is a party
had been submitted to conciliation or
arbitration or had become the subject
of a valid notice of strike or lockout.
If a collective bargaining agreement
has been duly registered in
accordance with Article 231 of the
Code, a petition for certification
election or a motion for intervention
can only be entertained within sixty
(60) days prior to the expiry date of
such agreement.
Finding merit in a NAFLU's appeal, the
Director of Labor Relations rendered a
Resolution on April 30, 1986 setting aside the
Med-Arbiter's Order of June 14, 1985 and
dismissing KAMPIL's petition for certification
election. This disposition is justified in the
Resolution as follows:
... While it may be true that the one-
year period (mentioned in Section 3
above quoted) has long run its course
since intervenor NAFLU was certified
on February 27, 1981, it could not be
said, however, that NAFLU slept on its
right to bargain collectively with the
employer. If a closer look was made
on the history of labor management
relations in the company, it could be
readily seen that the delay in the
negotiations for and conclusion of a
collective agreement — the object of
the one-year period — could be
attributed first, on the exhaustion of all
legal remedies in the representation
question twice initiated in the company
before the filing of the present petition
and second, to management who had
 been resisting the representations of
NAFLU in collective bargaining.
The one-year period therefore, should
not be applied literally to the present
dispute, especially considering that
intervenor had to undergo a strike to
bring management to the negotiation
table. ...
KAMPIL moved for reconsideration, and when
this was denied, instituted in this Court the
present certiorari action.
It is evident that the prohibition imposed by
law on the holding of a certification election
"within one year from the date of issuance of
declaration of a final certification election
result' — in this case, from February 27, 1981,
the date of the Resolution declaring NAFLU
the exclusive bargaining representative of
rank-and-file workers of VIRON — can have
no application to the case at bar. That one-
year period-known as the "certification year"
during which the certified union is required to
negotiate with the employer, and certification
election is prohibited  — has long since
2 strike notice.
expired.
Thus the question for resolution is whether or
not KAMPIL's petition for certification election
is barred because, before its filing, a
bargaining deadlock between VIRON and
NAFLU as the incumbent bargaining agent,
had been submitted to conciliation or
arbitration or had become the subject of a
valid notice of strike or lockout, in accordance
with Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the
Omnibus Rules above quoted.
Again it seems fairly certain that prior to the
filing of the petition for election in this case,
there was no such "bargaining deadlock ...
(which) had been submitted to conciliation or
arbitration or had become the subject of a
valid notice of strike or lockout." To be sure,
there are in the record assertions by NAFLU
that its attempts to bring VIRON to the
negotiation table had been unsuccessful
because of the latter's recalcitrance and
unfulfilled promises to bargain collectively;  but
3 Resolution of the respondent Director of the
there is no proof that it had taken any action to
legally coerce VIRON to comply with its
statutory duty to bargain collectively. It could
have charged VIRON with unfair labor
practice; but it did not. It could have gone on a
legitimate strike in protest against VIRON's
refusal to bargain collectively and compel it to
do so; but it did not. There are assertions by
NAFLU, too, that its attempts to bargain
collectively had been delayed by continuing
challenges to the resolution pronouncing it the
sole bargaining representative in VIRON; but
there is no adequate substantiation thereof, or
of how it did in fact prevent initiation of the
bargaining process between it and VIRON.
The stark, incontrovertible fact is that from
February 27, 1981 — when NAFLU was
proclaimed the exclusive bargaining
representative of all VIRON employees — to
April 11, 1985 — when KAMPIL filed its
petition for certification election or a period of
more than four (4) years, no collective
bargaining agreement was ever executed, and
no deadlock ever arose from negotiations
between NAFLU and VIRON resulting in
conciliation proceedings or the filing of a valid
The respondents advert to a strike declared
by NAFLU on October 26, 1986 for refusal of
VIRON to bargain and for violation of terms
and conditions of employment, which was
settled by the parties' agreement, and to
another strike staged on December 6, 1986 in
connection with a claim of violation of said
agreement, a dispute which has since been
certified for compulsory arbitration by the
Secretary of Labor & Employment.  Obviously,
4
however, these activities took place after the
initiation of the certification election case by
KAMPIL, and it was grave abuse of discretion
to have regarded them as precluding the
holding of the certification election thus prayed
for.
WHEREFORE, it being apparent that none of
the proscriptions to certification election set
out in the law exists in the case at bar, and it
was in the premises grave abuse of discretion
to have ruled otherwise, the contested
Bureau of Labor Relations dated April 30,
1986 in BLR Case No. A-7-139-85 (BZEO-
CE-04-004-85) is NULLIFIED AND SET ("BLD"), seventeen (17) in the Ayala
ASIDE. Costs against private respondent. Operations Center (AOC), and
eighteen (18) in the Magnolia-Manila
SO ORDERED. Buying Station ("Magnolia-MBS"). 3
Consequently, the private respondent
union filed several grievance cases for
the said retrenched employees,
13. SAN MIGUEL praying for the redeployment of the
CORPORATION, Petitioner, said employees to the other divisions
v. NATIONAL LABOR of the company.
RELATIONS COMMISSION,
SECOND DIVISION, AND The grievance proceedings were
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION conducted pursuant to Sections 5 and
EMPLOYEES UNION (SMCEU) 8, Article VIII of the parties’ 1990
- PTGWO, Respondents. Collective Bargaining Agreement
providing for the following procedures,
DECISION to wit:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SECTION 5. Processing of Grievance.

