From Risk to Reward the Strong Negotiation Tactics of The United States to resolve the

Cuban Missile Crisis.

Caleb J Thomas
United States History II: 1865–Present
April 9, 2022
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Without strategic decisions and the help of American and Soviet Union leaders'

negotiations, there would've been a World War Three following the Cuban Missile Crisis. These

essential tactics found understanding and peace between the two countries, with minimal lives

lost. When looking at how the Kennedy Administration handled the Cuban Missile Crisis, it is

necessary to note the efforts of the Excomm group and the diplomacy of the negotiations. We

can view how the United States has used these tactics in future conflicts to avoid war in other

situations. Kennedy Administration, as a result of any meaningful political and military

discussions in the tensions of the Cuban Missile Crisis, reduced the Cold War tension between

the United States and the Soviet Union showed through negations tactics, quarantine of the

island of Cuba, and dismantling of the Jupiter Missiles in Cuba.

In October 1962, a U2 spy plane captured photos of the Soviet Union deploying nuclear

missiles at a base being constructed in Cuba1. This information would be given to President

Kennedy, who he and his administration would have an American response to end the crises.
2
Interestingly enough, this would drag the US, Soviet Union, Cuba, and Turkey into a significant

problem known as the Cuba Missile Crises after the U2 plane took photos of the base set up in

secret. President Kennedy decided to take a slightly risky approach by televising a broadcast on

October 22, 1962, informing Cuba of a quarantine. 3The Quarantined was labeled this because it

would've been an act of war to call it a Blockade.4 Continuous negotiations would start with

1
1. Steven L. Danver, ed., “JFK: Report on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba,” in Defining Documents: The Cold
War (1945–1991), ed. Michael Shally-Jensen, vol. 2, Escalation and Detente (Ipswitch, MA: Salem Press, 2016), 1.

2
2. Danver, “JFK: Soviet Arms Buildup,” 1.

3
3. Danver, “JFK: Soviet Arms Buildup,” 1.

4
4. Michael E. Weaver, “The Relationship between Diplomacy and Military Force: An Example from the Cuban
Missile Crisis,” Diplomatic History 38, no. 1 (January 2014): 18-22,
https://doi-org.ezproxy.snhu.edu/10.1093/dh/dht070.
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Robert Kennedy and Anatoly Dobrynin Chairman Khrushchev would also write two letters to

President Kennedy. The outcome would be an agreement between the Soviet Union and the

United States that if the US wouldn't invade Cuba and secretly take the missiles in Turkey away,

the Soviet Union would take the ballistic missiles out of Cuba. 5 The Cuban missile crisis ended

six days after the televised address for the quarantine. President Kennedy and Khrushchev agreed

to withdraw the missiles from Cuba. This was agreed upon as long as the United States didn't

invade Cuba and pull the missiles from Turkey. 6The promise to withdraw the missiles from

Turkey was a secret that wasn't to be made public. This also would help the polls for President

Kennedy, who is known for keeping his cool during tough times. 7

The Cuban missile crisis trends started with the United States ‘fears of War on the

horizon. The Fear of a possible war between the Soviet Union and America was a common fear

amongst Americans during this time frame. In August of 1949 post World War two, the Soviet

Union detonated its first nuclear weapon8. Once this was known, the American population was

scared of the threat of inhalation at any moment. There was little the government could do to

calm the people, but they tried by creating videos for schools and workplaces to help them

protect themselves in case of a nuclear strike. 9 Another main concern amongst the public was

the red scare. The Red scare was an idea that spies were working for the communist party in the

5
5. Danver, “JFK: Soviet Arms Buildup,” 6.

6
6. Danver, “JFK: Soviet Arms Buildup,” 6.

7
7. Stewart Alsop and Charles Bartlett, “In Time of Crisis,” Saturday Evening Post, December 8, 1962, 6,
http://www.saturdayeveningpost.com/wp-content/uploads/satevepost/1962-12-08-missile-crisis.pdf.

8
8. David J. Trowbridge, A History of the United States: 1865 to Present, 3rd ed. (Asheville, NC: Soomo Learning,
2017; Boston, MA: Flat World Knowledge, 2012), 9.17.

9
9. Trowbridge, A History of the United States, 9.17.
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United States. Robert McCarthy increased the Red Scare. When McCarthy stated he had a list of

over 205 card-carrying communist members in the US., he quickly changed this by saying there

were only 56, and when pressed, found he had no accurate information. He used this as a scare

tactic in the United States for political gain. This was later known as "McCarthyism."10

The actions of the President are what caused the two trends to become of historical

significance. To set the tone for the Cuban missile crisis, it is essential to understand how society

viewed the world around them. McCarthyism is a significant concern that J. Edgar Hoover later

implemented to try and find communists working in the government, movie stars, and more11.

