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Establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum:

constructing a ‘talking shop’ or a ‘norm brewery’?

Hiro Katsumata

To cite this article: Hiro Katsumata (2006) Establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum:
constructing a ‘talking shop’ or a ‘norm brewery’?, The Pacific Review, 19:2, 181-198, DOI:
10.1080/09512740500473197

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The Pacific Review, Vol. 19 No. 2 June 2006: 181–198

Establishment of the ASEAN Regional

Forum: constructing a ‘talking shop’
or a ‘norm brewery’?

Hiro Katsumata

Abstract A conventional explanation for the establishment of the ASEAN

Regional Forum (ARF) holds that it was an attempt on the part of the Associa-
tion of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to maintain US military engagement in
Asia while tactically promoting cooperative relations with China in the post-Cold
War era. This line of argument is associated with realism and neoliberalism. This arti-
cle maintains that such an explanation is unsatisfactory, and seeks to offer a sounder
explanation by employing a constructivist perspective. It argues that the interests and
policies of the ASEAN countries which had led them to initiate the ARF were defined
by what can be regarded as a norm of security cooperation in Asia. This norm con-
tains two sets of ideational elements. The first is common security thinking fostered
in the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Such thinking
emphasizes efforts to achieve the security of the whole region through multilateral
security cooperation, on the basis of the view that regional security is indivisible.
The second element is a set of diplomatic norms associated with the ASEAN Way of
diplomacy, which underline the Southeast Asian countries’ commitment to the habit
of dialogue and consultation. Today, the nature of the ARF may be disputed. Critics
of the ARF assert that it is a mere ‘talking shop’ in which no significant measure
to achieve security has been carried out. Yet only by understanding thoroughly the
establishment process of the forum can a fair assessment be made of its significance.
The research in this article concludes that the ARF should be seen as an arena for
the development and practice of norms – in other words, a ‘norm brewery’.

Keywords ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); Association of Southeast Asian

Nations (ASEAN); cooperative security; ASEAN Way; norms; constructivism.

Hiro Katsumata is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang
Technological University, Singapore.
Address: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Block
S4, Level B4, Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798. E-mail: ishkatsumata@ntu.edu.sg

The Pacific Review

ISSN 0951-2748 print/ISSN 1470-1332 online
C 2006 Taylor & Francis

http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
DOI: 10.1080/09512740500473197
182 The Pacific Review

Introduction
What is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)? As an Asia-Pacific region-
wide security framework, initiated by ASEAN in the post-Cold War era, the
ARF can be a subject of debate. It is unclear what the nature of the interac-
tion between its participants is, and what kind of framework it offers. One
of the major reasons for the vagueness about the ARF is the lack of suffi-
cient knowledge about its establishment process. The nature of the regional
security forum can be considered only when the process by which it was es-
tablished is thoroughly understood. Hence, this article aims to offer a sound
explanation of the establishment of the ARF. In this introductory section,
three different views of the ARF, based on different schools in International
Relations (IR), can be set out as follows:

(1) Realists’ ARF: a power-politics-oriented framework. The ARF is an arena

for power politics between the major powers in the region, such as China
and the United States. The direction of the ARF process, as well as the
fate of the smaller powers, depends on the balance of power among the
major powers.
(2) Neoliberals’ ARF: a tactical-interest-oriented framework. The ARF is an
arena for tactical cooperation between its participants in dealing with
various regional security issues. Each participant seeks its own interests
rationally in a game of interstate relations regarding regional security.
(3) Constructivists’ ARF: a norm-oriented framework. The ARF is a frame-
work for the development and practice of norms. The behaviour of each
participant is guided by the cooperative norms on which the ARF pro-
cess is based.

How can one account for the development of this region-wide framework
for security cooperation? In an analysis of the establishment of the ARF,
the leading role of ASEAN needs to be emphasized.1 Australia and Canada
were the first ones to put forward a proposal for a multilateral security ar-
rangement in the post-Cold War era. Their proposals could be seen as a way
of establishing an institution modelled after the Conference/Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE). In July 1990 Aus-
tralia proposed the so-called Conference on Security and Cooperation in
‘Asia’ (CSC‘A’) (Evans 1990). Canada made a similar proposal in the same
month by pointing out that, while the changes in Europe were promoted
by the CSCE, there were no similar institutions in the Asia-Pacific region
(Clark 1990). However, the ASEAN countries disagreed with their propos-
als. As many policy makers in ASEAN noted, it was inadvisable to duplicate
the European process in Asia (see, for example, Alatas 1991). They thought
that it was more appropriate to promote an informal framework to carry
out a security dialogue. Therefore, during the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting
(AMM) in July 1991 they suggested the possibilities of a security dialogue
 H. Katsumata: Establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum 183

by noting that the existing framework of the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Con-

ference (PMC) was an appropriate basis for addressing regional security
issues (ASEAN 1991). During the ASEAN Summit in Singapore in January
1992 the leaders of the ASEAN countries officially agreed to start such a
dialogue (ASEAN 1992). The first ARF meeting was held in July 1994. Each
of the three IR schools mentioned above can offer its own explanation for
ASEAN’s establishment of the ARF:

(1) Realists’ maintaining-US-engagement explanation: the establishment of

the ARF was ASEAN’s attempt to maintain US engagement in the
region.
(1) Neoliberals’ tactically-cooperating-with-China explanation: the ARF was
ASEAN’s attempt to cooperate tactically with external powers, in par-
ticular with China.
(1) Constructivists’ norm explanation: ASEAN’s interest and its policy to
promote the ARF were defined by norms.

