NEYPES VS. CA-GR. NO.

 141524, Nov. 14, 2005

FACTS:
Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance
and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC against the private respondents.
Later, in an order, the trial court dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground that the action
had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March
3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for
reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for
reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998,
petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.

On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight
days late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition for
certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of
appeal before the CA. In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed
their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to
run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court
denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27,
1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal.
On September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal
should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998
order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the “final
order” appealable under the Rules.

ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioners file their notice of appeal on time.

HELD:
YES. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days
within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this “fresh period
rule” shall also apply to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule 45. The new rule aims to regiment or
make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion
for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or
resolution.

The SC thus held that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period
of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for
reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules
which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final
order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word “or” signifies disassociation and
independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in
which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of “or” in the above provision supposes that the
notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days
from notice of the “final order,” which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order
denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.

Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the
appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of
appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still
applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion
for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the
assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize
and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have
judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice
fairly.

To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt
of the RTC’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the “final order”)
denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day
period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final
and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.
Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the
order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal
was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed.

NOTE:
The “FRESH PERIOD RULE” do not apply to Rule 64 (Review of Judgments and Final Orders or
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit) because Rule 64 is
derived from the Constitution. It is likewise doubtful whether it will apply to criminal cases.
Mendoza vs. Bautista- GR No. 143666, march 18, 2005

FACTS:
On December 10, 1991, respondent Purita Bautista filed a complaint for annulment of sale and
reconveyance against petitioners Soledad Mendoza and her husband, Peregil T.
Raymundo,  and spouses Philip G. Casiño and Ma. Caridad Zara Casiño before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 164, of Pasig City, docketed as Civil Case No. 61606.  The Register of Deeds and
the City Assessor, both of Mandaluyong City, in their official capacity, were also impleaded by
respondent

February 20, 1992, petitioner Casiño spouses filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res
judicata since a prior case (Civil Case No. 60953) with the same subject matter and cause of
action was dismissed for non-suit.  In opposing the motion, respondent argued that the prior
case was dismissed without prejudice. 

On March 2, 1992, the trial court held that the prior case was dismissed without prejudice and
denied the motion to dismiss. 
On April 29, 1992, upon motion of the respondent,  the trial court declared petitioners in
default for failure to file their responsive pleading. 
On May 18, 1992, petitioners filed a motion to lift the order of default  but the trial court
denied it in its Order dated September 2, 1992. 
On September 23, 1992, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. Then again, the trial
court denied the same in its Order dated October 22, 1992. 

Undaunted, the petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court, docketed as
G.R. No. 111034.  In a Resolution dated October 4, 1993, the Court denied the petition for non-
compliance with procedural requirements, as well as lack of merit thereof.  No motion for
reconsideration was filed by the petitioners and the decision became final and executory on
November 5, 1993.

ISSUE:
WON THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY AND SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT REVERSING THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT

HELD:
Yes. The trial court erroneously concluded that respondent's claim was founded on P.D. No.
1517. We consider this a "fundamental error, that is, such error as being readily seen lies at the
base and foundation of the proceeding and affects the judgment necessarily" or, as otherwise
expressed, "such manifest error as when removed destroys the foundation of the judgment."  It
is an error plain enough to authorize us to notice it, even though this issue was not explicitly
raised by petitioners.
It has been stated that the proviso requiring assignments of error, permitting the court, at its
option, to notice a plain error not assigned, was and is intended, in the interest of justice, to
reserve to the appellate court the right, resting in public duty, to take cognizance of palpable
error on the face of the record and proceedings, especially such as clearly demonstrate that the
suitor has no cause of action.  The rule does not intend that we are to sift the record and deal
with questions which are of small importance, but only to notice errors which are obvious upon
inspection and of a controlling character. The underlying purpose of this reservation in the rule
is to prevent the miscarriage of justice from oversight.

Thus, in the performance of their duties, courts should not be shackled by stringent rules, if to
do so would result in manifest injustice. Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities
that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must be avoided. Hence,
substantive rights must not be prejudiced by a rigid and technical application of the rules.
ATTY. ROGELIO E. SARSABA v. FE VDA. DE TE, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, FAUSTINO
CASTAEDA G.R. No. 175910, 30 July 2009, THIRD DIVISION, (Peralta, J.)

FACTS:
In the case Patricio Sereno v. Teodoro Gasing/Truck Operator, Sereno has been illegally
dismissed and ordered Gasing to pay him his monetary claims in the amount of P43,606.47.
After the Writ of Execution was returned unsatisfied, LA Sancho issued an Alias Writ of
Execution. Accompanied by Sereno and his counsel, Atty. Rogelio E. Sarsaba, levied a Fuso
Truck, which at that time was in the possession of Gasing. The truck was sold at public auction,
with Sereno appearing as the highest bidder.

Meanwhile, Fe Vda. de Te, represented by her attorney-in-fact, Faustino Castaeda, filed with
the RTC, a Complaint for recovery of motor vehicle, damages with prayer for the delivery of the
truck pendente lite against Sarsaba, Sereno, Lavarez and the NLRC

Sarsaba filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds: (1) respondent has no legal
personality to sue, having no real interests over the property subject of the instant complaint;
(2) the allegations in the complaint do not sufficiently state that Vda. De Te has cause of action;
(3) the allegations in the complaint do not contain sufficient cause of action as against him; and
(4) the complaint is not accompanied by an Affidavit of Merit and Bond that would entitle the
respondent to the delivery of the tuck pendente lite. The RTC denied Sarsaba’s Motion to
Dismiss.

Sarsaba filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss the Case on the following grounds:] (1) lack of
jurisdiction over one of the principal defendants; and (2) to discharge respondent's attorney-in-
fact for lack of legal personality to sue. It appeared that the respondent, Fe Vda. de Te, died.
The RTC denied for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

WON Sarsaba avail of the proper remedy in questioning the denial by the RTC of his Omnibus
Motion to Dismiss?

