1.

Can a struck off company be taken to NCLT for winding up their alleged dues to an
operational creditor?
It is clear from Section 248(7) and (8) of the Companies Act, 2013 that even after the ROC
strikes off the name of the company from the Register of Companies under Section 248 of the
Companies Act, 2013, the liability of its promoters or directors who are maintaining and
running the company at the time of strike off is not dissolved against any claim or liability.
According to Section 248(7), "the liability, if any, of every director, manager, or other officer
exercising any power of management, and of every member of the company dissolved under
sub-section (5), shall continue and may be enforced as if the company had not been
dissolved. Therefore a petition before the NCLT under provisions of section 7, 9 & 10 is
maintainable against a company even though its name has been removed from Register of
Companies by ROC. The following case is an example of the same-
ELEKTRANS SHIPPING PTE LTD. VS PIERRE D’SILVA
Facts-Mr. Pierre D'silva filed an application against M/s. Elektrans Shipping Private Limited
('Corporate Debtor') under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016
(hereinafter referred to as the 'I&B Code'), which was admitted by Adjudicating Authority
(National Company Law Tribunal), Mumbai Bench, by order dated 10th April, 2019. The
Appellant, Elektrans Shipping Pte Ltd. – Shareholder, has filed an appeal challenging the
admission order dated April 10, 2019. Learned Counsel for the Appellant presented evidence
that the name of M/s. Elektrans Shipping Private Limited ('Corporate Debtor') was struck off
by the Registrar of Companies on September 12, 2018 in exercise of the powers conferred by
Section 248 of the Companies Act, 2013. As a result, according to the Counsel for the
Appellant, the application under Section 9 of the I&B Code,2016 was not maintainable and
the Adjudicating Authority erred in admitting the application without considering the status
of the ‘Corporate Debtor’ as on the date of admission.
Issue-Whether Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) can be initiated against a
company whose name has been struck off from the Register of Companies?
JUDGMENT: On interpreting Section 248 of the Companies Act, 2013, the NCLAT noted
that, before issuing an order to remove the name from the ROC, the Registrar must be
satisfied that adequate provision has been made for the realization of all the amounts due to
the Company and for the payment or release of the ROC. Section 248(7) of the Companies
Act, 2013 clearly provides that, even after the removal of the company’s name from the
ROC, the existing liability of each company’s ex-management continues. Keeping this view
in mind the NCLAT observed the insolvency can still be initiated owing to the fact that
liability of the Company and its management remains alive despite being struck off from the
Register of Companies. In view of the provisions of Section 250 (3) read with Section 248 (7)
and (8) of the Companies Act, 2013, it is held that the application under Sections 7 and 9 of
IBC, 2016 will be maintainable against the ‘Corporate Debtor’, even if the name of a
‘Corporate Debtor’ has been struck-off. Thus, there is no merit in this appeal and hence
dismissed.
 2. Can registered trademarks be challenged in court as being infringing by another
registered trademark?
In the landmark judgment Clinique Laboratories LLC and Anr vs Gufic Limited and Anr, the
court held that a suit for infringement by a registered trade mark owner/proprietor is certainly
maintainable against another registered trade mark owner/proprietor. It was further held that
Section 124(5) of the Trademark Act also allows the grant of an interim injunction in such
suits for infringement. 
prior to the landmark Judgment of this case it was opined that under Sections 28(3), 30(1) (b),
31 and 33 of the Act, a proprietor of a registered mark cannot file or initiate infringement
action against another registered proprietor of an identical or similar mark. However,
registered user had exclusive right in relation to goods against third persons in respect of
which it had been registered.
CLINIQUE LABORATORIES LLC AND ANR VS GUFIC LIMITED AND ANR

