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CFS Lecture 3 Part 1
CFS Lecture 3 Part 1
CFS Lecture 3 Part 1
*KIND REMINDER (Repeating from Wk 1 first Lec of 2, Orientation): Each Week’s Lecture Slides and
accompanying commentary provide greater depth to no more than 4-5 issues or concepts associated with this
week or last week’s assigned reading. To repeat, by deliberate design, lecture slides and accompanying in-lecture
explanation do NOT cover ALL of the areas for which you are responsible.
YOUR Checklist for Full Success in CFS– Also per Week 1:
As assignments are
‘FULL’ each week starting
Anything missing from YOUR preparation? Wk 2, distraction of
scrambling to ‘catch up’
may hinder you in the NEW
week’s key understandings!
q You keep up with ALL assigned readings (notes, outlines as you read
recommended), understanding that lecture slides are deliberately NOT
designed as a substitute for the assignments.
q In class, you take your own careful lecture note of both lecture commentary,
illustrations, BOTH to deepen your understanding of key concepts
addressed in this course, AND because of your recognition that in-class
commentary has traditionally represented 20+% of the final exam content.
q You do NOT merely ‘show up and listen’ for the one-hour weekly
workshops; instead, you are fully prepared and attempt to actively
participate each and every week.*
*Given the number of attendees in each workshops, this obviously isn’t always possible, 2
but prepare fully– This is to your benefit!
Today’s Lecture Topics: Agenda
1. From last week: How adding debt exaggerates investment (CAPEX)
consequences, both good and bad
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FIRST, A FEW DEFINITIONS:
Cash Flow (CF): The basic measure of whether or not a company is creating value for
its owners. Simple version: NOPAT + DEPR + A
Discounted Cash Flow (DCF): CFs (above) calculated on present value (PV) basis,
with a rate based on analysed company WACC (below) often being that ‘discounting’
rate.
Free Cash Flow (FCF) simple version: CF – investment (i) outlay for that period.
Closely related to CF, this is a recurring measure of company performance in value
terms, such as cited in Stern 1974 (Earnings Per Share Don’t Count)
Net Operating Profit After Tax (NOPAT): Reported Net Income, but excluding any
non-continuing sources, extraordinary income or financing-derived gains or losses
Weighed Average Cost of Capital (WACC): Commonly used as the discounting rate
for DCF determination (above), this is typically calculated as the AT Cost of Debt x
Debt as % Total Capital (D+E) + CofE x Equity as % of Total Capital
4
Revisiting Week 1’s CFO BEST Operating Performance Measure Issue:
ROE and Similar Ratios* Have Considerable Support as the Financial Performance
Measure of Choice for FDs and Thus for Their Firms
• Evolution From ROA: Prior to the beginning of the High Leverage Era, returns on
assets predominated. Gradual shift towards ‘below the line’ numerator after 1982 not
a surprise.
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*ROE= NI/E. Similars: CFROE, CFROI, EBITDA/CAP etc.
After Tax Cost of Debt is Almost Always MUCH Cheaper Than Cost of
Equity…
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DEBT: Advantages to Borrower (loan) / Issuing Company (Co. bond)…
Usually less than half the cost of equity, on an AT basis
WHY? FOR WHAT THREE REASONS?
As a result of (1) usually (a) reduces the cost of capital and thus (b) increases the
company’s worth, AOTBE
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Extreme Gearing Brings Opportunities…. But Also Related Drawbacks
1) Usually less than half the cost of equity, on Threat of bankruptcy caused by default
an AT basis. on major loans, borrowings
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high
Equity (ROE)
Return
on… theorhetical
actual
Assets (ROA)
low high
Gearing level
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SCENARIO
2:
DEBT
ADDED,
10%
RETURN
PER
ADDED
DEBT
LAST WEEK’S 2nd
Lec SET:WARM-UP TO
EQUITY
CONSTANT
AT
10,000
2 SIDES OF LEVERAGE W/S
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2.
Some leverage theoretical
foundations
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M&M proclaim that financial return varies with risk, and
deliberately do not differentiate between the composition of
financing (that is, debt v equity)
Deductibility of interest on debt, one of the three factors making - borrowing almost
always less expensive than equity (OTHER 2?)
At very HIGH levels of gearing, risk of default on senior debt often but not always
leading to bankruptcy
At extremely LOW leverage levels, the publicly-traded company risks continuity threat
as predators have an incentive to exploit that firm’s under-utilised balance sheet,
effectively buying the firm with its own debt (OPM)
.