HELD:
No. The Order of the RTC denying Sarsaba’s Omnibus Motion to Dismiss is not appealable even
on pure questions of law. It is worth mentioning that the proper procedure in this case, as
enunciated by this Court, is to cite such interlocutory order as an error in the appeal of the case
-- in the event that the RTC rules in favor of Vda. De Te -- and not to appeal such interlocutory
order. On the other hand, if the petition is to be treated as a petition for review under Rule 45,
it would likewise fail because the proper subject would only be judgments or final orders that
completely dispose of the case.
Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74833, [January 21, 1991], 271 PHIL 89-
101

FACTS:
This appeal concerns the attempt by an American citizen (petitioner Thomas Cheesman) to
annul — for lack of consent on his part — the sale by his Filipino wife (Criselda) of a residential
lot and building to Estelita Padilla, also a Filipino.

On July 31, 1981, Thomas Cheesman brought suit in the Court of First Instance at Olongapo City
against his wife, Criselda, and Estelita Padilla, praying for the annulment of the sale on the
ground that the transaction had been executed without his knowledge and consent.

During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed upon certain facts which were subsequently
set out in a pre-trial Order dated October 22, 1981

The action resulted in a judgment dated June 24, 1982,  declaring void ab initio the sale
executed by Criselda Cheesman in favor of Estelita M. Padilla, and ordering the delivery of the
property to Thomas Cheesman

The judgment was however set aside as regards Estelita Padilla on a petition for relief filed by
the latter, grounded on "fraud, mistake and/or excusable negligence" which had seriously
impaired her right to present her case adequately.

Estelita Padilla filed a supplemental pleading on December 20, 1982 as her own answer to the
complaint, and a motion for summary judgment on May 17, 1983. Although there was initial
opposition by Thomas Cheesman to the motion, the parties ultimately agreed on the rendition
by the court of a summary judgment after entering into a stipulation of facts, at the hearing of
the motion on June 21, 1983

The Trial Court rendered a "Summary Judgment" dated August 3, 1982 declaring "the sale
executed by Criselda Cheesman in favor of Estelita Padilla to be valid," dismissing Thomas
Cheesman's complaint

Thomas Cheesman appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court and availed of the remedy of
appeal, this time to this Court. Here, he argues that it was reversible error for the Intermediate
Appellate Court.

ISSUE:
WON ONLY QUESTIONS OF LAW MAY BE RAISED PETITION FOR REVIEW.

HELD:
Yes. The facts set out in the pleadings or otherwise appearing on record are conclusions or
findings of fact. As distinguished from a question of law which exists "when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts" "there is a question of fact
when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts;"   or when
the "query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the
credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their
relation to each other and to the whole and the probabilities of the situation.

It is axiomatic that only questions of law, distinctly set forth, may be raised in a petition for the
review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals presented to this Court.  As everyone
knows or ought to know, the appellate jurisdiction of this Court is limited to reviewing errors of
law, accepting as conclusive the factual findings of the lower court upon its own assessment of
the evidence. 

The creation of the Court of Appeals was precisely intended to take away from the Supreme
Court the work of examining the evidence, and confine its task to the determination of
questions which do not call for the reading and study of transcripts containing the testimony of
witnesses. The rule of conclusiveness of the factual findings or conclusions of the Court of
Appeals is, to be sure, subject to certain exceptions,  none of which however obtains in the case
at bar.
Banting v. Spouses Maglapuz, G.R. No. 158867, [August 22, 2006], 531 PHIL 101-116

FACTS:
An ejectment complaint was filed with the MeTC Defendants Spouses Reyes and Banting filed
an Answer with Counterclaim where the MeTC rendered judgment in favor of Spouses
Maglapuz.

Spouses Reyes and Banting appealed to the RTC which issued an Order dated September 27,
2002 directing the parties to file their respective memoranda on appeal within thirty (30) days
from receipt thereof. The records reveal that defendants-appellants Spouses Reyes and Banting
received copy of the Order on October 7, 2002. Plaintiffs-appellees Spouses Maglapuz filed a
Memorandum on Appeal. Spouses Reyes and Banting did not file any memorandum.

November 21, 2002, the RTC dismissed the appeal Spouses Reyes and Banting received copy of
the Order on December 4, 2002.

December 2, 2002, Atty. Dionisio Landero, filed an Entry of Appearance with Omnibus Motion
for Reconsideration and to Admit Late Memorandum for Defendants-Appellants.

The RTC rebuffed the motion for reconsideration. It held in its Order of January 7, 2003 that the
delay in filing the memorandum on appeal was due to the inexcusable negligence of both
counsel and clients who were given sufficient notice to file memorandum but, for lack of
coordination, failed to do so.

Through counsel, Spouses Reyes and Banting received copy of the foregoing Order on February
19, 2003 and filed on February 24, 2003 a Petition for Review with the CA and paid on the same
day the corresponding appellate docket fees. They also served copies of the petition on the RTC
and the adverse parties.

The CA dismissed the petition in the herein assailed Resolution dated May 16, 2003.

Petitioners Spouses Reyes and Banting filed a Motion for Reconsideration from the foregoing
resolution but this was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated June 19, 2003. Undaunted,
petitioners' newly appointed counsel filed an Urgent Motion to Admit Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration with a Motion for Reconsideration attached thereto. The CA merely took note
of this motion.

ISSUE:
WON  CA is correct in dismissing the Petition for Review of petitioners.
HELD:
No. The CA did not err in dismissing their Petition for Review for it was not only tardy but also
fatally defective. The appeal was deemed abandoned when petitioners failed to file their
memorandum on appeal despite sufficient time given to them by the court. A memorandum on
appeal or an appeal brief is vital to an appeal for only errors specifically assigned and properly
argued in the brief or memorandum will be considered in the decision on the merits, except
those affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter as well as plain and clerical errors. Hence,
the lack of a memorandum on appeal is ground for the dismissal of an appeal.

The excuse proffered by counsel for petitioners for their failure to file the memorandum of
appeal did not help their cause any. A counsel is required to inquire about the status of the
cases assigned to him and the motions he has filed for a client. He cannot pass this burden to
his client and blame the latter for every mishap. It was therefore due to the inexcusable
negligence of counsel that the memorandum on appeal was not filed on time.