Facts

The plaintiff (Clinique Laboratories) has the registered trademark by the name ‘CLINIQUE’
since 13th July,1981 in regards to cosmetics, lotions, oils and  creams, used in cleansing etc,
falling under class 3 of the goods and services mentioned in the 4th schedule to the Trade
Marks Rules, 2002. There are many other trademarks that are owned by the plaintiff and most
of them include the word ‘CLINIQUE’. For the plaintiff’s products which are used
worldwide, Clinique is the most distinguished feature of the trademark and the plaintiff’s
company has been doing business in India since 2007 The respondent has been selling their
product “STRETCH NIL SKINCLINIQ” since 1999, defendant has their registered
trademark by the name ‘CLINIQ’ but the plaintiff got to know about the registration and
usage of mark “SKINCLINIQ” and use of the label ‘SKINCLINIQ STRETCH NIL’ on or
about September, 2006. Defendants were involved in the same business as that of plaintiff
and both the parties got their trademark registered with the registrar of trademark
authority.On discovering about the similar trademark that defendant got, the plaintiff filed a
rectification application (cancellation petition) with the Registrar of Trademarks, India with a
view to get the trademark of the defendant cancelled. At the same time the plaintiff also files
a suit in the court seeking the order of injunction against the defendant prohibiting them from
passing off the goods manufactured under the similar trademark and selling them in the
Indian market not even through their distributor and agents.

Issues

 Whether there is an infringement of the trademark by the

defendant.                                    
 Whether a suit be brought up against a registered trademark for infringement of
another registered trademark.
 Whether the court can pass interim injunction to restrain the use of registered
trademark.
Judgement- the court said that a proprietor of a registered trademark is legally capable of
bringing a suit against another proprietor of the registered trademark if the trademark is
identical or similar in any kind and infringes the right of the trademark owner. Court
observed that Sections 28(3), 29 & 30(2) (e) cannot be read in isolation. As stated by the
court, Section 31 makes registration of a trademark as only prima-facie evidence of validity
thereof while giving the right for rectification before the Registrar. Therefore, intention of the
legislature was not that there could be no action for infringement against the registered
proprietor. Because if the intention was that as long as the registration exists it is valid,
without any question of prima-facie or not, the courts would have had to wait for the outcome
of the rectification proceedings.

Reference was made to the judgment in Singer Company Limited & Anr. Versus Ms. Chetan
Machine Tools & Ors.[14] where it has been held on a prima facie view that a suit by a
registered proprietor of a trade mark against another registered proprietor of the same trade
mark cannot be refused to be entertained at the threshold - such a suit can lie but may have to
be stayed pending adjudication of the defence raised by the defendant. However, in this
judgment no final opinion was expressed on this issue and in any case the question of interim
relief to be granted was not discussed.

the hon’ble court passed an order of interim injunction against the defendant until the
rectification application is not finally decided by the Registrar of the Trademark and further
restricting them to manufacture or sell the products in the market either directly or through
their distributors and agents.

3. Can a person working as a care taker of an owner or tenant claim ownership of the
property due to long use after demise of such owner or tenant?

In Maria Margadia Sequeria And Others Vs Erasmo Jack De Sequeria(D) Through Lrs, the
hon’ble supreme court laid down the following principles-
(i) No one acquires title to the property if he or she was allowed to stay in the premises
gratuitously. Even by long possession of years or decades, such person would not acquire any
right or interest in the said property.
(ii) Caretaker, watchman or servant can never acquire interest in the property irrespective of
his long possession. The caretaker or servant has to give possession forthwith on demand.
(iii) The Courts are not justified in protecting the possession of a caretaker, servant or any
person who has been allowed to live in the premises for some time either as a friend, relative,
caretaker or as a servant.
(iv) The protection of the Court can only be granted or extended to the person who has valid,
subsisting rent agreement, lease agreement in his favour.
(v) The caretaker or agent holds property of the principal only on behalf of the principal. He
acquires no right or interest whatsoever for himself in such property irrespective of his long
stay or possession.
The same principles were referred to In Jagjeet Singh Bedi vs Daljeet Singh Bedi
MARIA MARGADIA SEQUERIA AND OTHERS VS ERASMO JACK DE
SEQUERIA(D) THROUGH LRs
Facts-The Appellant Maria Margadia Sequeria was sole and exclusive owner of the suit
property. The exclusive possession, title and interest of the suit property were in favour of the
Appellant. Husband of the Appellant was an officer of the Indian Navy. As his service and
duty demanded, he was posted in different places in India for which the Appellant and her
family had to shift their residence from one place to other out of Goa. On request of the
Respondent Erasmo Jack De Sequeria, her brother, the Appellant graciously permitted the
Respondent to use the suit property as caretaker. The Respondent remained in possession of
the suit property for 28 years when he shifted to another location in Goa with his family. The
suit property was lying vacant for some months. The Appellant returned to Goa with her
family on 20.5.1992 , occupied and continued to enjoy the said property. On 17.6.1992, the
Respondent filed a suit for permanent and mandatory injunction before the Trial Court. The
Trial Court vide an ex-parte order dated 22.6.1992, granted injunction in favour of the
Respondent, directed the Appellant to deposit the keys of the suit property and decreed the
suit. Aggrieved by the said order of the Trial Court, the Appellant filed Civil Revision
Application N0. 3 of 2009 in the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay, Bench at Goa. The Hon’ble
High Court of Bombay vide judgment and order dated 05.5.2009 affirmed and upheld the
said order dated 22.6.1992 of the Trial Court. The Appellant filed Appeal before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court challenging the order dated 05.5.2009 of the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay
on the ground that the High Court’s order was totally contrary to the law laid down by the
Apex Court in the matter of injunction and claiming title on the basis of adverse possession.
issues
1. Whether injunction can be issued against the true owner of the property ?
2. Whether a person in permissive possession can claim absolute possession of the property
in adverse to the actual owner of the property ?
3. Whether the true owner of property can be dispossessed from the property ?

