Ayn Rand and Deducing 'Ought' from 'Is'

Author(s): Lachlan Doughney

Source: The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1 (August 2012), pp. 151-168
Published by: Penn State University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41607997
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Ethics

Ayn Rand and Deducing

'Ought' from 'Is'

Lachtan Doughney

Introduction
This paper argues that Ayn Rand believed 'ought' statements
could be deduced from 'is' statements.

In his book, Л Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume created a

philosophical debate that has lasted more than 250 years. He did so
by arguing:

In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with,

I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some
time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the
being of a God, or makes observations concerning human
affairs; when all of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that
instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not ,
I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an
ought , or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is
however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought
not , expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary
that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time
that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether
inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from
others, which are entirely different from it. (Hume 1969, 521)

The issue Hume elucidates in this passage is generally referred to

as the is-ought gap, question, distinction, dichotomy or problem.
Philosophers such as Alasdair Macintyre (1969, 35-50), W. D.
Hudson (1969b, 73-80), Geoffrey Hunter (1969, 59-63), Anthony
Flew (1969, 64-69), W. D. Falk (1986, 123-Ф2), and R. M. Hare
(1952, 1-197), to name but a few, have given different interpretations

The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 12, no. 1 (Issue 23, August 2012): 151-68.

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152 The journal of Ay n Rand Studies Vol. 12, No. 1 (Issue 23)

of what Hume meant in this passage. Indeed, what Hume actually

meant in this passage is the subject of much debate.
In his 2008 journal of Ayn Rand Studies essay, "Rand on Hume's
Moral Skepticism," Tibor Machan interprets Hume to argue that it is
"futile to try to deduce what one ought and ought not do from what is
or is not the case" (2008, 247). His interpretation of Hume is most
in line with the interpretation given by Hare, who also believed that
Hume argued 'ought' statements could not be deduced solely from 'is'
statements. Machan claims further that Rand did not deduce 'ought'
statements from 'is' statements.
This paper will show both why, and how, Rand argues to bridge
Hare's interpretation of the is-ought gap, using her ethical theory.
This will allow us to conclude, despite Machan's claim to the contrary,
that Rand did believe that she could deduce 'ought' statements from
'is' statements.

1. R. M. Hare's Interpretation of The Is-Ought Gap

Hare's interpretation of Hume's is-ought gap is known as the
"entailment" or "deduction gap" (Witkowski 1975, 234). Hare argues
that Hume's passage is about "the impossibility of deducing an
'ought'-proposition from a series of 'is'-propositions" (Hare 1952, 29).
Hare agrees with Hume, and believes he has a profound philosophical
insight in this passage. Hare discusses the issue at length, and this
paper will try to do justice to his interpretation in a concise manner.
For Hare, 'ought' statements are "imperatives" that are used to
tell "someone to make something the case" (5). Hare holds that 'is'
propositions, in contrast, are "indicative sentences" used to tell
"someone that something is the case" (5). He argues that "nothing
can appear in the conclusion of a valid deductive inference which is
not, from their very meaning, implicit in the conjunction of the
premisses" (32). Therefore, if a conclusion contains an imperative in
any way, then "not only must some imperative appear in the
premisses, but that very imperative must be itself implicit in them"
(32). As such, Hare claims that no argument can contain an 'ought'
in its conclusion, without an 'ought' in its premises.
An example can elucidate Hare's argument. Hare holds that the
move from this pure 'is' premise to this conclusion, which contains an
'ought' proposition, is invalid:

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 Doughney - Ayn Kand and Deducing 'Ought' from Ъ' 153

PI : Changing down gears is the only way to make the engine

run more smoothly.

CI : We ought to change down gears to make the engine run

more smoothly.

To explain why this is the case, Hare argues:

The fact that that [changing down] would enable the engine
to run more smoothly does not entail (i.e. allow us to infer in
virtue solely of its meaning) that we ought to change down.
And the same is true of whatever other factual sentence we
may choose, and for all prescriptive uses of the word
'ought'.1 (154)

For Hare, to make this deduction valid, an underived 'ought' premise

is required. The argument looks as follows when the 'ought' premise
is included:

PI : Changing down gears is the only way to make the engine

run more smoothly.

