A Limits Model of The Imago Dei A Barnes

University of St Andrews
School of Divinity
Submitted for the Degree of M.Litt in Analytic and Exegetical Theology
A Limits Model of the Imago Dei:

A Barnes-Campbell-Creamer Hybrid Approach
To Imago Dei As Filii Dei
By
Chow Guomin Kevin
ID number
Date Submitted: 13 September 2021
I hereby certify that this dissertation, which is approximately 16,328 words in length, has been
composed by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me and that it has not been submitted in
any previous application for a higher degree. This project was conducted by me at the University of St
Andrews from January 2021 to September 2021 towards fulfilment of the requirements of the
University of St Andrews for the degree of M.Litt in Analytic and Exegetical Theology under the
supervision of Dr. Joanna Leidenhag.
Signature of Candidate:
Date: 13 Sept 2021

Contents
1. Introduction.................................................................................................................... 3
1.1. Barnes-Campbell Hybrid Approach Towards Disability Theology................... 4
1.2. Ableism-Disability Distinction .......................................................................... 6
1.3. Disability and Well-Being.................................................................................. 6
1.4. Well-Being, Imago Dei, and Ableism ................................................................ 7
1.5. Summary .......................................................................................................... 10
2. Select History of Interpretation of the Imago Dei ....................................................... 11
2.1. Middleton: Ancient Near East — Mesopotamian Royal Ideology .................. 12
2.2. Kugler: Early Christianity — Paul ................................................................... 14
2.3. Zwollo: Patristics — Augustine ....................................................................... 16
2.4. Van Vliet: Protestant Reformation — Calvin .................................................. 19
2.5. Robinson: Modern — Balthasar....................................................................... 22
2.6. Summary: Imago Dei As Filii Dei ................................................................... 26
3. A Limits Model of the Imago Dei ............................................................................... 29
3.1. Critique of History of Interpretations of the Imago Dei .................................. 29
3.2. Being Embodied Implies Being Limited.......................................................... 33
3.3. Situating Limits Model in Wisdom Anthropology .......................................... 37
4. Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 42
5. Bibliography ................................................................................................................ 44
2
1. Introduction
Human persons are made in the image and likeness of God. Christians affirm the
intrinsic worth of persons with disabilities (hereafter: PWD)1 because of the imago dei.
However, a cursory overview of the history of the interpretations of the imago dei seems to
suggest that in any conception of the good life, PWD’s way of living is always less valuable
than the nondisabled. Thus, this paper intends to investigate, if select major interpreters of the
imago dei falls foul of ableism.
First, by using a Barnes-Campbell hybrid approach, this paper insists the relationship
between disability and well-being ought to remain an open question because of the lack of
exegetical data and the need to account for PWD’s diverse personal experiences about their
disabilities. Second, after a historical sketch of the interpretations of the imago dei, this paper
suggests that Calvin’s imago dei as filii dei best captures the imago dei as a theological-
vocational category. Third, this paper critiques the history of the interpretations of the imago
dei according to the Barnes-Campbell hybrid approach and utilises Creamer’s insight to
reframe limits as a positive trait rather than a deficit. This paper ends by locating the limits
model of the imago dei in wisdom anthropology.
In sum, this paper argues that Creamer’s limits model is a much-needed supplement to
Calvin’s imago dei as filii dei because being embodied human souls implies being limited. It
hopes to subvert the myth that ablebodiedness is a permanent state of affair and remind
readers that all human persons are vulnerable to disease, disaster, decay, and death. Instead of
grasping for our own transcendence, we ought to “become as little children,”2 trusting in the
love of our heavenly Father.
1
This paper uses the person-first term “persons with disabilities” to emphasise the individual’s identity
is not entirely defined by one’s disability. Also, the term reminds readers that disability is a highly fluid socially
constructed category. In short, the term “persons with disabilities” maintains the distinction between one’s
identity and one’s disability, whilst the term “disabled persons” suggests one’s disability is one’s identity.
2
Matt. 18:3.
3
1.1. Barnes-Campbell Hybrid Approach Towards Disability Theology
Disability is complex because it is a highly fluid category whose meaning is tied to
society’s construction of a perfect body type. However, there are some who are unable to
envision PWD leading a flourishing life. Like unjust prejudices against people of colour, age,
or gender are rightly named racist, ageist, and sexist respectively, ableists are those who
discriminate against PWD in virtue of their disabilities. Thus, in response to ableists’ deficit
in imagination, this paper proposes a Barnes-Campbell hybrid approach towards disability
theology by decoupling the inverse relationship between disability and well-being. This
approach argues disability is not necessarily detrimental to well-being and their relationship
ought to remain an open question. In fact, ableism is what harms PWD’s well-being. Thus, an
overarching question is,
therefore, whether, in any conception of the good human life, disability is an alternative way of living
that can be as valuable as any other or whether disability is intrinsically associated with deficiency or
defect in the value of life, one that must be tolerated or socially compensated and accommodated.3
This section serves to inform readers about this paper’s Barnes-Campbell hybrid
approach towards disability theology. From Barnes, it utilises her ableism-disability
distinction (contra disability-impairment), and “bad-difference” and “mere-difference” to
name normative (e.g., saint-sinner) and non-normative (e.g., blond-brunette) distinctions.4
From Campbell, it assimilates her insight that ableism constructs disablism where every body
type is evaluated against a projected perfect body type.5 Like Barnes and Campbell, this
paper opposes the biomedical model. It adopts a moderate social model that rejects ableism
3
Jerome E. Bickenbach, Franziska Felder, and Barbara Schmitz, eds., ‘Introduction: Rethinking the
Good Human Life in Light of Disability’, in Disability and the Good Human Life, Cambridge Disability Law
and Policy Series (New York, NY: Cambridge Univ Press, 2014), 7.
4
Elizabeth Barnes, The Minority Body: A Theory of Disability, Studies in Feminist Philosophy
(Oxford: Oxford Univ Press, 2016), 54; “According to the bad-difference view, disability has a negative effect
on well-being that is counterfactually stable — disability would have such effect even in the absence of ableism
[i.e., systemic prejudices against PWD in virtue of their impairments]. … The mere-difference view maintains
that disability is not bad-difference. We can maintain that disability is mere-difference without maintaining that
everything about disability is perfectly fine and shouldn’t be ameliorated.” (Barnes, 60, 75).
5
Fiona K. Campbell, Contours of Ableism: The Production of Disability and Abledness (New York,
NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 5.
4
and maintains that the relationship between disability and well-being ought to remain an open
question.
However, this paper’s presuppositions differ from Barnes and Campbell in four areas.
First, human person’s intrinsic worth comes from being known by one’s creator God.6
Second, the reality of sin, which is a “disruption of created harmony and then resistance to
divine restoration of that harmony,”7 implies “distortion in four directions: with God, self,
others, world.”8 Third, the eschatological reality of a perfected body (contra Feuerbachian
projection),9 which is a resurrected “spiritual body … bear[ing] the image of the man of
heaven.”10 Fourth, well-being and human flourishing are ultimately understood in terms of
union with Christ (i.e., ἐν χριστῷ [trans. “being in Christ”]).11
In sum, unlike Barnes and Campbell, this paper presupposes ableism is a consequence
of sin that requires divine intervention for absolute elimination and the perfect body type
gifted at the resurrection is not human projection, but a divine promise awaiting
consummation, though proleptically revealed through the resurrection of Jesus Christ, “the
first fruits of those who have died.”12
6
Brian S. Rosner, ‘`Known by God’: The Meaning and Value of a Neglected Biblical Concept’,
Tyndale Bulletin 59, no. 2 (2008): 226–228; See also Brian S. Rosner, Known by God: A Biblical Theology of
Personal Identity, ed. Jonathan Lunde (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2017).
7
Cornelius Plantinga, Not the Way It’s Supposed to Be: A Breviary of Sin (Grand Rapids, MI:
Eerdmans, 1996), 5.
8
Scot McKnight, A Community Called Atonement, Living Theology (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press,
2007), 61.
9
Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, trans. George [Marian Evans] Eliot (Cambridge:
Cambridge Univ Press, 2011), 224.
10
1 Cor. 15:44, 49.
11
Grant Macaskill, Union with Christ in the New Testament (Oxford: Oxford Univ Press, 2013);
Constantine R. Campbell, Michael J. Thate, and Kevin J. Vanhoozer, eds., ‘In Christ’ in Paul: Explorations in
Paul’s Theology of Union and Participation, vol. 384, Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen Zum Neuen
Testament 2. Reihe (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014); Grant Macaskill, Living in Union with Christ: Paul’s
Gospel and Christian Moral Identity (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2019).
12
1 Cor. 15:20.
5
1.2. Ableism-Disability Distinction
As this paper does not intend to settle the disability-impairment terminology dispute,
it follows Barnes’ ableism-disability distinction (contra disability-impairment). The two
advantages of adopting Barnes’ ableism-disability distinction are: (1) “ableism” accurately
names the systemic prejudices against PWD in virtue of their impairments, whilst (2)
“disability” maintains the common synonymity between disability and impairment. Thus,
Barnes’ distinction is preferable because it is “more parsimonious — we don’t need to
distinguish between separate categories of disability, impairment, handicap, etc.”13 In short,
this paper uses “ableism” to pick out what social model refers to as disability whilst
“disability” refers to a “value-neutral” view of impairment where “a disability is bad (or
good, or indifferent) for you depends on what else it is combined with.”14
1.3. Disability and Well-Being
The biomedical model conceives disability as a personal tragedy whilst the social
model conceives it as systemic prejudices against PWD in virtue of their disability. Although
these are not the only models available, they represent two distinctive paths towards PWD’s
well-being. The biomedical model’s aim is to find a cure to eliminate disability because
ablebodiedness is essential to well-being. The social model’s aim is to remove ableism
because full participation in society is crucial to well-being.
Clearly, this paper’s Barnes-Campbell hybrid approach opposes the biomedical model
because it is not self-evident that ablebodiedness is necessary to well-being. Also, one of
biomedical’s weaknesses “is that it fixes upon the ‘problem’ of the individual (impairment
13
Barnes, The Minority Body, 52.
14
Barnes, 102.
6
inheres in the person) and ignores those aspects of impairment that are socially or
biographically produced.”15 In short, what is being opposed here is ableism, which is
A network of beliefs, processes and practices that produces a particular kind of self and body (the
corporeal standard) that is projected as the perfect, species-typical and therefore essential and fully
human. Disability then is cast as a diminished state of being human.16
Doubtlessly, this paper agrees with the social model that it is ableism — not disability
— that is detrimental to well-being, thus we ought to strive towards “a world free of ableism
… where no individuals harbour prejudiced thoughts about the disabled …also a world that
doesn’t contain massive accessibility barriers for the disabled.”17 However, due to its
theological commitments stated above, this paper has reservations about actualising this
ableism-free world without divine intervention. Here, this paper part ways with secular social
models because one’s understanding of well-being is shaped by what one means by human
flourishing, which invariably involves one’s teleology.
1.4. Well-Being, Imago Dei, and Ableism
For Christians, human flourishing cannot be understood apart from knowing one is a
beloved creature whose destiny is being in union with the Creator.18 Thus, well-being is
intimately coupled with what it means to be made in the image and likeness of the Creator
God. Although “[n]o one has seen God … [i]t is God the only Son, who is close to the
Father’s heart, who has made him known.”19 If Jesus Christ is “the image of the invisible
God … in him all the fullness of God was pleased to dwell,”20 and he is “the reflection of
God’s glory and the exact imprint of God’s very being,”21 then “[w]hoever has seen [him]
15
Campbell, Contours of Ableism, 98.
16
Campbell, 5.
17
18
For more, see John F. Kilner, Dignity and Destiny: Humanity in the Image of God (Grand Rapids,
MI: Eerdmans, 2015).
19
John 1:18.
20
Col. 1:15, 19.
21
Heb. 1:3.
7
has seen the Father.”22 In other words, “this is eternal life [i.e., well-being], that they may
know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent.”23 In short, for
Christians, human flourishing is knowing and being known by God.
However, whilst Christians commonly affirm PWD’s intrinsic worth because of the
imago dei, the “idea that disability is not inherently bad or suboptimal is one that many
philosophers [and theologians?] treat with open scepticism, and sometimes even with
scorn.”24 For example, some find it doubtful that one with Down’s Syndrome can have an
amazing life.25 But more significantly, “many Christian theologians have struggled with how
people with disabilities could be perfectly united to God in the afterlife.”26 It seems the
suggestion of “the possibility of individuals retaining their disabilities in the eschaton and
nevertheless enjoying complete union with God (and through God to others)”27 is almost
blasphemous because it is surely beneath God not to restore everyone to “perfection.”28
Lest it be misunderstood, this paper does not unreservedly endorse Hauerwas’ dictum,
“To eliminate the disability is to eliminate the subject,”29 because it potentially confuses
“characterisation identity”30 with “numerical identity.”31 Thus, a charitable reading of
Hauerwas’ dictum would conclude that “not all accidental properties must be lost in the
22
John 14:9.
23
John 17:3.
24
25
George Webster, “Learning Disability Week 2021: ‘I Loved Going to Secondary School Because It
Was So Exciting’,” BBC Bitesize (BBC, June 14, 2021), https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/articles/z7j2qfr.
26
Kevin Timpe, ‘Defiant Afterlife: Disability and Uniting Ourselves to God’, in Voices from the Edge:
Centring Marginalized Perspectives in Analytic Theology, ed. Michelle Panchuk and Michael C. Rea (Oxford:
Oxford Univ Press, 2020), 206.
27
Timpe, 206.
28
For more on reconfiguring perfection, see Amy Jacober, Redefining Perfect: The Interplay between
Theology & Disability (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2017).
29
Cited in Ryan T. Mullins, ‘Some Difficulties for Amos Yong’s Disability Theology of the
Resurrection’, Ars Disputandi 11, no. 1 (January 2011): 26.
30
“Under what conditions are ‘actions, experiences, beliefs, values, desires, character traits, and so on
(hereafter abbreviated ‘characteristics’) to be attributed to a given [human being]? (Schechtman 1996, 73).”
(Lynne R. Baker, ‘Making Sense of Ourselves: Self-Narratives and Personal Identity’, Phenomenology and the
Cognitive Sciences 15, no. 1 [2016]: 8).
31
“Under what conditions is a person considered at time t the same person as a person considered at
