Filing# 155265772 E-Filed 08/ 12/2022 11 :51 :56 PM

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE J 5TH

JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR PALM
BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA

FIRST AMERICAN BANK, as successor CASE No.: 5020 16-CA-009292

By merger to Bank of Coral Gables, LLC,

Plainti ff,

V.

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LAURENCE S. SCHNEIDER,
STEPHANIE L. SCHNEIDER, et al.

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Defendant(s).
______________ ./
FIRST AMERICAN BANK, as successor
by merger to Bank of Coral Gables, LLC,

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Pla int iff;

vs.
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LAURENCE S. SCHNEIDER, STEPHANIE
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L. SCHNEIDER, IST FIDELITY LOAN

SERVJCJNG, LLC, S & A CAPITAL
PARTNERS, INC., REAL ESTATE
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& FJNANCE, INC., BRAD AXEL and

PAIGE AXEL

T hird-Party Defendants.
_____________
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./
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THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF'S

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SECOND AMENDED SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT FOR REVERSE PIERCING

THE CORPORATE VEIL AN D PERMAN ENT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, AVOIDANCE
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OF FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS AND OTHER RELIEF WITH PRE.fUDTCE

COMES NOW Th ird-Pany Defendants LAURENCE SCHNEIDER (herei nafter "L.

Schneider"), STEPHANIE SCHNEIDER (hereinafter "S. Schneider"), and IST FIDELITY LOAN

SERVICING, LLC (hereinafter "Fidelity") (L. Schneider, S. Schneider, and Fidel ity may be

hereinafter collect ively referred to as "Third-Party Defendants''), by and through the undersigned

FILED: PALM BEACH COUNTY, FL, JOSEPH ABRUZZO, CLERK, 08/12/2022 11 :51 :56 PM
counsel and pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1. 140, and hereby files this Motion to Dismiss Third-Party

Plaintiff FIRST AMERICAN BANK's, as successor by merger to Bank of Coral Gables, LLC

(hereinafter " Plainti ff' and/or ''First American") Second Ame11ded Supplemental Complaint for

Reverse Piercing the Corporate Vei l, Pe,manent Injunctive Relief, Avoidance and Recovery of

Fraudulent Transfers, and Other Related Relief with Pr~iudice, and states in support thereof:

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Procedural History

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l. Plainti ff filed an Eight-Count Th ird Pa,ty Complaint for (i) Reverse Piercing the Corporate

Veil against Fidel ity and L. Schneider and S. Schneider (L. Schneider and S. Schneider may be

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hereinafter collectively referred to as "Schneiders"), (ii) Reverse Piercing the Corporate Vei l
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against S&A Capital Partners, Inc. (hereinafter "S&A), Brad Axel (hereinafter "B. Axel), Paige
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A,xel (hereinafter "P. Axel) (B. Axel and P. Axels may be hereinafter collectively referred to as
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"Axels"), and the Schneiders, and (i ii) Reverse Piercing the Corporate Veil against Real Estate

and Finance, Inc. (hereinafter "REF") and the Schneiders, (iv) Pem1anent Injunction agai nst the
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Schneiders and Axels, (v) Avoidance and Recovery of Fraudulent Transfers Pursuant to Fla. Stat.

§§ 726. I0S(l)(a) and 726.108 against S. Schneider, (vi) Avoidance and Recovery of Fraudulent
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Transfers Pursuant to§§ 726.I0S(l)(a) and 726.108 against S. Schneider, (vii) Avoidance and
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Recovery of Fraudulent Transfers Pursuant to §§ 726.106 and 726. I 08 against S. Schneider, and
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(v iii) Civi l Conspiracy to Commit Fraudulent Transfer against S. Schneider.

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2. On March 9, 2022, the Fourth District Court of Appeals entered its Opinion (See Exhibit

"A") reversing the final deficiency judgment against S. Schneider and remanded for the entry of

an amended judgment against only her husband, L. Schneider. Wherein the Court stated: "We
reverse the final deficiency judgment against Schneider and remand for the entry of an

amended judgment against only her husband." (Emphasis added).

3. OJJ March 22, 2022, PlaiJJtiff as Appellee filed a Motion for Rehearing, and, ]\!lotion for

Rehearing en Banc.

4. On Apri l 28, 2022, the Fourth District COLtrt of Appea ls entered an Order denying

PlaintiftYAppellee's Motion for Rehearing, and, Motion for Rehearing En Banc.

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5. On May 20, 2022, the Fourth District Court of Appeals issued its Mandate (See Exhibit

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"B") stating:

"This cause having been brought to the Court by appeal, and after due
consideration the Cotlft having issued i1s opinion; YOU ARE HEREBY

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COMMANDED that such further proceedings be had in said cause as may
be in accordance with the opinion of this Court, and with the rules of
procedure aod laws of the State of Florida." IE
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6. This Motion to Dismiss timely follows.
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Legal Standard for Motion to Dismiss

''Whether a complaint is sufficient to state a cause of action is an issue of law."

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W.R. Townsend Contracting, Inc. v. Jensen Civil Construction, Inc., 728 So. 2d 297, 300 (Fla. 4th

DCA 1999). "To state a cause of action, a complaint must allege sutlicient ultimate facts to show
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that the pleader is entitled to relief." Id. at 300 (quotit1g Pen y v. Cosgrove, 464 So. 2d 664, 665
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(Fla. 2d DCA 1985)); Fla. R. Civ. P. I.I J0(b) (requiring " a sbo1t and plain statement of the ultimate
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facts showing that the pleader is entitled to relief').

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("A dismissal with prejudice for failure to state a cause of action should not be ordered

without giving the party offering the detective pleading an opportunity to amend, unless it is

apparent that the pleading cannot be amended so as to state a cause of action.") (emphasis added).
A motion to dismiss tests whether a plaintiff has alleged a good cause of action in a complaint.

Visor v. Buh l, 760 So. 2d 274, 275 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).

Whi le "comt s must liberal ly construe, and accept as true, factual allegations in a complaint

and reasonably deductible inferences therefrom," they " need not accept .. . conclusory allegations,

unwarranted deductions, or mere legal conclusions made by a party." Id. (citing Response

Oncology, Inc. v. Metrahealth Ins. Co., 978 F. Supp. 1052, 1058) (S.D. Fla. 1997). Thus, the

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question for the trial court to decide is whether, assuming the well-pleaded factual allegations in

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the Complaint are true, Plaintiffs would be entitled to the reliefrequested.

