The Human Surrender towards the Earth:

Anthropocentrism & Karoline von Günderrode’s Philosophy of Nature

Introduction

This paper aims to bring Karoline von Günderrode’s philosophy of nature into contemporary
discussions of environmental ethics on anthropocentrism. I will argue that her way of
approaching nature is morally relevant and operable because it offers a metaphysical account of
the relationship between humans and the earth. I believe that Günderrode’s idea of the earth
could balance our contemporary discussions on anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism.

The argument will be developed in three sections: first, I will reconstruct Günderrode’s
understanding of self and nature, its position in a larger unity, and its individualized realization
within this whole; second, I will argue that there is a lack and vagueness of metaphysical
reasonings of modern approaches to environmental ethics discussions, regarding human beings as
‘the sole moral agents’ in this universe; third, I will suggest that Günderrode’s view of the
realization of the idea of the earth justifies the responsibility of human beings towards nature
modestly, by her interpreting it as a human mission to be fulfilled by and to surrender to the
whole reality.

I. Günderrode on Self and Nature

Distinguished from the German idealist and romantic philosophies of nature, Günderrode’s way
of conceptualizing the human being and nature doesn’t show a character of diminishing
individual empirical responsibility 1. Instead, as part of the whole during the realization of the idea
of the earth, and as a natural being who has a nature-defined capacity to strive to be transformed
ultimately, a human being is supposed to be ‘actively’ responsible for nature in an effective way.
In this relationship, a particular person never fails to keep their identity. We will see how this is
1
In this part, my research is mainly based on the reading of Dalia Nassar, The
Human Vocation and the Question of the Earth: Karoline von Günderrode’s
Philosophy of Nature, Published online by De Gruyter on March 4, 2021, from the
journal Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2019-
0028 where she suggests to understand Günderrode’s account of the human relation
to the earth rather metaphysically than morally.

1
found in Günderrode’s text of The Idea of the Earth, where she depicts the Earth as both a
realized and not yet fully realized idea. She contends that the idea of the Earth could only achieve
its proper being until every life of an individual being is finally transformed, namely into being
fully organic2; In contrast, this idea of the earth as a life principle to all the things in the earth is
by itself also simultaneously and metaphysically realized, in the sense that it is already there with
a presenting way of body and soul, and has started with its being of existence.

However, for Günderrode, the human being as part of the earth is not so much different from
other things in nature, such as plants, sects, animals, etc. Instead, all of them are equally made or
produced by something she calls the ‘elements’ of the poles after synthesizing the unity of body
and soul by the identical earth-essence. They are only various in proportions of poles, either
bodily or spiritual predominated. Therefore, when Günderrode claims that human beings are part
of nature, it’s not saying as if they are living inside of nature as their environment. For her,
human beings are part of the whole, literally, body and soul, like all other beings on earth. They
are getting involved in the whole realization of the idea of the Earth as one part, through their
life-death and reverting to the substance of the earth according to their natures.

Let’s still remember that there is a difference between the Earth as it is and the Earth as its proper
being. According to Günderrode, as the whole of the earth only exists through this unification of
soul and body, so, too, the individual and smallest things only exist through it and cannot be
conceived as split in two3; in this context, it follows with the same logic and life principle,
Günderrode would say that human beings and other beings are on the earth as it is and as well as
have their proper state to strive for by definition. Namely, the earth is a realized idea of a unity of
soul and body by presenting itself in and through the constant contributions of individual struggle
and development across time. This change inevitably moves in a cycle of decay and
enhancement: through an individual’s death and reincarnation, life is purified and transformed, if
not endlessly, until the earth fulfilled its ultimate idea.

Therefore, what we argued in the beginning, that Günderrode’s way of conceptualizing the
human being and nature doesn’t show a character of diminishing indi vidual empirical
responsibility, now ironically becomes a suspicious point of view: how does individual selfhood
develop and relate to nature, if it doesn’t necessarily have to have its consciousness, or if its

2
Karoline von Günderrode, The Idea of the Earth, at the end of fourth paragraph.
3
Karoline von Günderrode, The Idea of the Earth, in the first paragraph.

