029B - Heirs of Antonio Pael vs. Court of Appeals

9/22/22, 2:05 AM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 415
VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 11, 2003 451

Heirs of Antonio Pael vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 133547. November 11, 2003.
HEIRS OF ANTONIO PAEL and ANDREA ALCANTARA and

CRISANTO PAEL, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JORGE
H. CHIN and RENATO B. MALLARI, respondents.
*
G.R. No. 133843. November 11, 2003.
MARIA DESTURA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JORGE

H. CHIN and RENATO MALLARI, respondents.
Judgments; Land Titles; The superiority of University of the

Philippines’ title over that of the Paels has been recognized by the courts in
an earlier case filed by Roberto Pael, et al. against UP.—The facts show
that Chin and Mallari and the Desturas trace their claim of ownership over
the property to the Paels. The Desturas allegedly purchased the property
from the Paels through their agent, a certain Lutgarda Marilao. Chin and
Mallari claim that they bought 70% of the property from spouses Luis and
Leony Menor, and 30% thereof directly from the Paels. The Menor spouses,
in turn, allegedly acquired the 70% also from the Paels. The disputed
property, however, is part of the UP Diliman Campus, covered by TCT No.
9462. It was established, after the survey conducted by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, National Capital Region (DENR-
NCR) that the property claimed by Chin and Mallari overlaps the property
covered by UP’s title. The superiority of UP’s title over that of the Paels has
been recognized by the courts in an earlier case filed by Roberto Pael, et al.
against UP.
_______________
* SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION.
452
452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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Same; Same; The private parties are precluded from claiming

ownership of the land in dispute as the issue of ownership by UP has long
been settled in numerous decisions by the Supreme Court, and have
therefore become incontestable.—UP was then not a party in the case and its
right over the property was not considered when this Court rendered its
decision. It was only after the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
that UP intervened and claimed that the property subject of this case is
within its premises and is titled to its name. Our Decision, therefore, should
not bind UP and our initial ruling as regards the rights of the original parties
to the case should not prejudice the rights of UP. The remand of the case to
the Court of Appeals was precisely intended to determine the veracity of the
allegation of UP that the contested property is indeed within its premises.
And this fact was affirmed in the Verification Survey Report of the DENR-
NCR Survey Team which found that Lot Nos. 588-A and 588-B overlap the
property of UP. Needless to stress, Chin and Mallari are precluded from
claiming ownership of the land in dispute as the issue of ownership by UP
has long been settled in numerous decisions by this Court, and have
therefore become incontestable.
Same; Same; Res Judicata; Words and Phrases; There is
conclusiveness of judgment when, between the first case where the judgment
was rendered and the second case where such judgment is invoked, there is
identity of parties, not of causes of action—the judgment is conclusive in the
second case only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and
determined and not as to matters merely involved therein.—Contrary to the
opinion of the Court of Appeals, the rulings of this Court in the various
cases questioning the validity of UP’s title, especially in G.R. No. 97277
entitled “Roberto Pael, et al. vs. University of the Philippines,” apply to the
case at bar and constitute res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of
judgment. There is conclusiveness of judgment when, between the first ease
where the judgment was rendered and the second case where such judgment
is invoked, there is identity of parties, not of causes of action. The judgment
is conclusive in the second case, only as to those matters actually and
directly controverted and determined, and not as to matters merely involved
therein.
Same; Same; Same; It should be emphasized that the Supreme Court’s
decision in Tiburcio v. People’s Homesite & Housing Corporation, 106 Phil.
477 (1959), as well as in the subsequent cases upholding the validity and
indefeasibility of the certificate of title covering the UP Diliman Campus,
precludes the courts from looking anew into the validity of UP’s title—the
rule is that material facts or questions which were in issue in a former
action and were there admitted or judicially determined are conclusively
settled by a judgment rendered therein and that such facts or questions
become res judicata and may not again be litigated in a subse-
453
VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 11, 2003 453
quent action, between the same parties or their privies, regardless of the
form the issue may take in the subsequent action, whether the subsequent
action involves the same or a different form of proceedings, or whether the
second action is upon the same or a different cause of action, subject matter,
claim or demand, as the earlier action.—It should be emphasized that this
Court’s Decision in Tiburcio, et al. vs. PHHC, as well as in the subsequent
cases upholding the validity and indefeasibility of the certificate of title
covering the UP Diliman Campus, precludes the courts from looking anew
into the validity of UP’s title. Thus, the appellate court’s discourse in the
case at bar as regards the origin of UP’s certificate of title, whether it came
from OCT 730 or OCT 735 is intolerable, to say the least. The rule is that
material facts or questions which were in issue in a former action and were
there admitted or judicially determined are conclusively settled by a
judgment rendered therein and that such facts or questions become res
judicata and may not again be litigated in a subsequent action between the
same parties or their privies, regardless of the form the issue may take in the
subsequent action, whether the subsequent action involves the same or a
different form of proceedings, or whether the second action is upon the
same or a different cause of action, subject matter, claim or demand, as the
earlier action. In such cases, it is also immaterial that the two actions are
based on different grounds, or tried on different theories, or instituted for
different purposes, and seek different reliefs. By the same token, whatever is
once irrevocably established as the controlling legal principle or decision
continues to be the law of the case between the same parties in the same
case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on
which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case
before the court.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Actions; Evidence; Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are

generally final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed by the Supreme
Court, unless they appear to be based on speculation, surmises or
conjectures or when these are not based on substantial evidence.—
Considering the factual and evidentiary matters raised by the University of
the Philippines in its petition-in-intervention, we referred the case to the
Court of Appeals since it has the “power to try cases and conduct hearings,
receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual
issues.” Indeed, this Court is not a trier of facts. Its jurisdiction in appealed
cases is limited to resolving questions of law. This being the case, the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are generally final and conclusive
and cannot be reviewed by this Court, unless they appear to be based on
speculation, surmises or conjectures or when these are not based on
substantial evidence. It is not our function to analyze and weigh all over
again the evidence presented by the parties during trial. Our jurisdiction is in
principle lim-
454
ited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the Court
of Appeals. Factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive
on this Court especially where they are consistently, and sufficiently
supported by the evidence on record. Based on my own reading and analysis
of the Court of Appeals’ Report dated July 30, 2003, the factual findings
contained therein are well supported and established by the records.
MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION of the decision of the

Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Gonzales, Relova & Associates for Heirs of A. Pael, C. Pael &
Andrea Alcantara.
Samuel B. Alentaje for respondents.
Antonio A. Fernandez for L.M. Menor.
Reynaldo A. Ruiz for Roberto Pael, et al.
Fier, Ramos & Associates Law Offices collaborating Counsel
for Destura.
Raul S. Cabanlig for petitioners Jose Pael, et al.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
This treats of the Report submitted to this Court by the Former

Special Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals, dated July 30,
2003, pursuant to our Resolution, dated December 7, 2001, directing
said court to receive evidence on the conflicting claims over the
subject properties covered by TCT Nos. 52928 and 52929 between
private respondents Jorge H. Chin and Renato B. Mallari, on the one
hand, and intervenor University of the Philippines (UP), on the
other.
The case at bar is another crass attempt to grab part of the
Diliman Campus of the University of the Philippines. Over and over
again, this Court has ruled that the title of UP over its Diliman
Campus is indefeasible and beyond dispute. We cannot deviate from
this ruling.
455
VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 11, 2003 455

The facts reveal that on December 9, 1993, Maria Destura filed a

complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against
her husband, Pedro Destura, together with Jorge Chin and Renato
Mallari. The complaint sought the annulment of the memorandum of
agreement (MOA) dated March 26, 1992 executed by Chin and
Mallari as first parties, Pedro Destura as second party, and Jaime
Lumansag, Jr. as third party, over Lot Nos. 588-A and 588-B located
in Barrio Culiat, Quezon City, covered by TCT No. 52928 and TCT
No. 52929. It alleged that Chin and Mallari were former agents of
Pedro Destura, authorized to sell Lot Nos. 588-A and 588-B, then
covered by TCT No. 36048; that when Destura came from Canada,
he discovered that the title to the land has been transferred to Chin
and Mallari in whose names TCT No. 52928 and TCT No. 52929
were registered; that Chin and Mallari executed the MOA subject of
the complaint to appease Destura; that the MOA stated that Chin and
Mallari had a buyer of the lots and they promised to pay Destura one
hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00) upon finality of the sale;
that the sale did not materialize and the payment of the promised
amount has become uncertain, to the prejudice of the Destura
spouses. The complaint also sought the annulment of TCT No.
52928 and TCT No. 52929 as they were allegedly obtained through
fraudulent means. It prayed that the Register
1
of Deeds issue a new
title in the name of the Destura spouses.
The case was dismissed against Pedro Destura after he and his
wife entered into an amicable settlement.
Chin and Mallari, meanwhile, were declared in default for failure
2
to file their Answer.
On January 24, 1995, the trial court rendered a judgment by
default. The trial court nullified the MOA in question. It ruled:
On the issue of the memorandum of agreement, it is to be noted that under

its express terms the payment of the P100,000,000.00 to Pedro Destura
depended on the sale of the properties covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 52928 and 52929 to the alleged ready buyer of the third party,
Jaime B. Lumansag, Jr. Since no sale materialized in accordance therewith
because the buyer backed out of the transactions, the agreement lost its
efficacy. Pursuant to Art. 1181, Civil Code, upon the
_______________
1 Original Records, pp. 1-5.