PURISIMA, J.: — Should a grievance arise, an
earnest effort shall be made to settle
the grievance expeditiously in
At bar is a Petition for Certiorari under accordance with the following
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, procedures: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

assailing the Resolution 1 of the

National Labor Relations Commission Step 1. — The individual employee
in NLRC NCR CASE NO. 00094-90, concerned and the Union Directors, or
which dismissed the complaint of San the Union Steward shall, first take up
Miguel Corporation (SMC), seeking to the employee’s grievance orally with
dismiss the notice of strike given by his immediate superior. If no
the private respondent union and to satisfactory agreement or adjustment
compel the latter to comply with the of the grievance is reached, the
provisions of the Collective Bargaining grievance shall, within twenty (20)
Agreement (CBA) 2 on grievance working days from the occurrence of
machinery, arbitration, and the no- the cause or event which gave rise to
strike clause, with prayer for the the grievance, be filed in writing with
issuance of a temporary restraining the Department Manager or the next
order.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red

level superior who shall render his

decision within ten (10) working days
The antecedent facts are as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

from the receipt of the written

grievance. A copy of the decision shall
In July 1990, San Miguel Cooperation, be furnished the Plant Personnel
alleging the need to streamline its Officer. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

operations due to financial losses, shut

down some of its plants and declared Step 2. — If the decision in Step 1 is
55 positions as redundant, listed as rejected, the employee concerned may
follows: seventeen (17) employees in elevate or appeal this in writing to the
the Business Logistics Division Plant Manager/Director or his duly
authorized representative within
twenty (20) working days from the
receipt of the Decision of the
Department Manager. Otherwise, the
decision in Step 1 shall be deemed
accepted by the employee.
The Plant Manager/Director assisted
by the Plant Personnel Officer shall
determine the necessity of conducting
grievance meetings. If necessary, the
Plant Manager/Director and the Plant
Personnel Officer shall meet the
employee concerned and the Union
Director/Steward on such date(s) as
may be designated by the Plant
Manager. In every plant/office,
Grievance Meetings shall be scheduled
at least twice a month.
The Plant Manager shall give his
written comments and decision within
ten (10) working days after his receipt
of such grievance or the date of
submission of the grievance for
resolution, as the case may be. A copy
of his Decision shall be furnished the
Employee Relations Directorate.
Step 3. — If no satisfactory
adjustment is arrived at Step 2, the
employee may appeal the Decision to
the Conciliation Board as provided
under Section 6 hereof, within fifteen
(15) working days from the date of
receipt of the decision of the Plant
Manager/Director or his designate.
Otherwise, the decision in Step 2 shall
be deemed accepted by the employee.
The Conciliation Board shall meet on
the grievance in such dates as shall be
designated by the Division/Business
Unit Manager or his representative. In
every Division/Business Unit,
Grievance Meetings of the Conciliation
Board shall be scheduled at least once
a month.
The Conciliation Board shall have
fifteen (15) working days from the
date of submission of the grievance
for resolution within which to decide
on the grievance.
SECTION 6. Conciliation Board. —
There shall be a conciliation Board per
Business Unit or Division. Every
Conciliation Board shall be composed
of not more than five (5)
representatives each from the
Company and the Union. Management
and the Union may be assisted by
their respective legal counsels.
In every Division/Business Unit, the
names of the Company and Union
representatives to the Conciliation
Board shall be submitted to the
Division/Business Unit Manager not
later than January of every year. The
Conciliation Board members shall act
as such for one (1) year until removed
by the Company or the Union, as the
case may be." cralaw virtua1aw library
x           x          x
SECTION 8. Submission to Arbitration.
— If the employee or Union is not
satisfied with the Decision of the
Conciliation Board and desires to
submit the grievance to arbitration,
the employee or the Union shall serve
notice of such intention to the
Company within fifteen (15) working
days after receipt of the Board’s
decision. If no such written notice is
received by the Company within
fifteen (15) working days, the
grievance shall be considered settled
on the basis of the company’s position
and shall no longer be available for
arbitration." 4
During the grievance proceedings,
however, most of the employees were
redeployed, while others accepted
early retirement. As a result only 17
employees remained when the parties
proceeded to the third level (Step 3)
of the grievance procedure. In a
meeting on October 26, 1990,
petitioner informed private respondent
union that if by October 30, 1990, the
remaining 17 employees could not yet
be redeployed, their services would be
terminated on November 2, 1990. The
said meeting adjourned when Mr.
Daniel S. L. Borbon II, a
representative of the union, declared
that there was nothing more to
discuss in view of the deadlock. 5
On November 7, 1990 the private
respondent filed with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB) of the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) a notice of
strike on the following grounds: a)
bargaining deadlock; b) union busting;
c) gross violation of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA), such as
non-compliance with the grievance
procedure; d) failure to provide
private respondent with a list of
vacant positions pursuant to the
parties’ side agreement that was
appended to the 1990 CBA; and e)
defiance of voluntary arbitration
award. Petitioner on the other hand,
moved to dismiss the notice of strike
but the NCMB failed to act on the
motion.
On December 21, 1990, petitioner
SMC filed a complaint 6 with the
respondent NLRC, praying for: (1) the
dismissal of the notice of strike; (2) an
order compelling the respondent union
to submit to grievance and arbitration
the issue listed in the notice of strike;
(3) the recovery of the expenses of
litigation.
On April 16, 1991, respondent NLRC
came out with a minute resolution
dismissing the complaint; holding,
thus: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"NLRC NCR IC NO. 000094-90,
entitled San Miguel Corporation,
Complainant -versus- San Miguel
Corporation Employees Union-PTWO
