1. People v. Perfecto, G.R. No.

L-18463, October 4, 1922

FACTS: The issue started when the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando Guerrero,
discovered that the documents regarding the testimony of the witnesses in an investigation of oil
companies had disappeared from his office. Then, the day following the convening of Senate,
the newspaper La Nacion – edited by herein respondent Gregorio Perfecto – published an
article against the Philippine Senate. Here, Mr. Perfecto was alleged to have violated Article 256
of the Spanish Penal Code – provision that punishes those who insults the Ministers of the
Crown. Hence, the issue.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in force and can be
applied in the case at bar?
HELD: No.
REASONING: The Court stated that during the Spanish Government, Article 256 of the SPC
was enacted to protect Spanish officials as representatives of the King. However, the Court
explains that in the present case, we no longer have Kings nor its representatives for the
provision to protect. Also, with the change of sovereignty over the Philippines from Spanish to
American, it means that the invoked provision of the SPC had been automatically abrogated.
The Court determined Article 256 of the SPC to be ‘political’ in nature for it is about the relation
of the State to its inhabitants, thus, the Court emphasized that ‘it is a general principle of the
public law that on acquisition of territory, the previous political relations of the ceded region are
totally abrogated.’ Hence, Article 256 of the SPC is considered no longer in force and cannot be
applied to the present case. Therefore, respondent was acquitted.

2. Macariola v. Asuncion
Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization
and operation of the governmental organs of the State and define the relations of the state with
the inhabitants of its territory.
Doctrine:
(1) The prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the
pendency of the litigation involving the property
(2) The political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those
of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted
by affirmative act of the new sovereign.
Summary:
An action is filled against Judge Asuncion in violation against the following:
(1) Article 1491 of New Civil Code -when purchased the Lot 1184-E, a portion of the property
involved in partition case which he presides over and Article 14 of Code of Commerce – when
he associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a
stockholder and a ranking officer.
The court held the case at bar: (1) not in violation of Article 1491 (5) as he purchased the
property no longer subject for litigation and brought it from Dr. Galapon, a party not involved in
the partition case and (2) Article 14 of Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and
cannot apply to the respondent since it is a political law, which is abrogated upon the change of
sovereignty.

FACTS:

A complaint for partition was filled by filed by Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes,
Ruperto Reyes,Adela Reyes, and Priscilla Reyes, plaintiffs, against Bernardita R. Macariola, defendant,
concerning the properties left by the deceased Francisco Reyes (Civil Case #3010)

Macariola claims that:

Sinforosa R. Bales was not a daughter of the deceased; the only legal heirs were defendant Macariola
and the remaining plaintiffs as children of the deceased from the second marriage with Irene Ondes the
properties left were all conjugal properties from the first marriage those conjugal properties should be
partitioned into two parts: (1) half portion to be adjudicated to Macariola & the remaining half to be
divided equally among the children of the deceased from two marriages.

On June 8, 1963, Judge Asuncion rendered decision on the partition case and became final for the lack of
appeal

On October 16, 1963, a project of partition signed by the respective counsel of the plaintiffs and
defendant was submitted and was approved by Judge Asuncion on October 23, 1963.

On March 6, 1965, Dr. Galapon sold Lot 1184-E to Judge Asuncion & his wife, and was declared by the
latter for taxpurposes.

On August 31, 1966, spouses of Judge Asuncion & Dr. Galapon conveyed their respective shares &
interest in Lot 1184-E to The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as Judge Asuncion being
the President.

On August 9, 1968, Macariola filed complaint alleging Judge Asuncion in violation of Article 1491 (5) of
New CivilCode for acquiring Lot 1184-3 as one of the properties in the partition case which was decided
by the latter and Article 14 of Code of Commerce as he associated himself with the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc.as a stockholder and a ranking officer.

Issue:

Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491 of New Civil Code & Article 14 of Code of
Commerce?

HELD: NO
(1) The prohibition of Article 14911/
applies only to the sale or assignment
of the property that takes place during
the pendency of the litigation
involving the property.
Though it is true that Judge Asuncion
did not violate Article 1491, it was
improper for him to have acquired the
same. He should be reminded of
Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial
2/
Ethics . One who occupies an exalted
position in the
judiciary has the duty and
responsibility of maintaining the faith
and trust of the citizenry in the courts
of justice, so that
not only must he be truly honest and
just, but his actuations must be such as
not give cause for doubt and mistrust
in the
uprightness of his administration of
justice.
(2) Article 14 of the Code of
Commerce has no legal and binding
effect and cannot apply to the
respondent. It is a
general principle of the public law that
on acquisition of territory the previous
political relations of the ceded region
are totally abrogated. Article 14 of the
Code of Commerce partakes more of
the nature of an administrative law
because
it regulates the conduct of certain
public officers and employees with
respect to engaging in business; hence,
political in
essence.
RATION/REASONING

(1) The prohibition of Article 14911/ applies only to the sale or assignment of the property that takes
place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. Though it is true that Judge Asuncion
did not violate Article 1491, it was improper for him to have acquired the same. He should be reminded
of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics2/. One who occupies an exalted position in the judiciary has
the duty and responsibility of maintaining the faith and trust of the citizenry in the courts of justice, so
that not only must he be truly honest and just, but his actuations must be such as not give cause for
doubt and mistrust in the uprightness of his administration of justice.