time t’?” (Baker, 8).
8
resurrection. … We strongly identify with lots of our non-essential properties [e.g., being a
parent]; but our resurrection doesn’t require that they’re not present in the eschaton.”32 In
other words, if bad-difference disability is one that inhibits complete union with God and
would be eliminated at the eschaton, then we should not be surprised to find PWD with mere-
difference disability on the other side of eternity.
Although one’s disability is an accidental property and not essential to one’s
numerical identity, this paper suggests that the elimination of all disabilities would diminish
one’s characterisation identity.33 Also, it does not presuppose that “the afterlife is a ‘magical’
fix for all the challenges posed by disability…”34 However, it does posit we would inherit a
“spiritual body … [that] bear[s] the image of the man of heaven.”35 In other words, our
conception of this eschatological perfect body would have retroactive effect on our present
interpretation of the imago dei and consequently well-being. Thus, for example, if we
conceive this eschatological perfect body has smooth skin, slim bodyline, and toned muscles,
then someone who currently possesses these attributes would be deemed to be flourishing.36
On the contrary, someone without them must somehow work out their flourishing to attain
these attributes.
Therefore, if our conception of this eschatological perfect body gifted at the
resurrection is the plumb line by which we measure all our current imperfect bodies, then we
32
Timpe, ‘Defiant Afterlife’, 220.
33
“It is important to be clear that these different eschatologies have direct implications for the
hermeneutics of people labelled disabled. To love someone conceived as temporarily ‘defective’ assumes that
their ‘real’ self has what is conceived as broken about them erased [at the eschatological healing]. When loving
someone assumed to be currently ‘normal’ reverses the problem — that they would be radically changed by
being healed and restored seems unnecessary. … Those seen as disabled pose a sharp question: ‘If you cannot
love us today, what makes you think you would love us if we were different, healed, or better?’” (Brian Brock,
Wondrously Wounded: Theology, Disability, and the Body of Christ, Studies in Religion, Theology, and
Disability [Waco, TX: Baylor Univ Press, 2020], 182). See also Terrence Ehrman, ‘Disability and Resurrection
Identity’, New Blackfriars 96, no. 1066 (2015): 723–38.
34
Amos Yong, ‘Disability and the Love of Wisdom: De-Forming, Re-Forming, and Per-Forming
Philosophy of Religion’, Ars Disputandi 9, no. 1 (January 2009): 70.
35
1 Cor. 15:44, 49.
36
Consider ancient Greek marble statues and present-day billboard models.
9
ought to be wary of ableist interpretations of the imago dei because ableism distorts the
meaning of well-being and human flourishing.37
Whether it be the ‘species typical body’ (in science), the ‘normative citizen’ (in political theory), the
‘reasonable man’ (in law), all these signifiers point to a fabrication that reaches into the very soul that
sweeps us into life and as such is the outcome of a political constitution: a hostage of the body.38
Put more strongly, ableism says all are equally made in the image and likeness of God, but
some are more equal than others because of their ablebodiedness.
1.5. Summary
Whilst this paper’s Barnes-Campbell hybrid approach is adopted to resist ableist
interpretations of the imago dei that categorise PWD as liminal cases thereby making them
less equal, it does not claim to be completely free from ableist presupposition. This paper is
fully cognisant that theology is a “form of cultural activity … something that human beings
produce. Like all human activities, it is historically and socially conditioned; it cannot be
understood in isolation from the rest of human sociocultural practices.”39 Thus, it does not
claim to have a God’s-eye-view concerning interpretations of the imago dei. Rather, it hopes
to be part of the church’s call to “theologise without ceasing, not because the gospel changes
but because the historical stage, cultural scenery, and intellectual setting of the church, the
company of gospel players, is constantly changing.”40 In sum, this paper seeks to point out
ableist projection of the imago dei using the Barnes-Campbell hybrid approach and hopes to
reconfigure traditional interpretations with Creamer’s “limits model”41 of disability.
37
See also Lorraine Cuddeback-Gedeon, ‘Disability: Raising Challenges to Rationality and
Embodiment in Theological Anthropology’, in T&T Clark Handbook of Theological Anthropology, ed. Mary A.
Hinsdale and Stephen Okey (London: T & T Clark, 2021), 333–44.
38
Campbell, Contours of Ableism, 6.
39
Kathryn Tanner, Theories of Culture: A New Agenda for Theology (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress,
1997), 63.
40
Kevin J. Vanhoozer, ‘“One Rule to Rule Them All?”: Theological Method in an Era of World
Christianity’, in Globalizing Theology: Belief and Practice in an Era of World Christianity, ed. Craig Ott and
Harold A. Netland (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2006), 111.
41
Deborah B. Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology: Embodied Limits and Constructive
Possibilities, Academy Series (Oxford: Oxford Univ Press, 2009), 6.
10
2. Select History of Interpretation of the Imago Dei
This chapter serves to sketch a brief historical overview of the interpretations of the
imago dei from Evangelicalism’s perspective.42 As it is virtually impossible to be
exhaustively comprehensive,43 it will select works by (1) Middleton,44 (2) Kugler,45 (3)
Zwollo,46 (4) Van Vliet,47 and (5) Robinson.48 In other words, they are guides to select major
interpreters of the imago dei of their respective contexts: (1) Ancient Near East, (2) Early
Christianity, (3) Patristics, (4) Protestant Reformation, and (5) Modern. This chapter ends
with seven suggestions for future interpretations of the imago dei.
Before the brief historical overview, it ought to be noted that one’s interpretation of
the imago dei is tethered to one’s anthropological presuppositions. So, whilst this paper
admittedly presupposes a theological anthropology, it does not claim that holy scriptures —
or even Gen. 1:26–28 — are purposed for anthropological concerns. In short, any theological
anthropology must avoid “imagining that the Bible is ‘about’ us.”49 Nonetheless, this does
not mean holy scriptures do not contain anthropological concerns. For example, Psa. 8:3–4
expresses anthropological concern by juxtaposing divine glory and human lowliness. Hence,
in order to avoid flattening the contours of holy scriptures, this paper maintains a minimalist
42
Cf. Bebbington’s quadrilateral: Conversion, biblicism, activism, and crucicentrism (David W.
Bebbington, Evangelicalism in Modern Britain: A History from the 1730s to the 1980s [Grand Rapids, MI:
Baker, 1989], 5–17; For more, see Mark A. Noll, David W. Bebbington, and George M. Marsden, eds.,
Evangelicals: Who They Have Been, Are Now, and Could Be [Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2019]).
43
“To adequately discuss and situate this history of interpretation would require, minimally, expertise
in Second Temple, Talmudic, and medieval rabbinic Judaism as well as in the history of Christian theology and
exegesis from patristic to modern times, including Christian speculation by nontheologians such as the
humanists of the Italian Renaissance, among whom the imago dei was prominent. This expertise is well beyond
the capacity of any single scholar. It constitutes simple honesty to admit this.” (J. Richard Middleton, The
Liberating Image: The Imago Dei in Genesis 1 [Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos, 2005], 39).
44
Middleton, The Liberating Image.
45
Chris Kugler, Paul and the Image of God (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2020).
46
Laela Zwollo, St. Augustine and Plotinus: The Human Mind as Image of the Divine, Supplements to
Vigiliae Christianae 151 (Leiden: Brill, 2019).
47
Jason Van Vliet, Children of God: The Imago Dei in John Calvin and His Context, Reformed
Historical Theology 11 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009).
48
Dominic Robinson, Understanding the ‘Imago Dei’: The Thought of Barth, von Balthasar and
Moltmann (London: Ashgate, 2016).
49
Joel B. Green, Body, Soul, and Human Life: The Nature of Humanity in the Bible, Studies in
Theological Interpretation (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2008), 2.
11
approach towards theological anthropology, which claims human persons are created to know
and be known by God in human communities (i.e., union with God).50 As a result of this
knowing and being known by God, it is with hope that one responds to his call to love and
serve him by “keep[ing] [Jesus’] commandments … abid[ing] in [Jesus] as [he] abides in
[us].”51
2.1. Middleton: Ancient Near East — Mesopotamian Royal Ideology
In The Liberating Image, Middleton proposes interpreting the imago dei in Gen. 1:26–
28 against the context of Gen. 1–11, which is to be seen as a corrective against
Mesopotamian royal ideology. Whilst the divine basis of kingship is not uncommon in the
ancient Near East, the royal interpretation of the imago dei in Gen. 1 differs in that Israel’s
king alone does not bear the image and likeness of God.
The democratisation of the imago Dei in Genesis 1 thus constitutes an implicit delegitimisation of the
entire ruling and priestly structure of Mesopotamian society (and especially the absolute power of the
king). In the Genesis vision, it is ordinary humans (and not some elite class) who are understood to be
significant historical actors in the arena of earthly life.52
In short, God’s image does not reside within the king alone. Similarly, God’s commands to
multiply, rule, and subdue the earth are not given to the king alone, but all the people of God.
Middleton’s main critique against both substantialistic and relational interpretations of
the imago dei is their inadequate assimilation of Hebrew scholarship. Although there is
“virtual consensus” of the royal interpretation of the imago dei by Hebrew scholarship,
substantialistic and relational interpretations “almost universally excludes the body from the
image (whether explicitly or by omission), thus entrenching a dualistic reading of the human
50
Michelle A. Gonzalez, ‘Created for God and for Each Other: Our Imago Dei’, in T&T Clark
Handbook of Theological Anthropology, ed. Mary A. Hinsdale and Stephen Okey (London: T&T Clark, 2021),
69–70.
51
John 14:15; 15:4.
52
Middleton, The Liberating Image, 204.
12
condition.” 53 He notes that substantialistic interpretation’s associating the imago dei with
human rationality “is part of the pervasive influence of Platonism on Christian theology,”54
whilst relational interpretations are misguided because, unlike ‫( אישׁ‬lit. “man”) and ‫( אשׁה‬lit.
“woman”) in Gen. 2:23, ‫( זכר‬lit. “male”) and ‫( נקבה‬lit. “female”) in Gen. 1:27 are
“biological, not social, terms and thus cannot support either the notion of human relationality
or culturally male/female characteristics.”55
That being said, kings represent (read: image) God in a unique way unlike others, just
as priests are distinct in their respective manners. Only kings have authority to govern.56 Only
priests are allowed to perform cultic service in the tabernacle.57 However, unlike
Mesopotamian royal ideology, the authority of Israel’s king is limited to the stipulations of
the Torah.58 For example, God’s removal of Saul’s kingship because of his illicit sacrifice,59
God’s striking against the child that Uriah’s wife bore to David because David struck down
Uriah,60 and God’s bringing disaster against the house of Ahab because Ahab and Jezebel
murdered Naboth to acquire his land.61 In short, it may be argued that the judiciary system is
independent of the king.62
In sum, Israel’s kings represent God and exercise God’s reign over his people in
accordance to the Torah.63 Unlike Mesopotamian royal ideology, Israel’s kings alone do not
53
Middleton, 24–26.
54
Middleton, 19.
55
Middleton, 50.
56
1 Sam. 8:4–22.
57
Num. 3:5–10.
58
Deut. 17:14–20.
59
1 Sam. 13:13–14.
60
2 Sam. 12:1–15.
61
1 King. 21:1–29.
62
Whilst admittedly anachronistic, perhaps an imperfect analogy that might help modern readers is the
separation of powers, thus providing a level of check and balance. For more, see David C. Flatto, ‘The King and
I: The Separation of Powers in Early Hebraic Political Theory’, Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 20, no. 1
(2008); Marvin A. Sweeney, ‘The Rights and Duties of Kingship in Israel’, Bible Odyssey, accessed 14 July
2021, https://www.bibleodyssey.org/en/passages/related-articles/rights-and-duties-of-kingship-in-israel.
63
“It is precisely because the representational aspect of the image consists in a functional similarity or
analogy between God and humanity, specifically concerning the exercise of (royal) power, that the image can be
articulated also as representative, referring to the human office of representing God’s rule/power in the world.”
(Middleton, The Liberating Image, 88).
13
possess the imago dei. “Correlative with this mutuality of power and agency [i.e.,
democratisation] is the implicit claim of the imago Dei that all persons have equal access to
God simply by being human.”64 Even if Middleton might potentially be accused of reading
Western liberal democratic ideals into ancient Hebrew scriptures, he rightly notes that
creation is God’s ‫( היכל‬trans. “temple-palace”)65 because God desires to dwell amongst his
people,66 and for his Spirit to be poured out on all flesh (not to all flesh through some flesh).67
Indeed, “[f]or what other great nation has a god so near to it as YHWH our God is whenever
we call to him? And what other great nation has statutes and ordinances as just as this entire
Torah that I [Moses] am setting before you today?”68
2.2. Kugler: Early Christianity — Paul
In Paul and the Image of God, Kugler argues that Paul’s imago dei in 2 Cor. 2:17–
4:6, Rom. 7–8, and Col. 1:15–20; 3:10, “reflects an association with Plato’s teleological
doctrine of ‘likeness to god.’”69 Like Middleton, Kugler argues Paul’s imago dei ought to be
interpreted against his sociocultural context, which minimally must include the destruction of
the first temple, Babylonian exile, and Hellenistic Judaism.70 Thus, Kugler concludes that
Paul’s imago dei is better elucidated by “Jewish wisdom tradition and Middle Platonic
intermediary speculation”71 than ancient Near Eastern divine-royal ideology. In other words,
64
Middleton, 207.
65
“The notion of the cosmos as temple has its roots in the ancient Near Eastern worldview, in which
temples were commonly understood as the royal palaces of the gods, in which they dwelled and from which
they reigned.” (Middleton, 81). See also G. K. Beale, The Temple and the Church’s Mission: A Biblical
Theology of the Dwelling Place of God, New Studies in Biblical Theology 15, 2004.
66
E.g., Exod. 29:45–46; Lev. 26:11; Num. 35:34; 1 King 6:13; Ezek. 37:27; 43:7.
67
Joel 2:28–32; See also Acts 2:16–21. “Indeed, in the account of the day of Pentecost in Acts 2
(typically understood by Christians as the reversal of Babel) linguistic confusion is overcome, although not by
imposition of a single language. Multiple languages (and cultures) remain, but the presence of the Sprit
overcomes the comprehension barrier. People hear/understand each other once again.” (Middleton, The
Liberating Image, 225).
68
Deut. 4:7–8.
69
Kugler, Paul and the Image of God, 103.
70
Kugler, 3.
71
Kugler, 20.
14
for example, Paul did not work out the “unique divine identity”72 of Jesus of Nazareth as the
God-king of Israel by applying the imago dei’s royal function to Jesus without resourcing
from Greek philosophy.73
Whilst Middleton rightly critiques substantialistic and relational interpretations for
their inadequate assimilation of Hebrew scholarship, it is equally erroneous for one to dismiss
Hellenistic influence over Christian interpretations of the imago Dei.74 Thus, one ought to
avoid the false dichotomy between Paul as a Jewish theologian and Paul as a Greek
philosopher, such that “the more ‘Jewish’ Paul’s thought was the ‘lower’ his Christology, and
the more ‘Hellenised’ he was the ‘higher’ the Christology.”75
That Paul’s image christology reflects a creative christological appropriation of Jewish sophia
speculation and particularly of Middle Platonic intermediary doctrine is evident from the following
points: the formulaic and semi-technical collocation of (1) εἰκών and πρωτότοκος (Rom. 8.29; and Col.
1.15–16) and (2) μορφ- and εἰκών (2 Cor. 3.18; and Rom. 8.29), as well as (3) the use of prepositional
metaphysics (1 Cor. 8.6; and Col. 1.15–16).76
However, this must not be taken to mean Kugler rejects Middleton’s royal