We refer petitioners to their Entry of Appearance with Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration
and to Admit Late Memorandum for Defendants-Appellants. There they specifically argued that
the failure of their counsel to file the memorandum on appeal was "x x x by reason of
his excusable negligence. Petitioners cannot now turn around and claim that the negligence of
their counsel is gross and that they may be said to have been deprived of due process.

All told, the appeal of petitioners fell short even on the merits. It was properly dismissed by the
RTC. The Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the RTC.
De Villa vs. Commendador- 200 SCRA 80

FACTS:
This is a consolidated case of members of the AFP who were charged with violation
of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman)
and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder). The
petitioners were questioning the conduct of the pre-trial investigation conducted where a
motion to bail was filed but was denied.

Before the charges were referred to GCM No. 14, a Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel had been
constituted pursuant to Office Order No. 16 dated January 14, 1990, to investigate the
petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948.
The PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena dated January 30, 1990, individually addressed to the
petitioners, to wit:

On the same date, the petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of the charge sheet, sworn
statements of witnesses, and death and medical certificates of victims of the rebellion.

At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the proceedings on various grounds,
prompting the PTI Panel to grant them 10 days within which to file their objections in writing.

This was done through a Motion for Summary Dismissal dated February 21, 1990.
In a resolution dated February 27, 1990, the PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the
petitioners 5 days from notice to submit their respective counter-affidavits and the affidavits of
their witnesses.

On March 7, 1990, the petitioners verbally moved for reconsideration of the foregoing denial
and the PTI Panel gave them 7 days within which to reduce their motion to writing. This was
done on March 14, 1990.

The petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated
by Article of War 71.

ISSUE:
WON the conduct of the Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.

HELD:
No. We find that the respondents have not acted with grave abuse of discretion or without or
in excess of jurisdiction to justify the intervention of the Court and the reversal of the acts
complained of by the petitioners.

As a rule, civil courts exercise no supervision or correcting power over the proceedings of
courts-martial, and that mere errors in their proceedings are not open to consideration. The
single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction. But it is equally true that in the exercise of their
undoubted discretion, courts-martial may commit such an abuse of discretion — what in the
language of Rule 65 is referred to as "grave abuse of discretion" — as to give rise to a defect in
their jurisdiction. This is precisely the point at issue in this action suggested by its nature as one
for certiorari and prohibition

The referral of charges to a court-martial involves the exercise of judgment and discretion (AW
71). A petition for certiorari, in order to prosper, must be based on jurisdictional grounds
because, as long as the respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in
the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be
reviewed or corrected only by appeal. Even an abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to
justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari.
St. Martin Funeral Homes vs. National Labor Relations Commission and Bienvenido Arcayos G.R.
No. 130866 September 16, 1998

FACTS:
Respondent (Arcayos) was summarily dismissed by St. Martin Funeral Homes for
misappropriating funds worth Php 38,000 which was supposed to be taxes paid to the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR). Alleging that the dismissal was illegal, respondent filed a case against
St. Martin Funeral Homes in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

Petitioner’s (St. Martin Funeral Homes) contention is that the respondent is not an employee
due to the lack of an employer-employee contract. In addition, respondent is not listed on St.
Martin’s monthly payroll.

The labor arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner, confirming that indeed, there was no employer-
employee relationship between the two and hence, there could be no illegal dismissal in such a
situation.

The respondent appealed to the secretary of NLRC who set aside the decision and remanded
the case to the labor arbiter. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied by
the NLRC. Now, petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court – alleging that the NLRC committed
grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s appeal/petition for certiorari was properly filed in the Supreme
Court.

HELD:
No. The new rules no longer provide provisions regarding appellate review for decisions
rendered by the NLRC.However in this case, the Supreme Court took it upon themselves to
review such decisions from the NLRC by virtue of their role under the check and balance system
and the perceived intention of the legislative body who enacted the new rules.

“It held that there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies
on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute; that the
purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and
protect the substantial rights of the parties; and that it is that part of the checks and balances
which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.”
Thus, the petitioners rightfully filed a motion for reconsideration, but the appeal or certiorari
should have been filed initially to the Court of Appeals – as consistent with the principle of
hierarchy of courts. As such, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals.

Seastar Marine Services Inc. v. Bul-an, Jr., G.R. No. 142609, [November 25, 2004], 486 PHIL
330-347

FACTS:
Lucio A. Bul-an, Jr. was hired by Seastar as an Able Seaman for and in behalf of H.S.S. Holland
Ship Service, B.V., on board the M/V Blue Topaz.|||On April 28, 1995, the respondent boarded
the M/V Blue Topaz off the coast of Castellon, Spain, with a complement composed mostly of
Filipinos.

In a Letter dated August 20, 1995 Paruginog reported the respondent's unusual behavior since
boarding the ship, and the circumstances leading to the latter's disembarkation. 

June 30, 1995 executed an Affidavit and return to the Philippines on July 4, 1995 and filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal.

November 19, 1997, the labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of the respondent. The
petitioners assailed the decision of the labor arbiter before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC).

September 15, 1998, the NLRC ruled in favor of the respondent and dismissed the appeal for
lack of merit. The motion for reconsideration of the petitioners was, likewise, denied by the
NLRC for lack of merit in a Resolution dated January 12, 1999.

On April 14, 2000, the petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, as amended, before the Court of Appeals. 

However, the petitioners failed to allege the date when they filed their motion for
reconsideration of the resolution of the NLRC dismissing their petition ruling that it had no
other way of determining the timeliness of the filing of the petition, conformably to Sections 3
and 5, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

The petitioners then filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for Leave to Admit
Amended Petition on June 2, 1999, which the appellate court, likewise, denied on February 29,
2000.

ISSUE:
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT REVERSING THE NLRC AND FINDING THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS DISMISSED FOR JUST AND VALID CAUSE NOTWITHSTANDING THAT
THE LABOR ARBITER FAILED TO CONDUCT TRIAL ON THE MERITS ALTHOUGH THE FACTS AND
ISSUES INVOLVED WARRANT SUCH TRIAL

RULING:
No. It is clear that the labor arbiter enjoys wide discretion in determining whether there is a
need for a formal hearing in a given case. . . . [H]e or she may use all reasonable means to
ascertain the facts of each case without regard to technicalities. The case may be decided on
the basis of the pleadings and other documentary evidence presented by the parties. In the
absence of any palpable error, arbitrariness or partiality, the method adopted by the labor
arbiter to decide a case must be respected by the NLRC. Thus, a formal trial-type hearing is not
at all times and in all instances essential to due process. It is enough that the parties are given a
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to
present supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based.