First, (neo)realists hold that small powers seek to align with others when
faced with a threat from a large power (Morgenthau 1960; Waltz 1979; also
see Walt 1987). In this context, they would argue that the ASEAN countries,
as small powers, sought US engagement in the region in order to constrain
the major powers in Asia, such as China, through a multilateral framework,
and thus they initiated the ARF process. It should be noted that, following
the end of the Cold War, the ASEAN countries feared that the United
States would withdraw or significantly reduce its military presence in Asia.
US withdrawal would change the balance of power in the region, prompting
other regional powers such as China or Japan to fill the power vacuum.
Second, neoliberals hold that, in a game of interstate relations, players
may act rationally and seek cooperation, instead of pursuing immediate
gains from defection. They may pursue an institution which provides its par-
ticipants with information about the actions and intentions of others. Such an
institution minimizes the potential for exploitation by providing mechanisms
for monitoring and by applying sanctions against violators (Haftendorn et al.
1999; Keohane 1984). In this context, neoliberals would argue that ASEAN
tactically cooperated with external powers, including China, by promoting
a multilateral framework. It should be mentioned that, in the 1990s, the
security policies of China were the most serious concern for the ASEAN
countries (Snitwongse 1995: 534). The territorial dispute over the Spratly
Islands was one of the most contentious issues involving them and Beijing.
Yet, in an era of mutual interdependence in various aspects, including strate-
gic and economic areas, cooperation was held to be more beneficial in the
long run. Finally, for constructivists, ideational factors can define actors’ in-
terests and policies. The ASEAN countries’ interests and policies which led
them to initiate the ARF were defined by a set of norms concerning security
cooperation.
184 The Pacific Review

Following this introductory section, this article has five sections. The first
section deals with what can be regarded as a conventional explanation, and
concludes that such an explanation is unsatisfactory. In the second section,
constructivism is introduced. A constructivist analysis of the development
of the ARF begins in the third section. The third section focuses on interna-
tional affairs in the 1980s, while the fourth section discusses the development
of cooperation in the 1990s. The concluding section considers the significance
of the ARF by revisiting the three different views set out at the beginning
of this introductory section.

Conventional explanation
What can be regarded as a conventional explanation for ASEAN’s estab-
lishment of the ARF contains elements of both the realist and neoliberal
explanations. Michael Leifer (1996: 19) holds that:

[The ARF’s] underlying goal was to create the conditions for a stable
balance of power . . . For ASEAN, a constructive regional order would
ideally be based on the balancing military engagement of the United
States.

With regard to ASEAN’s relations with China, Leifer (1996: 18) argues that:

ASEAN strongly resisted any confrontation with China because of

its likely impact on the region’s economic activity, let alone its secu-
rity . . . The prevailing view within the Association was that any attempt
to confront China would introduce an unnecessary and destructive ten-
sion into regional relationships.

Leifer can be regarded as the chief proponent of the conventional explana-

tion. Many authors have put forward an explanation similar to his (Emmers
2003: 110–27; Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo 1994: 199–
200).
The conventional explanation can be recapitulated as the Maintaining-
US-engagement while tactically-cooperating-with-China explanation: the es-
tablishment of the ARF was ASEAN’s attempt to maintain US engagement
in the region while promoting cooperative relations with external powers,
in particular with China. Both realists and neoliberals would have no strong
objections to this explanation. It is true that realists are more sceptical of
the possibilities of international cooperation than are neoliberals. However,
both of them would support the view that the ARF was the result of the
states’ rational pursuit of a given set of interests defined in material terms. It
is notable that, in today’s IR, (neo)realism and neoliberalism are often clas-
sified into one category, namely rationalism (see Katzenstein et al. 1998).
 H. Katsumata: Establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum 185

