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Estate of Marcus Hartsfield V Oakridge Et Al
Estate of Marcus Hartsfield V Oakridge Et Al
Estate of Marcus Hartsfield V Oakridge Et Al
EUGENE DIVISION
Defendants.
•
Plaintiff is THE EST ATE OF MARCUS HARTSFIELD (hereafter "the estate") acting through
OAKRIDGE, OREGON ( hereafter "the city''), LANE COUNTY, OREGON (hereafter "the
ATTORNEY FOR LANE COUNTY, OREGON (hereafter "the district attorney"), and shows as
follows:
VENUE
1.
Venue is proper within the district of Oregon because the events giving rise to this claim
occurred in this judicial district, and all defendants reside in this district, 28 USC sec. 1391
(b )(2). The acts and conduct complained of herein occurred in Lane County, Oregon. Thi s court
has jurisdiction over the subject matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.. The court has supplemental
jurisdiction over the state tort claims because they arise out of the same case or controversy
2.
RHONDA GILBREATH is a resident of Lane County, Oregon and is the personal representative
of the Estate of Marcus Hartsfield, Cause No. 22PB01033 , presently pending in the circuit court
3.
Defendant City is a duly organized municipal corporation under Oregon law. City may be served
with process by serving its mayor, Christina A Hollett, 48370 7th Street, Oakridge, OR 97463.
Public bodies are liable for the tortious conduct of their agents and employees pursuant to ORS
4.
Defendant County is a political subdivision of the State of Oregon. County may be served with
process through the Lane County District Attorney, Patricia Perlow, 125 E 8th Ave #400,
Eugene, OR 97401.
5.
Defendant Steve Davidson was an Officer of the Oakridge, Oregon Police Department during the
incident giving rise to this complaint, and was at all material times herein an agent, servant,
and/or employee of the city of Oakridge. Officer Davidson may be served with process at his
place of employment, Oak Ride Police Department, 76435 Ash Street, Oakridge, OR 97463.
6.
Defendant Patricia Perlow was the District Attorney for Lane County, Oregon, during the events
giving rise to this complaint. Defendant Perlow may be served with process at her place of
employment, Lane County District Attorney, 125 E 8th Ave., #400, Eugene, OR 97401.
7.
8.
The incident occurred at 76360 Rainbow St. Oakridge, Lane County, Oregon.
FACTS
9.
On or about October 16, 2019, Mr. Marcus Hartsfield (hereafter "Mr. Hartsfield" or "decedent")
had a mental episode and cut himself with a razor blade on his arms, stomach, and neck at the
10.
Family members, including without limitation, Dylan Gardiner, "Amanda," and "David", called
"911 ", and told the call taker that Mr. Hartsfield was suicidal, and requested immediate medical
assistance.
11.
Although the family had requested medical assistance, Oakridge Police Officer Steve Davidson
12.
Officer Davidson did not announce himself when he entered the scene.
13.
Officer Davidson did not have an arrest warrant for decedent. Officer Davidson did not state that
decedent was under arrest and did not take steps to put him in custody.
14.
Officer Davidson did not attempt communication with the bystanders on scene.
15.
There was no crime in progress when officer Davidson entered the scene.
16.
Shortly after his arrival, Officer Davidson, without warning, shot Mr. Hartsfield three times with
his gun, twice in the chest and once on the chin, ultimately causing his death.
17.
One of the shots was fired after Mr. Hartsfield had collapsed on the ground.
18.
There were several bystanders standing behind Mr. Hartsfield in the line of fire when the shots
were fired .
19.
Decedent' s father, Ronald Hartsfield, a former combat medic, and an ambulance, arrived on
20.
Officer Davidson prevented the father and ambulance crew from rendering aid to decedent for a
21.
Witnesses saw a body camera on officer Davidson at the time of the incident.
22.
23.
After the death of Mr. Hartsfield, and on or about November 1, 2019, Defendant Patricia Perlow,
the District Attorney for Lane County, Oregon, issued a press release directed to the "Lane
County media", which stated in part that:" ... Preliminary toxicology confirmed the presence of
24.
Contrary to the statement in paragraph 23 above, neither the autopsy, toxicology report, or
narcotic, or even alcohol, in the decedent' s system at the time of death. Plaintiff is unaware of
any other reports or investigations, of any type or nature, confirming the presence of any narcotic
Timely Tort Claim Notice under ORS 30.275 was sent to the City of Oakridge and to Lane
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, 436 U.S. 658) and 42 U.S. CODE§ 1983
City of Oakridge
26.
27.
There is an obvious need to train police officers to deal with persons attempting suicide, which is
the city of Oakridge had a legal duty to train its police officers in dealing with suicidal situations.
28.
The egregious conduct of officer Davidson in responding to this suicide attempt by shooting and
killing the victim under the circumstances described in paragraphs 9-14 above, displays such an
city to the training of its police officers, such as to constitute a deliberate policy choice. The lack
of training was further shown by the officer's lack of professional assessment of the incident
scene and failure to consult the on-site witnesses prior to discharging his gun.
29.
The failure by the city to provide adequate training was closely related to the wrongful death of
decedent, for which it is legally liable for damages under the Monell doctrine and 42 USC
section 1983.
30.
31.
Officer Davidson intended to and did cause harm to decedent, by using deadly force without
Officer Davidson's use of deadly force was excessive and unreasonable because, without
limitation: 1. No crime was in progress, 2. Decedent posed no immediate threat to the officer, 3.
Decedent was not resisting arrest, 4 .. The officer had adequate time to properly evaluate the
situation and determine the appropriate amount of force, 5. The use of any force, much less
deadly force, was not appropriate under the circumstances, 6. Numerous alternatives were
available for detaining decedent in custody, if that were necessary, 7. The officer placed other
lives at risk by using deadly force, 8. The officer gave no warning prior to using deadly force, 9.
The officer was on notice that decedent was mentally ill, 10. A reasonable officer should have
perceived that decedent posed no imminent threat, 11. The officer had no probable cause to
believe decedent had committed a crime involving the infliction, or threatened infliction, of
serious physical harm, and 12 .. The cumulative facts and circumstances of the incident did not
32.
Based on the acts, conduct and omissions described in paragraph 23 above, officer Davidson and
the city are jointly and severally liable for damages for the wrongful death of Mr. Hartsfield
caused hy the use of excessive force, pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
SECTION 1983
33.
34.
Officer Davidson intentionally and unreasonably restrained decedent by shooting and killing
him, and by refusing to allow medical intervention. This restraint and seizure were umeasonable
because under the facts known to officer Davidson, probable cause did not exist since
an objectively reasonable police officer would not have concluded that there was a fair
35.
Based on the acts, conduct and omissions described in paragraph 26 above, officer Davidson and
the city are jointly and severally liable for damages for the wrongful seizure and detention of Mr.
Hartsfield caused by their violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and 42
36.
37.
Officer Davidson ' s actions, as described in the above paragraphs 1-14 were so egregious and
evaluate the incident scene before using deadly force, 2. Failing to announce his presence as a
police officer, 3. Failing to consider use of possible alternatives to deadly force, 4. Failing to
warn before using deadly force, 5. Using any force, much less deadly force, when force was not
reasonably necessary, 6. Shooting decedent with knowledge he was mentally ill, 7. Shooting
decedent when he was not resisting and did not pose an imminent threat, 8. Shooting the
decedent when he was incapacitated on the ground, 9. Shooting decedent without probable cause
to believe decedent had committed a crime involving the infliction, or threatened infliction, of
serious physical harm and 10. Endangering innocent bystanders with the shooting of his gun .. As
indicated, these outrageous actions directly caused Mr. Hartsfield' s death, for which officer
Davidson is liable for damages under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and
38.
The city ' s lack of training in de-escalation and proper detention was so egregiously and
outrageously inept that it ultimately led to the incompetent actions of its agent as described in the
above paragraph 29, and the ensuing death of Mr. Hartsfield, for which it is legally culpable
along with is agent, officer Davidson, under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
39.
40.
Officer Davidson's actions, conduct and omissions as described in the above paragraphs, caused
a foreseeable risk of harm to decedent's life, health, and welfare, and to the welfare of the
bystanders, by 1. Failing to make adequate effort to evaluate the incident scene before using
deadly force, 2. Failing to announce his presence as a police officer, 3. Failing to consider use of
possible alternatives to deadly force, 4. Failing to warn before using deadly force, 5. Using any
force, much less deadly force, when force was not reasonably necessary, 6. Shooting decedent
with knowledge he was mentally ill, 7. Shooting decedent when he was not resisting and did not
pose an imminent threat, 8. Shooting the decedent when he was incapacitated on the ground, 9.
Shooting decedent without probable cause to believe decedent had committed a crime involving
the infliction, or threatened infliction, of serious physical harm and l 0. Endangering innocent
bystanders with the shooting of his gun. As indicated, these actions and omissions were
unreasonable in light of the risk, and caused the death of Marcus Hartsfield, and endangered the
bystanders, for which the city and officer Davidson are jointly and severally responsible for
damages under ORS § 30.265, since officer Davidson was acting within the scope of his
41.
42.
Officer Davidson's actions in shooting and killing decedent, and then denying him medical
attention that could possibly have saved his life, constitute a false imprisonment and unlawful
arrest under Oregon law because: 1. Decedent was "confined" by the officer's actions, 2. The
officer's actions were intentional, 3. Decedent was aware of his confinement, and 4. The
confinement was unlawful. The confinement was unlawful because: I. There was no arrest
warrant, and 2. Officer Davidson had no probable cause, because there was no substantially
objective basis for believing that, more likely than not, an offense had been committed, and that
Mr. Hartsfield had committed it, see. ORS section 131.005(11 ). The city and officer Davidson
are therefore jointly and severally liable for the damages caused by the false imprisonment and
unlawful arrest since officer Davidson was acting within the scope of his employment or duties
LAW)
43.
44.
Officer Davidson's actions in shooting decedent were obviously an intentional harmful contact
causing severe injury and death and are actionable as a legal battery under Oregon law. Officer
Davidson was not justified in using deadly force because: 1. There was no legal basis for an
arrest, see paragraph 34 above, 2. Decedent was not committing any crime at the time of the
battery, 3. There was no threat of imminent deadly force from decedent toward officer Davidson
or any third party, and 4 there was no need for self-defense or to defend a third person from what
the peace officer reasonably believed to be the use or imminent use of physical force while
see ORS section 161.239. The city and officer Davidson are therefore jointly and severally
liable for the damages caused by the battery since officer Davidson was within the scope of his
45.
46.
Based on the acts, conduct and omissions of officer Davidson as described in detail in this
complaint, Plaintiff Rhonda Gilbreath, as representative of the estate of her deceased son, may
sue for damages for the wrongful death of her son, including medical and funeral services; the
pecuniary loss to the estate as a result of the death; lost society, companionship and services of
her son, and any other fair, just, and reasonable pecuniary compensation to the estate, pursuant to
ORS section 30.020. The officer and the city are jointly and severally liable since officer
Davidson was acting within the scope of his employment or duties with the city at the time of the
incident.
47.
48
Plaintiff believes the D.A. had no reasonable basis supporting her statement, and that it was at
best negligent, and at worst, intentionally defamatory. Plaintiff alleges that the statement had at
least the potential to impugn Mr. Hartsfield in the public eye, and therefore to adversely affect
the Plaintiff's constitutional right to a fair trial under the federal and Oregon state constitutions.
49.
Plaintiff alleges the statement also violated the constitutional right to be free from state
interference with the peaceful remembrance of a decedent and violated constitutional privacy
rights by disclosing unflattering information to the public, which need not have been disclosed,
50.
Plaintiff seeks its reasonable damages flowing from these violations of constitutional rights in an
amount not exceeding $20,000.00, pursuant to 42 USC section 1983, against the defendant
Perlow individually.
Lane County
51.
52.
Ms. Perlow's statement was defamatory by subjecting decedent to hatred, contempt, and ridicule,
and by tending to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill, or confidence in which the decedent
was held, or by exciting adverse, derogatory, or unpleasant feelings or opinions against the
decedent.
53.
As stated above, the statement was widely disseminated to the public in Lane County.
54.
As a result of the publication of the defamatory statement, plaintiff seeks its reasonable general
damages naturally flowing therefrom in the amount of $20,000.00, against the defendant county.
Lane County
55.
56.
By disparaging the decedent, Ms. Perlow either intentionally or negligently violated the
constitutionally protected interest of the estate to receive a fair trial for the wrongful actions of
the Oakridge police. Her statement also intentionally or negligently invaded the Hartsfield
family's privacy rights to be free of interference with peaceful remembrance of the decedent, by
57.
As the certain, or substantially certain, and foreseeable consequence of Ms. Perlow's conduct,
the Hartsfield family suffered, and continues to suffer, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment,
and anger, causing emotional distress and mental anguish in the amount of $20,000.00, for which
58.
Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this complaint to adjust each claim for damages and to add
ECONOMIC DAMAGES
59.
As a result of the actions described herein. Plaintiff incurred economic damages, which include
the decedent's social security benefits of $786.00 per month, for the 46 years of his remaining
damages from Defendants, City of Oakridge, and Officer Steve Davidson, jointly and severally.
NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES
60.
Based on the Causes of Action numbers 1 through 7 above, Plaintiff and the Hartsfield family
endured pain and suffering, and the loss of the life and companionship of Marcus Hartsfield. for
which it seeks the sum of $9,000,000.00 in non-economic damages from Defendants, City of
NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES
61.
Based on the Cause of Action number 8 above, Plaintiff and the Hartsfield family endured pain
and suffering, and mental distress for which it seeks the sum of $20,000.00 in non-economic
NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES
Lane County
62.
Based on the Causes of Action number 9 and 10 above, Plaintiff and the Hartsfield family have
suffered general damages from the libelous statements and endured pain and suffering, and
mental distress for which they seek the sum of $20,000.00 in non-economic damages from
63.
Pursuant to 42 USC 1988, Plaintiffs is entitled to recover reasonable attorney ' s fees and
64.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants, City of Oakridge, and Officer
Steve Davidson, jointly and severally, for Plaintiff's economic damages of $433, 872.00, and
non-economic damages in the amount of $9,000,000.00 for a total prayer amount of $9,
433,872.00.
65.
Plaintiff prays for judgment on its 8th cause of action against Defendant Patricia Perlow, for
66.
Plaintiff prays for judgment on its 9 th a nd 10th causes of action against Defendant Lane County for
67.
Plaintiff prays for judgment for its reasonable attorney fees pursuant to 42 USC section 1988(b ).
68.
Plaintiff also seeks costs, disbursements and for any other relief that the Court deems just and
equitable.
Respectfully submitted
2 U.S. Government 4 Diversity Citizen of Another State 2 2 Incorporated and Principal Place 5 5
Defendant (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III) of Business In Another State
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