(2) Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the
respondent. It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous
political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. Article 14 of the Code of Commerce
partakes more of the nature of an administrative law because it regulates the conduct of certain public
officers and employees with respect to engaging in business; hence, political in essence.

3. Holy See V Rosario

Petitioner: The Holy See

Respondent: Hon. Elidberto Rosario, Jr., in his capacity as

Presiding Judge ofRTC Makati, Branch 61 and Starbright Sales

Enterprises, Inc

FACTS: Petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of

land. Lot 5-A, registered under the name Holy See, was

contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5-D under the name of Philippine

Realty Corporation (PRC). The land was donated by the

Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal Nuncio, which represents

the Holy See, who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican

City, Rome, Italy, for his residence.

Said lots were sold through an agent to Ramon Licup who

assigned his rights to respondents Starbright Sales

Enterprises, Inc.

When the squatters refuse to vacate the lots, a dispute

arose between the two parties because both were unsure whose

responsibility was it to evict the squatters from said lots.

Respondent Starbright Sales Enterprises Inc. insists that

Holy See should clear the property while Holy See says that

respondent corporation should do it or the earnest money

will be returned. With this, Msgr. Cirilios, the agent,

subsequently returned the P100,000 earnest money.

The same lots were then sold to Tropicana Properties and

Development Corporation.

Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a suit for

annulment of the sale, specific performance and damages

against Msgr. Cirilios, PRC as well as Tropicana Properties

and Development Corporation. The Holy See and Msgr. Cirilos

moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction based

on sovereign immunity from suit. RTC denied the motion on

ground that petitioner already "shed off" its sovereign

immunity by entering into a business contract. The

subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was also denied hence

this special civil action for certiorari was forwarded to

the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Holy See can invoke sovereign

immunity.

HELD: The Court held that Holy See may properly invoke

sovereign immunity for its non-suability. As expressed in

Sec. 2 Art II of the 1987 Constitution, generally accepted

principles of International Law are adopted by our Courts

and thus shall form part of the laws of the land as a

condition and consequence of our admission in the society of

nations.

It was noted in Article 31(A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention

on Diplomatic Relations that diplomatic envoy shall be

granted immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction

of the receiving state over any real action relating to

private immovable property. The Department of Foreign

Affairs (DFA) certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is

a duly accredited diplomatic missionary to the Republic of

the Philippines and is thus exempted from local jurisdiction

and is entitled to the immunity rights of a diplomatic

mission or embassy in this Court.

Furthermore, it shall be understood that in the case at bar,

the petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary

course of real estate business, surely, the said transaction

can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner

has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of

the lot were made for profit but claimed that it acquired

said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic

Nunciature in the Philippines.

The Holy See is immune from suit because the act of selling

the lot of concern is non-propriety in nature. The lot was

acquired through a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila,

not for a commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner

to construct the official place of residence of the Papal

Nuncio thereof. The transfer of the property and its

subsequent disposal are likewise clothed with a governmental

(non-proprietal) character as petitioner sold the lot not

for profit or gain rather because it merely cannot evict the

squatters living in said property.

In view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED and

the complaints were dismissed accordingly.

It is significant to note that the

NOTE:

present Code of Commerce is the

Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885,
with some
modifications made by the
"Comision de Codificacion de las
Provincias de Ultramar," which was
extended to the
Philippines by the Royal Decree of
August 6, 1888, and took effect as law
in this jurisdiction on December 1,
1888.
5. MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. 187167,
August 16, 2011
  Facts:
In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating(divide) the maritime baselines of the
Philippines as an Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 1958, codifying the sovereignty
of State parties over their territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended by R.A. 5446, correcting
some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah.
In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of 1984. The
requirements complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the location of some
basepoints and classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as ‘regime of islands’. Under the "regime of
islands," each island has its own territorial sea, contiguous zone, EEZ, and continental shelf.
Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:
1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;
2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining our
sovereignty and security; and
3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken our claim over those
territories.
 Issue:
Whether or not R.A. 9522 is constitutional?
 Ruling:
1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a codified norm that
regulates conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark out
basepoints along coasts, serving as geographic starting points to measure. it merely notices the
international community of the scope of our maritime space.
2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation designating routes
within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passages. but in the absence
of such, international law norms operate.
the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages does not place
them in lesser footing vis a vis continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP is a customary
international law, no modern state can invoke its sovereignty to forbid such passage.
3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and in fact, it
increased the Phils.’ total maritime space. Moreover, the itself commits the Phils.’ continues
claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.
If not, it would be a breach to provisions of the UNCLOS III:
Art. 47 (3): ‘drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago’.
Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.
KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, we’ll breach the rules: that it
should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.
SOVEREIGNTY
Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff G.R. No. L-533             August 20, 1946
FACTS: The ground of the petition was that the petitioners were not subject to military law at the
time the offense for which they had been placed on trial was committed.  In their memorandum
they have raised an additional question of law—that the 93rd Article of War is unconstitutional.
The 2nd Article of War defines and enumerates the persons subject to military law as follows:
ART. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law.— The following persons are subject to these articles
and shall be understood as included in the term 'any person subject to military law’ or 'persons
subject to military law', whenever used in these articles:
“(a) All officers, members of the Nurse Corps and soldiers belonging to the Regular Force of the
Philippine Army; all reservists, from the dates of their call to active duty and while on such active
duty; all trainees undergoing military instructions; and all other persons lawfully called, drafted,
or ordered into, or to duty or for training in, the said service, from the dates they are required by
the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same;
“(b) Cadets, flying cadets, and probationary third lieutenants;
“(c) All retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying or serving with the Army of the
Philippines in the field in time of war or when martial law is declared though not otherwise
subject to these articles;
“(d) All persons under sentence adjudged by courts-martial.”
ISSUE :WON 93rd Article of War is unconstitutional.
Ruling: NO
The constitutionality of the 93rd Article of War is assailed. This article ordains "that any person
subject to military law who commits murder in time of war shall suffer death or imprisonment for
life, as the court-martial may direct." It is argued that since "no review is provided by that law to
be made by the Supreme Court, irrespective of whether the punishment is for life imprisonment
or death," it violates Article VIII, section 2, paragraph 4, of the Constitution of the Philippines
which provides that "the National Assembly may not deprive the Supreme Court of its original
jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment."
Petitioners are mistaken. The silence of the law as to the power of the Supreme Court to review
the decisions and proceedings of courts-martial, especially when the penalty imposed is death
or life imprisonment, should not be understood as negating such power, much more when it is
recognized and guaranteed by specific provisions of the fundamental law. At any rate, any
doubt in interpreting the silence of the law must be resolved in favor of a construction that will
make the law constitutional.
The petition has no merit and that it should be dismissed with costs.
REAGAN VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

G.R. NO. L-26379 DECEMBER 27, 1969

FACTS:
FACTS:

Petitioner Reagan, a civilian

employee of an American
corporation providing technical
assistance
to the US Air Force in the
Philippines, questioned the
payment of the income tax
assessed on him
by respondent CIR on an
amount realized by him on a
sale of his automobile to a
member of the
US Marine Corps, the
transaction having taken place
at the Clark Field Air Base at
Pampanga. It
is his contention, that in legal
contemplation the sale was
made outside Philippine
territory and
therefore beyond our
jurisdictional power to tax. He
seeks that an amount of
P2,979.00 as the
income tax paid by him be
refunded.
ISSUE: WON the Clark Field
Air Base is a foreign property
therefore excluded from the
power
of Philippine taxation.
HELD: NO.
By the [Military Bases]
Agreement, it should be noted,
the Philippine Government
merely
consents that the United States
exercise jurisdiction in certain
cases. The consent was given
purely as a matter of comity,
courtesy, or expediency over
the bases as part of the
Philippine
territory or divested itself
completely of jurisdiction over
offenses committed therein.
This
provision is not and can not on
principle or authority be
construed as a limitation upon
the rights
of the Philippine Government.
The State is not precluded from
allowing another power to
participate in the exercise of
jurisdictional right over certain
portions of its territory. If it
does so, it by no means follows
that
such areas become impressed
with an alien character. They
retain their status as native soil.
They are still subject to its
authority. Its jurisdiction may
be diminished, but it does not
disappear. So it is with the
bases under lease to the
American armed forces by
virtue of the
military bases agreement of
1947. They are not and cannot
be foreign territory.
FACTS:
Petitioner Reagan, a civilian employee of an American corporation providing technical assistance
to the US Air Force in the Philippines, questioned the payment of the income tax assessed on him
by respondent CIR on an amount realized by him on a sale of his automobile to a member of the
US Marine Corps, the transaction having taken place at the Clark Field Air Base at Pampanga. It
is his contention, that in legal contemplation the sale was made outside Philippine territory and
therefore beyond our jurisdictional power to tax. He seeks that an amount of P2,979.00 as the
income tax paid by him be refunded.

ISSUE: WON the Clark Field Air Base is a foreign property therefore excluded from the power
of Philippine taxation.

HELD: NO.

By the [Military Bases] Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine Government merely
consents that the United States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was given
purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency over the bases as part of the Philippine
territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. This
provision is not and cannot on principle or authority be construed as a limitation upon the rights
of the Philippine Government.
The State is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of
jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that
such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil.
They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not
disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the
military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory.
Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997

FACTS:

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of
the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC).
In a close bidding, two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation (MPHC), a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian
firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per
share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder and the execution of the contracts,
the MPHC matched the bid price in a letter to GSIS. MPHC sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a
subsequent letter, which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS
has disregarded the tender of the matching bid, MPHC came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.

Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila
Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument
which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture.

Respondents assert that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of
principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s).

ISSUE:

Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.

RULING:

Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule
by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.

Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.

In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or
rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation.
What is the Constitution?

That body of rules and maxims in accordance with which the powers of sovereignty are habitually
exercised.

WRITTEM OR UNWRITTEN

That written instrument enacted by direct action of the people by which the fundamental powers
of the government are established, limited and defined, and by which those powers are
distributed among the several departments for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of
the body politic.

A written constitution is one whose precepts are embodied in one document or set of documents; while
an unwritten constitution consists of rules which have not been integrated into a single, concrete form
but are scattered in various sources, such as statutes of a fundamental character, judicial decisions,
commentaries of publicists, customs and traditions, and certain common law principles.

Enacted (Conventional) or Evolved (Cumulative) . A conventional constitution is enacted, formally struck

off at a definite time and place following a conscious or deliberate effort taken by a constituent body or
ruler; while a cumulative constitution is the result of political evolution, not inaugurated at any specific
time but changing by accretion rather than by any systematic method

Rigid or Flexible.

A rigid Constitution is one that can be amended only by a formal and usually difficult process; while a
flexible Constitution is one that can be changed by ordinary legislation.

Unitary government OR Federal government

Unitary government- Power is placed in one central governing system

Federal government- Power and responsibilities are shared between national and local levels.

Parliamentary OR presidential

In a parliamentary form of government, the chief executive, is part of the legislative body, or
parliament. In a presidential form of government on the other hand the powers are concentrated in the
hands of the single executive or the President of the country
AMENDMENTS AND REVISION

Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the Constitution, like altering the
principle of separation of powers or the system of checks and balances. There is also revision if
the change alters the substantial entirety of the Constitution. On the other hand, amendment
broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, deletes, without altering the basic principle
involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the Constitution; while amendment
generally affects only the specific provision being amended.

Lambino vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006

FACTS:

Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado (“Lambino Group”), with other groups and individuals,
commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. They filed a
petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b)
and (c)2 and Section 73 of the Initiative and Referendum Act (“RA 6735”).

The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Legislative and
Executive Department and by adding Article XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions.”6 These proposed
changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of
government.

ISSUES: Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative.

RULING: No, Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed
constitutional amendment” should be “ready and shown” to the people “before” they sign such
proposal. The framers plainly stated that “before they sign there is already a draft shown to them.” The
framers also “envisioned” that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents
must “prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.”

In determining whether the Lambino proposal involves an amendment or a revision, the Court
considered this case two-part test. First the quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is
so extensive in its provision as to change directly the “substance entirety” of the Constitution
by the deletion or alteration of numerous provisions. The court examines only the number of
provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change. Second, the qualitative test,
which inquiries into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the Constitution. The main
inquiry is whether the change will “accomplish such far-reaching changes in the nature of our
basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision.

The Lambino proposal constituted a revision, not simply an amendment, of the Constitution,
because it involved a change in the form of government from presidential to parliamentary ,and a
shift from the present bicameral to a unicameral legislature

Bicameral-two houses (Senate & House of Rep)

Unicameral-only one house or assembly is present.

Santiago vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997

FACTS:

Jesus Delfin filed with a petition with COMELEC to amend the Constitution so as to lift the term limits
of elective officials via People’s Initiative. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago and others opposed the
petition on the ground that the constitutional provision on people’s initiative can only be implemented
by law to be passed by Congress and no such law has been passed. They also argued that RA No.
6735, which was relied upon by Delfin, contained no provision regarding amendments to the
Constitution.

Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory. While the Constitution has
recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason,
does not provide for its implementation.

ISSUE:

Whether the Jesus Delfin Group’s (COMELEC) initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII
of the Constitution.

HELD:

NO, Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory. While the Constitution has
recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason,
does not provide for its implementation. There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to
implement the exercise of the right than through the passage of a statute or legislative act. This is
the essence or rationale of the last minute amendment by the Constitutional Commission to
substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of Article XVII. Moreover, RA No. 6735 is incomplete,
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned.
Gonzales vs. COMELEC G.R. No. L-28196 November 9, 1967

DOCTRINE: Article XV of the 1935 Constitution

FACTS :

On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the
following resolutions:

(1) to amend the Sec. 6 Art. VI of the Constitution so as to increase the membership of the House of
Representatives from 120 to 180;

(2) to summon a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution to be held on November

1971, the convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative
district; and

(3) to amend the Sec. 16 Art. VI of the same Constitution so they can be
delegates to the aforementioned convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in
Congress.

Subsequently, on June 17, 1967, Republic Act No. 4913 was passed, providing that
the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions Nos. 1 and 3 be
submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections which shall be held on November 14,
1967.

