Sec.

1
1. Yakult Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91856, October 5, 1990.
FACTS:

Salvado, an employee of Yakult Philippines, was charged with the crime of

reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries in an information that was filed
on January 6, 1983. Later, on October 19, 1984 a complaint for damages was filed by
Roy Camaso represented by his father, David Camaso, against Yakult Philippines and
Larry Salvado. Decision was rendered in the civil case ordering defendants to pay jointly
and severally the plaintiff. Defendants appealed the judgment challenging the jurisdiction
of the trial court over said civil case.

Petitioners' alleged that the civil action for damages for injuries arising from
alleged criminal negligence of Salvado cannot be filed independently of the criminal
action. Further, it is contended that under Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure such a separate civil action may not be filed unless reservation
thereof is expressly made. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, hence the matter
was brought to SC.
ISSUE:

Whether the offended party effectively reserved their right to institute civil action
separately?
RULING:

Yes. Under the Sec. 1 of Rule 111, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
is impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action. It is also provided that the reservation of the right to institute the separate
civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under
circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such
reservation.

In this case, the offended party has not waived the civil action, nor reserved the
right to institute it separately. Neither has the offended party instituted the civil action
prior to the criminal action. However, the civil action in this case was filed in court
before the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution in the criminal action of
which the judge presiding on the criminal case was duly informed, so that in the
disposition of the criminal action no damages was awarded.

Although the separate civil action filed in this case was without previous reservation in
the criminal case, nevertheless since it was instituted before the prosecution presented
evidence in the criminal action, and the judge handling the criminal case was informed
thereof, then the actual filing of the civil action is even far better than a compliance with
the requirement of an express reservation that should be made by the offended party
before the prosecution presents its evidence. The purpose of this rule requiring
reservation is to prevent the offended party from recovering damages twice for the same
act or omission.
2. Heirs of Simon v. Chan, G.R. No. 157547, February 23, 2011.
FACTS:
The late Eduardo Simon (Simon) was charged with a violation of BP 22. More
than three years later from such filing of criminal action, respondent Elvin Chan filed a
civil action before the MeTC for the collection of the principal amount of ₱336,000.00.
The MeTC issued a writ of preliminary attachment and executed the same. Simon filed
an urgent motion to dismiss to which the lower court resolved to grant the same by reason
of litis pendentia. On appeal, RTC upheld the dismissal of Chan’s complaint. Chan
appealed to the Court of Appeals challenging the propriety of the dismissal of his
complaint on the ground of litis pendentia. The Court of Appeals overturned the RTC
ruling that the changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to
independent civil actions which became effective on December 1, 2000 are applicable to
this case. Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-124, an independent civil action for damages on
account of the fraud committed against respondent Villegas under Article 33 of the Civil
Code, may proceed independently even if there was no reservation as to its filing. Hence
the matter was elevated to Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Chan's civil action to recover the amount of the unfunded check (Civil
Case No. 915-00) was an independent civil action?

RULING:
The court agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that upon filing of the criminal
cases for violation of B.P. 22, the civil action for the recovery of the amount of the
checks was also impliedly instituted under Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure. Under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation
of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action.||| 

However, there is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing check
issued in contravention of BP 22. This is clear from Rule 111|||

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be

deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to
file such civil action separately shall be allowed. 

To repeat, Chan's separate civil action to recover the amount of the check involved in the
prosecution for the violation of BP 22 could not be independently maintained under
both Supreme Court Circular 57-97 and the aforequoted provisions of Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court, notwithstanding the allegations of fraud and deceit.|||

3. Neri v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 202243, August 7, 2013.

FACTS:
Petitioner Romulo L. Neri (Neri) served as Director General of the National Economic
and Development Authority (NEDA) during the administration of former President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. In connection with what had been played up as the botched
Philippine-ZTE National Broadband Network (NBN) Project, the Office of the
Ombudsman (OMB ) filed with the Sandiganbayan two (2) criminal Informations, the
first against Benjamin Abalos and the second Information against Neri, both for violation
of Sec. 3(h), RA 3019. Later, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), OMB, citing
Sec. 22, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court in relation to Sec. 2 of the Sandiganbayan
Revised Internal Rules, moved for the consolidation of these cases stating the reason to
promote a more expeditious and less expensive resolution of the controversy of cases
involving the same business transaction. Neri opposed and argued against consolidation,
and, as he would later reiterate, contended, among other things that: (a) two cases
involved different issues and facts; (b) the desired consolidation is oppressive and
violates his rights as an accused; (c) consolidation would unduly put him at risk as he
does not actually belong to the Abalos group which had been negotiating with the ZTE
officials about the NBN Project; (d) he is the principal witness in the Abalos case; (e) the
trial in the Neri and Abalos cases are both in the advanced stages already; and (f) the
motion is but a ploy to further delay the prosecution of SB-10-CRM-0099, considering
the prosecution’s failure to present any more witnesses during the last two (2) scheduled
hearings. The Sandiganbayan Fifth Division, agreeing with the position thus taken by the
OSP, granted the consolidation of the said cases.

