UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW Evidence

E2024 Professor Jacoba

Cañedo v. Kampilan Security and Detective Agency, Inc.
G.R. No. 179326 – July 31, 2013
Second division | Del Castillo, J.

Topic: Rules of Admissibility; Documentary Evidence; Parol Evidence Rule and Interpretation of Documents;
Interpretation of Documents; Interpretation according to intention; general and particular provisions
(Rule 130, Section 13)

Parties:
PETITIONER RESPONDENTS
Luciano P. Cañedo Kampilan Security and Detective Agency, Inc.
Ramoncito L. Arquiza

Case Summary:
Cañedo, a security guard of Kampilan, was assigned to an NPC station in Toledo. For not wearing proper
uniform while on duty, he was suspended for a month effective May 8, 2003. On June 2, in a letter addressed
to Kampilan, the NPC requested for Cañedo’s replacement. Cañedo requested Arquiza to issue a certification
in connection with his intended retirement effective that month on June 17, which Arquiza complied with,
specifying in said certification that Cañedo was “terminated from his employment by Kampilan on May 7,
2003 as per client’s request”. Cañedo then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and non-
payment of monetary benefits against Kampilan and Arquiza.

The SC resolved the issue of whether or not Cañedo was dismissed from service, to which it ruled in the
negative.

Upon close reading of the certification, the Court found that Cañedo was not dismissed from the service. The
import of the certification is that Cañedo was assigned in NPC, and on May 7, 2003, Kampilan terminated his
assignment to NPC upon the latter’s request. This is the correct interpretation based on the true intention of
the parties as shown by their contemporaneous and subsequent acts and other evidence on record. [See
Doctrine] To recap, Cañedo was suspended effective May 8. On June 2, NPC requested for his replacement.
He then intimated his desire to retire from service on June 17. These circumstances negate Cañedo’s claim
that he was terminated on May 7; clearly, there is no dismissal to speak of.

Doctrine:
Section 12 of Rule 130 states that in the construction and interpretation of a document, the intention of the
parties must be pursued. Section 13 of the same rule further instructs that the circumstances under which a
document was made may be shown in order to ascertain the correct interpretation of a document.

FACTS OF THE CASE

[procedural history included; can skip for recit but take note of how the lower courts interpreted the
certificate]
Kampilan hired Cañedo as a security guard and assigned him at the Naga Power Barge 102 of the National
Power Corporation (NPC) in Toledo City. For not wearing proper uniform while on duty as per report of
NPC’s employee, Cañedo was suspended for a month effective May 8, 2003. On June 2, 2003, NPC informed
Kampilan in a letter that it was no longer interested in Cañedo’s services and requested for his replacement.
Following this, on June 17, 2003, Cañedo requested Arquiza to issue a certification in connection with his
intended retirement effective that month, which Arquiza complied with, specifying in said certification that
Cañedo was terminated from his employment by Kampilan on May 7, 2003 as per client’s request. Five days
later, Cañedo filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and non-payment of monetary benefits
against Kampilan and Arquiza before the LA.

Cañedo alleged that his suspension was without valid ground and effected without due process. He claimed
that the NPC employee’s report about his non-wearing of uniform was fabricated and ill-motivated.
 UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW Evidence
E2024 Professor Jacoba
Furthermore, the roving inspector who checked the attendance of guards on duty does not have any report
showing his commission of any infraction. Cañedo averred that he was suspended without the chance to
explain his side. He was surprised to find out that he was already terminated from the service effective May
7, 2003 when he reported back to work after his suspension.

Kampilan countered that Cañedo was not dismissed from service; in fact, despite Cañedo’s propensity for not
wearing the uniform while on duty as shown by the entries in the station logbook and after a series of
infractions, they still opted to retain his services. However, in view of NPC’s request for his replacement,
Kampilan had to pull him out form NPC. But instead of waiting for a new posting, Cañedo filed a complaint
against them. The LA ruled in Cañedo’s favor, holding that he was illegally dismissed form the service and
finding that his suspension was illegal; hence, it granted him all his monetary claims except for underpayment
of wages.

