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Who's socializing whom? Complex engagement in

Sino-ASEAN relations

Alice D. Ba

To cite this article: Alice D. Ba (2006) Who's socializing whom? Complex engagement in Sino-
ASEAN relations, The Pacific Review, 19:2, 157-179, DOI: 10.1080/09512740500473163

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The Pacific Review, Vol. 19 No. 2 June 2006: 157–179

Who’s socializing whom? Complex

engagement in Sino-ASEAN relations

Alice D. Ba

Abstract This article draws on constructivist approaches to explore processes of

socialization in the context of evolving relations between China and the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Constructivist discussions have challenged
traditional accounts of socialization; however, left under-examined are the processes
by which social learning and social change take place. This article contributes to
the theoretical discussion with its examination of ASEAN’s regional engagement
processes. It treats ASEAN states’ ‘complex engagement’ of China as an exercise
in argumentative persuasion, which seeks common agreement via a deliberative,
non-coercive process. In contrasting ASEAN’s particular style of engagement with
other models that emphasize more coercive and utilitarian strategies of persuasion,
the article draws attention to how particular kinds of interaction may facilitate so-
cial learning, as well as the conditions that may make social learning more likely.
Particular attention is paid to the roles played by power asymmetries, uncertainty,
and different kinds of engagement (mutual and interactive versus closed and unidi-
rectional) in social learning, as well as the importance of viewing socialization as a
process that involves different stages.

Keywords China; ASEAN; Southeast Asia; engagement; socialization; construc-

tivism.

Introduction
This article explores questions of socialization in the context of China’s
evolving relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) and the latter’s engagement of China over the last fifteen years.

Alice D. Ba is Assistant Professor of Political Science in the Department of Political Science and
International Relations, University of Delaware, Newark, USA. Her publications and research
have focused on ASEAN–China relations and Asia’s evolving regionalisms. Her co-edited
volume Contending Perspectives on Global Governance is published by Routledge.
Address: Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Delaware,
Newark, DE 19711, USA. E-mail: aliceba@udel.edu

The Pacific Review

ISSN 0951-2748 print/ISSN 1470-1332 online
C 2006 Taylor & Francis

http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
DOI: 10.1080/09512740500473163
158 The Pacific Review

Improvements in relations have been dramatic, especially when compared

to the hostility that characterized relations previously. Most significant have
been the changes in China’s policies towards regional multilateralism. This
analysis looks to constructivist arguments about social context and process
to shed additional light on the conditions and processes of social change;
however, constructivists’ discussions of the social processes by which actors
come to be transformed need clearer elaboration.
Sino-ASEAN relations offer a good opportunity to illuminate some of
‘those elements of process and interaction missing in more sweeping ac-
counts of social learning’ (Checkel 2001: 560). In this relationship, ASEAN
states, individually and collectively, have emphasized an engagement ap-
proach to China that involves important assumptions about the socializing
properties of engagement processes and regular interaction. Best described
as complex engagement, ASEAN’s approach is characterized by a multiplic-
ity of interactions – economic, political, and social; informal and formal;
bilateral and multilateral – on a variety of issues. Most important, ASEAN
states also tend to see their interactions and exchanges with China more in
terms of an ongoing negotiation of relations, less predetermined interests of
the kind emphasized by traditional approaches of International Relations
(IR). Put another way, ASEAN states hope that engagement processes can
persuade China to respect ASEAN norms and to see ASEAN in more co-
operative terms.
This article begins with a brief sketch of the ways in which the discipline of
IR has tended to understand and explain socialization. Drawing on construc-
tivist insights, this analysis then turns its focus to Sino-ASEAN relations to
draw attention to some under-explored aspects and dynamics of socialization
processes. It describes complex engagement as an example of ‘argumenta-
tive persuasion’, that is, ‘a social process of interaction that involves changing
attitudes about cause and effect in the absence of overt coercion’ (Checkel
2001: 562). Finally, the article offers some preliminary conclusions about the
evolution of Sino-ASEAN relations and how different conditions and pro-
cesses affect social learning, as well as suggestions for future directions of
inquiry.

Constructivist arguments about socialization

One of the problems in discussing socialization is the impreciseness of the
term and lack of agreement about both its mechanisms and the changes as-
sociated with it. Most theorists agree that socialization involves convergence
of some kind or modifications to behavior patterns such that an actor ‘fits
in’ to a larger community (Haas 1965; Johnston 2001; Waltz 1979; Wendt
1999), but aside from that general point there is little agreement. Recently,
constructivist arguments that socialization involves more than the conver-
gence of behavior and interests but also social identities and worldviews have
challenged neorealist and contractual accounts. Not only do constructivists
 A. D. Ba: Who’s socializing whom? 159

argue that identities and interests are more fluid than described by other ap-
proaches but they also differ on the mechanisms of socialization. Rather than
attributing changes in behavior to shifting material incentives, constructivists
highlight how new interpretations and changing social interactions can also
produce important behavioral changes. In other words, systemic change may
be a function of ‘social learning’, whereby actors gain ‘the capacity and moti-
vation . . . to manage and even transform reality by changing their beliefs of
the material and social world and their identities’ (Adler and Barnett 1998:
43–4). For constructivists, understanding social change requires attention
be paid to the types of interaction between actors, and the intersubjective
meanings that they have attached to their associations and interactions.
Despite their interest in social learning and changing identities, construc-
tivist discussions on socialization have been surprisingly limited, however.
In particular, Jeffrey Checkel observes that constructivists give insufficient
attention to the process of social learning, as well as the conditions under
which such learning might take place. According to Checkel, not only do
constructivists tend to ‘bracket . . . the intervening processes of social inter-
action’ by which actors arrive at conclusions about particular norms, ideas,
and relationships but they also display a surprising tendency towards an indi-
vidualist ontology to describe social processes (Checkel 2001: 554). In these
discussions, one group of actors sets out to convince another to comply with
certain norms, but almost always the process is described in unidirectional
terms where the target of socialization activities is the only site of change.
Far less attention is given to how actions by the target actor can also change
the context of interactions and the group or actors whose community it is
that the targeted actor is being socialized into. In other words, socialization is
often treated as a unidirectional, rather than interactive or mutual, process.
Constructivist discussions on socialization have also offered only limited
discussions on how power disparities may inform and condition socializa-
tion processes. Questions of power are especially interesting in the case of
ASEAN’s efforts to ‘socialize’ China since it is precisely because ASEAN
is a set of weaker powers that there is such skepticism about its ability to
convince a larger power like China to conform to ASEAN norms. Such skep-
ticism reflects an important utilitarian logic contained in much of the IR lit-
erature and that can be seen in the particular emphasis given to hegemonic
power as a socializing force (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990). The focus on
hegemonic-led socialization is evident also in some constructivist accounts.
Most notably, Adler and Barnett, in their discussion of security communities,
posit that ‘power can be a magnet’ that attracts other actors, and convinces
them to rethink old ideas, practices, and roles because of the benefits derived
from associating with that power (Adler and Barnett 1998: 39–40; see also
Farrell 2002: 70–1). Of those who draw on sociological approaches, Schim-
melfennig may be most explicit in arguing that a more powerful ‘socializer’
is a condition of successful socialization. As he argues in his discussion of EU
expansion, ‘Asymmetry between East and West is the structural prerequisite
160 The Pacific Review