interpretation of the imago dei. Rather, what Kugler intends to emphasise is that one ought
not to conceive Jesus’ imago dei as being fashioned after Adam. On the contrary, Adam is
made in the image of Jesus Christ. In other words, Kugler’s differentiation between the
Sophia-Image christology and Adam-Royal christology is
to emphasise the fact that … Jesus is the protological and cosmogonical image of God according to
which Adam himself was made and toward which he was destined; as such, Jesus is deliberately
included within the unique divine identity as creator (rather than creature). Nevertheless, the reason
why Paul thinks it still appropriate to refer to the now-human — bodily crucified, bodily resurrected,
72
Kugler, 48; For more, see Richard Bauckham, Jesus and the God of Israel: God Crucified and Other
Studies on the New Testament’s Christology of Divine Identity (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2008).
73
The history of hermeneutics ought to remind us that it is naïve to think one could read any text
without any preunderstanding nor truly engage any text without being changed afterwards. For more, see
Merold Westphal, Whose Community? Which Interpretation? Philosophical Hermeneutics for the Church
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2009); Stanley E. Porter and Jason C. Robinson, Hermeneutics: An Introduction to
Interpretive Theory (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011); Anthony C. Thiselton, Why Hermeneutics? An
Appeal Culminating with Ricoeur (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2019).
74
Unlike von Harnack, who is highly critical of the Hellenisation of Christianity, this paper maintains a
value-neutral position towards Hellenistic influence of Judaism and early Christianity. For critique against von
Harnack, see William Rowe, ‘Harnack and Hellenisation in the Early Church’, Philosophia Reformata 57, no. 1
(1992): 78–85; Christoph Markschies, ‘Harnack’s Image of 1 Clement and Contemporary Research’, Zeitschrift
Für Antikes Christentum 18, no. 1 (2014): 54–69.
75
N. T. Wright, ‘Foreword’, in Paul and the Image of God (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2020), vii.
76
15
and bodily enthroned — Jesus as the paradigmatic imago Dei is because, in his reading of Genesis
1.26, the creative imago Dei made the created imago Dei not least in view of the day when it would be
appropriate fully to bring the two together. In other words, and this is also the basis of Paul’s vision of
theōsis, the creative imago Dei made the created imago Dei with capax Dei.77
In sum, for Paul, humanity’s imago dei is christological because Adam’s imago dei is
fashioned after Jesus Christ.78 More specifically, Kugler argues for a Sophia-Image
interpretation of Paul’s christology because of the parallels between Jewish wisdom tradition
and Middle Platonism. Consequently, “Paul’s imago Dei theology too reflects an association
with Plato’s teleological doctrine of ‘likeness to god.’”79 However, this does not mean a
rejection of Middleton’s royal interpretation of the imago dei because Paul includes Jesus
Christ in the unique divine identity of Creator and Ruler of all. In short, the Sophia-Image
christology serves to clarify Jesus’ human nature was not made in Adam’s image. More
significantly for this paper, Jesus’ human nature reveals humanity’s perfected imago dei at
the eschaton.
2.3. Zwollo: Patristics — Augustine
In St. Augustine and Plotinus, Zwollo accurately notes Augustine’s doctrine of the
imago dei utilises Plotinus’ philosophical framework. In particular, human souls are images
of the divine Λόγος, which, “apart from being a creative and formative principle …, is
predominantly a principle of reason and order.”80 Like Plotinus, Augustine agrees that
humanity’s goal is to ascend and participate in the Godhead. However, “[w]ho shall ascend
the hill of YHWH? And who shall stand in his holy place?”81 Here, both Plotinus and
Augustine insist the ascent and participation require the purification of the soul from sin,
77
Kugler, 197.
78
“For those whom he [God] foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image [εἰκών] of his
Son, in order that he might be the firstborn [πρωτότοκος] within a large family. And those whom he predestined
he also called; and those whom he called he also justified; and those whom he justified he also glorified.” (Rom.
8:29–30).
79
80
Zwollo, St. Augustine and Plotinus, 87.
81
Psa. 24:3.
16
which meant contemplating on the divine Λόγος and ordering one’s life in accordance to
him.82 In short, life’s purpose is to image the divine Λόγος more perfectly and be more
godlike.83
Unsurprisingly, when humans fail to fix their gaze upon the divine Λόγος, their
imaging also falls short and they sin. According to Plotinus,
Evil or vice is essentially founded upon illusory or wrong thinking. Sin entails mistaking phantoms
φαντασιάι, material or physical images ει͗δ́ ωλα, for true reality, falling in love with them as it were and
identifying oneself with them (IV.4). Therefore, humans who cannot contemplate well will be more
prone to doing evil.
Here, Zwollo finds parallels with Augustine’s Genesis commentaries:
Hence, St. Paul says “Be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man, who is being
renewed unto the knowledge of God, according to the image of his Creator.” By these words he shows
wherein man has been created to the image of God, since it is not by any features of the body but by a
perfection of the intelligible order, that is, of the mind when illuminated.84
Or in the words of Paul, “Claiming to be wise, they [humanity] became fools; and they
exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images resembling a mortal human being or
birds or four-footed animals or reptiles.”85
Despite his close affinity with Plotinus, Augustine offers theological corrections
against Plotinus’ conception of the Godhead and love.86 Although both agree on the
Godhead’s immateriality, immutability, and eternality, Augustine diverges from Plotinus in
82
“Plotinus’ goals were essentially the same as Augustine’s: to gradually approach God by
strengthening one’s likeness to Him. In order to do so, a purification of the heart was necessary. Plotinus and
Augustine prescribed this purification in many of the same ways: such as contemplating the Ideas, instilling
goodness and virtue in the soul and training the mind’s eye to perceive beyond the physical. But Augustine’s
stress on purification went a few steps further: one needed to scrupulously recognise one’s sins, rent them and
confess them to Christ in prayer in order to be purged of them. Augustine directly attributed the purification of
sin to the Verbum Dei himself, as well as to his life on earth in which he sacrificed himself for the sins of the
world.” (Zwollo, St. Augustine and Plotinus, 428).
83
“In sum, the groundwork of Augustine’s doctrine of the image of God in Gen. litt. has an
epistemological, redemptive character. Because the imago Dei can know God and acquire wisdom by
contemplating the Ideas, it is distinguished from the lower soul, as well as from other creatures and things in the
visible world. It is also set apart from them in that it is able to resemble God by obtaining divine Wisdom and
become a perfect image of God.” (Zwollo, 165).
84
Augustine’s Gen. litt. III.20.30, cited in Zwollo, 160; See also 3.2.4 Imago Dei, Original Sin and
Human Nature in Zwollo, 169ff.
85
Rom. 1:22–23.
86
Zwollo, St. Augustine and Plotinus, 451–454.
17
two main areas: (1) Human incarnation of the divine Λόγος,87 and (2) “his [Augustine’s]
more insistent differentiation between the Creator and the creature.”88 Consequently, whilst
Augustine agrees that humanity’s goal to ascend and participate in the Godhead requires
purification of one’s soul from sin, unlike Plotinus, Augustine “directly attributed the
purification of sin to the Verbum Dei [Jesus Christ] himself,”89 and insists on the
impossibility of “total unification with the Trinity” or “complete participation in a divine self-
relationship, which would ultimately entail a transcendence (albeit momentary) of the self, in
the way Plotinus sometimes suggested.”90 However, this must not be taken to mean that
Augustine opposes humanity’s union with God through Christ. Rather, it is his manner of
preserving the Creator-creature divide by emphasising the limits of human-divine
relationship in comparison to intratrinitarian relationships.91
In sum, for Augustine, the human imago dei is made in accordance to the divine
Λόγος — Jesus Christ — for the purpose of participating in the communion of the holy
Trinity. Like Plotinus, Augustine posits the ascent to be gradual, “being transformed into the
same image from one degree of glory to another; for this comes from the Lord, the Spirit.”92
Unlike Plotinus, Augustine insists that our ascent is made possible only “by grace through
faith”93 in Jesus Christ, the mediator of the Creator-creature ontological divide.
87
“For Platonists, who posited the absolute immateriality of God, the incarnation of a divinity into
human physical body was unthinkable. For this reason, the New Testament notion of Jesus Christ was
undeserving of their attention. The Platonist ‘Son of God’ did not incarnate into a physical body or lead a
human life, nor would he have humbly died for the sake of the sins of humanity.” (Zwollo, 44).
88
Zwollo, 310.
89
Zwollo, 428.
90
Zwollo, 414.
91
“In my [Zwollo’s] opinion, Augustine’s statements on the infeasibility of a complete union with the
Godhead did not imply a negation of a unio mystica, or a pessimistic view of mankind’s redemption — as if
postlapsarian humans inherently and consistently fail to return to their Creator because of the invincible effects
of original sin. Instead his teachings, like those of Plotinus, still expressed an optimistic theology, facilitated by
one’s relationship with Christ. His interpretation of the New Testament removed any illusions of perfection or
deification while in this life. Christ, in collaboration with the Holy Spirit, would bring the human soul to a
unification with God — through the experience of love and desire, by means of contemplation and intellectual
vision — to the degree and the extent that it was possible for the human individual to achieve this.” (Zwollo,
430).
92
2 Cor. 3:18.
93
Eph. 2:8.
18
2.4. Van Vliet: Protestant Reformation — Calvin
In Children of God, Van Vliet contends that Calvin’s imago dei is filii dei when his
doctrine of the imago dei is understood not merely from his Institutes but also his biblical
commentaries and sermons.94 “In other words, when God created antelopes and eagles he
made creatures that would do his bidding, but when God created Adam and Eve he made
children who would be his heirs. Imago Dei means filii Dei; creation in the image of God
demonstrates that the human race is the lineage of God.”95 Setting aside scholastic minutiae
regarding the divine-human ontological chasm, Calvin interprets the imago dei according to
the heilsgeschichte (creation, fall, redemption, glorification) instead of the Platonic hierarchy
of being.96
Although Calvin’s theologising of the imago dei is primarily derived from his
reflections upon holy scriptures, he also takes seriously the theological reflections of the
church traditions. In other words, Calvin neither promotes an “atomist individualistic”97
reading of holy scriptures nor rigid “traditionalism.”98 Rather, “Calvin can be a genuine
reformer either by promoting change or by defending the status quo, so long as the teaching
94
Van Vliet, Children of God, 120.
95
Van Vliet, 32.
96
“For him [Calvin] the dividing line [within human soul] is not primarily an ontological tension
between the spiritual (spirit/soul) and the physical (body), but a historical difference between what the entire
human nature was like at creation and what it became after the fall into sin.” (Van Vliet, 165).
97
Philip Pettit, The Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society, and Politics (New York, NY:
Oxford Univ Press, 1996), 172. This paper suggests Eastman’s “second-person hermeneutics,” which argues for
“holistic individualism” against “atomistic individualism,” best captures the Reformers’ reading strategy. (Susan
G. Eastman, Paul and the Person: Reframing Paul’s Anthropology [Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2017], 15).
98
“Tradition is the living faith of the dead; traditionalism is the dead faith of the living. Tradition lives
in conversation with the past, while remembering where we are and when we are and that it is we who have to
decide. Traditionalism supposes that nothing should ever be done for the first time, so all that is needed to solve
any problem is to arrive at the supposedly unanimous testimony of this homogenised tradition.” (Jaroslav
Pelikan, cited in Joseph Carey, ‘Christianity as an Enfolding Circle: Conversation with Jaroslav Pelikan’, U.S.
News and World Report, 26 June 1989, 57).
19
of Scripture is upheld in both circumstances.”99 In other words, for Calvin, sola scriptura
must be understood in an ecclesiastical context lest it distorts into “solo scriptura.”100
Like his theological forebears and fellow reformers,101 Calvin agrees the locus of the
imago dei is the human soul (read: incorporeality).102 However, unlike them, Calvin is less
reticent towards including human corporeality in the imago dei.103 Nonetheless, this must not
be mistaken to mean Calvin thinks that Jesus Christ’s human body is the perfect form (read:
Platonic category) for all of humanity,104 for that would make Jesus Christ the first Adam,
contradicting Paul’s writing in 1 Cor. 15:45–49.
Although Calvin acknowledges that the human body belongs to the image of God in some measure, he
maintains that the seat of the image is in the soul. The likeness which God established between himself
and human beings is one of spiritual qualities, such as wisdom, justice, and goodness. Once the seat of
God’s image shifts away from the soul and rests predominantly in the body, the definition of the image
also changes.105
Whilst Calvin’s doctrine of the imago dei might have hints of Timaeus’ imago dei as
filii dei because he appropriates Renaissance humanist methodology,106 biblical exegesis
predominates his methodology. Thus, this implies Calvin prioritises biblical categories over
Platonic categories when conceptualising the imago dei. Here, it is significant to note that
99
100
“The main problem with ‘solo’ scriptura is that each individual biblical interpreter sees what is right
in his or her own eyes: ‘[O]ne Christian measures the scriptural interpretations of other Christians against the
standard of his own scriptural interpretation.’ ‘Solo’ scriptura thus denies the principle of catholicity.” [Kevin J.
Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine: A Canonical Linguistic Approach to Christian Doctrine (Louisville, KY:
Westminster, 2005), 154]. See also Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Biblical Authority after Babel: Retrieving the Solas in
the Spirit of Mere Protestant Christianity (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2018).
101
“… the basic definition of the image of God remains remarkably constant throughout the first fifteen
centuries of the Christian church. Theologians from different areas and eras generally agree that the image of
God consists of intellect and novice since, by using the two faculties, the human soul best reflects the Creator
who reveals truth and who is free to choose.” (Van Vliet, Children of God, 60).
102
“If someone is searching for a proper definition of the soul, Calvin advises his readers to avoid all
philosophers, except Plato who has ‘rightly affirmed its immortal substance.’” (Van Vliet, 154).
103
“By contrast [to Erasmus and Pico], Calvin was a dichotomist. His concern was not so much to draw
a metaphysical line in the sand between spirit and body, but rather to follow a chronological line through the soil
of redemptive history. For him the entire human being, including the body, is either in the state of integrity, or
sin, or redemption, or final glory.” (Van Vliet, 259).
104
“That Calvin connects God’s glory to the body [in his sermon on Gen. 5] before linking it to the soul
is certainly striking and decidedly unplatonic. … By including the corporeal aspect of human nature within the
image of God, Calvin is more affirmative concerning the created dignity of the human body than his reformed-
minded colleagues, Melanchthon and Bullinger.” (Van Vliet, 258–259).
105
Van Vliet, 250.
106
“If someone is searching for a proper definition of the soul, Calvin advises his readers to avoid all
philosophers, except Plato who has ‘rightly affirmed its immortal substance.’” (Van Vliet, 154).
20
despite much agreement with his theological forebears, Calvin disagrees with their
interpretive decision to distinguish between ‫( צלם‬trans. “image”) and ‫( דמוּת‬trans. “likeness”),