Judgement-The Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasised the role and obligations of the Judiciary
to discover the truth in delivering the justice. To restore the faith of the people in India’s
Judiciary the Court reminded that the presiding officers of Courts at all levels require to
engage themselves seriously and actively in the proceedings to find out the truth by taking the
recourse of section 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 which empowers the Court to
order discovery of truth by calling to give evidence, produce documents etc. and order any
fact to be proved by affidavit. The Hon’ble Supreme Court specifically pointed out that to
have an undue right of possession of a property it is a trend in our society more precisely the
wrongdoers and land grabber to abuse and misuse the judicial system by all means
suppression, manipulation of facts etc. for which discovery of truth is the prime object of the
Court.
After discussing at length the law on possession , Hon’ble Court granted the Legal
Representatives of the Respondent(D) three months time to vacate the suit property and to
hand over the vacant and peaceful possession of the suit property to the Appellant who is the
owner of the suit property and directed to pay Rs 1,00,000/- per month mesne profits for a
period of three months towards the use and occupation of the suit property.

4. What are the grounds for eviction of a tenant and licensee ?(under MRCA)

A landlord is not allowed to take back possession of any premises, as long as the tenant pays
or is willing to pay rent. Besides, the landlord cannot file a suit for recovery for the rented
premises on the grounds of non-payment of rent, until the expiry of 90 days. This 90 days
period starts after 15 days of service of the landlord’s notice to the tenant in this regard, as
provided u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
The landlord will be authorized to take back possession of the premises if the court is
satisfied that:

 The tenant has committed any act that is contrary to the provisions of Section 108
of the TOPA.
 The tenant has constructed any permanent structure on the rented premises,
without the landlord’s prior written permission.
 The tenant has given his/her notice to vacate the premises and subsequently, the
landlord has agreed to sell the premises or rent it out to another party.
 The tenant is guilty of nuisance or aggravation to the adjacent or neighboring
occupants or is found guilty of using the premises for unlawful or prohibited, or
immoral activities.
 The tenant is guilty of illegal/unauthorized subletting of the premises.
 The tenant has ceased to be the employee of the landlord, based on which the
rented lodging was provided.
 The tenant has been found guilty of an offense in respect of the premises, by
disregarding the provisions under:

 Section 394 and Section 394A of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act. 
 Section 376 and Section 376A of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations
Act, 1949. 
 Section 229 of the City of Nagpur Municipal Corporation Act, 1948.
 Section 280 and Section 281 of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar
Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act, 1965.
  The premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for his/her
habitation. Likewise, to carry out the necessary repairs, that may not be possible
without vacating the premises and demolition. In case a tenant fails to comply with
the order of eviction within 30 days of the date on which it has become final, a
competent authority may remove them, by using such force as may be required.

5. Judgements relating to where a husband was not required to pay maintenance under
an application filed u/s 125 of CrPC before Family court

According to Section 125(4) of the CrPC No Wife shall be entitled to receive an allowance
from her husband if she is living in adultery, or if, without any sufficient reason, she refuses
to live with her husband, or if they are living separately by mutual consent.