(SMCEU), Respondent. — Considering
the allegations in the complaint to
restrain Respondent Union from
declaring a strike and to enforce
mutual compliance with the provisions
of the collective bargaining agreement
on grievance machinery, and the no-
strike clause, with prayer for issuance
of temporary restraining order, and
the evidence adduced therein, the
Answer filed by the respondent and
the memorandum filed by the
complainant in support of its
application for the issuance of an
injunction, the Second Division, after
due deliberation, Resolved to dismiss
the complaint for lack of merit," 7
Aggrieved by the said resolution,
petitioner found its way to this court
via the present petition, contending
that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
"I
IT IS THE POSITIVE LEGAL DUTY OF
RESPONDENT NLRC TO COMPEL
ARBITRATION AND TO ENJOIN A
STRIKE IN VIOLATION OF A NO
STRIKE CLAUSE.
II
INJUNCTION IS THE ONLY
IMMEDIATE, EFFECTIVE SUBSTITUTE
FOR THE DISASTROUS ECONOMIC
WARFARE THAT ARBITRATION IS
DESIGNED TO AVOID." 8
On June 3, 1991, to preserve the
status quo, the Court issued a
Resolution 9 granting petitioner’s
prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order.
The Petition is impressed with merit.
lawlibrary
chanrobles virtual
Rule XXII, Section I, of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing Book V the
Labor Code 10 reads: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 1. Grounds for strike and
lockout. — A strike or lockout may be
declared in cases of bargaining
deadlocks and unfair labor practices.
Violations of the collective bargaining
agreements, except flagrant and/or
malicious refusal to comply with its
economic provisions, shall not be
considered unfair labor practice and
shall not be strikeable. No strike or
lockout may be declared on grounds
involving inter-union and intra-union
disputes or on issues brought to
voluntary or compulsory arbitration."
library
In the case under consideration, the
grounds relied upon by the private
respondent union are non-strikeable.
The issues which may lend substance
to the notice of strike filed by the
private respondent union are:
collective bargaining deadlock and
petitioner’s alleged violation of the
collective bargaining agreement.
These grounds, however, appear more
illusory than real.
Collective Bargaining Deadlock is
defined as "the situation between the
labor and the management of the
company where there is failure in the
collective bargaining negotiations
resulting in a "stalemate." 11 This
situation is non-existent in the present
case since there is a Board assigned
on the third level (Step 3) of the
grievance machinery to resolve the
conflicting views of the parties.
Instead of asking the Conciliation
Board composed of five
representatives each from the
company and the union, to decide the
conflict, petitioner declared a
deadlock, and thereafter, filed a notice
of strike. For failing to exhaust all the
steps in the grievance machinery and
arbitration proceedings provided in the
Collective Bargaining Agreement, the
notice of strike should have been
dismissed by the NLRC and private
respondent union ordered to proceed
with the grievance and arbitration
proceedings. In the case of Liberal
Labor Union v. Phil. Can Co. 12 , the
court declared as illegal the strike
staged by the union for not complying
with the grievance procedure provided
in the collective bargaining
agreement, ruling that: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . the main purpose of the parties
cralaw virtua1aw
in adopting a procedure in the
settlement of their disputes is to
prevent a strike. This procedure must
be followed in its entirety if it is to
achieve its objective . . . strikes held
in violation of the terms contained in
the collective bargaining agreement
are illegal, specially when they provide
for conclusive arbitration clauses.
These agreements must be strictly
adhered to and respected if their ends
have to be achieved . . ." 13
As regards the alleged violation of the
CBA, we hold that such a violation is
chargeable against the private
respondent union. In abandoning the
grievance proceedings and stubbornly
refusing to avail of the remedies under
the CBA, private respondent violated WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
the mandatory provisions of the hereby GRANTED. Petitioner San
collective bargaining agreement. Miguel Corporation and private
respondent San Miguel Corporation
Abolition of departments or positions Employees Union - PTGWO are hereby
in the company is one of the directed to complete the third level
recognized management prerogatives. (Step 3) of the Grievance Procedure
14 Noteworthy is the fact that the and proceed with the Arbitration
private respondent does not question proceedings if necessary. No
the validity of the business move of pronouncement as to costs.
petitioner. In the absence of proof that
the act of petitioner was ill-motivated, SO ORDERED.
it is presumed that petitioner San
Miguel Corporation acted in good faith.
In fact, petitioner acceded to the
demands of the private respondent
union by redeploying most of the
employees involved; such that from 14. G.R. No. 118915 February 4, 1997
an original 17 excess employees in
BLD, 15 were successfully redeployed. CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER OF
In AOC, out of the 17 original excess, CONCERNED EMPLOYEES-UNIFIED
15 were redeployed. In the Magnolia- FILIPINO SERVICE WORKERS, (CMC-ACE-
UFSW), petitioners,
Manila Buying Station, out of 18
vs.
employees, 6 were redeployed and HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA,
only 12 were terminated. 15 Undersecretary of the Department of Labor
and Employment; CAPITOL MEDICAL
So also, in filing complaint with the CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-
NLRC, petitioner prayed that the ALLIANCE OF FILIPINO WORKERS AND
private respondent union be compelled CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER
to proceed with the grievance and INCORPORATED AND DRA. THELMA
arbitration proceedings. Petitioner CLEMENTE, President, respondents.
having evinced its willingness to
negotiate the fate of the remaining
employees affected, there is no
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
ground to sustain the notice of strike
of the private respondent union.
This petition for certiorari and prohibition
seeks to reserves and set aside the Order
All things studiedly considered, we are dated November 18, 1994 of public
of the ineluctable conclusion, and so respondent Bienvenido E. Laguesma,
hold, that the NLRC gravely abused its Undersecretary of the Department of Labor
discretion in dismissing the complaint and Employment in Case No. OS.-A-136-
of petitioner SMC for the dismissal of 94   which dismissed the petition for
1