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Factor in what M&M missed, & modern conceptions of corporate leverage
management emerge, re-shaping the leveraged firm’s risk/return function
Post the
beginning of Heightened threat of debt
LBO era ~1982 default followed by
and concerns administration ‘flattens’ the
about agent gearing return curve at
management, very high levels, even
undergeared sometimes w/ positive CF.
companies Cannot gear to
Risk, perceived as extremes.
undermanaged,
Reward encouraging
‘management
change’, one
way or another
low high
Gearing percentage plus amount
The undergeared (and thus, financially mis-managed) firm is identified
by extremely low D/C ratio, but also by other factors such as
DO you suspect that there are many instances of this practice today, at least amongst publicly-
traded companies? Why or why not?
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3
Getting WACC’d
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The Cost of Capital reflects component costs and portions
of the firm’s primary financing elements*
Rate x Portion of
Rate x Portion of
Total Capital
Total Capital
* Long-term ‘permanent’ sources of financing: equity plus LTD long-term debt: corporate bonds, long term bank or other financial
institution borrowings, debentures etc. Excluded: trade credits, seasonal borrowings.
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WACC TOO HIGH (caused by undergearing)
An excessive discounting rate may mean that… WACC
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WACC TOO LOW WACC
.. Whereas an unrealistically low discounting
rate often means that:
Co. management OVER-estimates its own firm’s worth– and blames the
financial markets as ‘not understanding our strategy’ when financial
markets fail to confirm that faux-valuation.
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Several Perspectives on the Company’s Cost of Capital…
• In Terms of Financing Providers’ Requirements
Arnold (p. 32): “The rate of return a company has to offer financial providers to induce
them to buy and hold a financial security.
• Reflecting the Firm’s Point Along Its Competitive Life Span continuum. The
financing profile for the newly created start-up (e.g., Zynga) differs completely from that of
the near-death firm desperately struggling to avoid elimination (e.g., HMV).
.
Under the Capital Asset Pricing Model, WACE and WACD
START in the Same Place with RfR, Then Diverge…
(deliberately simplistic)
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CAPM Risk Free Rate is shown here as literally the
CofE foundation for calculating costs of the firm’s two
(illustrative) capital components, debt and equity
– HOW MUCH financing is ideal for the company given its present and
future projected productivity (return on tangible investments?), other
considerations
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4
‘Shooting Bucks Full of
Steroids’
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“We take a buck, we shoot it
full of steroids, we call it
leverage… leverage debt… it’s
a bankrupt business model.”
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If SOME Debt is Good, Then Loading Up the Firm Or Deal
With Maximum Debt Must Be Even Better, CORRECT?
(1) Exploiting Increasing debt-to-capital (D/C) Significant levels of Lowest marginal Subordinating firm’s value-optimal capital
target’s short-term ratio to the highest operational waste WACC rate structure to acquirer-financier’s
remaining level possible while still covering persist, and that possible in compensation scheme.
marginal debt debt servicing over near-term. excessive debt is best theory, but only if
servicing way to resolve that. financial markets Myopic orientation. Risk factors may mean
capacity As debt is significantly lower ignore or INCREASE in Cost of Capital.
(CADS, TIE) cost after-tax than equity, lowers Austerity budgets miscalculate
nominal WACC, thereby caused by unbalanced increases in Outdated notion of using indirect financial
increasing value all other things ST capital structure do financial, influences to improve operating performance.
being equal not permanently harm operating risk May encourages manipulation of debt type
company and form (P+I). Possible to probable
corporate value destruction.
(2) Approach Prevents some of the more Refer to (1) above Maximizes short- Still a myopic capital structure driven more by
(1), but with egregious manipulations of debt term D relative the financier’s objectives than what is best for
normalized servicing requirements possible to C, but with the target. Prospect of higher rather than
debt including in (1). Adequate contingency some lower WACC persists.
P+I, coverage provisions help to prevent safeguards
contingency optimal-peak financing risk (debt against the worst Opposition by those acquirers-financiers who
coverage dependent on abuses of (1) resist effective caps to extreme over-
unrealistic CF performance) leverage.
(3) Cap Designed to correct the outlier In order remain Pursuit of the Another spot (current) technique, with little if
Structure capital structure. competitive, company optimal capital any attention to company’s ongoing financing
Aligned With cannot afford a capital structure in requirements.
Industry structure which is competitive
Leaders’ significantly out of synch terms at the Effective presumption that leaders are at or
Practice with industry/segment forefront of approaching OCS. But if leaders are
leader capital planning, chronically over-geared, value destruction for
all.
(4) Adjusted Capital structure adapted to life Formulistic cap Helps to avoid To champions of extreme leverage,
for CAP stage changes in firm’s restructuring short-term reductions of D/C in latter life stages.
Lifespan competitiveness, CF generation, approaches that ignore capital planning Eliminates some mature & declining
Capital Cost risks. life stage considerations companies as HLT targets.
Implications are incomplete
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Table B.1 from Clark & Mills Masterminding the Deal 2013, Appendix B