1. Radaza vs.

FACTS:
Sandiganbaya
n, et. al. In 2006, the Province of Cebu was designated as the venue for the 12th Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit that was to be held on January 9-15, 2007.
Estoppel
vis-à-vis On January 9, 2007, Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), Central Visayas,
criminal KADAMAY, wrote the Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas (Ombudsman-Visayas).
jurisdiction Their letter alleged anomalies in pricing and called for the investigation of the transactions
entered into by the DPWH in connection to the street lighting project.
On March 23, 2007, the Ombudsman-Visayas released a Final Evaluation Report6 (Report)
on the matters raised by the above organizations. It found prima facie evidence of
overpricing resulting from the purported collusion between the winning bidders, the private
contractors, and the City Governments of Mandaue and Lapu-Lapu.
In January 24, 2008, the OMB-Visayas subsequently charged Radaza and others with
violation of Sec 3(g) of RA 3019 through an information approved by OMB Merceditas
Gutierrez.
Radaza filed an MR in the OMB Jan 24, 2008 Resolution raising the main issue as to
whether his mere signature on the Program of Works and Detailed Estimates (POWE)
sufficiently established probable cause against him for violation of Sec 3(g) RA 3019.
Pending resolution of his MR, Radaza filed different motions before the Court, among
others; Manifestation with urgent motion to defer issuance of/recall/hold Warrant of Arrest.
He also filed Omnibus Motion for Judicial Redetermination of Probable Cause, quashal of
information, reinvestigation with prayer for suspension of further proceedings including
arraignment.
On September 23, 2008, RADAZA was conditionally arraigned as one of the pre-requisites
to his Urgent Motion to Travel Abroad which was granted.
Subsequently, OMB-Visayas granted Radaza’s motion for reinvestigation. Later,
OMB-Visayas reiterated its earlier findings and reverted to its original accusations of
violation of Sec 3e of RA 3019. Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information relative
thereto.
Radaza’s moved to quash the amended information which was denied by the
Sandiganbayan holding that the absence or lack of PI is not a ground to quash amended
information relative to Sec 3e of RA 3019 nor does it render defective as to affect
jurisdiction over the same which the graft court has already assumed.
Hence, this Certiorari Petition alleging the amended information filed did not bear the
authority of the new OMB as the authority of OM Gutierrez having become functus officio
when OMB Carpio-Morales was appointed, the Sandiganbayan could not have acquired
jurisdiction over the Amended Information and over his person as accused pursuant
thereto.
ISSUE: WON the Sandiganbayan has acquired jurisdiction over Radaza.
RULING:
The Court did not find for petitioner.
It held that while earlier jurisprudence viewed the lack of authority by the officer filing an
information is jurisdictional, this has already been rendered old and obsolete with the
advent of Gomez vs People. It was held therein that the lack of prior written authority from
the head prosecutor in the filing of an Information does not affect the trial court’s jurisdiction
over the subject matter or the person of the accused.
The Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction over the offenses charged and over the person of
Radaza as an accused. The Court finds that Radaza have already submitted his person as
an accused to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Multiple pleadings, motions and
remedies had been signed, filed and prayed for under his name throughout the proceedings
of this case. He invoked the processes of the Sandiganbayan in moving for a judicial
re-determination of probable cause. He had even applied for bail and was granted
provisional liberty thereon. Settled is the rule that an accused is deemed to have yielded
himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking before it the grant of affirmative reliefs.
Also, the conditional arraignment bargained for by Radaza, as sanctioned by the Revised
Rules of Sandiganbayan cannot be discounted. Furthermore, the fact that Radaza was
arraigned under the original information for violation of Sec 3(e) of RA 3019 when the
Sandiganbayan granted his Urgent Motion for Permit to Travel, he is deemed to have
 acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over his person.
An accused who travels abroad with the provisional conformity of the Sandiganbayan is
considered to have positively invoked and already validated the same judicial power that
permitted his travel outside the Philippines. By principle of estoppel, the accsed’s own
actuations countered and nullified any dispute on the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
over the person of such accused.
He should not be permitted to assail the very authority that indulged in his personal
privileges that ordinarily are unavailable to an accused such as himself.
He had benefited far too much from the positive reliefs that he had sought from and granted
by the Anti- Graft Court. Whether in civil or criminal actions, prayers for affirmative reliefs
constitute waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending
party, by doing so, the latter is then deemed to have voluntarily appeared and submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
PETITION FOR CERTIORI DENIED.