Should the parties fail to agree upon an amicable settlement, either in whole or in part, during
the conferences, the Labor Arbiter shall issue an order stating therein the matters taken up and
agreed upon during the conferences and directing the parties to simultaneously file their
respective verified position papers. TSHE

Section 4. Determination of Necessity of Hearing. — Immediately after the submission

by the parties of their position papers/memorandum, the Labor Arbiter shall motu
proprio determine whether there is a need for a formal trial or hearing. At this stage, he
may, at his discretion and for the purpose of making such determination, ask
clarificatory questions to further elicit facts or information, including but not limited to
the subpoena of relevant documentary evidence, if any from any party or witness.
Section 5. Period to Decide Case. — (a) Should the Labor Arbiter find it necessary to
conduct a hearing, he shall issue an order to that effect setting the date or dates for the
same which shall be determined within ninety (90) days from initial hearing.
He shall render his decision within thirty (30) calendar days, without extension, after the
submission of the case by the parties for decision, even in the absence of stenographic
notes: Provided, however, that OFW cases shall be decided within ninety (90) calendar
days after the filing of the complaint and the acquisition by the labor arbiter of
jurisdiction over the parties.
(b) If the Labor Arbiter finds no necessity of further hearing after the parties have
submitted their position papers and supporting documents, he shall issue an Order to
that effect and shall inform the parties, stating the reasons therefore. In any event, he
shall render his decision in the case within the same period provided in paragraph (a)
hereof.
LTS Philippines Corp. v. Maliwat , G.R. No. 159024, [January 14, 2005], 489 PHIL 230-236

FACTS: February 12, 2001 to February 23, 2001, respondents Jocelyn D. Maliwat, Branch
Manager of LTS Philippines Corporation, Myra Estanislao, its Service Center Manager, Rhodelia
Bautista, its Branch Manager for its Calamba, Laguna Branch, and Ma. Theresa Rolle, its
Regional Manager, received separate notices of termination of employment from their
employer, petitioner LTS Philippines Corporation. ||| 

The respondents then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, damages and accrued monetary
benefits against their employer and Julie Evangelista with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC).

After due proceedings, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment, on November 21, 2001, in favor
of the respondents.

On appeal by the petitioners to the NLRC, the latter rendered judgment 2 on September 30,
2002 affirming with modification the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

The petitioners received a copy of the decision of the NLRC on October 28, 2002 and filed their
motion for reconsideration of the said decision on November 7, 2002.

On November 22, 2002, the NLRC resolved to deny the motion of the petitioners. The latter
received a copy of the resolution on January 16, 2003. However, the petitioners filed their
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) only on March 18, 2003.

The CA issued a Resolution on March 21, 2003 dismissing the petition for having been filed
beyond the reglementary period therefor.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari.

RULING:
No. the CA should not be faulted for dismissing the petition for certiorari of the petitioners for
having been filed one (1) day beyond the reglementary period therefor. As a rule, periods
prescribed to do certain acts must be followed with fealty as they are designed primarily to
speed up the final disposition of the case. Such reglementary periods are indispensable
interdictions against needless delays and for an orderly discharge of judicial business. 
Deviations from the rules cannot be tolerated. More importantly, its observance cannot be left
to the whims and caprices of the parties. What is worrisome is that parties who fail to file their
pleading within the periods provided for by the Rules of Court, through their counsel's
inexcusable neglect, resort to beseeching the Court to bend the rules in the guise of a plea for a
liberal interpretation thereof, thus, sacrificing efficiency and order. As we emphasized
in Sublay v. NLRC,  we cannot respond with alacrity to every claim of injustice and bend
the rules to placate vociferous protestors crying and claiming to be victims of a wrong.|||

We are not swayed by the petitioners' plea for a deviation from the application of the
reglementary period for filing their petition for certiorari, on their argument that the NLRC
erred in ordering them to pay separation pay to the respondents contrary to and prescinding
from the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter. We have reviewed the records and find that the
errors ascribed by the petitioners to the NLRC are mere errors of judgment and not errors of
jurisdiction. 
Professional Regulation Commission v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 117817 & 118437, [July 9,
1998], 354 PHIL 162-177

FACTS:
On 28 July 1993 the trial court granted a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction directing
petitioners to administer the oath to the six (6) private respondents and to register them as
professional physicians in the rolls of the Professional Regulation Commission.||| 

Petitioners questioned the issuance of the writ before the Court of Appeals. In its decision of 21
October 1993 respondent appellate court nullified the injunctive writ issued by the lower court.

Private respondents led by Arlene de Guzman sought recourse in this Court through a petition
for review on certiorari. In a resolution dated 23 May 1994 the Court denied the petition for
failure to sufficiently show that respondent Court of Appeals had committed any reversible
error in rendering the questioned judgment setting aside the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction earlier issued in favor of the medical examinees. 

On 13 December 1993 counsel for petitioners did not appear and petitioners were declared to
have waived their right to cross examination. On 27 January 1994, petitioners' counsel filed a
manifestation and motion stating the reasons for her nonappearance and prayed that she be
furnished the 13 December 1993 order and that the case be set anew for cross examination of
witnesses. 

On 21 February 1994 petitioners proceeded to file a motion for reconsideration which the
Branch Clerk of Court refused to accept upon instruction of Judge Nitafan that such motion
should be accompanied not by proof of mailing but by proof of personal service. 

On 28 February 1994 the trial court denied the motion on the ground that the adverse counsel
was notified thereof less than three (3) days prior to the hearing.||| 

On 31 August 1994 the appellate court declared the questioned orders of the trial court null
and void. 
On 25 October 1994 the appellate court denied the motion for reconsideration on the ground
that the prayers for nullification of the orders of the trial court and the dismissal of the
mandamus petition were inconsistent reliefs.