for the most pervasive feature of international socialization of the New

Europe’ because Western Europe’s ‘control of legitimacy as well as ma-
terial resources enables the West to apply, and makes the East susceptible
to, political conditionality’ (Schimmelfennig 2001: 111; emphasis added).
Not surprisingly, then, little is said about the ability of smaller power
arrangements to socialize or modify the behavior of larger ones. Nor is it
unexpected to find little optimism about ASEAN’s ability to elicit coopera-
tive behavior from China (Leifer 1996; Lim 1998). By this utilitarian logic,
ASEAN and ASEAN’s ways are made less attractive because ASEAN has
less to offer China in the way of material inducements, thus making change
less likely.
And yet the last fifteen years have seen a marked improvement in rela-
tions that suggest qualitative changes in relations. Indeed, Chinese views of
ASEAN have especially come a long way since it first branded the group
an anti-Chinese, anti-communist alliance back in 1967. Similarly, on the
ASEAN side, interactions have done much to ease some of the suspicions
that once defined its relations with China. To be sure, important problems re-
main and deeper trust is far from assured, but developments also suggest that
a decade of engagement has produced an important stabilization of expec-
tations, even some common understandings, about their respective roles, as
well as a new appreciation for their relations. Similarly, though there remain
key differences on specific issues, the 1990s has also seen growing agreement
on questions of East Asian and Asian-Pacific security, at very least on how
those questions are best approached. Such ‘mundane accomplishments’ (to
quote Yuan Foong Khong) are more significant to the long-term stability
of regional order than most headline-making cooperative ventures (Khong
1997: 291).
While the continued improvement of China–ASEAN relations will be a
contingent process, recent developments nevertheless call for closer inspec-
tion of the particular dynamics of their relations, interactions, and negoti-
ations (material and social). In particular, Checkel argues that more delib-
erative processes involving mutual exchange will be more likely to produce
social change than processes based on ‘lectures’ and ‘demands’ (Checkel
2001: 562–3). Specifically, the form of ASEAN’s engagement – informal,
non-confrontational, open-ended and mutual – may play an important part
in persuading China to rethink its ASEAN relations, to look upon ASEAN
in a more positive light, and to be more responsive to ASEAN concerns.

Complex engagement as argumentative persuasion

Complex engagement has formed a centerpiece of ASEAN’s response to
China’s growing influence since the ending of their de facto alignment against
Vietnam in 1991. It is characterized by non-coercive, open exchanges at mul-
tiple levels and over multiple issue areas; it is the strategic pursuit of cooper-
ative relations based on common understandings, as much interdependence.
 A. D. Ba: Who’s socializing whom? 161

At a time of growing Chinese influence and uncertain US policies, ASEAN

states have increasingly looked to bilateral and multilateral engagement not
only to create a constraining web of interdependence but also to persuade
China to think differently and less confrontationally about regional security
and its relations with the ASEAN states.
The process by which actors learn to think differently about cause and
effect, means and ends, indeed self and other, however, is not well explored
by constructivists. Instead, as Checkel discusses, it has been the contractual
theorists that have been clearest in specifying how actors come to particular
decisions about norms and compliance (Checkel 2001). The mostly legal-
istic and coercive processes that they emphasize, however, do not describe
ASEAN’s regional processes or its particular style of informal, non-binding
engagement well. Characterized by a multiplicity of interactions at multiple
levels and across different issues areas, complex engagement’s holistic ap-
proach also contrasts with the focus of contractual accounts on issue-specific
regimes and artificially parceled relations.
ASEAN’s engagement of China is also not simply about creating inter-
dependence or necessarily democratic change as often emphasized in more
liberal accounts of engagement (Metzger and Myers 1998). Rather, complex
engagement also aims to create cooperative relations by finding new areas
of agreement.1 The key point about those areas of agreement is that they
are shared; they need not be ‘liberal’ for them to provide the basis for stable,
cooperative relations. As some have noted, so-called illiberal values can also
provide the basis for community (Kivimaki 2001). Finally, complex engage-
ment involves an ongoing, two-way process that is interactive and mutual in
its flows of influence.
In that complex engagement emphasizes multiple channels of interaction
on a variety of issues, it does have some important similarities with Nye’s and
Keohane’s neoliberal conception of ‘complex interdependence’ (Keohane
and Nye 1977, 1998: 81–95). However, I emphasize the term engagement as
a way to underscore that what is taking place is an action and interaction,
less a condition or situation. Where complex interdependence tends to de-
scribe a material situation by which a state’s actions may be constrained by
a complex constellation of economic, military, and welfare interests,2 com-
plex engagement refers to a social, interactive process aimed at transforming
how actors conceive themselves in relation to others. As such, complex en-
gagement is not passive, but active; not static but dynamic. Most important,
complex engagement is a process, not simply a policy outcome (Johnston
and Evans 1999: 236).
Put another way, complex engagement is an active search for points of
consensus towards persuading another to change its attitudes and/or beliefs
about a particular subject, issue, or relationship. As such, complex engage-
ment can thus be seen as an example of ‘argumentative persuasion’ – that
is, a ‘process of active persuasion and recruitment’ (Adler 1997: 319–63) –
described by constructivists as one mechanism of social learning. As Thomas
162 The Pacific Review