the notice of strike, issuance of a
temporary restraining order, and an
order compelling the respondent union
to settle the dispute under the
grievance machinery of their CBA. chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
certification election filed by petitioner for lack
of merit and further directed private
respondent hospital to negotiate a collective
bargaining agreement with respondent union,
Capitol Medical Center Employees

Association-Alliance of Filipino Workers.

The antecedent facts are undisputed.
On February 17, 1992, Med-Arbiter Rasidali
C. Abdullah issued an Order which granted
respondent union's petition for certification
election among the rank-and-file employees of
the Capitol Medical Center.  Respondent CMC
2 Medical Center, Inc. v. Hon. Perlita Velasco,
appealed the Order to the Office of the
Secretary by questioning the legal status of
respondent union's affiliation with the Alliance
of Filipino Workers (AFW). To correct any
supposed infirmity in its legal status,
respondent union registered itself
independently and withdrew the petition which
had earlier been granted. Thereafter, it filed
another petition for certification election.
On May 29, 1992, Med-Arbiter Manases T.
Cruz issued an order granting the petition for
certification election.  Respondent CMC again
3 Respondent union, after being declared as the
appealed to the Office of the Secretary which
affirmed  the Order of the Med-Arbiter granting
4 employees of respondent CMC by Med-
the certification election.
On December 9, 1992, elections were finally
held with respondent union garnering 204
votes, 168 in favor of no union and 8 spoiled
ballots out of a total of 380 votes cast.
Thereafter, on January 4, 1993, Med-Arbiter
Cruz issued an Order certifying respondent
union as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of the rank and file employees
at CMC.  5
Unsatisfied with the outcome of the elections,
respondent CMC again appealed to the Office
of the Secretary of Labor which appeal was
denied on February 26, 1993.  A subsequent
6 collectively, respondent union filed a notice of
motion for reconsideration filed by respondent
CMC was likewise denied on March 23, 1993. 7 the other legal requirements, respondent
Respondent CMC's basic contention was the
supposed pendency of its petition for
cancellation of respondent union's certificate
of registration in Case No. NCR-OD-M-92211-
028. In the said case, Med-Arbiter Paterno
Adap issued an Order dated February 4, 1993
which declared respondent union's certificate
of registration as null and void.  However, this
8 It is at this juncture that petitioner union, on
order was reversed on appeal by the Officer-
in-Charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations in
her Order issued on April 13, 1993. The said
Order dismissed the motion for cancellation of
the certificate of registration of respondent
union and declared that it was not only a bona
fide affiliate or local of a federation (AFW), but
a duly registered union as well. Subsequently,
this case reached this Court in Capitol
G.R. No. 110718, where we issued a
Resolution dated December 13, 1993,
dismissing the petition of CMC for failure to
sufficiently show that public respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion.  The
9
motion for reconsideration filed by CMC was
likewise denied in our Resolution dated
February 2, 1994.   Thereafter, on March 23,
10
1994, we issued an entry of judgment
certifying that the Resolution dated December
13, 1993 has become final and executory.  11
certified bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
Arbiter Cruz, presented economic proposals
for the negotiation of a collective bargaining
agreement (CBA). However, respondent CMC
contended that CBA negotiations should be
suspended in view of the Order issued on
February 4, 1993 by Med-Arbiter Adap
declaring the registration of respondent union
as null and void. In spite of the refusal of
respondent CMC, respondent union still
persisted in its demand for CBA negotiations,
claiming that it has already been declared as
the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the
rank-and-file employees of the hospital.
Due to respondent CMC's refusal to bargain
strike on March 1, 1993. After complying with
union staged a strike on April 15, 1993. On
April 16, 1993, the Secretary of Labor
assumed jurisdiction over the case and issued
an order certifying the same to the National
Labor Relations Commission for compulsory
arbitration where the said case is still
pending.  12
March 24, 1994, filed a petition for certification
election among the regular rank-and-file
employees of the Capitol Medical Center Inc.
It alleged in its petition that: 1) three hundred
thirty one (331) out of the four hundred (400)
total rank-and-file employees of respondent
CMC signed a petition to conduct a
certification election; and 2) that the said
employees are withdrawing their authorization
for the said union to represent them as they
have joined and formed the union Capitol
Medical Center Alliance of Concerned
Employees (CMC-ACE). They also alleged