2. Leviste vs. Facts:

Alameda, et. On January 16, 2007, an Information was filed against Jose Antonio Leviste charging him
al with homicide for the death of Rafael de las Alas on January 12, 2007 before the RTC of
Makati. The private complainants-heirs of de las Alas filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion
Amendment praying for the deferment of the proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re-examine
of the evidence on record or to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense. The
Information/ RTC thereafter issued the Order granting the motion by the complainants, thus, allowing
Inquest the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation. Later, the trial court issued the other order that
admitted the Amended Information for murder and directed the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. Petitioner questioned these two orders before the appellate court.

Upon arraignment, the petitioner refused to plead. The trial court entered the
plea of "not guilty" for him. Prior to this, the petitioner filed an Urgent Application for
Admission to Bail Ex Abundanti Cautela, which the trial court granted on the ground that the
evidence of guilt of the crime of murder is not strong. The trial court went on to try the
petitioner under the Amended Information. Then, the trial court found the petitioner guilty of
homicide. From the trial court's decision, the petitioner filed an appeal to the CA. The
appellate court confirmed the decision of the trial court. The petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition to the SC.

Issue: Whether or not the amendment of the Information from homicide to murder is
considered a substantial amendment, which would make it not just a right but a duty of the
prosecution to ask for a preliminary investigation.

Held: Yes. A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense
charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of
form. The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a
defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment
is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to
the information in the one form as in the other.

An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged
therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused
of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not
of substance. here is no substantial distinction between a preliminary investigation and a
reinvestigation since both are conducted in the same manner and for the same objective of
determining whether there exists sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held
for trial.

What is essential is that petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from the charge
of murder after the claimed circumstances were made known to him as early as the first
motion. Petitioner did not, however, make much of the opportunity to present countervailing
evidence on the proposed amended charge. Despite notice of hearing, petitioner opted to
merely observe the proceedings and declined to actively participate, even with extreme
 caution, in the reinvestigation.

3. People vs. FACTS:

Janairo
November 13, 1992, an Information was filed charging appellant with murder. Upon his
Amendment arraignment on November 27, 1992, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter,
favorable to Counsel de Parte Per-fecto de los Reyes filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying for
the accused reinvestigation, insisting that the charge should be changed to homicide. During the pre-trial
on January 11, 1992, the lower court denied this Motion. Subsequently, the assistant city
prosecutor filed a Motion to downgrade the crime charged from murder to homicide. Noting
the conformity of the wife of the deceased, the court a quo issued an Order amending the
Information by crossing out the phrase “with treachery and evident premeditation.”
Arraigned again on April 13, 1993, appellant pleaded “not guilty.” Trial ensued. Thereafter,
the lower court promulgated its assailed Decision, Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

WON the proceedings is valid despite the amendment in the information.

