SUCCESSION DIGESTS-2

1. Paula T Llorente vs CAG.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000

FACTS:
 Lorenzo Llorente, an enlisted serviceman who was issued a US citizenship in 1943, was married
to petitioner Paula Llorente in 1937.
 On 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No.
5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern District of New
York.
 Upon his return to the Philippines, he found out that petitioner was pregnant with his brother’s son.
 Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as "Crisologo
Llorente," with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for the father’s
name was left blank
 February 2, 1946, the couple drew a written agreement to the effect that
(1) all the family allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzo’s salary and all
other obligations for Paula’s daily maintenance and support would be suspended;
(2) they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings;
(3) they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during their
marital life; and
(4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her
fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully.
The agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paula’s father
and stepmother. The agreement was notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel
 Went back to US Lorenzo filed for divorce before the Superior Court of the State of California
which issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce which became final in 1952.
 Lorenzo Llorente thereafter married Alicia Fortuno in 1958 to whom he had three children.
 In 1981, Lorenzo executed a last will and testament to which he bequeathed his properties
to Alicia Fortuno and their three children.
 The same was admitted for probate by the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur in 1984.
 Before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died in June 1985.
 The petitioner then filed with the same court for LETTERS ADMINISTRATION of Lorenzo’s
estate in her favor contending that she was the surviving spouse and the disposition in favor
of Alicia and her children encroached on her legitime and ½ share in the conjugal
properties. 
 The trial court granted Paula’s petition and subsequently ruled that the divorce decree
granted to Lorenzo is void and inapplicable in the Philippines incidentally making his
marriage to Alicia void.
 CA affirmed the decision of the lower court with modifications declaring Alicia co-owner of
properties acquired during her cohabitation with Lorenzo.

ISSUE: Whether the will was valid - YES

HELD:
 The fact that the late Lorenzo Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of:
(1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly
established, admitted and undisputed.
 Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.

"However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found." (Emphasis ours)

 True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized
to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.
 While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the foreign
law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the
case was "referred back" to the law of the decedent’s domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
 We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in the
same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that "American law follows
the ‘domiciliary theory’ hence, Philippine law applies when determining the validity of
Lorenzo’s will.
 First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of
the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law governing the
validity of testamentary provisions in the United States. Each State of the union has its own law
applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It can therefore refer to no other than
the law of the State of which the decedent was a resident.
 Second, there is no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by
New York State law.
 The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated as
duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the
factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.

 Validity of the Will

The Civil Code provides:

"ARTICLE 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.

"When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic
of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be
observed in their execution." (Emphasis ours)

 The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is
glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a
foreigner, not covered by our laws on "family rights and duties, status, condition and legal
capacity."

 Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by
foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with
 the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly
probated.
 As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs
may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to
the succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of successional
rights to the decedent’s national law.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP
No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.
 Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic
validity of Lorenzo N. Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing
proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to
settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.chanrob1es 

Validity of the Foreign Divorce

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
provided they are valid according to their national law.

Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that once proven that respondent was no longer a
Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and
petitioner could "very well lose her right to inherit" from him.

In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is
concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. We hold that the divorce
obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter
of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best
left to the determination of the trial court.

6. Nepomuceno vs CA 139 SCRA 206

No. L-62952. October 9, 1985.*

SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINA GOMEZ,
OSCAR JUGO ANG CARMELITA JUGO, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

CASE: PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

FACTS:
Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal. He left a last Will and Testament
duly signed by him at the end of the Will on page three and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof in the
presence of Celestina Alejandro, Myrna C. Cortez, and Leandro Leano, who in turn, affixed their signatures
below the attestation clause and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 of the Will in the presence of the
testator and of each other and the Notary Public. The Will was acknowledged before the Notary Public Romeo
Escareal by the testator and his three attesting witnesses
 In the said Will, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno
as his sole and only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to
a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had
been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and wife. In fact,
on December 5, 1952, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia J. Nepomuceno were married in
Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace. The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife
Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion thereof to herein
petitioner.

By virtue of this will, petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last Will and
Testament of Martin before CFI Rizal, Caloocan, asking for the issuance to her of letter testamentary. Rufina
and her children filed an opposition on the ground that the will was executed under undue influence as Martin
was already very sick then, and most importantly, the petitioner was the concubine of Martin.