that a certification election can now be
conducted as more that 12 months have
lapsed since the last certification election was
held. Moreover, no certification election was
conducted during the twelve (12) months prior
to the petition, and no collective bargaining
agreement has as yet been concluded
between respondent union and respondent
CMC despite the lapse of twelve months from
the time the said union was voted as the
collective bargaining representative.
On April 12, 1994, respondent union opposed
the petition and moved for its dismissal. It
contended that it is the certified bargaining
agent of the rank-and-file employees of the
Hospital, which was confirmed by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment and by
this Court. It also alleged that it was not
remiss in asserting its right as the certified
bargaining agent for it continuously demanded
the negotiation of a CBA with the hospital
despite the latter's avoidance to bargain
collectively. Respondent union was even
constrained to strike on April 15, 1993, where
the Secretary of Labor intervened and certified
the dispute for compulsory arbitration.
Furthermore, it alleged that majority of the
signatories who supported the petition were
managerial and confidential employees and
not members of the rank-and-file, and that
there was no valid disaffiliation of its
members, contrary to petitioner's allegations.
Petitioner, in its rejoinder, claimed that there is
no legal impediment to the conduct of a
certification election as more than twelve (12)
months had lapsed since respondent union
was certified as the exclusive bargaining
agent and no CBA was as yet concluded. It
also claimed that the other issues raised could
only be resolved by conducting another
certification election.
In its surrejoinder, respondent union alleged
that the petition to conduct a certification
election was improper, immoral and in
manifest disregard of the decisions rendered
by the Secretary of Labor and by this Court. It
claimed that CMC employed "legal
obstructionism's" in order to let twelve months
pass without a CBA having been concluded
between them so as to pave the way for the
entry of petitioner union.
On May 12, 1994, Med-Arbiter Brigida
Fadrigon, issued an Order granting the
petition for certification election among the
rank and file
employees.   It ruled that the issue was the
13
majority status of respondent union. Since no
certification election was held within one year
from the date of issuance of a final
certification election result and there was no
bargaining deadlock between respondent
union and the employees that had been
submitted to conciliation or had become the
subject of a valid notice of strike or lock out,
there is no bar to the holding of a certification
election.  14
Respondent union appeared from the said
Order, alleging that the Med-Arbiter erred in
granting the petition for certification election
and in holding that this case falls under
Section 3, Rule V Book V of the Rules
Implementing the Labor Code.   It also prayed
15
that the said provision must not be applied
strictly in view of the facts in this case.
Petitioner union did not file any opposition to
the appeal.
On November 18, 1994, public respondent
rendered a Resolution granting the
appeal.   He ratiocinated that while the
16
petition was indeed filed after the lapse of one
year form the time of declaration of a final
certification result, and that no bargaining
deadlock had been submitted for conciliation
or arbitration, respondent union was not
remiss on its right to enter into a CBA for it
was the CMC which refused to bargain
collectively.  17
CMC and petitioner union separately filed
motions for reconsideration of the said Order.
CMC contended that in certification election
proceedings, the employer cannot be ordered
to bargain collectively with a union since the
only issue involved is the determination of the
bargaining agent of the employees.
Petitioner union claimed that to completely
disregard the will of the 331 rank-and-file
employees for a certification election would
result in the denial of their substantial rights
and interests. Moreover,it contended that
public respondent's "indictment" that petitioner
"capitalize (sic) on the ensuing delay which
was caused by the Hospital, . . ." was
unsupported by the facts and the records.
On January 11, 1995, public respondent
issued a Resolution which denied the two
motions for reconsideration hence this
petition. 
18
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not
public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the petition for
certification election, and in directing the
hospital to negotiate a collective bargaining
agreement with the said respondent union.
Petitioner alleges that public respondent
Undersecretary Laguesma denied it due
process when it ruled against the holding of a
certification election. It further claims that the
denial of due process can be gleaned from the
manner by which the assailed resolution was
written, i.e., instead of the correct name of the
mother federation UNIFIED, it was referred to
as UNITED; and that the respondent union's
