VALENZUELA vs. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. L-56168 PARENS PATRIAE DOCTRINE

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PARENS PATRIAE DOCTRINE

VALENZUELA vs. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. L-56168


December 22, 1988
Facts:
Carlos Telosa is a farmer and a fisherman. He had very limited education. Telosa initiated a
loan with the Rural Bank of Lucena with a contract of mortgage. The mortgage covered a parcel
of land measuring 50,000 square meters. Several months later the Rural Bank of Lucena
experienced financial distress. The Central Bank appraised Rural Bank of Lucian’s shareholders.
It was found out in its investigation that key officers of the bank had certain anomalies or had
resorted to unsound banking practices which were prejudicial to the government, the public,
and its creditors. Rural Bank of Lucena has then undergone liquidation. It had received orders
to turn its non-monetary assets into cash to satisfy claims. Among one of the accounts it
decides to liquidate was the Telosa account in the amount of Php 5000.00. Rural Bank of
Lucena sent for a demand letter asking for the payment of the account. Carlos Telosa thought
that he owes the bank only Php 300.00 and not Php 5000.00, so Telosa filed a protest on the
demand received. Meanwhile Carlos Telosa died in January 13, 1968.The rural bank claiming
that the payment was not fully paid petitioned the foreclosure the Telosa’s land to satisfy the
claim. The lot was then sold to the highest bidder and was consequently registered in the
Registry of Deed son September 11, 1972. Telosa now pray for the annulment of the land back
to them because they have already paid the loan of Php 300.00.
Issue: Whether or not the state can intervene via parens patriae for the return of the Telosa’s
land.
Ruling:
The state can protect its citizens; it is a supreme power the state can exercise at any time the
rights of its citizen is being prejudiced. The bank took advantage of the Telosa’s by making a
document that was not the contract that they have agreed upon. Needless to state in this
regard the particular transaction was one of the fraudulent and anomalous
transactions involving the officer of the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. The state can intervene
because there has been a preponderance of proof that the loan only amounts to Php 300.00
and not Php 5000.00. By virtue of the power of the state the bank was ordered to return the
land it extra judicially settled.
In another case, Urbano vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R.
No. 72964, January 7, 1988, a vehicular accident resulted in a
criminal information for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property with physical injuries. There was acquittal due to failure to
prove guilty beyond reasonable doubt. A civil action for damages based
on tort was filed; this action was dismissed.

The Supreme Court answered: "The well-settled doctrine is that a


person, while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable." While the
guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond
reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil
action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal
extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a
declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist.

The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, which
provides that the acquittal of the accused on the ground that his guilt has
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt
him from civil liability for the same act or omission, has been explained
by the Code Commission as follows:

The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases
him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal
system. It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice,
where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as
to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the
civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not
proved, civil liability cannot be demanded
Ancheta vs Ancheta Case Digest
8:57 PM

Case Doctrine:

● Marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally
interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy
families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their
preservation is not the concern of the family members alone.

● In all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the State for the
purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the
complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order the
prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties. The
prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or
annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof
adduced is dubious and fabricated. 

Facts: Marietta and Rodolfo were married in 1959. They had 8 children. In


1992, Rodolfo left the conjugal home and abandoned Marietta and their children. Two
years after, Marietta filed a complaint for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership
and judicial separation of property with a plea for support and support pendente lite. At
that time, Marietta lived in Las Pinas. The parties entered into a compromise agreement
wherein their property located in Carmona, Cavite was adjudicated to Marietta and her
children. The court rendered judgment based on the compromise agreement.
Conformably thereto, Marietta and her children moved and began residence at the said
Carmona property. 
In 1995, Rodolfo, wanting to marry again, filed a case for the declaration of nullity of
his marriage with the Marietta on the ground of psychological incapacity. Although the
Rodolfo knew that the Marietta was already residing in Carmona, Cavite, he,
nevertheless, alleged in his petition that the Marietta was residing at No. 72 CRM
Avenue corner CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila. The sheriff
served the summons and a copy of the petition by substituted service on the the
parties’ son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, at his residence in Bancal, Carmona,
Cavite.

Marietta failed to file an answer and was declared in default. Rodolfo was allowed


adduce evidence ex-parte. On July 7, 1995, the trial court issued an Order granting the
petition and declaring the marriage of the parties void ab initio. The clerk of court
issued a Certificate of Finality of the Order of the court on July 16, 1996.

On July 7, 2000, the Marietta filed a verified petition against the Rodolfo with the Court
of Appeals under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended, for the annulment of the
order of the RTC.

Marietta, alleged, among others, that the order of the trial court nullifying her and the
Rodolfo’s marriage was null and void for the court a quo’s failure to order the public
prosecutor to conduct an investigation on whether there was collusion between the
parties, and to order the Solicitor General to appear for the State.

Held:  The records show that for the petitioner’s failure to file an answer to the complaint,

the trial court granted the motion of the respondent herein to declare her in default. The public

prosecutor condoned the acts of the trial court when he interposed no objection to the motion of the

respondent. The trial court forthwith received the evidence of the respondent ex-parte and rendered

judgment against the petitioner without a whimper of protest from the public prosecutor. The

actuations of the trial court and the public prosecutor are in defiance of Article 48 of the Family Code,

which reads:
  Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the
Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of
the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. 
  In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon
a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
The trial court and the public prosecutor also ignored Rule 18, Section 6 of the 1985
Rules of Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) which
provides:
  Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation.— If
the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to
answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a
collusion between the parties exits, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the
State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, this Court laid down the guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the
role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the State:

  (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless
the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and
zealous participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as
a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the
exposure of an invalid one as well.

A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the


danger of collusion. Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage
and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of
the State for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take
care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant-spouse fails to
answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should
order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties. The
prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or
annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof
adduced is dubious and fabricated.

Our constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social
institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract,
but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no
stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families
weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of the
family members alone. Whether or not a marriage should continue to exist or a family
should stay together must not depend on the whims and caprices of only one party,
who claims that the other suffers psychological imbalance, incapacitating such party to
fulfill his or her marital duties and obligations (Ancheta vs. Ancheta, G.R. No. 145370,
March 4, 2004).

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