A motion to dismiss a complaint raises as a question of law the sufficiency of the facts

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alleged to state a cause of action. Chai res v. N. Fla. Nat'l Bank, 432 So. 2d 183, 184 (Fla. I st

DCA 1983). IE
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Additionally, when presented with a motion to dismiss, a trial court is required to "treat the
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factual allegations of the complaint as trne and to consider tbose allegations in the light most

favorable to the plainti ffs." Hollywood Lakes Section Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Hollywood, 676
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So.2d 500,501 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (citing Carella Trucking, Inc. v. Cheoy Lee Shipyards, Ltd.

647 So.2d 1028, 1030 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)).

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As such, a complaint must allege sufficient ultimate facts to show that the pleader is entitled
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to relief. Samuels v. King Motor Co. of Fort Lauderdale, 782 So. 2d 489, 500 (Fla. 4th DCA
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200 1).
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Finally, where, as here, the plaintiffs are Lmable to amend a pleading to state a claim,

dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. See Hansen v. Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 348 So.2d

608, 610 (Fla. App. 4th DCA 1977) (citing 10 Fla. Jur. , Dismissal § 33, p. 544) ("A dismissal with

prejudice for fai lure to state a cause of action should not be ordered witbout giving the party
offering the defective pleading an opportunity to amend, unless it is apparent that the pleading

cannot be amended so as to state a cause of action.") (emphasis added).

Protected By Tenancv by the Entireties

Both real and person property are normally "subj ect (o levy and sale Lmder execution to

satisfy a judgment." § 56.061, Fla. Stat. (2019). However, it is well-established that "when

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property is held as a tenancy by the entireties, only the creditors of both the husband and

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w ife,jointly, may attach the tenancy by the entireties property; the property is not divisible on

behalf of one spouse alone, and therefore it cannot be reached to satisfy the obligation of only one

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spouse." W illiams v. M & R Constr. of N. Fla., Inc., 305 So. 3d 353, 354 (Fla. I" DCA 2020)
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[citing therein, Beal Bank, SSB v. A lmand & Assocs .• 780 So. 2d 45, 53 (Fla. 2001).
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To understa11d the key legal issues in this case, we start with an overview of the different
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forms of legal ownership of property in the State of Florida. Prope,ty held as a tenancy by

the entireties possesses six characteri stics: (I) unity of possession Uoint ownership and control);
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(2) unity of interest (the interests in the accOLUlt must be identical); (3) un ity of ti(le (the interests

must have originated in the same instrument) ; (4) unity of time (the interests must have
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commenced simultaneously) ;6 (5) survivorship; and (6) unity of marriage (the parties must be
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married at the time the property became titl ed in tbeiJ joint 11ames). Beal Bank. SSB v. Almand &
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Assocs., 780 So. 2d 45, 52 (Fla. 200 1) [citing therein. First Nat'/ Bank v. Hector Supply Co .. 254
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So.2d 777, 781 (Fla.1971), Sitomer v. Orlan 660 So.2d I II I, 1113 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); see

also In re Estate of Lyons. 90 So.2d 39, 4 1 (Fla. 1955) (citing Andrews v. Andrews. 155 Fla. 654,

2 1 So.2d 205,206 (1945).

 Here, Plaintiffs Third-Party Complaint fa ils to plead a cause of action for all counts within

the Third-Party Complaint by failing to allege any money that was provided to Third-Party

Defendants was not protected as deriving from entities or assets held in tenancy by the entireties,

as well as failing to allege that any of the Defendants' interests in the corporations would not be

protected under tenancy by the entireties. S. Schneider and L. Schneider hold their j oint marital

bank account as tenants by the entireties. At no time whatsoever, could First American claim any

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money from their joint bank account(s) held by S. Sclrneider and L. Schneider as tentants by the

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entirety.

Add itionally, First American has been aware since 2006 that S. Schneider and L. Schneider

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shareholder ownership of the corporations is held as tenants by the entirety, as L. Schneider
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provided this information to the Plaintiff at the time L. Schneider submitted his loan application
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for the loan the alleged breach of which is sought to be enforced sub judice.
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Moreover, First American has adm itted throughout the allegations 111 its Third-Party

Complaint that it is aware that S. Schneider has an interest in REF, S&A, and First Fidelity. An
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example of such is found within the prayers for rel ief in Counts I, II, and Ill, where First American

is requesting for the Court to enter an Order stating that S. Schneider has no interest within the
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entities a form of rel ief surely outside of the jurisdiction of this Court in enforcing the "Judgment"
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agaiust L. Schneider, or in proceedings supplemeutary sought by the Plaintiff herein.

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Failure to State A Cause Of Action to Reverse Pierce Corporate Veil in Counts I and Ill
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Ally v. Naim, 581 So. 2d 961, 962~3 (Fla. 3'd DCA 1991), provides:

Uuder Dania Jai- Alai Palace, Inc. v. Sykes. 450 So.2d 1114 (Fla.1984), "the
corporate vei l may not be pierced absent a showing of improper conduct." Id. at
112 1. Thus," '(t]he corporate vei l will not be penetrated either at law or in equity
unless it is shown that the corporation was organized or employed to mislead
creditors or to work a fraud upon them.'" Id. at 1120 (quotingAdvertects. Inc. v.
Sawyer Indus., Inc. 84 So.2d 21, 23 (Fla. l 955)). The fact that a corporation is a
 "one person" corporation does not, staoding alone, justify piercing the corporate
vei l, Riley v. Fatt, 47 So.2d 769, 773 (Fla.1950); see also Dania Jai- Alai Palace,
lnc., 450 So.2d at 11 20; Advertects, 84 So.2d at 24, nor does the fact that business
affairs have been poorly handled, without more, justify piercing the corporate
vei l. Advertects, 84 So.2d at 24 ..........The language just quoted
from Advertects must be read in the context of the rest of tbe decision, whicb holds
that the corporate vei l will not be penetrated '\mless it is shown that the corporation
was organized or employed to mislead creditors or to work a fraud upon
them." Id. at 23. Thus, it is not enough to show that the corporation's "business
affairs had be-en rather poorly handled," id. al 24; there must also be a showing " that
the stockholders had improperly converted ... its property to their own use or ...

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fraudulently or inequitably abused their relationship with the corporate entity." Id.