name CMCEA-AFW was referred to as
CMCEA-AFLO. Petitioner maintains that such
errors indicate that the assailed resolution was
prepared with "indecent haste."
We do not subscribe to petitioner's contention.
The errors pointed to by petitioner can be
classified as mere typographical errors which
cannot materially alter the substance and
merit of the assailed resolution.
Petitioner cannot merely anchor its position on
the aforementioned erroneous' names just to
attain a reversal of the questioned resolution.
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General,
petitioner is merely "nit-picking vainly trying to
make a monumental issue out of a negligible
error of the public respondent."  19
Petitioner also assails public respondents'
findings that the former "capitalize (sic) on the
ensuing delay which was caused by the
hospital and which resulted in the non-
conclusion of a CBA within the certification
year.''   It further argues that the denial of its
20
motion fro a fair hearing was clear case of
denial of its right to due process.
Such contention of petitioner deserves scant
consideration.
A perusal of the record shows that petitioner
failed to file its opposition to oppose the
grounds for respondent union's appeal.
It was given an opportunity to be heard but
lost it when it refused to file an appellee's
memorandum.
Petitioner insists that the circumstances
prescribed in Section 3, Rule V, Book V Of the
Rules Implementing the Labor Code where a
certification election should be conducted, viz:
(1) that one year had lapsed since the
issuance of a final certification result; and (2)
that there is no bargaining deadlock to which
the incumbent or certified bargaining agent is
a party has been submitted to conciliation or
arbitration, or had become the subject of a
valid notice of strike or lockout, are present in
this case. It further claims that since there is
no evidence on record that there exists a CBA
deadlock, the law allowing the conduct of a
certification election after twelve months must
be given effect in the interest of the right of the
workers to freely choose their sole and
exclusive bargaining agent.
While it is true that, in the case at bench, one
year had lapsed since the time of declaration
of a final certification result, and that there is
no collective bargaining deadlock, public
respondent did not commit grave abuse of
discretion when it ruled in respondent union's
favor since the delay in the forging of the CBA
could not be attributed to the fault of the latter.
A scrutiny of the records will further reveal that
after respondent union was certified as the
bargaining agent of CMC, it invited the
employer hospital to the bargaining table by
submitting its economic proposal for a CBA.
However, CMC refused to negotiate with
respondent union and instead challenged the
latter's legal personality through a petition for
cancellation of the certificate of registration
which eventually reached this Court. The
decision affirming the legal status of
respondent union should have left CMC with
no other recourse but to bargain collectively;
but still it did not. Respondent union was left
with no other recourse but to file a notice of
strike against CMC for unfair labor practice
with the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board. This eventually led to a strike on April
15, 1993.
Petitioner union on the other hand, after this
Court issued an entry of judgment on March
23, 1994, filed the subject petition for
certification election on March 24, 1994,
claiming that twelve months had lapsed since
the last certification election.
Was there a bargaining deadlock between
CMC and respondent union, before the filing
of petitioner of a petition for certification
election, which had been submitted to
conciliation or had become the subject of a
valid notice of strike or lockout?
In the case of Divine Word University of
Tacloban v. Secretary of Labor and
Employment,   we had the occasion to define
21
what a deadlock is, viz:\
A "deadlock" is . . . the
counteraction of things
producing entire stoppage; . . .
. There is a deadlock when
there is a complete blocking or
stoppage resulting from the
action of equal and opposed
forces . . . . The word is
synonymous with the word
impasse, which . .
"presupposes reasonable
effort at good faith bargaining
which, despite noble
intentions, does not conclude
in agreement between the
parties."
Although there is no "deadlock" in its strict
sense as there is no "counteraction" of forces
present in this case nor "reasonable effort at
good faith bargaining," such can be attributed
to CMC's fault as the bargaining proposals of
respondent union were never answered by
CMC. In fact, what happened in this case is
worse than a bargaining deadlock for CMC
employed all legal means to block the
certification of respondent union as the
bargaining agent of the rank-and-file; and use
it as its leverage for its failure to bargain with
respondent union. Thus, we can only
conclude that CMC was unwilling to negotiate
and reach an agreement with respondent
union. CMC has not at any instance shown
willingness to discuss the economic proposals