where “the human soul itself is sub-divided into a mortal part (in the likeness of the children
of the gods) and an immortal part (in the likeness of the father creator).”107
Like Augustine, Calvin finds it exegetically tenuous to maintain the distinction
between ‫ צלם‬and ‫דמוּת‬. “Therefore, beginning with his earliest writings, and continuing
through to his final ones, he [Calvin] depicts the image as a likeness of attributes.”108 In short,
Calvin maintains that the similitude between God and humanity is one of attributes rather
than essence.
For him [Calvin] the image is an attributive similarity which the Triune God imprinted upon the human
soul from the beginning. That is to say, as God himself is just, holy, and wise, so he also created Adam
and Eve in such a way that they were just, holy, and wise. The relationship which surrounds and
sustains this attributive similarity is a familial one. … In fact, Calvin explicitly states that the imago
Dei is God’s testimony to us that we are his children. … Under no circumstance will Calvin allow
imago Dei to metamorphose into esse Deum.109 (Emphasis mine)
In sum, for Calvin, the imago dei is God’s testimony of our destiny as filii dei.110
Although Calvin’s fellow reformers (i.e., Melanchthon and Bullinger) speaks of God’s
fatherhood in relation to creation, “they do not explicitly link God’s fatherhood with the
image of God” in the familial sense.111 Also, although every human can be called children of
God in a general sense, thus distinguishing us from animals, “the title ‘children of God’ is
reserved, in a special sense, for those who are adopted through faith in Jesus Christ, for they
alone are made to exhibit the likeness of God with the imputed, heavenly holiness of God’s
eternal Son.”112 In other words, whilst Calvin does not dismiss there remains a remnant of the
imago dei after the Fall, he contends that humanity’s goal is to not to ascend the “ladder of
107
Van Vliet, 148–149.
108
Van Vliet, 116.
109
Van Vliet, 253–254.
110
See also Brian G. Mattson, Restored to Our Destiny: Eschatology & the Image of God in Herman
Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics, vol. 21, Studies in Reformed Theology (Leiden: Brill, 2012).
111
112
Van Vliet, 97.
21
morality (virtue is above, vice below).”113 On the contrary, “[t]he restoration of the image is
nothing more and nothing less than adoption in Christ, the only-begotten Son. … The
ultimate goal [of humanity] is not to become some sort of divine beings but to enjoy the
eternal inheritance which the Father has prepared for his adopted children.”114
2.5. Robinson: Modern — Balthasar
In Understanding the “Imago Dei,” Robinson argues that Balthasar’s descendant-
ascendant imago dei best captures the unique worth of all humanity without blurring the
Creator-creature distinction or undermining Christ’s salvific work for humanity’s sin.
Rather than seeing these two perspectives [Christ’s descent and humanity’s ascent] as mutually
exclusive poles, Balthasar has portrayed them as part of one integrated dynamic of the relationship
between God and his image in creation, and dramatised this in a way which speaks of the essential
interplay of divine and human love.115
In short, for Balthasar, God’s descent — via Christ’s incarnation — enables fallen
humanity’s ascent — via the Spirit’s empowerment — to participate in the communion of the
holy Trinity.
As a Roman Catholic theologian, Robinson demurs that Protestants have overly
emphasised on humanity’s fallenness at the expense of humanity’s dignity. Their Lutheran
interpretation of Augustine’s doctrine of grace seems to have confused one’s effort to “work
out your own salvation with fear and trembling”116 with earning one’s salvation, “[h]aving
started with the Spirit … now ending with the flesh.”117
Luther believed that medieval theology’s concentration on the role of human nature in the God-human
relationship after the Fall implied our ability to work our way back to God to the extent that an
affirmation of belief in the total gratuity of salvation in Christ was jeopardised. … For Luther
humanity’s creation in God’s image does not entail the natural ability to prepare for God’s justice
which had characterised some medieval theology. We are able to make moral choices but this ability is
totally unconnected with God’s justice which is totally gratuitous. Human beings are called simply to
accept that as creatures made in the image we have been put right with God through the sacrifice of his
113
Van Vliet, 153.
114
Van Vliet, 269.
115
Robinson, Understanding the ‘Imago Dei’, 124.
116
Phil. 2:12.
117
Gal. 3:3.
22
Son Jesus Christ.118
Whilst this paper opines Robinson could be more charitable towards Protestants’ insistence
on sola fide, sola gratia, and solus Christus, nonetheless, Robinson rightly highlights the
resulting “passivity”119 of some Christians after they believed.120
Beginning with the common grounds, readers ought to be aware that both Roman
Catholicism and Protestantism recognise the restoration of fallen humanity is entirely because
of divine intervention. In other words, the soteriology of both traditions is in line with the
metanarrative of creation, fall, redemption, and glorification. Thus, whilst Roman
Catholicism, following Aquinas, speaks of “Gratia non tollit naturam, sed perficit,” it must
not be misunderstood that they believe human nature is neutral and one only needs divine
grace like a boaster jab to ascend and participate in the communion of the holy Trinity.121
Rather, both the Council of Trent and the Second Vatican Council “restated a clear
belief in the necessity of God’s action in Christ in restoring humanity’s original holiness and
justice which was lost through the sin of Adam.”122 In short, both Roman Catholicism and
Protestantism believe that postfall humanity’s imago dei — though marred but not
annihilated by sin — requires Christ’s salvific work. Indeed, it is only by God’s grace that the
118
119
“The enemy in our time is not human capacity, or over activism, but the enemy is passivity — the
idea that God has done everything and you are essentially left to be a consumer of the grace of God and that the
only thing you have to do is find out how to do that and do it regularly. … I [Willard] talk a lot about the value
of spiritual disciplines but also the danger of using the as if they help us earn our salvation. But it is crucial to
realise that grace is not opposed to effort, but to earning. Earning is an attitude, effort is an action. Without
effort, we would be nowhere. When you read the New Testament you see how astonishingly energetic it is. Paul
say, ‘take off the old man, put on the new.’ [Eph. 4:22–24] There is no suggesting that this will be done for
you.” (Dallas Willard, ‘Following Jesus and Living in the Kingdom’, Renovaré, April 2002,
https://renovare.org/articles/living-in-the-kingdom).
120
For more, see N. T. Wright, After You Believe: Why Christian Character Matters (New York, NY:
Harper, 2010); Scot McKnight, The King Jesus Gospel: The Original Good News Revisited (Grand Rapids, MI:
Zondervan, 2016); Matthew W. Bates, Salvation by Allegiance Alone: Rethinking Faith, Works, and the Gospel
of Jesus the King (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2017).
121
Similarly, one ought to refrain from exaggerating the moral aspect of sin within Protestant theology
because of Stendhahl’s article. See Krister Stendahl, ‘The Apostle Paul and the Introspective Conscience of the
West’, Harvard Theological Review 56, no. 3 (1963): 199–215.
122
23
imago dei might be restored for their intended destiny of participating in the holy Trinity. On
the flip side, sin is “the universal failure to achieve our human destiny.”123
Whilst there is significant agreement between Protestantism and Roman Catholicism
(as demonstrated by comparing Barth and Balthasar) that the doctrine of the imago dei ought
to be grounded in christology,124 Robinson opines that it is difficult for Barth to speak of God
and humanity having a meaningful and mutual relationship because “his [Barth’s] theological
system places humanity in a position of passive acceptance of Christ’s justification and
militates against a more integrated and actively relational model of human dignity.”125 For
Balthasar, “the most important truth about our being made in ‘imago Dei’ is not our fall from
grace. Rather we are drawn back to a recognition of our being loved by God as creatures
made in his image.”126 Thus, unlike Barth, Balthasar insists that “[w]e are not merely fallen
creatures, now passive recipients of Christ’s salvation, but actors in a drama in which we
have a special role as God’s imprint on earth capable of infinite transcendence in virtue of
Christ our origin and goal.”127 In short, for Balthasar, postfall humanity possesses capax dei
and the restoration of the imago dei is for the missio dei as participants of the theodrama of
“love.”128
123
Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley, vol. 2 (Edinburgh: T & T
Clark, 1994), 252. “Human beings are persons to the extent that they take possession of the image of God which
is their destiny. However this destiny can be attained only in a limited sense at any one moment and therefore
must be the work of an individual’s entire life history. This process is achieved by self-conscious awareness of
the finitude of one’s own life and the necessity of its dependence upon the infinite. Thus, the individual’s
relation to the divine, which is mediated by relations to others, is central for personhood.” (Theodore J.
Whapham, The Term ‘Person’ in the Trinitarian Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg [New York, NY: Peter Lang,
2012], 51). For more, see Kam Ming Wong, Wolfhart Pannenberg on Human Destiny (Aldershot: Ashgate,
2008).
124
“As a result [of emphasis by postconciliar Roman Catholic theology] theologians on both sides the
Reformation divide are now better able to speak to each other of human dignity from the perspective of the
‘imago Dei’ as long as the dialogue is rooted not in a subjective understanding of human potential but in God’s
action in human lives through the person of Christ.” (Robinson, Understanding the ‘Imago Dei’, 70).
125
Robinson, 43.
126
Robinson, 84.
127
Robinson, 92.
128
“To summarise, I [Robinson] would want to recommend that the doctrine of the ‘imago Dei’ is best
maintained and restated in a theological narrative which holds together the descendant and the ascendant pole in
a mutual drama of love.” (Robinson, 175).
24
In sum, Balthasar’s descendant-ascendant imago dei is more accurately a theological-
vocational category129 that is best understood via the medium of narrative.130 Whilst
Balthasar appreciates Barth’s christocentric emphasis for the imago dei,131 Barth’s aversion
towards natural theology (because of Nazi theology) implies “we do not and cannot mirror
God. Rather, we are conformed to him. We cannot find God through this understanding of
analogy as God remains essentially other and inaccessible to us.”132 But for Balthasar, whose
imago dei is not focused on humanity’s fallenness but humanity as God’s beloved creatures,
The basis of our human identity is a dialogue with Christ who draws us outwards towards dialogue
with others. Thus our being made in ‘imago Dei’ cannot possibly be considered a private matter. Rather
it is a communal one. To be in communion with Christ is to be called into communion with others.133
Thus, we are to know God and make him known because we are first known by him.134
129
“Through greater emphasis on Christ’s descent, human identity may now be placed more clearly in
the perspective of God’s presence within us, thus emphasising the dignity of each human person in whom God,
in descending to us in the person of his Son, resides. The dramatic power of Balthasar’s narrative portrayal of
Christ’s descent also enables us to speak of human dignity in terms of the vocation to go beyond ourselves. The
fuller picture of human dignity lies in the call to the adventure of transcendence in the ongoing relationship with
God in Christ. Our return and ascent to God will be a life of service as we are more fully incorporated into
Christ’s life and mission.” (Robinson, 159).
130
According to Balthasar, the nature-supernatural debates are, in the words of Otto, “attempts to play
off the ’salvation-historical’ development (from paradise to man’s final state) against the ‘categorical-analytical
distinction made between a ‘natural’ and a ‘supernatural’ element in man’.” (Robinson, 93); “An important
figure here is the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur, who saw the value of narrative for our understanding of
human identity. For Ricoeur telling our personal and communal narrative enables us to see our horizons more
clearly, so to understand ourselves better, and to prompt us to expectation of personal fulfilment. Theology can
speak of the dignity of the human personal all the more meaningfully and creatively through narrative. It enables
theology to situate the quest for a personal identity in the central mysteries of God’s becoming man, and so to
invite the human being to see his eternal horizon realised in Christ.” (Robinson, 174). See also Hans W. Frei,
The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics (New Haven:
Yale Univ. Press, 1974); George A. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal
Age (Louisville, KY: Westminster, 2009).
131
“The impetus for Balthasar’s turn to Christocentrism in theology is clearly that of Barth’s but he is
also strongly influenced by sources in the Patristic tradition whom he interpreted in a different way to him. …
Balthasar emphasised Augustine’s idea of the human way back to God and our eventual ‘deificatio’.”
(Robinson, Understanding the ‘Imago Dei’, 161).
132
Robinson, 55.
133
Robinson, 88.
134
Paraphrasing 1 John 4:19, where knowing is more than propositional knowledge, but intersubjective
knowledge (i.e., love).
25
2.6. Summary: Imago Dei As Filii Dei
In this chapter, readers are provided with a brief sketch of the history of
interpretations of the imago dei from Evangelicalism’s perspective of select major
interpreters from five major periods. Instead of a recap, this summary will synthesise the
findings above into seven suggestions for future interpretations of the imago dei so that one is
faithful to holy scriptures, church traditions, and the interpreters’ socio-historical contexts.
First, it is unnecessary to posit a distinction between ‫( צלם‬trans. “image”) and ‫דמוּת‬
(trans. “likeness”) because it is exegetically tenuous. Here, we find support from Middleton,
Augustine, and Calvin.
Second, it is unnecessary to posit humanity’s imago dei is annihilated after the Fall.
Apart from Luther’s interpretation of Augustine,135 most interpreters acknowledge a
remanent of the imago dei — though marred — remains.
Third, it is a modernist delusion to think one could theologise from a view of
nowhere. Instead of following Harnack’s critical assessment of the Hellenisation of
Christianity, one could adopt Anatolios’ method of creative reperformance of the historical
developments via their “exigencies.”136
Fourth, since “Scripture’s authority within the church is a function of Scripture’s
authority over the church,”137 biblical categories ought to predominate Platonic categories.
Here, Calvin is a prime exemplar of interpreting the imago dei via the heilsgeschichte instead
135
“Martin Luther believed that through Adam’s fall, humanity lost the image of God, which is
restored only through justification by faith. That doctrine would imply that non-Christians do not have the
image of God in them. This paper analyses Luther’s argument and proposes a mediating position: all humans
retain the divine image, but only justification can restore the divine likeness.” (Geoffrey Butler, ‘Luther’s
Peculiar Doctrine of the Imago Dei’, Evangelical Review of Theology 45, no. 2 [May 2021]: 176).
136
Khaled Anatolios, Retrieving Nicaea: The Development and Meaning of Trinitarian Doctrine
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2011), 7.
137
John B. Webster, Holy Scripture: A Dogmatic Sketch, Current Issues in Theology (New York, NY:
Cambridge Univ Press, 2003), 56.
26
of the Platonic hierarchy of being thus not blurring the Creator-creature divide nor
undermining Christ’s salvific work for humanity’s sin.
Fifth, if one concedes the imago dei is more accurately a theological-vocation
category,138 then narrative analysis ought to lead ontological analysis. Here, we find
Augustine and Calvin clearly utilising Greek metaphysics to speak of the imago dei as being
incorporeal human soul, yet they do not relinquish the human incarnation of the God-man —
Jesus Christ — whose corporeality would be abhorrent for thoroughgoing Platonists.
Sixth, even if the imago dei is more accurately a theological-vocational category,