Risse explains, argumentative behavior is like strategic behavior in that it is

goal oriented; however, instead of trying to attain one’s fixed preferences,
the goal is to reach a ‘reasoned consensus’ about the matter at hand (Risse
2000: 7). In this case, the goal of engagement processes is less about getting
specific goods or concessions than it is to reach agreement about regional
roles and relations.
Sino-ASEAN relations can also shed light on conditions, as much the
processes, that may make social change more likely. Discussions by Checkel
and Risse provide some starting points for discussion. Both highlight, for
example, how a situation of uncertainty can provide a favorable condition
for social learning. Risse adds that the existence of a ‘common lifeworld pro-
vided by a high degree of international institutionalization in the respective
issue area’ (Risse 2000) can also facilitate social learning. However, in cases
like China–ASEAN relations in the early 1990s, where there is neither a
common lifeworld nor any significant degree of institutionalization, activist
agents can play a critical role in the learning process. Risse draws especial
attention to the ‘conscious efforts by actors to construct such a common
lifeworld through narratives that enable them to communicate in a mean-
ingful way’. In this case, elites interested in recasting relations in a different
way played a central role in making possible and more likely the more co-
operative relations that exist between China and ASEAN today.3
At the same time, in ASEAN, there is also recognition that influence
may also work in the opposite direction; that is, ASEAN states may hope
to ‘socialize’ China to regional norms, but in their interactions they would
be changed as well. Especially given the emphasis placed on power as an
attracting and socializing force, the power differentials that characterize the
Sino-ASEAN relationship make the socialization questions posed above all
the more interesting in that they raise additional questions about the ability
of smaller powers to socialize larger ones. In its examination of ASEAN’s
evolving relations with China, the discussion below further draws attention
to the particular conditions, contexts, and processes that define ASEAN’s
complex engagement of China and that may provide further insight into
processes of social learning and social change.

Complex engagement in Sino-ASEAN relations, 1989–2002

Uncertainty and opportunity

Checkel and Risse identify uncertainty as one condition that can make ac-
tors more open to change. In the case of ASEAN–China relations, a number
of developments threw relations onto uncertain ground and compelled both
sides to reconsider their policies and relations. Most notably, the end of
Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia in 1989, which had provided the basis
for Sino-ASEAN relations for a decade, left relations without a unifying
focus. The US post-Cold War reprioritization of interests on trade, human
 A. D. Ba: Who’s socializing whom? 163

rights, interventionism, and regional security only added to the overall uncer-
tainty of the regional security environment. For both ASEAN and China,
the early 1990s were characterized by questions and suspicion about the
other’s interests and intentions – for ASEAN, concerns focused on China’s
military modernization and activities in the South China Sea; for China, they
focused on ASEAN’s plans for expanded membership and the creation of
new regional fora, especially the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Not only
did Beijing view such arrangements as ways for smaller powers to ‘gang up
on China’ but it also suspected that they might be avenues for the United
States to dominate and dictate the regional agenda (see Swaine and Tellis
2000: 136; Yuan 2001: 263). At the same time, those uncertainties also opened
opportunities and created incentives to reconsider the foundations of their
relations and to engage one another in different ways.
This having been said, uncertainty is also an insufficient explanation for
the growth and improvement in relations. The precise nature of uncertainty
is that developments can work in different directions. If the ASEAN states
were to convince China to adopt more accommodating policies towards
the region, they would have to demonstrate or signal to China that they were
open to working with China and, at least, were not a priori against Chinese
interests. In addition to uncertainty, efforts at reassurance were therefore
critical to their overcoming this initial uncertain period, and ASEAN’s early
efforts to engage China in bilateral and multilateral dialogue must be given
special credit.
For the ASEAN states, the economic and political-security uncertainties
surrounding the US role in Southeast Asia made it especially important for
ASEAN to engage China and improve relations as a kind of hedge against
the possibility of further US retrenchment. Better relations with China, in
other words, became imperative in the context of weakened US security and
economic commitments to Southeast Asia. Indeed, despite some important
variance in ASEAN assessments of China, there emerged notable agreement
about the necessity and value of engagement processes, both bilateral and
multilateral, as one way to militate against possible conflict with China.
Consequently, as early as 1991 China came to enjoy normal relations with
all the ASEAN states – the first time since ASEAN’s founding in 1967. Most
significant was the emergence of new and unprecedented multilateral ar-
rangements and dialogues. ASEAN began by expanding its Post-Ministerial
Conference (PMC) external dialogues to include four new dialogue partners,
including China. The PMC then formed the basis for East Asia’s first multi-
lateral security dialogue, the ARF. Other significant multilateral frameworks
that emerged during the 1990s were the South China Sea Workshops, Asia–
Europe Meetings (ASEM), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC),
and the ‘ASEAN Plus Three’ (China, Japan, and South Korea) (APT) meet-
ings, each of which included China. Engagement and dialogue also took place
bilaterally between China and ASEAN and became regularized through
the ASEAN–China Senior Officials Consultations, ASEAN–China Joint
164 The Pacific Review

Cooperation Committee meetings, ASEAN Plus China framework (along-

side the APT process), and regular ASEAN–China summits. These new
arrangements would also open additional doors for states to communicate
with one another and to acquire new information that would factor into their
reevaluation of relations.

Power and the ASEAN Way

In China’s relations with ASEAN, conventional wisdom is that power dif-
ferentials pose important (even insurmountable) obstacles to the creation
of any broader community of Chinese and ASEAN states, especially as re-
gards China’s willingness to comply with ASEAN norms. Such conclusions
stem from the view that China, by virtue of its greater capabilities (potential
and actual), can achieve its goals more efficiently through coercive measures.
However, it would be premature to conclude that ASEAN interests will nec-
essarily be shortchanged or that relations must necessarily be competitive
or conflictual as a result. In Sino-ASEAN relations, such power differences
matter mostly in two respects. First, it can enable and constrain policy op-
tions. It does not determine the type of interaction that takes place, but it is
one factor that affects the range of actions available to each actor. Over time,
initial actions or practices, even if initially derived from material conditions
or more instrumental calculations, can then become internalized and affect
how actors conceive their role in world politics. Second, power asymmetries
can be an attractive or detractive force in social learning processes, depend-
ing on the nature and context of interaction. It is not the case, for example,
that power will automatically attract followers. Instead, the ideas and images
that each actor has about the other, as well as their past experiences with
one another, are more important to understanding how power asymmetries
affect the process and the receptiveness of one actor to another’s message.
In relations between China and ASEAN, power asymmetries have bear-
ing not only on the initial range of action available to each actor but also
resulting normative ideas about the role each should play in world politics.
China’s economic and military resources (actual and potential), for example,
opens up more policy possibilities for China vis-à-vis ASEAN states, where
ASEAN states have generally found themselves more constrained in a ma-
terial sense. The result is that there would be more obstacles or more steps
involved if ASEAN states were to pursue, for example, an effective military
response or deterrence strategy. Thus, smaller powers may be more inclined
at the outset to consider or adopt a non-coercive, diplomatic approach (Wendt
1992: 415).
In the case of ASEAN, states have rejected a more militarized form of
regionalism since 1967 when the organization was founded. Material condi-
tions and circumstances – relative power weaknesses, domestic priorities, as
well as intra-ASEAN differences, for example – played a part in states’ initial
preferences and interest in a less confrontational approach towards greater
 A. D. Ba: Who’s socializing whom? 165