ISSUE:

Whether a consolidation of trial, under the factual and legal milieu it was ordered, is
proper.

RULING:
Jurisprudence has laid down the requisites for consolidation of trial. As held in Caños v.
Peralta,  joint trial is permissible "where the [actions] arise from the same act, event or
transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially on the
same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over the cases to be consolidated
and that a joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the
substantial rights of any of the parties."
More elaborately, joint trial is proper, where the offenses charged are similar, related, or
connected, or are of the same or similar character or class, or involve or arose out of the
same or related or connected acts, occurrences, transactions, series of events, or chain of
circumstances, or are based on acts or transactions constituting parts of a common
scheme or plan, or are of the same pattern and committed in the same manner, or where
there is a common element of substantial importance in their commission, or where the
same, or much the same, evidence will be competent and admissible or required in their
prosecution, and if not joined for trial the repetition or reproduction of substantially the
same testimony will be required on each trial.

Sec. 2
4. San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. v. Javier, G.R. No. 119771, April 24, 1998.
FACTS:
A passenger bus of petitioner San Ildefonso Lines, Inc., (SILI) figured in a vehicular
mishap involving a Toyota Lite Ace Van and injuring the owner Ms. Jao and her two
passengers in the process. The driver of the bus, herein petitioner Eduardo Javier, was
charged with reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical
injuries. Private respondent Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation (PISC), as insurer
of the van and subrogee, filed a case for damages against petitioner SILI with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, seeking to recover the sums it paid the assured under a
motor vehicle insurance policy as well as other damages. After the parties submitted their
pre-trial briefs, petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Civil Proceedings
grounded on the pendency of the criminal case against petitioner Javier in the Pasig RTC
and the failure of respondent PISC to make a reservation to file a separate damage suit in
said criminal action. The motion was denied by the trial court, holding that SILI may
legally institute the present civil action even in the absence of a reservation in the
criminal action because it falls among the exceptions provided by law. After their motion
for reconsideration was denied, petitioners elevated the matter to the Court via a petition
for certiorari which was, however, referred to public respondent Court of Appeals for
disposition. The appellate court eventually upheld the ruling of the trial court. Hence, the
present petition for review.

ISSUE:
If a criminal case was filed, can an independent civil action based on quasi-delict under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code be filed if no reservation was made in the said criminal
case?|

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners. The Court held that it is deducible
from the wording of Section 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court as brought about by the
1988 amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure — particularly the phrase "which
has been reserved" — that the "independent" character of the said civil actions does not
do away with the reservation requirement. Prior reservation is a condition sine qua
non before any of these independent civil actions can be instituted and thereafter have a
continuous determination apart from or simultaneous with the criminal action. Private
respondent PISC, as subrogee under Article 2207 of the Civil Code, is not exempt from
the reservation requirement. PISC merely stepped into the shoes of Ms. Jao (as owner of
the insured van), then it is bound to observe the procedural requirements which Ms. Jao
ought to follow had she herself instituted the civil case.

5. Ching v. Nicdao, G.R. No. 141181, April 27, 2007.

FACTS:
Petitioner Ching, a Chinese national, instituted criminal complaints for eleven
(11) counts of violation of BP 22 against respondent Nicdao. Consequently, eleven (11)
Informations were filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC). At about the
same time, fourteen (14) other criminal complaints, also for violation of BP 22, were
filed against respondent Nicdao by Emma Nuguid, said to be the common law spouse of
petitioner Ching. The Informations were filed with the same MCTC. At her arraignment,
respondent Nicdao entered the plea of "not guilty" to all the charges and a joint trial was
then conducted. The MCTC rendered judgment convicting respondent Nicdao of eleven
(11) counts of violation of BP 22. Incidentally, the MCTC likewise rendered its
judgment convicting respondent Nicdao of the fourteen (14) counts of violation of BP 22
filed against her by Nuguid. On appeal, the RTC in separate Decisions both dated May
10, 1999, affirmed in toto the decisions of the MCTC convicting respondent Nicdao of
eleven (11) and fourteen (14) counts of violation of BP 22.
Respondent Nicdao filed with the CA separate petitions for review of the two
decisions of the RTC. The petition involving the eleven (11) checks was assigned to the
13th Division and the petition involving the fourteen (14) checks was assigned the 6th
Division. Subsequently, the OSG filed a motion for its consolidation praying that the case
pending before the 13th Division be transferred and consolidated with the case before the
6th Division. Respondent Nicdao opposed the consolidation of the two cases. The CA
(13th Division) rendered the assailed Decision acquitting respondent Nicdao of the
eleven (11) counts of violation of BP 22 filed against her by petitioner Ching. On even
date, the CA issued an Entry of Judgment declaring that the above decision has become
final and executory. On appeal, petitioner contended that notwithstanding respondent
Nicdao’s acquittal of the eleven (11) counts of violation of BP 22, she should be held
liable to pay petitioner Ching the amounts of the dishonored checks in the aggregate sum
of ₱20,950,000.00. Respondent Nicdao, on the other hand, argued that the assailed CA
decision has already made a finding to the effect that the fact upon which her civil
liability might arise did not exist.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the offended party may appeal the civil aspect of the case
notwithstanding respondent Nicdao’s acquittal by the CA?