one’s conceptualisation of the imago dei bears metaphysical presuppositions. For example, if
a major characteristic of the imago dei is the ability to develop mutual relationship with God,
then relationality is an implicit metaphysical implication that requires tools from analytic
philosophy (e.g., what is relationality? Is it part of personhood?).139
Seventh, and most significantly, the imago dei is christological. Here, Kugler’s
Sophia-Image christology reminds us that all of humanity’s imago dei is fashioned after the
divine λόγος — Jesus Christ. But this must not be taken to mean that Jesus’ Jewish male
corporeality is the perfect human body type. However, this does mean we are called to
imitate Christ’s perfect sonship by participating in him.140 Here, we find support from
Eastman’s Pauline “participatory anthropology.”141
138
See also Paul Sands, ‘The Imago Dei as Vocation’, Evangelical Quarterly 82, no. 1 (January 2010):
28–41; J. G. McConville, ‘“Fellow Citizens”: Israel and Humanity in Leviticus’, in Reading the Law: Studies in
Honour of Gordon J. Wenham, ed. J. G. McConville and Karl Möller, Library of Hebrew Bible/Old Testament
Studies 461 (New York, NY: T & T Clark, 2007), 10–32.
139
E.g., James T. Turner, ‘Temple Theology, Holistic Eschatology, and the Imago Dei: An Analytic
Prolegomenon’, TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology
2, no. 1 (27 March 2018): 95–114. For more, see Michael Welker, ed., The Depth of the Human Person: A
Multidisciplinary Approach (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2014).
140
For more, see Max Botner, ‘“Whoever Does the Will of God” (Mark 3:35): Mark’s Christ as the
Model Son’, in Son of God: Divine Sonship in Jewish and Christian Antiquity, ed. Garrick V. Allen et al.
(University Park, PA: Eisenbrauns, 2019), 106–17.
141
Eastman, Paul and the Person, 26; For imitation language, see also Susan G. Eastman, Recovering
Paul’s Mother Tongue: Language and Theology in Galatians (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2007).
27
In sum, this paper concludes that the imago dei is relational (i.e., capax dei),
functional (i.e., royal interpretation), and substantialistic (i.e., embodied human soul).142 As
one theologising within Evangelicalism, this paper opines Calvin’s filii dei best captures the
theological-vocational and ontological aspects of the imago dei. Here, Calvin’s imago dei as
filii dei also finds support from Balthasar’s descendent-ascendent imago dei because both
agree that God’s descent — via Christ’s human incarnation — enables fallen humanity’s
ascent — via the Spirit’s empowerment — to participate in the communion of the holy
Trinity. However, humanity’s participation, even at the eschaton, would be limited in
comparison to the intratrinitarian relationship because of the Creator-creature divide. In other
words, humanity’s participation in the holy Trinity is through Christ as God’s “adopted
children.”143 However, “[b]eing made in the ‘imago Dei’ is not understood first and foremost
from the side of his human potential but from how Christ gives and realises this possibility.
Humanity’s moving towards God’s ‘likeness’ is in fact, as Tertullian, influenced by Irenaeus,
would define it, ‘realising the ‘likeness’ it already possesses’.”144 In other words, whilst every
human person is a child of God in a general sense, “the title ‘children of God’ is reserved, in
a special sense, for those who are adopted through faith in Jesus Christ, for they alone are
made to exhibit the likeness of God with the imputed, heavenly holiness of God’s eternal
Son.”145
142
This conclusion is like Peterson’s conclusion that the imago dei is human identity, but this paper
opines Peterson’s conception of human identity is too atomist individualistic and needs to be more wholistic
individualistic, accounting for the porous and communal aspect of identity. For more, see Ryan S. Peterson, The
Imago Dei as Human Identity: A Theological Interpretation, Journal of Theological Interpretation Supplements
14 (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2016).
143
Rom. 8:14–19; 9:8, 26; Eph. 1:5; Gal. 3:26; 4:5–7.
144
145
28
3. A Limits Model of the Imago Dei
This chapter is a proposal for a limits model of the imago dei, which utilises insights
from Barnes-Campbell hybrid approach,146 Calvin’ imago dei as filii dei,147 and Creamer’s
limits model of disability. First, it will point out ableist projection of the imago dei using the
Barnes-Campbell hybrid approach. Second, it posits that Creamer’s insight helpfully
reframes humanity’s limits as embodied beings is a positive trait rather than a deficiency.
Third, it situates the limits model of the imago dei in wisdom anthropology. In sum, this
chapter argues that Creamer’s limits model is a much-needed supplement to Calvin’s imago
dei as filii dei because being embodied human souls implies being limited.
3.1. Critique of History of Interpretations of the Imago Dei
In the previous chapter, we conclude that the imago dei is relational (i.e., capax dei),
functional (i.e., royal interpretation), and substantialistic (i.e., embodied human soul). Most
importantly, however, the imago dei is christological (i.e., Sophia-Image Christology). As a
theological-vocational category, this implies the imago dei is filii dei. In other words,
humanity’s destiny is to ascend and participate in the communion of the holy Trinity through
our adoption in Christ.
For you did not receive a spirit of slavery to fall back into fear, but you have received a spirit of
adoption. When we cry, ‘Abba! Father!’ it is that very Spirit bearing witness with our spirit that we are
children of God, and if children, then heirs, heirs of God and joint heirs with Christ — if, in fact, we
suffer with him so that we may also be glorified with him.148
Whilst Middleton rightly notes that relational and substantialistic interpretations lack
adequate assimilation of Hebrew scholarship’s virtual consensus on the royal interpretation,
this does not necessitate a Harnackian rejection of the Hellenisation of Christianity. Rather,
146
See 1.1. Barnes-Campbell Hybrid Approach Towards Disability Theology.
147
See 2.6. Summary: Imago Dei as Filii Dei.
148
Rom. 8:15–17.
29
as one within Evangelicalism, it implies biblical categories has methodological predominance
over philosophical categories. In other words, Paul, Augustine, Calvin, and Balthasar utilise
philosophical categories for the sake of theological exposition.149 That being said, this paper
recognises that the debates surrounding the Hellenisation of Christianity is very much alive
with postcolonial theologies questioning the predominance of Greek philosophical
categories.150 However, since the intent here is not to settle this issue but to critique the
history of the interpretations of the imago dei according to the Barnes-Campbell hybrid
approach, this paper simply presupposes that God sanctifies and uses Greek philosophical
categories for his purpose.151
According to the Barnes-Campbell hybrid approach, an ableist interpretation of the
imago dei is one that asserts ablebodiedness is essential for a person’s well-being. In other
words, “in any conception of the good life, … [PWD’s] way of living [cannot] be as valuable
as any other … [and] disability is intrinsically associated with deficiency or defect in the
value of life, one that must be tolerated or socially compensated and accommodated.152
149
If it is true that the triune God whom Christians worship is the all-determining and all-encompassing
reality, then theology cannot but engage with metaphysics and natural sciences. A recent example of utilising
philosophical categories for theological exposition is Pannenberg’s Grundprinzip of sub ratione dei, where there
is “‘an asymmetrical bipolar relational unity’ between fundamental and systematic theological concerns.” (John
McClean, ‘Anticipation in the Thought of Wolfhart Pannenberg’ [Doctor of Philosophy, Melbourne, Melbourne
College of Divinity, 2010], 25). For more, see Wolfhart Pannenberg, Metaphysics and the Idea of God, trans.
Philip Clayton (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1990); F. LeRon Shults, The Postfoundationalist Task of
Theology: Wolfhart Pannenberg and the New Theological Rationality (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999).
150
An oft cited article by Hiebert highlights the missiological issue when deploying Greek
philosophical categories. (Paul G. Hiebert, ‘The Flaw of the Excluded Middle’, Missiology: An International
Review 10, no. 1 [1982]: 35–47). A recent example is Doyle’s critique of Wan and Hedinger’s “repeated
contrast of what they call ‘Western theology’ to their model of relational theology. They [Wan and Hedinger]
write as if all ‘Western’ theology ignores the fundamental reality of relationships, and as if Western
missiologists have ignored the importance of relationships also.” (G. Wright Doyle, ‘Relational Missionary
Training: Theology, Theory, and Practice’, Global China Center, 27 April 2019,
https://www.globalchinacenter.org/analysis/relational-missionary). For more, see Mark Harling, ‘De-
Westernizing Doctrine and Developing Appropriate Theology in Mission’, International Journal of Frontier
Missions 22, no. 4 (Winter 2005): 159–66; Moonjang Lee, ‘Re-Configuration of Western Theology in Asia’,
Common Ground Journal 6, no. 2 (Spring 2009): 60–78.
151
Similar to Webster’s use of sanctification of religious text. (Webster, Holy Scripture, 24). Also,
Augustine’s analogy of using Greek philosophy and plundering of Egypt. (St. Augustine, On Christian
Doctrine, trans. J. F. Shaw [Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2012], 75).
152
Bickenbach, Felder, and Schmitz, ‘Introduction: Rethinking the Good Human Life in Light of
Disability’, 7.
30
Regardless of how one conceives a good life, for Christians, it surely involves knowing and
being known by God. On the flip side, Christians have a theological term — sin — to name
the obstacle for participating in the triune Godhead.
So, do Paul, Augustine, Calvin, and Balthasar associate ablebodiedness with the good
life? Surely not. For they are “convinced that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor rulers,
nor things present, nor things to come, nor powers, nor height, nor depth, nor anything else in
all creation, will be able to separate us from the love of God in Christ Jesus our Lord.”153
Despite all their unique theological distinctives, all these Christian thinkers hold firmly to the
theodrama of creation, fall, redemption, and glorification. In other words, they all would
agree the good life is union with the triune Godhead through adoption in Christ, which does
not necessitate ablebodiedness since all of us are merely temporarily abled.154 For those who
believe a minimum level of ablebodiedness is implicitly required, that way lies semi-
pelagianism because “[t]hose who are well have no need of a physician, but those who are
sick; [Jesus Christ has] come to call not the righteous but sinners.”155
For by grace you have been saved through faith, and this is not your own doing; it is the gift of God —
not the result of works, so that no one may boast. For we are what he has made us, created in Christ
Jesus for good works, which God prepared beforehand to be our way of life.156
That being said, this must not be taken to mean Christians do not associate
ablebodiedness with blessedness. If knowing God is — crudely put — merely a golden ticket
to get out of hell and go to heaven (whatever this means!), then it is reasonable to assume —
if given a choice — that most would prefer a path of least resistance (i.e., ablebodiedness)
because one need not swim against ableism. So, when the path-of-least-resistance motivation
is coupled with retribution theology, it is unsurprising to hear Jesus’ disciples asking him,
“Rabbi, who sinned, this man or his parents, that he was born blind [i.e., disabled]?”157 Here,
153
Rom. 8:38–39.
154
For more on being temporarily abled, see 3.2. Being Embodied Implies Being Limited.
155
Mark 2:17.
156
Eph. 2:8–10.
157
John 9:2.
31
the disciples wrongly believed that disability is caused by sin simpliciter and consequently
ablebodiedness is a sign of blessedness.158 However, since “he was born blind so that God’s
works might be revealed in him,”159 it seems tenable to interpret Jesus’ reply to mean that
every body type reveals God’s work in its own unique respective way. For example, God’s
work in wheelchair users would be different from the Deaf. In short, although all are stricken
with sin, every body type is equally valuable for the revealing of God’s work. Put more
strongly, the church must resist ableist interpretation of sin by concluding PWD are
inherently more sinful or less blessed in virtue of their disabilities.160
In sum, there is insufficient evidence to claim Paul, Augustine, Calvin, and Balthasar
believe that ablebodiedness is necessary to know God. However, it is also inconclusive that
they believe PWD’s way of living is an equally viable and valuable alternative to nondisabled
persons. In other words, whilst these Christian thinkers might not believe disability is a bad-
difference, they certainly have not unreservedly stated that disability is a mere-difference.
158
Like Gosbell, this paper does not presuppose holy scriptures teach that disability is caused by sin
simpliciter. As it does not intend to settle this interpretive issue, it simply presupposes that some interpretations
would incline one to believe that PWD is less blessed than a nondisabled person. (Louise A. Gosbell, ‘“The
Poor, the Crippled, the Blind, and the Lame”: Physical and Sensory Disability in the Gospels of the New
Testament’ [PhD, Sydney, Macquarie Univ, 2015]). For more, see Judith Z. Abrams, Judaism and Disability:
Portrayals in Ancient Texts from the Tanach through the Bavli (Washington, DC: Gallaudet Univ Press, 1998);
Tzvi Marx, Disability in Jewish Law, Jewish Law in Context 3 (New York, NY: Routledge, 2002); Hector
Avalos, Sarah J. Melcher, and Jeremy Schipper, eds., This Abled Body: Rethinking Disabilities in Biblical
Studies, Semeia Studies 55 (Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2007); Judith Z. Abrams and William
C. Gaventa, eds., Jewish Perspectives on Theology and the Human Experience of Disability (New York, NY:
Haworth Pastoral Press, 2006); Candida R. Moss and Jeremy Schipper, eds., Disability Studies and Biblical
Literature (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Darla Y. Schumm and Michael Stoltzfus, eds.,
Disability in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam: Sacred Texts, Historical Traditions, and Social Analysis (New
York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Saul M. Olyan, Disability in the Hebrew Bible: Interpreting Mental and
Physical Differences (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ Press, 2012).
159
John 9:3.
160
“We contend that the traditional Christian interpretations of suffering and disability foster,
intentionally or not, the narrative of the lie by suggesting that suffering and disability are a result of divine
punishment or a result of sin; or that they are sent by God to test, refine, or bless in some paradoxical way; or
that recovery and cure can be had by holding the proper faith or by praying in the proper way; or that suffering
is redemptive in and of itself. Such a narrative destroys the complex and ambiguous narratives of persons with
disabilities, limits the ability of those individuals to construct meaning out of their experience, and colludes with
society’s rejection of the disabled body as not ‘normal’ or ‘beautiful.’” (Helen Betenbaugh and Marjorie
Procter-Smith, ‘Disabling the Lie: Prayers of Truth and Transformation’, in Human Disability and the Service of
God: Reassessing Religious Practice, ed. Nancy L. Eiesland and Don E. Saliers [Nashville, TN: Abingdon
Press, 1998], 288–289).
32
Nonetheless, all these Christian thinkers would agree that nothing can separate us from the
love of God, which surely implies an affirmation of all body types161. Also, none considers
humanity’s corporeality as a problem. God made embodied human soul in his own image,
saw it, and declared it to be very good.162 Thus, when we judge embodiment’s finitude as
something to be transcended (i.e., not good), we need to repent and renew our minds in
accordance to the mind of Christ.163 So, how should we construe embodiment’s limitation?
Below, Creamer’s limits model of disability offers a corrective lens to our perception of
limits and perfection.
3.2. Being Embodied Implies Being Limited
In Disability and Christian Theology, Creamer subverts the myth of ablebodiedness as
a permanent state of affair for the nondisabled. “Because disability is an ‘open minority’ that
any of us might join at any time, and which we are much more likely to join as we age, it has