The petitioner, Ramon A. Gonzales, admittedly a Filipino citizen, a taxpayer, and a voter, claims to
have instituted case L-28196 as a class suit, for and in behalf of all citizens, taxpayers, and voters
similarly situated. Petitioner filed this suit for prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the
COMELEC from implementing RA 4913 assailing said law as unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

1. May Constitutional Amendments Be Submitted for Ratification in a General Election?

RULING:

1. Yes. Article XV of the 1935

Constitution provides:
"The Congress in joint session
assembled, by a vote of three-
fourths of all the Members of the
Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting separately,
may propose amendments to this
Constitution or call a convention
for that purpose. Such
amendments shall be valid as part
of
this Constitution when approved
by a majority of the votes cast at
an election at which the
amendments are submitted to the
people for their ratification."
There is in this provision nothing
to indicate that the "election"
therein referred to is a "special,"
not a general election. The
circumstance that three previous
amendments to the Constitution
had
been submitted to the people for
ratification in special elections
merely shows that Congress
deemed
it best to do so under the
circumstances then obtaining. It
does not negate its authority to
submit
proposed amendments for
ratification in general elections.
Further, there is no denying the
fact that an adequate appraisal of
the merits and demerits of the
proposed amendments is likely to
be overshadowed by the great
attention usually commanded by
the
choice of personalities involved in
general elections. But then, these
considerations are addressed to
the wisdom of holding a plebiscite
simultaneously with the election of
public officers. Those who
concur are unable to subscribe to
the contrary view without, in
effect, reading into the
Constitution
what is not written thereon and
what cannot fairly be deduced
from the letter thereof, since the
spirit
of the law should not be a matter
of sheer speculation.
Yes. Article XV of the 1935 Constitution provides: “The Congress in joint session assembled, by a
vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting
separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for that purpose.
Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the
votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.
“There is in this provision nothing to indicate that the "election" therein referred to is a "special,” not a
general election. The circumstance that three previous amendments to the Constitution had been
submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it
best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit
proposed amendments for ratification in general elections. Further, there is no denying the fact that
an adequate appraisal of the merits and demerits of the proposed amendments is likely to be
overshadowed by the great attention usually commanded by the choice of personalities involved in
general elections. But then, these considerations are addressed to the wisdom of holding a
plebiscite simultaneously with the election of public officers. Those who concur are unable to
subscribe to the contrary view without, in effect, reading into the Constitution what is not written
thereon and what cannot fairly be deduced from the letter thereof, since the spirit of the law should
not be a matter of sheer speculation.

Hence, the petition is dismissed and the writs therein prayed for denied.

DECLARATION OF POLICIES AND PRINCIPLES

Villavicencio vs Lukban G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919
Summary:

The Mayor of City of Manila ordered deportation of 170 women, from Manila to Davao. Some or
most of them were ill refute and/or prostitutes. The petitioners applied for writ of habeas corpus. In
granting the petition for the issuance of the writ, the SC upheld the right of these women, despite
having ill reputation, to liberty of abode and travel.

Doctrine:

[In relation to constitutional right to liberty and travel of the prostitutes, the SC explained:] "These
women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine
citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens."

FACTS:

The Mayor of the city of Manila ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute. The women
were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police.

In one midnight, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police, Anton Hohmann and
the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170
inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The
women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the
impression that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no
knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to
depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation.

The vessels reached their destination at Davao where the women were landed and receipted for as
laborers.

The friends of the victim filed a case for issuance of habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme
Court.

ISSUES RATIO:

Whether or not, the writ [of habeas corpus] should be granted.

The court awarded the writ, that directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann,
chief of police of the city of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao, and
Feliciano Ynigo, an hacendero of Davao, to bring before the court the persons therein named,
alleged to be deprived of their liberty.

According to the Supreme Court, there is no law that justifies the action of the respondent in
deporting the women of ill refute to Davao. In upholding the right of the victims on liberty to abode
and travel, the SC explained that: these women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are
nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as
are other citizens.

DISPOSITIVE:

Writ granted.

Kuroda vs. Jalandoni G.R. No. L-2662 March 26, 1949

I. THE FACTS
Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the
Philippines during the Japanese occupation, was charged before the Philippine Military
Commission of war crimes. He questioned the constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 that created the
National War Crimes Office and prescribed rules on the trial of accused war criminals. He
contended the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations
covering Land Warfare and therefore he is charged of crimes not based on law, national and
international.
II. THE ISSUES
Was E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DENIED the petition and upheld the validity and constitutionality of E.O. No. 68.]
YES, E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional.
Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that –
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.
In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day
including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of
international jurisprudence established by the United Nation all those person military or civilian
who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the
commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws
and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently in
the promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines
has acted in conformity with the generally accepted and policies of international law which are
part of the our Constitution.
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for
acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the
Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied
that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly
based on the generally accepted principals of international law. In facts these rules and
principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations the United State and Japan who were
signatories to the two Convention. Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our
nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our
Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the
recognition of rule and principle of international law as contained in treaties to which our
government may have been or shall be a signatory.