given by respondent union.  22
As correctly ratiocinated by public respondent,
to wit:
For herein petitioner to
capitalize on the ensuing delay
which was caused by the
hospital and which resulted in
the non-conclusion of a CBA
within the certification year,
would be to negate and render
a mockery of the proceedings
undertaken before this
Department and to put an
unjustified premium on the
failure of the respondent
hospital to perform its duty to
bargain collectively as
mandated in Article 252 of the
Labor Code, as amended,
which states".
"Article 252.
Meaning of
duty to bargain
collectively —
 the duty to bargaining deadlock submitted to conciliation
bargain or arbitration, with more reason should it not
collectively be conducted if, despite attempts to bring an
means the employer to the negotiation table by the "no
performance of reasonable effort in good faith" on the
a mutual employer certified bargaining agent, there was
obligation to to bargain collectively.
meet and
convene In the case of Kaisahan ng Manggagawang
promptly and Pilipino vs. Trajano 201 SCRA 453 (1991),
expeditiously in penned by Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa,
good faith for the factual milieu of which is similar to this
the purpose of case, this Court allowed the holding of a
negotiating an certification election and ruled that the one
agreement with year period known as the "certification year"
respect to has long since expired. We also ruled, that:
wages, hours
of work and all . . . prior to the filing of the
other terms petition for election in this
and conditions case, there was no such
of employment "bargaining deadlock . .
including (which) had been submitted to
proposals for conciliation or arbitration or
adjusting any had become the subject of a
grievance or valid notice of strike or
questions lockout." To be sure, there are
arising under in the record assertions by
such NAFLU that its attempts to
agreement and bring VIRON to the negotiation
executing a table had been unsuccessful
contract because of the latter's
incorporating recalcitrance, and unfulfilled
such promises to bargain
agreements if collectively; but there is no
requested by proof that it had taken tiny
either party but action to legally coerce VIRON
such duty does to comply with its statutory
not compel any duty to bargain collectively. It
party to agree could have charged VIRON
to a proposal with unfair labor practice; but it
or to make any did not. It could have gone on
concession." a legitimate strike in protest
against VIRON's refusal to
The duly certified bargaining bargain collectively and
agent, CMCEA-AFW, should compel it to do so; but it did
not be made to further bear not. There are assertions by
the brunt flowing from the NAFLU, too, that its attempts
respondent hospital's to bargain collectively had
reluctance and thinly disguised been delayed by continuing
refusal to bargain. 
23
challenges to the resolution
pronouncing it the sole
If the law proscribes the conduct of a bargaining representative in
certification election when there is a VIRON; but there is no
 adequate substantiation
thereof, or of how it did in fact
prevent initiation of the
bargaining process between it
and VIRON.  24
Although the statements pertinent to this case
are merely obiter, still the fact remains that in
the Kaisahan case, NAFLU was counselled by
this Court on the steps that it should have
undertaken to protect its interest, but which it
failed to do so.
This is what is strikingly different between
the Kaisahan case and the case at bench for
in the latter case, there was proof that the
certified bargaining agent, respondent union,
had taken an action to legally coerce the
employer to comply with its statutory duty to
bargain collectively, i.e., charging the
employer with unfair labor practice and
conducting a strike in protest against the
employer's refusal to bargain.   It is only just
25
and equitable that the circumstances in this
case should be considered as similar in nature
to a "bargaining deadlock" when no
certification election could be held. This is also
to make sure that no floodgates will be
opened for the circumvention of the law by
unscrupulous employers to prevent any
certified bargaining agent from negotiating a
CBA. Thus, Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the
Implement Rules should be interpreted
liberally so as to include a circumstance, e.g.
where a CBA could not be concluded due to
the failure of one party to willingly perform its
duty to bargain collectively.
The order for the hospital to bargain is based
on its failure to bargain collectively with
respondent union.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated
November 18, 1994 of public respondent
Laguesma is AFFIRMED and the instant
petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED
15. G.R. No. 75810 September 9, 1991
KAISAHAN NG MANGGAGAWANG
PILIPINO (KAMPIL-KATIPUNAN), petitioner,
vs.
HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his
capacity as Director, Bureau of Labor
Relations, and VIRON GARMENTS MFG.,
CO., INC., respondents.
Esteban M. Mendoza for petitioner.
 