P2: We ought to make the engine run more smoothly.

CI : We ought to change down gears to make the engine run

more smoothly.

The argument is now valid. There is an 'is' premise about a state

of affairs (that changing gears is the only way to make the engine run
more smoothly), and an 'ought' premise that states a course of action
(that we ought to make the engine run more smoothly). Together
these premises entail what we ought to do in this situation, which is
to change down gears to make the engine run more smoothly.
Hare holds that an aspect of 'ought' propositions has profound
relevance to the perceived consequences of the is-ought gap.2 This is
the non-cognitivist3 belief that underived 'ought' premises, or
imperatives, are expressions of "some non-belief psychological state."4
Hare believes that they are merely expressions of feeling, with no

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154 The Journal of Ay n Rand Studies Vol. 12, No. 1 (Issue 23)

truth value, that either lend or deny support to a course of action.

What this means, for Hare, is that no 'ought' conclusion can be a
"pure statement of fact" (29) given that it has to be supported by an
underived 'ought' premise with no truth value. Furthermore, Hare
argues that "it must be a part of the function of a moral judgment to
prescribe or guide choices, that is to say, to entail an answer to some
question of the form 'What shall I do?'" (29). Essentially, Hare claims
that moral judgments must contain imperatives, they must in some
manner or another tell us what we ought or ought not do. As such,
for Hare, "no moral judgment" that we arrive at as a conclusion in an
argument "can be a pure statement of fact" (29) as, apparently, it must
be derived from an 'ought' statement with no truth value. The
following passage from Hare can explain this non-cognitivist view of
underived 'ought' statements that form a component of our moral
judgments:

We all know how to recogni2e the activity which I have been

calling 'saying, thinking it to be so, that some act is wrong.'
And it is obvious that it is to this activity that the subjectivist
and the objectivist are both alluding. This activity ... is
called by the objectivist 'a moral intuition.' By the
subjectivist it is called ťan attitude of disapproval.' But in so
far as we can identify anything in our experience to which these
two people could be alluding by means of these two
expressions, it is the same thing - namely the experience
which we all have when we think that something is wrong.5
(41)

We have good reason to believe that Rand shares Hare's view that
underived 'ought' statements have no truth value.6 In The Virtue of
Selfishness , she claims that an underived 'ought' statement is an
"arbitrary human invention, unrelated to, underived from, and
unsupported by any facts of reality" (Rand 1964, 2). This claim can
be interpreted in two ways. First, one can see this as a claim that any
underived 'ought' statement is false. Second, one can interpret this as
a claim that underived 'ought' statements have no truth value. What
supports the latter interpretation is Ranďs endorsement (in Bins-
wanger 1988, ix) of her disciple Leonard Peikoffs doctrine of

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 Doughney - Луп Rand and Deducing 'Ought' from Ъ' 155

arbitrary assertions. One of Peikoffs claims about arbitrary

assertions, which include underived 'ought' statements, is that they are
"not to be regarded as true or false" (30).7 Given this, in what
follows, we will attribute to Rand the position that underived 'ought'
statements have no truth value.
Along with Rand's position on the truth value of underived
'ought' statements, she makes an explicit claim that is in opposition to
Hare's position, as it has been outlined here. Rand holds that no
underived 'ought' premise needs to be included in an argument for an
'ought' conclusion to be deduced from its premises. She believes that
an 'ought' conclusion can be deduced completely from 'is' premises,
and that the is-ought gap can be bridged. For her, a conclusion
generated in this way is derived from, supported by, and related to the
facts of reality. It can be an objective 'ought' conclusion with truth
value. Indeed, Rand argues that she uses this method in her ethical
theory to infuse her normative claims with objectivity.
In the following section of this paper, Rand's theory will be
systematically explained so that the two ways in which she claims to
have deduced an 'ought' conclusion from only 'is' premises may be
meaningfully understood. One of her deductions is not moral, and
one is moral. The deduction that is moral concerns human beings,
and is a deduction of an 'ought' conclusion that contains all the
normative claims of her ethical theory.