Ally v. Nairn, 581 So. 2d 961, 962-63 (Fla. 3'd DCA 1991).

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A showing of improper conduct, which is required to pierce the corporate veil , "is present

only in cases in whicb the corporation was a mere device or sham to accomplish some ulterior

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purpose ... or where the purpose is to evade some statute or to accomplish some fraud or illegal
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purpose." Joh11s011 Enters. of.Jacksonville, Inc., 162 F.3d at 1320 (interna l quotations omilled).
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Bookworld Trade, Inc. v. Daughters of St. Paul, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1361 (M.D. Fla. 2007).
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Bookworld Trade. Inc. v. Daughters of St. Paul, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1360--61 (M .D.
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Fla. 2007), further provides:

"T he mere fact that one or two individuals own and control the stock structure of a
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corporation does not lead inevitably to the conclusion that the corporate entity is a
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fraud or that it is necessari ly the alter ego of its stockholders ...." Advertects, Inc. v.
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Sawyer Indus .. Inc .. 84 So.2d 21 , 23- 24 (Fla. 1955); see also Johnson Enters. of
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Jacksonville, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc.. 162 F.3d 1290, 1319- 20 (JJ tb Cir. 1998)

(evidence that parent company provided wholly-owned subsidiary with funding

was not wrongfol); Ally v. Naim, 581 So.2d 961, 963 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (fact that

corporation compensates sole shareholder does not, by itselt: allow piercing of the

corporate veil).
 Here, First American is looking to pierce corporate veil for corporations that were formed

years prior to the initiation of the foreclosure proceedings in this case sub Judice. As stated within

First American' s Third-Party Complaint, tbey reviewed Fidelity's and REF's Sunbiz; therefore,

leaving them well aware of the time in which Fidelity and REF formed. Not to mention that First

American has been aware that L. Schneider, since the time that he app lied for the loan in 2006,

that his corporations were held in tenancy by the entireties with his Wife, S. Schneider. Despite

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such not falling with in the four (4) comers of the Complaint, the Plaintiff's intentional neglect of

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this ~,1owledge has lead to years of litigation wherein the Plaintiff attempts to create in personam

liabi lity against S. Schneider, the existence of which it disavowed at summary judgment in 20 I 7

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[D.E. 259].
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Here, First American has only alleged that Schneider's corporations are providing the
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shareholders with distributions. The mere fact that First American is attempting to Reverse Pierce
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the Corporate Veil based on allegations of shareholder distributions, without establishing the

requisite fraudulent intent, is an overreach which should lead to the dismissal of their Third-Party
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Complaint.
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The "outsider reverse piercing theory," (i.e., reverse piercing the corporate veil by an
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outside cred itor), is only avai lable "w here the shareholders have formed or used the corporation to
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secrete assets and thereby avoid preexisting personal liability." See Braswell. 989 So. 2d at 39
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(quoting S.A. (EPICA) v. Swiss Bank Corp. (Overseas) S.A., 507 So.2d I I 19, I 120 (Fla. 3d DCA

I 987)) (emphasis in original).

Although "reverse piercing" is distinguishable from the "standard" piercing the corporate

veil theory, in order to pierce the veil under either theory, a creditor must allege and prove: "( I)

the shareholder dominated and controlled the corporation to such an extent that the corporation's
independent existence was in fact non-existent and the shareholders were in fact alter egos of the

corporation; (2) the corporate form must have been used fraudulently or for an improper purpose;

and (3) the fraudulent or improper use of tbe corporate fonn caused injmy to the claimant."

Gasparini v. Pordom ingQ, 972 So. 2d 1053, 1055 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). And, "even ifa corporation

is merely an alter ego of its dom inant shareho lder or shareholders, the corporate vei l cannot be

pierced so long as the corporation's separate identity was lawfitlly maintained." Lipsig v. Ramlawi,

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760 So. 2d 170, 187 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).

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Moreover, the allegations necessary to warrant reverse piercing must be al leged w ith

specificity establish ing that the controll ing shareholder used the corporation to defraud ex isting

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creditors. Braswe ll, 989 So. 2d at 39. Pursuant to the "alter ego" theory, the Plaintiff must establish
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that "the shareholder dominated and controlled the corporation to such an extent that the
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corporation's independent existence, was in fact non-existent a11d the shareholders were in fact
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alter egos of the corporation. Gasparini, 972 So.2d at 1055.

T he Florida S upreme Court has clearly held that " the corporate veil may not be pierced
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absent a showing of improper conduct." Dania Jai-A lai Palace, Inc. v. Sykes, 450 So.2d 1114, 112 1

(Fla. 1984). Furthermore, the fact that a corporation is a closely held entity with a few shareholders
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does not ipso facto give rise to a claim of alter ego or fraud sufficient to pierce the corporate vei l,
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as such a conclusion could lead to "eve,y judgment agaiost a corporation [being) exploited as a
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vehicle for harassing the stockholders and entering upon fishing expeditions into their personal
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business and assets." Id. at 1120.

Here, First American has failed to properly allege and prove (1) the shareholder dominated

and controlled the corporation to such an extent that the corporation 's independent existenc-e was

in fact non-existent, and the shareholders were in fact alter egos of the corporation; (2) the
corporate form must have been used fraudulently or for an improper purpose; and (3) the fraudulent

or improper use of the corporate form caused injury to the claimant. Instead, first American has

alleged and proved (l) REF and Fidelity, the corporate ownership of which is held by the

Schneiders as tenants by the entirety, have provided shareholder distributions to accounts that are

protected ltnder tenancy by the entireties, 1 (2) Fidel ity and REF have used the corporate fom, as

provided by law, (3) the shareholder distributions provided by Fidelity and REF were shareholder

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distributions that were not provided fraudulently.

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Paragraph 53 of the Plaintiff's Third-Party Complaint state ''Upon information and belief,

Laurence is the person that manages and controls I" Fidelity on a day-to-day basis, and the

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Schneiders are the only members." However, Plaintiff contradicts itself in Paragraph 19 of
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Plaintiff's Third-Party Complaint, wherein it states, "Upon Information and belief; Ist Fidelity is
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solely owned and controlled [by] Laurence, and Laurence serves as its manager, president and
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registered agent." Here, Plaintiff has admi tted to tbeir knowledge that S. Schneider is a member,

and as stated above First American was made fully aware that the corporations held by L.
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Schneider are held ltnder tenancy by the entireties. Therefore, First American has fai led to provide

proper and sutlicient allegation(s) that Fidelity and REF are L. Schneider's "alter ego(s)."
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Fidelity and REF are real operating businesses upon which the Plaintiff cannot levy and
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apply to the judgment, sole ly against L. Schneider, as it would be detrimental to Fide lity and REF
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day-to-day business operations, as well as S. Schneider's rights as a shareholder, as tenants by the

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entirety with her Husband, L. Schneider, of Fidel ity and REF.

To survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must do more than merely state legal conclusions;

they are required to allege some specific factual basis for their unsupported conclusions or face

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Plaintiff was well aware that all assets and c-0rporations owned by L. Schneider were protected under tenancy by the
entire1ies at the time thal L. Schneider applied for the loan.
dismissal of their claims. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecommunications, 372 F.3d 1250, 1263 (11th

Cir. 2004).

T he allegati ons w ithin Counts I a11d Ill are 11othing more than conclusions made "on

information and belief," without any of the required factual specificity, especially as related to the

heightened standard of proof required in relation to fraudulent transfers See RREF SNV-FL. SSL,

LLC. V. Shamrock Storage, LLC, 178 So. 3d 90 (Fla. I " DCA 2015), to support the alleged

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"information and belief." See Braswell. 989 So. 2d at 39; Dania Jai-Alai Palace. 450 So.2d at 112 1;

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thus, providing that First American has fai led to state a cause of action in Cou11ts I and UL

Lastly, within First American's prayer for relief First American specifically is seek ing an

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Order declaring that S. Schneider has no interest in Fidelity and REF, which contradicts their
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assertions in their Prayers for Relief in Counts 1-111 acknowledging that S. Schneider does in fact
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have an ownership rights to the-se entities as derived by her tenants by the entireties ownership
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long predati ng Plaintiffs 2016 foreclosure complaint [D.E. I) .

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Failure to State A Cause Of Action to Reverse Pierce Corporate Veil in Count II

Ally v. Naim, 581 So. 2d 961, 962~3 (Fla. 3'dDCA 1991), provides:
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Under Dania Jai- Alai Palace. file. v. Sykes, 450 So.2d 111 4 (Fla.1984), " the
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corporate veil may not be pierced absent a showing of improper conduct. " id. at
112 1. Thus," '[t]he corporate vei l will not be penetrated either at law or in equity
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unless it is shown that the corporation was organized or employed to mislead

creditors or to work a fraud upon them.'" Id. at 1120 (quotingAdvertects, Inc. v.
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Sawy er Indus., Inc. 84 So.2d 21 , 23 (Fla.1955)). The fact that a corporation is a

"one person" corporation does not, standing alone, justify piercing the corporate
vei l, Riley v. Fat/, 47 So.2d 769, 773 (Fla.1950); see also Dania Jai- Alai Palace,
Inc.. 450 So.2d at 1120; Advertects, 84 So.2d at 24, nor does the fact that business
affairs have been poorly handled, without more, justify piercing the corporate
vei l. Advertects, 84 So.2d at 24..........The language j ust quoted
from Advertects must be read in the context of the rest of the decision, which holds
that the corporate vei l will not be penetrated "unless it is shown that the corporation
was organized or employed to mislead credi tors or to work a fraud upon
 them." id. at 23. T hus, it is not enough to show that tbe corporatioo's ''business
affairs had been rather poorly handled," id. at 24; there must also be a showing "that
the stockholders had improperly converted ... its property to their own use or ...
fraudulently or inequitably abused their relationship with the corporate entity." i d.

Allv v. Nairn, 581 So. 2d 961 , 962~3 (Fla. 3'd DCA 1991).

A showing of improper conduct, wh ich is required to pierce the corporate veil, "is preseot

only in cases in which the corporation was a mere device or sham to accomplish some ulterior

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purpose ... or where the purpose is to evade some statute or to accomplish some fraud or illega l

purpose." Johnson Enters. oj'Jacksonvi/le, inc., 162 F.3d at 1320 (interna l quotations omitted).

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Bookworld Trade. Inc. v. Daughters of St. Paul, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1361 (M.D. Fla. 2007).

Bookworld Trade. Inc. v. Daughters of St. Paul. Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1360--61 (M.D.

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Fla. 2007), further provides:
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"The mere fact that one or two individuals own and control the stock str ucture of a
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corporation does not lead inevitably to the conclusion that the corporate entity is a
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fraud or that it is necessari ly the alter ego of its stockholders ...." Adverlects, Inc. v.
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Sawyer Indus .. inc.. 84 So.2d 21 , 23- 24 (Fla. 1955); see also Johnson Enters. of

.!acksonville, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 162 F.3d 1290, 1319- 20 (I Ith Cir. 1998)
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(evidence that parent company provided wholly-owned subsidiary with funding

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was not wrongful); Ally v. Naim, 581 So.2d 961, 963 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (fact that
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corporation compensates sole shareholder does not, by itself, allow piercing of the
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corporate veil).

Here, First American is looking to pierce corporate veil for S&A that was formed years

prior to the initiation of the foreclosure proceedings in this case sub Judice. As stated within First

American 's Third-Party Complaint, they reviewed S&A's Sunbiz; therefore, leaving them well

aware of the t ime in which Fidelity and REF formed. Not to mention that First American has been
made aware at the time that L. Schneider applied for the Joan that his corporations were held by

tenancy by the entireties; however, that does not fall within the four corners of the Complaitll and

w ill be addressed at a later date.

Here, First American has only alleged that Schneider's corporations are providing the

shareholders with distributions. The mere fact that First American is attempting to Reverse Pierce

the Corporate Veil based on shareholder distributions is an overreach in which should dismiss their

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Third-Party Complaint. Not to mention that First American bas been aware that L. Schneider, since

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the t ime that he applied for the loan in 2006, that bis corporations were held in tenancy by the

entireties with his Wife, S. Schneider. Despite such not fall ing with in the four (4) corners of the

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Complaint, the Plainti ffs intentional neglect of this knowledge has led to years of litigation
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wherein the Plaintiff attempts to create in perso11am liability against S. Schneider, the existence of
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which it disavowed at summary judgment in 2017 [D .E. 259).
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The "outsider reverse piercing theory," (i.e., reverse piercing the corporate vei l by an
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outside cred itor), is only avai lable "where tbe sbareholders bave fonned or used tbe corporation to

secrete assets and thereby avoid preexisti11g personal liability." See Braswell, 989 So. 2d at 39
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(quoting S.A. fEPICA} v. Swiss Bank Corp. (Overseas} S.A., 507 So.2d 1119, 1120 (Fla. 3d DCA
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I 987)) ( emphasis in original).