HELD:

Without questioning the amendment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Under Rule 110
of the Rules of Court, however, only formal amendments are allowed after the arraignment
of the accused. “SEC. 14. Amendment. —The information or complaint may be amended,
in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the accused pleads; and
thereafter and during the trial asto all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the
court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused. By
implication, amendments as to substance are precluded after the accused has entered a
plea.
The amendment made here was undoubtedly a matter of substance, for the nature of the
crime was altered from murder to homicide. Nonetheless, the Court sustains the validity of
the proceedings. Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, does not bar substantial
amendments that are beneficial to the accused. Consistent with the constitutionally
enshrined rights to be informed of the nature of charges and to be accorded due process,
the rule aims to protect the accused from prejudicial machinations that change the game
midstream. In this case, the amendment benefited the appellant.
The amendment did not prejudice him or deprive him of defenses available before the
amendment. Moreover, appellant not merely consented to the amendment; in fact, he
sought it. Indeed, the defense counsel had filed a Motion for Reinvestigation, praying that
the charge of murder be changed to homicide. “Objection to the amendment of an
information or complaint must be raised at the time the amendment is made otherwise
appellant’s silence would be deemed consent on his part to the amendment.”

4. Ricarze vs. Facts:

CA
Eduardo Ricarze was a collector-messenger of City Service Corporation. He was assigned
Test whether to collect checks payable to Caltex. He then opened a bank account in the name of Dante
amendment Gutierrez, a regular customer of caltex. He did so by forging the signatures of the dorsal
is substantial portions of the stolen check and deposited it in that same bank account. Upon knowledge of
or formal his crimes, he was charged by the officers of Caltex with estafa through falsification of
commercial documents.

In the original infomation filed by the prosecutor, Caltex appeared to be the only offended
party because the prosecutor was not informed that PCI Bank credited certain amount to
Caltex. After the arraignment and enter of plea, PCIBank appeared as the complainant.
Then, Ricarze averred that the information can no longer be amended because he had
already been arraigned under the original information, and that doing so would place him in
double jeopardy.
 PCIBank argued that it had re-credited the amount to Caltex to the extent of the indemnity;
hence, the PCIB had been subrogated to the rights and interests of Caltex as private
complainant.

Issue:
Whether or not the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complainant at such a late
stage of trial is prejudicial to his defense.

Ruling:
No. Section 14, Rule 110 of the revised Criminal Procedure (amendment and substitution)
states that before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the
complaint or information may be made without leave of court. After the entry of a plea, only
a formal amendment may be made but with leave of court and if it does not prejudice the
rights of the accused. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if
the same is beneficial to the accused.
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged
and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The
following have been held to be mere formal amendments:

(1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose
in the event of conviction;

(2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct
from that charged in the original one;

(3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so as to
cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume;

(4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused; and

(5) an amendment that merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the

information and not to introduce new and material facts, and merely states with additional
precision something which is already contained in the original information and which adds
nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged.

The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense

under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made,
and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the
information in the one form as in the other. An amendment to an information which does not
change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or
cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had
each been held to be one of form and not of substance.

Thus, in the case of Ricarze, the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complainant is
not a substantial amendment. The substitution did not alter the basis of the charge in both
informations, nor did it result in any prejudice to the petitioner. The documentary evidence
in the form of the forged checks remained the same, and all such evidence was available to
petitioner well before the trial. Thus, he cannot claim any surprise by virtue of the
substitution.

5. Rofriguez Facts:
vs.
Ponderrada Separate informations for violation of estafa under Article 315 paragraph 2(d), as amended
and People and for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 were filed against petitioner Mary Ann
Rodriguez.
Prosecution
of civil action Thereafter, petitioner through counsel filed in open court before the public respondent an
in BP22 and opposition to the formal entry of appearance of the private prosecutor in the violation of
estafa BP22 case. The RTC held that the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged is deemed instituted, unless the offended party (1) waives the civil action,
 (2) reserves the right to institute it separately, or (3) institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action. Considering that the offended party had paid the corresponding filing fee for
the estafa cases prior to the filing of the BP 22 cases with the MeTC, the RTC court allowed
the appearance of the private prosecutor and intervene in the proceedings upon payment of
the legal fees pursuant to Section 1, Rule 141 of ROC.

Petitioner argues that the civil action arising from BP22 case before the MTC precludes the
institution of the civil action in the estafa case pending before the RTC. Section 1(b), Rule
111 of the ROC provides that the criminal action for violation of BP22 shall be deemed to
include the corresponding civil action and no reservation to file such civil action separately
shall be allowed.