The Patna High Court in the case of Masud Ahmed v. the State of Bihar, where the petitioner
approached the High Court for setting aside the order which had been passed by the trial
court directing the petitioner to pay the maintenance of Rupees 3000 per month to the ex-wife
and Rupees 2000 per month as the maintenance for children. The petitioner had argued that
his ex-wife, a teacher in a school, had been earning quite well. He contended that Section 125
of CrPC could only be invoked when the wife is not able to maintain herself. But, in this
case, she had been earning sufficiently well by working in the school. The court in this case
held that the wife should not be provided with the maintenance as after the divorce, the wife
had sufficient means to maintain herself and therefore the court set aside the order for giving
Rupees 3000 per month as the maintenance. 

In the case of Aarif v. Shajida, the revision petition was filed before the Madhya Pradesh
High Court under Section 397 and Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for setting
aside the order which had been passed by the lower court directing the petitioner to pay 3000
Rupees for the maintenance to his wife. It was contended by the husband that the wife had
deserted him again and again and had been living away from him for a long time. She did not
have sufficient reasons for staying away from the matrimonial house, then she even kept
leaving and coming back to her matrimonial house. The court found that the action of the
respondent-wife was contradictory. Hence, the court allowed for the revision of the
application.

In the case of Hemlataben v. State (2010), the wife (petitioner) had already instituted the
proceeding under Sec.125 Cr PC. under which the maintenance for her son was allowed at
750/- rupees per month. The petitioner was not given any maintenance because she was
working in a factory and earned 2500/- rupees every month which was sufficient to maintain
herself.The wife prayed for maintenance before learned Magistrate under the PWDV Act and
he granted the prayer. The husband challenged the order and the Additional Sessions Judge
dismissed the order of the Magistrate.The petitioner challenged the order of the Additional
Sessions Judge in the Gujarat High Court and Justice Akil Qureshi observed that the
Magistrate could not have granted maintenance until and unless strong reasons are stated. The
Additional Sessions Judge committed no mistake in setting aside the order of the learned
Magistrate to grant maintenance to the petitioner. The wife’s petition was thus, dismissed by
the High Court.

6. Does the wife of a tenant have a right in tenanted premises after his death ?

Section 7 (15)(d) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act,1999 states that a member of a
tenant’s family who has been residing with the deceased tenant at the time of his/her death
shall qualify first from the family as the successor to inherit the tenancy. The Bombay High
Court, in the case of Jaysen Jayant Rele & Ors v Shantaram Ganpat Gujar & Ors (2002),
held that the word “family” of the deceased tenant did not part with the ordinary meaning of
the word “family” and included family as consisting of father, mother, sons, daughters and all
such blood relations and other relations arising from lawful marriages. The same has been
defined in the Delhi Rent Control Act,1958. In the case of State of Gujrat v/s Jat Laxmanji
Talasji, reported in A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 825, the Supreme Court considered the meaning of
family in the context of the Gujrat Agricultural Land Ceiling Act, 1960, and observed that
because the word family was not defined under the said Act, one had to go by the concept of
family as it is commonly understood, taking into account the dictionary meaning of such
expression.
JAYSEN JAYANT RELE V/S SHANTARAM GANPAT GUJAR & ORS.
In the case, the tenant had treated his servant and wife as family members for 37 years. When
the tenant died, the servant performed all the rites expected of a son. The servant was not a
blood relative of the deceased tenant. The Bombay High Court ruled that a servant who is not
a blood relative of the tenant cannot be considered a family member and thus is not entitled to
Rent Act protection.

7. What are the grounds on which ownership by adverse possession be claimed ? Can
adverse possession be claimed by a tenant of a tenanted premises and what are the
conditions?
The law of Adverse Possession in India is governed by the principle of The Limitation Law
of 1963 according to which if an appeal is not made to revise any limitation, the current
scenario of titles continues. In terms of adverse possession, the period is defined to be 12
years. According to the Indian legal system, if a property owner fails to make a claim towards
their property for 12 years, and the same tenant continues to occupy the property for 12 years,
the ownership rights to the property is transferred to the tenant. 
These are the important requirement to prove adverse possession 

Continuity in adverse possession: If a property is taken through adverse possession, the

possession should be uninterrupted for the specified period of 12 years.
Actual possession: The possessor must occupy the property completely through actual
possession. Actual possession includes fencing the property, construction of the house,
grazing cattle, erection of shed in the land

Exclusive possession: The occupier should prove sole ownership for 12 years towards the
property. 