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A lthough "reverse piercing" is distinguishable from the "standard" piercing the corporate
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vei l theory, in order to pierce the veil under either theory, a creditor must allege aod prove: "(1)

the shareholder dom inated and conb·olled the corporation to such an extent that the corporation 's

independent existence was in fact non-existent and the shareholders were in fact alter egos of the

corporation; (2) the corporate form must have been used fraudulently or for an improper purpose;

and (3) the fraudulent or improper use of the corporate fonn caused injury to the claimant."
Gasparini v. Pordomingo, 972 So. 2d I 053, I 055 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). And, "even if a corporation

is merely an alter ego of its dominant shareholder or shareholders, the corporate vei l cannot be

pierced so lo ng as the corporatio n's separate identity was lawfully maintained." Lipsig v. Raml awi,

760 So. 2d 170, I 87 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).

Moreover, the allegations necessary to warrant reverse piercing must be al leged with

specificity establishing that the controll ing shareholder used the corporation to defraud existing

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creditors. Bras well, 989 So. 2d at 39. Pursuant to the "alter ego" theory, the Plaintiff must establish

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that "tbe shareholder dominated and controlled the corporatio n to such an extent that the

corporatio n's independent ex istence, was in fact non-existent and the shareholders were in fact

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alter egos of the corporation. Gasparini, 972 So.2d at 1055.
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The Florida Supreme Court has clearly held that "the corporate veil may not be pierced
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absent a showing of improper conduct." Dan ia Jai-Alai Palace, Inc . v. Sykes, 450 So.2d l 114, I 12 1
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(F la. 1984). Fmthem1ore, the fact that a corporati on is a closely beld entity with a few shareholders

does not ipso facto give rise to a claim of alter ego or fraud sufficient to pierce the corporate vei l,
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as such a conclusion could lead to "every j udgment against a corporation [being] exploited as a

vehicle for harassing the stockholders and entering upon fishing expeditions into their personal
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business and assets." Jd. at J 120.

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Here, First American has failed to properly allege and prove (I) the shareholder, alleged ly
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L. Schneider, dominated and controlled the corporation to such an extent that the corporation's

indepeudent ex istence was in fact no n-existent and the shareholders were in fact alter egos of the

corporatio n; (2) the corporate form must have been used fraudulently or for an improper purpose;

and (3) the fraudulent or improper use of the corporate form caused injLiry to the claimant. Instead,

First American has alleged and proved (I) S&A has multiple shareholders, which include the Axels
and S. Schneider, that the Corporation provides its shareholders with distributions, (2) S&A has

used the corporate form as provided by law, (3) the shareholder distributions provided by S&A

were shareholder distributions tbat were not provided fraudulently.

Paragraph 65 of the Plaintiffs Third-Party Complaint states "Laurence dominates and

controls S&A, using Brad, Paige and Stephanie as puppets to avoid S&A's assets being subj ect to

Laurence's creditors." However, Plaintiff contradicts itself in Paragraph 38 of Plaintiff's

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Amended Third-Party Complaint, wberein it states, "Brad, paige, and Stepbanie are shareholders

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ofS&A, and Brad is its vice president a11d is a signer on S&A's bank account." Here, Plaintiff has

admitted to their knowledge that S&A has shareholders, who act as officers and are involved in

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the dai ly operation of the corporation, that are not just an "alter ego". Therefore, First American
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has failed, based upon its own statements (See Paragraph 38 of Plaintitrs Amended Third Party
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Complaint), to allege sufficient allegations ofS&A being L. Schneider's "alter ego".
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S&A is real operating businesses upon whi ch tbe Plaintiff cannot levy and has failed to

allege any fraudulent transfer in support of a j udgment in proceedings supplementaryas it would

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be detrimental to S&A's day-to-day business operations, S&A' s abi lity to serve its cl ientele2, as

well as the Axels and S. Schneider's, ownership w ith L. Schneider as tenants by the entireties,
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rights as shareholders of S&A.

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To survi ve a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must do more tbao merely state legal conclusions;
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especially as related to the heightened standard of proofrequ ired in relation to fraudulent transfers
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See RREF SNV-FL. SSL LLC. V. Shamrock Storage. LLC, 178 So. 3d 90 (Fla. I" DCA 2015);

2 S&A owns a large number of re.sidential mo11gages where the mortgagee.s make regular payments, and the
management and supervision thereof is subject multiple Federal regulations related to consumer credit and other
regulations.
they are required to allege some specific factual bases for those conclusions or face dismissal of

their claims. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecommunications, 372 F.3d 1250, 1263 (I Ith Cir. 2004).

T he allegatioos within Counts U are oothiog more than cooclusions made "on information

and belief," without any of the required factual specificity to support the alleged " information and

belief." See Braswell, 989 So. 2d at 39: Dania Jai-A lai Palace 450 So.2d at I 12 1: thus, providing

that First American has failed to state a cause of action in Counts II.

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Lastly, within First American's prayer for relief First American specifically is seeking an

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Order declaring that the Ax els and S. Schneider have oo ioterest in S&A, which concedes that they

have knowledge that the Axels and S. Schneider, ownersh ip wi th L. Schneider as tenants by the

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entireties, do in fact have ownership rights toS&A ..
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Failure to State A Cause Of Action Perm anent In junction in Count IV
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Bookworld Trade, Inc. v. Daughters of St. Paul, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1360-61 (M.D.
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Fla. 2007), further provides:

"The mere fact that one or two individua ls own and control the stock structure of a
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corporation does not lead inevitably to the conclusion that the corporate entity is a

fraud or that it is necessari ly the alter ego of its stockholders ...." Advertects, Inc. v.
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Sawyer Indus.. Inc., 84 So.2d 21 , 23-24 (Fla. 1955);see also Johnson Enters. of
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Jacksonville. Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 162 F.3d 1290, 1319- 20 (U tb Cir. 1998)
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(evidence that parent company provided wholly-owned subsidiary with funding

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was not wrongful); Ally v. Naim, 58 1 So.2d 961, 963 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (fact that

corporation compensates sole shareholder does not, by itself; allow piercing of the

corporate veil).
 And, "even if a corporation is merely an alter ego of its dominant shareholder or

shareholders, the corporate veil cannot be pierced so long as the corporation's separate identity

was lawfully maintained ." Lipsig v. Ram lawi, 760 So. 2d 170, 187 (F la. 3d DCA 2000).