been suggested that it makes little sense to try to distinguish between able and disabled, but
rather that any difference is simply between disabled and temporarily able-bodied.”164 In
other words, although bearing God’s image, we are still mere mortals who suffer from
disease, disaster, decay, and death on this side of eternity.
When understood as part of what it means to be human, limits are no longer something to be overcome
in search of perfection or something that is experienced as a punishment for sinfulness. From the limits
perspective, sin might now be redefined as an inappropriate attitude toward limits as we both
exaggerate and also reject our own limits and the limits of others.165
In short, being embodied human souls implies being limited. Despite all its grandiosity, life
on this side of eternity is marked by its vulnerability, transience, and finitude.
161
It seems humanity’s pursuit of
162
Note God’s positive judgement of creation in Gen. 1 with the repeated phrase “And God saw that it
was good.”
163
Perhaps transhumanism is a current expression of transcendence. For more, see Jeanine Thweatt-
Bates, Cyborg Selves: A Theological Anthropology of the Posthuman, Ashgate Science and Religion Series
(England: Ashgate, 2012).
164
Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 3.
165
Creamer, 33.
33
Like Barnes and Campbell, Creamer rejects the biomedical model because “disability
is a problem that is experienced by an individual (making it a uniquely Western model) as a
deviation from an assumed state of normality.”166 However, Creamer also has reservations
about the social model because it “suggests that all people with disabilities should accept and
even embrace their own disabilities/impairments — after all, the impairment is not the (or a)
problem.”167
When assimilated for theologising, the biomedical model leads one to conclude that
disability is a problem to be solved whilst the social model lends itself to a particular
interpretation of Hauerwas’ dictum that makes disability essential to one’s numerical identity.
In other words, for both the biomedical and social models, the relationship between disability
and well-being is no longer an open question. The biomedical model posits all disabilities
would be eliminated at the eschaton, whilst the social model posits that all bad-difference
disabilities would be eliminated and mere-difference disabilities must remain. Thus, the
foreclosure of discussion of the relationship between disability and well-being has unintended
ethical consequences. “Both the medical model and the social model seek to explain
disability universally, and end up creating totalising, meta-historical narratives that exclude
important dimensions of disabled people’s lives and of their knowledge.”168
Whilst this paper is more inclined towards the eschatological vision painted by the
social model, it remains unconvinced that all mere-difference disabilities must remain at the
eschaton because of the lack of exegetical data. More significantly, it silences PWD who do
not accept their disabilities as an essential part of their identity. In other words, this paper’s
chief objection against the social model is its epistemic injustice against some PWD because
166
Creamer, 23.
167
Creamer, 27.
168
Creamer, 30.
34
of the perhaps unwitting neglect of their unique personal experience.169 Creamer’s limits
model avoids this epistemic injustice by reframing the abled-disabled distinction to a body
type limitation issue.170 “Because the limits model begins with reflection on distinct
experiences of embodiment, rather than with assumptions of normalcy or political
convictions, it allows for a diversity of interpretations and meaning-making.”171
For example, when comparing two wheelchair users, where one’s disability is
acquired and another is genetic, “[t]he limits model recognises that these two individuals may
vary in terms of their attitudes toward their disabilities, their own definitions and
understandings of disability, and the way and degree to which they see limits as affecting
their lives.”172 Or imagine one is stuck in a broken elevator where everywhere is dark and
every text is marked in Braille. A person with sight who cannot read Braille is considered
disabled in comparison to one with blindness but is proficient with Braille. Similarly, “[i]f
one equates disability with impairment, it would be a Hearing person who cannot sign who
would be different and thus disabled within the context of a Deaf community.”173
Apart from reframing the abled-disabled distinction, another notable insight from
Creamer’s limits model for the interpretation of the imago dei is to consider what it means for
God to limit himself.
When we imagine an unlimited God, there is a subtle implication that the more limits we have the less
we are like God. This is reminiscent of Daly’s claim that if God is male, then male is God. … My
[Creamer’s] proposal here is that, when we think about God, it is important to recognise the existence
and ‘normalcy’ of limits. Limits do not tell us all that God is or all that we are, individually or as
communities. As McFague would argue, it is at best one piece of the puzzle, one square of the quilt.174
169
For more, see Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (New York,
NY: Oxford Univ Press, 2007).
170
“Where the medical model begins with an evaluation or assessment of limitations, the limits model
begins with the notion of limits as a common, indeed quite unsurprising, aspect of being human. Unlike the
minority [i.e., social] model, the limits model avoids categorisation and instead encourages us to acknowledge a
web of related experiences, suggesting, for example, that a legally blind person may in some ways be more
similar to a person who wears glasses than to a person who uses a wheelchair.” (Creamer, Disability and
Christian Theology, 31–32).
171
Creamer, 117.
172
Creamer, 117.
173
Creamer, 97.
174
Creamer, 112, 113.
35
Whilst one could read Creamer’s quote above and conclude that she has given up on
classical theism’s God, it seems the more charitable reading is to conclude that Creamer
intends to remind her readers that human beings are always limited and contingent upon
God’s grace and providence. In other words, it erroneous to conclude that Creamer is
suggesting a limited God because that way lies Feuerbach’s anthropomorphic
projectionism.175 That being said, it could be argued that the God has limited himself in the
human incarnation of Jesus Christ.176
My [Davis’] claim is that every orthodox believer in the incarnation must believe that the Logos gave
up [i.e., limited] at least something in becoming incarnate in a man — the usual manifestations of the
divine glory, for example. Or we might say that in the incarnation the Logos gave up the normal
incorporeal life of God. Or we might say, following Philippians 2:7, that in the incarnation the Logos
gave up the form of a non-servant.177
In short, it is not unreasonable to suggest Creamer’s limits model has close affinity with
kenotic christology though further studies is needed to establish their link. Nonetheless, when
compared to the eternal God, most would affirm human life is indeed ‫( הבל הבלים‬lit. “vapour
of vapours”; trans. “vanity of vanities”).178
In sum, Creamer’s limits model reminds us that being embodied implies being
limited. Lest it be mistaken, Creamer does not presuppose all limits are good.179 A limits
model
175
For more, see critique of Block’s “Accessible God,” Black’s “Interdependent God,” and Eiesland’s
“Disabled God” in ‘4. Liberation Theologies of Disability,’ in Creamer, 75ff.
176
“Kenotic Christology affirms that the first and in some ways most decisive phase of this self-
emptying process is seen in the second person of the Trinity’s becoming a human being. In this act, God the Son
chose to ‘empty himself’ of some of his divine prerogatives and fully enter into the life of a human being. When
incarnated, God himself experiences the life of a finite, bodily being and all the limitations of such a life.” (C.
Stephen Evans, Exploring Kenotic Christology: The Self-Emptying of God [New York, NY: Oxford Univ Press,
2006], 190); “The notion is that in the incarnation, Jesus Christ ‘emptied himself’ by temporarily giving up
those divine properties that are inconsistent with being truly human while retaining sufficient divine properties
to remain truly divine. And he gave up those common human properties that are inconsistent with being truly
divine but retained sufficient human properties to remain truly human. Accordingly, in the incarnation, Jesus
Christ was truly human but not a mere human; he was truly divine but not God simpliciter.” (Stephen T. Davis,
‘The Metaphysics of Kenosis’, in The Metaphysics of the Incarnation, ed. Anna Marmodoro and Jonathan Hill
[New York, NY: Oxford Univ Press, 2011], 121).
177
Davis, ‘The Metaphysics of Kenosis’, 124–125.
178
Eccl. 1:2.
179
“Acknowledgement of limits means neither defining ourselves in terms of perfection and thinking
too highly of ourselves as individuals or as a community/nation (uncritically accepting or expecting the
36
does not mean that we ought not strive to overcome or adapt to limits; rather, it highlights that our
interpretations of limits are based on values that are appropriate for ethical and theological reflection,
and that alternate interpretations are both possible and appropriate. … the limits model does not
stipulate that all limits are necessarily ‘normal’ or even ‘good.’180
In other words, it is not a case where “everyone did what was right in their own eyes”181 at
the eschaton. Rather, this paper suggests it might be a case where PWD have their own
preferences regarding the continuing existence of their mere-difference disabilities but
nonetheless saying, “Not my will, but yours be done.”182 Consequently, our individuality is
not annihilated at the eschaton despite complete union and loving submission to the holy
Trinity. In short, we should not be surprised to witness a mixed bag with some PWD whose
mere-difference disabilities remain whilst others removed. So how should we reconceive
humanity’s embodiment and its limits in light of its glorious imago dei?
3.3. Situating Limits Model in Wisdom Anthropology
In the beginning, YHWH “formed the ‫[ אדם‬lit. ‘adam’] from the dust of the ‫[ אדמה‬lit.
‘ground’].”183 Unlike the glorious spiritual nature of the angelic hosts, the ‫ אדם‬has the lowly
embodied nature. This distinction is comparable to gold and dust respectively. Truly, “what is
‫[ אנוֹשׁ‬lit. ‘man’] that you [YHWH] are mindful of him, and ‫[ בנ־אדם‬lit. ‘son of adam’] that
you care for him? Yet you have made him a little lower than ‫[ אלהים‬lit. ‘god’; trans.
American dream) nor defining ourselves based on what we lack and thinking too lowly of ourselves and our
community/nation (falling into despair, cynicism, or apathy).” (Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology,
110–111).
180
Creamer, 109.
181
Judg. 17:6; 21:25.
182
Luke 22:42.
183
Gen. 2:7.
37
‘incorporeal angelic hosts’],184 and crowned him with glory and honour.”185 Why should
anyone care about dust of the ‫?אדמה‬
Surely, far be it from YHWH, the most glorious Creator and Ruler of all, to be
mindful and care for humankind. Yet, unlike all other created beings, which include angelic
hosts, only humankind received God’s “breath of life … [and] became a living being.”186 In
other words, whilst God has “made ἄνθρωπος [lit. ‘man’] for a little while lower than the
angels … [he has] crowned ὕιος ἄνθρωπος [lit. ‘son of man] with glory and honour,
subjecting all things under his feet.”187
The importance of this sort of distinction between angelic spirits and human flesh and blood is found in
other ancient Jewish texts. For example, The Cave of Treasures referenced above relates Satan’s refusal
to obey God’s command to worship Adam as follows: ‘It would be proper that he [i.e., Adam] prostrate
before me, for I am made of fire and spirit. I cannot prostrate before dust which is made from soil’
(Cav. Tr. 2:14).188
In short, humankind’s embodied nature simpliciter is worthless like the dust of the ‫ אדמה‬if
not for divine fiat. “Whilst not the grandest of God’s creations, humans nevertheless stand
out from creation because of the special attention given by God.”189 So how should we hold
the tension between the grandiosity of Gen. 1:26–28 with seeming worthlessness of being
embodied human souls?
Unlike the ideal anthropology of Gen. 1:26–28, wisdom literature’s reflection on
“What is humanity?” begins with lived reality. Ideal anthropology rests upon retribution
theology, which “is the conviction that the righteous will prosper and the wicked will suffer,
184
According to Heiser, there are six usages of ‫ אלהים‬and “[t]hey are all inhabitants of the divine
supernatural realm. In Israelite cosmology, this is the non-human realm; it is the realm of disembodiment … All
‫[ ֱא'ִהים‬i.e., incorporeal angelic hosts] by definition inhabit the supernatural realm. YHWH was an ‫ ֱא'ִהים‬but no
other ‫ ֱא'ִהים‬was YHWH.” (Michael S. Heiser, ‘Monotheism and the Language of Divine Plurality in the
Hebrew Bible and the Dead Sea Scrolls’, Tyndale Bulletin 65, no. 1 [2014]: 99–100). For more, see Michael S.
Heiser, The Unseen Realm: Recovering the Supernatural Worldview of the Bible (Bellingham, WA: Lexham,
2015).
185
Psa. 8:4–5.
186
Gen. 2:7 (contra Gen. 1:1–2:3).
187
Heb. 2:6–8 cites Psa. 8:5–8.
188
David M. Moffitt, Atonement and the Logic of Resurrection in the Epistle to the Hebrews (Leiden:
Brill, 2013), 139.
189
Jason Maston, ‘Introduction’, in Anthropology and New Testament Theology, ed. Jason Maston and
Benjamin E. Reynolds (London: T&T Clark, 2019), 1.
38
both in proportion to their respective righteousness and wickedness.”190 However, lived
reality is a mixed bag, thus the common refrain, “Why does the way of the wicked prosper?
Why do all who are treacherous thrive?”191
Without straightforward answers, one faces the “frustration of divine sovereignty …
human finitude … and … human mortality.”192 The frustration of divine sovereignty comes
from knowing God’s plan will always come to pass and cannot be thwarted.193 The
frustration of human finitude comes from having “an awareness that there is an eternal design
that functions well (‘beautiful in its time’, ‫ ) ָיֶפה ְבִﬠתּוֹ‬but perceiving that design is beyond us
due to our own human limitedness.”194 The frustration of human mortality comes from
knowing “[t]he brutes die even as we; but it is our knowledge that we have to die that makes
us human.”195
All your life, you have toiled the ground, “by the sweat of your face you shall eat
bread until you return to the ground, for out of it you were taken; you are dust, and to dust,
you shall return.”196 Surely, Martin best captures this sentiment with the oft repeated phrase
in his novel, “Valar morghulis.”197 Indeed, all mortals die, even if the dust of the ‫ אדמ‬is
“stardust.”198 Perhaps a life of bliss might urge you to have another tomorrow, whilst a life of
suffering might compel you to wish to have never exited out of the mother’s womb. So, why
continue living if “Death is God [?] … [N]othing faithful, vulnerable, fragile can be durable
190
John H. Walton, ‘Retribution’, in Dictionary of the Old Testament: Wisdom, Poetry & Writings, ed.
Tremper Longman and Peter Enns (Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 2008), 647.
191
Jer. 12:1; See also Job 12:6; 21:7–15; Psa. 73:3–12; Hab. 1:13; Mal. 3:15.
192
Jamie A. Grant, ‘“What Is Man?” A Wisdom Anthropology’, in Anthropology and New Testament
Theology, ed. Jason Maston and Benjamin E. Reynolds (London: T & T Clark, 2019), 7.
193
E.g., Isa. 14:27; Job 42:2; Prov. 19:21; 21:30; Psa. 33:10, 11.
194
Grant, ‘“What Is Man?” A Wisdom Anthropology’, 14.
195
Alexander Smith, Dreamthorp: A Book of Essays Written in the Country (London: Strahan, 1863),
55.
196
Gen. 3:18–19.
197
George R. R. Martin, A Storm of Swords, vol. 3, A Song of Ice and Fire (New York, NY: Bantam
Books, 2000), 45; David J. Peterson, The Art of Language Invention: From Horse-Lords to Dark Elves, the
Words behind World-Building (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2015), 199.
198
Karel Schrijver and Iris Schrijver, Living with the Stars: How the Human Body Is Connected to the
Life Cycles of the Earth, the Planets, and the Stars (Oxford: Oxford Univ Press, 2015), 8–9.
39
or have any true power. Death waits for these things as a cement floor waits for a dropping
light bulb. The brittle shell of glass loses its tiny vacuum with a burst, and that is that.”199
Thus, even if Christians do not believe that death has the final word, must their “hope that is
in”200 Christ be deferred to the end of time? So, what difference does it makes even if the
limits model of the imago dei is rightly situated within wisdom anthropology?
[I]t is appropriate to describe an OT wisdom anthropology as an anthropology of frustration.