Through the petition in G.R. No. 118437 filed on 17 January 1995 against Judge Nitafan and
private respondents, petitioners seek to nullify the order of respondent Judge dated 2
December 1994 in Civil Case No. 93-66530 denying petitioners' motion for his inhibition, as well
as his decision of 19 December 1994 granting the petition for mandamus in favor of respondent
examinees. Petitioners contend that respondent Judge should have recused himself from
further acting on Civil Case No. 93-66530 because of his evident partiality towards respondents.
Additionally, he should not have decided the mandamus case with amazing speed since G.R.
No. 117817 was initiated precisely to review the 31 August 1994 decision of respondent Court
of Appeals.
On the other hand, respondents urge the Court to declare petitioners guilty of forum shopping
for filing this petition despite the pendency of their appeal before respondent appellate Court
in CA — G.R. SP No. 37283.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the remedies of an ordinary appeal and certiorari is alternative or successive.

HELD:
No. It is settled that the remedies of an ordinary appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive,
not alternative or successive. We cannot apply the Lansang Jr. case to the present petition
because recourse to certiorari is no longer warranted. There is no showing of a need to
promptly extricate petitioners from the unfavorable judgment of the trial court.  Rather we find
that their perfected appeal can adequately grant the relief they seek. We therefore apply the
settled rule mentioned earlier that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive
and not alternative or successive.

Furthermore we note that while petitioners claim that their appeal "would not constitute a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy," they did not see fit to withdraw or abandon it after filing
the instant petition. In fact, their appeal is still pending resolution in the appellate court. As it is,
respondent court and this Court are reviewing the same decision of the trial court at the same
time. There is thus the distinct possibility that the appellate court may reverse the lower court.
In such event, its action could collide with a ruling finding no merit in petitioners' arguments
before this Court. Such a situation would lead to absurdity and confusion in the ultimate
disposition of the case. This possibility must be avoided at all costs.  A party is not allowed to
pursue simultaneous remedies in two (2) different fora because such practice works havoc on
orderly judicial procedure.

While counsel may owe entire devotion to the interest of her client, her privilege to practice
law carries with it certain correlative duties to the court one of which is to assist in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice and not saddle the court with multiple actions arising
from the same cause. A lawyer who performs her duty with diligence and candor not only
protects the interest of her client, she also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar and
helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal professions.
Novateknika Land Corp. v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 194104, [March 13, 2013], 706
PHIL 414-427

FACTS: On March 8, 2010, the Regional Trial Court of Manila issued the Notice of Extrajudicial
Sale, announcing the sale of NLC properties on May 5, 2010. The properties were awarded to
PNB, as the sole bidder, and the bid amount was applied in partial satisfaction of the
outstanding obligation of the borrowers.

NLC filed an action for injunction with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and/or a writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) in the Complaint,  dated May 5, 2010

In its May 20, 2010 Order,  the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Manila (RTC), granted NLC's
application for the issuance of a TRO, preventing PNB from consummating the public sale and
from doing any act that would tend to impede, hamper, limit or adversely affect its full
enjoyment of its ownership of the subject properties

Later, on June 22, 2010, the RTC issued the Order denying NLC's prayer for injunctive relief,
pronouncing that the evidence so far presented by NLC did not warrant the issuance of a WPI
because it failed to show that the right alleged in its complaint was clear and unmistakable. 

Aggrieved, NLC elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. In its Resolution, dated July 19, 2010, the CA dismissed the petition outright
for failure of NLC to file a motion for reconsideration before the RTC. The CA noted that NLC
simply averred that the filing of the said motion was unnecessary because of the alleged
extreme urgency for the CA to annul the questioned order of the trial court. The CA then
reiterated the rule that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition
to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner was justified in elevating the case to the CA without filing the requisite
motion for reconsideration before the RTC.

HELD:
No. Unmistakably, before a petition for certiorari can prosper, the petitioner must be able to
show, among others, that he does not have any other "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law." This remedy referred to in Section 1 of Rule 65 is a motion for
reconsideration of the questioned order. 
Well established is the rule that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to
the filing of a special civil action for certiorari, subject to certain exceptions. None of the
exceptions, however, is present in this case

Jurisprudence is replete with decisions which reiterate that before filing a petition
for certiorari in a higher court, the attention of the lower court should be first called to its
supposed error and its correction should be sought. Failing this, the petition
for certiorari should be denied.  The reason for this is to afford the lower court the opportunity
to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it through a re-examination of the legal and
factual aspects of the case. The petitioner's disregard of this rule deprived the trial court the
right and the opportunity to rectify an error unwittingly committed or to vindicate itself of an
act unfairly imputed.

At any rate, even if the Court allows the premature recourse to certiorari without the petitioner
having filed a motion for reconsideration in the trial court, the petition would still fail. Nothing
is more settled than the principle that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 will
prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to exist.||| 

Even if this Court permits the petitioner to dispense with the requirement of filing a motion for
reconsideration before resorting to certiorari, the petitioner still cannot be granted the
injunctive relief it prayed for because the Court finds no abuse of discretion on the part of the
RTC in denying the application for a writ of preliminary injunction by the petitioner.
People v. Bitanga, G.R. No. 159222, [June 26, 2007], 552 PHIL 686-698

FACTS: On February 29, 2000, the RTC promulgated in absentia a Decision finding Bitanga guilty
as charged for estafa.

On January 28, 2002, Bitanga filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with
Prayer for Other Reliefs 11 on the ground that extrinsic fraud was allegedly perpetuated upon
him by his counsel of record, Atty. Benjamin Razon.  He alleged that he received copy of the
February 29, 2000 RTC Decision only on December 13, 2001.||| 

The CA granted the Petition for Annulment of Judgment in the March 31, 2003 Decision and
denied the People's Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution of July 18, 2003.||| 

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals have erred in granting the Petition for Annulment of
Judgement.