Issue: WON the private prosecutor can be allowed to intervene and participate in the
proceedings of the estafa case for the purpose of prosecuting the attached civil
liability arising from the issuance of the checks involved which is also the subject
matter of the pending BP22 cases

Ruling: Yes.

The SC held that civil action in BP22 case is not a bar to civil action in estafa case. It is true
that each of the overt acts in these instances may give rise to two criminal liabilities - one for
estafa and another for violation of BP22. But every such act of issuing a bouncing check
involves only one civil liability for the offended party, who has sustained only a single injury.
Thus, the possible single civil liability arising from the act of issuing a bouncing check can be
the subject of both civil actions deemed instituted with the estada case and the BP 22
violation prosecution.

In the crimes of both estafa and violation of BP 22, Rule 111 of the ROC expressly allows,
even automatically in the present case, the institution of a civil action without the need of
election of remedies by the offended party.

The SC ruled that it was not the intent of Section 1(b) of Rule 111 to preclude the
prosecution of the civil action that corresponds to the estafa case, should the latter also be
filed.What the said provision prohibits is the reservation to file the corresponding civil action.
The fact that the Rules do not allow the reservation of civil actions in BP22 cases cannot
deprive private complainant of the right to protect her interests in the criminal action for
estafa. Nothing in the current law or rules on BP22 vests the jurisdiction of the corresponding
civil case exclusively in the court tryin the BP22 criminal case.

Private complainant’s intervention in the prosecution of estafa is justified not only for the
prosecution of her interests, but also for the speedy and inexpensive administration of
justice. However, a recovery by the offended party under one remedy necessary bars that
under the other.

6. People vs. DOCTRINE:

Culas Criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the accused, as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon. However, civil liability survives if the same may also
Effects of be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.
death of the FACTS:
accused In a Resolution dated July 18, 2014, the Court adopted the Decision, dated July 25, 2013 of
the Court of Appeals (CA), in finding accused-appellant Porferio Culas y Raga guilty of the
crime of Statutory Rape, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
without eligibility for parole, with amounts of civil indemnity and damages
awarded. However, before an Entry of Judgment could be issued in the instant case, the
Court received a Letter dated September 16, 2014 from the Bureau of Corrections,
informing the Court of accused-appellant's death on February 8,2014.
ISSUE:
Is there a need to reconsider and set aside the said Resolution and enter a new one
dismissing the criminal case against accused-appellant?
 RULING:
Yes. Under prevailing law and jurisprudence, the accused-appellant's death prior to his final
conviction by the Court renders dismissible the criminal case against him. Article 89 (1) of
the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished
by the death of the accused, as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. Corollarily,
the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may
also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict, namely: 1) Law; 2) Contracts;
3) Quasi-contracts; 4) Quasi-delicts(Article 1157 of the Civil Code).Where the civil liability
survives, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate
civil action, which may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of
the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same
is based. Further, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to i
tsextinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the
criminal case. Thus, upon accused-appellant's death pending appeal of his conviction, the
criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the
accused; the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of the civil liability ex delicto is
ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action. However, it is well to clarify
that accused-appellant's civil liability in connection with his acts against the victim may be
based on sources other than delicts; in which case, the victim may file a separate civil
action against the estate of accused-appellant, as may be warranted by law and procedural
rules.