Agustin vs. Edu G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979

FACTS:
Petitioner, Agustin assails the validity of the Letter of Instruction No. 229 which requires an early
warning device to be carried by users of motor vehicles as being violative of the constitutional guarantee
of due process and transgresses the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power.
Herein respondent Romeo Edu in his capacity as Land Transportation Commisioner set forth the
implementing rules and regulations of the said instruction.
Petitioner make known that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035, already
properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which
could very well serve as an early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of
Instructions No. 229, as amended, as well as the implementing rules and regulations in Administrative
Order No. 1 issued by the land transportation Commission,"
Furthermore, he contends that the law is "one-sided, onerous and patently illegal and immoral because
[they] will make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car owners who are
compelled to buy a set of the so-called early warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per set." are
unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New Society [as being]
compulsory and confiscatory on the part of the motorists who could very well provide a practical
alternative road safety device, or a better substitute to the specified set of Early Warning Device (EWD)."
This instruction, signed by President Marcos, aims to prevent accidents on streets and highways,
including expressways or limited access roads caused by the presence of disabled, stalled or parked
motor vehicles without appropriate early warning devices. The hazards posed by these disabled vehicles
are recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety. The Philippines is a signatory of the
1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organizations and the said
Vienna Convention was ratified by the Philippine Government under PD 207.
ISSUE:
WON the LOI 229 is invalid and violated constitutional guarantees of due process.
HELD:
NO. The assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of police power and there was no unlawful
delegation of legislative power on the part of the respondent. As identified, police power is a state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare. In this case, the particular exercise of police power was clearly intended to promote
public safety.
It cannot be disputed that the Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses
relevance: “The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the nation.” 
Thus, as impressed in the 1968 Vienna Convention it is not for this country to repudiate a commitment
to which it had pledged its word. Our country’s word was resembled in our own act of legislative
ratification of the said Hague and Vienna Conventions thru P.D. No. 207 .

Petition dismissed.
Ichong vs. Hernandez G.R. No. L-7995             May 31, 1957
FACTS
Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress enacted
Act No. 1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” The main provisions of the Act,
among others, are:
(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, among
others, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; and
(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail
business of additional stores or branches of retail business.
Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and
partnerships adversely affected by the said Act, brought an action to obtain a judicial
declaration, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons
acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions.
Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the Act, contending that:
• It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and
property without due process of law.
• The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof.
• The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.
Issue/s: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted
principles.
RULING
Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, the Supreme
Court saw no conflict between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The
equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it
merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions
both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is
not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if
it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a
distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.”

Gonzales vs. Hechanova G.R. No. L-21897            October 22, 1963

FACTS

During the term of President Diosdado Macapagal, he entered into two executive agreements
with Vietnam and Burma for the importation of rice without complying with the requisite of
securing a certification from the National Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in
cereals or rice. Hence, the then Executive Secretary, Rufino Hechanova, authorized the
importation of 67,000 tons of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local planters. Ramon
Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association assailed the
executive agreements. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction”, because Republic Act 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and corn by “the Rice
and Corn Administration or any other government agency.
ISSUE
Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into by Macapagal.
Yes. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by
Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the
latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that
have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive
agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. In the event of
conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not
applicable to the case at bar, Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the contracts
adverted to are not treaties. No such justification can be given as regards executive agreements
not authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation of
powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set
up.
As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may be invalidated
by our courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the
affirmative, by providing that the SC may not be deprived “of its jurisdiction to review, revise,
reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court
may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in “All cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in
question”. In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when
it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
In Re: Petition of Arturo Garcia

A Filipino citizen who obtained the degree of Bachelor of Laws in Spain and who was admitted
to practice in that country is not entitled to be admitted in the Philippine Bar without examination,
successfully passing the bar examination being a prerequisite to the admission to practice in
this country. (AGPALO)
IN RE: PETITION OF ARTURO EFREN GARCIA for admission to the Philippine Bar without
taking the examination (1961)
FACTS
Arturo Garcia is a Filipino citizen who graduated from the College of Law of the Central
University of Madrid with the degree of “Licenciado en Derecho,” which entitled him to practice
law in Spain. Invoking the Treaty of Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions
between the Philippines and Spain, he has applied for admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations.
ISSUE
Whether a graduate of a foreign law school may practice law in the Philippines without
submission to the required bar examinations
RULING
No, a graduate of a foreign law school may not practice law in the Philippines without
submission to the required bar examinations.

The applicant is a Filipino citizen who is subject to the laws of his own country and is not entitled
to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice their profession in the
Philippines. The Treaty of Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the
Philippines and Spain was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice their
profession in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice their professions in the
Philippines.
1 of the said Treaty has expressly stated that the privileges are subject to the laws and
regulations of the contracting State in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal
profession. In the Philippines, the Rules require that before anyone can practice the legal
profession in the Philippines he must successfully pass the required bar examinations.
The said Treaty could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines because the Executive Department may not
encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
People vs. Lagman G.R. No. L-45892 July 13, 1938

FACTS:  In 1936, Tranquilino Lagman, a Filipino citizen whom have attained the age of 20, is 
being compelled by Section 60 of the Commonwealth Act 1, otherwise known as the  “National
Defense Law’ to join and render the military service. Lagman refused to join  the military and
argued the provision was unconstitutional. He also defended that  reason he does not want to
serve the military is because he has a father to support, has  no military leanings and he does not
wish to kill or be killed. 