HELD:
Yes. The Petition for Annulment of Judgment of the February 29, 2000 Decision of the RTC in
Criminal Case No. 103677 was therefore an erroneous remedy. It should not have been
entertained, much less granted, by the CA. While it is true that neglect or failure of counsel to
inform his client of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal will not
justify setting aside a judgment that is valid and regular on its face, this rule is not unbending
and admits of exceptions as where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of
due process. This Court believes, and so holds, that the enumerated deplorable acts and
omissions of petitioner's counsel on record, finding no abatement either later from his court-
appointed lawyer, taken together, more than suffice to paint a clear picture of delinquency,
gross negligence and recklessness constitutive of extrinsic fraud.

Extrinsic fraud is that perpetrated by the prevailing party, not by the unsuccessful party's own
counsel.  As a general rule, counsel's ineptitude is not a ground to annul judgment, for the
latter's management of the case binds his client.  The rationale behind this rule is that, once
retained, counsel holds the implied authority to do all acts which are necessary or, at least,
incidental to the prosecution and management of the suit in behalf of his client, and any act
performed by said counsel within the scope of such authority is, in the eyes of the law,
regarded as the act of the client himself. There is an exception to the foregoing rule, and that is
when the negligence of counsel had been so egregious that it prejudiced his client's interest
and denied him his day in court.  For this exception to apply, however, the gross negligence of
counsel should not be accompanied by his client's own negligence or malice.  Clients have the
duty to be vigilant of their interests by keeping themselves up to date on the status of their
case.  Failing in this duty, they suffer whatever adverse judgment is rendered against them.||| 

Grande v. University of the Philippines, G.R. No. 148456, [September 15, 2006], 533 PHIL 366-
374

FACTS: The Court of Appeals in its Decision 1 dismissed the appeal interposed by petitioners
from the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City dismissing their complaint for
recovery of ownership and reconveyance of the subject property on the ground of lack of cause
of action. The RTC Decision concluded that the subject property was covered by a Torrens title
as early as 1914 and it was only in 1984, or 70 years after the issuance of the title, that
petitioners filed their action for recovery of ownership and reconveyance. During the
interregnum, ownership of the property was acquired by respondent University of the
Philippines as an innocent purchaser for value, so the RTC found and the appellate court
upheld.
Petitioners, through their former counsel, received a copy of the Court of Appeals' Decision on
28 December 1998, and a copy of the Resolution denying their motion for reconsideration on
17 March 2000. However, petitioners failed to elevate the rulings of the Court of Appeals to this
Court. They claim that their former counsel had neglected to inform them of the receipt of the
Resolution denying their motion for reconsideration.  As a result, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 14 December 1999 became final and executory as of 12 April 2000, with the
corresponding entry of judgment duly issued. 
It was only on 29 June 2001, more than a year after the appellate court's rulings had become
final, that petitioners filed with this Court the present "Petition for Annulment of Judgment,"
seeking the nullification of the rulings. Respondent points out that the procedure undertaken
by petitioners finds no sanction under the Rules of Court. IT

ISSUE:
Whether the Petition for Annulment of Judgement also pertains to the nullification of the CA’s
decisions.

HELD:
No. The annulment of judgments, as a recourse, is equitable in character, allowed only in
exceptional cases, as where there is no available or other adequate remedy.  It is generally
governed by Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 1 thereof expressly states
that the Rule "shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders
and resolutions in civil action of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through
no fault of the petitioner."  Clearly, Rule 47 applies only to petitions for the nullification of
judgments rendered by regional trial courts filed with the Court of Appeals. It does not pertain
to the nullification of decisions of the Court of Appeal.

Moreover, if what is desired is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals, which
petitioners could have been entitled to under ordinary circumstances, the only mode of appeal
cognizable by this Court is "a petition for review on certiorari."  That is governed by and
disposed of in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Constitution, laws, Rules 45; 48;
Sections 1, 2, and 5 to 11 of Rules 51; 52; and 56.  Notably, Rule 47 on annulment of judgments
has nothing to do with the provisions which govern petitions for review on certiorari. Thus, it is
totally inappropriate to extend Rule 47 to the review of decisions of the Court of Appeals. Then
too, appeals by certiorari to this Court must be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment or the final order or resolution appealed from.  Even if we were to treat the petition
for annulment of judgment as an appeal by certiorari, the same could not be given due course
as it had been filed several months after the Court of Appeals decision had already lapsed to
finality.
JOVEN vs. CALILUNG G.R. No. 140984

FACTS: Federico S. Calilung filed an unlawful detainer case against Emiliano D. Joven before the
MTCC of Angeles. The complaint prayed that Joven, his agents, assigns, employees, and all
found in the leased premises be ordered to vacate and restore possession of the property to
Calilung. He further prayed that Joven be directed to pay just and reasonable compensation for
the use of the leased premises pending trial of the case in the amount of PHP 110,000/month
plus interest of 25% per annum with an escalation of 10% for each passing year from the time
the complaint was filed.

On December 4, 1998, Judge Suriaga of the MTCC rendered judgment in favor of Calilung.
Aggrieved, Joven elevated the matter before the RTC on December 23, 1998. Despite the notice
of appeal, Calilung filed a motion for execution before the MTCC, and the court denied said
motion.

Upon the transmittal of the records of the case, Calilung field a motion to dismiss, which was
subsequently denied. Calilung then gave a sworn statement to the NBI denouncing Judge
Suriaga for demanding and receiving PHP 300,000 from him in consideration of a favorable
decision before the RTC. He reported that Suriaga was the one who approached him first and
assured a favorable judgment for PHP 250,000. Judge Suriaga was subsequently arrested. He
and one other judge was placed under preventive suspension. In view of such preventive
suspension, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Ofelia Tuazon-Pinto, acted as the judge over the
pending appeal for the ejectment case was lodged. Joven eventually got a hold of the NBI
report made by Calilung.

This prompted Joven to file an Annulment of Judgment before the RTC of Angeles which sought
to annul the judgment in the ejectment case due to extrinsic fraud. The RTC promulgated a
judgment affirming the judgment rendered by Judge Suriaga in toto, dismissing the petition for
annulment of judgment. Hence, the present petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE JUDGMENT OF THE MTCC SHOULD BE ANNULLED BY VIRTUE OF
EXTRINSIC FRAUD COMMITTED BY JUDGE SURIAGA.