On January 6, 1976, the lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as
the testator admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner from December 1952 until his death on July 16,
1974, the Will's admission to probate will be an Idle exercise because on the face of the Will, the invalidity of its
intrinsic provisions is evident.

Upon petitioner’s appeal to the CA, the respondent court set aside the decision of the CFI
as to the validity, upholding that the will was valid EXCEPT that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and
void pursuant to Article 739 in relation with Article 1028 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pt that the devise in
favor of the petitioner is null and void pursuant to Article 739 (prohibitions on donation) in relation with Article
1028 (prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to testamentary
provisions) of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The properties devised to petitioner was then to be passed on
intestacy to Rufina and the children.

In this petition, petitioner submits that the validity of the testamentary provision in her
favor cannot be passed upon and decided in the probate proceedings but in some other proceedings because
the only purpose of the probate of a Will is to establish conclusively as against everyone that a Will was
executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator has the mental capacity to execute the
same. Hence, the declaration of nullity of the Will based on Art. 739 could only be made by the proper court in
a separate action brought by the legal wife for the specific purpose of obtaining a declaration of the nullity of
the testamentary provision in the Will in favor of the person with whom the testator was allegedly guilty of
adultery or concubinage.

The respondents on the other hand contend that the fact that the last Will and Testament
itself expressly admits indubitably on its face the meretricious relationship between the testator and the
petitioner and the fact that petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance of
the true civil status of the testator put in the issue of the legality of the devise which must be resolved by the
same proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether or not intrinsic validity of Martin’s Will be resolved in the subject probate proceeding -
YES

HELD:

1. GENERAL RULE: Probate is one thing; the validity of the testamentary provisions is another. In probate of a
Will, the court's area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity thereof. The testator’s testamentary capacity
and the compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the only questions
presented for the resolution of the court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the
will or the legality of any devise or legacy is premature. The EXCEPTION is when practical considerations
demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, if for example if there are certain unusual
provisions of the will, the court should meet the issue even before it is probated.

Hence, to remand the nullified provision to the proper court in a separate action for that
purpose will just result to waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical
considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity 01 the
provisions of the will in question. Moreover, in the present case, there was no issue as to the extrinsic validity,
but only to the intrinsic validity, of Martin’s will

2.. The devise given by a married man estranged from his wife for 22 years prior to his death, to a woman with
whom he has been living for said period of time is void.

The prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a donation
between persons who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver
cannot give even assuming that the recipient may receive. The very wordings of Martin’s Will invalidate the
legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been
living in concubinage.

Moreover, petitioner cannot feign innocence nor good faith contending that she has no
knowledge of the previous marriage of Martin. Her knowledge was proven under the following proven
circumstances:
a. The Will states so that it was a relationship in concubinage
b. Marriage of petitioner to Martin was done in secrecy and in Tarlac where neither of them ever resided
and at the ages of 48 and 51, respectively
c. Sweetheart even before Martin got married to Rufina and just married petitioner after 30 years
d. Admitted that she knew the children of Martin
e. Frequented the house of Martin’s parents which was just a few meters away from that of Rufina’s

Hence, it is inherently improbable, for they are against the experience in common life and
the ordinary instincts and promptings of human nature that a woman would not bother at all to ask the man she
was going to marry whether or not he was already married to another, knowing that her groom had children. It
would be a story that would strain human credulity to the limit if petitioner did not know that Martin Jugo was
already a married man in view of the irrefutable fact that it was precisely his marriage to respondent Rufina
Gomez that led petitioner to break off with the deceased during their younger years.

PETITION dismissed.