powers; however, since then, resulting practices and subsequent interactions

have generated and strengthened ideas about ASEAN’s normative role and
identity – ideas as to the appropriateness of certain policies and actions and
the roles that actors conceive themselves playing. In particular, the general
improvement and transformation of intra-ASEAN relations generated and
strengthened ideas about engagement and regionalism, more generally, as
relationship-building exercises. Just as more material considerations may
have informed states’ initial preferences, today these ideas about regional-
ism also bound ASEAN action and inform ASEAN’s continued eschewal
of a more militarized regionalism.
At the same time, states also continued to look to the United States to
provide a stabilizing presence;4 however, as discussed above, post-Cold War
uncertainties about US policies created new pressures to find other ways
to stabilize and expand their relations with China. Consequently, ASEAN’s
collective diplomacy vis-à-vis China came to involve a kind of two-pronged
policy – one based on deterrence by extra-regional powers and the other
based on ASEAN’s complex engagement of China. Views about the value of
complex engagement, however, continued to strengthen over time as mem-
bers came to associate engagement with first the transformation of intra-
ASEAN relations and later improvements in their relations with China. The
perceived success and benefits of that approach, in other words, helped es-
tablish the value and validity of reassurance processes that, reinforced by
other interactions over time, became an important part of ASEAN’s orga-
nizational identity. In short, though ASEAN’s preferences for inclusion and
non-confrontational engagement were certainly influenced by various ma-
terial constraints and incentives, it has also come to be informed by past
practices and ideas about ASEAN itself. Thus, the engagement and reassur-
ance that are part of ASEAN diplomacy today can be seen as a product of
both the material and the social, whereby the material set up the initial incen-
tive structure, followed by social experiences that affirmed and established
particular ways of engagement as appropriate and distinctly ASEAN’s. Put
another way, if ASEAN today eschews a more militarized regionalism, it
may be less because it materially cannot and more because it is not the
‘ASEAN Way’.
Arguments about the value of complex engagement and the particular
role ASEAN can play in socializing China (and defining regional order
in general) were given further clarification and distinction in the mid- to
late 1990s when ASEAN’s organizational and diplomatic practices came
under criticism by Western powers that also questioned the appropriate-
ness of ASEAN’s small-power coalition being at the center of mixed fora
like the ARF. In their defense of ASEAN-centered arrangements, argu-
ments that a ‘policy of friendship is better than a policy of containment’5
grew more prominent and called attention to the importance of inclusion
and friendly reassurance in transforming uncertain relationships into co-
operative ones. Also, in that China remained sensitive to questions about
166 The Pacific Review

intervention, especially by larger powers like the United States, ASEAN

elites began to argue that ASEAN was, in fact, uniquely able to engage and
reassure China by virtue of its particular brand of diplomacy and the fact
that members were smaller powers.
In a related vein, ASEAN states viewed various regional fora that emerged
during the decade of the 1990s as important opportunities for reassurance,
persuasion, and positive reinforcement. Interdependence and transparency
were viewed as important products of that process, but, even more funda-
mentally, ASEAN states hoped to convince China that its interests lay with
ASEAN, not against it. Thus, in the eyes of ASEAN elites, these new regional
fora – including those with explicitly economic agendas – served important
political-security purposes. As one of ASEAN’s founding elites, Ghazali
Shafie explained about China-inclusive arrangements like the East Asian
Economic Caucus (EAEC): ‘Though economic in name, the basic thought
was political and social in intent to ensure togetherness and the sharing
of common fate and destiny’ (Shafie 1998; Wanandi 2000: 21). Indeed, the
ASEAN states have approached their complex engagement of China with
the explicit purpose of persuading China of the value to be found in good
relations with Southeast Asia and a stable regional order (Garofano 1999).
In part, that means creating, as liberals argue, webs of interdependence,
but it is also about encouraging China to take a less Sino-centric view that
is more respectful of Southeast Asian interests. As Jose Almonte, former
director general of the Philippines National Security Council, has stated:
‘East Asia’s greatest single problem is how to incorporate China into its
regional arrangements – how to “socialize” the country by reducing the ele-
ment of threat while accentuating the positive elements in China’s regional
relationships’ (Almonte 1997–98: 83). ‘Socialization’ in this context is less
about China becoming like the ASEAN states (no state really expects that),
but socialization, instead, in the sense of changing China’s behavior in ac-
cordance with a ‘culture of restraint’ and the ‘3 Rs’ of the ‘ASEAN Way’:
restraint, respect, and responsibility (Antolik 1990; Soesastro 2003).
Thus, to say that ASEAN’s diplomacy of non-confrontational engagement
was informed by initial material conditions is not to say that ASEAN elites
have not come to see complex engagement processes as having a compelling
logic of their own. As Malaysia’s now-former Prime Minister Mahathir ex-
plained ASEAN’s style of engagement: ‘We reject the possibility of ASEAN
evolving into a regional, collective security arrangement or military alliance.
We are able to do this because of our belief that to win friends, one should not
create enemies.’6 At very least, elites held out the possibility that if complex
engagement could transform Southeast Asia’s once conflictual relationships
then maybe it could do the same with respect to ASEAN’s relations with
China. In fact, the last decade has seen ASEAN give greater prominence
and centrality to complex engagement processes, such that increasingly, it
is now US security guarantees that provide the hedge for engagement pro-
cesses, rather than the other way around as it was in the early 1990s.7 Some
 A. D. Ba: Who’s socializing whom? 167

refer to ASEAN’s approach towards China as ‘engagement with insurance’