Kampilan filed a memorandum of appeal before the NLRC, contending that the certification was not sufficient
to establish Cañedo’s dismissal as such fact must be proven by direct evidence of actual dismissal. They also
averred that the use of the word ‘terminated” in the certification actually meant “pulled-out” and this can be
construed from the phrase “as per client’s request.” This position was strengthened by Cañedo’s letter
requesting for a certification in connection with his intended retirement. Kampilan explained that the
certification was only issued upon Cañedo’s request to facilitate his application for entitlement to retirement
benefits with the SSS. The word “terminated”, assuming its literal meaning, was only used in order to serve
the purpose of the same.

The NLRC initially affirmed with modification the LA’s decision, but reversed itself in resolving Kampilan’s
MFR. It then held that the certification should be read in conduction with NPC’s letter requesting for Cañedo’s
relief from his post. The NLRC noted that this was common practice for clients of security agencies to demand
replacement of any security guard assigned to them but cannot demand their dismissal from the employ of the
security agency. From the time Cañedo was relieved form his posting, he was considering on a floating status
which can last for a maximum of 6 months. Moreover, the NLRC opined that Cañedo’s intetion to retire as
shown by his letter negated his claim of termination. Nevertheless, the NLRC still held that Cañedo was
suspended without being notified of his infraction, so it ordered Kampilan to pay Cañedo his salary during the
period of his illegal suspension.

The CA denied Cañedo’s petition for certiorari after finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
NLRC. It negated Cañedo’s submission that he was dismissed from service; it concluded that Cañedo was
merely placed on a temporary “off-detail” which was not equivalent to dismissal. It likewise found that
Cañedowas deprived of due process when he was suspended and affirmed his entitement to his salary during
the period of suspension.

Cañedo’s MFR was denied by the CA; hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE/S & RATIO/S

W/N Cañedo was dismissed from service—NO.
• As there was no uniformity in the factual findings of the lower courts, the Court examined the records
as well as the evidence presented to determine which findings conform with the evidentiary facts.
• In illegal dismissal cases, it is incumbent upon the party alleging to prove his claim of dismissal.
o Cañedo relied on the word “terminated” as used in the certification and argued that it is a clear
indication of his dismissal from service. The Court is not persuaded.
o Cañedo cannot simply rely on this piece of document since the fact of dismissal must be
evidenced by positive and overt acts of an employer indicating an intention to dismiss. Aside
from this document, Cañedo proffered no other evidence showing that he was dismissed from
employment.
o While he was not allowed to report for work after the expiration of his suspension, the same
was due to NPC’s request. As correctly argued by Kampilan, Cañedo from that point onward
 UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW Evidence
E2024 Professor Jacoba
was not considered dismissed but merely on a floating status. Such status is lawful and not
unusual for security guards employed in security agencies as their assignments primarily
depend on the contracts entered into by the agency with third parties.
o A floating status can ripen to constructive dismissal only when it goes beyond the maximum
6-month period allowed by the law. In this case, Cañedo filed the complaint for illegal dismissal
even before the lapse of the period; hence, his claim lacks basis. Moreover, it was in fact
Cañedo who intended to terminate his relationship with Kampilan through his planned
retirement. This is further bolstered by his prayer in his complaint where he sought for
separation pay, not reinstatement.
• Upon close reading of the certification, the Court found that Cañedo was not dismissed from the
service.
o The import of the certification is that Cañedo was assigned in NPC, and on May 7, 2003,
Kampilan terminated his assignment to NPC upon the latter’s request. This is the correct
interpretation based on the true intention of the parties as shown by their contemporaneous and
subsequent acts and other evidence on record as discussed above.
o Section 12 of Rule 130 of the ROC states that in the construction and interpretation of a
document, the intention of the parties must be pursued. Section 13 of the same rule further
instructs that the circumstances under which a document was made may be shown in order to
ascertain the correct interpretation of a document.
o To recap, Cañedo was suspended effective May 8. On June 2, NPC requested for his
replacement. He then intimated his desire to retire from service on June 17. These
circumstances negate Cañedo’s claim that he was terminated on May 7; clearly, there is no
dismissal to speak of.

RULING
Petition denied; CA decision affirmed.

NOTES