Cayetano v. Leonidas
DOCTRINES:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; GRANT OF
MOTION TO WITHDRAW OPPOSITION TO PROBATE OF WILL IN CASE AT BAR, NOT A CASE OF. — We
find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge when he allowed withdrawal of petitioner’s
opposition to the probate of the will. No proof was adduced to support petitioner’s contention that the motion to
withdraw was secured through fraudulent means and that Atty. Franco Loyola was not his counsel of record. The
records show that after the filing of the contested motion, the petitioner at a later date, filed a manifestation
wherein he confirmed that the Motion to Dismiss Opposition was his voluntary act and deed. Moreover, at the time
the motion was filed, the petitioner’s former counsel, Atty. Jose P. Lagrosa had long withdrawn from the case and
had been substituted by Atty. Franco Loyola who in turn filed the motion. The present petitioner cannot, therefore,
maintain that the old man’s attorney of record was Atty. Lagrosa at the time of filing the motion. Since the
withdrawal was in order, the respondent judge acted correctly in hearing the probate of the will ex-parte, there
being no other opposition to the same.

2. ID.; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; PROBATE OF WILL; PROBATE COURT, SCOPE OF AUTHORITY. — As a

 general rule, the probate court’s authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution
thereof, the testatrix’s testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by
law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed
upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue (Maninang, v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).

3. CIVIL LAW; WILLS AND SUCCESSION; INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF WILLS GOVERNED BY THE NATIONAL
LAW OF THE DECEDENT; CASE AT BAR. — It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will, as provided for by Articles 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent
must apply. In the case at bar, although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus,
the respondent judge should have denied its probate outright, the private respondents have sufficiently
established that Adoracion Campos was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident
of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.. Therefore, the law governing Adoracion Campos’ will is the law of
Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. Under the Pennsylvania law, no legitimes are
provided for, and all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger.

4. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE; COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF

THE PROVINCE WHERE THE ESTATE IS LOCATED HAS JURISDICTION. — The settlement of the estate of
Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila where she had an estate since it
was alleged and proven the Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of
Pennsylvania, United States of America and not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONER ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING JURISDICTION OF COURT IN CASE AT
BAR. — Petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for relief. It
is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, against his
opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (See Saulog Transit,
Inc. v. Hon. Manuel Lazaro, Et Al., G.R. No. 63284, April 4, 1984).

 
FACTS:
1. Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private
respondent Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the surviving heirs. 
2. As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication under Rule 74,
Section I of the Rules of Court whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of the
deceased Adoracion Campos.
3. 11 months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of the
deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was allegedly executed in the United States and for her appointment as
administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix.
 xxx alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death xxx;
 that the testatrix died in Manila on January 31, 1977 while temporarily residing with her sister at 2167 Leveriza,
Malate, Manila; 
 that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last will and testament on July 10, 1975, according to the laws
of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., nominating Wilfredo Barzaga of New Jersey as executor; 
 that after the testatrix death, her last will and testament was presented, probated, allowed, and registered
with the Registry of Wins at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., that Clement L. McLaughlin, the administrator
who was appointed after Dr. Barzaga had declined and waived his appointment as executor in favor of the former,
is also a resident of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and 
 that therefore, there is an urgent need for the appointment of an administratrix to administer and eventually
distribute the properties of the estate located in the Philippines.
4. On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein petitioner alleging
among other things, that he has every reason to believe that the will in question is a forgery; that the
intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void; and that even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic
provisions are invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as they would work injustice and injury to him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the preterition is proper. YES, the governing law is law of Pennsylvania

HELD:
As a general rule, the probate court’s authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof,
the testatrix’s testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic
validity of the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However,
where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the
court should meet the issue (Maninang, v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).

Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should have
denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her
death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16
par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which respectively provide:

Article 16 par. 2: "However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of
the country wherein said property may be found."

Art. 1039: "Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent." library

The law which governs Adoracion Campo’s will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the
decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may
be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it
would be contrary to the sound and established public policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine
Law.

It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16 (2) and
1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply. This was squarely applied in the case of Bellis v.
Bellis (20 SCRA 358) wherein we ruled:

"It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress
has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter
alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent’s national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.

OTHER ISSUES:

As regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing for the petition for relief, the records will bear the fact that what
was repeatedly scheduled for hearing on separate dates until June 19, 1980 was the petitioner’s petition for relief and not
his motion to vacate the order of January 10, 1979. There is no reason why the petitioner should have been led to believe
otherwise. The court even admonished the petitioner’s failing to adduce evidence when his petition for relief was
repeatedly set for hearing. There was no denial of due process. The fact that he requested "for the future setting of the
case for hearing . . ." did not mean that at the next hearing, the motion to vacate would be heard and given preference in
lieu of the petition for relief. Furthermore, such request should be embodied in a motion and not in a mere notice of
hearing.