Open possession: The possession can’t be forced or without informing the owner or through
their license. 

The possessor must prove the following in front of the court: 

 The date of possession.

 The possession was known to the public.
 The nature of the possession.
 The continuity of the possession.
 The duration of the possession.

Tenancy through lease or rental agreement is generally not considered under the adverse
possession law in India. However, under certain circumstances, if the lease has expired or if
the owner has defaulted on particulars mentioned in the agreement, the tenants have taken
leverage of the situation to file for ownership through adverse possession. The set timeline
for the owner to take action is for 12 years. As soon as there is a breach in the contract, the
owner should look for vacating the tenants to avoid adverse possession. If after the
termination of the agreement, the tenant has paid rent to the owner in any form, they can’t
apply for ownership through adverse possession. 

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy & Others v Revamma & Ors  laid
down certain guidelines regarding the enquiry to be held by the Courts while deciding the
plea of adverse possession. The Hon’ble Court held :-
“Therefore, to assess a claim of adverse possession, two-pronged enquiry is required:
1. Application of limitation provision thereby jurisprudentially "willful neglect" element on
part of the owner established. Successful application in this regard distances the title of the
land from the paper-owner.

2. Specific Positive intention to dispossess on the part of the adverse possessor effectively
shifts the title already distanced from the paper owner, to the adverse possessor. Right
thereby accrues in favour of adverse possessor as intent to dispossess is an express statement
of urgency and intention in the upkeep of the property.”

In the case of Uttam Chand (dead) through LRs v Nathu Ram (dead) through LRs & Ors.
[6]
 while relying on its previous decisions again reiterated that only having long continuous
possession is not enough to perfect title by adverse possession and all other ingredients like
possession that is hostile, exclusive, uninterrupted, etc are also necessary.
 8. What are the conditions for quashing an FIR by consent, when a wife has filed an FIR
against a husband due to matrimonial disputes and the husband and wife have reached
a consensus on seeking divorce by mutual consent ?
The grounds and conditions for Quashing of FIR as laid down by the Supreme Court are as
follow:

1. The FIR is eligible to be quashed if the allegations in the said FIR do not amount to
any offence and is taken on entirety on the face value;
2. In case the allegations quoted in the FIR is of improbable nature and so absurd that no
man of prudence would do so;
3. In case the allegations made in the FIR and other supporting documents do not
amount to any cognizable offence whether being registered by Police under section
156 (1) or being directed by the Magistrate under section 156 (2).
4. In case the allegations constitute a non-cognizable offence and not a cognizable
offence, the no investigation can be probed by the police officer without the orders of
the Magistrate under section 155(2).
5. In case where the allegations stated in the FIR or compliant do not confirm of any
offence committed or displays any case against the accused.
6. Where it has been specifically mentioned in the Code that the accused can apply for
Quashi under certain conditions or in some circumstances.

The subjective assessment of the Judge would be the final and concluding for quashing of
FIR under section 482 of CRPC. There is a need to maintain a balance between powers of the
court as implied under section 482 and the facts of the case.

In a significant decision, the Nagpur bench of the Bombay High Court ruled that unless the
family court has formally granted divorce, a couple should not approach the high court for
quashing criminal proceedings against the husband and in-laws under Section 482 of the
Criminal Procedure Code. The court held that "In such cases of matrimonial disputes, the
high court should ordinarily not entertain the application under Section 482 for quashing the
FIR/chargesheet until the decree is passed by a competent matrimonial court and a certified
copy is placed on record along with the application." "We clarify this position to avoid any
confusion in such matters," a division bench of Justices Arun Chaudhari and PN Deshmukh
ruled.

9. Can the disability certificate of a doctor who hasn’t treated the patient be considered
while granting compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act?
In the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd vs A.P.Prasanna Venkatesh, the Madras High Court
observed that in cases, wherein certificates were issued by the Medical Officers other than the
Doctor, who treated the injured, the evidence of such medical officers require strict scrutiny.
However, it cannot be said that such certificates are inadmissible in evidence. The evidence
so tendered by the Doctors, who had no opportunity to treat the injured, should be convincing
and it should be based on accepted norms. It is only the standard of proof which would differ.
10. Can parties to a suit opt for arbitration in absence of arbitration clause in the
agreement which they seek specific performance of ?
Supreme Court of India, in the matter Kerala State Electricity Board and Anr. Vs. Kurien E.
Kathilal and Anr. Observed that When there is no express arbitration agreement between the
parties as regards to reference of disputes for arbitration, the court cannot refer the parties to
arbitration unless there's a written consent by parties by way of joint application or a joint
memo or a joint affidavit.