ISSUE:  Whether or not Sec. 60 of the Commonwealth Act 1  is constitutional? 

Yes. Sec. 60 of Commonwealth Act 1 is constitutional. 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  Because it is the duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be
performed except through  an army. Thus, the National Defense Law, may require its citizens to
compulsory render military  service. Sec. 4, Art. II of the Constitution states that “The prime duty
of government, and in the  fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render
personal military or civil  service.”  
Aglipay vs. Ruiz G.R. No. L-45459             March 13, 1937

FACTS:
The government had authorized a special stamp issue on the occasion of the observance in
Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress under the sponsorship of the Catholic
Church. The petitioner, as head of the Philippine Independent Church, assailed the measure,
contending that it violated the Constitution because it benefited a particular religion; thus he
sought to prohibit the issuance and selling of the stamps commemorative of the event.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the authorized stamp issue be declared invalid for violating the principle of
separation of Church and State.

RULING:
No.
The Supreme Court, on examining the background facts, discovered that although the original
design of the stamp featured a Catholic chalice, this was later rejected in favor a map of the
Philippines under which appeared the caption, “”Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress,
Feb. 3-7,1937.” What was emphasized, therefore, is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but
Manila, as the seat of that congress. The issuance of the postage stamps in question was not
inspired by any sectarian denomination. The only purpose was “to advertise the Philippines and
attract more tourist to this country.” The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the
Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that
church. The officials concerned merely took advantage of an event considered of international
importance “to give publicity to the Philippines and its people”.
While it is obvious that the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be
inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any,
received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. The
Government should not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results,
more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be
undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its
subordinate to mere incidental results not contemplated.

Therefore, the stamp issue was held to be not invalid.

Taruc vs. De la Cruz G.R. No. 144801, March 10, 2005

FACTS:

Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC) in Socorro, Surigao
del Norte. Respondents Porfirio de la Cruz and Rustom Florano were the bishop and parish
priest, respectively, of the same church in that locality. Petitioners, led by Dominador Taruc,
clamored for the transfer of Fr. Florano to another parish but Bishop de la Cruz denied their
request. It appears from the records that the family of Fr. Florano’s wife belonged to a political
party opposed to petitioner Tarucs, thus the animosity between the two factions with Fr. Florano
being identified with his wife’s political camp. Bishop de la Cruz, however, found this too flimsy a
reason for transferring Fr. Florano to another parish.Because of the order of
expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction
against Bishop de la Cruz before the RTC.They contended that their expulsion was illegal
because it was done without trial thus violating their right to due process of law.

ISSUE: What is the role of the State, through the Courts, on matters of religious intramurals?

RULING:

The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a matter

best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said
institution/organization.

It is not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in the performance of their
discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of religious
institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations.

“Civil Courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of a religious organization except for the
protection of civil or property rights. Those rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil court,
and the courts have jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to the title, use, or possession
of church property.”

Obviously, there was no violation of a civil right in the present case.

SECTION 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development
CALALANG VS. WILLIAMS
Summary:
Calalang filed a petition for writ of prohibition against certain officials in enforcing the prohibition
of animal-drawn vehicles in certain areas and during certain periods of the day. The Court ruled
that Commonwealth Act No 548, the law in question, is constitutional.
Doctrine:
Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that
justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.
Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements
of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the
interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of
measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying
the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.
Facts:
Maximo Calalang brought a petition for a writ of prohibition against the following respondents:
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission (A.D. Williams), Director of Public Works (Vicente
Fragante), Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications (Sergio Bayan), Mayor of the
City of Manila (Eulogio Rodriguez), and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila (Juan Dominguez).
It is alleged in the petition that the respondents have caused and enforced the prohibition of
animal-drawn vehicles from passing along Rosario St. extending from Plaza Calderon de la
Barca to Dasmarinas Street (from 7:30am-12:30pm and from 1:30-5:30p.m.); and Rizal Avenue
extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street (from 7-11a.m.) for a
period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge, to the detriment not only
of their owners but of the riding public as well.
The petitioner avers that the rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic
on national roads, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 548, infringe upon the constitutional
precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security
of all the people
Issues Ratio:
WON CA No 548 is unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of legislative power – NO
The provisions of CA No 548 do not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works
and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and
regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to
carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly.
The delegated power is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the
ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be
predicated.
To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and
how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the
traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative
function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the
discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining
whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise
of such discretion is the making of the law.
WON CA No 548 constitutes as an unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and
abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion – NO
Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of the
paramount police power of the state.
In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public
convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic, a menace to
public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state
in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and
with business and occupations.
Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure
the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state.
WON CA No 548 infringes upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social
justice – NO
The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any
given group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,"
but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so
that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.
Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements
of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the
interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of
measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying
the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should
be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic
life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the
health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the
greatest number."
Dispositive:
In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby denied, with costs against
the petitioner. So ordered.