 
Finally, we find the contention of the petition as to the issue of jurisdiction utterly devoid of merit. Under Rule 73,
Section 1, of the Rules of Court, it is provided that:

"SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time
of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original
case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record."

Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila
where she had an estate since it was alleged and proven the Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and
permanent resident of Pennsylvania, United States of America an not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by the
petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the
petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief,
against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. (See Saulog
Transit, Inc. v. Hon. Manuel Lazaro, Et Al., G.R. No. 63284, April 4, 1984).chanrobles law library
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

12. Maloles vs Pacita de los Reyes Philipps Jan 31, 2000

G.R. No. 133359. January 31, 2000
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II,, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FERNANDO V. GOROSPE, JR., in
his Official Capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC-Makati, Branch 61, and PACITA PHILLIPS as the
alleged executrix of the alleged will of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, Respondents.

FACTS:

On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati City, filed a petition for probate
of his will in RTC Makati Br. 61. RTC granted the petition in allowing the will. When the case was called for
hearing on the date set, no oppositor appeared nor any written opposition was ever filed and on motion of
petitioner, he was allowed to adduce his evidence in support of the petition. In its decision, RTC approved and
allowed the petition for the allowance of Dr. Arturo’s Last Will and Testament. It was indicated in the Will that
Dr. Arturo has no compulsory heirs and Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc., with address at No. 9 Bauhinia
corner Intsia Streets, Forbes Park, Makati City has been named as sole legatee and devisee of his properties,
real and personal, approximately valued at not less than P2 million, and private respondent Ms. Pacita de los
Reyes Phillips was designated as executor and to serve as such without a bond.

Shortly after the probate of his will, Dr. De Santos died on February 26, 1996. Thereafter, petitioner
Octavio Maloles II filed a motion for intervention claiming that, as the only child of Alicia de Santos (testator’s
sister) and Octavio Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He
likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the testator. Petitioner thus prayed for the reconsideration of the
order allowing the will and the issuance of letters of administration in his name. Meanwhile, Pacita filed a
motion for the issuance of letters testamentary, but later on withdrew and refiled it with RTC Makati, Br. 65,
which in turn, issued an order appointing her as special administrator of Dr. De Santos estate.

Petitioner sought to intervene to set aside the appointment of private respondent as special
administrator. Aside from asserting that he was the sole heir, he also contended that the probate proceedings
before Branch 61 of the same court was still pending that in truth, private respondent misdeclared the true
worth of the testator’s estate and thus, was not fit to be the special administrator of the estate. This was denied
on the ground that that the matter is for a separate case to be filed under Rule 78 of the Rules of Court (for the
issuance of Letters Testamentary and of Administration) and cannot be included in this case filed under Rule
76 (for the allowance of Will during his lifetime) of the Rules of Court. However, Br. 61 took cognizance of the
entire case to expedite the proceedings.

On November 4, 1996, Judge Abad Santos of Br. 61 granted petitioner’s motion for intervention. Private
respondent Pacita moved for a reconsideration but her motion was denied by the trial court. She then filed a
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The CA ruled that petitioner has no right to intervene in the
settlement of the estate of Dr. Arturo de Santos.

In this petition, petition argued that the probate proceedings in Branch 61 of RTC-Makati did not
terminate upon the issuance of the order allowing the will of Dr. De Santos because the proceedings must
continue until the estate is fully distributed to the lawful heirs, devisees, and legatees of the testator, pursuant
to Rule 73, of the Rules of Court. He also argued that he has the right to intervene in and oppose the petition
for issuance of letters testamentary filed by private respondent because as the nearest next of kin and creditor
of the testator, his interest in the matter is material and direct.

ISSUES: 
1. Whether or not petitioner has the right to intervene in the probate and settlement proceedings – NO
2. Whether or not the probate proceedings terminate upon the issuance of allowance to the Will of Dr.
Arturo Santos - YES

HELD:

1. Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be considered an "heir" of the
testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary succession that one who has no compulsory or forced heirs
may dispose of his entire estate by will. 