A careful assessment of this conventional explanation, however, reveals

that it has some serious shortcomings. It seems to grasp some elements of
the development of the ARF and thus is not entirely wrong. Nonetheless,
it is insufficient for the following five reasons. First, it ignores the fact that
agendas for multilateral security arrangements were not something which
arose after the end of the Cold War. Such agendas had been explored during
the 1980s when the prospect of US withdrawal from Asia was remote. The
proposals for multilateral arrangements in the 1990s, put forward by various
countries, were the fruit of discussion of the relevant ideas since the 1980s,
as will be demonstrated below.
Second, the connection between the ARF and US military engagement is
unclear. The realist claim is implausible because the framework for a security
dialogue does not necessarily guarantee US military engagement. The US
may participate in such a forum without its military presence in the region.
It can be said that Washington’s political engagement was the most that
ASEAN could expect from its initiation of the ARF process.
Third, even for the sake of US political – if not military – engagement, the
ARF was unnecessary and undesirable. US political engagement was pos-
sible without the ARF. For the pursuit of such a goal, ASEAN could have
simply strengthened its existing frameworks which involved the US, such as
the ASEAN-PMC or ASEAN-US Dialogue. However, ASEAN sought to
do something more in the PMC: it sought to utilize the PMC for a region-wide
multilateral security dialogue, whose participants would include such non-
like-minded – if not enemy – countries as China, the Soviet Union/Russia
and Vietnam.2 This idea later enabled the ARF to be set up. Such an idea
permitted the establishment of the ARF later. More importantly, the ARF
was an undesirable choice because, in the early 1990s, the United States
was reluctant to engage in multilateral arrangements, especially in region-
wide ones. Thus, if Washington’s political engagement had been the ASEAN
countries’ realistic goal, it would have been more reasonable for them to sim-
ply strengthen their relations with the US through the existing frameworks
mentioned above. During the Cold War era, Washington preferred bilateral
measures to multilateral frameworks because it thought that the latter could
undermine the former (Mack and Kerr 1995: 124–5). When ASEAN pro-
posed the multilateral framework in the early 1990s, the United States still
preferred bilateral arrangements to multilateral frameworks (see Zoellick
1991). It was after the inauguration of the Clinton administration in January
1993 that the United States began to support multilateral arrangements (see
US Department of Defense 1995). Hence, the question remains unanswered
as to why ASEAN sought a region-wide multilateral framework in the face
of Washington’s reluctance.
Fourth, another problem with the conventional account is that it does
not address convincingly the distinctiveness of Asian security cooperation
(Acharya 2004: 267). The form of cooperation in Asia is characterized by
informality and a low degree of institutionalization. No concrete rules and
186 The Pacific Review

mechanisms to address conflicts are stipulated in the ARF process. Asian

participants emphasize the value of lengthy discussion for the purpose of
building mutual trust and shared understandings. Such an informal style is
in contrast with the form of cooperation in other regional arrangements,
in particular the CSCE/OSCE, which can be characterized by its rigidly
institutionalized mechanisms.
Proponents of the conventional explanation may attempt to address the
distinctive style of Asian cooperation in terms of states’ tactical behaviour.
When Australia proposed the CSC‘A’ in 1990, the ASEAN countries re-
jected it because they thought that the plan to adopt the European model
was premature, due to the fact that countries in the Asia-Pacific region had
had little experience in multilateral cooperation in the political/security field.
Notably, during the Cold War era, there were no region-wide cooperative se-
curity arrangements comparable to the CSCE. Mainstream IR authors may
add that ASEAN countries rejected the proposal because they thought that
an Asian version of the CSCE could possibly limit their sovereignty (Kahler
2000: 562, 568–9). Many of the ASEAN countries had internal security prob-
lems, such as political unrest and ethnic separatism. They were afraid that a
CSCE-type institution would limit their sovereignty by narrowing the range
of domestic policies available to deal with these internal problems. How-
ever, this line of argument does not address the Asian countries’ preference
for cooperating in an informal style. It might explain ASEAN’s rejection of
a rigidly institutionalized framework, but not its promotion of an informal
style of cooperation. This point needs to be elaborated further.
Fifth, the strategic implications of the confidence-building measures
(CBMs) carried out in the ARF are unclear. It is obscure how these measures
can serve the tactical interests of rational actors. Thus, mainstream authors,
taking a rationalist view, would have difficulties in addressing ASEAN’s
promotion of the informal style of cooperation, the strategic implications of
which are unclear. In the case of the CSCE, the promotion of CBMs cer-
tainly had clear strategic implications. The CBMs during the Cold War era
were intended to prevent an accidental military confrontation between the
Eastern and the Western blocs, and to reduce the risk of a surprise attack.
Examples include prior notification of certain military manoeuvres and ver-
ification measures, including compulsory inspections. However, in the case
of Asia, the strategic implications of CBMs are at best ambiguous and at
worst insignificant. Examples of measures in Asia include a security dia-
logue on common security concerns in the region and enhanced contacts,
including high-level visits. In these voluntary-dialogue-based CBMs, decep-
tion could easily take place. From the neoliberal institutionalist point of view,
the ARF is not designed to serve its function effectively, offering few con-
crete mechanisms for information provision, monitoring and sanctions. The
conventional explanation does not address the question of why ASEAN
promoted the informal style of cooperation in which CBMs with unclear
strategic implications are carried out.
 H. Katsumata: Establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum 187

Since it fails to address the five points above, it can be concluded that the
conventional explanation, incorporating the realist and neoliberal expla-
nations, is unsatisfactory. It leaves the ASEAN countries’ interests unclear.
From the viewpoint of mainstream IR authors, the ARF appears to be a mere
‘talking shop’ with no significant impact. It offers no military arrangements
between Washington and Asian countries. Nor does it offer any concrete in-
stitutional arrangements to deal with security concerns involving countries
in the region, including China. However, it may be inappropriate to dismiss
the ARF as a problematic institution. From the next section, this article pur-
sues an alternative approach – constructivism – in order to address actors’
interests differently. The five points discussed in this section will be revisited
in the concluding section.