2
ultimate mission is to surrender to nature and to be dissolved in the Whole 4 during the realization
of the idea of the Earth? Since this change or rule of nature is already defined by the contact and
attraction of the elements like its blueprint, what is happening to the individual free will and self-
determination there? Suppose it’s not out of human free choice and self-consciousness. In this
case, how could we say or know that Günderrode’s philosophy of nature can offer our
environmental ethics discussions on either anthropocentrism or non-anthropocentrism a better
and more responsible way for human beings toward nature? Before we talk about that, let’s first
go into those contemporary discussions.

II. Anthropocentrism: Inescapable and Fundamental

Various efforts and attempts within the field of environmental ethics have been made to reject so-
called anthropocentrism, revolving around trying to either criticize human chauvinism or avoid
human speciesism. However, as Allen Thompson sharply remarked, ‘if a view is to be relevant
for guiding human behavior, as an ethical view must, then any non-anthropocentric view, even
the most radically so, cannot escape remaining conceptually anthropocentric’5.

Since we can’t ignore or escape the reality that only humans have moral consciousness and free
will, we must go beyond not attributing human intrinsic value or rights to non-human nature and
animals, let alone mentioning using them instrumentally. Instead, abandoning a modern dualistic
conception of the relationship between the outside world and the human mind will provide us
with a broader horizon of the whole. It will also change our anthropocentric way of conceiving
intrinsic moral values, namely either to be an external system ready to be interpreted by us (i.e.,
ontological and ethical anthropocentrism) or to be inferred as a reasonable result from our
cognizing capacity (i.e., conceptual anthropocentrism), into a narrative of humbly tracing back to
the metaphysical existence and reality of both human and nature.

Namely, while anthropocentrism is inescapable, narrating it without distorting the moral intrinsic
value’s fundamental structure is also crucial. A seemingly more modest way of conceptualizing
humans and nature (i.e., Kant’s conceptional anthropocentrism) turns out to be subtlety ignorant
of the existence of the thing itself while emphasizing the triumphed phenomenon of human

4
Karoline von Günderrode, The Idea of the Earth, fifth and seventh paragraph.
5
Allen Thompson, Anthropocentrism: Humanity as Peril and Promise, The
Oxford Handbook of Environmental Ethics, Print Publication Date: Jan 2017,
Online Publication Date: Nov 2015, p.85

3
reason and deification of the autonomy of the moral law 6. It shows an unavoidable failure of
comprehending the world only from within a human conceptual framework and a cutting-off
from a bigger reality that is prior to the phenomenon. Conceptional anthropocentrism is proposed
to reject ontological anthropocentrism by pointing out the structural limits of ‘the human
normative and axiological capacities’7, whereas the latter, usually endorsed by monotheistic
religions, never presents it oppositely. Instead, they recognize these limits and take them
seriously enough.

From the Judaic, Christian, and Islamic traditions, a human being’s morally superior existence
implies recognition of both surrender to God’s sovereignty and responsible stewardship towards
nature. The creation theory offers humans and nature a platform to be themselves in how they are
created. Until the day comes when nature, plants, and animals start to talk and communicate with
humans, the latter will not lose its special and unique moral importance in this universe.
However, inherent hierarchical order within a narrative system does not necessarily entail one
specie’s unequalness to or dominance over the others. From an ontological point of view, all of
them are creations of God, either plants and sects or animals and humans. In the beginning,
everything was created and existed in harmony with natural order8.

Therefore, accusations made about ontological anthropocentrism could not be justified by two
distinct dimensions. One points to the necessity of metaphysical inquiry into reality prior to the
existence of human beings. This is a dimension related to the critical question that both
conceptual anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism cannot escape: discussions on the
human-nature relationship unavoidably carries a certain moral angle, i.e., ‘all human values are
human values.’ Like one cannot lift oneself by simply grabbing one’s hair, an intrinsic value or
moral significance
towards either self or others requires a scale or anchor from the third party to make the valued
worthy of being valued. This metaphysical inquiry breaks the confinement put on to the capacity
of human reason; extends the field of vision beyond human reasoning (i.e., love, fear, anxiety,
and desire) by finding the same scale for both parties, thus might solving the ontological problem
in the eyes of a higher third party, at least within a narrative system.
6
Michael Mack, Franz Rosenzweig’s and Emmanuel Levinas’s Critique of
German Idealism’s Pseudotheology, The Journal of Religion, Vol.83, Jan 2003,
p.67, The University of Chicago Press.
7
Allen Thompson, p.79
8
Genesis 1:31

