Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Combat Vienna in '45
Combat Vienna in '45
S 4L B-160
English Copy
COMBAT IN
VIENNA
(29
MAY 10 1965
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era were tehnically under the command of the Commander of Defense Area, In Vienna. All
units and commands of the Replacement Army stationed in the defense area which had not yet been shifted or were in process of being shifted west; all units of the field forces withdraw-
ing to the defense area; all air force units detailed for
ground fighting; the police, (organized in the Volkseturm), the military units of the "Party" and the civilian administrative
/_
J-160
and .for
a short time the civilian administrative agencies of the town. During the entire battle of Vienna, troops of the field forces were subordinated for one day only, 13 April 1945. At all
other times they remained under the command of the IX SS Panzer Corps.
GO
7 April 1945,
I,
was likewise placed under the comand of that corps and there upon my combat command function practioally ceased. Moreover,
my authority was limited by the necessity of obtaining the agreement of Reich Defense Commissioner von Schirach for every important measure* I had nothing to do with ARLZ measures
(general regulations concerning demolitions); I could spare neither materiel nor forces for such measures. 2.
The
Except for the telephone order from ~8eent. Army Personnel Department, Vienna, which
neither General
Headquarters nor any other superior headquarters issued a verbal or written order concerning the defense of Vienna. reasures undertaken by me s co t commander, therefore, were
md
were also guided by general orders issued to combat comndero by the Wehrmrcht or Army Bigh Comnd
NZS
B--160
-3.
3,
stAimate of1thet
n_
. A.i'd1 !45.
On 31 March
blocked the
(4th and 33d Training Sattalions) south of Moedling and in the vicinity of axenburg. Ona 4 April the enemy penetrated the eusiedler and the Danube advancing
simultaneously from south and north, occupied it on 5 April. The enemy now had three choices: The first, most probable, and politically advisable, was to gain speedy possession of Vienna as the capital of a country which was to be restored to "freedom,"
Lins.
1inally,
he could combine both courses of action, since He had at his disone motorized,
one arwored,
-B-60
and one infantry army.
one mechanized,
assisted by an air force which had absolute command of the air and probably by forces of the Austrian resistance movement, which we also learned about later. At the time we did not
have a clear picture of the strength of the enemy and of the number and type of his units but we.had the general impression that the enemy was far superior both in German forces (Sixth S8 from personnel and materiel. which had withdrawn
Panzer Army),
un ary to the frontier fortifications on both s.ides of had not been able to establish themselves in
Lake Neusiedler,
the prepared positions south of the lake, since these positions had already been overrun by tl enemy. Hence they had to reRiver. North of
Lake Neusiedler several experienced, though exhausted, Eastern front divisions were occupying positions which they succeeded in holding for a few days.
Because of their poor combat efficiency, the alert replacement units which had been moved to the front by order of the commander of the eplacement Army to reiRlforce the line, Some did not even
reach the position, but were surprised by the enemy, south of Lake Neusedler, while detraining or moving up.
T he
D.-16O
-5
Q*iS~
were numerically weak and for the most part insufficiently armed and equipped. The Luftwaffe antiaircraft units detailed for ground fighting in and around Vienna (24th Antiaircraft Division) could be expected to provide some defense. On the other hand, (As it turned
not a single German plane was in the air during the entire Supply troops had not been provided. In
short, no preparations whatever had been made for the defense of the city. Nevertheless an attack against Vienna by strong Russian forces was to be expected within a few days. Our only hope
was that some German divisions from the field would become. available for the battle, such divisions, ungary, if any,
Since
the Co mander in Chief of the Sixth aS Panser Army, SS Oberetgruppenfuehrer Dietrich, and I agreed about this at our first meeting 4 April, 1945. And again at a later date, when it
was proposed to make a corresponding report to the High Command in the hope that the intention of defending the city might be abandoned and the battle avoide d As late as 2 April, after
.S
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the loss of the frontier fortifications which up to that time had generally and correctly been considered the only possible line of defense for Vienna, the order was given to defend the
city and, in the end, I indorsed it, in spite of the clearly unfavorable situation. the decision had been made because of
the following considerations 1. Russians, The early occupation of Austria's capital by the with its incalculable political consequences, must
be prevented or, at least, delayed. 2. forces if The defense of the city would engage strong enemy the Russians decided to first attack Vienna. In
this case, it was hoped, wea ld gain time for consolidating the front. The decision for or against fighting was not mine to make. All I had to do was to concentrate on gaining as much time as possible and building up our defense. II. CO~ AT AQTION Ia r a
nd Orders ~Measurea to Strengtbhen the Defense.