Constructivism and Asia-Pacific security cooperation

In contrast to the IR rationalist schools – (neo)realism and neoliberalism
– which define actors’ interests largely in material terms and treat them
as exogenously given and constant, constructivism makes shared ideas the
key to approaching actors’ interests. In other words, their interests can be
defined and redefined by ideational factors, including norms – i.e. shared
understandings of standards for behaviour (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998;
Katzenstein 1996; Klotz 1995: 17–27). Constructivism is broad with regard
to its epistemology, and contains many strands. The strand of constructivism
employed in this study should be the one which takes a similar epistemo-
logical stance to those of the rationalist IR schools. This is because this kind
of constructivism, like the rationalist schools, seeks to explain events in the
real world,3 and the aim of this article is to offer a sound explanation for
ASEAN’s establishment of the ARF.
In a constructivist study of the ARF, a reasonable starting point is to
identify the norms which have been shared by the participants of the ARF
process. For the identification of shared ideas, this study has taken three ap-
proaches. First, norms have been inferred from ARF documents which the
participants have agreed on and thus considered legitimate. In particular,
the study focused on the ARF Concept Paper which is seen as a blueprint of
this process, and the Chairman’s Statement of the first ARF which stipulates
the aims of the ARF process and the code of conduct governing relations
between ARF participants (ARF 1994; ASEAN 1995). Second, ideas have
been identified through interviews. A total of twenty-four interviews were
held with individuals who have attended ARF meetings, who are/were in-
volved in the ARF process, or who have played a role in the development
of regional security dialogue, either at the governmental or unofficial levels.
Most of them are from Southeast Asian countries, the leaders of the forum.
Finally, the existing literature on institutions in the Asia-Pacific region which
addresses their ideational aspects has been studied (Acharya 1997, 2001: 169,
173–7; Busse 1999: 52–3; Capie and Evans 2002: 59–63; Dewitt 1994).
188 The Pacific Review

On the basis of these three approaches, what can be regarded as a norm

of security cooperation in Asia may be identified. In short, such a norm en-
courages one to be concerned about the security of the whole region rather
than that of an individual country, and calls for multilateral efforts to en-
hance regional security through dialogue and consultation, while rejecting
rigid rules and rapid institutionalization. It has two sets of ideational ele-
ments. The first is common security thinking fostered in the CSCE process.
Such thinking emphasizes efforts to achieve the security of the whole re-
gion through multilateral security cooperation, on the basis of the view that
regional security is indivisible and can be achieved only through coopera-
tive undertakings (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security
Issues 1982: 6, 139; OSCE 1999: 2). It constitutes the ideational basis of var-
ious cooperative security agendas such as CBMs. Indeed, the discourse of
security cooperation on the part of individuals involved in the ARF process
is premised on the notion of ‘regional security’. The second element is a set
of diplomatic norms associated with the ASEAN Way of diplomacy, or what
the Concept Paper refers to as ‘prevailing ASEAN norms and practices’.
The ASEAN norms also highlight cooperative IR. Yet what is important
is the fact that they underline the Southeast Asian countries’ commitment
to the habit of dialogue and consultation, aimed at enhancing a sense of
mutual trust. The ASEAN Way calls for an informal and gradual approach
to cooperation while rejecting rigid rules and procedures. Its core elements
include the principles of non-interference in internal affairs, decision mak-
ing through consensus, and the non-use of force (see Acharya 2001: Ch. 2;
Capie and Evans 2002: 14–27; Katsumata 2003).
The norm of cooperation may regulate actors’ behaviour by spelling out
the permissible limits to their activities. It also constitutes the very notion
of ‘security cooperation’ and their interests in pursuing a multilateral ap-
proach (Dessler 1989: 454–7; Giddens 1979: 66; Katzenstein 1996: 5; Klotz
1995: 17–27; Ruggie 1998: 22–5; Searle 1969: 33–5). It addresses the funda-
mental question of what security is by underlining the notion of regional
security in which all the countries have a share. Without such a conception
of security, multilateral efforts to enhance regional security and actors’ in-
terest in cooperation are inconceivable. When the interests of actors in the
Asia-Pacific region are defined by the cooperative norm, their behaviour
can be seen as driven by a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen 1989,
1998). The standard of appropriateness defined by the norm is the key to
understanding their behaviour.
The norm of security cooperation seems to be useful for an understand-
ing of the ARF process. This process is intended to achieve security among
all the countries in the region through cooperative measures, without at-
tributing either friend or enemy status to the relations involved. What is
remarkable about the ARF is its informal style of cooperation, based on a
security dialogue. No rigid rules are set, decisions are made on a consensus
basis, and no compulsory provisions are pursued. Yet, at this stage, what
 H. Katsumata: Establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum 189

