Purposive Rule

The purposive rule or the mischief rule of interpretation originated in Heydon’s case,1 in
1584. In this case, the Barons of the Exchequer resolved “that for the sure and true
interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of
the common law) four things are to be discerned and considered;

(1st) What was the common law before the making of the Act.

(2nd) What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide.

(3rd) What remedy the Parliament had resolved and appointed to cure and the disease of the
Commonwealth. And,

(4th) The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the judges is always to make
such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress
subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro private commodo,
and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of
the Act, pro bono publico”. This principle is also known as the rule of purposive construction.
It has been said in Macmillan v. Dent,2 that in interpreting an Act of Parliament you are
entitled, and in many cases bound, to look to the state of the law at the date of the passing of
the Act, not only the common law but the law as it then stood under previous statutes, in
order to properly interpret the statute in question. Thus, the mischief rule as it was originally
laid down has now been modified to the extent that not only the common law but also the
statute law prior to the Act being interpreted needs to be looked into.

In Kanwar Singh v. Delhi Administration, 3 the officers of the respondents, while rounding up
stray cattle, were beaten up by the appellants the owners of the cattle. When prosecuted for an
offence under Section 332, Indian Penal Code the appellants pleaded right to private defence
of property. They also contended that the cattle were not abandoned, within the meaning of
Section 418, Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 in that abandoned mean completely
leaving a thing as a final rejection of one’s responsibilities so that it becomes ownerless as
have been described in the dictionaries. The Supreme Court, while rejecting this argument,
held that it is not necessary that the dictionary meaning of a word is to be always adhered to
even if the context of an enactment does not so warrant. In the present instance, to know the

1
3 Co. Rep. 7a; 76 ER 637
2
(1907) 1 ch. 107
3
AIR 1965 SC 871
mind of legislature, it is expedient to see what mischief was intended to be suppressed and
what remedy advanced. So interpreted, the word abandoned must mean let loose or left
unattended.

In Ranjit Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra, 4 the appellant was convicted under Section 292,
Indian Penal Code for selling an obscene book titled Lady Chatterley’s Lover. He contended
that the prosecution had a duty to prove guilty mind against him which in this case is the
knowledge that the book contained obscene material. Further, he argued that when there is a
very large number of books in a shop, the shopkeeper is not expected to go through each
book to see as to whether some books contain obscene literature. Rejecting these arguments,
the Supreme Court held that there was no ambiguity in the language of the enactment and that
the meaning of Section 292 is clear and precises. Further, the mischief of sale of obscene
literature was sought to be remedied by the provision and, therefore, the interpretation given
by the appellant was unacceptable.

4
AIR 1965 SC 881