Formation of
placement training and recruit uvits of the Vienna garrison, soldiers on leave and stragglers from the field forces. b, Collection of Arms, Ammunition, and Equipment
I"'
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situation and general confusion, this measure met with many difficulties, which sonetimes were not worth the effort. some cases these difficulties may have been intentionally aggravated by
C.
In
embers of the Austrian resistance movement. Bringing in of Beinforements (alert units of Two light and two heavy batteries .t were expect-
from Wels and one antitank company from Freist ed, but only the antitank company arrnd one
These units were placed under the co=mand of the 6th Panzer Division for technical reasons. 4.
through the rounding up of all motor vehicles still in Vienna. This project did not get underway smoothly. e. Units. Requisitionin of Officers and GC0s for the Alert
Officer Replacement pool in the Doellersheim training area, and 100 cadets were detached from the reserve officers training courses at Znojmo (Znaim). The majority of the latter
were detailed to the 6th Panzer Division, some to the 2d SS Panzer Division, and others to my staff as administrative officers. f. Organization of a Working Staff for my Headquarters.
Beside a few command
B -160
Military
-s
sisted chiefly of officers with little battle experience and combat initiative. Some were too old and, as it turned out
movement.
g. Organization of a Quasi-military Government Over Because of the rapid
and unfavorable development of the tactical situ tion, this project did not reach fulfillment. I could only instruct the
I requested that the field divisions in the Vienna nd, for centralization of authority.
This request was rejected but contact with these units was established and continuously maintsi Ted. b. Comitment of alert units, after reconnaissance
by bicycle and mototized scout squads, for blocking and defensive missions on the main enemy approach roads. o. Commitment of bicycle mounted antitank detach-
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d.
-9-
in9..
alert units were placed under the army group engineers, G&Q Engineer Brigade), whose task it
special-missions staff officers and messengers, since only a small and technically inadequate alert signal company was at my disposal. 1or most of the time, liaison with higher com person or
mands and adjacent units had to be established in through local telephone or radio service.
a. On 29
wiener Neustadt,
nd Wiener
advancin
from Koeszeg,
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10the Rosalien Moutains and overran, with tanks, TXII as they Russian
penetrated
tanks and infantry then attacked German bloking unite at the road defile south of through 31 March.
3attersburg.
frontal attack brought no sucoess, the enemy turned west via Deutahkreuz and beeaenmarkt, nd captured Sopron on 1 April .
In the course of a further enemy penetration on 31 March and I April, through the Rosalien Mountains northwest towards two other battalions of the ienmer Neustadt
though equipped only with small arms and a initially frustrated enemy
Frohadorf.
30 tanks.
On 2 April, while fighting continued in this area, the course of events in the enemy penetration in
'attersburg--Sopron
the direotion of
M5
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Leitha River and during the night of 2 April to give up iener Xeustadt. On the same day the enemy advanced via Also on 2 April the igh Command i
the enemy advaned northward from the line Wiener Neuata t-Eb nfurth. This advance led to the first engagements with
forward reconaissanoe detachments to the south and with parts of the alert units of the 4th and 33d Panzer Replacement and Trainirig Battalions stationed approximately on a line from Guntrasdorf to Laxaburg Farther east the enemy captured
Eisenatadt,
(Preasburg).
On the evening of 3 April, having been appointed combat commander of Defense Area, Vienna by order of the High Co mand, I arrived in ehrmaeht
Vienna and took over the com and ity, LtGen. saerker, who
military headquarters on Universitaetastrasse. Because of the danger impending in Panzer Division (t*Das between Gutrarsdorf eich") wa te south, the 2d s
nd Laxenburg, which up t
W1
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been occupied by parts of the 4th and 3d Pan er Replacement and Training battalions attalions. The divieion now absorbed these
and
uenoehendorf,
of frontier fortifications between Lake leusiedler and the Danube River, the loss of Bruck on the Leitha River on 4 April, made the withdrawal of the 2d Sr Panzer Division to the line Moedling--Neudorf--imberg inevitable and led to severe fighting on that line as well as in the vicinity of Rauchenwarth. A
envelopment attemteed by Russian troops west of Moeling on the afternoon of 4 April was evaded. first On this day I had m
conference with Reich Defense Commissioner yon Sohiraoh onference with the in
military and oivilian authorities who had reaied At this time the 1, easures listed ie setions II, 1,
Vienna.
b were inaugurated.