has been demonstrated is simply the correlations between the norm and the
ARF. This article has so far offered no sound explanation for the develop-
ment of security cooperation. What is needed is a process-oriented study
(George and McKeown 1985: 35). Hence, the next two sections trace the
process by which cooperative security agendas developed and the ARF was
established, covering the period from the late 1980s to the early 1990s.

Development of security cooperation in the 1980s

In the Asia-Pacific region, an exploration of the possibilities of multilateral
security cooperation began in the late 1980s. Those who were engaged in the
discussion of security cooperation were inspired by the fruit of the CSCE
process, which made the major powers’ perceptions of security postures
towards each other less confrontational. The notion of common security
influenced the security policies of both the Soviet Union and Western coun-
tries, thereby setting in motion a process leading to the end of the Cold War
(Risse-Kappen 1994). The apparent success of the CSCE through the 1980s
led to the call for similar approaches in the Asia-Pacific region (Dewitt 1994:
5). It should be noted that much of the discussion was carried out in unofficial
settings. Such settings are called ‘Track II’, while inter-governmental chan-
nels are called ‘Track I’. The central participants of the Track II activities are
researchers in strategic studies institutions, who make policy recommenda-
tions to governments. In addition, government officials participate, but in a
private capacity.
At the Track I level, during the 1980s, the development of agendas
for cooperation in the Asia-Pacific stagnated. To be sure, some proposals
were made. In Vladivostok in July 1986, the then Soviet leader, Mikhail
Gorbachev (1986: 223), proposed a ‘Pacific conference along the lines of
the Helsinki conference’. It was indeed the first occasion that common se-
curity thinking had come to prominence in the Asia-Pacific region (Capie
and Evans 2002: 60). In August 1987, Canberra called for the promotion of
CBMs among the superpowers in the Asia-Pacific region (Hayden 1988).
These proposals were not supported by other countries in the region.
However, at the Track II level, a multilateral framework for the discussion
of security issues was initiated in 1987: a series of Asia-Pacific Roundtable
(APR) conferences, held annually in Kuala Lumpur. While the APR has
been an Asia-Pacific region-wide framework, the key players have been the
ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), a coalition
of strategic studies institutions of the Southeast Asian countries. Through the
discussion of regional security by the participants in the APR conferences,
ideas concerning security cooperation gradually began to develop. The dis-
cussions centred on the notions of confidence building, conflict reduction
and arms control. These concepts had been pursued mostly in the global
arena surrounding the CSCE, and were new to Asia. Participants at the con-
ference in the Asia-Pacific region explored the possibilities of adopting these
190 The Pacific Review

agendas in their own region. Take the first APR in 1987, for example: the
main theme of the conference was ‘Confidence Building and Conflict Re-
duction in the Pacific’. In the conference, there was unanimous agreement
that more attention should be given to peace efforts in the region (Alagappa
1988a: vi). The possibilities of CBMs were among the central issues consid-
ered in the series of APR conferences. Participants considered whether, and
to what extent, the CSCE process could be a model for confidence building
in Asia (see, for example, Findlay 1989).
With regard to the ideational development in the 1980s, it is possible to
identify three remarkable elements. Retrospectively, these ideational ele-
ments were reflected in the ARF in the 1990s, which, at that time, could not
have been expected by anyone to be established several years later. The first
one to be mentioned is the notion that regional security is indivisible. Such
a notion can be associated with common security thinking. It was shared
by the initiators of the APR conferences, and it was reflected in the inclu-
sive approach of this framework. Muthiah Alagappa, a then senior fellow
of ISIS Malaysia, recalls that he and other initiators of the ARF made sure
that the framework would be inclusive. Thus, from the first meeting, they
invited participants from almost all the countries in the Asia-Pacific region,
including China, the Soviet Union and North Korea (Interview, Singapore,
11 February 2003). In the third APR conference in 1989, the then director of
ISIS Thailand, Sukhumbhand Paribatra (1990: 75), emphasized the view that
peace in Southeast Asia is indivisible in nature, and cannot be achieved if
each country simply pursues its own security. The indivisible view of regional
security constituted the basis of the exploration of measures for confidence
building and conflict reduction.
Second, the idea of extending ASEAN’s diplomatic style over a larger
geographical area, in an attempt to promote regional cooperation, was ad-
vocated by many participants from the Southeast Asian countries. For them,
multilateral cooperation over a wider region should be considered in accor-
dance with their own practice and norms. Although they were attentive to
cooperative security measures carried out in the CSCE, they thought that
European arrangements should not be transferred to Asia. Thus, in their
discussion of ways to achieve peace in the Asia-Pacific region, they often re-
ferred to ASEAN’s experience of cooperation. The second APR conference
in 1988 is a useful example: during his keynote address, the then Malaysian
foreign minister, Abu Hassan Omar (1989: 1–2), introduced ASEAN’s diplo-
matic style as a model for confidence building in the Asia-Pacific region.
Finally, on the basis of these two points, many participants in the APR con-
ferences advanced the idea of establishing a forum for a security dialogue at
the inter-governmental level. The like-minded participants of the Track II
conference felt the need to create a similar framework at the official level.
What they called for was an arena for the discussion of regional security
issues, not a CSCE-type institutional framework. At the first APR confer-
ence in 1987, Alagappa (1988b: 11) noted that an important prerequisite for
 H. Katsumata: Establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum 191