Comply this with the proof that the Soviet Union was able to create nuclear weapons by a

government agent giving information to the Soviet Union atomic physicist. Most people in

America didn't trust their neighbors. Comply this with the fear of global warfare and the

destruction of nuclear weapons at any moment. This fear is counterbalanced by the government

with little to no relief from videos and comic books explaining to men, women, and child about

how to survive a nuclear weapons attack on the US.12

13
The Kennedy Administration reduces the cold War tension during the Cuban Missile

Crisis during a pivotal historical moment. The first way they were able to do this was through

Negotiation tactics. President Kennedy had an important decision after the picture was taken by

the U2 spy plane of the Cuban missile silos being built. His advisors, known as the ExComm,

10
10. Trowbridge, A History of the United States, 9.18.

11
11. Trowbridge, A History of the United States, 9.17.

12
12. Trowbridge, A History of the United States, 9.18.

13
13. Ambassador Dobrynin to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, telegram, October 27, 1962, National Security Archive,
George Washington University, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/moment.htm.
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wanted him to bomb the missile silos before construction was complete.14 Kennedy knew that

this aggression would only lead to an all-out nuclear war. He decided to address the issues at

hand, and in his October 22nd, 1962, nation address, he declared a "quarantine" to surround Cuba.
15
This would give the Soviet Union time to think about precisely what President Kennedy wanted

to do. Delaying for more time would open the lines for communication between the two

powerhouse countries. While the quarantine was in full effect, many attempts to negotiate were

discussed. In the First Letter to President Kennedy from Chairman Khrushchev, he writes that he

sees Kennedy's fear of preserving the peace between our two countries. Khrushchev is laying the

groundwork for his terms of negation. He mentions that Cuba has the right to maintain its

defense against another country just like we do. the Soviet Union is simply helping them defend

themselves if this happens. If the United States are allowed to do this, shouldn't Cuba, he asks?

The real cause for this is that we set up missile silos in many different countries, including

Turkey. He mentions this is on his country’s border, and they didn't stop the United States from

creating the silos. Why would we prevent them?164The Quarantine is still going on, and we are

opening lines of communication to work through this problem without global inhalation.

President Kennedy later concluded that if we removed the missile silos in Turkey and did not

invade Cuba, the Soviet Union would dismantle the missile silos in Cuba. President Kennedy

later concluded that if we removed the missile silos in Turkey and did not invade Cuba, the

Soviet Union would dismantle the missile silos in Cuba. The other tactic created was the lines of

communication that were opened. President Kennedy had many of his advisors on the team name

14
14. Alsop and Bartlett, “In Time of Crisis,” 1.

15
15. Danver, “JFK: Soviet Arms Buildup,” 2-5.

16
17. Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, letter, October 27, 1962, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library
and Museum, https://microsites.jfklibrary.org/cmc/oct27/doc4.html.
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"Excomm" to help him view the situation from many different angles. The team wanted him to

Bomb the missile silos before completion. He would think about this and decide differently. He

would surround himself with many different people to ensure he would come to the proper

conclusion. Later, Robert Kennedy would have negotiations with Anatoly F Dobrynin. Once a

second letter was received by the Excomm team that demanded the removal of the Jupiter

Missiles in Turkey. President Kennedy agreed to the terms of not invading Cuba but secretly also

excepting these terms of removing the missiles in Turkey that his brother delivered to Dobrynin.
In these negotiations, a formal letter was sent to Khrushchev
agreeing not to invade Cuba, known as the non-invasion

pledge. Attorney General was to carry the message to the Ambassadors office of Dobrynin to

decide to take out the Missiles in Turkey and get assurance this would remain quiet to the United

States people and NATO.

One of the powerful tactics utilized by the Excomm team was the Blockade or

"quarantine" of the island to halt further creation of the Missile silos in Cuba. President

Kennedy's quarantine was a compromise with the Excomm team, who were adamant about

bombing the silos in Cuba. This would give the Excomm team more time to work on resolving

the missile issue in Cuba without causing a war. This would have to be labeled a quarantine

because the word blockade is an act of war. However, this was the first step in Kennedy's

strategy of showing force while using the diplomatic approach to the issue of the Cuba

Missiles.17 The fear was these missiles would be operational, and then the United States would

have to use an airstrike to resolve the issue. 18Using an airstrike would lead to an all-out war,

possibly a nuclear war. This is to deter the possibility of war and use the military as a possible

17
20. Weaver, “Diplomacy and Military Force,” 11.