Rand's Normative Theory

Rand begins her theory by attempting to give an explanation for
what "gets the entire normative enterprise - both theories of
goodness and theories of right - off the ground" (Den Uyl and
Rasmussen 1984c, 63). She holds that to give a basis for why people
consider things good or bad, right or wrong, one must give an
account of the concept of value. Throughout history, the concept of
value has been used to explain (amongst other things) the reason for
an action, what action to take over others, and which actions are
morally correct or not. As such, Rand asks "what are values? [and]
why does man need them?" (1964, 5). Rand then defines value as
"that which one acts to gain and/or keep" (5). She has thus defined
'value' as the "object of an action, an end or goal" (Den Uyl and
Rasmussen 1984c, 64), which something or some one acts to "gain

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156 The Journal of Ay n Rand Studies Vol. 12, No. 1 (Issue 23)

and/or keep" (Rand 1964, 5) or, in other words, to achieve and

maintain. As a result, the notion of valuation can be considered as
"the process of acting for an end" (Den Uyl and Rasmussen 1984c,
64).
Rand argues that the things capable of valuation (end-oriented
action) and possessing values (ends attainable through action) are
living things. Rand asserts this when she says that "only a living entity
can have goals or can originate them. And it is only a living organism
that has the capacity for self-generated, goal-directed action" (Rand
1964, 6). While the concept of value may seem to apply to living
things that consciously act towards some end, this is not necessarily
the case. Rand believes that the "process of acting for an end" can be
either "purposive or non-purposive" (Den Uyl and Rasmussen 1984c,
64). As David Lowenthal (1978) notes, the activities of many living
things "involve striving for something needed, in the main
unconsciously" (97). For example a tree, through its inbuilt process
of photosynthesis, unconsciously acts toward sustaining its own life.8
Rand argues that, as only living things are capable of valuation and
possessing values, there cannot be values without lives.9 As such, it
is reasonable to attribute to her the view that all values are values for
someone or something. Taking this into account, her core argument
can be characterized as follows:10

Definition (D). V is a value for X iff X acts to achieve/

maintain V as an end. - Analytic 'is'.

Premise (P). X acts to achieve/maintain an end only if X is

alive. - Empirical ťis'

Conclusion (Ç). There are values only if there are lives. -

Empirical ťis'

Rand is an Aristotelian (Den Uyl and Rasmussen 1984b, 3). As

such, she holds that there must be an ultimate value toward which all
goal-oriented action aims. This Aristotelian notion that there is
something "for the sake of which everything else is done" (Wheeler
1984, 83) is indeed central to her theory. Rand believes that for any
normative theory to be "meaningful, to make sense, there must be an

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 Doughney - Луп Rand and Deducing 'Oughťfnom Ъ' 157

ultimate end" (Rasmussen 1980, 70). Her argument is thus strongly

teleological. She cannot accept the notion that values are "an arbitrary
human invention, unrelated to, underived from and unsupported by
any facts of reality" (Rand 1964, 2); this, for her, would take away any
meaning that values and ethics in general possess. She believes that
the only acceptable way to establish a connection between 'Values and
the facts of reality" (7) is to postulate an ultimate value stated as a fact,
as an 'is' statement about die world. For her, this gives an absolute,
objective basis upon which her normative claims are justified. She
argues for an ultimate value in the following passage:

Without an ultimate goal or end, there can be no lesser goals

or means: a series of means going off into an infinite
progression toward a nonexistent end is a metaphysical and
epistemological impossibility. It is only an ultimate goal, an
end in itself, that makes the existence of values possible. (7)

Essentially, Rand believes that we need an ultimate value, which is at

the same time a fact about the world, an 'is', that explains the entire
normative enterprise in order to arrive at any justifiable 'ought'
conclusion with truth value. This is why Rand attempts to deduce
'ought' conclusions completely from 'is' premises, as she believes that
this gives all her normative claims objective, factual status.
To describe what the ultimate value is Rand identifies, in her
opinion, the only objective alternative between success and failure in
ends of all living things. She argues that this is the "fundamental
alternative between life and death" (Blair 1985, 94). The physical
functions of all living things, such as "nutritive function in the single
cell of an amoeba to the blood circulation in the body of man" (Rand
1964, 6) automatically aim at preserving life and not death. As such,
Rand claims that the ultimate value, that thing "for the sake of which
everything else is done" (Wheeler 1984, 83), that which is to be
achieved or maintained as an end, "for any given entity is its own life"
(Rand 1964, 7). Rand further holds that any known living creature,
except for a human being, has "an automatic code of values" and
"cannot decide to choose the evil and act as its own destroyer"
(10-1 1). Such creatures, she claims, seek to succeed in achieving and
maintaining their lives as their ultimate end, in the face of the