RULING:
Yes. Notwithstanding respondent Nicdao’s acquittal, petitioner Ching is entitled
to appeal the civil aspect of the case within the reglementary period.
It is axiomatic that "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable.” Under the pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of Court, the civil action is
generally impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Under Section 2(b), Rule 111, an
acquittal does not necessarily carry with it the extinguishment of the civil liability of the
accused.
It is also relevant to mention that judgments of acquittal are required to state
"whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the
accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the
judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist.”
Jurisprudence provides that the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal: (a)
where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt; (b) where the court expressly declares
that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature; and (c) where the
civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of which the accused is
acquitted. Thus, under Article 29 of the Civil Code –

ART. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the

ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil
action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such
action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the
defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for
damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.

If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the
court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred
from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
 If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on
the civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of
acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party,
the offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil
aspect of the case within the period therefor.

From the foregoing, petitioner Ching correctly argued that he, as the offended
party, may appeal the civil aspect of the case notwithstanding respondent Nicdao’s
acquittal by the CA. The civil action was impliedly instituted with the criminal action
since he did not reserve his right to institute it separately nor did he institute the civil
action prior to the criminal action.

Sec. 3
- Civil Code Art. 32, 33, 34, & 2176.

Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who
directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another
person shall be liable to the latter for damages:

(1)  Freedom of religion;

(2)  Freedom of speech;

(3)  Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical

publication;

(4)  Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;

(5)  Freedom of suffrage;

(6)  The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

(7)  The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for
public use;

(8)  The right to the equal protection of the laws;

(9)  The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures;

(10)  The liberty of abode and of changing the same;

(11)  The privacy of communication and correspondence;

(12)  The right to become a member of associations or societies for

purposes not contrary to law;

(13)  The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the

government for redress of grievances;

(14)  The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;

(15)  The right of the accused against excessive bail;

(16)  The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be

informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;
 (17)  Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or
from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of
immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person
confessing becomes a State witness;

(18)  Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment,

unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute
which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and

(19)  Freedom of access to the courts.

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the

defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved
party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil
action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted),
and mat be proved by a preponderance of evidence.

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also
be adjudicated.

The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless
his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other
penal statute.

Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action
for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may
be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.

Art. 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or

fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or
property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and
the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The
civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal
proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support
such action.

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there

being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)

Secs. 6-7
6. Dreamwork Construction, Inc. v. Janiola, G.R. No. 184861, June 30, 2009.
FACTS:
Petitioner, through its President, Roberto S. Concepcion, and Vice-President for
Finance and Marketing, Normandy P. Amora, filed a Complaint Affidavit dated
October 5, 2004 for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22(BP 22) against private
respondent Cleofe S. Janiola with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City.
The case was docketed as I.S. No. 04-2526-33. Correspondingly, petitioner filed a
criminal information for violation of BP 22 against private respondent with the MTC
on February 2, 2005 docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, entitled People of the
Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola.
 On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband, instituted a civil
complaint against petitioner by filing a Complaint dated August 2006 for the
rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for
damages. The case was filed with the RTC, Branch 197 in Las Piñas City. Notably, the
checks, subject of the criminal cases before the MTC, were issued in consideration of
the construction agreement.
Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings  in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, alleging that the civil and criminal
cases involved facts and issues similar or intimately related such that in the resolution
of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily
be determined. In other words, private respondent claimed that the civil case posed a
prejudicial question as against the criminal cases.

Petitioner interprets Sec. 7 (a) to mean that in order for a civil case to create a
prejudicial question and, thus, suspend a criminal case, it must first be established that
the civil case was filed previous to the filing of the criminal case. This, petitioner
argues, is specifically to guard against the situation wherein a party would belatedly file
a civil action that is related to a pending criminal action in order to delay the
proceedings in the latter.
On the other hand, private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code which
provides:

Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any

criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall be
governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall promulgate
and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of this Code.
(Emphasis supplied.) HTASIa
Private respondent argues that the phrase "before any criminal prosecution may be
instituted or may proceed" must be interpreted to mean that a prejudicial question exists
when the civil action is filed either before the institution of the criminal action or during
the pendency of the criminal action. Private respondent concludes that there is an
apparent conflict in the provisions of the Rules of Court and the Civil Code in that the
latter considers a civil case to have presented a prejudicial question even if the criminal
case preceded the filing of the civil case.
ISSUE:
Whether the criminal case should be suspended on the basis of prejudicial in civil case?