According to instructions,
District headquartera XVII moved to Duernstein near Krems (later Preistadt, Upper Austria),
During the night of 4 April stronger enemy forces advanced from the south through the Vienna Woods i Pressbaum on the western railroad line. the direction of A police battalion,
with one police tank, in position on both sides of the Pressbaum road to protect this important line of comuication was
-60
out in half.
was with-
at full strength and soe alert units of lesser combat efficiency. However, the Cerman cormunications and supply line
to and from the west was now cut south of the Danube Aiver. Because of these developments and the enemy's attempt at envelopment near Moedliag, position of the 2d during the night of 4 April the from Moedling
matters affecting
ing his way Iforxard on both sides of the western railroad line towards Vienna. north of this line, ewere able at first but south of it to hold the position a threatened enemy envelop-
ment of the 2
ortganied within the Battalions of "Hitler Youth" werr. framework of the Volkcsstur.
tS
16o
-14Fighting developed in
this threat, alert and police units were committed on the northern bank of the Liesing, especially on Laser Mountain. Antiaircraft batteries took part in this action, for the first time, to delay the enemy's advance. Ever growing enemy pressure against the Vienna front from several sides necessitated further withdrawal of the 2d 8$ Panser Division and adjoining units to the auer--Liesing-Probably in-
fluenced by this withdrawal, the alert and police units committed on the Laser ountain evacuated their positions unt On the left or eastern
flank the 3d SS Panzer Division and the 6th Panzer Division were still withdrawing toward and across the Schweohat River, taking along with them the remnants of the security detachments from Military Headquarters Vienna which had beern stationed in the Schweohat area. Russian armored spearheads invaded the Cotncentration of stronger enemy
f Vienna.
iS
of Huettendorf toward
the afternoon,
sector had to
be abandoned and the Hitler Youth battalion, was given the task of protecting the
facing southwest,
t enemy forces that had been advancing with tanks on the Wiental
road and south thereof toward Hietzing. At nightfall and during the night of 6 A.pril, however, Its
right flank was in the vicinity of Hietzinger Hauptplatz and its left in contact with the 3d SS Panzer Division near the
Rossmarkt.
rom Rothnewsiedl
Mountain.
These Russians were finally stopped or both sides . severe fighting took place for the southThe advance
of
uedatirolerplat
east railroad
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-1 6-
north through the Zentralfriedhof (cemetery) toward the Simmering-Danube Canal made it necessary to commit the advance
Panzer Division also was committed at once on the island between the Danube Canal and ?iver. The leading artillery bat-
teries of the Fuehrer Grenadier Division took up positions in the Priatr. But during the evening the arsenal grounds had to At the same time, the southernmost railroad
be surrendered.
bridges over the Danube Canal and River were blown up.
d.
During
the niht of 6 April Russian armored spearheads cautiously moved forward toward the west railroad station although Hitler Youth antitank detachments were employed against them with considerable success. The fighting near Rietzinger Hauptplatz, Sued-
tiroler Plats, and the southeast railroad station lasted all night. On 7 April the enemy reached the Danube River northwest of Vienna. Fighting ensued near Kloterneuburg, where the 80th
During the night of 6 April two 75-mm antitank guns of the antitank alert company, which had arrived from Yreistadt, were set up
at the exit from the city toward Klosterneuburg, and two others on the opposite bank of the Danube.
of superior enemy forces toward that stat sation forced the 2d 2S Panzer Division to withdraw, abandon the station. fighting, to the Guertel and
interrupted for some time, but contact with the 3d SS Panzer Division on the left was maintained. and in spite of determined resistance, After severe fighting this division finally
had to abandon the southeast railroad station to the enemy. The enemy likewise gained ground, the 6th Panzer 'ivision on the Prater. although slowly, against The fighting there was
especially severe.