2 Id. at pp. 33 & 74.
456
non-fulfillment of the condition, the obligation of the defendants under the

memorandum of agreement did not take effect and Destura ceased to be
bound thereby.
That the fulfillment of the condition, i.e., the payment of the
P100,000,000.00 to Destura, already became uncertain and indefinite is also
established competently and conclusively. As a consequence, the
memorandum of agreement should be nullified because it was made to
depend upon a condition that was void for being dependent upon the sole
3
will of the debtors.
The trial court likewise nullified TCT No. 52928 and TCT No.
52929. It found:
Concerning the validity of the transfers of the certificates of title into the
names of defendants Mallari and Chin, the records competently and credibly
show that highly suspicious circumstances attended such transfers of
registered ownership resulting in the issuance of Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 52928 and 52929. The transfers were by virtue of two deeds of
sale covering the land described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 36048
which appear to have been executed on the same date of December 10,
1978. The vendors in the first deed of sale were the spouses Luis and Leony
Menor and those in the other were Roberto Pael, Crisanto Pael, and Teofila
Pael. The deeds were supposedly notarized by a certain Catalino C.
Manalaysay. Yet, as certified to by the Chief of the Archives Division,
Records Management and Archives Office, no copy of the first deed of sale,
Exhibit “U”, was available at said office because the latest notarial record on
file under the name of Catalino C. Manalaysay was for the year 1964.
Another document submitted to support the transfer of the property to the
defendants was a deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate with waiver made
and entered in among Crisanto, Roberto, Teofila, and Cresencia, all
surnamed Pael, under date of December 27, 1965, by which the alleged
heirs of Antonio Pael and Andrea Alcantara divided and adjudicated among
themselves the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 36048.
Again the Chief of the Archives Division, Records Management and
Archives Office, certified that no copy of the document was available at said
office because the notary public before whom the document appeared to
have been acknowledged, one Catalino E. Dumlao, had no records thereat
for the period from January, 1964 to December 18, 1967.
There was, moreover, a certification issued on September 2, 1992 by the
Chief, Official Gazette Publication, National Printing Office, attested (sic)
that there were no records in said office showing that a publication of LRC
Case No. N-10792, LRC Record No. 7672, entitled Spouses Antonio
_______________
3 Id., at p. 138.
457
VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 11, 2003 457

Pael and Andrea Alcantara, et al., Applicants, Petition of Extrajudicial

Settlement had been made in the Official Gazette. This contradicted the
alleged certificate of publication of notice of initial hearing.
The sale appears to have been made in 1978. But if that was so, then it
was fictitious, since the defendants willingly accepted appointments as the
agents of Pedro Destura with authority to sell the property in his behalf only
in 1990. Their act of accepting the appointment was a declaration against
interest, in that they thereby admitted quite expressly the ownership of the
property on the part of the Desturas as late as 1990, in effect debunking the
alleged sale in 1978 in their favor. It is additionally relevant to note that this
fact of Destura’s ownership was further confirmed by the fact that the
defendants caused the transfer of the certificates in their names only in
4
1992.
The trial court then ordered the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to
“cancel Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 52928 and 52929 in the
names of Jorge Chin and Renato B. Mallari and the transfer
certificates of title from which said certificates were derived until but
not including Transfer Certificate of Title No. 36048, and thereafter
reinstate Transfer Certificate of Title No. 36048 in the names of
5
Spouses Antonio Pael and Andrea Alcantara and Crisanto Pael.”
On February 13, 1995, Atty. Oliver Lozano, counsel for Chin and
6
Mallari, filed a notice of appeal. The following day, the trial court
approved the 7
notice of appeal and forwarded the records to the Court
of Appeals.
A week later, Atty. Lozano filed a motion for new trial and a
8
supplemental motion.
On August 28, 1995, the trial court denied the motion for new
trial for lack of merit. It also dismissed the appeal previously
allowed on the ground of abandonment. 9
The trial court’s decision
was thus declared final and executory.
In September 1997, Chin and Mallari, assisted by new counsel,
Atty. Samuel Alentaje, filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition
_______________
4 Id., at pp. 138-139.

5 Id., at pp. 139-140.
6 Id., at p. 141.
7 Id., at p. 142.
8 Id., at pp. 144-149.
9 Id., at pp. 191-197.
458

for Annulment of Judgment. They claimed that the gross negligence

of their former counsel, Atty. Lozano, constituted extrinsic fraud
which prevented them from presenting their case before the trial
court. They also assailed the trial court’s order cancelling their title
and upholding the title of the Paels who were not parties to the
10
case. 11
On April 29, 1998, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in
favor of Chin and Mallari. It annulled the decision of the trial court
upon finding that the gross and reckless negligence of their former
counsel which caused them to be declared in default and which later
led to the dismissal of their appeal and finality of the judgment
amounted to extrinsic fraud. Further, the appellate court reversed the
order of the trial court canceling TCT No. 52928 and TCT No.
52929 and reinstating TCT No. 36048 registered in the name of the
Paels. It also rejected Maria Destura’s claim over the property. It
instead upheld the validity of the sale of 70% of the property by a
certain Luis and Leony Menor and 30% thereof by the Paels to Chin
and Mallari. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated January 24, 1995

and the Order dated August 28, 1995, both issued in Civil Case No. Q-93-
18569, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and accordingly
judgment is issued:
a) DECLARING as valid the memorandum of agreement dated March

26, 1992;
b) DECLARING as null and void both the cancellation of the titles,
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 52928 and 52929 of petitioners
Jorge H. Chin and Renato B. Mallari over the subject property and
the reinstatement of the title Transfer Certificate No. 36048, in the
names of Antonio Pael, Andrea Alcantara and Crisanto Pael;
c) DECLARING the petitioners as the true and absolute owners of the
subject property and ORDERING the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City to REINSTATE the aforementioned titles, TCT Nos. 52928
and 52929 in favor of petitioners Jorge H. Chin and Renato B.
Mallari;
_______________
10 Court of Appeals Rollo, vol. 1, pp. 3-67.

11 Id., at pp. 579-638.
459
VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 11, 2003 459

12
x x x x x x x x x”
The case was elevated to this Court by the Heirs of Pael and by
Maria Destura via separate petitions for review.
The Heirs of Pael argued in G.R. No. 133547:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely misappreciated,

ignored, misapplied and/or overlooked the fact that under
the facts and circumstances of this case, the annulment of
judgment is improper as there was no extrinsic fraud or
reckless and gross negligence committed by private
respondents’ former counsel, Atty. Oliver Lozano, hence,
the assailed decision of the appellate court should be
stricken down for being without credible basis.
2. The Honorable Court of Appeals seriously erred in not
holding that assuming arguendo that extrinsic fraud and
gross and reckless negligence were committed by Atty.
Lozano, private respondents were bound by said extrinsic
fraud and gross and reckless negligence as they themselves
contributed to the commission of such fraud and negligence
of their counsel.
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in not
holding that the revival of the title in favor of Antonio Pael
and Andrea Alcantara and Crisanto Pael, even if they are
not parties to the case below, was a logical consequence of
the default judgment.
4. The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in not
holding that since the default judgment had already long
become final and executory, consequently the reinstatement
of the titles of private respondent and the declaration as null
and void of the title in the names of Antonio Pael and
Andrea Alcantara and Crisanto Pael were erroneous and
improper.
5. The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred when in its
decision it adjudicated the case on the merits, which is
13
procedurally flawed.
Destura raised the following errors in G.R. No. 133843:
1. The ruling of the respondent Court of Appeals that private

respondents are not bound by the negligence and
incompetence of their counsel is erroneous and contrary to
law and jurisprudence.
2. The ruling of the respondent Court of Appeals that the gross
negligence of counsel for private respondents constitutes
“extrinsic fraud” is likewise erroneous and contrary to law

and jurisprudence.
_______________
12 Id., at p. 636.
13 Rollo, G.R. No. 133547, pp. 113-114.
460