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158 The Journal ofAyn Rand Studies Vol. 12, No. 1 (Issue 23)

alternative of failing in this end, death.11 She holds that the same
value applies to human beings too, but that a human can "act as its
own destroyer" and may choose "evil" (11) values that do not have
life as their end. This will be discussed later. For now, it suffices to
apply her argument to those creatures that automatically value their
lives - simple living things.
The following is the deductive argument for life as the ultimate
value of simple living things. The value is given as a descriptive fact,
as an 'is' statement about the world:12

D. V is a value for X iff X acts to achieve/maintain V as an

end. - Analytic 'is'.

P. Any simple living thing acts to achieve/maintain its own

life as an end. - Empirical 'is'

C. Any simple living thing's life is a value for itself. -

Evaluative 'is'.

After postulating life as the ultimate value for all living creatures,
Rand claims that this ultimate value allows her to bridge the is-ought
gap. She says:

Let me stress that the fact that living entities exist and
function necessitates the existence of values and of an

ultimate value which for any given living entity is its own life.
Thus the validation of value judgments is to be achieved by
reference to the facts of reality. The fact that a living entity
is, determines what it ought to do. So much for the issue of
the relation between 'ЧГ and "oughf' (7-8)

This is in need of some explanation. Rand argues that the actions

that allow all creatures to succeed in their ultimate value, the
achievement and maintenance of their own life, is determined by what
kind of creature they are. For example, sustenance is a crucial
component of any creature's continued survival, and different
creatures use different methods to feed themselves. Indeed, she
believes that where "a plant can obtain its food from the soil in which

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 Doughney - Луп Rand and Deducing * Oughť from Ъ} 159

it grows," a lion 'Ъяб to hunt for it" and "man has to produce it" (9).
Rand argues that those actions that are successful for specific
creatures in preserving their lives, given the kind of creature they are,
are the actions they ought to take. This is because part of what it is
to hold the achievement and maintenance of a something as an end
(to hold it as a value), is to prefer success over failure in this end, or
else one would not act for this end.
An example can explain this concept. Actions that are suitable to
preserving lions' lives are the actions that they ought to take because
such actions allow them to succeed in achieving and maintaining their
own lives. This is their ultimate value, and implicit in holding it is to
prefer values that achieve it. Conversely, actions that are not suitable
to preserving lions' lives are the actions that they ought not to take
because such actions do not allow them to succeed in achieving and
maintaining their own lives. This is their ultimate value, and implicit
in holding it is to avoid actions that do not achieve it. Whether lions
believe, or are capable of understanding, which actions are better or
worse for the maintenance of their lives is irrelevant. It is a fact that
certain courses of action are better than others for maintaining the life
of a lion, such as the act of stalking prey. lions that can stalk prey
will be able to better maintain their lives than lions that cannot, as
stalking prey is crucial to the survival of a lion.
Rand's deductive move from ťis' to 'oughť, as it applies to non-
human living things, can be characterked as follows:

Diagram 1

/ D1
' /pi' K1
K1 MYMY/гпЛ v 's a value f01 >: fí acts t0 v as an end ~ An3b'tK: 'is'
PI. Any simple h ing thing actsto achiev e/ mantain its о ли life as an end - Empirical is.'
^ P2. ä isa simple toingthing - Empirical is'.

/по' D¿. If v is a value for X then к ought to act in vva/s that '«vil achieve/mailt an v as an end - Analytic
íUZj (РЗ) I ) is'ímattei of debatei
'
N. P4. If X actsin л ary s С then > л ill achieve, mantain >: asan end. - Empirical is'.