Here, First American has failed to properly allege/plead that REF, S&A, and Fideli ty are

alter egos of L. Schneider. First American has ultimately contradicted itself in every allegation

throughout the Third-Party Complaint while attempting to allege that REF, S&A, and Fidelity are

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alter egos of L. Schneider. First American has admitted throughout its Third-Party Complaint that

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it is aware that REF, S&A, and Fidelity have additi onal shareholders and parties that maintain

interest(s) in the entities other than just L. Schneider. First American has further admitted that the

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enti ties have shareholders that are not just "alter egos" but who are in fact officers and day-to-day

managers of the companies. IE

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To survive a motion to dismiss, plainti ffs must do more than merely state legal conclusions;
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they are required to allege some specific factual bases for those conclusions or face dismissal of

their claims. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecommunications, 372 F.3d 1250, 1263 (I Ith Cir. 2004).
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The allegations within Count IV are nothing more than conclusions made "on infonnation

and belief," without any of the required facnial specificity to support the alleged " information and
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belief." See Braswell. 989 So. 2d at 39; Dania Jai-Alai Palace, 450 So.2d at 1121; thus, providing
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that First American has fai led to state a cause of acti on in Count IV.
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When reviewing the trial court's issuance of an injunction, this court must detenn ine
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whether the movant established: "(I) that it will suffer in-eparable hann un less the status quo is

ma intainedl; (2) that it has no adequate remedy at law; (3) that it has a substantial likel ihood of

3 This assertion is untenable where all of the Schneider•s ''Entities" are the ov.'lters of multiple residential mortgages
which continue to make periodic payments throughout the life of their loans. Therefore, the entities comume to have
ongoing sources of income which invalidates any irreparable hann argument(s).
success on the merits; and (4) that a temporary injunction will serve the public

interest." Foreclosure FreeSearch, Inc. v. Sullivan, 12 So. 3d 771, 775 (Fla 4•1> DCA 2009) [citing

therein Broward County v. Me ikle john. 936 So.2d 742, 746 (fla. 4th DCA 2006); and Aerospace

Welding, Inc. v. Southstream Exhaust & Welding, Inc .. 824 So.2d 226, 228 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)].

Here, First American has failed to establish its bltrden as the movant: "( I) that it wi ll suffer

irreparable harm unless the status quo is maintained; (2) that it has no adequate remedy at law; (3)

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that it has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; and ( 4) that a temporary injunction will

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serve the public interest. In fact, f irst American has only established: (1) that it w ill suffer

irreparable harm if the shareholders ofS&A, REF, and Fidel ity were to access, control, or dispose

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of the assets; (2) that First American has no remedy at law to collect on L. Schneider 's debt other
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than depriving the shareholders of their right to REF, S&A, and Fidelity, including, depriving S.
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Schneider of her protection under tenancy by the entireties; (3) that First American has no
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likel ihood of success on their merits, a11d (4) failed to al lege that an injunction w ill serve the public

interest. Inj unctive relief is an extraordinary remedy that requires a clear legal right, free from
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reasonable doubt. Fltrther, a temporary inj lU1Ct ion should on ly be granted on ly sparingly and only

after the moving party has alleged and proven facts entitl ing it to rel ief: Samme Investments, LLC
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v. Strategica Capital Investments. Inc. , 247 So. 3d 596 (Fla. 3 rd DCA 2018).
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First American is simp ly unwilling to concede that the schneider's entities are held by L.
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Schneider and S. Schneider as tenants by the entireties thatthei r post-judgment proceedings against
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L. Schneider's assets are protected lUlder tenancy by the entireties, and now the Plainti!T is

attempting to deprive all shareholders of Fidelity, REF, and S&A of their rights, as well as takeover

all assets of the entities in which the Schneider's own interests, despite their holding such as tenants
by the entireties, and without alleging sutlicient facts either "alter ego" or specific fraudulent

transfers•.

If anyone should be enjoined, it should be First American Bank as they are cooti nuously

harassing S. Schneider with their unlawfu l collections premised upon a judgment which has been

reversed, and now they are attempting to do the same with the Axels, independent stockholders

and managers of S&A Capital.

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Failur e to State A Cause Of Action for Avoidance and Recovery of Fraudulent Transfers in
Count V. VI. and Vil

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Counts V, VI, and VII of the Plaintiff's Complaint are all premised upon Both real and

pcrsoo property are oonnally "subject to levy aod sale under execution to satisfy a judgme,11." §

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56.06 1, Fla. Stat. (2019). However, it is well-established that "when property is held as a tenancy
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by the entireties. only the creditors of both the husband and wife, jointly, may attach the tenancy
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by the entireties property; the property is not divisible on behalf of one spouse alone, and therefore
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it cannot be reached to sat isfy the obligation of only one spouse." Will iams v. M & R Constr. of
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N. Fla., Inc., 305 So. 3d 353, 354 (Fla. I " DCA 2020) (citing therein, Beal Bank , SSB v. Almand

& Assocs., 780 So. 2d 45, 53 (Fla. 200 I)].

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To understand the key legal issues in this case, we start with an overview of the
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different fonns oflegal ownership of property in the State of Florida. Property held as a tenancy by
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the entireties possesses six characterist ics: (I) unity of possession Uoint ownership and control) ;
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(2) unity of interest (the interests in the account must be identical); (3) unity of title (the interests

must have originated in the same instnrment); (4) unity of time (the interests must have

commenced simultaneously);6 (5) survivorship; aad (6) unity of marriage (the parties must be

'Despite the Plaintifrs having seized multiple vehicles titled solely in S. Schneider's name, subpoenaing a wide range
of the Schneider's companies and personal bank accounts.
married at the time the property became titled in their joint names). Beal Bank. SSB v. Almand &

Assocs., 780 So. 2d 45, 52 (Fla. 2001) [citing therein. First Nat'/ Bank v. Hector Supply Co., 254

So.2d 777,781 (Fla.1971),S itomer v. Orl an. 660 So.2d till , 1113 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995);see

also In re Estate of L)'..Q!lli. 90 So.2d 39, 4 1 (Fla. 1955) (citing Andrews v. Andrews. 155 Fla. 654,

2 1 So.2d 205,206 (1945)).]