CBMs and arms control was a forum for security dialogue among all the
countries in the Pacific.

Development of security cooperation in 1990s

Ideational development in the early 1990s was even more remarkable. Vari-
ous actors from different countries explored the possibilities of multilateral
measures, thereby fostering cooperative security ideas. Those who proposed
such measures were inspired by the achievement of the CSCE process. This
process had contributed to a major change in the structure of security per-
ception at the global level. The meaning which the Eastern and Western
blocs attached to their opponents’ military power ceased to be one of threat.
The controversy over the Australian and Canadian proposals in 1990 for
an Asian version of the CSCE was indeed the first major inter-governmental
discussion about the possibilities of multilateral cooperation in the post-Cold
War era. Although their plans themselves were not implemented, what be-
came apparent through this controversy was that many actors in the Asia-
Pacific region were sharing the spirit of security cooperation. The idea of
creating a CSC‘A’ itself was rejected by the ASEAN countries. For them,
such an idea implied a rapid institutionalization of a framework for coop-
eration. It was against their diplomatic norms. Yet they did not reject the
cooperative approach per se. What they rejected was the rapid institutional-
ization, but not the idea of creating a peaceful environment through security
cooperation. Cooperative security ideas had widely been shared. For ex-
ample, the then Indonesian foreign minister, Ali Alatas (1991), during the
AMM in 1991, pointed out that European institutions could not simply be
transplanted to another part of the world, but emphasized that this did not
‘detract from the need to begin laying the foundations for more peaceful and
stable relations’. He added that the ASEAN approach remained ‘of central
validity and relevance’.
It was ASEAN’s agenda which resulted in the establishment of the ARF.
ASEAN-ISIS played an important role in conceptualizing the idea of an
ASEAN-initiated security dialogue. To be sure, the emphasis on ASEAN-
ISIS does not mean that this network of strategic studies institutions was the
sole architect of the ARF. Yet the process of the development of cooperative
security ideas in Southeast Asia had begun in the 1980s, and participants of
ASEAN-ISIS had been taking the leading role in the Track II activities. The
ideas fostered in the post-Cold War era were the fruits of the discussion in
Track II settings in the 1980s, in which participants of ASEAN-ISIS were
the central players. Therefore, for an understanding of a set of shared ideas
in the early 1990s, it is worth focusing on the ASEAN-ISIS agenda.
In June 1991, ASEAN-ISIS (1991) produced its policy recommendation
paper, the ASEAN-ISIS Memorandum entitled ‘A Time for Initiative’. It
called for ASEAN to initiate a region-wide multilateral framework for a
security dialogue. The ASEAN-ISIS agenda for security cooperation was
192 The Pacific Review