18
21. Weaver, “Diplomacy and Military Force,” 18.
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threat if needed. Even though the blockade was not an agreement to stop the construction of the

missile silos, it was a short answer to slow the production of the productions. Once the blockade

was in place, they had a small window to complete the negotiations because if they held the

blockade without an airstrike, it could create a look of a weak United States. 19If the United

States were to appear weak, it would build more confidence from the Soviet Union to disburse

the blockade and continue the build of the missile silos. Although this was a more diplomatic act

to create lines of communication, there were still tensions on both sides that there could be war.

This was the first step to stop the issue of the missile silos being built and still not creating a new

World war.

The final product of this conflict was ended because of the dismantling of the Jupiter

Missiles in Turkey. It was finally reaching the end of the match known as the Cuban Missile

Crisis. Presidents Kennedy created an environment of negotiations and diplomacy with the threat

of possible military action. Kennedy and Khrushchev knew there would be compromises to close

this ordeal. The main agreeance that was known around the world was the non-invasion pledge.

This was from President Kennedy stating that the United States wouldn't be invading Cuba in the

understanding that the Soviet Union would take down and stop the completion of the missile

silos. This isn't the only deal; however, Khrushchev, a man of larger stasis in Russia, wanted fair

trade to dismantle the Cuba missiles. President Kennedy decided to take down the Jupiter

missiles in Turkey; however, this wasn't made public for some time after the crisis. This

information was trusted by his brother and Attorney General Robert F Kennedy. Robert F

Kennedy would state in his relocation of the meeting with Dobrynin that there would be no quid

19
22. Weaver, “Diplomacy and Military Force,” 20.
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quo pro for removing the missiles in Turkey due to the decision of NATO. 20After this statement,

Robert F Kennedy said he also explained to Dobrynin that President Kennedy had asked for the

removal of the missiles in Turkey and Italy a while back. They were under the understanding this

would be completed after the Cuban Missile Crisis was averted. According to Dobrynin, the

meeting was requested by Robert Kennedy, and in the forum, when Dobrynin asked, "What

about Turkey?" Robert replied that if this is the only issue between the resolution of this crisis,

we can oblige the Soviet Union and remove the Jupiter missiles.21 We may never honestly know

the real account, but we can see that the missiles were taken down in Turkey, which was a small

price to pay to avoid a nuclear war between the Soviet Union and the United States.

The Negotiations of the United States to calm the American people from War on the

horizon were accomplished due to the tactics of the Excomm group and the willingness of the

Soviet Union. This was accomplished by creating a quarantine around the Island of Cuba to start

the negotiations and the understanding of giving up the Jupiter Missiles to achieve peace and the

deconstruction of the missile silos in Cuba. These combined have created the grounds for future

conflict negotiations and resolution.

20
23. Ambassador Dobrynin to the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

21
24. Ambassador Dobrynin to the Soviet Foreign Ministry.
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Bibliography

Alsop, Stewart, and Charles Bartlett. “In Time of Crisis.” The Saturday Evening Post, December

8, 1962. http://www.saturdayeveningpost.com/wp-content/uploads/satevepost/1962-12-

08-missile-crisis.pdf: 15–21.

Denver, Steven L., ed. “JFK: Report on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba.” In Defining

Documents: The Cold War (1945–1991). Edited by Michael Shally-Jensen. Vol. 2,

Escalation and Detente, 316–21. Ipswitch, MA: Salem Press, 2016.

Dobrynin, Anatoly. Description of meeting with Robert Kennedy wired to the Soviet Foreign

Ministry, October 27, 1962. National Security Archive. George Washington University,

Washington, DC. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/moment.htm.

Khrushchev, Nikita. Letter to President John F. Kennedy, October 27, 1962. John F. Kennedy

Presidential Library and Museum, Boston, MA.

https://microsites.jfklibrary.org/cmc/oct27/doc4.html.

Trowbridge, David J. A History of the United States: 1865 to Present. 3rd ed. Asheville, NC:

Soomo Learning, 2017. First published 2012 by Flat World Knowledge (Boston).

Weaver, Michael E. “The Relationship between Diplomacy and Military Force.” Diplomatic

History 38, no. 1 (January 2014): 137–81.

https://doi-org.ezproxy.snhu.edu/10.1093/dh/dht070.