Here, S. Schneider is a shareholder as tenants by the entirety in every entity that L.

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Schneider has an interest in. The assets of Fidelity are protected under tenancy by the entireties,

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wbich the Plaintiff bas been fully aware of si nce 2006. First American has engaged in vexat ious

litigatio n against S. Schneider attempting to create in personam liability against S. Schneider,

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where she was never liable for such where she only signed the Plaintiffs Mortgage to perfect it's
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security interest against her Husband, Mr. L. Schneider, the only borrower under the Plaintiffs
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Note [D.E. 2] and as conceded by Plaintiffs Counsel at Summary Judgment [D.E. 259] , and
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seeking to recover against S. Schneider's assets, such as her vehicles, to sati sfy the Plaintiffs

Judgment solely against L. Schneider. All that First American Bank has alleged within Counts V,
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VI, and VII is that S. Schneider has received distributions from Fidelity , but they wholly fai l to

demonstrate that such are fraudulent or otherwise subject to recovery in proceedings

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supplementary.
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J3ook\vorld T rade. Inc. v. Daughters of St. Paul. Inc.. 532 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1360--61 (M.D.
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Fla. 2007), further provides:

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"The mere fact that o ne or two individuals own and control the stock structure of a

corporation does not lead inevitably to the conclusion that the corporate entity is a

fraud or that it is necessari ly the alter ego of its stockholders ...." Advertects. Inc. v.

Sa"yer Indus., inc.. 84 So.2d 21 , 23- 24 (F la. 1955); see also Johnson Enters. of
 Jacksonville. Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 162 F.3d 1290, 1319- 20 (11th Cir. 1998)

(evidence that parent company provided wholly-owned subsidiary with funding

was not wrongful); Ally v. Naim, 581 So.2d 961, 963 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (fact that

corporatio n compensates sole shareholder does not, by itself, allow piercing of the

corporate veil).

And, "even if a corporation is merely an alter ego of its dominant shareholder or

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shareholders, the corporate veil cannot be pierced so long as the corporation's separate identity

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was lawfully maintained." Lipsig v. Ram lawi, 760 So. 2d 170, 187 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).

Here, First American has failed to properly allege/plead that Fidelity is an alter ego of L.

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Schneider. First American has ultimately contradicted itself in every allegation througho ut the
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Third-Party Complaint while attempting to allege that Fidel ity is an alter ego ofL. Schneider. First
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American has admitted throughout its Third-Party Complaint that it is aware that Fidelity has
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additional shareholders and parties tbat maintain interest in the entities other than just L. Schneider.

First American has further adm itted that the entities have shareholders that are not just an '·alter
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ego". Therefore, First American is not entitled to relief sought in Counts V, VI, and VII based on

their failure to be a valid creditor of Fidelity due to its ownership extending beyond its L.
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Schneider, and the Plaintiff's knowledge of such dating back to 2006.

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To survive a moti on to dismiss, plaintiffs must do more tbao merely state legal conclusions;
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they are required to allege some specific factual bases for those conclusions or face dismissal of
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their claims. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecommunications, 372 F.3d 1250, 1263 (I Ith Cir. 2004).

The allegations w ithin Count V, VI, and VII are nothing more than conclusions where First

American alleges that "Fidelity is an alter ego of L. Schneider," without any of the required factual

specificity to support the such otber than the alleged ''information and belief." See Braswell, 989
So. 2d at 39; Dania Jai-Alai Palace, 450 So.2d at 1121; thus, providing that First American has

failed to state a cause of action in Counts V, VI, and VII.

Failure to Stnte A Cause Of Action for Civil Conspiracy in Count VITT

Both real and person property are nonnally "subject to levy and sale under execution to

sat isfy a j udgment." § 56.06 1, Fla. Stat. (2019). However, it is well-established that "when

property is held as a tenancy by the entireties, only the creditors of both the husband and

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wife,joint/y, may attach the tenancy by the entireties property; the property is not divisible on

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behalf of one spouse alooe, and therefore it cannot be reached to satisfy the obligation of on ly o ne

spouse." W illiams v. M & R Constr. of N. Fla .• Inc .. 305 So. 3d 353, 354 (Fla. I., DCA 2020)

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[citing therein, Beal Bank, SSB v. Almand & Assocs., 780 So. 2d 45, 53 (Fla. 200 I)].
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To understand the key legal issues in this case, we start w ith an overview of the
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different forms of legal ownership of property in the State of Florida. Property held as a tenancy by
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the entireti es possesses six characteristi cs: (I) unity of possession Uoint ownership and control);

(2) unity of interest (the interests in the account must be identical); (3) unity of title (the interests
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must have originated in the same instnunent); (4) Llllity of time (the interests must have

commenced simultaneously) ;6 (5) survivorship; and (6) unity of marriage (the parties must be
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married at the time the property became titled in their joint names). Beal Bank. SSB v. Almand &
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Assocs., 780 So. 2d 45, 52 (Fla. 2001) [citing therein. First Nat'/ /Jank v. Hector Supplv Co .. 254
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So.2d 777, 781 (Fla. 1971). S itomer v. Orlan, 660 So.2d I II I, 1113 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); see
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also In re Estate of Lyons 90 So.2d 39, 4 1 (Fla. 1955) (citing Andrews v. Andrews. 155 Fla. 654,

2 1 So.2d 205,206 (1945)).]

Here, S. Schneider is a shareholder by nature of their tenants by the entirety ownership, in

all the entities thatL. Schneider has an interest in. T he assets of Fidelity are protected under
tenancy by the entireties, which the Plaintiff is fully aware of. Additionally, First American has

not been provided the opportunity to reverse pierce the corporate vei l to recover funds transferred

from Fidelity. First American has engaged in vexatious litigation agai nst S. Schneider to attempt

to convert S. Schneider's assets to cover the Judgment against L. Schneider. All that First

American Bank has alleged wi thin COLmts VIII is that S. Schneider has received distributions from

Fidelity that she is entitled to.

