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Philosophical Studies: Conditional Permission in Deontic Logic
Philosophical Studies: Conditional Permission in Deontic Logic
Philosophical Studies: Conditional Permission in Deontic Logic
STUDIES
Edited by WILFRID SELLARS and HERBERT FEIGL with the advice and
assistance of PAUL MEEHL, ~'OHN HOSPERS, MAY BRODBECK
CONCLUSION
In the face of the considerations set forth above, I submit that Anderson's
proposed definition (D) does not represent an acceptable construction of
the concept of conditional permission. This, in turn, suggests that condi-
tional permission must be viewed as a viable deontic relationship in its own
right, and is not definable in terms of unconditional deontie concepts. It ap-
pears, then, that a reduction of conditional to unconditional deontic logic
is not warranted.
Received May 15, 1959
NOTES
1 N. Rescher, "An Axiom System for Deontic Logic," Philosophical Studies, 9:24-30
(1958).
6 PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
G. H. yon Wright, "A Note on Deontic Logic and Derived Obligation," M i n d , 65:
507-9 (1956).
8For convenience, the practice of autonomous use of symbols is adopted when con-
fusion cannot result.
' A. R. Anderson, "On the Logic of 'Commitment,' " Philosophical Studies, 10:23-27
(1959).
5The articulation of deontic logic (in both its conditional and unconditional ver-
sions), presupposes a system of modal logic, i.e., strict implication, to whose symbolism
a .primitive predicate (or relation) P is added, subject to a suitable set of additional
axioms.
Note that if we have (p &q) ~ p---as we do in the usual systems of strict impli-
cation-then (8) entails (6), and (6) entails (5). Thus Objection 1 is, as it were,
the most fundamental in that, if sustained, it would serve also for the work done by
Objections 2 and 3. However, any one of the objections suffices to invalidate the defini-
tion (D).
IN THE preceding paper, Mr. Rescher corrects an error of mine, and offers
intuitive counter-examples to three theorems of a system of deontic logic
which arises if we add to one of the familiar systems of alethic modal logic
a definition of conditional permission:
P ( p / c ) ----o~c---~ P ( p ) .
I no longer wish to defend this proposal, since I no longer believe that the
familiar systems of alethic modal logic can be regarded as providing an analy-
sis of " i f . . . then . . .-1 But if we take the arrow as e n t a i l m e n t in the
sense of the system E, 2 then it still seems to me that conditional permission
so defined captures an important intuitive notion.
It is clear that when we say " p is permitted in the circumstance c," we
never (or at least very rarely) mean that c is a n e c e s s a r y condition for p's
being permitted. But surely we sometimes mean that c is a sufficient condi-
tion for p's being permitted, and this is the notion I was trying to capture
in the proposal above. In consulting a lawyer, for example, as to whether p
is permitted to a person in our circumstances c, we expect him to give more
than the prima-hcie answer, and to go on to consider possible relevant special
circumstances; and if he does tell us to go ahead with the project, we would
feel that we were badly advised if it should turn out that by reason of special
overriding considerations p was not permitted to us after all.
REPLY TO MR. RESCHER 7
To consider Reseher's examples in particular, then:
Reply to Objection 1. The statement that a man is "permitted" (by cur-
rent etiquette) to wear a hat in the presence of ladies seems to me simply
false--at least this is the moral I should wish to draw from Rescher's example.
Surely the proper answer to the question whether this is permitted is not
"Yes," but rather "Well, that depends . . . sometimes it's all right, and
sometimes it isn't."
Reply to Objection 2. The argument concerning
O(p/c &d) O(p/c)
seems in fact an argument against
O ( p / c & d) --->O(p/c & Nd).
"For example, I am indeed (morally) obligated to pay Smith five
dollars if (1) I am able to do so and (2) I owe him the money; but I
am surely not obligated to pay him this sum when the former cir-
cumstance alone is realized."
And of course the latter is not a theorem of any of the systems under con
sideration. But it might be easier to see the point if we look at the equivalent
formula.
V(p/c) --, P(p/c &d).
Under the interpretation "c is a sufficient condition for p's being permitted,"
it surely follows that c & d is also a sufficient condition for p's being per-
mitted.
" 0 (p/c)" then has the interpretation "c is not a sufficient condition for
permitting ,~p,,,a and again it would seem to follow that if c & d is not a
sufficient condition for permitting ,-,p, then c is not a sufficient condition
either.
Reply to Objection 3. The proposed counter-example to
(c ~ d) ~ [P(p/d) ~ P ( p / c ) ]
seems to me to fail to be a counter-example; if the major premise is taken to
mean "some unmarried males are permitted to marry," then the syllogism is
formally invalid, and if it is taken to mean "all unmarried males are per-
mitted to marry," then it is (under the hypotheses of the example) simply
false.
This is not to say, however, that the notion of conditional permission as
defined above is the only one, or even the most important one. It might also
be of interest to understand the logic of Rescher's concept, which it seems
to m e fair to characterize as doubly conditional permission: "P (p/c)" hav-
ing the interpretation "p is permitted to those circumstances c, other things
8 P H I L O S O P H I C A L STUDIES
being equal (or provided there are no overriding considerations to the con-
trary) ." T h e difficulty, of course, is that this amounts to saying that p is per-
mitted to those in circumstances c--unless it isn't. And while m a n y of our
blanket moral injunctions have these loophole clauses ( " T h o u shalt not
kill--unless it is all right t o " ) , they d o n ' t provide us with an awful lot of
guidance.
T h e r e is also another notion of conditional permission P', defined as
P ' ( p / c ) = e l ,~ (c--> --,Pp),
i.e., c is not a sufficient condition for p's being forbidden. For this notion we
have the following theorems in O E 4 (corresponding to Rescher's axioms):
AI.' c--> P ' ( p v ~ p / c )
ALl' P ' ( p v q / c ) --> [ P ' ( p / c ) v P ' ( q / c ) l
A2.2' [ P ' ( p / c ) v P ' ( q / c ) ] --> P ' ( p v q / c )
A3.' (p-->q) ~.P'(p/c) -->P'(q/c)
Analogues of A4-A7 are, however, not provable in O E . A6, for example,
comes to
d--> N p p --~. c v ,-,e --> N p p ,
which is unacceptable if we subscribe to the principle that anything entailed
by a necessary truth is necessary, since it leads to
d --> ---Pp -->. I-l,-~Pp
(where " [ ] " is logical necessity).
lust
which of these various reconstructions of the intuitive ideas is the
most satisfactory seems a m o o t point; it is likely that various contexts require
various interpretations--Rescher's being as adequate a candidate as any of
the others.
Received M a y 20, 1960
NOTES
1 This is not the place to defend this wildly heterodox claim, but it seems evident that
neither material nor strict "implication" represents the intuitive "if . . . then . . ." if
we reflect on the meaning of the denial of such a statement, i don't in fact think that
GSdel's completeness theorem follows from the fact that snow is white, and I accordingly
reject as false the statement "if snow is white then the first order functional calculus is
complete." But when I say that that statement is false, I do not mean that snow is white
and the first order functional calculus is incomplete, or even that that is possible.
journal of S y m b o l i c Logic, 23:45%58 (1958).
In E, the denial of an "if . . . then . . ." assertion p--> q does not have as a con-
sequence that p & ~q, or even <>(p & ---q).
I.e., the system arising from E if we add an uninterpreted propositional constant
"b," defining "Pp" as "N(p--> (b & O ~ b ) ) , " and other deontic modalities in the obvi-
ous way. (See Mind, n.s., 67:100-4 (1958), and for motivation Logique et analyse, n.s.,
1:84-91 (1958).)