C. >: cMjght art inwa/sC - Action guiding imperative

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160 The Journal of Ay n Rand Studies Vol. 12, No. 1 (Issue 23)

Intuitively, it would appear that D2 is an 'ought' premise - from

the very fact that it contains an 'ought'. If it were truly an 'ought'
premise it would prevent the deduction of an 'ought' conclusion from
'is' premises here. However, it can be argued that D2 is not genuinely
an 'ought' or an 'is' premise.13 It can be understood in the way that
Charles Pigden understands such premises, as a definition that is a
"stipulation of how words should be used" (Pigden 1989, 147). For
Pigden, unlike meaningful 'is' and 'ought' statements, such a definition
"does not state how the world is or should be" but states how "words
are or should be," and is therefore "insubstantial" (147). To validly
deduce an 'ought' conclusion from 'is' premises, Rand must accept
this definition, or one similar to this, and argue that it is
insubstantial.14 Rand's theory as it concerns humans, the next subject
this paper will discuss, also needs to use this definition to try to validly
deduce a moral conclusion concerning human action from only
factual 'is' premises.
Rand derives the kind of ultimate value human beings have from
the kind of creatures we are. Rand believes that, as with all other
creatures, the ultimate value for human beings is our own lives. How-
ever, humans are unlike all other creatures in a crucial way. We are
rational beings but "rationality is a matter of choice" (Rand 1964, 16).
What this means can be better understood by reference to the nature
of the ultimate value that all other non-human animals possess. Rand
explains:

[A]n animal has no choice in the standard of value directing

its actions: its senses provide it with an automatic code of
values, an automatic knowledge of what is good for it or evil,
what benefits or endangers its life. An animal has no power
to extend its knowledge or to evade it. In situations for which
its knowledge is inadequate, it perishes - as, for instance, an
animal that stands paralyzed on the track of a railroad in the
path of a speeding train. But so long as it lives, an animal
acts on its knowledge, with automatic safety and no power of
choice: it cannot suspend its own consciousness - it cannot
choose not to perceive - it cannot evade its own
perceptions - it cannot ignore its own good, it cannot decide
to choose the evil and act as its own destroyer. (10)

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 Doughney - Луп Rand and Deducing 'Oughť from Ъ' 161

According to Rand, all non-human animals automatically act in

life-preserving ways specific to them as creatures. We are different.
As human beings, we have the power to suspend our consciousness.
For example, we can weigh up our own beliefs and desires and choose
whether or not to act on them. As such, we are special creatures who
can, according to Rand, ignore our own good and act in ways that are
not in accordance with our nature. This feature of its application to
humans is what makes Ranďs theory a theory of morality. We may
possess evil values that are unnatural to us as human beings. We need
to choose to act in accordance with what is good and natural to us as
human beings, in order to achieve and maintain our lives.15
Rand's argument is that the awareness of our own consciousness
sets us apart from non-human animals. It makes us creatures with
"no automatic code of survival ... no automatic course of action, no
automatic set of values" (11). However, she also believes that our
consciousness possesses a tool through which we can "discover the
answers" to what kinds of action and what values are good for us as
human beings (11). Within our consciousness, we have a faculty that
allows us to understand objective facts about human nature. It is our
ability to reason. Reason, to Rand, allows us to understand the facts
of nature and realize that we ought to behave in certain ways specific
to us as human beings. Indeed, she notes that the values appropriate
to our nature that allow us to achieve and maintain our lives, our
ultimate value, are not automatically possessed by us. Rather, they
must be "desired, and furthermore justified or approved by the
reason" (Blair 1985, 93) before we can understand their objective
connection with our ultimate end and act upon them. The way we
discover what we ought to do as human beings, then, is through using
our reason and consciously engaging in ethical conduct to realize our
ultimate good. Consequently, for every human, "ethics is an objective,
metaphysical necessity" of "survival" (Rand 1964, 16). It is something we
must engage in to preserve our lives. However, not just any ethical
system or any set of values will be capable of fulfilling this function.
Tara Smith (2006) notes that, for Rand:

What is good for a person - what is in his interest - is not

simply a subjective projection of that person's beliefs,
attitudes, tastes, or desires, for those are not adequate guides