3. Granting for the sake of argument, that there is basis to

annul the questioned decision, the action of respondent
Court of Appeals in adjudicating the merits of the case is
contrary to Section 7, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
4. The findings of the respondent Court of Appeals that the
interest of the private respondent in the subject property
over that of petitioner is not borne out by any evidence in
14
the records of the case in the trial court.
On February 10, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision denying both

petitions and affirming the title of Chin and Mallari over the
property.
The Heirs of Pael and Destura filed separate motions for
reconsideration. During their pendency, the University
15
of the
Philippines (UP) filed a motion for intervention, alleging that the
properties covered by TCT Nos. 52928 and 52929 in the names of
Chin and Mallari form part of its Diliman Campus, registered in the
name of UP under TCT No. 9462.
On December 7, 2001, this Court denied the motions for
reconsideration of Destura and the Heirs of Pael, but granted the
motion for intervention filed by UP. The Court remanded the case to
the Court of Appeals for reception of evidence on the conflicting
claims
16
over the property in question by Chin and Mallari as against
UP.
On July 30, 2003, the Former Special Fourth Division of the
Court of Appeals submitted its Report recommending that this Court
recognize the better rights of Chin and Mallari over the property as
against the claim of UP. It made the following observa tions:
It is the view of this court that petitioners have successfully refuted U.P.’s
assertion of ownership over the subject properties, more particularly, the
two (2) parcels of land denominated as Lot No. 588-A consisting of 518,455
square meters, and Lot 588-B, comprising 261,022 square meters, or a total
of 779,477 square meters, or 77.9477 hectares. The preponderance of
evidence supports the claim of petitioners Chin and Mallari over the subject
properties covered by TCT Nos. 52928 and 52929, as shown by the

following:
1. The April 29, 1998 decision of this court and the February 10, 2000
decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. Nos. 133547 and 133843
which
_______________
14 Rollo, G.R. No. 133843, pp. 18-19.

15 Rollo, vol. 3, pp. 873-876.
16 Id., at pp. 1242-1248.
461
VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 11, 2003 461

plainly and categorically stated that petitioners Chin and Mallari

are the true and absolute owners of the subject properties.
2. The December 7, 2001 resolution of the Supreme Court itself
which remanded the instant cases to this court for reception of
evidence merely to determine the conflicting boundary claims of
the parties, petitioners and intervenor U.P.
3. The verification survey report dated January 16, 2003 submitted to
the RTC, Branch 99, Quezon City, which found that “the property
of Jorge Chin and Renato Mallari described on TCT Nos. 52928
and 52929 falls inside and is entirely within the property covered
by TCT Nos. RT-107359 (192689), RT-107350 (192686), RT-
58201 (192687), RT-57441 (192688) PR-32309, registered in the
name of the University of the Philippines.”
4. The findings of Atty. Virgilio B. Tiongson, Assistant Regional
Executive Director for Legal Services and Public Affairs, DENR-
NCR, in his memorandum dated January 14, 2003, that since the
verification and survey report found that the properties of Chin and
Mallari, covered by TCT Nos. 52928 and 52929, “fall(s) inside the
property covered by the titles of the University of the Philippines,”
then there is an apparent overlapping of the titles. His findings
refuted the Tiburcio and other cases cited by U.P. which were found
to be inapplicable and irrelevant to the claim of Chin and Mallari.
Atty. Tiongson recommended that the report on the
verification/relocation survey over the properties covered by TCT
Nos. 52928 and 52929 in the names of Jorge H. Chin and Renato
B. Mallari be adopted as it appears from the record that the
properties of U.P. under TCT No. 9462 overlap the properties of
Chin and Mallari, hence, the same should be returned to Chin and
Mallari, the true and absolute owners thereof.
5. The aforementioned decision of this court dated April 29, 1998 and
the decision of the Supreme Court dated February 10, 2000 in G.R.
Nos. 133547 and 133843 which categorically ruled that petitioner’s
Chin and Mallari are the true and absolute owners of the subject
properties and its resolution dated December 7, 2001 remanding the
cases to this court for reception of evidence to determine the
conflicting boundary claims of petitioners Chin and Mallari and
intervenor U.P.
6. The findings of Geodetic Engineer Mauro Gabriel in the narrative
report dated February 20, 1995 on the verification survey of the
subject properties which he submitted to the Regional Technical
Director, DENR-NCR, who then found that the properties of U.P.
overlap the properties of the Paels identified as Lot 588-A and Lot
588-B, Psd-1006, and recommended that said properties be
excluded from the properties claimed by U.P. under its TCT No.
9462, thus:
“x x x x x x x x x
462

In order to correct whatever mislead (sic) that had been (sic) transpired by the
previous preparation of the Deed of Conveyance is to exclude properties and rights
that had been long existing before the transfer of ownership from the
Commonwealth Government of the Philippines to University of the Philippines. That
is to exclude the private property of the Paels, the survey plan, Psd-1006 from lot 42-
C, Pcs-13 (8th parcel of land) covered by T.C.T. No. 9462 (U.P.).
In view of the foregoing, I am recommending that the long existing private
property of Antonio Pael, et al. (now Jorge H. Chin & Renato B. Mallari) identified
as lots 588-A & 588-B, Psd-1006 be respected and that lot 42-C, Pcs-13 be amended
in order to exclude the private rights from University of the Philippines properties,
upon approval and confirmation of the proper legal authorities concerned.”
17
(emphases supplied)
The Court of Appeals further found that the certificate of title held
by Chin and Mallari originated from OCT No. 730 registered on
May 5, 1914, while that of UP originated from OCT No. 735 which
was allegedly registered on a later date, July 6, 1914. It declared:
This court, after a studied and judicious examination and appreciation of the
totality of the evidence submitted by petitioners Chin and Mallari and
intervenor U.P., finds that petitioners’ TCT Nos. 52928 and 52929
originated from OCT No. 730 which was registered on May 5, 1914. On the
other hand, the court finds that intervenor U.P. has failed to sufficiently
establish that its TCT No. RT-107350 (192689) similarly originated from
the same OCT No. 730. For one, intervenor failed to submit authenticated or
certified copies of the TCT of the Commonwealth of the Philippines which
covers the parcels of land sold to U.P. and which thereafter secured its TCT
No. 9462. To note once more, in her report to the LRA Verification
Committee (Exh. “3”), Atty. Edelwina C. Pastoral lamented that because of
“the loss of said documents, it is difficult to establish the link and determine
the manner of transfer of the lot in question owned by the Tuasons from
OCT No. 730 to TCT No. 2681, TCT No. 6075 & TCT No. 26550, and to
the Commonwealth of the Philippines leading to the issuance of TCT No.
36048 in the name of the latter.” Moreover, the TCTs presented by
intervenor U.P. to prove its ownership of the lands allegedly conveyed to it
by the Commonwealth of the Philippines (marked as Exhs. “1,” “2,” “3,”
“4,” “5” and “6”), uniformly show that the OCT No. 730 which, U.P.
claims, was the root of said TCTs was registered on May 3, 1914. This date
appears, however, to fall on a Sunday, which casts doubts on U.P.’s claim.
_______________
17 Report submitted by Associate Justices Oswaldo D. Agcaoili, Chairman, Eliezer R. De

Los Santos and Danilo B. Pine, pp. 14-16.
463
VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 11, 2003 463

This court, therefore, finds that in line with its observations on the cases
cited by U.P., the latter’s TCT, which overlaps that of petitioners, originated
from another title—OCT No. 735—which was registered on July 6, 1914
18
(see Galvez vs. Tuason, supra).
We rule in favor of intervenor UP.