On the same day strong Russian forces crossed the Danube in
&
River in a westerly direction north of Hainburg. On the afternoon of 7 April, Panzer Army, by order of the Sixth SS SS Panzer Corps. Thus
to an end.
similar to that of a division com, ander, although I retained the title of combat commander.
$ I-160
-18l
During the night of 7 April stronger elements of the auehrer Grenadier Division came into the city and were deployed for the purpose of regaining the west railroad station. But the enemy was also observed to be assembling stronger forces near that station.
Further north, the Hitler Youth
battalion, ably led and bravely fighting, completed its covering assignment in the vicinity of Huettendorf, disengaged itself from the enemy according to instructions, and took up It was reinforced by of
the west station and placed under its command. .On 8 April the battle whole front,
Kahlenberg,
from the northern part of the city through the the uertel, the arsenal grounds to the Prater.
Russian t nk attacks on the road from Xlosterneuburg along the banks of the Danube were halted. (Two tanks were put out of However, the Kahlen-
action by the two 75-mm antitank guns.) berg, occupied by a air force alert
efficiency, was lost. Strong enemy forces attempting to advance east and northeast along the Alserstrass were attacked on their wre southern
flank by a pa zer infantry regiment from the Fuehrer Grenadier Division. The regiment was advancing to retake the west rail-
road station but, seeing the Russian forces, turned north and
cS
8-160
19- . in the
of Mannhardabrunr,
units still
available into the Rossau barracks and set up a makeshift defensive line running in the general direction Friedee-
brueoke--University--Rathaus, and thus preserved a certain continuity on this front. However, the attempt to close the
gap in the left wing of the Hitler Youth battalion north of the Friedensbruecke was unsuccessful. The rest of the front he d
Abadonment of
the fighting continued with increasing violence The Hitler Youth battalion had firmly
established its
to the Danube Canal north of the Priedenabruecke and In the morning enemy armored reconaieposition were turned back. Likewise
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north and northwest was repulsed with high casualties. while, on the east bank of the Danube Canal, dorter Spitz atd the Sriedensbrueoke, an alert
Mean-
between Nus-e
battalion was
stitioned to give tactical support and possibly assist the withdrawal of the Hitler case in Youth battalion. This ws the only
Almost simultaneously with the attack on the Hitler Youth battalion other enemy forces farther south, advanced southward and in the early after oon took possession of the
Franz .Joseph
Railroad Station and Joined up there with units advancing from the west. In the late afternoon the front line of the Bitler west, Youth and
drawn across the Danube during the night, at the hnds of greatly superior forces. The withdrawal was carried out i fore, without major casualties.
good order
ad,
as be-.
The enemy,
however,
following
iussdorfer Spitz.
lodge the enary from the lock failed otinued attempts of the enemy, over to the islan in or 9
the
10 April,
to cross
rad !iver--probably
order to push on t
Florisdorfer
Bridge--were beaten
SI
-160
west railroad bridge was blown up because of the imminent danger that it might fall intact into the enemy's hands. On the same It
wa
no loiger useful to us and would have had to be destroyed :Moreover, the engineer units comof reinforcement were urgent-
The unfavorable development of the tactical situation all along the Vienna front, the continuous dwindling of the German
troops in the face of growing enemy forces, and above all the
appearance of enemy troops on the north bank of the Danube, called for new decisions and measures, rvliant efforts of the three field notwithstanding the fighting
divisions still
Corps Headquarters ordered the abandonment of the center of the city and a withdrawal acrosa the Danube Canal during the night. I also directed the demolition of the Danube C nal bridges
e n~
B-160Q ihrhood
n
2%
9 April to the
north,
."
&:oiss Thzro
il
c14'.
.vrher
these
committed
on
anal
t ~.tside of
i
,d
ube
.te
lve
wee
withrawn aross P e
00n
od i
and wirthot
much.
enemiy,
,
i
erestr o de
Brid'e
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staff FMd
)1 nj
.were
te
_f e Ys .
last
st 0300
10
ix
'i,
t r en
:rr
rcr rna
Division KL s
w
.
se
redeployed
along
m.eiiy
atdvsoi,g
in uorthwt
(
rctior;
h
Driit
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the ln
: 'anuT
e~~sUQUSi c~ ti
fort%
Ivi :o
o
w'u'hq~
'est
d r.
ed,
iet
J.pn
>sntact
csbi
ith
6th
Nanzr
the
a Pc. z .'e
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tof
relieved
of
my ~4. g.
r
t~~r
A
e r
x .h? ,
n~t~:
otr nes
ye:
G
; br~ddB-cvsrtat CLL~~~W
d
a ov L7
:
our QQLrat
.wed
roitr
rv
line,
e4 . A
as
't, y
12 ;
.toorsba'-
..
uT
it.
wumed
of tk
werea
the
P
figting
ore At
nul
, ig
ii I
wve es
ea4;abli-shs
.
cJ OJ Li 1bii&.
