G.R NO.

112287
NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION , Petitioner vs
COURT OF APPEALS AND VLASONS SHIPPINGS, INC., Respondents

FACTS
 The MV Vlasons I is a vessel which renders tramping service and, as such, does not
transport cargo or shipment for the general public. Its services are available only to
specific persons who enter into a special contract of charter party with its owner. The
ship is a private carrier, and it is in this capacity that its owner, Vlasons Shipping, Inc.
(VSA), entered into a contract of affreightment or contract of voyage charter hire with
National Steel Corporation (NSC) on 17 July 1974, whereby NSC hired VSI’s vessel, the
MV ‘VLASONS I’ to make 1 voyage to load steel products at Iligan City and discharge
them at North Harbor, Manila
 The shipment was placed in the 3 hatches of the ship which arrived with the cargo at
Pier 12, North Harbor, Manila, on 12 August 1974. The following day, when the vessel’s
3 hatches containing the shipment were opened by NSC’s agents, nearly all the skids of
tinplates and hot rolled sheets were allegedly found to be wet and rusty. The cargo was
discharged and unloaded by stevedores hired by the Charterer.
 On 6 September 1974 NSC filed with VSI its claim for damages suffered due to the
downgrading of the damaged tinplates in the amount of P941,145.18. Then on 3
October 1974, NSC formally demanded payment of said claim but VSI refused and failed
to pay.
On appeal, and on 12 August 1993, the Court of Appeals modified the decision of the
trial court by reducing the demurrage from P88,000.00 to P44,000.00 and deleting the
award of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation. NSC and VSI filed separate motions
for reconsideration. The CA denied both motions. NSC and VSI filed their respective
petitions for review before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE
 Whether or not VSI contracted with NSC as a common carrier or a private carrier.

RULING
 Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a common carrier as “persons, corporations, firms
or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods
or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public.” It
has been held that the true test of a common carrier is the carriage of passengers or
goods, provided it has space, for all who opt to avail themselves of its transportation
service for a fee.
 A carrier which does not qualify under the test of a common carrier is deemed a private
carrier. “Generally, private carriage is undertaken by special agreement and the carrier
does not hold himself out to carry goods for the general public. The most typical,
although not the only form of private carriage, is the charter party, a maritime contract
by which the charterer, a party other than the shipowner, obtains the use and service of
all or some part of a ship for a period of time or a voyage or voyages.”Herein, VSI did
not offer its services to the general public. It carried passengers or goods only for those
it chose under a “special contract of charter party.” The MV Vlasons I “was not a
common but a private carrier.” Consequently, the rights and obligations of VSI and NSC,
 including their respective liability for damage to the cargo, are determined primarily by
stipulations in their contract of private carriage or charter party.
 In Valenzuela Hardwood and Industrial Supply, Inc., vs. Court of Appeals and Seven
Brothers Shipping Corporation, the Court ruled that “in a contract of private carriage, the
parties may freely stipulate their duties and obligations which perforce would be binding
on them. Unlike in a contract involving a common carrier, private carriage does not
involve the general public. Hence, the stringent provisions of the Civil Code on common
carriers protecting the general public cannot justifiably be applied to a ship transporting
commercial goods as a private carrier. Consequently, the public policy embodied therein
is not contravened by stipulations in a charter party that lessen or remove the protection
given by law in contracts involving common carriers.”
 From the parties’ Contract of Voyage Charter Hire, dated 17 July 1974, VSI “shall not be
responsible for losses except on proven willful negligence of the officers of the vessel.”
The NANYOZAI Charter Party, which was incorporated in the parties’ contract of
transportation further provided that the shipowner shall not be liable for loss of or
damage to the cargo arising or resulting from unseaworthiness, unless the same was
caused by its lack of due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy or to ensure that the
same was “properly manned, equipped and supplied,” and to “make the holds and all
other parts of the vessel in which cargo was carried, fit and safe for its reception,
carriage and preservation.” The NANYOZAI Charter Party also provided that “owners
shall not be responsible for split, chafing and/or any damage unless caused by the
negligence or default of the master or crew.”
Herein, NSC must prove that the damage to its shipment was caused by VSI’s willful
negligence or failure to exercise due diligence in making MV Vlasons I seaworthy and fit
for holding, carrying and safekeeping the cargo. Ineluctably, the burden of proof was
placed on NSC by the parties’ agreement.
Article 361 of the Code of Commerce provides that “Merchandise shall be transported at
the risk and venture of the shipper, if the contrary has not been expressly stipulated.
Therefore, the damage and impairment suffered by the goods during the transportation,
due to fortuitous event, force majeure, or the nature and inherent defect of the things,
shall be for the account and risk of the shipper. The burden of proof of these accidents
is on the carrier.”
 Article 362 of the Code of Commerce provides that “The carrier, however, shall be liable
for damages arising from the cause mentioned in the preceding article if proofs against
him show that they occurred on account of his negligence or his omission to take the
precautions usually adopted by careful persons, unless the shipper committed fraud in
the bill of lading, making him to believe that the goods were of a class or quality
different from what they really were.”
 As the MV Vlasons I was a private carrier, the shipowner’s obligations are governed by
the foregoing provisions of the Code of Commerce and not by the Civil Code which, as a
general rule, places the prima facie presumption of negligence on a common carrier.
 The Supreme Court denied the consolidated petitions; and affirmed the questioned
Decision of the Court of Appeals with the modification that the demurrage awarded to
VSI is deleted. No pronouncement as to costs.
 GR NO. 174156
FILCAR TRANSPORT SERVICES, Petitioner v
JOSE A. ESPINAS, Respondent

FACTS

 Respondent Jose A. Espinas was driving his car along Leon Guinto Street in Manila
when he was suddenly hit by another car. Upon verifying with the LTO, Espinas
learned that the owner of the other car is Filcar. This car was assigned to Filcar’s
Corporate Secretary Atty. Candido Flor and, at the time of the incident, was driven
by Atty. Flor’s personal driver, Timoteo Floresca.
 Espinas sued Filcar for damages. Filcar denied liability, claiming that the incident
was not due to its fault or negligence since Floresca was not its employee but that
of Atty. Flor.

ISSUE
 Whether or not Filcar, as registered owner of the motor vehicle which figured in
an accident, may be held liable for the damages caused to the Espinas

RULING
 Filcar, as registered owner, is deemed the employer of the driver, Floresca, and
is thus vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation with Article 2180 of the
Civil Code
 Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though
the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
 It is well settled that in case of motor vehicle mishaps, the registered owner of
the motor vehicle is considered as the employer of the tortfeasor-driver, and is
made primarily liable for the tort committed by the latter under Article 2176, in
relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code.
 In so far as third persons are concerned, the registered owner of the motor
vehicle is the employer of the negligent driver, and the actual employer is
considered merely as an agent of such owner.
 The main aim of motor vehicle registration law is to identify the owner so that if
any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on
public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the
registered owner.
 The registered owner can recover from the actual owner and the driver under
the doctrine of unjust enrichment
 The set-up may be inconvenient for the registered owner of the motor vehicle,
but the inconvenience cannot outweigh the more important public policy being
advanced by the law in this case which is the protection of innocent persons who
may be victims of reckless drivers and irresponsible motor vehicle owners.
 Petition is DENIED. The decisions of the CA are AFFIRMED.