The facts show that Chin and Mallari and the Desturas trace their
claim of ownership over the property to the Paels. The Desturas
allegedly purchased the property from the Paels through their agent,
a certain Lutgarda Marilao. Chin and Mallari claim that they bought
70% of the property from spouses Luis and Leony Menor, and 30%
thereof directly from the Paels. The Menor spouses, in turn,
allegedly acquired the 70% also from the Paels.
The disputed property, however, is part of the UP Diliman
Campus, covered by TCT No. 9462. It was established, after the
survey conducted by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, National Capital Region (DENR-NCR) that the property
claimed by Chin and Mallari overlaps the property covered by UP’s
title. The superiority of UP’s title over that of the Paels has been
recognized by the courts in an earlier case filed by Roberto Pael, et
al. against UP.
Roberto Pael, et al., previously filed before the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City, Branch 52 a complaint against UP for
declaration of nullity and damages docketed as Civil Case No. Q-

31629. The complainants alleged that they were the heirs of Antonio
Pael and Andrea Alcantara, the registered owners of a parcel of land
consisting of Lot Nos. 588-A and 588-B of subdivision Plan Psd-
1006, located in Barrio Culiat, Quezon City and covered by TCT
No. 36048. They sought to nullify the title of UP, TCT No. 9462,
which also covered said parcel of land. After the complainants
rested their case, UP filed a demurrer to evidence which was denied
by the trial court. UP then went to the Court of Appeals via a
petition for prohibition to restrain the trial court from proceeding
with Civil Case No. Q-31619. UP contended that the question of the
validity of the certificate of title of the land in dispute has been put
to rest in three cases decided by the Supreme Court as early as 1959.
The Court of Appeals granted the petition for prohibition and
permanently enjoined the trial court from hearing and proceeding
with Civil Case No. Q-31619. It cited the findings of this Court in
_______________
18 Id., at p. 25.
464

prior cases that the land in question covered by OCT No. 730 was
originally owned by the Tuasons who sold the same to UP. OCT No.
730 was cancelled and TCT No. 9462 was later issued and registered
in the name of UP. It held that as early as 1959, this Court has
declared that the decree of registration with respect to the land
covered by OCT No. 730 had become conclusive and binding
against the whole world. Upholding the validity of UP’s title over
the property, the Court of Appeals ruled that Pael’s complaint lacked
legal basis. Pael filed before this Court a petition docketed as G.R.
No. 97277 entitled “Roberto Pael, et al. vs. University of the
Philippines” to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. The
petition was denied by this Court on April 15, 1991 for late filing.
Entry of judgment was made on August 15, 1991. The ruling in this
case is final and binds the Paels and all their successors-in-interest
which include Chin and Mallari. Nonetheless, despite the above
decision, Chin and Mallari filed another Petition against UP for
Quieting of Title before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
The petition filed on February 5, 1995 alleged that Chin and Mallari
were the individual owners of Lot Nos. 588-A and 588-B located in
Barrio Culiat, Quezon City and covered by TCT No. 52928 and
TCT No. 52929. They claimed to have derived their titles from TCT
No. 36048 registered under the name of Spouses Antonio Pael and
Andrea Alcantara and their son Crisanto Pael. They alleged that
based on official records and entries in the land registration offices
of the government, there appears to be two TCT No. 36048 in
existence—one registered in the name of the Commonwealth
Government and another registered in the name of the Paels. The
Commonwealth Government’s title was later cancelled and TCT No.
9462 was issued and registered in the name of UP. They averred that
this created a cloud on the title of the Paels from whom they derived
their titles, hence the Petition for Quieting of Title. During the
course of the proceedings, Chin and Mallari filed a “Motion to Order
for Relocation and Verification Survey.” They alleged that there was
a need to define in an appropriate sketch plan the relative locations
of the individual properties of the parties for the purpose of
determining whether their lots were within the perimeter area of
UP’s property. The trial court granted the motion. UP filed a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals to set aside the order of the
trial court granting the motion. The appellate court dismissed the
petition after finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court. UP filed
465
VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 11, 2003 465

a petition for review before the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No.
127537 entitled “University of the Philippines vs. Hon. Felix M. De
Guzman, etc., Jorge H. Chin and Renato B. Mallari.” The petition
was denied on March 19, 1997 as it was filed late. Entry of judgment
was made on August 4, 1997. Hence, in an Order dated August 2,
2002, the Quezon City RTC ordered the DENR-NCR to conduct a
relocation and verification survey of the properties covered by TCT
19
Nos. 52928 and 52929. The Verification Survey Report dated
January 16, 2003 of the DENR-NCR survey team revealed that “the
property of Jorge Chin and Renato Mallari described in TCT Nos.
52928 and 52929 falls inside and is entirely within the property
covered by TCT Nos. RT-107350 (192689), RT-107360 (192689),
RT-58201 (192687) and RT 57441 (192688) PR32309 registered in
20
the name of the University of the Philippines,” confirming its
21
initial findings that there was an overlapping of titles.
It is judicial notice that the legitimacy of UP’s title has been
settled in several other cases decided by this Court. The case of
Tiburcio, et al. vs. People’s Homesite & Housing Corp. (PHHC), et
22
al. was an action for reconveyance of a 430-hectare lot in Quezon
City, filed by the heirs of Eladio Tiburcio against PHHC and UP. A
portion of the disputed land was covered by TCT No. 1356
registered in the name of PHHC and another portion was covered by
TCT No. 9462 registered in the name of UP. Affirming the validity
of TCT No. 1356 and TCT No. 9462, thus Court ruled:
x x x the land in question has been placed under the operation of the Torrens
system since 1914 when it has been originally registered in the name of
defendant’s predecessor-in-interest. It further appears that sometime in 1955
defendant People’s Homesite & Housing Corporation acquired from the
original owner a parcel of land embracing practically all of plaintiff ’s
property for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1356 was issued in its
favor, while defendant University of the Philippines likewise acquired from
the same owner another portion of land which embraces the remainder of
the property for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9462 was issued in
its favor. It is, therefore, clear that the land in question has been registered in
the name of defendant’s predecessor-in-interest since
_______________
19 Exhibit “F” for Respondents, CA Rollo, vol. 3, pp. 1181-1882.

20 Exhibit “G” for Respondents, CA Rollo, vol. 3, pp. 1185-1886.
21 Exhibit “H” for Respondents, CA Rollo, vol. 3, p. 1888.
22 106 Phil. 477 (1959).
466

1914 under the Torrens system and that notwithstanding what they now
claim that the original title lacked the essential requirements prescribed by
law for their validity, they have never taken any step to nullify said title until
1957 when they instituted the present action. In other words, they allowed a
period of 43 years before they woke up to invoke what they claim to be
erroneous when the court decreed in 1914 the registration of the land in the
name of defendants’ predecessor-in-interest. Evidently, this cannot be done
for under our law and jurisprudence, a decree of registration can only be set
aside within one year after entry on the ground of fraud provided no
23
innocent purchaser for value has acquired the property.
Thus, this Court held that the decree of registration in the name of
the predecessor-in-interest of PHHC and UP, as well as the titles
issued pursuant thereto have become incontrovertible.
This Court again affirmed the validity
24
and indefeasibility of UP’s
title in the case of Galvez vs. Tuason, where Maximo Galvez and
the heirs of Eladio Tiburcio sought the recovery of a parcel of land
in Quezon City registered under the names of Mariano Severo,
Maria Teresa Eriberta, Juan Jose, Demetrio Asuncion, Augusto
Huberto, all surnamed Tuason y de la Paz, UP, and PHHC. This is
the same land subject of the controversy in Tiburcio vs. PHHC. This
Court held in Galvez that the question of ownership of the disputed
land has been thrice settled definitely and conclusively by the courts:
first, in the proceedings for the registration of the property in the
name of the Tuasons; second, in the application filed by Marcelino
Tiburcio with the Court of First Instance of Rizal for registration of
the disputed property in his name which was dismissed by said
court; and third, in the action for reconveyance filed by the heirs of
Eladio Tiburcio against PHHC and UP which was also dismissed by
the court, which dismissal was affirmed by this Court in Tiburcio vs.
PHHC. We held that the issue of ownership of the property was
already beyond review.
The rulings in Tiburcio vs. PHHC and Galvez vs. Tuason were
25
reiterated by this Court in PHHC vs. Mencias and Varsity Hills vs.
26
Mariano.
_______________
23 Id., at p. 481.
24 10 SCRA 344 (1964).
25 20 SCRA 1031 (1967).
26 163 SCRA 132 (1988).
467
VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 11, 2003 467