R E S O LU T I O N
 
NARVASA, J.:
The propriety of holding a certification election
is the issue in the special civil action
of certiorari at bar.
By virtue of a Resolution of the Bureau of
Labor Relations dated February 27, 1981, the
National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU)
was declared the exclusive bargaining
representative of all rank-and-file employees
of Viron Garments Manufacturing Co., Inc.
(VIRON).
More than four years thereafter, or on April 11,
1985, another union, the Kaisahan ng
Manggagawang Pilipino KAMPIL Katipunan
filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a
petition for certification election among the
employees of VIRON. The petition allegedly
counted with the support of more than thirty
percent (30%) of the workers at VIRON.
NAFLU opposed the petition, as might be
expected. The Med-Arbiter however ordered,
on June 14, 1985, that a certification election
be held at VIRON as prayed for, after
ascertaining that KAMPIL had complied with
all the requirements of law and that since the
certification of NAFLU as sole bargaining
representative in 1981, no collective
bargaining agreement had been executed
between it and VIRON.
NAFLU appealed. It contended that at the
time the petition for certification election was
filed on April 11, 1985, it was in process of
collective bargaining with VIRON; that there
was in fact a deadlock in the negotiations
which had prompted it to file a notice of strike;
and that these circumstances constituted a
bar to the petition for election in accordance
with Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code,  reading as follows:
1
SEC. 3. When to file. — In the
absence of a collective bargaining
agreement submitted in accordance
with Article 231 of the Code, a petition
for certification election may be filed at
any time. However, no certification
election may be held within one year
from the date of issuance of
declaration of a final certification
election result. Neither may a
representation question be entertained
if, before the filing of a petition for
certification election, a bargaining
deadlock to which an incumbent or
certified bargaining agent is a party
had been submitted to conciliation or
arbitration or had become the subject
of a valid notice of strike or lockout.
If a collective bargaining agreement
has been duly registered in
accordance with Article 231 of the
Code, a petition for certification
election or a motion for intervention
can only be entertained within sixty
(60) days prior to the expiry date of
such agreement.
Finding merit in a NAFLU's appeal, the
Director of Labor Relations rendered a
Resolution on April 30, 1986 setting aside the
Med-Arbiter's Order of June 14, 1985 and
dismissing KAMPIL's petition for certification
election. This disposition is justified in the
Resolution as follows:
... While it may be true that the one-
year period (mentioned in Section 3
above quoted) has long run its course
since intervenor NAFLU was certified
on February 27, 1981, it could not be
said, however, that NAFLU slept on its
right to bargain collectively with the
employer. If a closer look was made
on the history of labor management
relations in the company, it could be
readily seen that the delay in the
negotiations for and conclusion of a
collective agreement — the object of
the one-year period — could be
attributed first, on the exhaustion of all
legal remedies in the representation
question twice initiated in the company
before the filing of the present petition
and second, to management who had
been resisting the representations of
NAFLU in collective bargaining.
The one-year period therefore, should
not be applied literally to the present
dispute, especially considering that
intervenor had to undergo a strike to
bring management to the negotiation
table. ...
KAMPIL moved for reconsideration, and when
this was denied, instituted in this Court the
present certiorari action.
It is evident that the prohibition imposed by
law on the holding of a certification election
"within one year from the date of issuance of
declaration of a final certification election
result' — in this case, from February 27, 1981,
the date of the Resolution declaring NAFLU
the exclusive bargaining representative of
rank-and-file workers of VIRON — can have
no application to the case at bar. That one-
year period-known as the "certification year"
during which the certified union is required to
negotiate with the employer, and certification
election is prohibited  — has long since
2
expired.
Thus the question for resolution is whether or
not KAMPIL's petition for certification election
is barred because, before its filing, a
bargaining deadlock between VIRON and
NAFLU as the incumbent bargaining agent,
had been submitted to conciliation or
arbitration or had become the subject of a
valid notice of strike or lockout, in accordance
with Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the however, these activities took place after the
Omnibus Rules above quoted. initiation of the certification election case by
KAMPIL, and it was grave abuse of discretion
Again it seems fairly certain that prior to the to have regarded them as precluding the
filing of the petition for election in this case, holding of the certification election thus prayed
there was no such "bargaining deadlock ... for.
(which) had been submitted to conciliation or
arbitration or had become the subject of a WHEREFORE, it being apparent that none of
valid notice of strike or lockout." To be sure, the proscriptions to certification election set
there are in the record assertions by NAFLU out in the law exists in the case at bar, and it
that its attempts to bring VIRON to the was in the premises grave abuse of discretion
negotiation table had been unsuccessful to have ruled otherwise, the contested
because of the latter's recalcitrance and Resolution of the respondent Director of the
unfulfilled promises to bargain collectively;  but
3
Bureau of Labor Relations dated April 30,
there is no proof that it had taken any action to 1986 in BLR Case No. A-7-139-85 (BZEO-
legally coerce VIRON to comply with its CE-04-004-85) is NULLIFIED AND SET
statutory duty to bargain collectively. It could ASIDE. Costs against private respondent.
have charged VIRON with unfair labor
practice; but it did not. It could have gone on a SO ORDERED.
legitimate strike in protest against VIRON's
refusal to bargain collectively and compel it to
do so; but it did not. There are assertions by
NAFLU, too, that its attempts to bargain
collectively had been delayed by continuing
challenges to the resolution pronouncing it the
sole bargaining representative in VIRON; but
there is no adequate substantiation thereof, or
of how it did in fact prevent initiation of the
bargaining process between it and VIRON.

The stark, incontrovertible fact is that from

February 27, 1981 — when NAFLU was
proclaimed the exclusive bargaining
representative of all VIRON employees — to
April 11, 1985 — when KAMPIL filed its
petition for certification election or a period of
more than four (4) years, no collective
bargaining agreement was ever executed, and
no deadlock ever arose from negotiations
between NAFLU and VIRON resulting in
conciliation proceedings or the filing of a valid
strike notice.

The respondents advert to a strike declared

by NAFLU on October 26, 1986 for refusal of
VIRON to bargain and for violation of terms
and conditions of employment, which was
settled by the parties' agreement, and to
another strike staged on December 6, 1986 in
connection with a claim of violation of said
agreement, a dispute which has since been
certified for compulsory arbitration by the
Secretary of Labor & Employment.  Obviously,
4