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The other dimension points to another fundamental issue in the practical level of moral ethics.
Even if we locate humans and non-human beings in the order of harmony, in the context of
ontological anthropocentrism, whereas an identity of stewardship of humans is supposed to be the
excellent and just one, how could we guarantee that in practice, these norms and values would be
adopted and applied dully? Or, more critically, in what sense is the move from it is good to it
ought to be legitimated and justified? Many alternatives to ethical anthropocentrism (i.e.,
sentiocentrism) also try to anchor a compelling reason of things ought to do in the harbor of
either deontological theories or shared experiences of avoiding pain and striving for life 9, etc. We
could see endeavors from the human’s side to project a fake or an artificial equalness to animals
among those modern approaches. However, this is not implying that animals are insignificant;
instead, it reflects the void way of approaching the reality of non-human beings’ legitimate place
in front of their otherness.

III. An Ontologically Important Other

Any discussion on the human-nature relationship unavoidably carries a certain moral angle. The
real question here would be: how firm or convinced is the theoretical ground of the human moral
obligation to nature? To what degree is this ethical inquiry to be legitimated and formed? Or even
do environmental ethics need a metaphysical grounding? This is like puzzle solving, and we are
expected to put pieces together logically. The solution requires the recognition of patterns and
adherence to a particular kind of order. Unless the moment you realize the design or blueprint,
you will not solve the problem quickly. Analogically speaking, I believe that only if human
beings find a truthful place in front of the Other ontologically could they, in practice, do the right
things to the world, which is in a broader sense called nature.

Inspired by the essay of Michael Mack, Franz Rosenzweig’s and Emmanuel Levinas’s Critique
of German Idealism’s Pseudotheology10, I propose that a relationship within a triangular
grounding structure among self, nature, and God would stabilize and strengthen the human moral
obligation toward nature, meanwhile, a separation of the three entities and not anyone to be
9
Allen Thompson, Anthropocentrism: Humanity as Peril and Promise, The
Oxford Handbook of Environmental Ethics, Print Publication Date: Jan 2017,
Online Publication Date: Nov 2015, p.80
10
Michael Mack, Franz Rosenzweig’s and Emmanuel Levinas’s Critique of
German Idealism’s Pseudotheology, The Journal of Religion, Vol.83, Jan 2003,
pp.56-78, The University of Chicago Press.

5
ignored or replaced by the others needs to be emphasized. Günderrode’s philosophy of self and
nature in The Idea of the Earth distinguishes itself from that of other German idealists in the
sense that a Jewish and Christian God’s role still anonymously functions in her philosophical
framework without being replaced by a human self-projection11 (i.e., Schelling’s), although it is
replaced by the realization of the idea of the earth in her term. It deserves to be introduced into
contemporary discussions of environmental ethics on anthropocentrism.

Therefore, how does Günderrode’s philosophy of nature help us in today’s environmental ethics
theory reconstruction? As we have explored in sections one and two, Günderrode’s way of
conceptualizing the earth as both a realized idea and not yet realized one gives her philosophy a
unique metaphysical hook, by which we could locate or orientate the positions of these three
entitles of self, nature, and God in the pattern of puzzle correctly, without losing the identity of
any part.

At the same time, it also provides us with a possibility of forming a kind of weak ontological
non-anthropocentrism12, in the sense that by the appearance, Günderrode’s philosophy of nature
rarely mentions human beings specifically but prefers to treat their existence as typical as among
those non-human beings in nature, like one drop in the whole ocean. Therefore, it is undoubted
that could be ascribed to the camp of non-anthropocentrism in this way. However, by the internal
structure of her metaphysics, the proper being of the idea of the earth as a life principle that is
immanent in and defines everything remains in play as an ontological cause to guarantee a
change and procession going on the right way. From this perspective, it is still a weak ontological
environment theory, in contrast to a strong traditional orthodoxy holds.