(Storey 1999–2000). The shift in emphasis reflects the general view in South-
east Asia that relations with China have improved in significant ways and
that much of this improvement is facilitated by complex engagement pro-
cesses and the opportunities for mutual reassurance that are associated with
their heightened interactions.
So what about China? Again, conventional wisdom is that China should
be more resistant to foregoing more coercive strategies that seem to promise
more immediate results. Conventional wisdom is also that China would likely
find little reason to adopt ASEAN norms. And indeed, China had not initially
been very enthusiastic about participating in ASEAN and ASEAN-related
processes in the early 1990s. Michael Swaine and Ashley Tellis, for example,
discuss China’s concern about being locked into arrangements, as well as
China’s belief that it could better get what it wanted through bilateral nego-
tiations, in which it would dominate as the larger power (Swaine and Tellis
2000: 136).
As for China’s eventual willingness to participate in ASEAN’s regional
processes, many point to calculated and pragmatic considerations on China’s
part that were based on an understanding of its short-term limitations and
the priority of economic growth. They describe China’s participation in re-
gional multilateralism as a ‘tactical gambit’ towards strengthening its posi-
tion on the South China Sea and/or towards constraining US and Japanese
power and influence in East Asia (Emmers 2001; Lim 1998; Montaperto
and Binnendijk 1997). In a similar vein, Swaine and Tellis argue that
China’s changed position on participation was the product of ‘constrained
choice’, that China joined only when it became apparent that these new fora
would be around for a while with or without China’s participation (Garrett
and Glaser 1994: 31; Montaperto and Binnendijk 1997; Swaine and Tellis
2000).
What is striking, however, is China’s continued interest and participation
in regional multilateralism at a time when its situation is much improved.
Its initial decision to participate in regional fora in the early 1990s may have
been the product of constrained choice, but those constraints do not ex-
plain well its continued participation or subsequent changes in its policies
and views towards regional multilateralism. They do not explain, for exam-
ple, China’s being at the forefront in creating multilateral initiatives like the
ASEAN China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) or Shanghai Cooperation Orga-
nization (SCO) with the Central Asian states; nor does it explain the new
emphasis on dialogue and consultation as the foundations of regional se-
curity contained in its ‘new security concept’ (Thayer 2000).8 Perhaps most
striking in China–ASEAN relations has been China’s recent and concerted
campaign to reassure ASEAN at a time of increased Chinese leverage. Such
developments provide evidence that its prior ambivalence about ASEAN
has been replaced by more positive assessments of ASEAN as a potential
partner and even friend.
168 The Pacific Review

Thus, the relevant point here is not to deny the existence of these other
more material motives and interests on the part of China or ASEAN. It
is clear that ‘instrumental’ calculations did play a part in both their initial
decisions to engage the other. However, engagement is again not simply a
policy outcome; it is a process. The initial reasons for pursuing an engagement
approach/strategy may be partly or largely instrumental, but the process
itself may still change an actor’s understanding of interests, relations, and
reasons for engagement over time and given the right conditions. Whether
actors choose to focus on differences versus similarities also depends in large
part on both the context and nature of their interaction.

The context and process of complex engagement

In addition to the initial condition of uncertainty and relative power differ-
ences, other factors also conditioned their initial post-Cambodia, post-Cold
War interactions. In particular, it helped that China and ASEAN shared
some similar historical experiences that could provide the basis for a com-
mon language and narrative. While China’s and ASEAN’s experiences are
by no means the same, they do share an outsider’s view of the international
system, as well as a historical sense of vulnerability vis-à-vis advanced in-
dustrialized powers. Past experiences with Western power thus provided a
basis for a narrative of culture and domination and a basis for identification
vis-à-vis the West. This context would help make more salient their common
differences with Western powers over trade and human rights.
Such commonalities of experience, however, still do not automatically lead
to a greater receptiveness to another’s message or collective identification.
The presence of elites interested in drawing on that history to reconstruct
relations also played an important role in shaping a new context for relations.
As Risse argues, especially in cases like China–ASEAN relations in the early
1990s where relations are under-institutionalized, the conscious efforts of ac-
tors to create narratives that draw attention to what is similar as opposed to
what is not can be critical to the building of cooperative relations (Risse 2000:
19; Risse-Kappen 1995). Thus, while recent interactions and their common
participation in ARF and APEC forums appear to have created opportuni-
ties for both China and ASEAN to discover common ground, their ability
to recognize such commonalities was neither automatic nor instantaneous.
Leaders like Lee Kuan Yew who assumed the role of ‘explaining’ China to
the West, as well as the many elites in ASEAN that took special care to
publicly play down the idea of the China threat and to reassure China about
ASEAN and new regional fora, may therefore also play important roles in
creating an environment more conducive to change.
In addition to the initial conditions of engagement, the process of engage-
ment can also affect the outcomes of socialization efforts. Here, ASEAN’s
more open and inclusive style of engagement, by Checkel’s arguments above,
may have helped persuade China to reconsider its views towards regional
 A. D. Ba: Who’s socializing whom? 169

multilateralism and ASEAN. In particular, ASEAN’s quiet informality and

particular brand of regionalism – in which ‘three ASEAN rules apply:
1) exchanges remain private; 2) agreement is by consensus; and 3) internal
affairs are excluded’ (Whiting 2000) – likely factored into China’s greater
receptiveness to ASEAN’s message. According to Checkel, that style of
engagement is likely to be more ‘attractive’ than an engagement based on
public ‘lectures and demands’.
Another factor that likely played a part in creating more cooperative at-
titudes on the part of China was the existence of a relatively stable regional
balance of power. In relationships that lack trust, actors will require, at very
least, consistency of interaction over time – reinforcement – if they are to be-
lieve that the other means it no harm and if it is to change its behavior in turn.
Such consistency and stabilization of views is difficult to achieve if an envi-
ronment is in constant flux. In short, the success of socialization processes
may depend also on there being a relatively stable, material environment.
This argument about stability as another condition of social learning is not
contrary to Checkel’s and Risse’s arguments about uncertainty, but it does
underscore the need to distinguish between different stages of the socializa-
tion process. What Checkel and Risse discuss are the initial conditions under
which actors contemplate new ideas or new thinking about a subject or rela-
tionship.9 In relations between China and ASEAN, uncertainties associated
with the end of the Cold War and Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia helped
destabilize ideas – about each other, the United States, regional security, and
even the world in general – which then opened the door to change. At the
same time, some stability must follow if there is to be any stabilization of
expectations and of new relations. Here, a relatively stable balance of power
during the 1990s provided an important, if not necessary, period of stability
that allowed new patterns to stabilize and new ideas to take root.