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The elements of a civil conspiracy are: (a) a conspiracy between two or more parties, (b)

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to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by unlawful means, (c) the doing of some overt act in

pursuance of the conspiracy, and (d) damage to plai nti ff as a result of the acts performed pursuant

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to the conspiracy. Walters v. Blankenship. 931 So. 2d 137, 140 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) [citing therein
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Florida Fem Growers Ass'n. Inc. v. Concerned Citizens of Putnam County. 6 16 So.2d 562 (Fla.
IF
5th DCA 1993)].
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Here, First American has only proved that tbe Schneiders bave conspired to provide S.

Schneider with a distribution as a shareholder of Fidel ity.

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Failure to State A Cause Of Action for Aiding and Abetting Fraudulent Transfer in
Co unt X
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Both real and person property are normally "subject to levy and sale under execution to

satisfy a j udgment." § 56.06 1, Fla. Stat. (2019). However, it is well-establ ished that "when

property is held as a tenancy by the entireties, only the creditors of both the husband and

wi fe, joint/y, may attach the tenancy by the entireties property; the property is not divisible on

behalf of one spouse alone, and therefore it cannot be reached to satisfy the obligation of only one
spouse." Williams v. M & R Constr. of N . Fla., Inc., 305 So. 3d 353, 354 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020)

[citing therein, Beal Bank. SSB v. A lmand & Assocs., 780 So. 2d 45, 53 (Fla. 2001)).

To understand the key legal issues in this case, we start w ith an overview of the

different forms of legal ownership of property in the State of Florida. Prope11y held as a tenancy by

the entireties possesses six characterist ics: (1) uni ty of possession (joi nt ownership and control);

(2) unity of interest (the interests in the account must be identical); (3) unity of title (the interests

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must have originated in the same instrument); (4) unity of time (the ulterests must have

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commenced simu ltaneously);6 (5) survivorship; and (6) unity of marriage (the pa11ies must be

married at the ti me the property became titled in their joint names). Beal Bank. SSB v. Almand &

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Assocs., 780 So. 2d 45, 52 (Fla. 200 1) [citing therein First Nat'/ Bank v. Hector Supply Co. 254
IE
So.2d 777,781 (Fla.1971), S itomer v. Orlan. 660 So.2d 1111, 1113 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995);see
IF
also In re Estate of Lyons. 90 So.2d 39, 4 1 (Fla. 1955) (citing Andrews v. Andrews. 155 Fla. 654,
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2 1 So.2d 205, 206 (1945)).)

Here, S. Schneider by nature of their tenants by the entirety ownership, in all their entities
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is a shareholder that L. Schneider has an interest in. The assets of Fidelity are protected under

tenancy by the entireties, which the Plaintiff is fully aware of. Add itionally, First American has
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engaged in vexatious litigation agai nst S. Schneider to attempt to convert S. Schneider's assets to
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cover tbe Judgment against L. Sclmeider. All that First American Bank has alleged within Count
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X is that S. Schneider has received distributions from Fidel ity that she is entitled to.
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Plaintiff's Failure to Attach the Entire Contract for which this Action is based upon

Plaintiffs claims for fraudulent transfers rely on the so called accounts that they claim to

have uncovered the fraudulent transfers.

 Florida Ru le of Civil Procedure l.130(a) provides that "[a]II bonds, notes, bills of

exchange, contracts, accounts, or documents upon which an action may be brought . .. shall be

incorporated or attached to tire pleading." The point of this rule is to put the defe11da11t on notice

oft/re 11ature and extent o_ft/re Cil/1,~e o_f ilctio11 so that defendant may plead with greater certainty

in response thereto. See Sachse 11. Tampa Music Co.. 262 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972).

Consequently, a complaint based on a written instrnment does 1101 state a Cil11se of action

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until such time as the actual instrument, or an adequate portion of the instrument, is attached to or

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incorporated in the pleadings. See Safeco Insurance Company ofAmerica v. Ware, 401 So. 2d 1129

(Fla. 4th DCA 198 1). Here, Plaintiff fai ls to attach a full and complete copy of the transfers that

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First American claims to be fraudulent. Plaintiff on ly attached cutouts of the transfers in which
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they intend to claim are fraudulent not evidencing the accounts in which they are coming or going
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from. Thus, Plaintiff failed to comply with Fla. R. Civ. Pro. l. 130(a), which in return has limited
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T hird-Party Defendant's notice of the litigation and the extent of the causes of action asserted

against them, and ultimately means the Complaint fai ls to state a cause of action against Third-
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Party Defendants. As such, this COLirt must dismiss Plaintiffs Third-Party Comp laint against Third-

Party Defendants until such time that the relevant documents arc attached.
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WHEREFORE, the Third-Party Defendants LAURENCE SCHNEIDER, STEPHANIE

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SCHNEIDE R, and I sr FIDE LITY LOAN SERVICING, LLC hereby moves this Court to dism iss
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Plaintiff's Thi rd-Party Second Amended Supplemental Compla int for Reverse Pierci ng the
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Corporate Vei l, Permanent Injunctive Rel ief, Avoidance and Recovery of Fraudulent Transfers,

and Other Related Relief w ith Prej11dice, for an award of reasonable attorney' s fees and costs

incurred, and for any other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
 CERTlFl CATE O.F SERVI CE

I CERTIFY that a copy hereof has been furnished on August 12, 2022, via emai l service
to all parties designated to receive Service of Court documents via Florida's eFiling Portal
pertaining to this case, via e-mai l to Meaghan E. Murphy, Esq., Meland Budwick, P.A., 200 South
Biscayne Blvd., Ste. 3200, Miami , FL 33131, mmumhy@melandbudwick.com,
mramos@mclandbudwick.com, and mrbstatc@vahoo.com, and via emai l to John W. Keller, 111,
Esq. , Sioli Alexander Pino, 9155 S. Dadeland Blvd., Ste. 1600, Miami, FL 33 156,
jkcllcr@siol ilaw.com and smcsa@siol ilaw.com.

Respectfully Submitted,

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MCCARTHY & VERSEL, PLLC
Attorneys for the Third-Party Defendants

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4929 SW 74" Ct.
Miami, FL 33 155
Ph.: (305) 407-8006 / Fax.: (866) 676-4671

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By: Isl Martin G. McCarthy
Emre Yersel, Esq., Florida Bar No.: 114485
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Service Email: eyersel@myattorneyservices.com
Martin G. McCarthy, Esq. Florida Bar No.: 149896
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Service Email: mccarthv@myattorneyservices.com
Service Email 2: lawclerk@myattorneyservices.com
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