HELD:
The Court held in the affirmative. The judgment rendered by Judge Suriaga, being irrevocably
tainted with corruption, must be annulled. Extrinsic fraud has been explained in wise, in recent
jurisprudence: It is only extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud,
however, that can serve as a basis for the annulment of judgment. Fraud has been regarded as
extrinsic or collateral, within the meaning of the rule, 'where it is one the effect of which
prevents a party from having a trial, or a real contest, or from presenting all of his case to the
court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but of the
manner in which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy. In
other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation
which is committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has been
prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by
his opponent. In the case at bar, it is evident that extrinsic fraud has been committed against
Joven.

The receipt of the money demanded by Suriaga from Calilung is clearly an act used to procure a
judgment without a fair deliberation of the controversy. It was a fraudulent act of the prevailing
party done outside of the trial which could not be litigated and determined at the trial of the
case. This Court will not condone the inappropriate acts of a dismissed member of the judiciary
by permitting a patently void decision to attain legitimacy by recognizing such judgment as
binding and conferring legal rights to the parties involved. The Court will not consent to any act
of impropriety that may taint the integrity of the judiciary as well as corrode the people's
respect for the law.

TOLENTINO vs. LEVISTE G.R. No. 156118

TOPIC: Grounds for Annulment of Judgments or Final Orders and Resolutions

DOCTRINE: Under the Rules, an action for annulment of judgment may only be availed of based
on the following grounds: 1. Extrinsic fraud, and 2. Lack of jurisdiction The negligence of the
petitioners’ counsel does not amount to extrinsic fraud. Well-settled is the rule that the client is
bound by the counsel’s actions, unless the counsel acts so grossly negligent that fault can only
be attributed to the latter. After petitioners have endorsed the summons to said lawyer, they
did not exert any effort to follow up the developments of the suit. Hence, they were declared in
default and judgment was rendered against them.

FACTS:
On October 18, 1996, respondent spouses Gerardo Cinco, Jr. and Pamela Cinco filed a
complaint for specific performance with damages against petitioners Tempus Place Realty
Management Corporation and Pablo T. Tolentino. The complaint alleged that respondents
purchased a condominium unit from the petitioners, located at Tempus Place Condominium II,
Diliman, Quezon City. Despite the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale and the delivery of
the owner’s copy of the condominium certificate of title, petitioners failed to deliver possession
of the unit because they have allegedly leased the same to a third party.
The complaint also alleged that the petitioners refused to pay the capital gains tax and
documentary stamp tax on the transaction, and execute the necessary board resolution in
order to turn over the unit. As such, the respondents therefore prayed for PHP 20,000/month
in rentals from May 1994 until such time that the unit is delivered to them. They also prayed for
moral damages.

Petitioners failed to file their answer to the complaint. As such, Judge Oscar Leviste issued an
order on January 17, 1997 granting respondent’s motion to declare petitioners in default. After
reception of evidence, a decision by the RTC was made on April 15, 1997, in favor of the
respondents.

Petitioners thereafter filed a motion for new trial on the ground of accident, mistake and
excusable negligence because of their former counsel. The court denied such motion. On
November 3, 1997, the petitioners, through new counsel, filed an appeal against the decision
rendered by the RTC. The CA, however, dismissed the same because the petitioners failed to
file the requisite appeal brief.

The decision became final and executory on March 26, 1999 and was recorded in the book of
entries.

On July 4, 2000, petitioners filed with the CA an action for annulment of judgment alleging
several grounds.

On April 23, 2002, the CA issued a decision modifying the RTC and explained that the
annulment of judgment may be based on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, and
it is important that petitioner failed to move for new trial, appeal, or file a petition for relief or
other appropriate actions to assail the decision without fault on the part of the petitioner.

Therefore, the action for the annulment of judgment was dismissed. Respondents moved for
reconsideration of the decision of the CA but it was only partly granted, and the judgment was
not annulled.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE JUDGMENT RENDERED BY THE RTC SHOULD BE ANNULLED BY THE CA.

HELD:
The Court held in the negative. Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or
could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief. Under the Rules, an
action for annulment of judgment may only be availed of based on the following grounds: 3.
Extrinsic fraud, and 4. Lack of jurisdiction In the present case, the petitioners did not allege nor
present evidence of fraud or deception employed on them by the respondents to deprive them
of the opportunity to present their case in court. hey, however, assert that the negligence of
their former counsel in failing to file the appeal brief amounts to extrinsic fraud which would
serve as basis for their petition for annulment of judgment.

We disagree. The Court has held that when a party retains the services of a lawyer, he is bound
by his counsel's actions and decisions regarding the conduct of the case. This is true especially
where he does not complain against the manner his counsel handles the suit. After petitioners
have endorsed the summons to said lawyer, they did not exert any effort to follow up the
developments of the suit.

Hence, they were declared in default and judgment was rendered against them. Ergo, the client
is bound by the mistakes of the counsel unless the counsel himself is grossly negligent.
Furthermore, it is provided in Section 2 of Rule 47 that extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid
ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition
for relief. In other words, it is effectively barred if it could have been raised as a ground in an
available remedial measure. The records show that after petitioners learned of the judgment of
default, they filed a motion for new trial on the ground of extrinsic fraud. It was however
denied by the trial court. They filed a notice of appeal thereafter. Hence, they are now
precluded from alleging extrinsic fraud as a ground for their petition for annulment of the trial
court decision.

National Housing Authority v. Evangelista, G.R. No. 140945, [May 16, 2005], 497 PHIL 762-774

FACTS: On 1991 that petitioner filed Civil Case No. Q-91-10071 with Sarte, the City Treasurer of
Quezon City and the Quezon City Register of Deeds, as defendants. While the case was pending,
Sarte executed in favor of respondent Jose Evangelista, a Deed of Assignment dated December
2, 1994, covering Lot 1-A.  TCT No. 108070 was cancelled and TCT No. 122944 was issued in the
name of respondent on December 21, 1994. Subsequently, the Register of Deeds annotated on
TCT No. 122944 an Affidavit of Adverse Claim of petitioner.