RULING:
Yes. The Civil Action Must Precede the Filing of the Criminal Action for a Prejudicial
Question to Exist.
The court did not agree with private respondent.
The court ruled that prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must
precede the criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment
can be rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely
connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal
action. In this case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the
complaint in Civil Case No. 7160 filed by the State with the RTC in Civil Case No. 7160.
Thus, no prejudicial question exists.

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two

conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b)
the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed. 
7. Pimentel v. Pimentel, G.R. No. 172060, September 13, 2010.
FACTS:
 On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private
respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel
(petitioner), docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415, before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 223 (RTC Quezon City).
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial
and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v.
Joselito Pimentel)for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of
the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the
proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a
prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the
offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case No.
04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC
Quezon City
ISSUE:
Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question
that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against
petitioner. 

RULING:
NO. The resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the
suspension of the criminal action.

The court ruled that Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question in Criminal
Case for Parricide.

There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are
both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively
resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised
in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case. A prejudicial question is defined as:

. . . one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical

antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend
the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would
be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined. 
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the
crime of parricide, which punishes any person "who shall kill his father, mother, or
child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or
his spouse." The relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes the
crime of parricide from murder  or homicide. However, the issue in the annulment
of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case
for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

8. People v. Arambulo G.R. No.186597, July 17, 2015.

FACTS:
Respondent Victoria R. Arambulo (Victoria), Emerenciana R. Gungab, Reynaldo
Reyes (Reynaldo), Domingo Reyes (Domingo), Rodrigo Reyes and Oscar Reyes (Oscar)
are the heirs of Spouses Pedro C. Reyes and Anastacia Reyes. Anaped Estate Inc.
(Anaped) was incorporated as part of the estate planning or as conduit to hold the
properties of the estate of Pedro Reyes for and in behalf of his heirs.
 Jose Buban (Buban), as Vice-President and General Manager of Anaped Estate
Inc. (Anaped), filed a complaint for estafa against Victoria and her husband Miguel
Arambulo, Jr. (Miguel) before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City. He
alleged that Victoria failed to remit the rentals collected from the time the ownership of
the commercial apartments was transferred to Anaped.
Respondents were charged with estafa. Respondents filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings on the ground of a prejudicial question in view of the pendency of two intra-
corporate cases pending before the RTC of Quezon City and Makati City. One for
accounting of all corporate funds and assets of Anaped, and the other is a petition
questioning the authority of the Board to act for and in behalf of the corporation. They
asserted that the resolution of the SEC cases in their favor particularly the issues of
whether of the group of Rodrigo and Buban are the lawful representatives of the
corporation and whether they are duly authorized to make a demand for remittance would
necessarily result in their acquittal in the criminal case.The trial court granted the motion
for suspension of the proceedings stating that the issue in the SEC cases has a direct link
to the issue of the culpability of the accused for estafa. However, acting on the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioner, the trial court issued an Order setting aside its
previous Order and setting the case for pre-trial. On appeal, the Court of Appeals granted
the petition which REVERSED and SET ASIDE the trial court’s orders and enjoined
from hearing the Criminal Case until the termination of the SEC Case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there exists a prejudicial question which calls for the suspension
of the criminal proceedings before the trial court?

RULING:

Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure prescribes the

elements that must concur in order for a civil case to be considered a prejudicial
question, to wit:
Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. — The elements of
a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Aptly put, the following requisites must be present for a civil action to be
considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal
proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case: (1) the civil case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2)
in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence
of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said
question must be lodged in another tribunal.
As correctly stated by the Court of Appeals, SEC Case No. 05-97-5659 does
not present a prejudicial question to the criminal case for estafa. It is an action for
accounting of all corporate funds and assets of Anaped, annulment of sale, injunction,
receivership and damages. Even if said case will be decided against respondents, they
will not be adjudged free from criminal liability. It also does not automatically follow
that an accounting of corporate funds and properties and annulment of fictitious sale
of corporate assets would result in the conviction of respondents in the estafa case.

With respect to SEC Case No. 03-99-6259, however, we affirm the Court of Appeals'
finding that a prejudicial question exists. The Complaint in SEC Case No. 03-99-6259
prays for the nullification of the election of Anaped directors and officers, including
Buban. Essentially, the issue is the authority of the aforesaid officers to act for and behalf
of the corporation.||| 

Verily, the result of SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 will determine the innocence or guilt of
respondents in the criminal case for estafa.||