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162 The Journal of Ay n Rand Studies Vol. 12, No. 1 (Issue 23)

to meeting his life's requirements. (25)

Rand claims that for humans to act in accordance with their

nature they must choose those "actions, values and goals by the
standard of that which is proper to man - in order to achieve, main-
tain, fulfill and enjoy that ultimate value, that end in itself, which is his
own life" (Rand 1964, 19). As Hartford (2007) explains, acting
rationally, for Rand, denotes "the choice to use objectivity" (301) or
to hold as a fact that one's life is the ultimate value and to act
accordingly. It is irrational not to hold this ultimate value as a fact
and, consequently, it is irrational to act through some other
motivation. She believes that to do so "contradicts the facts of
reality" and that a man who would do so "disintegrates his
consciousness"(Rand 1964, 24) and degenerates into subhuman
behavior, perhaps even leading to his untimely death.
The logical structure of Rand's deductive argument regarding
human beings is nearly identical to that applying to simple living
things. It is as follows:

D. V is a value for X iff X acts to achieve/maintain V as an

end. - Analytic cis'.

P. Any rational being acts to achieve/ maintain its own life as

an end. - Analytic 'is'.

С. Any rational being's life is a value for itself. - Evaluative

'is'.

The difference here is that rational beings are those who act
rationally and do indeed hold their life as the ultimate value. This may
not apply to all human beings.
Rand argues that her system of "rational ethics will tell" humans
"what principles of action are required to implement" our "choice" if
we choose to live and hold our own life as our ultimate value (Rand
1982, 99). As will be seen, she thinks that her own system of values,
when acted upon in a principled way, can provide an absolute guide
to holding one's own life as one's ultimate value. Indeed, she believes
that this is the only system that can allow us to value the achievement

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 Doughney - Луп 'Rand and Deducing ' Oughť from Ъ' 163

and maintenance of our lives successfully in a way that is specific to

us as creatures. Her ethical system is characterized as rational
selfishness. This system is selfish because it demands people aim at
the ultimate value that is the achievement and maintenance of their

own life. One should never make any sacrifice of this value for the
sake of others (Rand 1988, 4). Human life as the ultimate value is
called "man's survival qua man" (Rand 1964, 18).
Rand's description of the ultimate value when applied to human
beings is as follows:

"Man's survival qua man" means the terms, methods,

conditions and goals required for the survival of a rational
being through the whole of his lifespan - in all those aspects
of existence which are open to his choice. (1 8)

The basic values that Rand believes are "required for the survival
of a rational being through the whole of his lifespan" (18) are "Rea-
son, Purpose, [and] Self-Esteem" (19-20). The basic virtues that one
must exhibit to act in accordance with these values are "Rationality,
Productiveness, [and] Pride" (20). Consequendy, if one acts in
accordance with these basic values by exhibiting their corresponding
virtues, one will do what one naturally ought to do as a rational being.
Holding "man's survival qua man" as the ultimate value requires
acting in accordance with the basic values and virtues of Rand's
theory. She thinks they are a "metaphysical necessity" of our survival
(16). As an Objecdvist, Rand argues that her value system is an
objectively identifiable component of her ultimate value. These values
serve as the only possible means by which a rational man can aim at
his end of survival. They are direcdy entailed by the ultimate value.
They are and always will be a necessary requirement of acting towards
"man's survival qua man." Peikoff (1991) elaborates on Rand's
argument:

/ Relationships are not the enemy of absolutism; they are what make it
possible. We prove a conclusion on the basis of facts logically
related to it and then integrate it into the sum of our
knowledge. That process is what enables us to say:
everything points to this conclusion; the total context

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164 The Journal of Ay n Rand Studies Vol. 12, No. 1 (Issue 23)

demands it, within these conditions, it is unshakable. (175)

If one holds "man's survival qua man" as one's ultimate value,

"the total context" of what this value entails is that one must hold all

the basic values and virtues of Rand's theory. This is an "unshakable"

aspect of this ultimate value. Indeed, Rand notes, through her Atlas
Shrugged protagonist, John Gait, that "to live, man must hold three
things as the supreme and ruling values of his life: Reason - Purpose
- Self-Esteem. . . . These three values imply and require all of man's
virtues . . ." (Rand [1957] 1992, 1018). Her basic values and virtues
are all direcdy entailed by holding life as the ultimate value. This
analysis of Rand's theory, as it applies to humans, provides the basis
for an argument about how she is able to deduce an 'ought'
conclusion from only 'is' premises. Her attempted deduction from 'is'
to 'ought' is as follows:

Diagram 2
/ ' /¡СГ' /rn' Dl. VisavalueforXiff Xactstoadiieve/maintain Vasanend - Ana^ticis'.
/01} j/1) Irl) PI Any rational being acts to achieve/ maintain its own life as an end - Analytic ' is'.
^ P2- x is a raöonal bein& " Empirical 'tf.

' D2. If v is a value for X then X. oughtto act in ways that wül achieve; maintain V as an end

{ D2 ] (^) { ^ / -Ana|Vtic is'lmatter of debated

'
' У P4. X actsin л a/ sth a .vil achieve/ maintain X asan end iff X actsin accordance with value

' у/ system R. -Empirical is'.

0' V
V j С. X oughtto act in accordance with value system R. - Action guiding imperative

Value system R is, of course, "the supreme and ruling values" of

Rand's system said to be necessary to hold one's life as a value -
Reason, Purpose, and Self-Esteem, which "imply and require all of
man's virtues" (1018). They are all encapsulated in the 'ought'
conclusion of this deduction and provide a necessary guide to action
under all circumstances.

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 Doughney - Луп Rand and Deducing 'Ought' from Ъ' 165

Conclusion
In this paper, Ranďs normative theory has been analyzed in order
to show how she attempts to deduce a fundamental 'ought'
conclusion from only 'is' premises. This conclusion supports all the
normative moral claims of her theory that apply to human beings.
Tibor Machan has argued in this journal that Rand misinterpreted
Hume, and did not attempt to "to deduce what one ought and ought
not do from what is or is not the case" (Machan 2008, 247). Whether
she misinterpreted Hume or not (as Machan may have), Rand did
attempt to Ci deduce what one ought and ought not do from what is or
is not the case." Rand attempted to provide a universally objective
"unshakable" normative moral claim - that we ought to act in
accordance with her value and virtue system - a claim is deduced
from concepts with "closed, final definitions" (247). Whether or not
her deduction is correct, and whether or not her premises are true, is
a matter for another paper.
What has been provided in this paper is a clear interpretation of
Rand's theory that shows how she attempted to do what Machan
claims she did not.

Acknowledgments
Thanks to Norva Y. S. Lo who, as my philosophy honors supervisor, was
integral to the development of the ideas I have expressed in this paper.

Notes
1 . Not all statements that contain the word 'ought' are considered to be
genuine 'ought' statements by Hare. He holds that any 'ought' statement that is gen-
uine is an 'action-guiding' statement, which demands that we, or others, ought, or
ought not, perform a certain action. There are ought statements that have no
'action-guiding' content. 'There ought to be a solar eclipse at 4pm' is an example.
Hare does not consider such statements to be genuine 'ought' statements.
2. The is-ought gap and its consequences are discussed from Hare's perspective
when he made his interpretation of it. I present his views at that time, and do not
incorporate changes to his philosophy since then.
3. Ayer (1936, 102-14) gives the first and most influential formulation of the
non-cognitivist idea that things like 'ought' statements have no truth value, and he
clearly influenced Hare.
4. Horgan and Timmons (2006, 7 5n) state this to describe the position of Hare
and other non-cognitivists.
5. In this passage, Hare does not refer to all subjectivists when he describes
their views. Parfit (2006, 327n) points out that "by 'subjectivists' Hare means non-