Thus, a written memo of instructions by parties is necessary for the reference of dispute to
arbitration and an oral consent given by the counsel of the parties would not fulfill the
requirement under section 89 of CPC.

(1) In this Part, "arbitration agreement" means an agreement by the parties to submit to
arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in
respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not.

(2) An arbitration agreement may be in the form of an arbitration clause in a contract or in the
form of a separate agreement.

(3) An arbitration agreement shall be in writing.

(4) An arbitration agreement is in writing if it is contained in—

(a) a document signed by the parties;

(b) an exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or other means of telecommunication

which provide a record of the agreement; or

(c) an exchange of statements of claim and defence in which the existence of the
agreement is alleged by one party and not denied by the other.

(5) The reference in a contract to a document containing an arbitration clause constitutes an

arbitration agreement if the contract is in writing and the reference is such as to make that
arbitration clause part of the contract

11. Under Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, Check that are the provisions for appeal
against order by the Deputy Registrar under section 77A and appeal against order of District
Joint Registrar or Deputy District Registrar u/s 154?
Section 77A of Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act,1960 talks about Appointment of
member of committee, new committee or Administrator, where there is failure to elect
member, to constitute committee or where committee does not enter upon office
An appeal against an order or decision under sections 4,9,11,12,13,14, 17, 18, 19, 21, 21A,
29, 35, 77A. 78, 79, 85, 88 and 105 including against an order for paying compensation to
society shall lie,—

(a) if made or sanctioned or approved by the Registrar, or the Additional or Joint Registrar on
whom powers of the Registrar are conferred, to the State Government,

(b) if made or sanctioned by any person other than the Registrar or the Additional or Joint
Registrar on whom the powers of the Registrar are conferred, to the Registrar.

(2) Where an appeal against any order or decision to the Co-operative Appellate Court has
been provided under this Act, it shall lie to the Co-operative Appellate Court.]

(3) An appeal under sub-section (1) or (2) shall be filed within two months of the date of the
communication of the order or decision.

(4) Save as expressly provided, no appeal shall lie against any order, decision or award
passed in accordance with the provisions of. this Act; and every such order, decision or award
shall, whether expressly provided or not, be final, but shall always be subject to the
previsions for revision in this Act ; and where an appeal has been provided for, any order
passed on appeal shall likewise be final, but be subject to such revision provisions.

U/s 154 which talks about the revisionary powers of state government and Registrar, it has
been stated that The State Government or the Registrar, suo motu or on an application, may
call for and examine the record of any inquiry or proceedings of any matter, other than those
referred to in sub-section (9) of section 149, where any decision or order has been passed by
any sub ordinate officer, and no appeal lies against such decision or order for the purpose of
satisfying themselves as to the legality or propriety of any such decision or order, and as to
the regularity of such proceedings. If in any case, it appears to the State Government, or the
Registrar, that any decision or order so called for should be modified, annulled or reversed,
the State Government or the Registrar, as the case may be, may, after giving the person
affected thereby an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders thereon as to it or him may
seem just.

12.Is a writ petition maintainable before High Court against order passed by District Joint
Registrar u/s 154 appeal ?

In WRIT PETITION NO.6403 OF 2010, Smt.Shireen Sami Gadiali And vs Spenta

Co.Op.Hsg.Soc.Ltd it was challenged that the order of the State Government holding that the
revision under Section 154 against the order passed under that very provision by the
Divisional Joint Registrar is not maintainable.
The judgement said that “the clear ratio is that the court should not entertain when statutory
remedy is available. We have seen that the revision does lie to the State Government against
the order of Joint Registrar. The remedy is both adequate and efficacious. When a particular
forum is provided that remedy must be availed. The restraint has to be observed or else the
High Court would be flooded with litigation and the very purpose of creating alternate forum
would be defeated. That has to be avoided and the forum created under the Act must be left to
deal with the disputes. Therefore, I do not find that the writ petition can be entertained. Same
is dismissed."

Therefore a writ petition is not maintainable before High Court against order passed by
District Joint Registrar u/s 154 appeal.