Knowledge of the ultimate realities of human origins does little to alleviate the tensions and traumas of
lived human experience. Mystery, as we have seen above, makes the human experience inexplicably
arduous. However, the sages would argue that mystery is far better than randomness. Mystery implies
that there is a plan, even if it is opaque to our eyes. Randomness means that the brutal vicissitudes of
life actually have no meaning.201
In sum, the limits model of the imago dei rightly situates within wisdom anthropology
because it acknowledges the bewildering tension of living as God’s beloved creatures yet
experiencing the limits that accompany different body types.202 Indeed, it is tempting to see
in our eyes that created imago dei as filii dei ought to be limitless (like God?). However, we
ought to imitate Christ, who “[a]lthough he was a Son, he learned obedience through what he
suffered; and having been made perfect, he became the source of eternal salvation for all who
obey him, having been designated by God a high priest according to the order of
Melchizedek.”203 In other words, like little children, we trust in our heavenly father that
all things work together for good for those who love God, who are called according to his purpose. For
those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, in order that he
might be the firstborn within a large family. And those whom he predestined he also called; and those
whom he called he also justified; and those whom he justified he also glorified.204
Thus, whilst we might not have answers to why we have certain body types with their
specific limits, a limits model of the imago dei allows us to “boast all the more gladly of [our]
199
Saul Bellow, Herzog (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1976), 315.
200
1 Pet. 3:15.
201
202
Fergusson similarly proposes to locate the imago dei in wisdom literature. See David Fergusson,
‘Humans Created According to the Imago Dei: An Alternative Proposal’, Zygon 48, no. 2 (1 June 2013): 439–
53.
203
Heb. 5:8–10. See also Mateusz Kusio, ‘“To Become like His Brothers”: Divine Sonship and
Siblingship in Hebrews’, in Son of God: Divine Sonship in Jewish and Christian Antiquity, ed. Garrick V. Allen
et al. (University Park, PA: Eisenbrauns, 2019), 171–87.
204
Rom. 8:28–30.
40
weaknesses [i.e., limits], so that the power of Christ may dwell in [us]. Therefore [we are]
content with weaknesses, insults, hardships, persecutions, and calamities for the sake of
Christ; for whenever [we are] weak, then [we are] strong.”205 In short, the church images and
tabernacles the triune God in her weakness.206
205
2 Cor. 12:9–10.
206
For more, see Thomas E. Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion: A Theology of Disability and
Hospitality (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos, 2008); Marva J. Dawn, Powers, Weakness, and the Tabernacling of
God (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2001); Miroslav Volf, After Our Likeness: The Church as the Image of the
Trinity (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998).
41
4. Conclusion
This paper has set out to investigate if select major interpreters of the imago dei falls
foul of ableism. It concludes that Paul, Augustine, Calvin, and Balthasar do not believe
ablebodiedness is necessary for union with God. However, it remains sceptical that they
believe PWD’s way of living is equally valuable to nondisabled persons because there is lack
of data to claim that they believe mere-difference disabilities might remain at the eschaton.
Thus, readers must grapple with the tension that on the one hand, these Christian thinkers
clearly do not believe disability is a bad-difference. On the other hand, they hesitate to affirm
“the possibility of individuals retaining their disabilities in the eschaton and nevertheless
enjoying complete union with God (and through God to others).”207
Also, whilst these Christian thinkers would largely agree with the seven suggestions
for interpreting the imago dei,208 this paper is unsure if they would agree that disability is a
highly fluid socially constructed category, an open minority where the nondisabled is more
accurately described as temporarily abled. This paper speculates that when their conception
of a limitless and perfect God is taken to its logical end, it leads towards an ableist
interpretation of the imago dei.209 Consequently, this seems to suggest that, for them, being
ablebodied is still more blessed than being disabled. Perhaps some might even argue that
embodiment is not good and we would all shed our corporeality for a nonbodily resurrection
at the eschaton.
Thus, it is in taking our embodiment seriously that this paper argues that Creamer’s
limits model is a much-needed supplement to Calvin’s imago dei as filii dei because being
embodied human souls implies being limited. It hopes to subvert the myth that
ablebodiedness is a permanent state of affair and remind readers that all human persons are
207
Timpe, ‘Defiant Afterlife’, 206.
208
See 2.6. Summary: Imago Dei As Filii Dei.
209
See ‘Limits and God,’ in Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 112.
42
vulnerable to disease, disaster, decay, and death. Here, this paper’s limits model of the imago
dei finds close affinity with wisdom anthropology, which acknowledges the frustration of
experiencing the limits that accompany different body types. However, wisdom anthropology
does not defer all hope to the eschaton. Qoheleth reminds us that life is given by God for us
to enjoy too.210 “So, Qohelet joins Job and the author of Proverbs, in also concluding that,
while life with God is by no means easy or understandable, it is better than life without God.
Life with God offers some hope of ultimate meaning and significance, whereas a life apart
from God inevitably lacks any sense of ultimate meaning (Eccl. 8:12–17).”211
In closing, this paper’s limits model of the imago dei hopes to remind readers to resist
grasping for our own transcendence, but strive to “become as little children,”212 trusting in
the love of our heavenly Father because “[t]he fear of the LORD is the beginning of
knowledge; fools despise wisdom and instruction.”213 Indeed, “YHWH redeems the life of
his servants; none of those who take refuge in him will be condemned.”214 Lastly, it hopes to
generate more conversations about how worship actualises the imago dei in an ecclesiastical
context,215 and how the limits model might fit well with an ethics of human
interdependency.216
210
Eccl. 8:15.
211
212
Matt. 18:3.
213
Prov. 1:7.
214
Psa. 34:22.
215
Benjamin T. Conner, Disabling Mission, Enabling Witness: Exploring Missiology through the Lens
of Disability Studies, Missiological Engagements Series (Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 2018).
216
Sandra Sullivan-Dunbar, Human Dependency and Christian Ethics, New Studies in Christian Ethics
(New York, NY: Cambridge Univ Press, 2017).
43
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A Limits Model of The Imago Dei A Barnes