in line with the view that regional security is indivisible and security can be
achieved only through cooperative undertakings. In the 1990s, when the par-
ticipants of ASEAN-ISIS were considering their proposal for a new security
framework in the region, there had already been a consensus among them
that such a framework should be multilateral (interview with Sukhumbhand
Paribatra, Bangkok, 13 December 2001). Moreover, they thought that en-
gaging China was important, and believed that China should be included in
any new regional security arrangements (interviews with several ASEAN-
ISIS participants, 1998–2004).
Here it should be emphasized that ASEAN-ISIS thought that the pro-
motion of security cooperation should be in line with the ASEAN Way of
diplomacy (interview with Sukhumbhand Paribatra, Bangkok, 13 December
2001). Thus, the ISIS participants called for a security dialogue aimed at pro-
moting a sense of mutual trust, instead of creating a CSCE-type institution.
Their commitment to the ASEAN norms at that time is apparent in that
when they explored the possibilities of regional cooperation they frequently
emphasized the importance of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC),
which elaborated on the principles of ASEAN diplomacy (ASEAN 1976).
For example, during the ASEAN-ISIS meeting in which the Memorandum
was produced, the then director-general of ISIS Malaysia, Noordin Sopiee
(1991), raised the following issue: ‘A question that arises is whether any of
the countries in the region find any single Article . . . of the [TAC] less than
appropriate as it currently stands.’
The ASEAN-ISIS proposal, the elements of which were based on ideas
fostered since the 1980s, was forwarded to the governments of the ASEAN
countries. It is true to say that the Memorandum was received well. In the
early 1990s, policy makers in the governments were also committed to the
Southeast Asian diplomatic norms, as they frequently emphasized the im-
portance of TAC and relevant norms in their discussions of regional security
issues on various occasions (see, for example, Alatas 1991; ASEAN 1991,
1992). With regard to their security perceptions, they were faced with con-
ditions of uncertainty about regional security, arising mainly from their con-
cern about Beijing’s security posture. Their concern was founded on bitter
historical experience: most of the ASEAN countries had been annoyed by
Beijing’s attempt to ‘export’ communism at some time in the past. Against
the background of uncertainty about the post-Cold War security environ-
ment, a set of new ideas became salient, and policy makers became receptive
to these ideas (see Checkel 1997: 8–11; Haas 1992: 12–13).
A set of ideas shared widely among various actors called for security
cooperation through a dialogue. It was developed through the exploration
of the possibilities of multilateral cooperation by those who had taken part
in Track II activities since the 1980s. Thus, by the summer of 1991, there was
a broad consensus among the governments of the ASEAN countries that
a regional security dialogue should be initiated. At the AMM in July 1991,
they expressed their willingness to promote a security dialogue (ASEAN
 H. Katsumata: Establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum 193

1991). Then, at the ASEAN Summit in January 1992, they officially agreed
to initiate a region-wide security dialogue (ASEAN 1992). The decision to
establish the first region-wide security framework, the ARF, was made in
July 1993 (ASEAN 1993). The first ARF meeting was held in July 1994, and
included participants from throughout the region, including China, Russia
and Vietnam. The forum became truly inclusive when North Korea joined
in 2000. It has been an arena where all the countries in the region pursue a
security dialogue without assuming any friend–enemy relations.
To conclude, the ideational aspect of ASEAN’s security agenda is sig-
nificant. What can be regarded as the norm of security cooperation was
constructed through the Southeast Asian actors’ reinterpretation of exter-
nal ideas in accordance with the local norms in their own region.4 Inspired by
the fruits of the CSCE process, these actors explored the possibilities of secu-
rity agendas originating in this process, such as measures to build confidence
and reduce conflicts, as well as the very notion of establishing a region-wide
institution for security cooperation. Yet, through such a process, they reinter-
preted these external agendas in accordance with the local/regional norms
in Southeast Asia. For the actors who had already internalized ASEAN’s
diplomatic principles, all kinds of agendas should be sought in accordance
with such principles. In other words, security cooperation had to meet the
standard of appropriateness defined by the ASEAN Way. What has been
described above is an actor-centred process – the actors’ reconstruction of
external ideas in accordance with their local norms. The other side of such a
process is a structure-centred one (Giddens 1979: 5, 69; Wendt 1987): while
the Southeast Asian countries’ interests and policies were influenced by ex-
ternal ideas, the influence of such ideational factors was affected by the local
norms in Southeast Asia. The ideational development of Asian security co-
operation, as well as ASEAN’s initiative for the voluntary-dialogue-based
forum, can be understood in terms of these processes.

Conclusions
This article has offered five reasons to support the claim that the conven-
tional explanation, which centres on the maintaining-US-engagement while
tactically-cooperating-with-China approach, is insufficient. Constructivists
can provide answers to all of the five points which the proponents of the
conventional explanation are unable to deal with in a satisfactory man-
ner. First, agendas for multilateral cooperation had been explored since the
1980s. ASEAN’s initiative in the 1990s was the fruit of earlier deliberation
in unofficial settings. Second, ASEAN’s primary motive was not the main-
tenance of US military engagement for the sake of the balance of power.
Third, the ARF was not even ASEAN’s attempt to maintain US political
engagement. In the constructivist explanation, the issue of the relationship
between Washington’s military/political engagement and the ARF is sim-
ply irrelevant. Fourth, the informal style of cooperation in the ARF can be
194 The Pacific Review

discussed in terms of ASEAN’s diplomatic norms. Fifth, the implications of

the CBMs in Asia are largely normative, rather than strategic. The bases of
these measures are the norm of security cooperation whose elements include
ASEAN’s diplomatic principles. It can be concluded that the constructivists’
norm explanation is sounder than the conventional explanation embodying
the realist and neoliberal accounts.
Having completed its analysis of ASEAN’s establishment of the ARF, this
article is now in a position to consider the nature of the ARF by assessing
the three views set out in the introductory section. The following discussion
is based on an analysis of ASEAN’s policies carried out in this article, and
thus concerns ASEAN’s view of the ARF. To begin with, the realist view is
insufficient. It does not grasp the most important aspect of the cooperative
framework. The ARF should not be seen as a mere arena for power politics
among the major powers in the region. This is because achieving a balance of
power was not the primary motive behind the ASEAN countries’ initiation
of the ARF. Such a claim is a challenge to the proponents of the conventional
explanation who seem to support the realist view. Leifer (1996: 53) deplores
the fact that the ARF is unable to serve as a traditional means to achieve a
balance of power, such as collective defence:

The ARF . . . can be seen as an imperfect diplomatic instrument for

achieving regional security goals in that it seeks to address the prob-
lem of power which arises from the anarchical nature of international
society without provision for either collective defence or collective
security.