Art. 842 of the Civil Code provides:

One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any
person having capacity to succeed.

One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the
provisions of this Code with regard to the legitimate of said heirs.

Compulsory heirs are limited to the testators -

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate
children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code

Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have been preterited in the
testator’s will. His claim as the creditor of the testator was also not substantiated. Since the testator instituted
or named an executor in his will, it is a well-settled rule to respect the desires of the testator. The choice of his
executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary concomitant of his right to dispose of his property
in the manner he wishes. It is natural that the testator should desire to appoint one of his confidences, one who
can be trusted to carry out his wishes in the disposal of his estate. The curtailment of this right may be
considered a curtailment of the right to dispose. 

Therefore, only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to give bond may the
court appoint other persons to administer the estate. None of these circumstances is present in this case.

Moreover, Rule 79 of the ROC provides that the opposition to the issuance of letters testamentary with
simultaneous petition for administration can be filed by any person interested in a will. An "interested person" is
one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as
a creditor, and whose interest is material and direct, not merely incidental or contingent. Clearly, the petitioner
cannot be considered as an interested contemplated by the law. Hence, cannot intervene. 

2.  Probate proceedings do not cease upon the allowance or disallowance of a will but continues up to such
time that the entire estate of the testator had been partitioned and distributed. However, in this case, the
petition for probate was filed by Dr. De Santos, the testator, solely for the purpose of authenticating his will and
hence, the proceedings were terminated. On the other hand, the estate settlement proceedings commenced by
the filing of the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by private respondent terminates upon the
distribution and delivery of the legacies and devises to the persons named in the will.

The fact that the will was allowed during the lifetime of the testator meant merely that the partition and
distribution of the estate was to be suspended until the latter’s death. In other words, the petitioner, instead of
filing a new petition for the issuance of letters testamentary, should have simply filed a manifestation for the
same purpose in the probate court.
 In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the court is limited to ascertaining
the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the
death of the testator, so much so that, after approving and allowing the will, the court proceeds to issue letters
testamentary and settle the estate of the testator. 

However, Art. 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the filing of a petition for probate of the will filed by the
testator himself. 

Civil Code, Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed
in accordance with the Rules of Court.

The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having jurisdiction for the allowance of
his will. In such case, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court for the allowance of wills after the
testators death shall govern.

The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of Court as may be necessary for the
allowance of wills on petition of the testator.

Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the lifetime of the testator or after
his death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution.

The RATIONALE of allowing the probate of will during lifetime of testator, according to the Code
Commission is that it will be far easier for the courts to determine the mental condition of a testator during his
lifetime than after his death, hence, fraud, intimidation and undue influence are minimized. Moreover, after a
will has been probated during the lifetime of the testator, it does not necessarily mean that he cannot alter or
revoke the same before his death. Should he make a new will, it would also be allowable on his petition, and if
he should die before he has had a chance to present such petition, the ordinary probate proceeding after the
testator’s death would be in order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decisions of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.

Cayetano v. Leonidas
DOCTRINES:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; GRANT OF
MOTION TO WITHDRAW OPPOSITION TO PROBATE OF WILL IN CASE AT BAR, NOT A CASE OF. — We
find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge when he allowed withdrawal of petitioner’s
opposition to the probate of the will. No proof was adduced to support petitioner’s contention that the motion to
withdraw was secured through fraudulent means and that Atty. Franco Loyola was not his counsel of record. The
records show that after the filing of the contested motion, the petitioner at a later date, filed a manifestation
wherein he confirmed that the Motion to Dismiss Opposition was his voluntary act and deed. Moreover, at the time
the motion was filed, the petitioner’s former counsel, Atty. Jose P. Lagrosa had long withdrawn from the case and
had been substituted by Atty. Franco Loyola who in turn filed the motion. The present petitioner cannot, therefore,
maintain that the old man’s attorney of record was Atty. Lagrosa at the time of filing the motion. Since the
withdrawal was in order, the respondent judge acted correctly in hearing the probate of the will ex-parte, there
being no other opposition to the same.

2. ID.; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; PROBATE OF WILL; PROBATE COURT, SCOPE OF AUTHORITY. — As a

general rule, the probate court’s authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution
thereof, the testatrix’s testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by
law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed
upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue (Maninang, v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).