Because of the stable triangular grounding structure among self, nature, and God (the proper
being of the idea of the earth), and the unique role of the Idea of the Earth as an ontological
important Other confronted self and nature, such a weak ontological non-anthropocentrism is able
to encompass most challenges that raised by contemporary philosophers both in anthropocentrism
and non-anthropocentrism, solving the main problems of the philosophy of environmental ethics.
Among them are the ‘all human values are human values’ problem, the dualistic conceptions of

11
Absolute self-projection probably results in absolute human autonomy and,
therefore, destruction and corruption.
12
I make this term based on Allen Thompson, Anthropocentrism: Humanity as
Peril and Promise, The Oxford Handbook of Environmental Ethics, Print
Publication Date: Jan 2017, Online Publication Date: Nov 2015, pp.77-90

6
modernism (i.e., human-nature, sprit-matter, etc.)13, and the pity of a modest self-conception
should not become an agnostic self-deceiving problem.

Back to the questions, we asked at the end of section one, how do we reconcile the emergence of
self-consciousness and a monistic realization of the Idea of the Earth? I want to quote an insight
from Yohji Yamamoto14: The thing ‘self’ is invisible. It hits something else and bounces back to
understand ‘self.’ Therefore, collide with something very strong, terrible, and high-level, and
then you know what ‘self’ is. This is the ‘self.’ And I agree with him, in honor of the ontologically
significant Other, in Günderrode’s term, the Idea of the Earth.

Conclusion

This essay presents a possible balanced way of discussing the human-nature relationship in the
framework of contemporary philosophy of environmental ethics: weak ontological non-
anthropocentrism, based on a metaphysical interpretation to understand Günderrode’s account of
the human relation to the Idea of the Earth, arguing that her philosophy of nature has an inherent
stable triangle structure among self, nature, and God the proper being of the idea of the earth as
their ontologically important Other.

References:
13
Allen Thompson, Anthropocentrism: Humanity as Peril and Promise, The
Oxford Handbook of Environmental Ethics, Print Publication Date: Jan 2017,
Online Publication Date: Nov 2015, p.86
14
A Japanese fashion designer, has won notable awards for his contributions to
fashion, see more: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yohji_Yamamoto

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1. Dalia Nassar, The Human Vocation and the Question of the Earth: Karoline von Günderrode’s
Philosophy of Nature, Published online by De Gruyter on March 4, 2021, from the journal
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2019-0028
2. Michael Mack, Franz Rosenzweig’s and Emmanuel Levinas’s Critique of German Idealism’s
Pseudotheology, The Journal of Religion, Vol.83, Jan 2003, pp.56-78, The University of Chicago
Press.
3. Allen Thompson, Anthropocentrism: Humanity as Peril and Promise, The Oxford Handbook of
Environmental Ethics, Print Publication Date: Jan 2017, Online Publication Date: Nov 2015.
4. Karen Ng, The Idea of the Earth in Günderrode, Schelling, and Hegel, draft forthcoming in
The Oxford Handbook of Women Philosophers in the Nineteenth Century (please do not cite
without author’s permission).
5. Dalia Nassar and Kristin Gjesdal, as editors, and by Anna, C. Ezekiel translated from German,
Women Philosophers in the Long Nineteenth Century: The German Tradition, pp.62-82, Oxford
Scholarship Online: August 2021.
6. Anna C. Ezekiel, Revolution and Revitalization: Karoline von Günderrode’s political.
Philosophy and its metaphysical foundations, British Journal for the History of Philosophy,
Published online: 17 Sep 2020.
https://www-tandfonline-com.kuleuven.ebronnen.be/doi/full/10.1080/09608788.2020.1806033
7. Anna Ezekiel (2014) Metamorphosis, Personhood, and Power in Karoline von
Günderrode, European Romantic Review, 25:6, 773-791, DOI: 10.1080/10509585.2014.9638477.
8. Dalia Nassar, The Responsibility to Know Well: Goethe on the Ethics of Knowing, Dec 9, 2021,
draft forthcoming.
9. Lawrence Vogel, Does Environmental Ethics Need a Metaphysical Grounding? The Hastings
Center Report, 1995, Vol. 25, No. 7, The Legacy of Hans Jonas (1995), pp.30-39.
10. Morito Bruce, “Value, Metaphysics and Anthropocentrism,“ Environmental Values 4, no.1
(1995): 31–47, The White Horse Press, Cambridge, UK.