It works both ways

There is evidence to believe that ASEAN’s engagement of China has been
relatively successful at convincing China that it is more friend than foe.
Again, evidence to this fact can be found especially in China’s expanded
participation in various regional multilateralisms and its own concerted ef-
forts to engage the ASEAN states. Moreover, China’s changed approach
is evident across different issue areas. In trade and economics, China has
demonstrated initiative and leadership, the two outstanding examples be-
ing its commitment to not devaluing the yuan during the 1997–98 financial
crisis and its proposal to form ACFTA. In the military-security realm as
well, China has expanded its multilateral participation since the early 1990s.
Bilaterally and multilaterally, China now engages in different military and
defense dialogues with the ASEAN states. In 2004, China hosted the first
Security Policy Conference of the ARF. Also notable are China’s changed
position on addressing the South China Sea dispute in multilateral (as
170 The Pacific Review

opposed to bilateral) fora as well as new willingness to develop and sign

regional codes of conduct, including a Code on the South China Sea. While
far from resolved, the diminution of tensions on contentious South China
Sea claims is nevertheless notable, especially if one considers how that con-
flict loomed large over relations in the early 1990s. These initiatives point
to China’s new appreciation for multilateral/regional processes (or, at least,
particular kinds of multilateral processes), which is a stark contrast to its
views fifteen years ago (Zhang 2002).
These changes in Chinese foreign policy and Beijing’s own engagement
of ASEAN were important if relations were to move beyond the initial un-
certainty stage (when relations could have turned for better or for worse)
and into a stage where there is greater stability in terms of mutual expecta-
tions and even greater likelihood of cooperation. And in fact, since the early
1990s, the growth in Sino-ASEAN relations has contributed to the general
consensus in Southeast Asia that relations are ‘on a much better footing than
in recent decades’ (Ho 2001: 683; Ba 2003). Thus, while ASEAN’s early re-
assurance efforts and overtures to China were important to mitigating what
might have been a spiral of insecurity in those first years after the ending
of the Cambodian and Cold War conflicts, China’s response to those efforts
were just as important to the improvement of relations. Engagement, in
other words, had to work both ways.
To be sure, important concerns and differences remain and even the above
developments are not without their caveats. Nevertheless, these develop-
ments suggest important modifications in China’s behavior and means–ends
calculus on questions of regional security, as well as changed expectations
and ideas about its ASEAN relations. In addition to greater flexibility in
its policies towards ASEAN (Ho 2001), there appears to be a new appre-
ciation for a more cooperative, multilateral approach towards neighboring
states, as well as the potential value of mutual recognition as a building
block of regional security and stability, at least where the ASEAN states
are concerned.10 Some Chinese participants of Track II processes have been
most explicit about regional processes performing important reassurance
functions towards mitigating Asian security dilemmas not only in terms of
China–ASEAN relations but also China’s relations with Japan and the wider
East Asia (Tang 2002; Zhang 2003; Zhang and Tang 2002).11 China also ap-
pears more comfortable with ASEAN taking the lead in particular areas.
The fact that these attitudinal changes in China were not the product of co-
ercive interactions (or new material challenges) usually emphasized in the
literature, underscores the need to think more carefully about processes of
social interaction and how different processes may affect social learning.
But while ASEAN states appear to be successful at persuading China to
change its views of ASEAN, China has been less successful in its own efforts
to persuade ASEAN to abandon the suspicion with which its member states
view China. While most ASEAN elites do not see China as an immediate
 A. D. Ba: Who’s socializing whom? 171

threat and see recent developments as promising and reassuring, there is still
concern about how deep recent changes run. Here, power differences, made
significant by both their recent and not-so-recent relations, pose an important
obstacle to China’s ability to convince ASEAN that its intentions are benign.
Thus, even given China’s and ASEAN’s common sense of vulnerability and
common grievances against larger, Western powers, China remains a major
power in the eyes of ASEAN, which, by contrast, self-identify as ‘smaller
states’. To use Risse’s expression, ASEAN states do not view themselves and
China as existing in the same ‘lifeworld’. That important difference continues
to pose an obstacle to better relations.
For the ASEAN states, this view of China as major power is underscored
by China’s sense of its own centrality in East Asia. As Rosemary Foot argues,
that sense of regional entitlement has interacted with its sense of historical
victimization, which at times can make it ‘hard for [China] to be sensitive
either to the sense of entitlement that other countries might have, or to its
bigness, or to the fears that its geopolitical dominance can evoke in its neigh-
bors’ (Foot 2000). If, as Risse and Checkel argue, mutuality is an important
condition of successful socialization processes, that kind of inability to see
beyond oneself would clearly pose obstacles to learning and any rethink-
ing of self and other. China’s initial unwillingness to work with ASEAN on
questions like the Spratly Islands disputes in the early 1990s only served to
confirm for many their worst suspicions.
As discussed above, China’s views about ASEAN and regional multilater-
alism have changed significantly since that initial period. And, overall, there
are indications that Chinese leadership, media, academia, and even military
have a greater understanding for ASEAN’s particular dilemma as weaker
powers (Whiting 2000). In contrast to the early 1990s, which were character-
ized by ASEAN efforts to reassure China, for example, the latter part of the
1990s and now the early part of the twenty-first century have seen China step
up its efforts to address ASEAN concerns and to demonstrate to ASEAN its
political and economic value as a partner, even trusted regional leader. As in
ASEAN’s efforts to reassure China in the early 1990s, the success of China’s
efforts will depend in large part on how it chooses to engage ASEAN and
its ability to demonstrate its commitment to good relations over time.
Thus far, Beijing appears to be pursuing a policy with an eye for the long
term. Especially impressive is the persistence of China’s engagement and
attention. Again, consistency and persistence over time would seem to be
critical factors in convincing actors that change is anything more than skin
deep. One test of China’s commitment would thus be whether or not in-
terest in engagement persisted beyond the original circumstances that first
produced the policy. In this sense, the 1997–98 financial crisis offered one
test of relations because of the material changes associated with it. As dis-
cussed above, China, despite reservations, had some important economic
and political interests to engage ASEAN in the early 1990s. However, af-
ter the financial crisis much of the perceived advantages of associating with
172 The Pacific Review