Ondoy vs. Ignacio G.R. No. L-47178, May 16, 1980

Facts. Ondoy, a fisherman, was indisputably drowned while employed in the
fishing enterprise of Ignacio. In the hearing for the claim for compensation
filed by petitioner, Ignacio submitted affidavits executed by the chief
engineer and oiler of the fishing vessel to the effect that Ondoy,
undeniably a member of the working force of the ship, was in that ship,
but after being invited by friends to a drinking spree, left the vessel, and
thereafter was found dead. On the other hand, the affidavit of the chiefmate
of the fishing enterprise stated that “sometime in October 1968,
while xxx Ondoy xxx was in the actual performance of his work with [the]
fishing enterprise, he was drowned and [he] died on October 22, 1968.
That the deceased died in [the] line of duty.” The hearing officer
summarily ignored the latter affidavit, and dismissed the claim for lack of
merit.

Issue. Should the claim for compensation be granted?

Held. Yes. There is evidence, direct and categorical, to the effect that the
deceased was drowned while “in the actual performance of his work” with
said shipping enterprise. Even without such evidence, the petitioner could
have relied on the presumption of compensability under the [Workmen’s
Compensation] Act once it is shown that the death or disability arose in the
course of employment, with the burden of overthrowing it being cast on
the person resisting the claim. [The affidavit] to the effect that the
deceased left the vessel for a drinking spree certainly cannot meet the
standard required to negate the force of the presumption of
compensability. This court, in recognizing the right of petitioner to the
award, merely adheres to the interpretation uninterruptedly followed by
this Court in resolving all doubts in favor of the claimant. The principle of
social justice is in this sphere strengthened and vitalized. As between a
laborer, xxx and the employer xxx, the law has reason to demand from the
latter stricter compliance. Social justice in these cases is not equality but
protection.

SECTION 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights.

Imbong vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014

Sept 24
Ceferino Paredes, Jr. vs Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 108251 – 252 SCRA 641 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – The Legislative
Department – Suspension of a Member of Congress – RA 3019 

In January 1990, Teofilo Gelacio, the then vice mayor of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, filed a
case against Ceferino Paredes, Jr. (who was then the governor of the same province), Atty.
Generoso Sansaet (counsel for Paredes), and Mansueto Honrada (a clerk of court). The three
allegedly conspired to falsify a copy of a Notice of Arraignment and of the Transcript of
Stenographic Notes. Gelacio claimed that, in fact, no arraignment notice had ever been issued
against him in a criminal proceeding against him. Gelacio was able to produce a certification
from the judge handling the case himself that the criminal case against him never reached the
arraignment stage because the prosecution was dismissed. Atty. Sansaet on his part
maintained that there was indeed a Notice of Arraignment but he later retracted his testimonies.
Paredes claimed that Sansaet only changed his side because of political realignment.
Subsequently, the Office of the Ombudsman recommended that Paredes et al be charged with
Falsification of Public Documents. Paredes appealed but was eventually denied by the
Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE: Whether or not Paredes, now a member of Congress, may be suspended by order of

the Sandiganbayan.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by

the Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on the
prerogatives of congress.  The SC ruled:

Petitioner’s invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution – which deals with the
power of each House of Congress inter alia to punish its Members for disorderly behavior and
“suspend or expel a Member” by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the
qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days – is
unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA
3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact
that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of
Representatives.
Miriam Defensor Santiago vs Sandiganbayan (2001)
G.R. No. 128055 – 356 SCRA 636 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – The Legislative
Department – Suspension of a Member of Congress – Violations of RA 3019; Preventive
Suspension
FACTS
In October 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was the then Commissioner of the
Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID), approved the application for legalization of
the stay of about 32 aliens. Her act was said to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith and it
ran counter against Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The
legalization of such is also a violation of Executive Order No. 324 which prohibits the
legalization of disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized by Santiago were allegedly known by her
to be disqualified. Two other criminal cases were filed against Santiago. Francis Garchitorena, a
presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, issued a warrant of arrest against Santiago. Santiago
petitioned for provisional liberty since she was just recovering from a car accident which was
approved. In 1995, a motion was filed with the Sandiganbayan for the suspension of Santiago,
who was already a senator by then. The Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate President
(Maceda) to suspend Santiago from office for 90 days.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate
without violating the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. It is true that the Constitution provides that “each house may determine the rules of
its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-
thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed,
shall not exceed sixty days.”
But on the other hand, Section 13 of R.A No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
provides:
Suspension and loss of benefits. – Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property
whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of
participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by
final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is
acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed
to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been
filed against him.
In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress
to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above
constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate
or the Lower House, as the case may be, upon an erring member. This is quite distinct from the
suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary,
preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner
for misbehavior as a Member of the Senate.