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University of St Andrews

Submitted for the Degree of M.Litt in Analytic and Exegetical Theology

A Limits Model of the Imago Dei:

Chow Guomin Kevin

Date: 13 Sept 2021

1.1. Barnes-Campbell Hybrid Approach Towards Disability Theology................... 4

1.2. Ableism-Disability Distinction .......................................................................... 6

1.3. Disability and Well-Being.................................................................................. 6

1.4. Well-Being, Imago Dei, and Ableism ................................................................ 7

1.5. Summary .......................................................................................................... 10

2. Select History of Interpretation of the Imago Dei ....................................................... 11

2.1. Middleton: Ancient Near East — Mesopotamian Royal Ideology .................. 12

2.2. Kugler: Early Christianity — Paul ................................................................... 14

2.3. Zwollo: Patristics — Augustine ....................................................................... 16

2.4. Van Vliet: Protestant Reformation — Calvin .................................................. 19

2.5. Robinson: Modern — Balthasar....................................................................... 22

2.6. Summary: Imago Dei As Filii Dei ................................................................... 26

3. A Limits Model of the Imago Dei ............................................................................... 29

3.1. Critique of History of Interpretations of the Imago Dei .................................. 29

3.2. Being Embodied Implies Being Limited.......................................................... 33

3.3. Situating Limits Model in Wisdom Anthropology .......................................... 37

imago dei falls foul of ableism.

model of the imago dei in wisdom anthropology.

love of our heavenly Father.

Disability is complex because it is a highly fluid category whose meaning is tied to

in imagination, this paper proposes a Barnes-Campbell hybrid approach towards disability

overarching question is,

approach towards disability theology. From Barnes, it utilises her ableism-disability

distinction (contra disability-impairment), and “bad-difference” and “mere-difference” to

name normative (e.g., saint-sinner) and non-normative (e.g., blond-brunette) distinctions.4

union with Christ (i.e., ἐν χριστῷ [trans. “being in Christ”]).11

first fruits of those who have died.”12

it follows Barnes’ ableism-disability distinction (contra disability-impairment). The two

advantages of adopting Barnes’ ableism-disability distinction are: (1) “ableism” accurately

Barnes’ distinction is preferable because it is “more parsimonious — we don’t need to

distinguish between separate categories of disability, impairment, handicap, etc.”13 In short,

“disability” refers to a “value-neutral” view of impairment where “a disability is bad (or

good, or indifferent) for you depends on what else it is combined with.”14

1.3. Disability and Well-Being

ablebodiedness is essential to well-being. The social model’s aim is to remove ableism

because full participation in society is crucial to well-being.

because it is not self-evident that ablebodiedness is necessary to well-being. Also, one of

biographically produced.”15 In short, what is being opposed here is ableism, which is

flourishing, which invariably involves one’s teleology.

1.4. Well-Being, Imago Dei, and Ableism

Christians, human flourishing is knowing and being known by God.

blasphemous because it is surely beneath God not to restore everyone to “perfection.”28

“characterisation identity”30 with “numerical identity.”31 Thus, a charitable reading of

difference disability on the other side of eternity.

Although one’s disability is an accidental property and not essential to one’s

Therefore, if our conception of this eschatological perfect body gifted at the

meaning of well-being and human flourishing.37

some are more equal than others because of their ablebodiedness.

Whilst this paper’s Barnes-Campbell hybrid approach is adopted to resist ableist

reconfigure traditional interpretations with Creamer’s “limits model”41 of disability.

imago dei from Evangelicalism’s perspective.42 As it is virtually impossible to be

with seven suggestions for future interpretations of the imago dei.

serve him by “keep[ing] [Jesus’] commandments … abid[ing] in [Jesus] as [he] abides in

2.1. Middleton: Ancient Near East — Mesopotamian Royal Ideology

28 against the context of Gen. 1–11, which is to be seen as a corrective against

Middleton’s main critique against both substantialistic and relational interpretations of

or culturally male/female characteristics.”55