In upholding the alleged right of Chin and Mallari over the property
in dispute, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on the Decision of
this Court dated February 10, 2000 that Chin and Mallari are its true
and absolute owners. It should be emphasized, however, that our
February 10, 2000 Decision involved only the conflicting claims of
Chin and Mallari as against Maria Destura and the Heirs of Pael.
Our Decision upholding the superior rights of Chin and Mallari over
those of the petitioners was based on its findings on the sale of the
property by the Paels and a certain Menor to Chin and Mallari. Thus,
this Court held:
On the other hand, the records show that private respondents are the owners
of the subject property by virtue of the sale to them by the Menors and the
Paels as early as December 10, 1978. As above stated, the Paels sold 70% of
the total land area of the property to the spouses Luis and Leony Menor. The
Menors, in turn, sold to private respondents the same 70%, while the
remaining 30% was sold by the surviving heirs of the Paels to private
27
respondents. x x x.
UP was then not a party in the case and its right over the property
was not considered when this Court rendered its decision. It was
only after the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration that UP
intervened and claimed that the property subject of this case is

within its premises and is titled to its name. Our Decision, therefore,
should not bind UP and our initial ruling as regards the rights of the
original parties to the case should not prejudice the rights of UP. The
remand of the case to the Court of Appeals was precisely intended to
determine the veracity of the allegation of UP that the contested
property is indeed within its premises. And this fact was affirmed in
the Verification Survey Report of the DENR-NCR Survey Team
which found that Lot Nos. 588-A and 588-B overlap the property of
UP. Needless to stress, Chin and Mallari are precluded from
claiming ownership of the land in dispute as the issue of ownership
by UP has long been settled in numerous decisions by this Court,
and have therefore become incontestable.
Contrary to the opinion of the Court of Appeals, the rulings of
this Court in the various cases questioning the validity of UP’s title,
especially in G.R. No. 97277 entitled “Roberto Pael, et al. vs.
University of the Philippines,” apply to the case at bar and consti-
_______________
27 Decision, G.R. Nos. 133547 and 133843, p. 27.
468

tute res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment. There

is conclusiveness of judgment when, between the first case where
the judgment was rendered and the second case where such
judgment is invoked, there is identity of parties, not of causes of
action. The judgment is conclusive in the second case, only as to
those matters actually and directly controverted and determined, and
28
not as to matters merely involved therein.
G.R. No. 97277 involved an action by the Paels to nullify the title
of UP over Lot Nos. 588-A and 588-B which they claim to be
likewise registered in their name. The appellate court affirmed the
validity of UP’s title and held that Pael’s complaint lacked legal
basis. It is admitted in this case that Chin and Mallari derived their
title to Lot Nos. 588-A and 588-B from the Paels. The ruling in the
former case, therefore, insofar as the superiority of UP’s title is
concerned, is conclusive in the case at bar. It has been said that the
foundation principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is
that parties should not be permitted to litigate the same issue more
than once; that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity
for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it
remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those

29
in privity with them in law or estate.
Finally, it should be emphasized that this Court’s Decision in
Tiburcio, et al. vs. PHHC, as well as in the subsequent cases
upholding the validity and indefeasibility of the certificate of title
covering the UP Diliman Campus, precludes the courts from looking
anew into the validity of UP’s title. Thus, the appellate court’s
discourse in the case at bar as regards the origin of UP’s certificate
of title, whether it came from OCT 730 or OCT 735 is intolerable, to
say the least. The rule is that material facts or questions which were
in issue in a former action and were there admitted or judicially
determined are conclusively settled by a judgment rendered therein
and that such facts or questions become res judicata and may not
again be litigated in a subsequent action between the same parties or
their privies, regardless of the form the issue may take in the
subsequent action, whether the subsequent action involves the same
or a different form of proceedings, or whether the
_______________
28 Camara vs. Court of Appeals, 310 SCRA 608 (1999).

29 Calalang vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, 231 SCRA 88 (1994).
469
VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 11, 2003 469

second action is upon the same or a different cause of action, subject

matter, claim or demand, as the earlier action. In such cases, it is
also immaterial that the two actions are based on different grounds,
or tried on different theories, or instituted for different purposes, and
seek different reliefs. By the same token, whatever is once
irrevocably established as the controlling legal principle or decision
continues to be the law of the case between the same parties in the
same case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as
the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the
30
facts of the case before the court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Decision dated February
10, 2000 is SET ASIDE insofar as it declares private respondents
Jorge H. Chin and Renato B. Mallari as the true and absolute owners
of Lot Nos. 588-A and 588-B. The title of intervenor UP over the
disputed property is upheld. Thus, the Registry of Deeds in Quezon
City is ordered to cancel TCT Nos. 52928 and 52929 in the names of
private respondents Jorge H. Chin and Renato B. Mallari, and Civil
Case No. Q-95-22961 filed by private respondents against intervenor
UP before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99, for
quieting of title is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman) and Austria-Martinez, J.,

concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., See dissenting opinion.
Azcuna, J., I agree with the dissent.
DISSENTING OPINION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
With fitting deference to the majority, I vote to maintain our

Decision dated February 10, 2000 and to deny the petition-in-
intervention of the University of the Philippines.
_______________
30 J.C. Lopez & Associates, Inc. vs. Commission on Audit, 364 SCRA 472 (2001),
citing Veloso, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 196 (1996).
470

Considering the factual and evidentiary matters raised by the

University of the Philippines in its petition-in-intervention, we
referred the case to the Court of Appeals since it has the “power to
try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any
1
and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues.” Indeed, this Court
is not a trier of facts. Its jurisdiction in appealed cases is limited to
2
resolving questions of law. This being the case, the findings of fact
of the Court of Appeals are generally final and conclusive and
cannot be reviewed by this Court, unless they appear to be based on
speculation, surmises or conjectures or when these are not based on
3
substantial evidence.
It is not our function to analyze and weigh all over again the
evidence presented by the parties during trial. Our jurisdiction is in
principle limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been
committed by the Court of Appeals. Factual findings of the Court of
Appeals are final and conclusive on this Court especially where they
are consistently, and sufficiently supported by the evidence on
4
record.
Based on my own reading and analysis of the Court of Appeals’
Report dated July 30, 2003, the factual findings contained therein are
well supported and established by the records. Thus, it is my view

that we should adopt its conclusion and recommendation as follows:
“ACCORDINGLY, it is respectfully recommended that a ruling by the

Honorable Supreme Court recognizing the better rights of petitioners Jorge
H. Chin and Renato B. Mallari to the properties covered by their TCT Nos.
52928 and 52929, as against intervenor University of the Philippines, be
issued, without prejudice to the claim of intervenor Pfina Properties, Inc.
thereto, and consistently therewith, the said properties be ordered excluded
from the claim and title of intervenor University of the Philippines.
Enclosed herewith are the records of CA-G.R. SP No. 454245, Vols. I, II
and III.
_______________
1 B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 9, last par., as amended.

2 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 2 (e); 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 45, Sec. 1.
3 Padunan v. DARAB, G.R. No. 132163, 28 January 2003, 396 SCRA 196.
4 Producers Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115324 19 February 2003, 397 SCRA 651.
471
VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 11, 2003 471

5
Respectfully submitted.”
Indeed, it appeared that U.P.’s claim of ownership over the subject

properties is not supported by clear, competent and substantial
evidence. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals evidently found a
preponderance of evidence which buttress the claims of private
respondents to the properties, which it enumerated as:
1. The April 29, 1998 decision of this court and the February
10, 2000 decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. Nos.
133547 and 133843 which plainly and categorically stated
that petitioners Chin and Mallari are the true and absolute
owners of the subject properties;
2. The December 7, 2001 Resolution of the Supreme Court
itself which remanded the instant cases to this court for
reception of evidence merely to determine the conflicting
boundary claims of the parties, petitioners and intervenor
U.P.
3. The verification survey report dated January 16, 2003
submitted to the RTC, Branch 99, Quezon City, which
found that “the property of Jorge Chin and Renato Mallari
described on TCT Nos. 52928 and 52929 falls inside and is
entirely within the property covered by TCT Nos. RT-07359
(192689), RT-107350 (192686), RT-58201 (192687) and
RT-57442 (192688) PR-32309, registered in the name of the

University of the Philippines.”
4. The findings of Atty. Virgilio B. Tiongson, Assistant
Regional Executive Director for Legal Services and Public
Affairs, DENR-NCR, in his memorandum dated January
14, 2003, that since the verification and survey report found
that the properties of Chin and Mallari covered by TCT
Nos. 52928 and 52929 “fall(s) inside the property covered
by the titles of the University of the Philippines,” then there
is an apparent overlapping of the titles. His findings even
refuted the Tiburcio and other cases cited by U.P. which
were found to be inapplicable and irrelevant to the claim of
Chin and Mallari. Atty. Tiongson recommended that the
report on the verification/relocation survey over the
properties covered by TCT Nos. 52928 & 52929 in the
names of Jorge H. Chin and Renato B. Mallari, be adopted
as it appears from the record that the properties of U.P.
under TCT No. 9462 overlap the properties of Chin and
Mallari, hence, the same should be returned to Chin and
Mallari, the true and absolute owners thereof.
5. The aforementioned decision of this court dated April 29,
1998 and the decision of the Supreme Court dated February
10, 2000 in G.R. Nos. 133547 and 133843 which
categorically ruled that petitioners Chin
_______________
5 Report, pp. 26-27; signed by Associate Justices Oswaldo D. Agcaoili, Eliezer R.