On May 1, 1995, petitioner filed a motion for leave to file supplemental complaint in Civil Case
No. Q-91-10071, seeking to include respondent Evangelista, Northern Star Agri-Business
Corporation and BPI Agricultural Development Bank as defendants. The proposed additional
defendants were the subsequent purchasers of Lots 1-A and 1-B.  The trial court, however,
denied the motion in its Order dated May 17, 1995.

Thus, petitioner, on May 31, 1995, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch
82) a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Assignment, Deed of Absolute Sale, Real Estate
Mortgage, Cancellation of TCT Nos. 122944 and 126639, and Damages, against Sarte,
respondent Evangelista, Northern Star Agri-Business Corporation, BPI Agricultural Development
Bank and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-23940.  But the
trial court dismissed without prejudice said case on October 23, 1995, on the ground of the
pendency of Civil Case No. Q-91-10071
Respondent then filed with the CA a petition for annulment of the trial court's judgment,
particularly paragraph 3 of the dispositive portion, referring to the nullity of any transfer,
assignment, sale or mortgage made by Sarte.

The CA granted the petition and declared null and void paragraph 3 of the dispositive portion of
the trial court's decision insofar as petitioner's title to the property is concerned. 

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in annulling paragraph 3 of the trial court's decision on grounds of
lack of jurisdiction and lack of due process of law.

HELD:
No. Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional
cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy.  Jurisprudence and Section 2,
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court lay down the grounds upon which an action for annulment of
judgment may be brought, i.e., (1) extrinsic fraud, and (2) lack of jurisdiction or denial of due
process. 
Lack of jurisdiction refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or
over the subject matter of the claim, and in either case, the judgment or final order and
resolution are void.  A trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant either
by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of
summons. 
In this case, it is undisputed that respondent was never made a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-
10071. It is basic that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and
strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the court.  Yet, the assailed
paragraph 3 of the trial court's decision decreed that "(A)ny transfers, assignment, sale or
mortgage of whatever nature of the parcel of land subject of this case made by defendant
Luisito Sarte or his/her agents or assigns before or during the pendency of the instant case are
hereby declared null and void, together with any transfer certificates of title issued in
connection with the aforesaid transactions by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City who is
likewise ordered to cancel or cause the cancellation of such TCTs." Respondent is adversely
affected by such judgment, as he was the subsequent purchaser of the subject property from
Sarte, and title was already transferred to him. It will be the height of inequity to allow
respondent's title to be nullified without being given the opportunity to present any evidence in
support of his ostensible ownership of the property. Much more, it is tantamount to a violation
of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property without due
process of law.  Clearly, the trial court's judgment is void insofar as paragraph 3 of its dispositive
portion is concerned.
Diona v. Balangue, G.R. No. , [January 7, 2013], 701 PHIL 19-37

FACTS:
On March 2, 1991, respondents obtained a loan of P45,000.00 from petitioner payable in six
months and secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over their 202-square meter property located in
Marulas, Valenzuela and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. V-12296.  When the
debt became due, respondents failed to pay notwithstanding demand. Thus, on September 17,
1999, petitioner filed with the RTC a Complaint.

In a Decision dated October 17, 2000, the RTC granted petitioner's Complaint

Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution, alleging that respondents did not
interpose a timely appeal despite receipt by their former counsel of the RTC's Decision on
November 13, 2000. Before it could be resolved, however, respondents filed a Motion to Set
Aside Judgment dated January 26, 2001

On March 16, 2001, the RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Execution to implement its
October 17, 2000 Decision. However, since the writ could not be satisfied, petitioner moved for
the public auction of the mortgaged property,  which the RTC granted.  In an auction sale
conducted on November 7, 2001, petitioner was the only bidder in the amount of P420,000.00.
Thus, a Certificate of Sale was issued in her favor and accordingly annotated at the back of TCT
No. V-12296.||| 

Respondents then filed a Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and to Set Aside Execution
Sale dated December 17, 2001. In an Order dated May 7, 2002, the RTC granted respondents'
motion.

Displeased with the RTC's May 7, 2002 Order, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. On August 5, 2003, the CA rendered
a Decision declaring that the RTC exceeded its jurisdictionTaking their cue from the Decision of
the CA in the special civil action for certiorari, respondents filed with the same court a Petition
for Annulment of Judgment and Execution Sale with Damages. Initially, the CA denied due
course to the Petition.  Upon respondents' motion, however, it reinstated and granted the
Petition. In setting aside portions of the RTC's October 17, 2000 Decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not  THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS
ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT GRANTED RESPONDENTS' PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT
AS A SUBSTITUTE OR ALTERNATIVE REMEDY OF A LOST APPEAL.

HELD:
No. A Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy
granted only under exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, has
failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies. Said rule explicitly provides that it is not available as a substitute for a
remedy which was lost due to the party's own neglect in promptly availing of the same. "The
underlying reason is traceable to the notion that annulling final judgments goes against the
grain of finality of judgment. Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and
it is essential to an effective administration of justice that once a judgment has become final,
the issue or cause involved therein should be laid to rest." 
While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may
be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence
recognizes lack of due process as additional ground to annul a judgment.  In Arcelona v. Court
of Appeals,  this Court declared that a final and executory judgment may still be set aside if,
upon mere inspection thereof, its patent nullity can be shown for having been issued without
jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law.

In fine, respondents did not lose the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief and other
remedies through their own fault. It can only be attributed to the gross negligence of their
erstwhile counsel which prevented them from pursuing such remedies. We cannot also blame
respondents for relying too much on their former counsel. Clients have reasonable expectations
that their lawyer would amply protect their interest during the trial of the case.  Here,
"[r]espondents are plain and ordinary people . . . who are totally ignorant of the intricacies and
technicalities of law and legal procedures. Being so, they completely relied upon and trusted
their former counsel to appropriately act as their interest may lawfully warrant and require.||| 

A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the maintenance
and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, to the end that
nothing can be taken or withheld from his client except in accordance with the law."  Judging
from how respondents' former counsel handled the cause of his clients, there is no doubt that
he was grossly negligent in protecting their rights, to the extent that they were deprived of
their property without due process of law.