ASEAN had dissipated. ASEAN’s claims to regional leadership, for ex-

ample, were undermined by its perceived disarray in managing the crisis.
Post-crisis ASEAN also looked far less attractive as trade or investment
partners as foreign and domestic capital took flight, while China remained
relatively unscathed by the crisis. China’s entrance into the WTO and the
rush of investment into China only underscored deepening asymmetries and
the reversal of situations that had taken place.
Given their changed circumstances, one might therefore expect that China
would reprioritize its relations with ASEAN, but instead China appears to
have intensified its reassurance efforts. Recent overtures also suggest greater
sensitivity or recognition of ASEAN concerns and insecurities. Initiatives
like ACFTA, for example, were partly in response to vocal and increasingly
sharp concerns about the ‘economic threat’ posed by China to ASEAN’s
economies still recovering from the 1997–98 Asian economic crisis. In 2003
China responded to ASEAN’s heightened concerns that China was diverting
foreign investment away from Southeast Asia with a pledge to increase
Chinese investment in the ASEAN economies.
Its efforts to accommodate some of ASEAN’s most important concerns,
despite changed circumstances, are thus especially notable. In the case
of ACFTA, China’s concessions included an ‘early harvest’ provision
involving early (though partial) liberalization of China’s agricultural sector
over three years (agriculture being the most important issue in ASEAN’s
trade relations).12 China also agreed to extend MFN status to ASEAN’s
newer members, which are not yet WTO members, in addition to promising
them ‘special and differential treatment and flexibility in implementation’
(five extra years – by 2015 – to comply with the agreement).13 In addition,
China agreed to write off the debts owed it by ASEAN’s four newest
members.14 In that the original ASEAN members have been concerned
about the development gap between old and new ASEAN members,
China’s willingness to be flexible has contributed, in the words of one
Malaysian trade ministry official, ‘much good will’ in ASEAN.15
Other examples of China’s attention to ASEAN include visits by Hu Jin-
tao and others in the lead-up to China’s 16th Party Congress in 2002, which
aimed to reassure ASEAN states about China’s impending leadership transi-
tion and to demonstrate the leadership’s continued commitment to relations.
And then, in 2003, China – in what ASEAN Secretary General Ong Keng
Yong described as a ‘trail-blazing’ move – became the first non-ASEAN
signatory to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), an espe-
cially significant gesture given that TAC has long been considered a corner-
stone of an ASEAN-based regional order.16 China’s accession to TAC was
then followed by another first, that is, its expressed willingness to sign onto
ASEAN’s Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty, making it
the first nuclear power to express such willingness.
Even the 2003 outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)
might be considered another example of China’s greater responsiveness to
 A. D. Ba: Who’s socializing whom? 173

ASEAN’s concerns (as well as the persuasiveness of ASEAN’s complex en-

gagement approach). As SARS spread to Southeast Asia, ASEAN states
were especially sharp in their criticisms about the lack of transparency
with which China handled the problem. Led by Singapore and Thailand,
ASEAN’s ‘quiet persuasion’ led to China’s admission of earlier missteps in
dealing with the crisis, as well as expressions of regret from Chinese Premier
Wen Jiabao. China then followed up with proposals for new cooperation.
Consequently, though SARS began as a kind of crisis for China–ASEAN re-
lations – the first significant challenge to their post-Asian financial crisis rela-
tions – its conclusion was marked by the expansion of China–ASEAN coop-
eration into new areas of health and transnational human security threats.17
It is through this kind of continued attention to ASEAN – moreover, at
a time when China seems to have less need to and when other powers seem
to be giving less attention to ASEAN than they once did – that China hopes
to reassure ASEAN states about its power and its intentions. Consequently,
despite some persistent concerns and uncertainty about how to interpret
China’s motives, China’s recent gestures have also made ASEAN a little
more receptive to its efforts to persuade ASEAN that it desires to be a ‘long-
term friend’.18 If current developments continue, the social foundations laid
over the last decade and a half will also grow stronger, making it more likely
that relations will be able to weather future disagreements and conflicts
without crisis.

Conclusion
George Yeo, Singapore’s trade minister, remarked in 2002 that ‘The emer-
gence of China as a political, economic, and cultural power will affect our
lives in a thousand ways.’ There can be little doubt that ASEAN has much
riding on ongoing socialization efforts. The above discussion gives reason
for both caution and optimism. On the one hand, there is a greater den-
sity of interactions in all areas; confidence-building measures continue to
broaden and deepen; and relations appear to have achieved a stability that
did not exist fifteen years ago. On the other hand, social learning and the
evolution of relations also remain contingent processes. At the very least,
until relations are more institutionalized, the presence of actors interested
in recasting relations in a cooperative light will continue to be critical. A
relatively stable regional security environment is also likely to be important
if relations are to stabilize around cooperative norms. In contrast to fifteen
years ago, however, today there are important opportunities for reassurance,
as well as a growing interdependence, that can help militate against conflict,
if not create strong foundations for future cooperation.
The recent evolution of China–ASEAN relations sheds light on some
of the conditions and processes involved in social learning, especially the
roles played by uncertainty, power, and different types of interaction. As
both Risse and Checkel hypothesize, social learning may be more likely in a
174 The Pacific Review

novel situation of uncertainty where actors lack sufficient knowledge about

the other’s interests or a particular situation (Checkel 2001: 563; Risse 2000:
33). Here, uncertainties about the post-Cold War, post-Cambodia strategic
environment destabilized old ideas and helped make actors more receptive
to new ideas about relations. At the same time, a favorable environment
for social learning will be one that allows for social reinforcement over
time. Thus, a subsequent period of stability may also be necessary for so-
cial learning to take place because it will be more difficult for new patterns
and perceptions to stabilize if actors are constantly reassessing situations and
relations in response to new challenges. In the evolution of China–ASEAN
relations, post-Cold War, post-Cambodia uncertainties provided a catalyst
for new thinking about regional relationships, but a subsequent period of
stability – in this case, provided by a relatively stable balance of power – was
also an important condition that allowed for stability in engagement pro-
cesses that, in turn, allowed for a reinforcement of new ideas, a stabilization
of new patterns of interaction, as well as meaningful change in China’s and
ASEAN’s perceptions of one another.
As discussed above, much distrust remains, especially among ASEAN
states about China, and questions about whether China’s commitment to
regional processes reflects only a short-term calculus. In this sense, time will
be an important measure of whether recent developments reflect deeper
changes in China’s conceptions of interests and relations with the ASEAN
states (or vice versa) – ‘time’ because changes in China’s policies and behav-
ior must transcend the original circumstances or situation that first produced
them if they are to be indicative of anything more than opportunistic change.
On the question of power, power matters but not always in the ways that
IR theorists have envisioned. First, power matters in that it, along with ideas
about how to use it, defines a range of possible policies available to an actor.
More powerful actors will have greater capacity to adopt more coercive
approaches as a first option to get what they want or think they need. Less
powerful actors are likely to be more constrained and consequently may
be more likely at the outset to engage in arguing processes to get what they
want. At the same time, resulting practices also come to shape both the social
context and the identities of actors themselves, which in turn creates different
kinds of constraints on future behavior. Here, too, it may be important to
view social learning as having different stages. Finally, power asymmetries
are not in themselves an attracting or detracting force in questions of social
learning. It is more important to consider the social context of interactions
and the types of interactions that take place.
On the role of process, both Risse and Checkel hypothesize that the kind
of interaction and kind of persuasion have bearing on the social outcome. For
both Checkel and Risse, arguing processes where persuasion is based on mu-
tual exchange are likely to be more effective than unidirectional ‘lectures and
demands’ (Checkel 2001; Risse 2000). Checkel also adds that actors are more
likely to be receptive to persuasion when the process is private, insulated,
 A. D. Ba: Who’s socializing whom? 175