However, the ARF is not meant to address the ‘problem of power’. In other
words, the ARF is not an inferior substitute for a collective defence system.
At best, it can be a better alternative for maintaining peace and, if nothing
else, the ARF and the existing collective defence mechanisms – i.e. a set of
US bilateral alliances – can coexist while serving different purposes.
Next, the neoliberal view is also insufficient. The main purpose of the ARF
is not to serve as an arena for tactical cooperation between its participants,
in dealing with various regional security matters. Such a claim is justifiable
because it is too simplistic to argue that the ARF was ASEAN’s attempt
to cooperate tactically with external powers, in particular with China. For
neoliberals, the ARF should offer an international solution to various dis-
putes in the region, including one of the most contentions issues between
ASEAN and China – i.e. the Spratly Islands issue. However, they should
realize that the ARF is not designed to ‘resolve’ these disputes – i.e. to
reach a formal agreement, or to create a formal mechanism to regulate con-
cerned states’ actions. Rather, it is aimed at bringing about long-term peace
by fostering a sense of mutual trust. In this regard, a common criticism of
the forum is off the mark. Today, many authors offer a pessimistic view
of the role of the ARF by stating that the forum is unlikely to be able to
 H. Katsumata: Establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum 195

deal with various conflicts in the region (see, for example, Dibb 2000: 7–9;
Garofano 2002: 520). It is true that the ARF has not succeeded in resolv-
ing many issues. One might say that many contentious issues have simply
been ‘swept under the carpet’. This, however, by no means demonstrates
the failure of the ARF process because it is not designed to resolve such
issues.
Finally, the constructivist view is the most appropriate, and it is reason-
able to see the ARF as a norm-oriented framework. The other two views
are not entirely wrong, but insufficient. Mainstream IR authors must bor-
row an ideational perspective from constructivists in order to offer a satis-
factory argument. For constructivists, multilateral institutions reflect actors’
intersubjective normative understandings, and these shared understandings
in turn influence actors’ actions. The ARF reflects a set of norms associ-
ated with Asian security cooperation, constructed through the process de-
scribed above. In the ARF process the participants may practise coopera-
tive norms, and, through their practices, they may strengthen such norms
and spread them to a larger geographical area – from Southeast Asia to
the Asia-Pacific region. The ARF should be seen as a framework for the
development and practice of a set of norms associated with security coop-
eration. In this respect, the ARF is, so to speak, a ‘norm brewery’. Shared
normative understandings fostered in the ARF process may in turn influ-
ence the participants’ interests and policies. The key to facilitating cooper-
ation is incentives and pressure in an ideational or moral sense, instead of a
material one (see Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 895, 902–4; Johnston 2001:
499–502). In the norm-oriented framework of the ARF, the participants
seek regional peace and cooperation because cooperative behaviour meets
the standard of appropriateness in the light of relevant norms. Therefore,
for constructivists, the cooperative security forum is significant in terms of
norms, although it may appear to be a mere ‘talking shop’ with no strategic
significance.

Acknowledgements
An earlier version of this article was presented at the First Congress of the
Asian Political and International Studies Association, Singapore, 29 Novem-
ber 2003. I thank the participants of this congress for their useful comments.
I am also highly indebted to Amitav Acharya, Stuart Croft, Julie Gilson,
Christopher Hughes, and Peter Preston. I also wish to thank my former
colleagues at the graduate schools of the University of Birmingham, the
National University of Singapore, and Sophia University. Any errors are
mine.

Notes
1 In this article, the term ‘ASEAN countries’ refers to its six members in the early
1990s: Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines, and Brunei.
196 The Pacific Review

2 Since the earliest stage of the discussion, these countries’ participation in a new
framework has been one of the most important aims. See ASEAN Institutes of
Strategic and International Studies (1991).
3 For the epistemological position of this kind of constructivism, see Katzenstein
(1996: 4–5) and Wendt (1999: 38–40, 47–91). Another strand of constructivism
takes a different epistemological stance, and seeks to understand the way in which
the world is constructed by emphasizing the role of language.
4 Amitav Acharya (2004) argues that actors in Southeast Asia have ‘localised’ for-
eign norms–including the common security norm–to ensure that they fit with local
beliefs and practices.

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