3. CIVIL LAW; WILLS AND SUCCESSION; INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF WILLS GOVERNED BY THE NATIONAL
LAW OF THE DECEDENT; CASE AT BAR. — It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will, as provided for by Articles 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent
 must apply. In the case at bar, although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus,
the respondent judge should have denied its probate outright, the private respondents have sufficiently
established that Adoracion Campos was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident
of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.. Therefore, the law governing Adoracion Campos’ will is the law of
Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. Under the Pennsylvania law, no legitimes are
provided for, and all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger.

4. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE; COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF

THE PROVINCE WHERE THE ESTATE IS LOCATED HAS JURISDICTION. — The settlement of the estate of
Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila where she had an estate since it
was alleged and proven the Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of
Pennsylvania, United States of America and not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONER ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING JURISDICTION OF COURT IN CASE AT
BAR. — Petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for relief. It
is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, against his
opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (See Saulog Transit,
Inc. v. Hon. Manuel Lazaro, Et Al., G.R. No. 63284, April 4, 1984).

 
FACTS:
1. Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private
respondent Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the surviving heirs. 
2. As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication under Rule 74,
Section I of the Rules of Court whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of the
deceased Adoracion Campos.
3. 11 months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of the
deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was allegedly executed in the United States and for her appointment as
administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix.
 xxx alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death xxx;
 that the testatrix died in Manila on January 31, 1977 while temporarily residing with her sister at 2167 Leveriza,
Malate, Manila; 
 that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last will and testament on July 10, 1975, according to the laws
of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., nominating Wilfredo Barzaga of New Jersey as executor; 
 that after the testatrix death, her last will and testament was presented, probated, allowed, and registered
with the Registry of Wins at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., that Clement L. McLaughlin, the administrator
who was appointed after Dr. Barzaga had declined and waived his appointment as executor in favor of the former,
is also a resident of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and 
 that therefore, there is an urgent need for the appointment of an administratrix to administer and eventually
distribute the properties of the estate located in the Philippines.
4. On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein petitioner alleging
among other things, that he has every reason to believe that the will in question is a forgery; that the
intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void; and that even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic
provisions are invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as they would work injustice and injury to him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the preterition is proper. YES, the governing law is law of Pennsylvania

HELD:
As a general rule, the probate court’s authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof,
the testatrix’s testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic
validity of the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However,
where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the
court should meet the issue (Maninang, v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).

Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should have
denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her
death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16
par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which respectively provide:

Article 16 par. 2: "However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of
the country wherein said property may be found."

Art. 1039: "Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent." library

The law which governs Adoracion Campo’s will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the
decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may
be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it
would be contrary to the sound and established public policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine
Law.

It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16 (2) and
1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply. This was squarely applied in the case of Bellis v.
Bellis (20 SCRA 358) wherein we ruled:

"It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress
has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter
alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent’s national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.

OTHER ISSUES:

As regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing for the petition for relief, the records will bear the fact that what
was repeatedly scheduled for hearing on separate dates until June 19, 1980 was the petitioner’s petition for relief and not
his motion to vacate the order of January 10, 1979. There is no reason why the petitioner should have been led to believe
otherwise. The court even admonished the petitioner’s failing to adduce evidence when his petition for relief was
repeatedly set for hearing. There was no denial of due process. The fact that he requested "for the future setting of the
case for hearing . . ." did not mean that at the next hearing, the motion to vacate would be heard and given preference in
lieu of the petition for relief. Furthermore, such request should be embodied in a motion and not in a mere notice of
hearing.

 
Finally, we find the contention of the petition as to the issue of jurisdiction utterly devoid of merit. Under Rule 73,
Section 1, of the Rules of Court, it is provided that:

"SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time
of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original
case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record."

Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila
where she had an estate since it was alleged and proven the Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and
permanent resident of Pennsylvania, United States of America an not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by the
petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the
petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief,
against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. (See Saulog
Transit, Inc. v. Hon. Manuel Lazaro, Et Al., G.R. No. 63284, April 4, 1984).chanrobles law library

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.