B
V-1
.sr
e ..
rs
of.. ?;
o..cnu r4
Da J
pi .y
on the
the
Ca~inal
a:-idl, he
it Ar..w . Li
iii(1s -lU
h vr.
ighting
rth
the
'Paxub- l t
p' ie
iwr C
(r
i.er
em ~as'hgly
"he
ewm e
i nned
slowly
4t..r
zS..+itead
l::
no rth-
westerly
ireoticn
; eiC r.
t
D m +tlry
-v t V s
rit
"
f 10
rt -b(
A prfl
thz
t.
iti ,r
'Youth
'1
t:1io
W"; otob
Danube
ndthen t
I~~~i
I.l
4ifl
rt
Cor
of
mi
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t th
~srior
'AR >u ec
c. )
tze
Panze r
.urri
V3
cr
31A iy
th
tce two
S .,.{~~; 3V~ Uuqe
dSb9
ioi*
n 4'Ce
.;
e'emy suaceeded
rnpd in Di
s ion3,
jpoir tc , g Ke,#'P(
m.ttud,
the
Ptater diztriot
'e 'I, 12 Apri.
~i. .t.
the
thl
;<wa
6th
e;t~
Panwz r
D1 1z~ rjvir
to a
F'J1JV
4ttVJ. r
andJAHti 1X
'.
at
31
t
ordered by 7.
t;
fiir:b}
2.
orw
tWn
hc, ,crtr
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over tke
o&a. ottInt
om
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it,
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oe fl.g
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hili ol of
r
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ucrcan
9 t sam }i.c9 w
offc-e
1 Aaiu
by totor
,'d
ob~ tiW.
ail
'
zs d '1
ir e-,
aub
tW
riod.'c;
a
affI
"
tri thec
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e t
,...
of
i.A
&md:"
{>ey
occu i , P.brlr
' t
cr orly resmnt
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v
At
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t 71
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e
4a
Y~i~ tt iz
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t.
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6th
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t'~'icr;w
ft 13-160
night of 12 April. The beich Bridge was intact but under fire or the right bank of the
Danube. forces
It
On the left
flank it
since the issuance of the order from Bisamberg. changing the plan oBn my own authority, to the IX 8S Panzer Corp,
but to hold the reduced bridgehead until the Danube by day would have entailed high under enemy fire.
casualties because the Florisdorfer Bridge waa iighting became incredibly severe.
tically out of amunition, suffered almost continuous enemy fire rom all typea of weapons* streets $-34 tanks were employed against and even on
them on all
resisted unflinchingly
posed left
withdrawing the front line some 100 meters and by archoring the
left
MS
-160
-25-
wounded were taken to the rear; ther the whole bridgehead was
vacated,* At 2400 the
Florisdorfer
Bridge wa
:ussiars
demolished.
The
Why the
more energy is incioprehensible, for they could easily have annihilated the forces holding the bridgehead and captured the bridge probably undamaged. The oo oLander of the 2d SS Panzer livision, S4 Colonel
Lehmann, ws wounded during these engements on the afternoon of 13 April. y command post was at first in the same area Later, headquarters were again 'resdenerctrasse near the southweatern During all of this period, and in the first
lorisdorfer Bridge.
I observed the fighting, often at close range, line during the final The battle for the
loridorfer bridgehead.