7. Rafael FACTS:
Jose-Consing,
Jr. Vs. People 1. Rafael Jose-Consing, Jr. negotiated with and obtained for himself and his mother,
of the Cecilia de la Cruz various loans totaling ₱18,000,000.00 from Unicapital Inc.
Philippines 2. The loans were secured by a real estate mortgage constituted on a parcel of land
(property) covered by TCT No. T-687599 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province
Prejudicial of Cavite registered under the name of De la Cruz.
question 3. In accordance with its option to purchase the mortgaged property, Unicapital
agreed to purchase one-half of the property for a total consideration of
₱21,221,500.00.
4. Payment was effected by off-setting the amounts due to Unicapital under the
promissory notes of de la Cruz and Consing in the amount of ₱18,000,000.00 and
paying an additional amount of ₱3,145,946.50.
5. The other half of the property was purchased by Plus Builders, Inc., a joint venture
partner of Unicapital.
6. Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop the property, they learned that
the title to the property was really TCT No. 114708 in the names of Po Willie Yu
and Juanito Tan Teng. TCT No. 687599 held by de la Cruz appeared to be
spurious.
7. On its part, Unicapital demanded the return of the total amount of ₱41,377,851.48
as of April 19, 1999 that had been paid to and received by de la Cruz and Consing,
but the latter ignored the demands.
8. On July 22, 1999, Consing filed Civil Case No. 1759 in the Pasig City RTC (Pasig
civil case) for Injunctive Relief, thereby seeking to enjoin Unicapital from
proceeding against him for the collection of the ₱41,377,851.48 on the ground that
he had acted as a mere agent of his mother.
9. In the meanwhile, on October 13, 1999, Plus Builders commenced its own suit for
damages against Consing (Civil Case No. 99-95381) in the RTC in Manila (Manila
civil case).
10. On January 21, 2000, an information for estafa through falsification of public
document was filed against Consing and De la Cruz in the RTC in Imus, Cavite,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 7668-00 and assigned to Branch 21 (Cavite
criminal case).
11. Consing filed a motion to defer the arraignment on the ground of the existence of a
prejudicial question, i.e., the pendency of the Pasig and Manila civil cases.
 ISSUE:

Is there a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the proceedings in

the criminal case?

RULING:

1. None.
2. In the Pasig civil case, the issue is whether or not Consing merely acted as an
agent of his mother. But even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his
mother, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any person
may be held liable for conspiring to falsify public documents. Hence, the
determination of the issue involved in the case for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to
the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa through
falsification of public document.
3. In the Manila civil case, the action was predicated on fraud. It is well settled that a
civil action based on defamation, fraud and physical injuries may be independently
instituted pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not operate as a
prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of a criminal case.

8. San Miguel Petitioner San Miguel Properties (SMP) purchased from BF Homes Inc., represented by
Properties, Atty. Orendain as its duly authorized rehabilitation receiver, 130 residential lots in its
Inc. vs. Sec subdivision in BF Homes Parañaque. However, 20 TCTs (out of 40) were withheld delivery
Perez, et. al by BF Homes since Atty. Orendain had ceased to be its rehabilitation receiver at the time of
the transactions;; BF Homes refused to deliver the TCTs despite demands. Because of this,
Nature and SMP filed a complaint-affidavit in the Office of the Prosecutor (OCP) of Las Pinas charging
rationale of respondent directors and officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of titles in violation of Sec.
prejudicial 25 in relation to Sec. 29 both of PD No. 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’
question Protective Decree). Simultaneously, SMP sued BF Homes for specific performance in the
HLURB praying to compel BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs in its favor.

The OCP dismissed SMP’s criminal complaint for violation of PD No. 957 on the ground,
among others, that there existed a prejudicial question necessitating the suspension of the
criminal action until after the issue on the liability of the distressed BF Homes was first
determined by the SEC en banc or by the HLURB. SMP appealed the resolution of the OCP
to the DOJ, which denied the same. Upon elevation of the case to the CA via Petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus, SMP submitted the issue of whether or not HLURB Case
presented a prejudicial question that called for the suspension of the criminal action for
violation of PD No. 957. CA dismissed SMP’s petition.

Issue: WON the HLURB administrative case brought to compel the delivery of the TCTs
could be a reason to suspend the proceedings on the criminal complaint for the violation of
Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground of a prejudicial question.