De Los Santos and Danilo B. Pine.
472

and Mallari are the true and absolute owners of the subject
properties and its resolution dated December 7, 2001
remanding the cases to this court for reception of evidence
to determine the conflicting boundary claims of petitioners
Chin and Mallari and intervenor U.P.
6. The findings of Geodetic Engineer Mauro Gabriel in the
narrative report dated February 20, 1995 on the verification
survey on the subject properties which he submitted to the
Regional Technical Director, DENR-NCR, who then found
that the properties of U.P. overlap the properties of the Paels
identified as Lot 588-A and Lot 588-B, Psd-1006, and
recommended that said properties to be excluded from the

properties claimed by U.P. under its TCT No. 9462, thus:
“x x x x x x x x x
In order to correct whatever mislead (sic) that had been transpired by the previous
preparation of the Deed of Conveyance is to exclude properties and rights that had
been long existing before the transfer of ownership from the Commonwealth
Government of the Philippines to University of the Philippines. That is to exclude
the private property of the Paels, the survey plan, Psd-1006 from lot 42-C, Pcs-13
(8th parcel of land) covered by T.C.T. No. 9462 (U.P.).
In view of the foregoing, I am recommending that the long existing private
property of Antonio Pael, et al. (now Jorge H. Chin & Renato B. Mallari) identified
as lots 588-A & 588-B, Psd-1006 be respected and that lot 42-C, Pcs-13 be amended
in order to exclude the private rights from University of the Philippines properties,
6
upon approval and confirmation of the proper legal authorities concerned.”
Anent the cases cited by intervenor U.P. in support of its claim of

ownership over the disputed properties, I submit that the Court of
Appeals was correct in stating:
Intervenor U.P. places much reliance on the alleged validity, efficacy,

indefeasibility and imprescriptibility of its title over the subject property
claiming that the same has long been upheld with finality by no less than the
Supreme Court in several cases, to wit:
1. Tiburcio v. People’s Homesite Housing Corporation

106 Phil. 477 (1959)
2. Galvez v. Tuason

10 SCRA 344 (1964)

3. People’s Homesite Housing Corporation v. Mencias
20 SCRA 1031 (1967)
_______________
6 Id., pp. 14-16; emphases in the original.
473
VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 11, 2003 473

4. Katigbak v. Intermediate Appellate Court

GR. No. L-67414, December 7, 1988
5. Varsity Hills v. Mariano

163 SCRA 132 (1988)
6. Pael v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No 97277, April 15,
1992
7. Krus na Ligas Farmers Multi-Purpose Cooperative

v. University of the Philippines
G.R. No. 107622, March 23, 1993
The aforementioned cases fail to support U.P.’s superior claim over the
particular properties being claimed by petitioners Chin and Mallari, nor
uphold U.P.’s title to that specific property. Petitioners Chin and Mallari
have managed to show that the origin or source of U.P.’s purported TCT No.
9462 was OCT No. 735, and not OCT No. 730. The evidence indicates that
U.P. derived its property from the Tuasons, the predecessor-in-interest of the
PHHC and U.P., and that the said property being claimed by U.P. is the one
covered by OCT No. 735 issued on July 6, 1914, and not OCT No. 730
issued on May 5, 1914, which is another property of the Tuasons.
Indeed, the Tiburcio cases readily show that the mother title involved
therein was OCT No. 735, not OCT No. 730. The origin of U.P.’s purported
TCT No. 9462 is OCT No. 735 while that of the Paels, now Chin and
Mallari, is OCT No. 730.
Tiburcio v. People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation, supra, ruled as
follows:
“It appears, however, that the land in question placed under the operation of the
Torrens system since 1914 when it was originally registered in the name of
defendant’s predecessor-in-interest. It further appears that sometime in 1955
defendant People’s Homesite and Housing Corp. acquired from the original owner a
parcel of land embracing practically all of plaintiff’s property for which Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 1356 was issued in its favor while defendant University of
the Philippines likewise acquired from the same owner another portion of land which
embraces the remainder of the property for which Transfer Certificate of Title No.
9462 was issued in its favor while defendant University of the Philippines likewise
acquired from the same owner another portion of land which embraces the remainder
of the property for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9462 was issued in its
favor. x x x.
x x x. Thus it appears that defendant People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation
bought the portion of the property in question from its predecessor-in-interest
sometime in 1955 for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1356 was issued in its
favor. x x x. The same
474

thing is true with regard to defendant University of the Philippines. It likewise

acquired the portion of the property in question sometime in 1955 from its
predecessor-in-interest for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9462 was issued in
its favor. x x x.”
The case of Tiburcio does not support U.P.’s claim of having acquired its
properties from the Commonwealth of the Philippines in a deed of sale
executed by Pres. Quirino on March 1, 1949. The case simply essays that
the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation acquired its property
registered under TCT No. 1356 in 1955 from the original owner. U.P.
likewise acquired its properties registered under TCT No. 9462 in the same
year from the original owners.
A careful reading of the subsequent case of Galvez v. Tuason, supra,
shows that what was involved was OCT No. 735 issued on July 6, 1914 in
the name of the Tuasons. Since the court noted that the same property was
earlier litigated in Tiburcio v. People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation,
supra, then this earlier case involved the same property originally registered
under OCT No. 735, and not OCT No. 730. As a matter of fact, it was
People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation which presented said OCT No.
735 as evidence. Pertinent portions of the decision in Galvez read:
“x x x Their complaint alleged, in substance that they and their predecessors-in-

interest had been in actual, adverse, open, public, exclusive and continuous
possession as owners of a parcel of land located in Quezon City containing an area
of 430 hectares cultivating and enjoying its fruits; that when the PHHC and U.P.
began exercising rights of dominion over the property, they investigated the records
of the Register of Deeds of Rizal and discovered that their property was included
within the technical boundaries set out in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 in the
name of the defendant Tuasons by means of detachable sheets of paper incorporated
to the certificate of title; that by virtue of a deed of donation executed by the Tuasons
in favor of themselves said certificate was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 2680 was issued in their (Tuasons) names; that subsequently the latter sold to
appellee U.P. and PHHC the property covered by TCT No. 2680.
x x x x x x x x x
For its part, the PHHC presented as evidence the Original Certificate of Title No.
735 issued on July 6, 1914 in the name of the Tuasons, its predecessors-in-interest,
covering the property claimed by appellants (Exhibit “1-PHHC”); a certificate of the
Commissioner of Land Registration to the effect that the document thereto attached
is a duplicate copy of the Decree No. 17431, on the basis of which Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued (Exhibit “2-PHHC”); a copy of Decree No.
17431 showing that the property claimed by ap
475
VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 11, 2003 475

pellants was included in the judgment rendered in favor of the Tuasons (Exhibit “2-
A-PHHC”); and a certificate showing the technical description of the property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1356 issued in favor of the PHHC
(Exhibit “3-PHHC”) x x x.”
Perforce, when the Supreme Court held in Galvez that “the question of
ownership with respect to the property in litigation is a matter thrice settled
definitely and conclusively by the courts, and must be deemed well beyond
the reach of review,” it was obviously referring to OCT No. 735 and not to
OCT No. 730.
In short, what has been passed upon with finality by the Supreme Court
in the aforecited cases is the origin of U.P.’s TCT No. 9462 which is TCT
No. 2680 which, in turn, came from OCT No. 735 of the Tuasons. There
thus arise serious doubts as to the factual basis of the March, 1949
Proclamation of President Quirino. It states that the property sold by the
Commonwealth Government to U.P. was covered by TCT No. 36048 of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal, yet it is clear that the title of U.P., TCT No.
9462, did not come nor originate from TCT No. 36048 which belonged to
the Paels, but from TCT No. 2680 of the Tuasons.
It is, therefore, understandable that U.P. has been claiming that its title
originated from OCT No. 730, and that the same was cancelled by TCT No.
9462 from which came TCT No. 36048. This claim is clearly erroneous and
is negated by the foregoing earlier decided cases.
Thus, the statement in Galvez that—
“Clearly, therefore, the question of ownership with respect to the property in

litigation is a matter thrice settled definitely and conclusively by the courts, and must
be deemed well beyond the reach of review.”
clearly refers to OCT No. 735, not to OCT No. 730.
The Supreme Court was categorical and explicit in Galvez and People’s
Homesite and Housing Corporation decisions that the origin of U.P.’s title is
not OCT No. 730, but OCT No. 735, and that the source of its present title,
TCT No. 9462, was TCT No. 2680 of the Tuasons, not TCT No. 36048 of
the Paels.
In any event, even if the Proclamation had any operative force and effect,
it is always subject to private rights which must, perforce, be respected.
The case of Katigbak v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra, also cited
by U.P., could not be appreciated as no copy of the judgment or resolution
alluded to has been submitted to this court. The same observation is made as
regards Krus na Ligas Farmers Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. University of
the Philippines, supra.
476