April).
bank of the
ainube,
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were reinforced, particularly opposite the Reich Bridge which under heavy fire, could not now be destroyed. colmasnd of the covering parties, I first assumed I was
isatructed to relinquish this authority and place myself again at the disposal of the II S8 PaMzer Corps. along
the northern bank of the Danube and were approaching the suburbs of Vienna o. that side. This approach led to severe fighting,
specially in the Lobau sector held by the Fuehrer Grenadier Division, and to the north. On 14 April the enem unexpected-
ly crossed the Danube north of Klosterneuburg and succeeded in effecting a deep penetration toward Koenigsbrunn. forces turned from eiring toward Gerasdorf. It no
Some enemy
was imwhich
ran approximately along the line Stadlau--Kagran-Leopoldau-Ltammersdorf-Hagelbrunn, ead to the north thereof. frot During the
fevertheless, the
The
oo
and post
Ms
II
#; B-160
S Panzer Corps was terminated on the evening of 14 April. (. 16 April near o command-
Poelten sector,
remained until
1. General
a. Durin the whole battle of Vienna the enemy conplanea which at-
not effect severe losses in personnel, they did seriously im pede our freedom of move ment the city, whi They also caused great havoc i raids than
from the actual fighting in the streets--except possibly at such focal pointa district lats.
ts
the Prater,
the
curtailed
of a,,unition.
The enemy air force had complete command of the ar over the battle area, with no opposition fro us.
2 B-160
b. The iussians carried out their land attacks
28-
systematically: infantry,
When they
encountered resistance they usually stopped or withheld their attack temporarily and tried to reach their goal from another direction. Typical of this method were their tactics designed e envelopments (the advance
through the Vienna Woods, bypassing Vienna to the west, and the attempted envelopment near Foedling). customary infiltration area west of Vienna, Also typical was their The
itself,
offered
peatedly demonstrated their skill in this procedure. have been coped with by strong, experienced
infantry unite,
but such units were not at our disposal. . in fire. The performance of the hostile' artillery did not for such supporting
the foal points and especially during the fighting for the island between the anube Canal and river. In this area even
multiple rocket guns of large caliber were used. there were sudden concentrations of fire city, in the area
Occasionally
The general impression was that of a methodical and relatively slow, sometimes even hesitant, attack. This was surprising in
material.
This deliberate,
cautious offensive
was all
the more
inexplicable in view of the enemy's undoubted knowledge of our weakness. S The extent to which the Russian tactics of sparing their
forces may have been due to expected aid from the Austrian resistance movewent is not known. The loss of Vienna was in-
evitable.
tven
providing that no
considerable reinforcements of fresh troops could be brought up, could be predicted and calculated through a comparison of the strength of the opposing forces in the light of the tactical situation, without special allowance for the Austrian resistance movement. However, it is not only possible, but probable, that
the enemy ws directed occasionally by inhabitants of the city and perhaps even by guides who were adherents of the resistance
movement.
d. The cosfiguration of the terrain and the presence except toward the
through infiltration.
MS
-160
owever, t the sme time it helped corceal the
*R0-
Mnuerical
weak!ess of our forces and favored reonnaissance and minor combat actions. he terrain did not facilitate either sidesa. On the
observation for heavy infantry weapons and artillery. othar hand the terrain sout rather ope and level.
portunity for observation. 2. gri tjgaloe . s. These were the most critical moments
during the fighting: a.o Thebdvance of the Russians through the Vienna orth, in the direction of Pressbaum, during
the niht of 4 April and their turning moveent eastward toward Vienna. Northward and along the western railroad line, was one of the weakest
a main route of approach from the west, sectors it battalion, our entire front line.
only units of poor combt efficiency were available the point of junction with the 2d 88 Pazer There
Division ov the left (south) flank was situated there. fore the danger tha t into
t
te
b,
The
t -460
vailable. The enemy could theorfore have occupied the
were
This
danger was averted by a northward shift of the panzer grenadier regiment of the ?uehrer Grenadier Division, which had been advancing south of the sertrase toward towar the west in order
enemy advance.
Rathaus, but not to extend it to the left flank of the Hitler Youth battalion stationed north of the bridge.
c.
flank of the 2d SS Panzer Division near the northwest railroad station and probably have caused withdrawal of the division's
MS
- B-160
These events might have led to the 85 Panzer Corpa, ex-
tendig in the general direction Stadlau--Kagran--Leopoldau-Staimeradorf-- agelbruna, engage the corps fro if it had not been possible to die-
The disengagement was acomplished with great lose of materiel, and the front was reestablished on a line running approximately north of Korneuburg--Manrhardsbrunn.