Ruling: YES
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in the criminal case, and the cognizance
of which pertains to another tribunal. It is determinative of the criminal case, but the
jurisdiction to try and resolve it is lodged in another court or tribunal. It is based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but is so intimately connected with the crime that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. The rationale behind the principle of
prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions. The essential elements of a
prejudicial question are provided in Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. the action
for specific performance was an action civil in nature but could not be instituted elsewhere
except in the HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the action was exclusive and original.
the action for specific performance in the HLURB would determine whether or not San
 Miguel Properties was legally entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs,
while the criminal action would decide whether or not BF Homes’ directors and officers
were criminally liable for withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the former must
obviously precede that of the latter, for should the HLURB hold San Miguel Properties to be
not entitled to the delivery of the 20 TCTs because Atty. Orendain did not have the authority
to represent BF Homes in the sale due to his receivership having been terminated by the
SEC, the basis for the criminal liability for the violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree
No. 957 would evaporate, thereby negating the need to proceed with the criminal case.

9. FACTS:
Callo-Claridad
vs. Esteban, • The petitioner is the mother of the late Cheasare Armani “Chase” Callo Claridad, whose
et. al lifeless but bloodied body was discovered in the evening of February 27, 2007 between
vehicles parked at the carport of a residential house located at No.10 Cedar Place,
Nature and Ferndale Homes, Quezon City.
role of • Allegedly, Chase had been last seen alive with respondent Philip Ronald P. Esteban
preliminary (Philip) less than an hour before the discovery of his lifeless body.
investigation • Resolution of the Office of City Prosecutor – dismissed the complaint for murder due to
lack of evidence, motive, and circumstantial evidence to charge Philip with homicide, much
less murder
• Resolution of the Secretary of Justice (petition for review) – affirmed the dismissal holding
that the only circumstantial evidence connecting Philip to the crime was the allegation that
at between 7:00 to 7:30 o’clock of the evening in question, Chase had boarded the white
Honda Civic car driven by Philip; that the witnesses’ positive identification of Philip as the
driver of the car was doubtful, however, considering that Philip did not alight from the car,
the windows of which were tinted; and that the rest of the circumstances were pure
suspicions, and did not indicate that Philip had been with Chase at the time of the
commission of the crime • CA (petition for review under Rule 43) – dismissed
• Hence, the petitioner appealed by petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: 1. WON the CA erred in upholding the decision of the Secretary of Justice that
there was no probable cause to charge Philip and Teodoro with murder for the killing of
Chase?

–NO.

The determination of probable cause to file a criminal complaint or information in court is

exclusively within the competence of the Executive Department, through the Secretary of
Justice. The courts cannot interfere in such determination, except upon a clear showing
that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.

Thus, a preliminary investigation, according to Section 1, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, is
“an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty
thereof, and should be held for trial.” The investigation is advisedly called preliminary,
because it is yet to be followed by the trial proper in a court of law. The occasion is not for
the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence but for the presentation only of such
evidence as may engender a well-founded belief that an offense has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty of the offense. The determination of the existence of
probable cause lies within the discretion of the public prosecutor after conducting a
preliminary investigation upon the complaint of an offended party.Probable cause for
purposes of filing a criminal information is defined as such facts as are sufficient to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing
that more likely than not a crime has been committed, and that it was committed by the
accused. Probable cause, although it requires less than evidence justifying a conviction,
demands more than bare suspicion. Admittedly, the petitioner relies solely on circumstantial
evidence, which she insists to be enough to warrant the indictment of respondents for
murder which is insufficient.

Under the circumstances presented, we conclude to be correct the CA’s determination that
no prima facie evidence existed that sufficiently indicated the respondents’ involvement in
the commission of the crime. It is clear that there was: • No eyewitness of the actual killing
of Chase • There was no evidence showing how Chase had been killed, how many persons
had killed him, and who had been the perpetrator or perpetrators of his killing • Nothing that
directly incriminated the respondents in the commission of either homicide or murder.