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166 The Journal of Ay n Rand Studies Vol. 12, No. 1 (Issue 23)

cognitivists, not those cognitivists who believe that normative claims are factual
statements about our own attitudes."
6. It must be noted that Machan does not believe this is the case. I agree with
him. For an insightful explanation as to why underived 'ought' statements can be
considered to have truth value, see Machan 2004, 81.
7. It is a matter of controversy as to whether Rand developed the notion of
arbitrary assertions. As such, not all of the claims in this doctrine will be attributed
to her here. For anin-depth discussion and critique of Peikoff s doctrine of arbitrary
assertions, see Campbell 2008.
8. The entities that come under this concept may or may not include some
Robots and Machines. Much of this depends on whether a Robot is capable of self-
generated end-oriented action. It may be that some Robots, with adaptive tech-
nologies that now exist, are capable of valuation. This is possible given that some of
their actions are self-generated. This point may cause юте difficulty to Randian
theorists. However, while worthy of discussion, the point is unimportant to the
arguments made in this paper.
9. As Rand (1964, 7) notes: "Epistemologically, the concept of Value' is
genetically dependent upon and derived from the antecedent concept of 'life'. To
speak of 'value' as apart from 'life' is worse than a contradiction in terms. It is only
the concept of 'Life' that makes the concept of 'Value' possible."
1 0. Rand (1 990) explicitly endorsed the correspondence theory of truth and also
rejected the use of analytic statements. This would render the attribution of analytic
statements to her to characterize the steps of her argument, as has been done in this
paper, invalid. However, as seen in Seddon 2006 (see especially 44-45), Rand
implicitly used a variety of notions of truth to develop her epistemology, in a way that
recognizes the existence of analytic statements. Given this development, to
characterize her argument, we will use analytic statements, so that her argument may
proceed as we find it in The Virtue of Selfishness.
11. Rand's claim about animals may not be correct. Indeed, there are empirical
data that may go against this idea from sources more than 1 00 years old. The second
volume of Herbert Spencer's The Principles of Tithics contains information that could
discountthis notion. Spencer (1 978, appendix D) receives a letter from an individual
who has (most cruelly) tested the behavior of a dog that he owns. It would seem that
this dog did not act in naturally life preserving ways. The passage is as follows:

Consider the "sense of duty" or "ought" in another of my teachers - the

dog Punch. I have given details before but briefly. He wills not to injure
any living thing, nor anything that shows by its shape that work has been
expended upon it. The most striking instance is that I have repeatedly
purposely caused him severe and long continued pain by pressing upon
and even cutting the subcutaneous loops of the nerves without ever being
able to induce him to bite me or even snap at me. In the same way, when
bitten by dogs, often severely, he will not bite them. There appears to me
to be here a "sense of duty," or of "ought," which is specifically different.

The behavior of this dog led the individual, T. Mann Jones, to conclude that
animals may not act in life preserving ways, and that their behavior may "proceed

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 Dougbney - Ayn Rand and Deducing * Oughť from Ъ' 167

from two very different classes of motives, which I had been accustomed to
distinguish as (A) the Rectal-moral and (B) theseШshorconventional-moral.,, In the
case of the dog, Spencer in reply argues that the behavior of the animal is determined
by conditioning and tries to defend the notion that animals automatically act in life
preserving ways or, as a Randian may argue, that animals automatically act to achieve
and maintain their own lives as an end. This paper is concerned with the deduction
Rand argued for, and not the truth of its premises. The very fact that the revised
introduction to this edition of Spencer's book is written by Tibor Machan provides
good reason to believe that this issue will be discussed.
12. It contains an indicative and no imperative, and is therefore an 'is'
statement under Hare's terminology - despite being evaluative. However, Hare
(1 952, 1 63) would see this statement as useless, and not action-guiding. As he says,
'Value- judgments, if they are action-guiding, must be held to entail imperatives."
13. It can also be argued that it is a meaningful 'ought', given that it provides
the motivation required for an action. This would be a matter for some debate. On
this issue, this paper shall remain silent.
1 4. As discussed in note 1 0, Rand may not have publicly endorsed this premise
if expressed in the way it has been here, given her rejection of analytic statements.
However, this premise is consistent with the claims she makes in The Virtue of
Selfishness , and elsewhere. GiventhatSeddon (2006) shows she implicitly recognized
the existence of analytic statements anyway, it is an implicit part of her argument, and
that for her deduction to be valid she must accept it. Rand may have changed her
mind on this.
1 5. An important point here is that Rand may not be talking explicitly about
biological survival. She may be talking about survival as a rational being, not just as
a biological entity, or both if they are not incompatible. This has already been the
subject of some debate.

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