53
Final Coment.
of Vienna proved the correctness of the original estimate of the situation-. did not have the authority to decide whether hould or should not take place-. the only poasiblity, hen the
for command and troops, due to the field the case of other
Commendation is in
units commendation must be qualified or even denied altogether. Seen as a whole, the battle of Vienna was regrettable from
a humain point of view, however, it tied down very strong Busian forces, and made the establishment of a new front line south of the Danube possible. enormous difficulties, the battle rea a n their It also made possible, under ome 9000 wounded from
removal westward.
MS ' B3-160
Designation A. 1) 2) 2) SuFperior authorities SS Armored Army 6th qarre dSASy et HeadQuariers 2d 28' Headquarters 24&a-
eaOberstgruppenfuerer Bittrich
l~YA'nTll 111*Y~ X'lqIIYl
units of garrison
Greater Vienna and Military District XVII
forgotten
convalescents,and
stragglers from field forces
including antiaircraft
units
3s1
B-160
List of units (Cont'd)
-34-
Deaignatio
-.- _ ...... :. -.. ..... m( :' -. ...... J .. :
Name of commanders
--I :- ----- ,e... :w,, ,_ -, U -v. . ._. l Y _; ._ 1Y--- ' - -Y '-
Time
-
-'- -
.~Y
Antiairoraft units of
Gen,
ground fighting
Volkesturm consisting
partly of organizations Names forgotten of the Party (political leaders, .tional Socialist 1otor Corps, Hitler Youth)
2) 3) geurit, |oloe
Comander: Biedermann MaJ
troos
temaiintg hospitals
a arl..alllM u 0
1) 2)
torte
Corm nder: Maj GeQ. Baeron. von laideafels Co ader aj. Gen. Meder 6-14 April
evening
4-14 April
evening
Sadvanced ele-
ments from
6 April
IMS
-35-
Designation
3) 2d S Panzer Division, "Das Reich"
Name of commanders
Commandert SS Standartenfuehrer
Time
(4-14 April evening;)
(re
ining ele-
ments subord-
Kreutz 4) 3A SS Passer.
Division, "Totenkopf"
.ated on
13 April)
Commander: .
fuehrer Becker
Ober-
4-14 April
evening
..K62 9
-1
APPENDIX B
Strength
Designation
Alert units of 11th
Combat Efficiency
well led, average
Recomnaissance Replacement and Training Bn Alert unite of 4th and 33d Armored Replacement and Training B.
well led; good combat efficiency employed as iifantry well led; good combat efficiency
I company
4 mstz
75-mm antitaik guns 3 75-mm heavy antiaircraft
howitzers
combat efficiency
13-160pak~
-37-
Designation
Alert units of 17th Administrative Replacement and Trainiag BM Alert units constating of soldiers on leave, convaP leseents and stragglers from field forces end
avy
Combat Efficiency
inexperienced; poorly led, poor combat efficiency
poorly led, and for the most part moderate to poor ombat efficiency
Air Force alert units AA units of 24th AA Division detailed for ground fighting Police alert units
badly led; poor combat efficiency command average; Combat efficiency average, in part good commad poor; inexperienced; poor combat ef-
battalions
tank
ficieny,
no
enthusiasm uninstructed oommand; no 'combat experietce, very poor combat efficiency, with some exceptions
Units of the
local Volkmturm
No record
small
arms
t.
a~
, T
-38-
SDeligatio
Combat
ftficieney
some pan-
well led; high zerfausts, combat morale; some arms willing .nd eager to fight; high combat efficiency
1 understrength company
just sufficient personnel and materiel to keep up and maintain local installations; poor radio
ment
equipment (fighting troops were mostly connected teleby loal phone network); willing to work
Armed toroes
patrol service
Not constant
emall
arms
lot dependable, as
command belonged
to Austrian resistance movement; improved later Constabulary No record small arms At first fair, but deteriorated
gradually
Supply troops ---------.--I Except for
sanitary estab-
lihmenits, no
supply troops were
available; thus
the bulk of alert
units d pended on
the supply in-
~ ~jllj Yy
great diffiulty
V,,4 A, 4. A.VSW4" v
m4-160
-59-
ia59.
Strength
Designation 6th Amored Personnel About 2 Materiel adequate Combat Efficiency Very well led;
Division (Army)
luehrer Grenadier
Division (Army)
2d SS Panzer
Division 3d S Pa.Ser Division
About 50%
adequate
than average
About 25% adequate
well
~er1CO
011,. t
AT 004