The resolution dated April 15, 1992 in Pael v. Court of Appeals, supra, is
not relevant as it merely denied the Petition for Review filed by Roberto
Pael, et al., “for having been filed out of time.”
Relevantly, in the same case of CA-G.R. SP No. 39298, this court made
the following observations:
a. Paels’ TCT is presently kept in the vault of the Register of Deeds,

Quezon City; the Philippine Commonwealth Government’s TCT is
missing in the Land Registration Commission Records, as per letter

of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City dated July 30, 1986;
b. Paels’ TCT was issued at 8:36 a.m.; that of the Philippine
Commonwealth Government, at 9:30 a.m.;
c. Paels’ TCT embraces an area located at Bo. Culiat, Quezon City;
that of the Philippine Commonwealth Government, an area located
in Balara, Quezon City;
d. Paels’ TCT was transferred direct from OCT No. 730; that of the
Philippine Commonwealth Government, was transferred from TCT
No. 31990, but even the latter TCT is missing in the records of the
Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal, as per Certification of said
Registry dated November 23, 1947;
e. Paels’ TCT covers 77.9477 hectares; that of the Philippine
Commonwealth Government, only 43.21 hectares;
f. Paels’ TCT contains two (2) lots, 588-A and 588-B; that of the
Philippine Commonwealth Government, it contains seven (7) lots,
namely, Lots 40, 41, 101, 102, 103, 131 and 174;
g. Paels’ TCT subdivision survey plan was approved by the Bureau of
Lands on July 22, 1925, under Psd-1006 with Accession No.
224154, per Certification of the Bureau of Lands dated August 12,
1986; whereas, that of the Philippine Commonwealth Government
has no subdivision survey plan.
What is clear from the cases cited is that intervenor U.P.’s title actually
came from OCT No. 735 of the Tuasons, which was registered on July 6,
1914 (Exhs. “M-2” and “M-3”). Clearly, the registration of the property of
the Tuasons, U.P’s predecessors, was later than the registration of OCT No.
730 on May 5, 1914. The cases also show that OCT No. 735 was replaced
by TCT No. 2680 by virtue of the deed of donation executed by the
Tuasons, who eventually sold the property in 1955 to PHHC under TCT No.
1356, and the remaining portion, also in 1955, to intervenor U.P. under TCT
No. 9462 (Exhs. “M-2” and ‘M-3’). These are judicial findings which
should estop intervenor U.P. from taking any contrary stand now.
Moreover, petitioners point out that it is highly improbable that U.P.’s
title was issued on May 3, 1914 because May 3, 1914 fell on a Sunday when
there were no routine official transactions. They also stress that it is legally
improbable for the Commonwealth to have acquired and later
477
VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 11, 2003 477

for U.P. to have purchased the subject landholdings on November 1, 1938

which is seven (7) months prior to its recorded creation, upon approval of
CA No. 442 only on June 3, 1939. It can neither be the same Tuason’s OCT
No. 730, with its different registration date of May 5, 1914, that gave birth
to TCT No. 36048 (Exh. “C”) in the name of the Paels, which cannot also
be the same as U.P.’s missing TCT No. 36048 of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines.
TCT No. 9462 (Exh. “A”) of U.P. embodied eight (8) specifically
described parcels of land with an area of 4,930,981.30 square meters, which
is nowhere close to Paels’ TCT No. 36048 (Exh. “C”) which covered only
two (2) lots, namely, Lot Nos. 588-A and 588-B with a total area very much
less than that stated in TCT No. 36048 of U.P. Significantly, no
authenticated copies of U.P.’s alleged titles of origin, OCT No. 730 dated
May 3, 1914, and TCT No. 36048 in the name of the Commonwealth of the
7
Philippines, while alleged, have ever been presented by the intervenor U.P.
Furthermore, intervenor U.P.’s claims were belied by the same

reports on which it relied. As the Court of Appeals found:
U.P. invokes the report dated August 27, 1984 of Atty. Edwina C. Pastoral, a
member of the Verification Committee of the LRA (Land Registration
Authority), on the “authenticity” of TCT No. 36048 of the Paels (Exh. “13”
& Annex “16” of U.P.’s Memorandum). An examination of said report
shows that it makes lavish reference to previous other reports, such as the
alleged report dated June 6, 1983 of then Acting Register of Deeds of Pasay
City, Atty. Ramon Manalastas, the report dated July 3, 1984 of then Acting
Register of Deeds of Quezon City, Atty. Vicente N. Caloyan and the letter of
Atty. Josefina C. Ceballos then Special Assistant to the Director of Lands,
wherein she informed the LRA (formerly LRC) that their office cannot trace
the official copy of plan Psd-1006 of the 2 lots covered by TCT No. 36048
of the Paels. Atty. Ceballos appeared to have submitted with her letter
another report of Privadi J.D. Daire, a geodetic engineer of the Lands
Management Bureau (then Bureau of Lands).
The weight of the Pastoral Report is, however, denied by Atty. Pastoral
herself when she pointed out that “vault-keeper Manuel Lim of the Q.C.
Registry could not find in the archives the said deed of sale in favor of U.P.
as well as TCT No. 36048 in the name of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines.” Atty. Pastoral then expressed therein that—
“In view of the loss of said documents, it is difficult to establish the link and
determine the manner of transfer of the lot in question owned by the Tuasons from
OCT No. 730 to TCT No. 2681, TCT No.
_______________
7 Id., pp. 16-22.
478

6075 & TCT No. 26550, and to the Commonwealth of the Philippines leading to the
issuance of TCT No. 36048 in the name of the latter.”
The above admission implicitly confirms that there is indeed a disturbing

doubt as to whether the titles of U.P., allegedly derived from TCT No.
36048 of the Tuasons, are the true facts. At the same time, this supports this
court’s earlier observations that what was confirmed by the cases cited by
U.P. in its memorandum is that U.P’s original mother title is OCT No. 735,
not OCT No. 730. U.P.’s memorandum also cites a report of Mamerto L.
Infante, Regional Technical Director for Management Service, NCR,
DENR, who concluded therein that “an actual relocation survey may be
superfluous because it will just confirm the same technical condition as
established x x x.” This is self-defeating and leads this court to no other
8
alternative than to give the report no probative value.
Private respondents, on the other hand, submitted to the Court of

Appeals credible evidence to show that their titles, over the subject
properties, TCT Nos. 52928 and 52929, originated from OCT No.
730. These are, as enumerated by the Court of Appeals:
1. TCT No. 36048 (Exh. “C”) which was registered on

November 11, 1939 in the names of the Spouses Antonio
Pael and Andrea Pael (Paels) and their son Crisanto Pael,
covering two (2) parcels of land designated as Lot No. 588-
A with an area of 518,455 square meters, and Lot No. 588-
B comprising 261,022 square meters, or a total area of
779,477 square meters (77.9477 hectares).
2. TCT No. 52924 (Exh. “R”) in the names of Crisanto Pael
and Roberto Pael which cancelled TCT No. 36048 upon the
execution of an extrajudicial settlement by the Paels on
December 27, 1965.
3. TCT No. 52925 (Exh. “S”) in the names of the Paels and
Luis Menor which cancelled TCT No. 52924 after Menor
purchased a portion of the land of the Paels on July 24,
1978.
4. TCT No. 52926 (Exh. “I”) in the names of Luis Menor and
petitioners (private respondents) Chin and Mallari which
replaced TCT No. 52925 after the Paels sold their
remaining share to Chin and Mallari on December 10,
1978.
5. TCT No. 52927 (Exh. “U”) in the names of Chin and
Mallari which replaced TCT No. 52926 after Luis Menor
sold his share in the land to the former.
6. TCT Nos. 52928 and 52929 (Exhs. “P” and “Q”) in the
names of Chin and Mallari which were issued upon their
request, thereby cancelling
_______________
8 Id., pp. 23-24.
479
VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 11, 2003 479