and less politicized. ASEAN’s complex engagement of China based on non-

confrontational interactions and mutual exchange may thus be an important
reason why China has become more receptive to ASEAN’s message of coex-
istence and cooperation. Here, further research contrasting China’s partici-
pation in different kinds of arrangements and processes and under different
conditions could shed additional light on the dynamics of ASEAN–China
relations in particular and of socialization processes in general.
The discussion above highlights the point that successful persuasion
strategies may require a deliberative/interactive, as opposed to didac-
tic/unidirectional, process. Just as this may be one reason why ASEAN’s
message has been more persuasive, it may also be one reason why China’s
has been less so. Though China today has adopted a more open and ac-
commodating approach towards ASEAN and is becoming more persuasive
in the process, China’s past predilection towards a didactic and less com-
promising approach towards ASEAN – a predilection that still occasionally
makes a strong appearance – presents an obstacle to relations that it must
still overcome. Lastly, one should not forget that influence and now engage-
ment works both ways, which means that ASEAN, too, is unlikely to be left
unchanged from the process.
In sum, the heightened frequency and intensity of Sino-ASEAN relations
over the last fifteen years, the establishment of multiple and regular avenues
of communication, as well as a certain consistency in their interactions sug-
gest qualitative changes in this relationship since the late 1980s. Though
conclusions about the future of Sino-ASEAN relations at this stage can be
only tentative, one can point to positive developments in relations, includ-
ing a heightened willingness on both sides to give the other the ‘benefit of
the doubt’. In addition, it is important to note that neither successful social-
ization nor good relations requires that there be a definitive conclusion to
all conflicts. While the sovereignty of South China Sea claims, for example,
may indeed be non-negotiable, moderation and self-restraint, as well as the
adoption of new strategies and approaches, are still important indicators of
social learning and social change. Similarly, equality also should not be seen
as a prerequisite for good relations. In this case, the goal of complex engage-
ment processes is not equality so much as it is to achieve mutual respect and
mutual agreement about their relations and their respective roles. For ex-
ample, if China and ASEAN can arrive at common understandings of their
relations as cooperative rather than competitive, then power asymmetries
will matter less. Communities are made up of different actors with different
roles; the future of Sino-ASEAN relations depends on their both being able
to reach a ‘reasoned consensus’ about the roles they are each to play.

Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Amitav Acharya, Matthew J. Hoffmann, and
Richard Stubbs for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.
176 The Pacific Review

Notes
1 As Stuart Harris and others have observed, ‘Establishing a sense of community
[has been] an important goal and consequence of multilateral processes in Asia’
(Harris 2000: 501).
2 In addition to Keohane and Nye above, see also Rosecrance (1986).
3 By the same token, elites can also have just the opposite effect and exacerbate
divisions.
4 It should be noted, however, that ASEAN states did have important differences
about the form of that US security presence, and, in general, varying comfort
levels about such a role for the United States. These differences were most evi-
dent in 1990 and 1992 during the public disagreements between Singapore and
Indonesia over Singapore’s decision to provide expanded access and support for
US forces in the Pacific and to the relocating of US logistics facilities to Singapore
from the Philippines. See, for example, Balakrishnan and Vatikiotis (1990: 8–10);
‘Unease over bases’ (1992: 4).
5 ‘Japan PM talks on ASEAN in KL’, Jakarta Post (Reuters), 9 January 1997, p. 11.
6 ‘Economic, security issues dominate ASEAN Summit’, Indonesia Times, 15 De-
cember 1987.
7 See Snitwongse (2000). On the primacy of US security guarantees, the exceptions
may be the Philippines and Singapore, though both would agree that engagement
processes are important and have played a role in the improvement of China–
ASEAN relations.
8 See also China’s 1998 defense white paper, China’s National Defense.
9 See also Swidler (1986), Cruz (2000), Legro (2000), and Ikenberry and Kupchan
(1990) on how crisis can open the door to new thinking.
10 Zhang Yunling and Tang Shiping, both of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
and participants in regional Track II processes, argue that
China’s leaders understand clearly that an aggressive security strategy
is simply not a viable option . . . [that] an expansionist policy may lead
its neighbours to form a counterbalancing alliance with distant pow-
ers, most likely the US . . . [but] if . . . China adopts a more coopera-
tive approach, most regional countries would be reluctant to adopt a
hard-core containment policy and [China] would enjoy a benign security
environment.
(Zhang and Tang 2002)
11 This is not to say that there may not still be debate, especially from those who do
not take part in regional processes and thus may not be persuaded to abandon
old strategies. See, for example, Wang (2000).
12 Products covered under the early harvest package include about 600 se-
lected agricultural products in the following categories: live animals, meat,
fish, dairy products, other animal products, live trees, vegetables, fruit and
nuts.
13 ASEAN Secretariat Press Release: ‘ASEAN–China Free Trade Area negoti-
ations to start next year’, 30 October 2002; available at the ASEAN website
(http://www.aseansec.org).
14 ‘Vietnamese PM cites new challenges facing ASEAN at Summit in Phnom Penh’,
VNA News Agency, via BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 5 November 2002.
15 Interview with author, Kuala Lumpur, August 2002.
16 ‘ASEAN secretary-general on Sino-ASEAN relations’, Xinhua General News
Agency, 19 August 2003.
17 For a discussion of the SARS crisis in China–ASEAN relations, see Breckon
(2003).
 A. D. Ba: Who’s socializing whom? 177

18 George Yeo commenting on ASEAN’s initial hesitation and then acceptance

of China’s proposed ACFTA. ‘China’s free trade proposal shocked ASEAN’,
Agence France Press, 15 March 2002.

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