TCT No. 52927. These two (2) TCT’s were registered in the Office of the
9
Register of Deeds of Quezon City on January 24, 1992.
Hence, I am constrained to agree with the Conclusion and

Recommendation of the Court of Appeals as follows:
This court, after a studied and judicious examination and appreciation of the
totality of the evidence submitted by petitioners Chin and Mallari and
intervenor U.P., finds that petitioners’ TCT Nos. 52928 and 52929
originated from OCT No. 730 which was registered on May 5, 1914. On the
other hand, the court finds that intervenor U.P. has failed to sufficiently
establish that its TCT No. RT-107350 (192689) similarly originated from
the same OCT No. 730. For one, intervenor failed to submit authenticated or
certified copies of the TCT of the Commonwealth of the Philippines which
covers the parcels of land sold to U.P. and which thereafter secured its TCT
No. 9462. To note more, in her report to the LRA Verification Committee
(Exh. “3”), Atty. Edelwina C. Pastoral lamented that because of “the loss of
said documents, it is difficult to establish the link and determine the manner
of transfer of the lot in question owned by the Tuasons from OCT No. 730
to TCT No. 2681, TCT No. 6075 & TCT No. 26550, and to the
Commonwealth of the Philippines leading to the issuance of TCT No.
36048 in the name of the latter.” Moreover, the TCT’s presented by
intervenor U.P. to prove its ownership of the lands allegedly conveyed to it
by the Commonwealth of the Philippines (marked as Exhs. “1,” “2,” “3,”
“4,” “5” and “6”), uniformly show that the OCT No. 730 which U.P. claims,
was the root of said TCT’s was registered on May 3, 1914. This date
appears, however, to fall on a Sunday, which casts doubts on U.P.’s claim.
This court, therefore, finds that in line with its observations on the cases
cited by U.P., the latter’s TCT, which overlaps that of petitioners, originated
from another title—OCT No. 735—which was registered on July 6, 1914
(see Galvez v. Tuason, supra)
In Benin v. Tuason, 57 SCRA 531 (1974), it was held that the original
certificate of title takes effect upon the date of its entry in the registration
book of the Register of Deeds of the city or province where the property is
situated, and the land thereby becomes registered land on that date. (see
also, secs. 39 and 40 of P.D. No. 1529). The land covered by OCT No. 730
of the Tuason, thus, became registered land as of May 5, 1914, ahead of the
registration of OCT No. 735 on July 6, 1914.
Although intervenor U.P. appears to hold a certificate of title over the
same property covered by petitioner’s TCT Nos. 52928 and 52929, it
certainly could not claim a better right to the property than petitioners. It has
been aptly commented that:
_______________
9 Id., p. 24.
480

“The simple possession of a certificate of title does not necessary make the holder
thereof a true owner of all the property described therein, such as when such title
includes by mistake or oversight land which can no longer be registered under the
Torrens system, as when the same land had already been registered and an earlier
certificate for the land is existence.” (Land Registration and Related Proceedings by
Amado D. Aquino, 2002 Ed., p. 144, citing Avila vs. Tapucar, 201 SCRA 148, 156
[1991], Miranda vs. Court of Appeals, 177 SCRA 303 [1989], Register of Deeds vs.
PNB, 13 SCRA 46 [1965], and other cases).
In Register of Deeds v. Philippine National Bank, supra, it was also held

that the indefeasibility of title could be claimed only if a previous valid title
to the same land does not exist. Nor does the incontestable character of
Torrens certificate apply when the land covered thereby is not capable of
registration (Martinez v. Court of Appeals, 56 SCRA 647 [1974]; Republic v.
Court of Appeals, 99 SCRA 743 [1980]), as when it is private property.
The rule has also been laid down that a certificate of title is likewise not
conclusive of ownership where the certificate itself is faulty as to its
purported origin. Thus, where the holder of a transfer certificate of title
claims that its origin as reflected in the certificate is not the true original
certificate of title but another certificate of title, then the derivative
certificate’s conclusiveness is not indubitable (Widows and Orphans
Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA 165 [1991]). This rule
equally applies even when, as in the case at bar, it is another party who
disputes the origin of a derivative certificate.
This court does not in this report make a finding that intervenor U.P.
illegally obtained titles over the contested property. But given the fact that
petitioners’ TCT’s are transfer certificates from OCT No. 730 which was
earlier registered than OCT No. 735, and by reason of the above-cited
rulings and jurisprudence governing the Torrens system of registration, this
court must inevitably submit that petitioners have a better right of ownership
10
over the property in dispute than U.P.
However, while I agree with the Court of Appeals that the rights of
respondents Chin and Mallari to the properties in dispute must be
upheld, the same should not be made subject to the claims of PFINA
Properties, Inc. In other words, I believe that the Court of Appeals
erred when it granted PFINA’s motion for leave to intervene. It is
too late in the day for PFINA to intervene after judgment in the main
case has already become final. These proceedings
_______________
10 Id., pp. 25-26; emphases in the original.
481
VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 11, 2003 481

are only for the determination of the conflicting claims of intervenor

U.P. Insofar as the other parties are concerned, this case has already
been terminated with finality in our Resolution dated December
2001.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, I dissent from the majority Resolution
and vote to deny the petition-in-intervention filed by intervenor
University of the Philippines for lack of merit.
Decision of February 10, 2000 set aside. Title of UP over
disputed land upheld and Registry of Deeds of Quezon City ordered
to cancel TCT Nos. 52928 and 52929 in the names of Jorge H. Chin
and Renato B. Mallari. Civil Case No. 95-22961 against U.P.
dismissed.
Notes.—The principle of indefeasibility of title is unavailing

where there was fraud that attended the issuance of the free patents
and titles. (Meneses vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 162 [1995])
When two certificates of title are issued to different persons
covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must
prevail, and, in the case of successive registrations where more than
one certificate is issued over the same land, the person holding a
proper certificate is entitled to the land as against a person who relies
on a subsequent certificate. (Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA
713 [1998])
——o0o——
482
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029B - Heirs of Antonio Pael vs. Court of Appeals

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9/22/22, 2:05 AM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 415

VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 11, 2003 451

HEIRS OF ANTONIO PAEL and ANDREA ALCANTARA and

MARIA DESTURA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JORGE

Judgments; Land Titles; The superiority of University of the

* SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION.

452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heirs of Antonio Pael vs. Court of Appeals

Same; Same; The private parties are precluded from claiming

VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 11, 2003 453

Heirs of Antonio Pael vs. Court of Appeals

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Actions; Evidence; Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are

454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heirs of Antonio Pael vs. Court of Appeals

MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION of the decision of the

This treats of the Report submitted to this Court by the Former

VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 11, 2003 455

The facts reveal that on December 9, 1993, Maria Destura filed a

On the issue of the memorandum of agreement, it is to be noted that under

1 Original Records, pp. 1-5.

non-fulfillment of the condition, the obligation of the defendants under the

VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 11, 2003 457

Pael and Andrea Alcantara, et al., Applicants, Petition of Extrajudicial

4 Id., at pp. 138-139.

458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

for Annulment of Judgment. They claimed that the gross negligence

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated January 24, 1995

a) DECLARING as valid the memorandum of agreement dated March

10 Court of Appeals Rollo, vol. 1, pp. 3-67.

VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 11, 2003 459

1. The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely misappreciated,

Destura raised the following errors in G.R. No. 133843:

1. The ruling of the respondent Court of Appeals that private

“extrinsic fraud” is likewise erroneous and contrary to law

460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

3. Granting for the sake of argument, that there is basis to

On February 10, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision denying both

properties covered by TCT Nos. 52928 and 52929, as shown by the

14 Rollo, G.R. No. 133843, pp. 18-19.

VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 11, 2003 461

plainly and categorically stated that petitioners Chin and Mallari

“x x x x x x x x x

462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

17 Report submitted by Associate Justices Oswaldo D. Agcaoili, Chairman, Eliezer R. De

VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 11, 2003 463

We rule in favor of intervenor UP.

declaration of nullity and damages docketed as Civil Case No. Q-

464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 11, 2003 465

19 Exhibit “F” for Respondents, CA Rollo, vol. 3, pp. 1181-1882.

466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 11, 2003 467

intervened and claimed that the property subject of this case is

27 Decision, G.R. Nos. 133547 and 133843, p. 27.

468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

tute res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment. There

remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those

28 Camara vs. Court of Appeals, 310 SCRA 608 (1999).

VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 11, 2003 469

second action is upon the same or a different cause of action, subject

Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman) and Austria-Martinez, J.,

With fitting deference to the majority, I vote to maintain our

470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED